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A History of Cyprus

Volume 3: The Frankish Period, 1432-1571

George Hill

Cambridge University Press

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A HISTORY OF CYPRUS

BY

SIR GEORGE HILL
K.C.B., F.B.A.

* * *

VOLUME III

The Frankish Period

1432–1571

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CHAPTER IX

JOHN II (1432–1458)

Before the news of the death of Janus had gone out, his only son, John, was acknowledged as his successor by all the lords; the proclamation followed immediately.[1] Born in May 1414, John had just entered on his eighteenth year; it was therefore necessary to appoint a Regent. The choice fell upon Sir Peter de Lusignan, Count of Tripoli, second cousin of John, but by many years his elder;[2] he was at the same time made Constable of the Kingdom.[3] Sir Carceran Suarez, Admiral of Cyprus, Sir James de Cafran, Marshal of Cyprus, Sir James de Flory, Auditor,[4] Sir James Gurri, a judge, and others were either confirmed in or appointed to offices, and formed with the Regent a Council of forty for the King's guidance.[5] To them was added Sir Badin de Nores, Marshal of Jerusalem, when he returned from his mission to Poland.[6] He came to wield great influence with the King; in 1444 the Venetian Senate told its ambassador to get into touch with him; it was informed that he was 'deputed to be a governor of the King, with whom, if we may use the phrase, he is all powerful'.[7] From Tafur, however, who was in Cyprus in 1436 and 1437, we learn that the King's most intimate adviser, with the Cardinal, was his aunt Agnes, by whose counsels the Kingdom was mostly governed.[8] As to the members of

[1] Machaeras, 703; Strambaldi, p. 287; Amadi, p. 515; Fl. Bustron, p. 371.

[2] M.L., *Gén.* p. 21, no. 38 a. 2. Dawkins on Machaeras, 704, n. 1.

[3] He was also in this same year 1432 Marshal, or more probably Seneschal, of Jerusalem. M.L., *H.* II, p. 526, n. 2.

[4] In 1438 and 1441 we find Flory described as 'gubernator regni Cypri' (Iorga, *N.E.* II, p. 349; III, p. 67), which means merely member of the Council, as in the case of Badin de Nores (below).

[5] Machaeras, 704.

[6] Above, Ch. VIII, p. 494.

[7] M.L., *Nouv. preuves, B.E.C.* 35, p. 151: *ad gubernationem ejusdem dni regis.*

[8] Tafur, tr. Letts, p. 65. Agnes was inscribed on the roll of nobility of Venice on 4 March 1436. See Iorga, *N.E.* I, p. 581, and Sanudo, *Vite dei Duchi*, ed. Monticolo, I, p. 61, correcting Mas Latrie's conjecture (*Gén.* p. 38) that the reference is to Anna, Duchess of Savoy. She seems finally to have left Cyprus to retire to Savoy in 1439, for it can only be to her that the passport issued by Philip Maria Visconti to 'Agnes, Queen of Jerusalem, Cyprus and Armenia'(!), that she might travel from Istria through his dominions to Piedmont, refers (29 Oct. 1439); at the same time a safe-

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the Council, little or nothing is heard of them. James Gurri, however, was a favourite of the King, and earned such unpopularity that the people took up arms with intent to kill him. The Cardinal and Lady Agnes were involved in this riot. The King had to shut himself up in the citadel, and the disturbance was only settled on his promising to banish Gurri from the court for a year.[1]

Almost immediately after his accession, on 8 July, John renewed to Cardinal Hugh, now Bishop of Palestrina, the procuration which Janus had given him.[2] The Regent with the Council was competent to deal with the affairs of Cyprus in the Kingdom itself, but there were affairs in the West which needed the attention of someone on the spot. The Cardinal was commissioned to interest the Pope (Eugenius IV) in the matter of the heavy burdens under which the Kingdom was labouring, and in the prevention of the scandals which were to be feared in it; he was also to represent the King at the Council of Basle.[3]

conduct was granted to her Venetian boatmen. (Osio, *Doc. Diplom. Milan.* III, p. 190.) The supposition that John's mother exercised much influence in the government, taking part in the deliberations of the Haute Cour, has found its way into modern writers from Loredano, who makes her survive until 1434, whereas she died in 1422 (p. 466).

[1] This was in 1437. Tafur, pp. 103 f. Gurri had been sent to Castile some ten years earlier to collect money for the ransom of King Janus, and Tafur had met him there (p. 66).

[2] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 1–3. This procuration gave the Cardinal authority to nominate others to take his place if necessary.

[3] This Council sat from 14 Dec. 1431 to May 1442. The King nominated as his ambassadors the Bishop of Uzès, 'cancellarium regni, nec non militem et N. doctorem'. The Bishop had previously been nominated by Janus. (*Mon. Conc. Gen., Conc. Basil., Scriptores*, t. II (Vienna, 1874), p. 618.) The Council decided on 19 Dec. 1432, if the Pope refused his adherence, to appoint Cardinal Hugh as legate *in illis partibus et regno Cipri* (Haller, *Conc. Bas.* II, p. 299). On 20 March 1433 Cardinal Hugh nominated William, Bishop of Rennes, and Bertrand, Bishop of Uzès, to take his place at Basle (Haller, II, p. 439). In 1435 the Bishop of Uzès was replaced by the Bishop of Albenga (Haller, III, p. 563). Hugh, with other Cardinals, had had differences with the Pope, arising out of the questions with which the Council was concerned, and had been deprived of his title; but the Council wrote to the Pope in their favour on 19 Oct. 1433 (Haller, II, p. 508), and Hugh was reinstated on 15 Dec. 1433 (Raynaldus, 1434, § 1, p. 164). For his activities as legate in connexion with the peace concluded at Arras on 10 Dec. 1435 between France and Burgundy, see M.L., *H.* III, p. 11, n. 1 and *Arch.* p. 283. His letter to the King of England, 26 Sept. 1435, and Henry's reply, 26 Oct., in Mansi, *Conc.* XXX, cols. 950–1, 958; frequent references in the proceedings of the Council, Haller, III–IV; his letter announcing peace with

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At Rome one of the Cardinal's first acts as John's representative was formally to announce to the Pope the death of Janus and the accession of his son. The letter of Eugenius to John, expressing the usual condolences and trite advice, is preserved.[1] At Venice, the Cardinal, on asking that aid should be forthcoming to the young King if his security should be troubled by the Genoese, was assured that the necessary orders had already been issued.[2]

Communicating the death of a King and the accession of his successor to the Pope had probably from the beginning of the Lusignan dynasty been customary in Cyprus. Something new, on the other hand, and significant, was the formal embassy on such an occasion to the Sultan of Egypt. The envoys to Cairo were John Flatro and Paul Chappe.[3] They doubtless carried promises to pay the tribute which had been imposed on John's predecessor. From Arabic sources, however, we have the other side of the picture. Barsbai, on hearing of John's accession, sent a mission of congratulation, the real object of which was to ascertain whether John would acknowledge his suzerainty, and pay the arrears of the ransom of Janus and the annual tribute. John agreed to all this.[4]

The embassy, on the other hand, which was sent about the same time to the Grand Karaman,[5] represented no such subjection; it was intended to reaffirm the peaceful relations which had prevailed between Cyprus and the Grand Karaman during the reign of Janus. At Laranda the French traveller, Bertrandon de la Brocquière, came across this mission, of which the chronicler Leontios Machaeras was a member. He

Burgundy, v, p. 421 (21 Sept. 1435). On 28 June 1436 he was translated from Palestrina to Tusculum. In 1437 he concluded the negotiations for the marriage of King John to Medea of Montferrat (M.L., *H.* III, p. 79, n. 1). He was in Venice when Tafur arrived there on his return journey on 22 May 1438, but was on the point of departing for Cyprus (p. 167, tr. Letts). And it was he who completed in 1441 the agreement with Genoa about the payment of the debt to the Office of St George. He died in Aug. 1442. Popularly called the Cardinal of Cyprus, he is to be distinguished from another Lusignan, Lancelot, who was also known by that name. Lancelot was one of the Cypriotes who had gone to Savoy in the suite of the Duchess Anna in 1434. For his career, see M.L., *Arch.* pp. 284-6.

[1] Raynaldus, 1431, § 35, p. 115.

[2] Iorga, *N.E.* I, p. 552 (10 Oct. 1433).

[3] Reinhard, II, p. 26, after Loredano (Giblet, II, pp. 169–70). It will be remembered that Flatro was one of those who took office under the Mamelukes when they occupied Nicosia (p. 484).

[4] Ziada, II, p. 43.

[5] Ibrahim b. Muhammad Taj ad-Din.

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describes fully the none too courteous reception of the ambassadors by Ibrahim.[1] It has been suggested that, since no trouble ensued with the Ottomans, a similar embassy, with a similar result, may have been sent to Broussa.[2]

John was crowned King of Cyprus, Jerusalem and Armenia in Santa Sophia on 24 August 1432 by the Dominican Solomon, Bishop of Tortosa.[3] A plague of locusts visited the island about the same time.[4]

If the chroniclers were to be trusted, we should believe the history of the reign of John II to be mainly of domestic interest. Documents, on the other hand, reveal that there was no cessation in the pressure on the Kingdom from Genoa, Venice, or the Moslem.

In the matter of Famagusta, one of the tasks of the Cardinal Hugh was to present to the Genoese authorities a formal protest against the Captain of Famagusta and other Genoese officials in the island.[5] After

[1] Bertrandon de la Brocquière, *Voyage d'outremer*, ed. Schefer (Paris, 1922), pp. 106ff., 111f. Also in M.L., *H.* III, pp. 3–10. English translation in T. Wright, *Early Travels in Palestine*, from which Mogabgab, *Supp. Exc.* I, pp. 28–31. See also M.L., *Rel. pol. et comm.* II, p. 136. The presents brought by the Cypriote envoys were six pieces of Cyprus camlet, a number of ells of scarlet cloth, about forty loaves of sugar, two arbalests, a dozen *vires*, and a peregrine falcon. *Vires* are apparently a kind of cross-bow bolts, *viretons*, see V. Gay, *Glossaire archéol.* II, p. 477 (information from Mr J. G. Mann).

[2] M.L., *Rel. pol. et comm.* II, p. 137.

[3] Machaeras, 706 (1433); Amadi, p. 515 (1432); Fl. Bustron, p. 371 (26 Aug. 1432). The two latter give the Bishop the name Cardus. Dawkins thinks he may be the Bishop of Paphos who was so roughly handled by the band of Alexis (p. 486). Since there seems to be no reason why the coronation of John should have been delayed for more than a year, 1432 seems to be a more likely date than 1433. The latter in Machaeras may be an echo of the same date, in his previous paragraph, for the death of Hedwig of Poland, which is itself a year too late.—Although Amadi says only that John was crowned for Cyprus, Loredano (Giblet, II, p. 168) is probably right in making him receive all three crowns at the same time.

[4] Machaeras, *loc. cit.* Amadi, p. 516, says the locusts came for a number (which has fallen out) of years.

[5] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 23–7. (1) A certain Opezinus (Obizzino?) de' Gentili, citizen of Genoa, accused the King to the Saracen officials of Beirut of being the instigator and provider of Catalan raids on Syria; the Saracens accordingly prepared for war, and were only deterred when the King's ambassador Domitius (Dominic?) de Palu informed them of the truth; even so they equipped five galleys, which did some damage to Cyprus. When Opezinus returned and the King demanded justice from the consul and other officials, it was refused, and Opezinus was actually made consul of Lemesos, and the King's protests were ignored. (2*a*) The Famagusta officials

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making half a dozen detailed complaints, the Cardinal ends his protest with the remark that the King, who ought to have the sympathy of the Genoese, suffers more tribulation, and has more cause of offence, from Genoese officials and private persons living in Cyprus, than from the infidels. The Genoese reply to this protest, which was written on 15 February 1435, has not been found. On the other hand, Andrew Cibò, who went out as Captain of Famagusta in 1436, was instructed to lay before the King complaints of injurious treatment of Genoese residents, and the officers of Famagusta were ordered to take reprisals if Cibò did not obtain satisfaction.[1] And the pressure never ceased to be exerted for the payment of the debt to the Mahona. The King promised to send ambassadors, but they did not appear, and the Genoese government, on 17 April 1439, wrote to its syndic at Nicosia that if they had not come by 1 October, an action would be brought.[2] They arrived, as we shall see, towards the end of the year.

But in spite of these recriminations the home government seems to have become more friendly disposed to the King,[3] or at least to have realized at last, for a time, that this outpost of Christendom should not

harbour runaway slaves, pleading a new decree that if a slave escapes, and the then captain does not return him, the next captain is not bound to do so, whereas in the old treaty there was no such limitation. (2*b*) They break the agreement not to harbour or allow to leave the port anyone in the King's pay without the King's passport, and have recently harboured a fugitive secretary of the King and made him a salaried official, and judge in a case between the late King Janus and a Genoese, in which he overrode an agreement between the two parties to await judgement from Genoa. (3) They have put a Genoese in possession of an estate in the district of Famagusta which belongs to the King. (4) The Genoese consul in Nicosia has made himself troublesome to the King with unjustified claims for payments to the Old Mahona. (5) The King had borrowed from a Genoese, Brancaleone de' Barchati, 8500 ducats, undertaking to pay 10,000 ducats from the sugar revenue of 1433 and 1434; but Brancaleone's agents made a ring with other Genoese merchants to keep down the price of sugar. (6) The Genoese government has ordered the officials of Famagusta not to allow any merchandise or property of the King, which has ever been pledged to any Genoese, to pass.

[1] Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 5. The Genoese government accepted the offer of a private citizen to consult Tuscan legists on the questions at issue (*ibid.* 24 June 1436).

[2] *Ibid.* p. 43.

[3] Cp. the friendly letter, 29 March 1436, of the Doge Isnardo Guarco (Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 2). He had passed many years in Cyprus, received great benefits from the King's father, and considered himself deeply indebted to John himself, to whom he offered all possible service both in his private capacity and as Doge. The Republic's official congratulations to the King on his accession followed on 5 June 1438 (*ibid.* p. 5).

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be weakened by internal dissensions. On 25 August 1437, the Doge, John Campo Fregoso, addressed a letter to Charles VII of France.[1] King John's ambassadors had reported to the Doge the imminent danger to the island, indeed the threat of destruction to the whole Christian name, from the huge fleet which the Sultan was equipping. Charles would hear this from the ambassadors, who were going on to France. The Doge offered to supply anyone who was willing to go to the help of Cyprus with as many ships, biremes or triremes, as would be necessary for its protection. He urged Charles to take a leading part in the movement, for the promotion of which he offered the free use of all facilities at the command of the Republic. It is hardly necessary to say that the political situation of France at this time effectually prevented any response to this appeal. But the intervention of Genoa is worthy of notice, as one of the rare instances of her taking apparently disinterested action on behalf of her victim.

Two years later, on 11 August 1439, Cardinal Hugh was invested by the King with special powers for negotiating a new arrangement with the Office of St George.[2] Two envoys of the King preceded him. They asked for a further prorogation of the payment of the debt which was due in annual instalments of 2500 ducats, but were refused. Deeds, not words, were wanted.[3] The Genoese government was losing patience. On 24 February 1440 it complained to the King that he was giving assistance to the subjects of the King of Aragon against the Genoese, was treating the 'White Genoese' as Cypriotes, and was not paying his debt to the Mahona. On 2 April a stiffer protest followed: the King would not pay his debt; he refused the proceeds of the octroi of Nicosia to the syndic of Famagusta, having given them to others; he allowed the rivals of Genoa, with whom the Republic was at war, to enter his ports, in violation of the treaty which confined trade to Famagusta. For the last time he was asked to give satisfaction; otherwise the Office of St George would take sufficient steps to recover not only the capital of the debt, but the fines for arrears which had been incurred.[4] Louis,

[1] D'Achery, *Spicil.* III, col. 763; Reinhard, I, Beyl. 67, p. 101.

[2] Sperone, *Real Grandeza*, pp. 164–6.

[3] Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 52. The envoys were the Chancellor Galesius de Montolif, Bishop elect of Lemesos, and afterwards Archbishop of Nicosia, and the Butler, Philip de Grenier.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 54 (2 April 1440), cp. p. 55. The Catalan pirates, whom the King was accused of encouraging, had depopulated Famagusta by destroying its trade (*ibid.* p. 56).

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Duke of Savoy, intervened on behalf of the King, but was informed (3 June 1440) that no further concessions could be made without the consent of the shareholders, which would be difficult to obtain.[1] On 8 April 1441, however, the Cardinal concluded a new treaty with the representatives of the Office.[2] But it was long before it was ratified by the King, and meanwhile there seemed to be little prospect of settlement. For as late as 31 December 1441 the Protectors of the Bank of St George wrote to the Genoese consul at Nicosia that nothing had been concluded with the King's agent, the Cardinal of Cyprus; but that, though the Cypriote proposals were altogether improper and unjust, they themselves were so kindly disposed and devoted to the King that they hoped for an understanding. The consul was to press for payment; the interminable delays could no longer be tolerated.[3]

Had they known what had happened earlier in the month, the Protectors would have written in a different strain. The fact that negotiations had advanced so far did not deter King John from taking the next opportunity which offered itself for an attack upon Famagusta.

On 11 December 1441 James Villaragut arrived in Cyprus with four galliasses. Another twelve galleys and eight ships of the Catalans being available, the King resolved to make an attempt on Famagusta both by sea and by land. No less than three assaults were launched, but the

[1] Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 57.

[2] Sperone, *op. cit.* pp. 150–66; M.L., *H.* III, pp. 29–30. This treaty was ratified by the King of Cyprus on 28 Feb. 1442 (Sperone, *op. cit.* pp. 166–9) and again confirmed by Genoa on 11 March 1445. The King had failed to pay the instalments due, by the second treaty of 1428, in 1435, 1436 and 1437; he was therefore liable for the whole previous debt of 150,000 ducats and a fine of 50,000. In consideration of the troubles in which he was involved (including the plague), the new arrangement mentioned in the text was made. He was nevertheless still liable for the salary of the Captain of Famagusta, and for an annual payment of 3000 old besants of Cyprus to the employees of the Office in the island. In view of the fact that many of the payments had been made in besants of inferior alloy, heavy fines were to be exacted if the payments were not in future made in good coin and punctually.—Another business in which the Cardinal was concerned was the King's private debt to one Louis Salvago. Salvago had taken possession of a lake and of the estates of Strovilo and Trapeza; the Cardinal arranged for the settlement of the claim and the restitution of the lake and estates (Aug.–Sept. 1440, Iorga, *N.E.* III, pp. 61, 64, 71). But the affair had a characteristic sequel: two Genoese, Tedesco Doria and Paul Vivaldi, went surety for the King to the amount of 500 ducats, but by 1449 had not been fully repaid, and asked the Genoese government for the right of reprisal (*B.E.C.* 6 Ser. t. 4, 1868, p. 622).

[3] Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 82.

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garrison was well prepared (two deserters from the Catalan fleet having brought information) and made a successful defence. Seeing that he had no prospect of carrying the place, John made peace and raised the siege.[1]

It is curious (though explicable on the ground of its fear for its colony of Famagusta) to find Genoa assuming, about this time, the rôle of champion of Cyprus, and reading lessons to the Pope on his duty. In 1442 it informed Eugenius that it had received the recent reports, that it was well aware of the serious state of the Kingdom, of what it had suffered and its almost complete devastation, of its continuing danger from the Turks and Egypt. What was wanted was not to tell Genoa what it already knew, but to expedite assistance. And the urging of that was the Pope's business, which he ought not to neglect; the fall of this Christian kingdom would bring shame on all the faithful, but before all on the Pope in whose pontificate it occurred.[2] Next year the Doge and his Council, speaking as the ally of Cyprus, remind the Pope that the Kingdom deserves the support of western Christendom and the special favour of the Holy See. It is therefore with surprise that they have heard of the arrest of the King's ambassador by order of the Pope, for reasons into which they do not pretend to go; though he has been released on conditions, they earnestly beg that the King and his servants may be more gently treated.[3] In August 1447 Cypriote ambassadors

[1] Amadi, p. 517 (Monsignor James Villarauto); Fl. Bustron, p. 371; Loredano (Giblet, II, p. 176); Iorga, *N.E.* I, pp. 84, 87. *Villarauto* (Amadi), *Villaruoto* or *Villamuto* (Fl. Bustron) must represent the well-known Spanish name *Villaragut* rather than *Villamarina*, as M.L., *H.* III, p. 79, n. 2 suggests. (The name is in Lusignan's list of Cypriote noble families, *Chor.* f. 83b; *Descr.* f. 83b.) There is no ground for Herquet's opinion that Villamarina is concerned and that the incident belongs to 1449 (*Charlotta*, p. 103). Loredano makes Thomas of Morea, Queen Helena's foster-brother and Chamberlain of Cyprus, command the land army in this attempt on Famagusta. Since Thomas only came to Cyprus in Helena's following, this is chronologically impossible. There is no evidence of any later attack on Famagusta in his lifetime.—Assistance in repelling the Catalan attack was given by Antony James Stracco of Ancona, who lost his ship, and was indemnified and otherwise rewarded by Genoa and Famagusta (Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 91).

[2] Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 104 (10 Oct. 1442).

[3] 21 May 1443. *Ibid.* p. 127. Iorga suggests that the ambassador is Hugh Podocataro. The Doge and his Council wrote at the same time to the Bishop of Savona (Valerian Calderini) asking him to support their request to the Pope, before seeing whom he is to find out from Hugh what he has obtained from the Holy See and what more he wants. This affair of Hugh interests them more than if he were one of their own subjects. The King is described as *rex amicissimus* (Iorga, *ibid.*).

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arrived at Genoa with the usual appeal; the government wrote to the Pope (Nicolas V) that it was certain that the Sultan was planning an invasion, encouraged by the apathy of the faithful; it is the Pope's duty to exhort Christians to a Holy War; Genoa will contribute not only the tithe due to its clergy, but every kind of help, on condition that it does not stand alone and that the Pope writes to the Archbishop of Genoa and recalls Christian Europe to its duty.[1]

This enthusiasm sounds strangely in connexion with the fact that in this same year, 1447, the Republic of Genoa, torn by internal dissensions, found itself unable any longer to govern the colony of Famagusta, which it therefore ceded to the Office of St George.[2] This was the first stage in the process by which the Republic shook off the responsibility for its colonies. On Famagusta followed Caffa, Pera and Corsica. So far as Cyprus was concerned, the change was not an improvement, for it loosened such restraint as the home government might have exercised on the 'Protectors' of the Office. And the Office was no more capable than the Republic of defending its possession or maintaining its prosperity, which steadily declined. The act of cession to the Office speaks of the extreme dangers to which Famagusta has been subject for many years past, and which, with the necessity of taking measures for its protection, have been set forth to the Doge and his Council by a deputation of notables. The causes of the crisis are given as the depletion of the exchequer, the high expenses of administration, exceeding the revenues of the place, and the small number of citizens and inhabitants;[3] all which are frankly admitted to have arisen out of bad administration by the officials sent out from home.[4] A committee of leading citizens

[1] 25 Aug. 1447. Iorga, *ibid.* p. 223. Such professions were of course not inconsistent with Genoa's determination to exact from the King payment of his debts. Thus on 22 Aug. 1452 King John was reminded of the good relations which James I and Janus had entertained with the Republic, but threatened with armed force if he persisted in defaulting (*ibid.* p. 278).

[2] The deed of cession, of 8 July 1447, is given in full in M.L., *H.* III, pp. 34–47. See also Marengo, etc., *Il Banco di S. Giorgio*, pp. 481 f.

[3] Immigration was welcomed as a remedy for the depopulation of Famagusta. On 10 July 1441 the Captain, *massari* and provisors, having heard that certain of the Armenians in Syria and Turkey would be glad to migrate to Famagusta if they had means of subsistence, promised such immigrants salaries and other assistance, and equal treatment with the Genoese and natives of the place. Iorga, *N.E.* III, pp. 70–1.

[4] But Quirico Pallavicini, James Centurione and Michael Grillo, the delegates from Famagusta, threw the blame on the King, who did not fulfil his promises to the envoy

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had been formed to provide a remedy for the threatened danger, and they, with the authorization of the Doge, Janus Campo Fregoso, recommend the transfer of the colony to the Office of St George.[1]

of Famagusta, violated the treaties, did not effectively close his other ports, and by his bad government provoked the discontent of his people. It was on this report that the government appointed a commission to investigate the matter (6 March 1447, Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 219). Centurione had a claim against the King, who was warned that if he did not meet it the right of reprisals would be granted to this claimant (*ibid.* p. 220).

[1] That institution now has handed over to it the city of Famagusta and its dominion, with its surrounding zone of two leagues, with all its appurtenances, castle and forts, arms and munitions, with its port-dues, gabelles, revenues and all rights pertaining to it now and hereafter, with *merum et mixtum imperium* and power of the sword and every kind of jurisdiction, and with all royalties belonging to the Genoese Commune now and hereafter, both in Famagusta and the whole island of Cyprus. It has the right of prohibiting the use of other ports in the island, in accordance with the agreement of 1383; of appointing a Captain in Famagusta and its territory, *massari* (administrators and treasurers) and other officials. The Captain has jurisdiction, *merum et mixtum imperium* and power of the sword, over citizens and inhabitants of Famagusta and its territory, and over all Genoese and subjects of Genoa and foreigners living and trading in the city or in the island, in any place where the Genoese Commune has jurisdiction; such jurisdiction, that is to say, in respect of other places as the Captains of Famagusta have been wont to possess, but no more; of imposing taxes, gabelles and the like. But the Commune of Genoa and the Office of St George may not impose any new gabelles save with the authority of the Doge and his Council. The arrangement is for a period of twenty-nine years, after which the city, castle, fortalices and territory and the jurisdiction over them are to be handed back to the Commune of Genoa. The Protectors of St George undertake to govern the city in such a way as to uphold the honour of the Genoese name, and to contribute up to 10,000 lire a year to the costs of administration and defence.—The statutes and ordinances regulating the government of Famagusta under the new dispensation are published by Vito Vitale, in *Atti della Soc. Ligure di Storia Patria*, LXIII (1934), pp. 393–454. The first regulations were issued on 23 July 1447. Besides the Captain and *massari*, the authorities are the *Ufficio della Moneta* and the Viscount. The aim of the regulations for the Captain was to abolish abuses and ensure the armed defence and regular administration of the city, port and territory. He was not to sleep out of his palace, or attend banquets or meals in other houses, and generally was to avoid all contacts which might distract him from his duties. He was not to engage in trade, even through an agent, or accept gifts from anyone, beginning with the King of Cyprus, or have a part in the farming of gabelles, or make any agreement with his own officials and dependants under cover of which he might achieve any personal gain. Similar rules govern the conduct of the *massari*. Accounts were to be rendered annually. The Captain's judicial functions were exercised in his name by his vicar, but he personally had to sit in court twice a week. Many regulations refer to the military defence. The object of all these regulations being, besides the security of the colony, its economic prosperity, it was a fundamental provision that prohibited both Genoese and other traders from touching at other ports

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But in spite of this renunciation of its rights and obligations in Famagusta, the Republic was not able wholly to shake off its responsibilities. After all, the Office of St George was managed by leading citizens of Genoa, who, when necessary, would naturally call the Doge and Council to the aid of the Office. Thus it was that in 1449, the depopulation of Famagusta, which was one of the signs of impending ruin noted in the deed of cession, engaged the attention of the Doge and Council. On 21 January[1] they decided that one of the chief causes of the mischief was a tax which had been imposed some four years earlier; this tax prevented merchants from calling at the port, and the Office of St George was authorized to purchase it back from the contractors, Manuel and Lionel de Oliva, to whom it had been farmed out. These farmers objected strongly, although they were offered a better price than they had given, but were forced to accept.

In 1451, at the request of the outgoing Captain, the Protectors nominated a Commissary and Prefect, to provide for the defence and needs of the colony, attend generally to Genoese interests in the island, and treat with the King of Cyprus.[2] Napoleon Lomellini, who was appointed, showed great unwillingness to go out, doubtless owing to the disturbed conditions in the Levant and the Turkish menace. Internal troubles in the Republic, ravaged as it was by faction, were reflected in its colonies. From henceforth, until the Genoese were expelled by James II, there were frequent refusals to accept the office of Captain. The general indiscipline is attested by the fact that Genoese merchants were among the first to disobey the prohibition against

of Cyprus, in the hope of guaranteeing the Genoese monopoly of the maritime commerce of the island. The local population was represented by the Viscount and a certain number of *burgenses*. These had some say, for instance, in the case of the sudden death of a Captain: the *massari* and *Ufficio della Moneta* then must summon in four days the Genoese merchants established in Famagusta and Nicosia, and also the Viscount and *burgenses*, to elect a provisional Captain. They also elected the syndics, two *burgenses* and two Genoese merchants, who examined the records of the work of the administrators, audited their accounts, reviewed their sentences, etc. The decisions of the syndics had to be transmitted to the Office of St George, which examined them. Iorga has published (*N.E.* I, pp. 92–4) extracts from an enquiry into the charges against Peter de Marco, formerly Captain of Famagusta, from the *Syndicamenta Famagustae* for 1448–9.—Trouble soon arose between the Captain and the *massari*, and these seem to have been abolished soon after 1448, their functions being taken over by the clerks and notaries of the *masseria*, who, being definitely inferior officials, could not prejudice the authority of the Captain.

[1] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 56–8.

[2] Vitale, *op. cit.* p. 401.

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touching at other ports, and to neglect the duty of keeping Famagusta well supplied and so able to cope with its enemies.

The intentions of the Office of St George were doubtless excellent, and the accusations of tyrannous exploitation which have been brought against it may be exaggerated. But in the endeavour to create and maintain a monopoly it defeated its own ends, non-Genoese traders being driven to divert their traffic to Syria. The distance of the colony from home, and the frequent changes in the directors, weakened their authority. Such remedies as we have instanced were rosewater for the plague, and the place decayed.[1] The pilgrim Stephen von Gumppenberg,[2] who was there in 1449–50, describes it as having many fine buildings, but being for the most part all desert and waste, even as a Venetian admiral was to speak of it in 1476.[3]

A common cause of dispute between the two governments, as is seen from the articles referring to it in various treaties, was the question of the jurisdiction over the so-called White Genoese. This question was the subject of a special agreement with the Captain of Famagusta, on 16 March 1450.[4] It was agreed that the right of deciding who was a White Genoese, and was to be treated as such, and of jurisdiction over him, was to belong to the Captain of Famagusta and the officers of the Protectors of the Office of St George.

The bickering with Venice about the payment of debts owing to its citizens is the subject of various references in the records of this reign.[5] In 1440 Nicolas Petriano, one of the ducal secretaries, was sent to Cyprus to represent the interests of the late Angelo Michiel (who, as already related, had advanced large sums toward the ransom of King Janus) and Nicolas Bragadin. He had to report that his first attempt at obtaining satisfaction was unsuccessful. On 13 September 1440 he was told to try again; if the King remained obstinate, he was to threaten that Cypriotes' property in Venice would be sequestrated. Early in

[1] Vitale, *loc. cit.* R. Lopez, *Storia delle colonie genovesi nel Mediterraneo* (1938), p. 427, says that under the Office of St George Famagusta recovered slightly; it was not possible to bring back her lost trade, but the administration was bettered. Cp. Tucci, in *Bollett. Storico-bibl. Subalpino*, XXXVII (1935), pp. 83 f., on the great work of political and economic reform initiated by the Bank of St George.

[2] Feyerabend, *Reyssbuch*, f. 243 b.

[3] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 491.

[4] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 60–4.

[5] See especially M.L., *Nouv. preuves*, *B.E.C.* 35, pp. 147–58. Cp. above, p. 448, and Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 127 (references in proceedings of the Senate, 1443).

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1441 the Bishop of Lemesos appeared in Venice;[1] he acknowledged the justice of Bragadin's claims and promised that satisfaction should be given, and the sequestration of deposits belonging to Stephen Pignoli was accordingly raised. But still the King did nothing. The dispute was still going on in 1443, when a new Venetian ambassador, Peter Contarini, was appointed to proceed to Cyprus. He was instructed to get into touch with Badin de Nores, who was all-powerful in the counsels of the King. The matter might be referred to arbitration.[2] King John did, as a matter of fact, send an envoy to make arrangements for the satisfaction of his 'old and new debts', and the Senate had agreed to accept payment of the old debt in six years; the King had actually sent some sugar towards the payment of the first instalment, and the new debt was secured on the revenues of the royal domain. In 1447 another cause of dispute arose. The King, in order to raise funds for the tribute exacted from Cyprus by the Sultan, laid the White Venetians under the same tax as he raised from all other persons resident in the island.[3] The ambassador about to proceed to Cyprus was instructed to protest strongly against such action, as being a breach of the privileges long enjoyed by the Venetians. Should the King refuse to remove the burden, all Venetians were to leave Cyprus within nine months, the agents of the Cornaro of Episkopi alone excepted; these were to remain and send the sugar from the estate to Venice, but not to trade in it. The King attempted to justify himself, his envoys presenting a memorandum, which was dealt with in detail by the Senate on 12 May 1448. All Venetians residing in Cyprus were, by the agreements made with the King and his predecessors, free from all taxation. The King argued that he had imposed this levy, not with the intention of infringing any immunity or exemption granted by him or his predecessors to the Venetian nation, but under pressure of necessity. The Venetians could no more be exempt than the Genoese, Rhodians and the whole clergy. He was forced to levy this tax by the perfidious injustice of the Sultan, who intended to extort 100,000 ducats, under threat of ruin and desolation to the Kingdom. To avoid a greater evil, the King had agreed

[1] His name is unknown. The James Gastodengo (Guastandenghies) mentioned by Iorga was Bishop of Famagusta, not Lemesos. Negotiations with the Senate mentioned 16 Feb. 1442, Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 83.

[2] It was still unsettled in 1448. Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 234.

[3] The sum he raised from them seems to have been no more than 1400 ducats. See below, p. 513, n. 5.

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to pay at once 30,000 ducats, and to double the annual tribute. As it was quite impossible to raise this sum from his own and his subjects' resources, it had seemed fair that all who possessed immovable property in the Kingdom, and whose interests were at stake, should bear the burdens as they enjoyed the advantages of their position. If the Venetians were excepted, the others would demand exemption, the money would not be found, and in the fury of destruction which would be let loose by the Sultan's fleet many of the Venetians would undoubtedly suffer loss. Previously the King had paid the 5000 ducats tribute out of his own revenues; now, with this demand of an extra 5000, as well as an immediate payment of 30,000, a new and unforeseen necessity had arisen. The King also pointed out that almost all the Venetians residing in the Kingdom were White Venetians, not Venetians by birth, but such as at different times had been privileged by the King's special grace; not one of them had ever seen Venice, or any Venetian possession, but all had come from Syria and were of Syrian origin, and had been given hospitality and domicile in Cyprus for more than two hundred years, with their families and all their property, movable and immovable, the majority of them indeed having acquired fiefs, estates and salaries from the King, and never in the service of Venice. To this argument the Senate replied that, the imposition being contrary to the Venetian privileges, what had been collected must be repaid; but, to show that it wished to deal humanely with the King, it would accept payment in instalments over twelve years; on condition that no such levy should be imposed in the future, and all the immunities, agreements, franchises and exemptions should be inviolably observed and maintained. These privileges must be once more confirmed.

The Venetian ambassador demanded that the Venetian consul should be put in possession of the royal dye-works at Nicosia, on which his salary was secured. The King agreed to do his best to effect this, although it would be much to his prejudice, since the works were farmed out to certain Genoese merchants.[1]

[1] Another demand of the ambassador, that agreement should finally be made with Nicolas Bragadin, and the village of Akhelia restored to him, the King characterized as astonishing. For thirteen years affairs between the King and Bragadin had been regulated by a decision of the Haute Cour, whose jurisdiction Bragadin had accepted. The question had been settled, and a public instrument drawn up after the judgement embodying it. These new claims were improper. The Senate decided to ask for information from the consul in Cyprus.

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To sum up, the Senate, ignoring the King's plea about the White Venetians, declined to make any modification, other than that already mentioned, in its demand that the tax which had been levied by the King should be refunded.

The Genoese monopoly, combined with Saracen activity in the neighbourhood of the island, must have made Venetian trade more than ever a precarious adventure. It is recorded[1] that on 11 April 1448 the Signory decided that neither ships nor galleys should sail to the Levant, because of the hostility of the Sultan, 'who seemed to be beside himself'. The island was also subjected to constant attacks and threats from the Grand Karaman. These difficulties were put forward by the King's envoys as an excuse for the failure to make the payments to Venice which had been undertaken in recent agreements. The Senate, on 30 March 1451, consented to a delay of two years, provided that the King would pay the salary of the Venetian consul and his staff. It also undertook to send an envoy to the Grand Karaman to induce him to come to terms with the King.[2] But by 14 October of the same year, the King had not even paid the consul's salary, although the Republic had incurred considerable expenses, notably on account of the embassy to the Grand Karaman.[3] On 18 July 1452, the situation not having improved, the Senate decided to send a new ambassador to complain of the King's failure to meet his obligations, and of constant breaches of the privileges to which the Venetians were entitled.[4] Full instructions were given on 3 August[5] to the ambassador, Bernard Contarini, who was to express to the King the astonishment and distress of the Signory at his violation of the pacts and agreements made by his predecessors, to the prejudice of the jurisdiction of the Signory, and the infliction of great

[1] *Relatione*, in Reinhard, II, Beyl. 3, p. 29. Earlier, on 3 Sept. 1443, the Beirut galleys had been ordered to remain at Crete, if they heard that the Ottoman fleet was at sea; in any case, they were not to call at Cyprus or Rhodes. This latter prohibition was however rescinded on 17 Sept. (Noiret, pp. 404–5). In 1444 the Venetians explained to Eugenius IV, who had reproached them with forbidding their ships to sail to Cyprus or Rhodes, that they could not afford to provoke the Sultan, and involve the numerous Venetians in his territories in risk of pillage and death (Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 185). On 4 July 1447 the Senate refused to help the King against the Sultan, partly because of the war in which it was engaged against Milan, but also because of its interests in Syria (*ibid.* p. 223).

[2] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 370.

[3] *Ibid.* 14 Oct. 1451.

[4] *Ibid.* p. 373, n. 2.

[5] *Ibid.* pp. 373–7.

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injury and loss on all Venetian nobles and persons under Venetian protection.[1] Contarini was to enquire what were the King's intentions, 'in order that we may know how we are to live and consult the interests of ourselves and of our Venetians and subjects'. If the King, as was expected, showed himself amenable, Contarini was to set forth in detail the grievances in question. He was, among other things, to remind the King of his failure to make the annual payment of 14,000 besants, which was secured on the royal dye-works; and that, although he had been granted a delay of two years, he had not even paid the salary of the consul and his staff. It was therefore to be insisted that the consul should again be put in possession of the dye-works and octroi of Nicosia. The King had repudiated a promise made by his envoys to contribute 500 ducats towards the expenses incurred by Mark Cornaro in connexion with the embassy to the Grand Karaman.[2] Venetian merchants for many years had not enjoyed the freedom of all the ports in the island which had been promised them, having been obliged to pay dues at Famagusta. Of the sum of 14,000 ducats borrowed by the King in 1447 from certain Venetians and due to be paid in ten years, nothing had yet been received. Contarini's instructions contain many other items.[3] Finally, if he finds that the King is merely putting him off, and shows no sign of wishing to amend the situation, he is to order the consul and Venetian residents to quit the island with all their property, and all Venetian subjects are to be absolutely forbidden to trade or communicate with Cyprus.[4]

The ambassador succeeded in bringing the King to terms on the majority of the questions in dispute, and, for the rest, John appointed ambassadors, who were to go to Venice with the Venetian fleet on its

[1] *Venetus noster*, here and elsewhere, means a person who is not a Venetian citizen, but is under Venetian protection—generally a White Venetian.

[2] Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 278.

[3] Of failure to pay debts to private persons, arbitrary seizure of estates, and the like. In spite of all representations, such practices continued; cf. cases in 1453 and 1455, M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 371–2.

[4] Exception is again made of the agents of the Cornaro of Episkopi, and of the farmers of the sugar crops of Kolossi, which belong to the Hospital, and are at present farmed out to Venetian citizens. See, on the sugar of Kolossi, the contract between the Order and the firm of Martini in 1464, M.L., *H.* III, pp. 88–90. On the sugar-culture and trade in general, see Pegolotti, *Pratica della Mercatura*, ed. Evans, pp. 362–5; K. Herquet, *Cyprische Königsgestalten* (1881), pp. 165–70; Heyd, II, p. 687; *O.C.* pp. 282–5.

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return from Beirut.[1] That fleet, however, failed to call at Cyprus, and the ambassadors were unable to come. On 9 March 1453[2] the Senate rescinded the order for the immediate departure from Cyprus of the Venetian consul and residents; it was only to be carried out if the King's ambassadors failed to arrive with the next galley from Cyprus, or the galleys from Barbary. The ambassadors eventually reached Venice, and on 14 September 1453 the Senate gave a reply to their representations which left matters much as they were.[3]

Four months later the Senate made further representations through its envoy Orsato Giustinian, who went out as Venetian Bailie. A detailed reply was made by the King on 15 January 1454.[4] He explains that with the best will in the world he has been unable to meet his old obligations, owing to raids (there have been three of them) by the Turks, who have carried off prisoners, ravaged and burned the estates, particularly the sugar plantations. There had also been the expense of embassies to the Ottoman Turk and the Sultan of Egypt.[5]

[1] Cp. Iorga, *N.E.* III, pp. 278–9: it was known as early as 20 Dec. 1452 that Bernard Contarini had given the Venetians in Cyprus notice to quit in eight months; the King had announced that he was sending an ambassador, and Orsato Giustinian, elected consul in Cyprus, was to await his arrival.

[2] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 377; Iorga, *ibid.* p. 292. Orsato Giustinian was again instructed, on 14 Aug. 1453, to postpone his departure until the arrival of the ambassadors, who had been on their way for some months (*ibid.* p. 378).

[3] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 378. The question of the original debt, as to which the King claimed that he owed no more, and the accounts were not clear, was referred to the consul. The Senate insisted on the consul being placed again in possession of the dye-works and octroi of Nicosia, on which the annual payment of 14,000 besants was secured. All subjects of the Republic, present and future, should enjoy all the old franchises, pacts and immunities. The 14,000 ducats due to certain Venetians since 1447 to be paid off in twelve annual instalments.

[4] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 379–84; *Libri Comm., Reg.* V, p. 83, no. 272.

[5] The payment of the debt at this time was made in consignments of sugar. The two estates of Morphou and Lefka are specially mentioned. These were at the time pledged to the Genoese; when that pledge should be redeemed, they were to pass to Venice as security for the debt. Among other things in his reply, the King promises to reinstate the Bailie in possession of the octroi and dye-works of Nicosia; also that subjects acquired by Venice later than the original pact should be treated in matters of jurisdiction like other Venetian citizens; and that in future no special levy should be imposed, without the licence of the Signory or its Bailie, on Venetian owners of houses and lands, as had been done on the occasion of the Sultan's expedition against Cyprus, when 1400 ducats had been raised from them.

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Needless to say, in spite of all the King's protestations and promises, the government officials continued to act with a high hand, and the Venetian Senate as regularly to complain. In 1455, for instance. the Senate had to demand a remedy for the injuries inflicted on the family of Cornaro at Episkopi, notably by officials who had attempted to impress some of their men for service in one of the King's galleys, and had wounded and killed a number of them.[1]

Genoa and Venice, however, were not the only western Powers from whom Cyprus had to fear trouble at this time. John's own brother-in-law, Louis, Duke of Savoy, was in 1450 meditating an attack on the island. This fact, which is revealed by two Genoese documents, remains a mystery;[2] no trace of any dispute between Louis and John, which might throw light on it, seems otherwise to have survived. It appears that the Duke entered into negotiations with Genoa for the support of an expedition; but both the agreement which was reached, and the preparations (if any) which were made, must have been kept secret, and nothing came of them. Louis, a supporter of the Ghibelline exiles, had engaged in a campaign against Genoa, but after a few days' fighting peace was made by the mediation of the Count of Lavagna. Among the clauses of the treaty between the Duke and the Doge, Peter Campo Fregoso, were two concerning Cyprus. At any time within ten years, should the Duke desire to equip a fleet in Genoa, in order to acquire for himself the Kingdom of Cyprus, the Doge would provide as many galleys as should be considered necessary, make a subsidy of from 3000 to 5000 florins, and give all possible facilities and aid to the Duke consistent with his honour. The decision as to the number of galleys and the amount of the subsidy necessary was to be left to the arbitration of the Count of Lavagna. In return, the Duke agreed to respect all the rights, honours, prerogatives and customs enjoyed now or in the future by the Doge and Commune of Genoa, as well in the whole Kingdom of Cyprus, as in that part of it which might be acquired and held by the Duke or his agents. The Count of Lavagna, by an arbitration of the same date, fixed the amount of the subsidy at 4000 ducats.

This treaty furnishes a curious contrast to the appeal which, thirteen

[1] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 372 (17 Sept. 1455).

[2] 17 Sept. 1450. M.L., *H.* III, pp. 67–72, with note 1 on pp. 67f. In the treaty as printed by Mas Latrie the Count of Lavagna is called John Baptist Fieschi; in the arbitration he is John Philip Fieschi. The latter is correct.

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years before, the Doge of Genoa had made to the King of France to come to the aid of Cyprus against the infidel (p. 502). Speculation on the significance of the abortive agreement would be futile, but it is perhaps worth noting that it covered a period of ten years. It is possible therefore that no immediate action was intended. But since John had no legitimate son to succeed him, it might have been present to the minds of the Duke and the Duchess, the King's sister, that there might be difficulty about the succession of John's daughter Charlotte, as indeed came to pass. The fact that in this very year 1450 a dispensation was obtained from Nicolas V for the marriage of Janus, eldest son of Duke Louis, to Charlotte (they were related in the second degree)[1] shows that there was a design, if Charlotte should succeed, to secure the Kingdom for the dynasty of Savoy. This marriage proposal came to nothing, and Charlotte, as we shall see, married a Portuguese prince. But in October 1457,[2] well before ten years were over, the Duke's son Louis was married by proxy to the widowed Charlotte, and interference in the struggle between them on the one hand, and James the Bastard on the other, became a matter of practical politics.

The definite subjection of the Kingdom of Cyprus as a tributary to the Sultan of Egypt might have seemed to exempt it from the danger of attack from that quarter. Nevertheless we hear, in 1434, of an attack

[1] Iorga, *N.E.* II, p. 439 (8 April 1450). Iorga (*N.E.* III, p. 253, n. 1) has a different interpretation of the problem, based apparently on the Chronicle of Magno, which under the year 1450 says that King John offered his daughter Charlotte to Louis son of Duke Louis; the Duke then sent an abbot (this would be Augustine, Abbot of Casanova, mentioned in the treaty) to ask for four or five galleys to take his son to Cyprus, which he was to govern. Four galleys were offered to the Duke which he was to equip at his own expense. Iorga holds that the treaty of 17 Sept. is related to the marriage of Charlotte not to Louis but to Janus. To this it must be objected that the treaty makes no reference to any marriage, and that its whole tone implies an offensive expedition—*pro classe paranda per ipsum ad acquirendum regnum Cipri*—not to a mere convoy for a prince going out peaceably to marry the heiress to the throne. It seems that, the original proposal to marry Charlotte to Janus having broken down, the Duke made up his mind to be prepared to take by force what he could not get by peaceable means; that later agreement was reached, Louis being substituted for Janus; and that Magno has dated the proposal to marry Charlotte to Louis too early, knowing that there was a proposal in 1450, but not that it was Janus who was concerned. That prince, it may be mentioned, eventually married Helen of Luxemburg in 1465 and died in 1491 (Litta, *Fam. Cel.*, *Savoia*, tav. x).

[2] M.L., *Gén.* p. 46 and n. 10.

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by Egyptian ships on Kolossi.[1] This, if it was not a mere case of privateering, may have been regarded as a hostile act against Rhodes, rather than Cyprus, or as a reprisal for Catalan raids on Syria. In 1435, 1437, and again in 1443, there were rumours of preparations by the Sultan of a huge fleet to attack the island.[2] If these reports were actually true, they were belied by events, for no such expedition took place. Probably, however, it was part of the Sultan's regular policy to extort the tribute by threats of invasion, as we have seen that he did in 1447 (p. 509). But as a rule the relations between Cyprus and Egypt about this time seem to have been unruffled. Pero Tafur,[3] who acted as ambassador from King John in 1437, was extremely well received, and all the requests made by the King were granted. It had been customary to send some Mamelukes to collect the tribute each year; in view of the great expense which this involved, the King's undertaking to send it in four months was accepted. The tribute would be paid in camlets, estimated at the price they commanded in Cairo.[4] The duties on the sale of Cyprus salt (a great source of revenue) throughout Syria were also removed.

On the other hand Cyprus became to some degree a base for the Egyptian fleet. Thus the expedition which was directed against Rhodes in 1440 revictualled in the island.[5] The Sultan's grievance against Rhodes was that the Order interfered with his subjects in their trade with Cyprus. Eventually in 1443 he proposed that there should be peace between the Order and himself, so far as Cyprus was concerned. John de Marsanac, lieutenant of James de Milly, Grand Commander of

[1] Sanudo, *Vite*, col. 1637: they pillaged the estate of the Catalan family of Ferrer. This is presumably the same raid as is mentioned by Jauna, p. 944, and Vertot, II (1726), p. 211, where they are said to have pillaged and burnt the Commandery, being at war with Rhodes.

[2] Letter of the Pope to the Council of Basle, 21 Jan. 1435, Haller, *Conc. Basil.* v, p. 114. Letter of the Doge of Genoa to Charles VII, above, p. 502. Report of Stephen Pignoli to the Pope, Raynaldus, 1443, pp. 412–16, §§ 13–19.—Barsbai was succeeded on the Egyptian throne in 1438 by Yusuf, who reigned from June to September, and was followed by al-Malik az-Zahir Jakmak (Sept. 1438–Jan. 1453).

[3] Tr. Letts, pp. 69–76, 102.

[4] The cloth-laws depreciated the gross value of camlet in Cairo in terms of money; the tribute was exempted from these laws. Ziada, II, p. 44.

[5] Herquet, *Charlotta*, p. 89; Atiya, pp. 474–5. Suyuti, p. 24, has this under 1443. On their way back the Egyptians raided the Grand Commandery: Pauli, *Cod. diplom.* p. 122, no. 102.

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Cyprus, went to Alexandria to negotiate, returning to Rhodes with Jakmak's terms, which the Venetian John Delfin took back with the ratification of the Grand Master, John de Lastic. The result was the curious arrangement by which Cyprus was excluded from the theatre of hostilities, the relations between Rhodes and Egypt remaining as they were (1443).[1]

The general danger to Christendom in the exposed position of its two eastern bulwarks, Rhodes and Cyprus, was pointed out by Eugenius IV in his encyclical issued early in 1443. King John's ambassador, Stephen Pignoli, had doubtless brought the latest information of the enemy's preparations; a large fleet was being equipped, probably with Cyprus as its objective.[2] Eugenius did not confine himself to exhortations, but is said to have actually equipped a fleet which he sent to the assistance of Rhodes.[3] Mark, the titular Patriarch of Alexandria, was appointed Apostolic Legate in Cyprus and Rhodes, with the task of seeing to their safety.[4] So far as Cyprus was concerned, even if it was unlikely to be attacked by Egypt, the threat from its northern neighbours was definite. The Emir of Scandelore was only checked in his plans for an invasion of the island in 1444 by the intervention of the Hospital.[5] King John's envoys to the West continued to press for

[1] Bosio, II, p. 161; Herquet, *loc. cit.* In August 1444 an Egyptian fleet with 18,000 men appeared before Rhodes and besieged it for forty days without success. A document quoted by Iorga, *N.E.* I, p. 89, indicates that it was in connexion with an Egyptian threat to Rhodes that the Genoese prepared to defend Famagusta in 1445.

[2] Raynaldus, 1443, pp. 412–16, §§ 13–19.

[3] It is perhaps with this that we should connect a curious statement of Nicolas della Tuccia (*Cronaca di Viterbo*, ed. Ciampi, p. 197), which, however, seems to have scarcely any relation to the facts. He says that the cardinal of 'San Chimento', nephew of Pope Eugenius and Vice-chancellor (i.e. Francis Condulmer, Cardinal of San Clemente), sailed from Venice with many ships to attack the Saracens, and on reaching Cyprus found that the King was besieged by the Saracens, and could not withstand them. Whereon the said cardinal went with his force to succour the King of Cyprus, who was a Christian, and was victorious and drove away the Saracens, and delivered the Kingdom. As a matter of fact a crusading fleet did sail for the Levant in 1443, the Venetian galleys being commanded by Louis Loredan, Condulmer being in command of the whole fleet. But it failed in its object, which was to prevent the Sultan Murad III from crossing the Hellespont. See Pastor, I, p. 327 and cp. Chacon, *Vitae Pont.* II, col. 894.

[4] Raynaldus, 1445, p. 464, § 18 (9 Jan. 1445); Reinhard, II, p. 33.

[5] Bosio, II, p. 165 (1444–5); M.L., *Rel. pol. et comm.* II, p. 138 (*B.E.C.* 2 sér. t. II, 1845–6).

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assistance. About 1447 we find Hugh Podocataro and Phoebus de Lusignan, a natural son of King Janus, engaged in this thankless task. Charles VII of France agreed to the levying of subsidies by the sale of indulgences.[1]

In 1448 the Order of St John was less successful with the Grand Karaman than it had been with the Emir of Scandelore in its efforts on behalf of the Kingdom.[2] The Grand Karaman Ibrahim Beg, who at the beginning of John's reign had given a not too favourable reception to his ambassadors (p. 500), had since become definitely hostile, and was preparing an expedition by land[3] and sea against the sole remaining possession of Cyprus on the mainland, and against the island itself. Alleging that Cyprus paid an annual tribute of 5000 ducats to the Emir of Scandelore, the Grand Karaman demanded similar tribute for himself. King John sent Philip Mistachiel with the news to Rhodes, and the Grand Master John de Lastic lost no time in despatching an envoy, Br. Maurice Vaselin, Commander of Troyes, to the Grand Karaman, to urge him to abandon his design. Writing to inform King John of this on 28 August, the Grand Master said that, from what an envoy of Ibrahim had recently said, he would be ready to make peace. But, if not, the Grand Master promised to send an armed galley to John's assistance, and more, if possible: 'Your difficulties and dangers we regard as our own.' Vaselin had instructions to go to Anamur, enquire where the Grand Karaman was to be found, and proceed thither without delay. But before leaving Anamur, he was to give orders to the ship which took him there, if he should be detained by the Grand Karaman, while an attack could be made on Gorhigos or Cyprus, to leave Anamur at once, inform King John, and then report to Rhodes. It was hoped that this would not be necessary. He was to thank the Grand Karaman for the friendly message which his ambassador had lately brought to the Grand Master, and offer him a welcome to the Rhodian ports for his commerce, in return for similar treatment which he offered to Rhodian ships at the recently constructed port at Anamur. As to the intended war against Cyprus, the Grand Karaman was to be told that

[1] D'Achery, *Spicil.* III, p. 767; M.L., *H.* III, p. 72, n. 3.

[2] The loss of Gorhigos: M.L., *H.* III, pp. 48–56, 59; *Rel. pol. et comm.* II, pp. 138ff.; Fl. Bustron, p. 384; Bosio, II, pp. 172–4; Loredano (Giblet), II, p. 181.

[3] The Grand Karaman at this time could put into the field some 30,000 horse. Cyprus could probably raise no more than a thirtieth of that number of knights. Sanudo, *Vite*, col. 962; M.L., *H.* III, p. 54, n. 1.

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the Grand Master, in response to his request, would willingly act as mediator; but he stood to King John in the relation of father and guardian, and anyone intending injury to the King must be understood to be doing it to the Grand Master. Against such an attack, Rhodes would defend and aid the King and his possessions as it had defended him against the Lord of Scandelore. The assertion that the King paid an annual tribute to that Lord was quite untrue; if any payment had been made, it was but on a single occasion. The Karaman, therefore, rather than make war against the King, should have pity on him in his manifold afflictions, and not add to his tribulations, and should withdraw and disarm the fleet which he was said to have equipped for a descent on Cyprus, and the land army which was directed against Gorhigos. He was to be told that the ambassador was sent only on his request for mediation with Cyprus and was ready to go thither with that object. If it became clear that the Karaman was bent on war, Vaselin was to take leave of him with the assurance that the Hospital would give all possible help to the King, whose cause was its own. Vaselin would then proceed to Cyprus to inform the King that the promised galley would be sent without delay, and then himself return to Rhodes, calling however at Scandelore with friendly messages to its ruler.[1]

The Grand Karaman's request to the Grand Master to act as mediator was, we can hardly doubt, not meant seriously, but was a mere blind, and his object was to keep the ambassador in play, while continuing his preparations.[2] He seems however to have given up his plan, if he ever made one, for a naval expedition. Meanwhile, Gorhigos fell an easy prey into his hands. Even while Vaselin and the ambassadors of the King of Cyprus were negotiating with him, the commandant[3] and garrison, short of provisions and corrupted by gold, gave this strong fortress up to the enemy. Things moved so fast that the promised Rhodian galley was never despatched. Vaselin, in accordance with his

[1] In Cyprus, Vaselin was to speak to the King and Queen on behalf of the Archbishop of Rhodes, who claimed certain annual payments from the revenue of the Church of Nicosia, in accordance with an agreement made at Rome between the two Archbishops.

[2] So Loredano asserts (*loc. cit.*), saying at the same time that the Grand Master saw through the trick.

[3] Fl. Bustron (p. 384) says that the commandant was James Bologna, who was executed by the King in December 1448, together with others responsible for the loss. Loredano calls the commandant Philip Attar.

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instructions, went from the Karaman to King John, and thence, returning to Rhodes, brought to the Grand Master details of the disaster, together with a request from the King for his advice. The Grand Master gave it in a letter of 20 November. The Grand Karaman, it appeared, had offered to make peace; if, after due consideration of their relative forces—and the Grand Karaman was very strong—John decided to attempt to recover Gorhigos, the Grand Master would aid him to the best of his power. Nevertheless he suggested sending an envoy to the Sultan of Egypt, Jakmak, to ask for help (although it was known that the Sultan himself had given leave to the Karaman to keep Gorhigos if he could take it, and to the Emir of Tarsus to assist in the siege). The Grand Master was writing to the Sultan on behalf of the King. If John decided to make peace it would be best if negotiated through the Sultan. In his letter of the same date to the Sultan,[1] the Grand Master expresses his inability to conceive that the Grand Karaman can have acted with the leave of the Sultan, since any injury to Cyprus, tributary as it was to Egypt, was an injury to himself. With Gorhigos as a base, the enemy can at his pleasure inflict damage on Cyprus night and day, and retire to safety. The Sultan was in duty bound to aid his tributary against such outrages. It is hinted that if he declined to assist the King of Cyprus against the Grand Karaman, he might see the Kingdom fall into the hands of some Christian prince who would not be so good a neighbour to Egypt as was King John.[2] Whether the Sultan intervened, as we are told on not the best authority, is very doubtful,[3] and Gorhigos was for ever lost to Cyprus. And there still remained the threat from the quarter of Scandelore. An attack was planned in 1450 by the Emir, Louphtou Beg, in concert with other Turkish rulers. The attitude of King John in the face of this danger is described as completely irresolute; the barons are branded as cowards,

[1] According to Bosio he had already written on 20 Oct. 1448.

[2] Were it not that the Duke of Savoy's agreement with Genoa (p. 514) dates from 1450, we might suspect that the Grand Master had got wind of it.

[3] Kyprianos (p. 210) says that John appealed to the Sultan as his suzerain, and the Karaman, fearing the Sultan's wrath and power, straightway restored Gorhigos. The untrustworthy Loredano (Giblet, II, p. 183) says that John sent Carceran Suarez to Cairo with presents, which persuaded the Sultan to send a message to the Karaman ordering him to restore Gorhigos or expect a declaration of war. The Karaman, alarmed by this threat, and the report that the Christians were forming a league against him, easily agreed to make peace and restore Gorhigos. There seems to be no other evidence for the recovery of the place by the King.

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who retired to the strong places in the island and trusted to chance. The King's government was divided against itself, as appears from letters received at Genoa from the officials at Famagusta, which, while repeating the usual complaints of injury received at the King's hands, mentioned the loss of Gorhigos, the 'various discords which have arisen between the chief men of the Kingdom, and last of all manifest dangers threatening the King and his realm'.[1] The Grand Master of the Hospital heard similar reports and, shocked by this state of things, equipped a new galley and despatched it to Cyprus with the regular guardship of Rhodes, at the same time warning the Admiral of King Alfonso of Aragon, Bernard of Villamarina, of the dangerous situation, and writing to encourage King John to help himself and not put his trust in the western Powers. The two galleys reached Cyprus, and so did Villamarina's squadron of ten. The Sultan of Egypt also, it is said, despatched a fleet of some size. His display of force frightened the Emir of Scandelore off his enterprise,[2] and on 7 September 1450 a treaty was sworn between the King and the Emir.[3] It is a treaty of friendship, and undertakes that the traders of both Powers shall have free access to ports.[4] Damages for any injury suffered by the one party at the hands of the other shall be paid by the offending party. Either party, learning of any intended enemy attack on the other, shall give warning. The treaty is confided to the charge of the Grand Master, who is to arbitrate in any dispute arising out of the breach of its terms.

[1] Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 237 (13 Nov. 1448). But Genoa was as nervous about the Venetians as about the Moslems. On 14 Aug. 1449 it had a report that the Venetians were preparing a powerful fleet for Cyprus; it was decided to take steps for the defence of Famagusta. The Doge intended by his preparations to show the Venetians that the Genoese were not so weak as to seem dead men; even if the Venetian aim were not Cyprus, it was necessary to demonstrate that Genoa knew how to defend its interests (*ibid.* p. 238).

[2] Raynaldus, 1450, p. 555, § 14; Bosio, II, p. 179. Kyprianos (*loc. cit.*) says that King John appealed to both the Grand Master and the Sultan, and the latter, out of emulation of the Hospital, sent his fleet.

[3] Preserved in Greek in the Maltese archives. M.L., *H.* III, pp. 64–6; *Rel. pol. et comm.* II, p. 141. Miklosich et Müller, III, pp. 284–5; Sakellarios, II, pp. 1–3; Aimilianides in Κυπρ. Σπ. III. pp. 91 ff. The last discusses the treaty in the light of international law. This is the earliest known instance of the use of Greek for an official Cypriote document.

[4] It is to be noted that the limitation of traffic to the ports of Famagusta and Kerynia, which had been agreed with the Genoese in 1383, is here ignored, perhaps deliberately. See Aimilianides, *op. cit.* p. 102.

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It was in accordance with this treaty that the Emir of Scandelore asked for help from Cyprus when in 1451 he was besieged by the Grand Karaman, Ibrahim Beg, to whom an understanding between Scandelore and Cyprus cannot have been welcome. King John forwarded the appeal to Rhodes. The Grand Master sent the Turcopolier, William Dawnay,[1] with some ships, and with this reinforcement the King laid siege to Anamur, with what effect is not known.[2] It was in connexion with this campaign that King John asked for the aid of Venice.[3] The Senate agreed to send an ambassador to ask the Grand Karaman to live in peace with Cyprus; otherwise it would take further steps. Francis Venier was elected ambassador in May, but did not leave until July. He was instructed to go and return by Cyprus.[4] Mark Cornaro also appears to have represented the interests of Cyprus on this mission, as he was to do in the time of James II.[5] Some success seems to have been obtained, for the Grand Karaman expressed himself as ready to act with Venice, the Pope and the King of Aragon against their common enemy, and on 12 February 1453 Venice concluded a commercial treaty with him.[6]

Although in 1448 the Sultan Jakmak may have connived at the designs of the Grand Karaman, his successor Inal at least pretended to a most friendly attitude towards the King. This appears clearly from a letter which he wrote on his accession in 1453 to John, acknowledging the congratulations which had been conveyed by Peter Podocataro.[7]

[1] Preceptor of Dynemore; appointed Turcopolier 18 June 1449, ob. 1468. Whitworth Porter, *Hist. of the Knights of Malta*[2] (1883), p. 726.

[2] Bosio, II, p. 181.

[3] The King's ambassadors went on to Rome, doubtless on the same errand (Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 263, 31 March 1451). On these negotiations with the Grand Karaman see the same, pp. 253 (30 March 1451), 263 (May), 265–6 (July), 267 (10 Oct.), 278 (18 July 1452), 281 (12 Feb. 1453).

[4] While there he was to demand that the King should pay the salary of the Venetian Bailie, Andrew Morosini; but John refused.

[5] The Venetian ambassador was instructed (18 July 1452) to complain to the King because Mark could not recover his expenses, 500 ducats.

[6] Romanin, IV, pp. 523–5.

[7] Fl. Bustron, in M.L., *H.* III, pp. 73–5, and in the ed. of R. de Mas Latrie, pp. 382–4 (under date 1458; but the letter is dated first day of the moon of November, A.H. 861, A.D. 1457). Since, however, Inal's accession was in March 1453, the date of the letter must be in that year, and so we find it in the version printed by Iorga, *N.E.* II, pp 525–6, from a Munich MS. (lat. 4143) of the 17th century, containing letters from or to Moslem rulers, mostly forgeries. From a phrase in the letter, M.L., *H.* III, p. 74,

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It seems that the accession of the Sultan had been celebrated with great festivities at Nicosia. The Sultan acknowledges the tribute (paid in camlets) and remits the arrears of tribute outstanding to the amount of 16,520 ducats. At the request of the King he is writing to the Ottoman Sultan, begging him to call off the raiders who are afflicting the Kingdom. A fine robe and horse from the Sultan accompany the letter, and the envoy has received similar gifts.

The feeling—so far as it existed—that Cyprus was comparatively secure from the side of Egypt, and agreements such as that with Scandelore described above, did little to relieve the general uneasiness in the West caused by the ever advancing wave of Moslem conquest, which culminated in the fall of Constantinople in 1453.[1] Little enough, however, was done by the Christian Powers, in spite of the continual exhortations which they received from Rome.[2] In 1450 Nicolas V contributed to the cost of a fleet which King Alfonso V of Aragon maintained in the waters of Rhodes and Cyprus.[3] In 1451 he enjoined the whole of Christendom to send troops or money to Cyprus; King John was exhorted to complete the fortifications of Nicosia (indulgences were granted for contributions to the cost of this work); and the old prohibitions against trading with the infidel in arms and munitions were renewed.[4] A bull of 12 April 1455 granted plenary indulgence to those who before 1 May 1455 should give assistance to Cyprus by personal

n. 7, infers that King John actually went to Cairo to the Sultan's 'coronation'. Where R. de Mas Latrie (from the Spinola MS.) reads 'la gratia che mi fece havere l'udito, e veduto al tempestuoso(!) coronamento', he (from the London MS.) has 'la gratia che vi fece d'haver udito et veduto al tempo il nostro coronamento . The Munich MS. reads 'la gratia che vi ha fatta d'haver udito e veduto il tempo nostro, il nostro coronamento'.

[1] The statement of Bosio (II, p. 184; cp. Phrantzes, p. 94) that the King of Cyprus then offered to pay tribute to the Turk is unlikely to be correct.

[2] Cp. the summary in M.L., *H.* III, p. 67n.

[3] Raynaldus, 1450, p. 559, § 18. It was due to the persuasion of the Grand Master that this fleet, under Bernard of Villamarina, was sent to the protection of Cyprus: Raynaldus, as above, p. 555, § 14. See above, p. 521.

[4] Raynaldus, 1451, p. 568, § 4; Pastor, II, pp. 247, 503–5; Iorga, *N.E.* II, pp. 457–8. Domin. Georgius, *Vita Nicolai V P.M.* (1742), p. 99, quoted by Reinhard, II, p. 33, note *o*, cites the encyclical of Nicolas to the Emperor Frederick III and the Kings of Hungary, Poland, Sweden, Norway, Bohemia, Sicily, England, Scotland and Cyprus; but his assertion that Mehmed II made war against Cyprus with a huge army is incorrect. This was doubtless the report which reached the Pope, but the Sultan's designs were against Constantinople.

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service or subsidy. King John, on 6 January 1452, empowered his envoy, Paul or Paulin Chappe, to receive subscriptions,[1] and Chappe in his turn sent his representatives all over Europe for the purpose. The names are preserved of the Commissioners who went to Germany: John de Castro Coronato, with his assistants Abel Kilchof of Cologne and Philip Gurri, of the Cypriote family. At Mainz they obtained the necessary licence from Bishop Dietrich. The earliest copies of the indulgence, for which the novel process of printing with movable type was used, perhaps for the first time successfully, were produced at Mainz and bear the dates of 1454 or 1455, and the name of Paulinus Chappe, councillor, ambassador and procurator of the King of Cyprus.[2] Of the indulgences sold in France, half the profits received in 1452 were assigned to the refortification of Nicosia.[3] The fall of Constantinople in 1453 gave a new impetus to the Pope's efforts;[4] we have seen that the indulgences were being

[1] Gudenus, *Codex diplom. anecdotorum*, IV (1758), pp. 309–11.

[2] See G. Zedler, 'Die Mainzer Ablassbriefe der Jahre 1454 und 1455' in *Veröffentlichungen der Gutenberggesellschaft*, XII–XIII (Mainz, 1913). I have to thank Mr V. Scholderer for the latest information on this subject. The indulgences, he writes (6 Nov. 1940), 'were printed in two editions, one in the compass of 30 lines, the other in 31 lines, with the year-dates 1454 or 1455 supplied in type, leaving the month and day of issue to be supplied by hand: the earliest of such insertions known are of 27 February, 1455, in a copy of the 30-line edition, and 22 October, 1454, in one of the 31-line issue. Of the former eight copies are preserved...of the latter 36 survive.' Copies of both are at London and Manchester. See Aloys Ruppel, *Johannes Gutenberg* (1939), pp. 159–64, with facsimiles. The two editions are described in Brit. Mus. *Catal. of Books printed in the XVth century*, Part I, pp. 15, 17, and in *Gesamtkat. d. Wiegendrucke*, nos. 6555, 6556. The seal (Zedler, Pl. XVI) is known in eight slight varieties. It bears a cross between the sun and moon, accompanied by the emblems of the Passion (scourge, sponge, crown of thorns and three nails) and flanked by the shields of the Papacy (crossed keys ensigned with the tiara) on the dexter side, and on the sinister of the Kingdom of Cyprus: quarterly, (1) Jerusalem, (2) Lusignan, (3) Cyprus, (4) Armenia, crowned. At the foot of the cross a shield charged with a lion. The legend is 'S(igillum) indulgen(ciarum) amplissimaru(m) pro deffensione fidei regi Cipri concessarum'. The lion shield has been explained as the family arms of John II (which it certainly is not) or as the arms of Armenia (which is unlikely, since that coat is already in the quarterings of the shield of the Kingdom). Neither is Cyprus likely, for the same reason. Zedler (p. 14) suggests that it is the shield of Paulin Chappe; his family bearing is unknown.

[3] Raynaldus, 1452, p. 604, § 15.

[4] King John's ambassador Hugh Podocataro was in Tuscany in Sept. 1453 (M.L., *H.* III, pp. 72f.), pointing out the necessity of peace in Italy if the Turk was to be stopped in his career. In August and October of the same year we find him as ambassador to Alfonso of Aragon-Naples (Iorga, *N.E.* II, p. 56; M.L., *H.* III, p. 810). In

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issued in 1454 and 1455. Nicolas's successor, Calixtus III (April 1455–August 1458), by the hand of his secretary Aeneas Sylvius, made known the objects for which the subscriptions were intended; the papal fleet was for the defence of Cyprus, Rhodes, Mytilene, Chios and other islands in Christian hands.[1] And the Legate Louis Scarampi, Cardinal of San Lorenzo in Damaso, was reminded in 1458 that if the Turk was threatening to invade Hungary, the Grand Karaman equally again had designs on Cyprus.[2] Unfortunately, the subscriptions did not always reach their destination. Thus in 1455 King Christian I of Denmark appropriated all the pious offerings which had been deposited in the treasury of the cathedral of Roskilde.[3]

The raising of money by indulgences or other means did little to cure the chronic insolvency of the Cyprus treasury. Nor could any measures adopted in the island itself produce any but the most meagre results. Thus the sum of 69,095 ducats which was obtained in May 1437 from Antony Fluvian, Grand Master of Rhodes, for certain estates which he acquired for the Order, was a mere drop in the bucket.[4] But the Order in general showed itself accommodating. The King still owed it a considerable proportion of the 15,000 ducats which it had advanced towards the ransom of Janus. In 1446 the Order agreed to accept the sugar crop of two estates in the Paphos district for the coming year, and the estate of Tarsi with all its appurtenances (the revenue of which was reckoned at 1000 ducats) for five years from 1448.[5]

We may now turn to the domestic history of the reign, on which, in preference to its external affairs, the unofficial sources are lavish of detail.

It was not until 1437 that the question of finding a wife for the King came to the front. He was then about twenty-three years of age. Tafur,[6]

Aug. 1454 he, with Peter Palestrino, Turcopolier, was in Genoa on the business of the King's debts (Iorga, *N.E.* I, p. 86, n. 5). The arrival of the envoys from Cyprus and Rhodes in Rome in November is described by Nicolas della Tuccia, *Cronaca di Viterbo*, in Ciampi, *Cronache e statuti della città di Viterbo* (Florence, 1872), p. 229.

[1] 1457. Aeneas Sylvius, *Opera* (Basil. 1551), p. 841 (ep. 371, Calixtus to the Roman Emperor Frederick); Raynaldus, 1457, p. 114, § 41.

[2] Raynaldus, 1458, p. 146, § 19.

[3] Pastor, II, p. 383.

[4] Herquet, *Charlotta*, p. 89.

[5] Herquet, *ibid.* p. 91.

[6] Tr. Letts, p. 104. He is out as regards the King's age, which he puts at sixteen or seventeen. There seems to have been a project to marry the Duke of Savoy's daughter Margaret, widow of Louis III of Anjou in 1434, to the King of Cyprus, but it came to nothing. It may be to this, or to the marriage of Medea which actually took place (see below), that Tafur refers.

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who was present in Cyprus, says that in that year while he was there two ambassadors came, one from the Duke of Savoy and the other from a Duke in Germany, each one to offer his daughter in marriage. At the same time it was said that another marriage was being urged by the Grand Master of Rhodes, the proposed bride being a daughter of the Count of Urgel in Aragon, sister of the wife of the Infante Don Peter, Regent of Portugal. Tafur thought that the King's Council favoured most the alliance with Savoy, and believed that this was the one that came about.[1]

John's marriage with Medea, daughter of the Marquess of Montferrat, John James Paleologo, took place by proxy on 23 December 1437 at Ripaille in Savoy. It had been negotiated by Medea's uncle, the Duke of Savoy, and Cardinal Hugh.[2] Nothing is known of the other proposals which are said to have been made. There was some hesitation about bringing the marriage to a conclusion. Venice suspected the Duke of Savoy of ulterior designs, and for a time the Marquess considered giving his daughter to the Marquess of Mantua, John Francis Gonzaga, who was Captain-General of the Venetian army. Eventually the Signory approved the marriage of Medea with the King of Cyprus, but she did not sail from Venice until 27 May 1440.[3] The marriage was celebrated at Nicosia in Santa Sophia on Sunday, 3 July 1440. But Medea survived the ceremony but a few months, dying on 13 September.[4]

[1] Tafur left Cyprus hardly later than about 20 Oct. 1437; for on the second day after he reached Rhodes he saw the Grand Master, John de Lastic, and presented to him letters from the King; and that same night, Lastic died. That date is known to be 29 Oct.

[2] Benvenutus de S. Georgio, *Hist. Montis Ferrati*, as printed by Muratori, *R.I.S.* XXIII, col. 708, has 23 Sept. which is corrected by M.L., *Gén.* p. 45, after Guichenon, from the MS. of the History. Details in M.L., *H.* III, p. 79, n. 1. Monod, *Ristretto*, p. 9, dates the marriage contract 25 Feb. 1437, I know not on what authority.

[3] M.L., *H.* III, p. 80, n. 2. For her stay at Venice, see the details in Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 57, n. 4; also *Relatione* in Reinhard, II, Beyl. 3, p. 29, which has the wrong year 1435. A fine reception was given her by the Doge and Dogaressa; she stayed with John Cornaro Episcopia, and among her presents were a balas ruby worth 500 ducats and another jewel of 400.—In consideration of the necessitous state of the Marquess, the King's ambassadors accepted a dowry of 25,000 ducats instead of the 100,000 which might have been expected; payment was to be completed within a term of eighteen years. Benv. de S. Georgio, *op. cit.* col. 709.

[4] Machaeras, 708; Strambaldi, p. 288; Amadi, p. 517. Fl. Bustron, p. 371, gives no date. Aeneas Sylvius (*Comm.* p. 322), followed by the *Chronicle* of Magno (Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 58n.), by Monod, and by Loredano (Giblet, II, p. 172) says that her death

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She was buried in St Dominic's in the same coffin as her mother-in-law.

Little time was lost in filling her place. There was Greek blood in the Paleologi of Montferrat; the lady who took Medea's place, Helena, daughter of Theodore II Palaeologus, Despot of Morea and Duke of Sparta, second son of the Emperor Manuel, was pure Greek.[1] The marriage was celebrated in Santa Sophia by the Prior of Antioch on 3 February 1442.

Helena, as all descriptions of her agree, was a virago endowed with a plentiful share of true Greek subtilty (or, as Aeneas Sylvius put it, treacherousness), bitterly hostile to the Roman Church, and in vindictiveness towards a rival in the King's affections hardly surpassed by Queen Eleanor.[2] She speedily took the measure of her effeminate husband, and the history of the next sixteen years is one long story of her conflict with those who stood in the way of her domination in the State and in the royal household. The death of Cardinal Hugh in August 1442[3] removed one who had guided the affairs of the Kingdom with skill and prudence ever since the disaster of Khirokitia. The court of Cyprus during Helena's lifetime presents a sorry picture of intrigue,

was due either to the climate or, as report said, to poison. Sanudo, writing in 1532 (*Diarii*, LVI, 1042), mentions the report of poison. Almost all her suite died at the same time. Loredano also mentions heart-failure. Lusignan (*Chor.* f. 60b) says she was delicate, and died of the rigours of the voyage to Cyprus.

[1] Machaeras, 709, 710; Strambaldi, p. 288; Amadi, p. 517; Fl. Bustron, p. 371. On the discrepancies in the days of the week and month in Machaeras, see Dawkins's note.

[2] Aeneas Sylvius, *Comm.* p. 322: 'ingeniosa et cordata mulier, verum Graeca instituta perfidia, Latinis inimica sacris et Romanae hostis ecclesiae'; followed by *Chronicle* of Magno, Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 58n., which adds that she introduced the Greek calendar. Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 155b: 'femme caute, fine et malicieuse'. The chronic bad health from which she suffered did not improve her temper. She was always ailing, says G. Bustron (p. 413), and Lusignan (*Chor.* f. 60b) says that was why she had no more children after Cleopatra and Charlotte. What the Genoese thought of her and her friends may be gathered from Bartholomew da Levanto, Captain of Famagusta, who in 1455 wrote to the Protectors of the Bank of St George: 'Questo reame è governato per la reina marotta in lecto che pare uno spirito, una pessima greca; soi compagni sono un vilano Thoma de le Moree, un medico maisto Jacobo Sanchituto, homini tutti indiavolati et perfidi e massime contra la nazione nostra. Loro protectore et defensore Johanne de Nava'; and of the last he says 'è homo vilissimo, per essere padre di ladri'. R. di Tucci, 'Il Matrimonio fra Ludovico di Savoia e Carlotta di Cipro' in *Bollettino Storico-Bibliogr. Subalpino*, XXXVII (1935), p. 85. Yet Famagusta was glad to welcome Thomas when he had to fly from Nicosia (below, p. 535).

[3] M.L., *Arch.* p. 286; Loredano (Giblet), II, p. 177.

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jealousy and assassination, with only one passage in relief, when Prince John of Portugal seems for a few months to have had the upper hand, until he suddenly disappeared.

The Orthodox Church in Cyprus must have hailed with delight the advent to the throne of a woman who had no qualms about giving practical effect to her hostility to the Roman Church. The witnesses against her are, it is true, prejudiced,[1] being Latins, but there seems to be no doubt that she did her best to raise the Greeks from the state of subjection under which they had groaned for so long. The lay *Graeculi esurientes* whom she brought in her train also doubtless profited by her favour. Not content with exerting her influence in the way in which strong-minded wives are wont to do, she sought official recognition as Regent of the Kingdom, and secured it from the Haute Cour.[2] That a Regent could be appointed during the lifetime of a King of mature age and *compos mentis*, was, as we have seen in the case of Henry II, not impossible; even there, the King's enemies maintained that his health prevented him from conducting the affairs of State in a satisfactory manner. But, unlike Henry, King John was, to his shame, consenting to the arrangement, and Helena obtained complete control of the affairs of the Kingdom. John gave himself up entirely to a life of self-indulgence.

Two daughters were the fruit of this union; Cleopatra, who died in infancy, and Charlotte.[3] The dates of their births are uncertain.[4] There

[1] Aeneas Sylvius, *loc. cit.*: 'quae ubi consummato matrimonio viri vecordiam cognovit, non tam reginam quam regem egit; regnumque ipsa gubernavit, magistratus veteres deposuit, novos instituit, sacerdotia pro suo arbitrio ordinavit, et, eliminato Latinorum ritu, Graecanicum superinduxit, belli pacisque leges dixit. Viro satis fuit convivari, deliciisque affluere, atque in hunc modum universa insula in potestatem Graecorum rediit.' Being Greek, says Lusignan (*Chor.* f. 60b) she 'changed almost all the Latin rite to the Greek, and gave almost all the offices to Greeks'. Her benefactions to the Orthodox monastery of Mangana so eclipsed its earlier history (as to which see below, pp. 1072 f.) that she was reputed to have founded it. She established refugees there after the fall of Constantinople in 1453, and gave it estates bringing in more than 1500 ducats a year (Machaeras, 711; Strambaldi, p. 288; Fl. Bustron, p. 372; Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 60b; Hackett, p. 361; Papaïoannou, II, pp. 154–5).

[2] Fl. Bustron, p. 372; Loredano (Giblet), II, p. 175.

[3] Cleopatra is mentioned by Lusignan (*Descr.* f. 156, cp. *Chor.* f. 60b) before Charlotte, but after her by Fl. Bustron (p. 373: Cleopa).

[4] Reinhard, II, p. 29 has 1436 for Charlotte, and M.L., *Gén.* p. 45, has the same although he rightly states, a few lines higher up, that her parents were not married until 1442. Charlotte was under twenty-five in 1462 (see the treaty of that year, Monod, *Trattato*, p. 49).

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were unfortunately no sons; but by a Greek mistress, Mary or Marietta of Patras, John had in 1440 or 1441[1] a son James, known as James the Bastard, who was to usurp the throne as James II. Helena was madly jealous of her rival, and made a violent assault on her. In illustration of the manners of the court we record that Marietta came out of the struggle without her nose, the Queen having, as the French historian says, for lack of a knife made use of her teeth. The unfortunate woman came to be known as *Comomutene* (crop-nosed).[2]

The death of Cardinal Hugh in August 1442 threw vacant the archbishopric of Nicosia, and a pretty quarrel sprang up between the Queen and Eugenius IV[3] It goes far to explain the bitterness with which the future Pius II speaks of her (p. 527, n. 2). Among the Greeks whom Helena had brought with her to Cyprus were her foster-mother, an ambitious woman whose influence is said to have been paramount, and her foster-brother Thomas. The foster-mother's intrigues on behalf of her family greatly embittered the politics of the court. She had a nephew whom Helena, at her instigation, recommended to the Pope as successor to the Cardinal. As he was of the Orthodox faith, it is not surprising that

[1] Calculated from the fact that he was still in his 33rd year at his death on 6 July 1473 (Malipiero, *Ann. Ven.* II, p. 599); cp. Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 72b; *Descr.* f. 183. This carries more weight than the statement of Pius II (*Comm.* p. 325) that he was twenty-two at the time when he fled to Cairo, early in 1459.

[2] M.L., *Gén.* p. 47, n. 7, says that the Queen who is the heroine of this story was either Medea or Helena; in *Nouv. preuves*, *B.E.C.* 32, p. 357, he decides for the former. I see no reason to doubt that it was Helena, as we read in Fl. Bustron (p. 372) and Lusignan (*Descr.* f. 156), to whom we owe the story; not to mention Loredano (Giblet, II, p. 174), who makes Helena cut off her rival's ears as well as her nose. Fl. Bustron says that it was when Marietta was known to be with child by the King that she was attacked by the Queen in the hope of aborting the issue, who however was born the handsome James the Bastard. Since James was born in 1440 or 1441, this, if true, would rule out Helena. But a point like this cannot be pressed; and the story fits the passionate character of Helena. Of Medea's we know nothing. Lusignan's description of this 'tant cruel, brave, furieux et chevaleureux combat' is written with evident relish; he adds that the King took indescribable pleasure in watching two such brave Amazons contending for his love. Cp. *Chor.* f. 60b.—On the derivation of Comomutene from κόπτω and μύτη (nose), see Hackett, p. 158, n. 1 (Papaïoannou, I, p. 208, n. 48).

[3] M.L., *Arch.* pp. 286ff.; Hackett, pp. 155f.; Papaïoannou, I, pp. 204f. Loredano is unfortunately our only source for this episode from the Cypriote side. Machaeras and Amadi (save for a few casual addenda) fail us from about the beginning of John's reign, and Florio Bustron is also deficient until 1456, when he and George Bustron begin to give full information.

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the Pope refused his consent; indeed it seems that, in anticipation of some such move on the Queen's part, he had already nominated Galesius de Montolif, and the see was thus no longer vacant. We shall recur to this episode in another chapter; here it is sufficient to say that the dispute, after dragging on for some three or four years, was settled in favour of the Pope's nominee. It is clear that the Queen's policy of subordinating the Latin clergy to the Greek was not always so successful as the Latin writers, so hostile to her, would have us believe.

Thomas of Morea, however, her foster-brother, was by her influence promoted to a position of considerable power. The King knighted him and gave him the office of Chamberlain of Cyprus, and estates which brought in great revenues.[1] It is true that the story of his being entrusted with the command of the army in an attempt on Famagusta (p. 504, n. 1) cannot be accepted. But his power at court evidently grew steadily, until James the Bastard made an end of him. The stages of this growth cannot be traced, owing to a gap of some fifteen years in the domestic sources. It is not until 1456 that the situation becomes somewhat clearer.

Meanwhile James, the natural son of the King by Marietta of Patras, was growing up. He was a lad of remarkable qualities, which showed themselves from his earliest days.[2] Of fine physique and good looks, he was adored by his father, who, it was said, would willingly have abdicated in his favour, but for fear of the Queen. He was brought up by his mother, until he was of age to go to school. There he showed less taste for letters than for fencing and riding; he rode his mounts almost to death, and nothing could tire him.[3] He bullied all his school-fellows, even those much older than himself; and woe to anyone whom he thought to have touched his honour; he did not sleep until he had had his revenge. The whole city had a wholesome respect for him, and some foresaw that so high-spirited a youth would not be satisfied with less than the highest position in the Kingdom.

[1] Fl. Bustron, p. 374; G. Bustron, p. 415.

[2] Fl. Bustron, p. 372. But Malipiero (*Ann. Ven.* p. 596) says that 'nei so principii havè poca virtù e poco anemo', but good luck brought him to the throne very quickly and without opposition. The last statement, at any rate, is not in accordance with the facts.

[3] Lusignan (*Descr.* f. 167b) says that he was recommended to the Sultan by his fine horsemanship; there was no animal so fierce but he could break it in, and his seat was so good that he looked like a tall column, and no horse could throw him; so strong was he that there was no bow he could not bend.

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He was barely thirteen or fourteen years of age when King John attempted to move the Pope to appoint him to the archbishopric of Nicosia, which was then vacant.[1] The King put him in possession of the revenues of the see, and of the archiepiscopal palace, where he lodged with his mother.[2] But never did Rome consent to confirm the election;[3] and James probably never took the higher orders.[4]

The interests of the Latin party were centred in the King's only legitimate child, his daughter Charlotte, who was a year or two younger than James.[5] In order to secure her succession, in the face of her half-brother's suspected designs on the crown, it was necessary to find her a husband. The official candidate was John of Coimbra, son of Peter, Duke of Coimbra, and grandson of John I, King of Portugal. Negotiations for the union were set on foot in 1455,[6] and practically concluded

[1] M.L., *H.* III, p. 73. Müller, *Documenti*, p. 178. The Republic of Florence, on 19 Sept. 1453, asks Nicolas V to grant the request of King John, whose ambassadors had come to Florence to insist on the necessity of pacifying Italy in order to resist the Turks, and were at the same time asking that the see of Nicosia should be conferred on the King's son. The granting of this favour would afford much consolation to the King among his present afflictions. This document proves that John's appointment of his son to the see dates from three years earlier than that usually assigned to it, 1456 (Fl. Bustron, p. 373, says that James had then reached fifteen years; G. Bustron, p. 415, that he was seventeen years old). From the fact that James was nominated by the King, but not confirmed by the Pope, he was known as the *postulato*, designate (Fl. Bustron, p. 373; cp. Magno, cited by Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 238, n. 1: 'Apostoleo'), which the Greeks turned into 'Αποστολές (M.L., *H.* III, pp. 76, n. 4, 82, n. 3; *Arch.* pp. 289f.; Dawkins, Machaeras, Glossary). Sathas (Μεσ. Βιβλ. II, p. ϛθ′, n. 2) ridicules the western writers for not knowing this Greek word, and inventing an absurd etymology, but does not himself give any explanation of the nickname. Zannetos (I, p. 900) supposes that the Bastard had from the beginning two names, *Apostoles* and *James*; the former was preferred by his mother, and was usual until the time when he was proclaimed King. This seems to be pure fiction. These writers do not appear to know the technical meaning of *postulatus*.

[2] Fl. Bustron, p. 373 (Paris MS.); G. Bustron, p. 415.

[3] Aeneas Sylvius, *Comm.* p. 323.

[4] Malipiero, II, p. 596: 'e 'l fese consagrar di quatro ordeni', at the persuasion of Helena; and Aeneas Sylvius says that Helena's object was to make him give up the hope of succeeding to the throne (so, too, Navagero, col. 1119). Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 157b, says he was ordained sub-deacon. He could not without a breach of canon law have been ordained priest before he was thirty years old.

[5] On Charlotte see the studies by Herquet, *Charlotta* (1871) and *Cyprische Königsgestalten* (1881), pp. 52–98, and W. Miller, *Essays*, pp. 502–7.

[6] Reinhard, II, p. 35; M.L., *Gén.* p. 46; A. Van de Put, *Notes and Queries*, 1 June, 1929, cols. 381–4. The Prince was living at the time at the court of Philip the Good of

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before the end of the year. If we may believe the report circulated by the Genoese in Cyprus, the Portuguese prince was selected by Queen Helena and her Council against the wishes of the King and all the nobles.[1] If so, she was to be grievously disappointed in the outcome of her plans, since from the beginning he showed himself strongly opposed to her pro-Greek policy, so much so that when he died unexpectedly she was suspected of having a hand in his removal. However this may be, another candidate was favoured, if not by the King and all the barons, yet by such of the latter as were in sympathy with the Genoese. This was Louis, Count of Geneva, son of the Duke of Savoy and Anna, King John's sister.[2] Nothing could be more conducive to strengthening the control of Cyprus by the Genoese than that a prince of the House of Savoy should mount the throne. The authorities of Famagusta accordingly despatched one Benedict of Vernazza, a wealthy Genoese resident in Cyprus, to the Protectors of the Bank of St George, who were to send him on to impress upon the Duke the desirability of marrying his son to Charlotte. Benedict took with him from Rhodes a letter from the Genoese colony in favour of

Burgundy, who was married to his aunt Isabel. The ambassadors of King John and of the Duke of Burgundy who were to negotiate the marriage with the King of Portugal (Alfonso V, the Prince's cousin) were in Venice on 30 Dec. 1455. The match was approved by Alfonso (Cerone in *Arch. Stor. Prov. Nap.* XXVII (1902), p. 445). King John intended to deposit at Venice certain monies and jewellery for the dowry of his daughter, and his ambassador asked, and the Senate agreed, that this deposit should be secure from all interference. M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 384f. John of Coimbra was elected a Knight of the Golden Fleece at the Hague Chapter of 2 May 1456 (Reiffenberg, *Hist. de l'Ordre du Toison d'Or*, p. 35). Sanudo, in a rather inaccurate summary of Cypriote history, which he inserts in his diaries (LVI, 1039–44), makes King John arrange this marriage after the death of Helena.

[1] Letter from Bartholomew da Levanto, Captain of Famagusta, to the Protectors of the Bank of St George, quoted by R. di Tucci, 'Il Matrimonio fra Ludovico di Savoia e Carlotta di Cipro', in *Bollettino Storico-Bibliogr. Subalpino*, XXXVII (1935), p. 87.

[2] Louis, when eight years old, had been betrothed on 14 Dec. 1444 to Annabella (called Melchis in the *Chron. lat. Sab.*, *Mon. Hist. Patr.* IV, *Scr.* II, col. 617), daughter of James I of Scotland. In 1455 she was brought to Savoy, but since Charles VII of France objected to the marriage, the promise was broken by an instrument drawn on 3 March 1455, in the presence of the ambassadors of the three parties concerned, and confirmed by the King of Scotland on 7 May 1456. This affair cost the Duke of Savoy 50,000 écus (M.L., *H.* III, p. 139, § 9 and n. 1), although the damages are put at only half that sum by Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, II (1778), p. 112. Burnett, *Exchequer Rolls o Scotland*, V, p. lxii, VI, pp. livf., notes that there is hardly any reference to the subject in Scottish records.

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the scheme, and was also charged to speak in the name of one of the Cypriote barons, James II de Flory, Count of Jaffa, who had become so disgusted with the way in which the control of the Kingdom had fallen into the hands of Greeks and worthless people that he had migrated with all his household to Famagusta.[1] He had intended going to Genoa himself, but stayed at Rhodes, entrusting his case to Benedict. The references to the object of the mission, so far, are made in veiled terms; but the instructions given to the emissary by the Protectors at Genoa, on 12 April 1456, are explicit.[2] He is to impress on the Duke the necessity of reform in the government of Cyprus, without alluding to the disposition of the King, which is well known to the Duke. The King's only legitimate child, his daughter Charlotte, must be married to someone who will restore the government to its right course. No one in all Christendom has so good a claim as one of the Duke's sons, belonging as he does through his mother to the blood royal of Cyprus, and ardently desired for their ruler by the chief barons and people of the Kingdom. It is the wish of the Protectors and of the chief citizens of Genoa that the wealthy Kingdom of Cyprus should pass to the house of Savoy, and the Captain and citizens of Famagusta would lend all assistance in their power. No time is to be lost, since the Queen and other enemies of the peace in Cyprus have caused an envoy to be sent to the Burgundian court. If Benedict finds the Duke lukewarm, he is to repeat his efforts at persuasion, but so as to give the impression that he is urging the proposal for the sake of the House of Savoy and the peace of the Kingdom, rather than in the interests of Genoa. If the Duke is favourable, but asks what he may expect from Genoa in the way of subsidy, he is to be told that the Republic will forward the plan in every possible way short of a pecuniary contribution, which it is unable to promise in view of the great expenses incurred in the defence of Caffa, Chios and Mytilene. If he asks what steps are to be taken to upset the Portuguese marriage, Benedict is to say he has no instructions from the Protectors, but explain the plans which have been confided to him by Cypriotes before he came away. Finally he is to discuss the matter with the Duchess and her son.

The Protectors were evidently anxious to avoid responsibility for any practical measures; and they had good reason to be doubtful of

[1] Letter of 25 Sept. 1455, quoted by Tucci, p. 87. The Count was afterwards in the service of Charlotte, and in 1463 was sent by her to Constantinople, where he was murdered. See below, Ch. x, p. 589.

[2] The text in full in Tucci, pp. 88–91.

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obtaining the Duke's agreement; for they must have known that he was shrewd enough not to interfere with arrangements that had been practically concluded some four months earlier. Benedict's mission was therefore without immediate effect, though he may have paved the way for the resumption of negotiations when John of Coimbra was removed from the scene.

The Prince arrived in Cyprus in 1456 and after being married to Charlotte went to live in the house which had belonged to Sir Hugh de la Baume, and which, since the return of King Janus from Egypt, had served as the royal residence.[1] He was at the same time created Prince of Antioch and Regent of the Kingdom.[2] We may hesitate to believe in their entirety the statements[3] that he succeeded in reforming the government, deposing many of the officials who had bought their places or been given them by the favour of Thomas the Chamberlain, and that he restored the Latin rite[4] which had been abolished by the Queen, deposing the Greek intruders (a reform which, however distasteful to the Greeks, was compensated by the satisfaction of their dislike for the Queen and her favourites). But his authority was certainly exercised in these directions. That it was very effective we may doubt from the fact that the intrigue and jealousy which were rife in the royal household[5] made his position so uncomfortable that, much to the annoyance of the King and Queen, he removed himself and Charlotte from under their roof and went to live in the house of the Princess's godfather, Peter de Lusignan, Count of Tripoli, the second cousin of King John.[6] This move had the appearance, true or false, of siding with the party opposed to the Queen.

[1] Fl. Bustron, p. 373; G. Bustron, p. 413. See above, p. 496, n. 2. Both writers say that the wedding took place in the house itself (si maritò nella casa, ἁρμάστην εἰς τὸ ἀπλίκιν).

[2] He is described as Regent of Cyprus in the register of the Knights of the Golden Fleece of 1456.

[3] Aeneas Sylvius, *Comm.* pp. 322–3; Loredano (Giblet), II, p. 185.

[4] Cp. Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 60b.

[5] According to Loredano the Queen, by persuading John that the Prince was his most dangerous enemy, induced the King to deprive him of any control of the affairs of State.

[6] Called his uncle by Machaeras 704 (where see Dawkins, n. 1), Fl. Bustron, p. 373, and G. Bustron, p. 414. See M.L., *Gén.* pp. 45f. Peter had been made Regent at John's accession (above, p. 497) and if he was superseded in that office by the Queen he was doubtless not very friendly to her; but more probably he had ceased to be Regent when John came of age.

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The opportunity which the Prince's enemies desired soon came. A young man named Sciarra[1] was killed in a night encounter with some Brethren of the Hospital. His brothers and friends displayed his corpse in the King's court and demanded justice. Some malicious persons told them that the Brethren who had killed the young man had been instigated by the Prince and were harboured in his house. The fact that the Hospitallers sided with the Latin party was enough to lend credit to this story.[2] A mob attacked the house, and in the struggle two of the Prince's servants and one of the mob were killed, and more than twelve wounded. That the Prince fell sick at this time was supposed to be due to his distress at this incident. It was reported to him that the person who had set the mob against him was the Chamberlain Thomas, who, as soon as he heard that the Prince had reason to suspect him, lent colour to the accusation by betaking himself to Famagusta, where the Genoese, glad to welcome any disturber of the peace of Nicosia, received him with much honour.

The Prince's illness, to whatever cause it was due, carried him off a few days later. Needless to say, poison was suspected.[3] He was buried in the Franciscan church,[4] and his widow returned to her father's

[1] Fl. Bustron, under 1457, p. 373 (*Zarra*); G. Bustron, under 1456, p. 414 (*Tzarra*); Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 60b; *Descr.* f. 157 (no name); Loredano (Giblet), II, p. 189 (*Sciarra*). From Fl. Bustron it appears that the fight may have been provoked by the young man. Sathas, Μεσ. Βιβλ. II, p. ρ′, assumes that he was murdered without provocation by the Brethren.

[2] According to Lusignan the story that it was Hospitallers who had committed the crime was an invention of the Chamberlain and the other Greeks.

[3] Pius II (*Comm.* p. 323): the Prince was poisoned by the Queen's nurse with the consent of the Queen. Magno, in Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 234, n. 1; Fl. Bustron, p. 374; G. Bustron, p. 415. Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 61: the Queen suspected of poisoning the Prince. Navagero, col. 1118E: the Chamberlain persuaded his mother to poison the Prince. Loredano (Giblet), II, pp. 189–91: the Prince swore eternal emnity to the Chamberlain, who instigated his mother to poison him, not without the complicity of the Queen. As a curiosity in the way of caricature of the facts, the following passage (quoted by Zilioli from Buonfiglio, in Reinhard, II, Beyl. p. 183) is probably unsurpassed: 'Fece Ciarlotta avvelenar il marito, per il che Iacopo, suo fratello bastardo, tolta la difesa e protezione della matrigna, amazzò il figlio della nutrice di Ciarlotta, troppo insuperbito per haversi arrogato il governo del Regno.'

[4] See A. Van de Put in *Notes and Queries*, 1 June 1929, p. 384, who quotes a description of the tomb by Fray Pantaliam d'Aveiro, *Itinerario da Terra Sancta* (Lisbon, 1593). The suggestion that Enlart may have found some remains of this tomb was rejected by Jeffery (above, Ch. I, p. 28, n. 2).

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house. The Chamberlain Thomas lost no time in reappearing in the capital.

Precise dates are lacking for John of Coimbra's short career in Cyprus. He arrived some time in or after May 1456 (if we may assume that he was present at the Hague Chapter of the Golden Fleece on 2 May) and died in the summer of 1457.[1]

But, although the leader of the party opposing the Queen had been so opportunely removed, he was soon to be avenged.[2] The widowed Charlotte appealed to her half-brother James, and her accusation was borne out by the common talk. James, a lad of seventeen, showed the metal of which he was made.[3] Accompanied by two Sicilian *bravi*, he went to the house of the Chamberlain, who received him courteously. On the pretext that he wished for a private conversation, he induced the Chamberlain to clear the room of all except the two Sicilians, explaining that it was unnecessary to send them out since they did not understand Greek. At a sign from him, the two ruffians stabbed the Chamberlain dead. On the way out, James was nearly killed by one of the Chamberlain's servants, who threw a stone at him; but he made his

[1] Aeneas Sylvius, writing on 11 Sept. 1457, reported the news, recently received from the East, that the Prince had died of poison. This can hardly have happened more than two months earlier. The Milanese envoy Otto del Carretto, writing from Rome on 25 Feb. 1458, speaks of 'quello giovene di Portogallo che morì là quest' anno' (Fumi in *Arch. Stor. Lomb.* ser. IV, vol. XVII (1912), p. 112). He must mean 1457, although both at Rome and at Milan the year began at Christmas. It is impossible, however, to reconcile such a date with the date of 1 May 1457 given by G. Bustron for the return of the Apostoles to Cyprus from Rhodes, where he had gone after avenging the death of Prince John by the murder of the Chamberlain, and where he stayed five months (pp. 418–19; also the same date for the burial of the murdered Sir James Gurri, p. 421; Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 62 has the same date for the summoning of the Haute Cour and the burial of Gurri; he gives the Apostoles six months at Rhodes). Nor can Bustron have made a mistake only in the year, and not in the month; for these events occurred during the lifetime of Queen Helena, who died 11 April 1458. It would seem that with Herquet (*Charlotta*, p. 118) we must place the return of James at the end of 1457 or beginning of 1458; but the precision of the dates given by G. Bustron, and by his follower Lusignan, remains puzzling.

[2] The murder of Thomas and the flight of James: G. Bustron, pp. 415f.; Fl. Bustron, pp. 374f.; Loredano (Giblet), II, pp. 191ff.

[3] We may, for once, accept the suggestion of Pius II that James murdered the Chamberlain less for his sister's sake than to remove an obstacle to his own ambition for the throne (*Comm.* p. 323). Navagero, col. 1119, puts it differently; it was when he found that the murder of the Chamberlain was approved by the barons that James began to intrigue for the crown.

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way to the house of the Constable, Sir Carceran Suarez, who, in great perplexity, got rid of him by advising him to return to the archiepiscopal palace and secure himself.

The King was torn between indignation at the murder of the Chamberlain, fear of his Queen Helena, and affection for his son. The second emotion for the time outweighed and obliged him to conceal the last. The only punishment he inflicted on the criminal, however, was to deprive him of the revenues of his see. James made every effort to recover them, but neither the Viscount of Nicosia, Sir James Gurri, who was a partisan of the Queen, nor the Queen's confessor, whom at Gurri's suggestion he consulted, was able to help him. There seemed to be no remedy for his situation in Cyprus.[1] Accordingly, one night, accompanied by a priest of Santa Sophia and his squire Martinengo de Lion, he escaped from the city[2] and, taking the horse which had been ordered to wait for him outside, rode for Aliki. There he embarked in a caravel belonging to John Tafur,[3] transferring afterwards to a Florentine galley bound for Famagusta. At that port it became known that he was on board, and the Admiral of Cyprus, Sir Bernard de Rieussec,[4] vainly endeavoured to induce him to land. He sailed on to Rhodes, where he was favourably received and entertained at the expense of the Grand Master. The Hospital (though it was later to sympathise with the Bastard's adversary) seems at this time to have favoured one who was the enemy of the champion of the Greek party, even though he was half a Greek himself and, as we shall see, counted the clergy of both creeds among his supporters.

Five or six months he waited at Rhodes, in the hope that news would reach him from Cyprus that he had been restored to the archbishopric. But none came. It is not unlikely that during this interval, he endeavoured through friends at Rome to obtain from Nicolas V

[1] Navagero, *ibid.*, says that for some days before his flight he hid in the house of the Venetian Bailie. We know that that official favoured him.

[2] Both on this occasion and on his return later James scaled the wall of the Armenian quarter, probably near the Paphos Gate.

[3] M.L., *H.* III, p. 355, n. 1. Tafur became an ardent partisan of James. He helped in the murder of James Gurri and was rewarded with a number of fiefs (Fl. Bustron, p. 422) and made Count of Tripoli and Captain of Famagusta.

[4] This is the form given by M.L., *H.* III, 125, n. 1. We find also *Rousos* (G. Bustron), *Russet* (Fl. Bustron), *Rousset* (Lusignan), *Rosso* (Fl. Bustron) and *Rison* (Lusignan).

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confirmation of his election to the see of Nicosia; if so, he was unsuccessful.[1]

In his retreat he was joined by the Augustinian, William Goneme.[2] A favourite and the confessor of King John, Goneme was driven by party intrigue out of the King's court, and made his way to Rhodes. Another Cypriote Augustinian whom James picked up at Rhodes was one Salpous,[3] who was charged with a message from Pope Calixtus III

[1] Pius II (*Comm.* p. 323) says that his application was opposed by Helena and Charlotte, and that their letters were intercepted by James. Cp. Navagero, col. 1119; Magno, cited by Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 253, n. 1; Bosio, II, p. 205; Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, I, p. 538.

[2] James's return to Cyprus and the murder of the Viscount: Fl. Bustron, pp. 376f.; G. Bustron, pp. 419f.; Lusignan, *Chor.* ff. 61b, 62; *Descr.* ff. 158b, 159; Loredano (Giblet), II, pp. 205ff. On Goneme see M.L., *Arch.* pp. 293–7; A. Palmieri in *Bessarione*, IX (1906), pp. 205–14; the same (P.A.P.), 'de monasteriis ac sodalibus O.E.S.A. in insula Cypro', in *Analecta Augustiniana*, Rome, I (1905–6), pp. 118–24. Goneme's enemies attacked him (under the name Helias) as a bogus Carmelite who suggested to James II his betrayal of Christianity. This is a libel, though he may not have been a saint. He was a man of some learning, attained the degree of lector in theology in 1433, and was teaching the subject at Nicosia next year. It was Helena who drove him out of Cyprus, since she disliked his influence with the King in favour of the Roman Church. He became in 1451 Provincial of the Augustinians in the Holy Land. From Mas Latrie's account, which stresses Goneme's 'vie pure' and lack of personal ambition, we get a distorted impression of the astute ecclesiastic who emerges from the pages of the two Bustrons. He was closely associated with James, supporting him (even if not taking an active part) in such dubious affairs as the attack on the royal residence and the plot to murder his enemies; Lusignan (*Chor.* f. 64b) says that he actually advised James to do this. He employed the customary methods of bribery to win the votes of the Egyptian Emirs. In fact he seems to have been worldly enough. Lusignan attributes his fervour in the cause of James to the promise of the reversion of the archbishopric. James found him useful also as a man of war, and rewarded him with two good estates (Fl. Bustron, p. 418). But his churchmanship was enough to give him a good place in Mas Latrie's books.—On Goneme's Christian name, which is William, though it sometimes appears as Julian in the chronicles (e.g. Fl. Bustron, p. 418), see M.L., *Arch.* p. 293. Lusignan begins by calling him William, but later prefers Elias; in *Chor.* f. 66 he has Fra Elia and Fra Guglielmo within a few lines of each other.

[3] *Salpous* in G. Bustron, p. 420; *Salpon* in Fl. Bustron, p. 379; *Selpon* in Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 61b; *Helpon* in *Descr.* f. 160; *Sulpice* in Loredano (Giblet), II, p. 205. Fl. Bustron says that the object of his mission was not known to James. Sathas (Μεσ. Βιβλ. II, pp. ρα′f.) assumes that the Hospital knew of the Pope's scheme, that he sent his nephew to Rhodes, and that James took him to Cyprus. For all this I can find no good evidence. It was certainly said that Balthasar Borgia was hidden in the Archbishop's

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to King John, proposing the marriage to Charlotte of a nephew, whom the chroniclers call sometimes Poncio, but more frequently Balthasar, Borgia.[1]

By Goneme's advice, two galleys and two caravels were secretly equipped in Rhodes, and James with Goneme sailed for Cyprus. Landing some of his men at Kerynia, he was before the capital before dawn.[2] Scaling the wall of the Armenian quarter, he surprised the Armenians, who however, far from offering any opposition, followed him. He made straight for the house of Sir James Gurri, the Viscount, whom he evidently regarded as responsible for his being deprived of the archbishopric. The unfortunate man was dragged from his bed and, in spite of his prayers for mercy, murdered.[3] His house was sacked. The friar Salpous was sent on a similar mission, with Martinengo de Lion and a number of Catalans, to the house of the Viscount's brother, Sir Thomas Gurri, which they sacked thoroughly, although Sir Thomas himself, by the connivance of Martinengo, escaped.

As day dawned, report reached the King that his son had returned, had killed both the brothers Gurri, and was about to kill all the knights. The bell was rung to arms, and the military assembled to defend the palace. James, for his part, took all the men he had brought with him and any others he could collect,[4] and made himself secure in the Archbishop's palace. The plunder from the houses of the brothers Gurri, which he brought thither with him, was estimated at 6000 ducats.

This cold-blooded outrage seemed to demand condign punishment; but the sequel[5] illustrates the depth to which the government of Cyprus

palace, but this seems to have been an invention of James's enemies. Salpous doubtless diverted to James any funds with which he may have been provided by the Pope (P.A.P., *op. cit.* p. 123).

[1] In G. Bustron he is μισὲρ Ποῦντζες or Μποῦντζες, μισὲρ Παλταζές or Παρταζές; in Fl. Bustron, *signor Ponzio*; in Lusignan, *Chor.*, *Baldassar(e) Borgia*, in his *Descr.*, *Valentin Borgia*; in Loredano (Giblet) *Baltazar Borgia*. No nephew of Calixtus bearing any of these names has been identified. The possibility that Peter Louis, whom Calixtus designed to marry Charlotte, may be meant, is discussed below (p. 542).

[2] For the date, see above, p. 536, n. 1.

[3] He was buried like a pauper in Santa Sophia, says G. Bustron. But his tomb-slab has survived: M.L., *Île de Chypre*, pp. 397–8; Indianos in Κυπρ. Σπ. VI, p. 16.

[4] All the ecclesiastics, says G. Bustron, showing that they still recognized him as Archbishop.

[5] Reinstatement of James and intrigues against him: Fl. Bustron, pp. 377f.; G. Bustron, pp. 421–6; Lusignan, *Chor.* ff. 62 sq.; *Descr.* ff. 159 sq.

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had sunk. The Haute Cour, before whom John without delay [1] formally arraigned his son, demanding judgement according to the Assizes, agreed that James should be arrested and brought before it. Three knights were sent for him, and brought back a stiff reply. James protested that he had attacked not the King but his personal adversaries; he was ready to die in the King's service, if he might have security for his own life, and recover what the King had given him of his own accord, to wit the archbishopric with its revenues and tithes.

The majority of the Haute Cour were well aware of the King's fondness for his son, which was only concealed out of fear for the Queen. The Court abjectly consented to the reinstatement of the criminal, and he was restored to the see, with all its revenues, as they had been enjoyed by Cardinal Hugh, and was granted security for the men whom he had brought with him, on condition that they should go to their ships, on pain of death. The instrument conveying the grant was drawn up before the whole Court, and in the presence of the Venetian Bailie, Peter Arimondo.[2] On receiving the grant, James immediately presented himself at the King's palace, where the sight of the armed guard excited his mirth. He was taken up to the chamber where the Queen lay sick, and the King made a show of scolding him. This was to please the Queen, but can hardly have deceived her. She seemed however to be disarmed, partly by the verdict of the Haute Cour, partly perhaps by her illness. As to the barons in general, those who were friendly to James needed not the hint which they received from the King, to show him no incivility; while his enemies truckled to him. His triumph seemed complete.[3] He dismissed his men to their ships, whither, conducted by the Bailie, they openly carried their loot from the houses of the brothers Gurri. James accompanied them as far as the gate of Nicosia.

He then returned to live in the Archbishop's palace. Under the surface of things a strong current of intrigue ran against him; but his

[1] According to Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 62, on the morning of 1 May 1457. As we have seen, this date is not acceptable (above, p. 516, n. 1).

[2] The important part played at this time by the Venetian Bailie, as if he were a member of the Haute Cour, is curious. He was a great friend of James (Fl. Bustron, p. 378; Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 62b; cp. *Descr.* f. 160). It is possible that it was by the orders of the Signory that he cultivated James's friendship (Magnante, *L'acquisto*, cap. 1, p. 83).

[3] As Navagero puts it (col. 1119), he remained in the city as though he were its conqueror and master.

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policy seems to have been to ignore it as far as possible, and even to pardon those who were detected in plotting against him.[1] One of these was Sir Thomas Gurri. James not only forgave him, but appointed him steward of his affairs, not only domestic but ecclesiastical, in the hope of soothing his animosity. Sir Thomas accepted the position, but never forgave James for the murder of his brother and the sacking of their houses.

The intrigues reached such a pitch that the King was persuaded to retire for greater safety to the castle, with the Queen and Charlotte. One of the charges which Gurri is said to have made against James was that he was conspiring to bring about the marriage of Balthasar Borgia, the Pope's nephew, to the Princess.[2] James, on hearing of the accusation, immediately demanded an enquiry, offering that the friar Salpous should be examined. The friar, and also one of the canons of Nicosia,[3] who had also come from Rome, were accordingly taken by the Viscount of Nicosia (Francis de Montolif, who had succeeded the

[1] One of his servants, Perrin Tounkes (?), had been some time before concerned in an attempt on his life, and had fled to Rhodes. James found him there, pardoned him and brought him back. Again he betrayed his master, taking part in the plot of Sir Thomas Gurri, and again James forgave him. The story of his attempt to murder James may be read in Loredano (Giblet), II, p. 215: Gurri and four assassins were admitted by Perrin to James's chamber, but beaten off by his servants. This is reported by G. Bustron (p. 424) with less embroidery; he speaks again (p. 431) of what seems to be a third attempt to kill James, immediately after the death of King John (below, p. 548). The name of this faithless recipient of such extraordinary favour from James is given as Τοῦνκες or Τοῦγκες by G. Bustron. *Tounches* or *Tunches* by Fl. Bustron (*Tanches* once in Paris MS., *Tundres* or *Zimches* in the Spinola MS.); *Janches* by Loredano.

[2] Why this in itself should have been regarded as treasonable is not clear, but it was obviously against the Queen's anti-Roman policy. G. Bustron, however, implies that it frightened the King into retiring to the castle. According to Lusignan (*Chor.* f. 62b; *Descr.* f. 160b) and Loredano (Giblet, II, p. 216), the King was told that Balthasar Borgia was hidden in the Archbishop's palace, and the plan was to kidnap Charlotte, which would be a reason for taking her to the castle. The nephews of Calixtus III cannot have been popular with the Cyprus government at this time. Two of them had lately raided the island; the papal Legate had caught and imprisoned them. Aeneas Sylvius, *Opera*, 1551, p. 792, ep. 269 (4 July 1457), cited by M.L., *H.* III, p. 99, n. 1. Herquet (*Charlotta*, p. 106) assumes that Balthasar was one of these two. It is to be remembered that all the nephews of Calixtus were called Borgia, some by direct grant, whatever their family names might be. Pastor, II, pp. 463–4.

[3] John Γράντον (G. Bustron, p. 426); *Grand'huomo* (Fl. Bustron, p. 379); *Grande* (Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 62b); *Grandi* (Giblet, II, p. 217).

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murdered James Gurri) to Kerynia, and put on the rack. James, who had expected them to be examined at the castle, and hoped to take part in the examination, considering that, since the victims were clerks, he had a right to be present, was much annoyed. The reason for taking them to Kerynia, it was alleged, was that the Queen wished to prevent the King from learning what they might reveal. However, severe torture failed to extract any confession damaging to James.[1] The torturing of a papal nuncio may have been unprecedented, but it is very doubtful whether his mission was an open one, that is, whether he was accredited to the King; he seems to have been a furtive person, and he had been concerned in the outrage on the brothers Gurri.

The Cypriote chroniclers are our only sources for this mysterious project on behalf of a Balthasar or Poncio, nephew of Calixtus III. But from other sources contemporary with the events we know that Calixtus had a nephew, Peter Louis, son of Jofre de Borja y Doms and of Isabella the Pope's sister, whom he designed as a husband for Charlotte and thus as a successor to the crown of Cyprus. In spite of the extreme difficulty of explaining how the names can have been thus confused, it is not easy to resist the conclusion that the chroniclers and the Italian letter-writers whom we are about to quote are referring to the same person.[2] However this may be, writing on 20 February 1458 to Francis Sforza of Milan, Antony of Pistoia, of the Roman curia, says: 'Messer Borgia during this illness made a vow that if he survived he would go in person to fight the Turk. And though it was said afterwards that the Pope had absolved him from this vow, nevertheless he is now preparing to go, with the intention of making himself King of Cyprus. Because the present King is old, and his only child is one daughter, whom he intends to marry to whoever is to succeed him on the throne. The Pope thinks that as he has made his nephew Prefect and Captain-General of the Church, this family alliance ought easily to be brought about. And a few days ago, His Holiness sent, to treat of this

[1] So say G. Bustron and Fl. Bustron definitely; but Lusignan (*Chor.* f. 63; not in *Descr.*) says *di poi che furono più ristretti, confessorno ogni cosa.*

[2] For Peter Louis de Borgia, see W. H. Woodward, *Caesar Borgia*, App. I, Table I. He died in 1458. For the correspondence about this project, see L. Fumi, 'Un Borgia re di Cipro e imperatore di Costantinopoli?' in *Arch. Stor. Lombardo*, ser. IV, vol. XVII (1912), pp. 111–13. My attention was called to the authorities on this episode by Mr A. Van de Put, who suggested that Balthasar or Poncio Borgia is really Peter Louis.

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matter, a Friar of Cyprus, to whom he gave 500 ducats, and who has assured him that the arrangement will surely be concluded.' Antony goes on to remind the Duke that he had once heard of a project of King John to marry his daughter to one of the Duke's sons (by which the Kingdom of Cyprus would accrue to the Duke), and he thought it was a Hospitaller, Christopher Visconti, who had been in those parts, who had told him about it. Another correspondent, the Milanese envoy Otto del Carretto, on 25 February 1458, writes that the Pope is treating for the marriage of the Prefect to the daughter of the King of Cyprus, who was the wife of that young man from Portugal who died there this year; and these negotiations have made some people suppose that His Holiness is thinking of making him King of Cyprus (because the King has no (legitimate) son and is himself almost imbecile, as is reported), and so afterwards making him Emperor of Constantinople with the help of the Christian military and naval forces. Carretto even learns that the Pope has informed the King of Aragon that he has created the Prefect Emperor of Constantinople.

The ambitious schemes of Calixtus, even if they had not been frustrated by his death on 8 August 1458, were doomed to come to naught, for the King had other plans, and had probably been for some time in negotiation with the Duke of Savoy and the Duchess, his sister, for the marriage of their son Louis to the Princess. Whatever part the King may have played a few years before this, when Louis was proposed as a rival to John of Coimbra, he was now clearly in favour of the union with Savoy. At the same time there is evidence that the first move came not from the court of Cyprus, but from the Duke and Duchess of Savoy. Years afterwards, in 1466,[1] Louis maintained that long before any embassy came to Savoy about this proposal, the Duke and Duchess had sent Br. George de Piozasque to Cyprus, and but for pressure from that quarter the marriage would never have come about. The negotiations progressed slowly, probably owing to the bitter opposition of the Queen, who as an Orthodox Greek was filled with horror at the idea of a marriage between first cousins.[2] Dispensations for such unions might be obtained from the Roman Church, but in the Greek they were anathema. On her deathbed she sent for Charlotte and commanded

[1] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 134, 135, n. 1.

[2] Pius II, with even more than his usual disregard for facts, says that it was by the persuasion of her mother and the barons that Charlotte was betrothed to Louis. *Opera*, 1551, p. 379.

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her with prayers and imprecations that she should not take her first cousin as husband. Equally she conjured King John against perpetrating such wickedness. But recent events had so shaken her that her health, always bad, grew rapidly worse. She left the castle and went to the Dominican monastery, where she died on 11 April 1458,[1] and where she was buried.

So little attention did John pay to Helena's objection to the marriage of Charlotte to her cousin, that almost immediately after her death he despatched Sir John Montolif, the Marshal of Cyprus, and Sir Odet Bussat, to fetch Louis of Savoy to Cyprus.[2] The contract of marriage was concluded on 10 October 1458.[3] It promised Louis the title of Prince of Antioch. He was to receive as dowry fiefs producing an annual revenue of 6000 ducats, and also all that the King had given and might give to the Princess since the death of her mother. On his arrival all the barons and liegemen should promise to take him for their King, should King John die without legitimate male issue; should Charlotte also die without issue, Louis should succeed to the crown.[4]

[1] Machaeras, 712; Strambaldi, p. 288; G. Bustron, pp. 426–7; Fl. Bustron, pp. 379–80; Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 63; *Descr.* f. 161b; Loredano (Giblet), II, p. 220. In her will she had directed that she should be buried in her favourite Greek monastery of Mangana, but the Dominicans, with the King's permission, buried her in a place known only to the King and themselves. The prestige of possessing her body probably counted for more than any sum she might have bequeathed for masses.

[2] G. Bustron, p. 428; Fl. Bustron, p. 387; Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 63; *Descr.* f. 161b; Loredano (Giblet), II, p. 221. On the confusion between Francis and John de Montolif, see below, p. 545, n. 2.

[3] The contract (Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, IV (1780), pp. 386–8; Reinhard, I, Beyl. 71, pp. 104–5) is dated 10 Oct. MCCCCLVIII, indiction VI. The Roman indiction beginning 25 Dec. or 1 Jan. was in use in Savoy alongside with that of Bede (24 Sept.), so that Mas Latrie's objection (*Gén.* p. 46, n. 10) that the date must be 1457, since the sixth indiction began 1 Sept. 1457, falls to the ground. (See A. Cappelli, *Cronologia*, pp. viii–ix.) The year could not, in any case, have been 1457, since Charlotte's mother is mentioned as dead, and she died on 11 April 1458. On the other hand there is a difficulty, in that John II is spoken of as still alive, though he died on 26 July 1458. Probably the contract was drawn while John was still alive, and the necessary correction not made when it was executed. When Herquet says (*Charlotta*, p. 111) that the marriage by proxy took place at Chambéry on 19 June 1459, he must be confusing the date of the payment of a subsidy, in connexion with Louis's elevation to the throne of Cyprus, with the date of the marriage (see Ch. X, p. 554, n. 4).

[4] 'Réservé toutes fois tous autres droits et décisions qu'il pourroit appartenir aux autres Messieurs Enfans de Savoye nés de Madame la Duchesse de Savoye Fille dudit Roy de Chypre.'

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James expressed much distress at the death of the Queen, and put himself and his household into mourning. He also sent his condolences to the King, and offered to go and see him. But his enemies at court had sufficient influence to force the King to forbid him to attend the funeral. James took the humiliation ill, and remained in his house for two days. But John's affection for his son overcame the designs of the opposition, who, realizing that James's star was in the ascendant, began to court his favour. When the King summoned him to the presence, they went in a body to escort him, although, it is true, they prevented any of his attendants from entering the castle with him. Had James known beforehand that he was to suffer this petty annoyance, he would, he said, have refused to go himself. The King, however, received him with every sign of affection, and he returned to the Archbishop's palace in high spirits. Next day all the barons came to sue for his favour, and he made a show of forgetting what he had suffered from them. The King in effect placed all the affairs of State in his hands. Office-seekers besieged him. Sir Hector Chivides, for instance, his secret enemy, begged for the office of Viscount of Nicosia, and the King, at his son's request,[1] immediately removed Sir Francis de Montolif[2] and appointed Sir Hector. Although all this time intrigues against James went on incessantly,[3] his position in his father's affections was too deeply rooted to be shaken. John is even said, though on bad authority,[4] to have

[1] G. Bustron (p. 429) gives on this occasion a little picture of the King's delight in his handsome son. 'The King showed him a fair countenance and much affection. And it was very warm, and he took off his coat and remained in his shirt; and seeing him in his shirt the King took much pleasure, for he had a handsome figure.'

[2] Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 63b (cp. *Descr.* f. 161b) and Loredano (Giblet), II, p. 224, confuse this Montolif with John or Janus who had been sent on a mission to Savoy (p. 544).

[3] For instance, there seems to have been an attempt, by Sir Thomas Gurri and others, to sow discord between James and Andrew Cornaro, by spreading the report that the archbishopric of Nicosia had been obtained from the King for Andrew by his brother Mark. This was in itself unlikely to be true, for Mark was otherwise consistently friendly to James (see Monod, *Ristretto*, p. 12, and M.L., *H.* III, p. 819), though Andrew supported Charlotte. The report came to the ears of Markios of Patras, James's maternal uncle, who said that if it was true he would kill Mark Cornaro. He was advised to hold his hand, since this was an attempt to get James into trouble. The advice, according to George Bustron (p. 430), came from James's mother; it is curious that Florio Bustron (p. 382) attributes it to George himself.

[4] Loredano (Giblet), II, pp. 225f.

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repented of his plan for marrying Charlotte to a foreigner who should succeed to the crown, and to have asked the Haute Cour to consider the possibility of making James his heir. If he indeed did so, the Haute Cour did not come to a decision before the whole situation underwent a complete change. King John did not long survive his wife, dying on 26 July 1458.[1]

The preceding narrative shows that, although John II is generally described as weakly resigning the control of State affairs into the hands of his wife, of whom he stood in great fear, he was willing and able to thwart her when his foolish fondness for his son James came into play. Helena, a less able woman than Queen Eleanor, with whom it is natural to compare her, by no means had it all her own way in domestic matters. In the contentions between the two the barons played a consistently pusillanimous part. The feudal system was in the last stages of decay; the soil was ready in its rottenness to produce a growth vicious, forceful but short-lived.

Personally, King John seems to have been effeminate but not unattractive,[2] at least to a superficial observer. Tafur[3] describes him in 1437 as a youth of sixteen or seventeen (twenty-three would be more correct) years of age, very tall. His legs were so fat that they were almost the same size at the garter as at the thigh. His manner was

[1] Machaeras 713 (Wednesday, 24 July; but Dawkins thinks, since 24 July was a Monday, τετράδην of the text is due to a false expansion of δ for δεύτεραν); Strambaldi, p. 288 (24 *lujo*); Fl. Bustron, p. 384 (26 *di juglio*); G. Bustron, p. 430 (τῇ κϛ' ἰουλίου); M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 390 ('le XXVI[e] jour du mois de Jun de M.CCCC.LVIII. mecredy', where *Jun* should probably be *Juignet*); Loredano (Giblet), II, p. 226 (26 July). The evidence seems to be in favour of the 26th. He was buried in St Dominic's, since that was where he was living, and the funeral mass was said on 3 August (M.L., *loc. cit.*). Machaeras and Strambaldi (p. 289) wrongly say that his daughter Charlotte died in the same monastery; also that the King died seventy days after Helena, which is sadly out. As to the cause of death, Loredano says that common opinion attributed it to some excess, the doctors to poison; more trustworthy chroniclers say nothing.

[2] Pius II (*Comm.* p. 323): 'vir muliere corruptior, quamvis forma et habitu corporis Regio dignus honore videretur; sed quam erat exterior decorus specie, tam fuit ignavus et turpis animus.' Cp. p. 322: 'puer inter feminas educatus, cum virilem aetatem attigisset, mulierem se magis quam virum ostendit, inter epulas atque delicias torpens.' This is followed by the *Chronicle* of Magno, Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 58n. Cp. Dom. Machaneus, in *M.H.P.*, *Scr.* II, col. 779: 'alter Sardanapalus.'

[3] Tr. Letts, pp. 104f.

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From the Diary of Georg von Ehingen

JOHN II, KING OF CYPRUS

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gracious, and his intelligence high, considering his age. He was lively and physically fit, and a fine horseman. Fond of hunting, he preferred the country to the town.[1] The portrait inserted in the Diary of George of Ehingen,[2] who was in Cyprus in 1454, only to a slight extent confirms the description by Tafur (Plate V).

[1] Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 64.

[2] Reproduced in the translation by M. Letts (Oxford, 1929), to whom I am indebted for the photograph. Ehingen calls the King Philip, and the artist has followed him. The shield (on which all three lions are represented to sinister) is held by a unicorn.

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CHAPTER X

CHARLOTTE AND LOUIS OF SAVOY 1458–1464

Charlotte[1] had inherited something of Helena's spirited character, as her sturdy resistance to her half-brother's usurpation will show. Her mother had brought her up as a good Greek; to the end she used the Greek tongue by preference, and important documents in other languages had to be interpreted to her. She spoke her native tongue with an eloquence which Pius II characterized as 'torrential, after the Greek manner'.[2]

Immediately after the death of her father, she was recognized by the barons as his successor.[3] The Constable, Sir Carceran Suarez, took the rings off the dead King's hands and sent them to her, and she was proclaimed Queen. For her greater security, the Constable took up his quarters with her in the castle. The first to come and take the oath of allegiance to her was James. After the funeral of the King, the knights escorted him on his way to the Archbishop's palace. But as he passed the castle he was called in by the Constable, who insisted on entertaining him and lodging him and his companions for the night. There appears to have been some suspicion of a plot, in which Perrin Tounkes[4] was again involved, to poison him. Pleading grief for his father, he declined to partake of the dinner which the Constable prepared for him, and next day ate nothing but what had been prepared for him by his mother. The Constable naturally took this in bad part; James returned to his home, and from this time there was enmity between them.[5]

At first Charlotte showed a friendly disposition to her half-brother, assured him that she regarded him as taking her father's place, and

[1] See above, p. 528, n. 3. 'Charlotta', not 'Carlotta', was the way she signed her name.

[2] 'Sermone blando, et Graecorum more torrenti simili.' *Comm.* p. 328.

[3] Recognition, marriage and coronation: Machaeras 713; Strambaldi, p. 289; *Lignage des rois de Jérus.*, M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 390; Benedict de Ovetariis, *ibid.* p. 392; G. Bustron, pp. 431–5; Fl. Bustron, pp. 384–7; Lusignan, *Chor.* ff. 63b–64b; *Descr.* ff. 162b–164; Loredano (Giblet), II, pp. 227–32.

[4] Above, p. 541, n. 1.

[5] Lusignan (*Descr.* f. 162b) dates this incident four days after the coronation.

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asked his help in arranging for the formal announcement of the death of King John to be sent by galley to the Princes of the West.[1] But the opposition at once began to undermine his standing. When James set up in his palace an office to recruit a crew for the galley, the Constable, Sir Hector de Chivides (for whom James, as we have seen, obtained the Viscounty of Nicosia) and Sir Tristan de Giblet at once caused it to be closed. James pretended not to resent this rebuff, and continued to attend the cathedral for mass every morning and to present himself with his attendants at the Queen's court. His enemies, however, determined to put a stop to this and gave orders that if he presented himself none of his suite should be allowed to enter. This time James did not swallow the insult and go in alone. He returned to his palace in desperate mood, and for a time meditated calling his supporters to arms. He did not, however, take this extreme step, but sent his vicar, Sir Antony Salvani, to complain to the Queen. Her answer was curt: what seemed good to her Council seemed good to her. Cut to the heart, and yet convinced that the Queen was not acting of her own volition, he put up with this rebuff also.

When the customary forty days from the death of the late King had passed, the Queen was to be crowned. The knights were to escort her from the castle to the royal residence in the house of Sir Hugh de la Baume. No notice of the arrangements was given to James. What was worse, on the eve of the coronation Sir Paul Chappe was sent on the Queen's behalf to inform him that she was going to Santa Sophia to be crowned, that he was to give instructions[2] for the church to be prepared, but that he himself and his servants were to confine themselves to his house. James who, as Archbishop elect, ought to have performed the ceremony, accepted this humiliating command without protest, saying that if it were so preferred, he was willing to stay six miles away from the city.

Charlotte was crowned on 15 October 1458[3] by the Bishop of

[1] According to Lusignan, the galley was to go to take the news and the tribute to the Sultan of Egypt.

[2] But Lusignan (*Chor.* f. 64b) has it that Chappe gave orders to James's *locum tenens* to prepare the church. In the *Description* he agrees with the other sources.

[3] G. Bustron, p. 435 (Sunday, but no date); Fl. Bustron, p. 387 (the same); M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 390 (Sunday, 15 Huitenbre 1458); Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 164 (first Sunday of September). All agree on a Sunday, and 15 October 1458, which fell on that day of the week, is to be accepted.

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Lemesos, Br. Nicolas, the Bishop of Hebron and the Abbot of Bellapais. It was regarded as a bad omen that on her return her horse shied, and the crown fell from her head.

James, who had recently been showing singular restraint, now decided to throw it off and attempt to get rid of his enemies.[1] Among his followers we now first hear mentioned two Sicilians who were to play a considerable part in the future, Rizzo di Marino[2] and Nicolas Morabit. With him, in his palace, were also his constant adviser, Br. William Goneme, his uncle Markios, his treacherous servant Perrin Tounkes, and a strong force of armed men, as well as his supporters among the clergy. The Queen had returned from the castle to the royal residence in the house of Sir Hugh de la Baume, where she had a strong guard. An attack on the house was planned for the night of 15 December 1458.[3] James himself was to lead some fifty-five men and try to force an entry at the gate of the residence; Rizzo di Marino with twenty-five others was to attack from another side. The ever treacherous Perrin Tounkes, who was not with either troop, slipped out of the Archbishop's palace and betrayed the plot to the Queen's physician, who made it known at the residence. Goneme, who had seen Tounkes go out, suspected him, and sent to warn James, who, finding that the alarm had been given, returned home.

Next morning one of the Queen's servants told George Bustron, the chronicler, an adherent of James,[4] that the Queen was going to summon her half-brother before the Haute Cour, to answer the charge of attempting to assassinate her. Bustron was begged to keep it secret (though why, in that case, he should have been told, is not clear). He

[1] The attempted *coup d'état* and flight of James: G. Bustron, pp. 436–41; Fl. Bustron, pp. 387–90; Lusignan, *Chor.* ff. 64b–65; *Descr.* ff. 164b–165b; Loredano (Giblet), II, pp. 233–5.

[2] This name appears in innumerable variations. The commonest is *Rizzo de* (or *di*) *Marino*, next comes *Rizzo de Marin*. In the proceedings of the Council of Ten he is *Ritius Marini*. Some variations are noted by M.L., *H.* III, pp. 171, n. 2, 247, n. 2. I can find no authority for Romanin's *Rizzo da Marino*, and H. F. Brown's *Marin Rizzo* seems a mere fancy.

[3] So G. Bustron; Fl. Bustron gives no date. Lusignan in his *Description* has 8 Oct. (which is the date he gives in the *Chorograffia* for the meeting of the Haute Cour).

[4] George Bustron's narrative gives a very good impression of fairness. He evidently disapproved of James's violent methods ('God hindered it', he says of this attempted outrage); but he does not disguise the fact that though bound to secrecy by his informant he told James what he had heard.

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however at once informed James. On 17 December the Queen sent the Chancellor Sir Nicolas Salacha and two others to examine and obtain a statement from James, who replied that he was not guilty of such treason, and that it could not be proved against him. As he refused to attend, the Queen's counsellors proposed to go and take him by force of arms. James, hearing of their intention, collected all his supporters,[1] to the number of three hundred, besides his household; they were all prepared to die rather than surrender.

In this critical situation the Queen and her Council summoned George Bustron,[2] who was a suspect; at the same time, as holding a fief from the crown, he was bound to obey the summons or be regarded as a traitor. After consulting James, who advised him to go and tell the truth, he obeyed. It was hoped by examining him to find out James's real intentions. Bustron explained that James had a force of three hundred men, in addition to his servants, at his command; that he and they were desperate; but if it was the Queen's behest that he should go with her men to her presence, he would obey. On this the Queen ordered her men to lay down their arms, and James dismissed his own, and was escorted to her presence. After the audience he returned to the Archbishop's palace under orders not to stir thence until he received the Queen's commands. He found his house deserted; a body of men, under Balian de Frasenge,[3] had been sent by his enemies, taking advantage of his absence, had put his servants to flight, and sacked the house, although they did not venture to take his arms or his horses.

James, although he stayed in the palace affecting to care little,[4] had come to the end of his patience. Since he had failed to destroy his

[1] Including the Greek Archbishop Nicolas, whom he wished to have as a witness of what might happen (Fl. Bustron, p. 388), and all the clergy, Greek as well as Latin (Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 64b; *Descr.* f. 164b). For Nicolas, see Note at end of this Chapter.

[2] Sathas (Μεσ. Βιβλ. II, p. ρμβ′,) thinks that he probably took part in the attempt on the royal residence; but he himself does not say so (and he is singularly frank about his part in the adventures of James), and the next morning early he was in his own house (p. 437), and not with James.

[3] Φρασές (G. Bustron); *Frasenge* (Fl. Bustron); *Frasengi* (Lusignan); *Frasin* (Loredano). Frasenge(s) was one of the noble families of Cyprus (Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 83; *Descr.* f. 83).

[4] G. Bustron (p. 440): ἐτρουφάριζεν καὶ δὲν ἐκουργιάζεν. Fl. Bustron, p. 389: 'giocando e dandosi piacere, senza curarsi più di niente.' Of the Greek words, the first is, R. M. Dawkins thinks, more likely to be from *truffare* than from τρυφή, which had occurred to me.

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enemies he made plans to escape. But there was a spy among his servants, with whom his enemies made a plan to go and take him alive or dead. The fourth hour of the night was fixed for the capture, but when they arrived at the palace, the bird was flown. They searched the house thoroughly, and even set fire to it, but found neither him nor any of his servants. At dawn the gates of the city were closed for the day, but he was far away. What had happened was that the same Balian de Frasenge, who had sacked his house a few days before, was apparently repentant, and had warned him of his danger, and two hours before his would-be captors arrived James, with a few faithful followers,[1] escaped from the city over the wall of the Armenian quarter, went to St George of Aglangia,[2] where he had previously sent a servant with a horse, and rode[3] for Aliki, where he went on board the caravel of Nicolas Galimberto,[4] as was reported at Nicosia by fishermen coming from Aliki.

[1] Br. William Goneme, his uncle Markios, John de Verni, Nicolas Morabit, Rizzo di Marino, and a Mameluke called Nassar Chus; also, according to Lusignan, George Bustron, 'lequel a escrit ceste Histoire', although George does not mention himself. It was believed at Rome (Pius II, *Comm.* p. 324; Navagero, col. 1120; Pantaleon, p. 116) that Mark Cornaro advised James to take this step, and provided him with a ship; but unless Mark hired Galimberto's ship, this last statement is untrue. Pius adds that James had with him some hundred friends (Navagero, some hundred and twenty), instead of the few who actually formed his suite. According to Monod, *Ristretto*, pp. 12–13, Mark was already planning to marry his daughter to James should he be successful. Mark may have had such a plan, but it was not yet envisaged by the Venetian Senate. Herquet, *Charlotta*, p. 111, gives reason to think that Mark was at this time hostile to James.—For Fl. Bustron's 'Nassar Chus', G. Bustron has τὸν 'Ασαρχούς (read probably τὸν Νασαρχούς) and Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 67b, 'M. Assar Ghus'. The first element probably represents *Nasr*; the second probably the Turkish *chawush*, though it is not possible to say which of the numerous offices covered by that word is intended; probably, as Mr Fulton suggests, something higher than those enumerated by Huart in *Enc. of Islam*, s.v. Čawsh. In Fl. Bustron, p. 394 (l'amira chiamato Chiaus), it is evidently a high command. It is to be noted also that Lusignan (*Chor.* f. 83; *Descr.* f. 82) has 'Ghiaus Armeno Cavallier (Chaus l'Armenien)' in his list of noble houses of Cyprus. Mr J. Walker makes another suggestion, that the name may represent the title Nazir al-Juyush, Inspector of the army.

[2] Eylenja, south-east of Nicosia to the right of the Larnaka road (M.L., *H.* III, p. 178, n. 5).

[3] He and John de Verni rode the one horse, the others walked—a good 25 miles.

[4] He is doubtless the 'Nicola Calaberto' who, according to Fl. Bustron, p. 419, was given fiefs by James, and the Galamberto' (*ibid.* p. 449) whom Catherine made Castellan of Famagusta.

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Before sailing, he wrote to the Queen, protesting that he had never intended any ill to her, and had always sought to serve her, not as a vassal or salaried knight, but as a loving brother. Well had it been if, as she had at first placed the administration of the realm in his hands, she had continued him in this charge. But she had deliberately chosen to govern by the advice of those who wished him ill (and her worse). His conscience was clear. He was willing to remain Archbishop, but her counsellors would not let him live in peace and enjoy her favour, and the realm had fallen into the hands of the treacherous enemies of Charlotte and himself. Since they sought to drive him out of his home, he, who had been born to lordship and freedom, refused to live as a slave. She must not think it strange that he sought to live in his own house, and to put down his enemies. The letter ended with an assurance that he would always love her as a brother, and do more for her honour than would their enemies, those evil counsellors, flatterers and ingrates.

Such, if the letter is genuine,[1] was the plausible defence of his action which James wished the Queen to accept. It was not long before he showed himself in his true colours. At Nicosia it was supposed that he was going not to Egypt but to the West.[2] But a few days after his flight a merchant ship came from Egypt with the news that he was in Cairo intriguing with the Sultan Inal for the possession of the crown of Cyprus, and was expected by many to succeed. Measures were at once taken to put Kerynia and other places in a state of defence. Another arrival from Egypt confirmed the first news, adding that a renegade Cypriote of the Flatro family,[3] who had risen to the rank of Emir, was obstructing James's designs, on the ground that Charlotte's claims should be heard. It was reported that the Sultan had proclaimed him King of Cyprus, and 'Son of the Sultan',[4] clothing him in robe and bonnet of

[1] It is given in full by Fl. Bustron. No one else mentions it.

[2] As indeed James, in his apology of 1461 (p. 576), maintained was his first intention. He says that galleys were sent in pursuit of him, which forced him to change his plan. Malipiero (II, p. 596) also believed that he was making for Rhodes or Italy but owing to stress of weather (*per fortuna*) reached Alexandria.

[3] The John Flatro who had joined the Mamelukes in 1426, thirty-two years before, can hardly be the one meant here. Possibly it is the John Flatro who later was rewarded with a fief by James (Fl. Bustron, p. 419); it is true that the man was opposing James; but, like many others, he may have come over to James's side when Charlotte's cause seemed hopeless.

[4] Malipiero (II, p. 596). Generally, for James's success at Cairo, see also Navagero, col. 1120. Accounts from Arabic sources in Ziada, II, pp. 48–50.

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gold, and carrying him in procession round Cairo. Still later came more merchants, who said (it was believed at the suggestion of James himself) that the Sultan would soon send him to Cyprus with a large force in support.

These reports were true. James was well received by Inal, on whom his attractive personality made a great impression.[1] He was, says his enemy Pius II, a youth of twenty-two years, handsome of person, in stature very like his father, but far superior to John II in intellectual endowments and in eloquence. The speech to the Sultan which report put into his mouth may be read in the Pope's own work.[2] He is made to speak as a Cypriote, reminding the Sultan of the injuries inflicted on Egypt by the French, and describing Louis, in contrast to himself, as a *Gallicus homo*. 'But if you cherish me, Cyprus will be as much yours as Egypt is.'

The Sultan was impressed, and sent an envoy, Taghribardi at-Tayyar, to Cyprus to communicate his wishes, and reprove the people for having passed over James in favour of Charlotte.[3]

To counter these moves, the Queen wished to send envoys to Cairo, but was persuaded to await more definite news. Meanwhile her affianced husband, Louis of Savoy, arrived in Cyprus in 1459, with a large following of Savoyans. The marriage was celebrated in Santa Sophia on 7 October 1459.[4] The people found Louis unattractive, poor-

[1] Among those who were won over to James were a son of the Sultan, about his own age, and three powerful Emirs. Aeneas Sylvius, *Comm.* p. 326.

[2] Aeneas Sylvius, *Opera*, 1551, p. 379. Cp. Navagero, col. 1120.

[3] Ziada, II, pp. 48–9. Taghribardi returned to Cairo with Podocataro. Cypriote sources do not mention his mission.

[4] On 5 Jan. 1459 the Estates of Savoy voted a provision for him 'in regnum Cypri proficiscenti' (Pingon, *Augusta Taurin.* in Graevius, *Thes.* IX, pt. 6, cols. 37–8). The Duke begged from every possible source. Tithes were levied to meet the expenses of the occasion. Thus on 19 June 1459 the sum of 106 florins was acknowledged from the Abbot of Entremont as a subsidy on the occasion of the accession of Louis to the throne of Cyprus (M.L., *H.* III, p. 139, n. 2). On the other hand, when he asked for a loan of 1000 florins from Geneva for the expenses of sending his son to Cyprus (the Prince giving surety for repayment), the council refused, being already indebted to several persons for the presents it had made to the Duke (Grenus, *Fragmens hist. sur Genève* (1823), pp. 29–30; M.L., *H.* III, p. 140, n. 1). It was while on his way to Cyprus that Louis, passing not far from Mantua, where Pius was holding the Congress, tactlessly omitted to call and pay his respects to the Pope (Aeneas Sylvius, *Opera*, 1571, p. 381). Writing on 13 and 14 Dec. to Charles VII of France and the Princess of Piedmont, the Duke tells them that the couple were married in Santa Sophia on

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spirited, sickly and of cold and melancholy temper. He was twenty-eight years old.

Now, after long delay, it was decided to send ambassadors to Cairo. Those who were selected had come in the suite of King Louis, or preceded him. They carried with them the usual presents and tribute.[1] Their reception by the Sultan was not unfavourable. But the plague was raging in Cairo, and carried off nearly all Queen Charlotte's envoys, as well as Sir John de Verni and one or two others in James's suite. Goneme urged James to take advantage of the other party's disappearance to press his claims among those who surrounded the Sultan. But presently there arrived from Nicosia another envoy, Sir Peter Podocataro. He was accompanied by John Delfin, Commander of Nisyros, who was sent by the Grand Master, James de Milly, at the request of the

7 Oct., and Louis received the crown of Cyprus (Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, IV, p. 388; Reinhard, I, Beyl. 72, 73, pp. 106–7). G. Bustron (p. 442) says that Louis was married a few days after reaching Cyprus; neither he nor Fl. Bustron gives an exact date for his arrival or marriage. Lusignan (*Descr.* f. 166b) says that he arrived at the beginning of 1459; Loredano (Giblet, II, p. 238), that he stayed eight days at Salines before entering the capital. If the last writer is to be trusted, the marriage was celebrated by his chaplain, the bishops of the Kingdom refusing to have anything to do with it, perhaps because of the affinity between the pair. For the latter reason, the Greeks regarded the marriage as null. It is curious that there seems to be no record of the Pope having granted a dispensation; yet it is hard to believe that Charlotte would have been so well received in Rome as she was had her marriage been regarded as incestuous.—Guichenon (*Hist. de Savoie*, I, p. 538; M.L., *H.* III, p. 96, n. 2) gives a list of knights in the suite of Louis, of whom only Philip de Seyssel, John, Lord of Lornay, William d'Allinges, Lord of Coudray, and Sibuet de Loriol, Chancellor designate of Cyprus, need be mentioned here. As a matter of fact, Philip de Seyssel was the head of a notable embassy which went to Cyprus before Louis himself (M.L., *H.* III, p. 135, § 3 and n. 4). Sibuet de Loriol went on the embassy to Cairo, but did not fall a victim to the plague (Ghinzoni, p. 21).—Here may be mentioned a story (H. Pantaleon, *Militaris Ordinis Johannitarum...hist.* p. 116) that a dispute between Venetians and Genoese broke out at the coronation of Louis, and was the cause of the disasters that followed. It seems to be baseless, and may be an echo of the dispute at Famagusta at the coronation of Peter II.

[1] Most of the names are very corrupt in the sources. G. Bustron (p. 442) has μισὲρ Οὐντάς, μισὲρ Νιοὺρ ('Ινιοὺν) τὲ Λορνές, μισὲρ Μουνάτ. Fl. Bustron (p. 392) has *monsignor Jose* (*Moris Tas* in the Paris MS.), *monsignor de Ornes*. The editor of Fl. Bustron suggests that *Tas* is for *d'Aix*, and that Philip de Seyssel, seigneur d'Aix, is meant, while *Ornes* is John, seigneur de Lornay. Lusignan (*Chor.* f. 65b; *Descr.* ff. 166b–167) has *Runtas* (*Runtaz*) and *Riome Tolonas* (*Riomon Tolones*), clearly corruptions of the first two names in G. Bustron.

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Cyprus government.[1] Immediately after presenting his credentials and delivering his message, Sir Peter went to work in the approved way, making presents to the influential Emirs. He represented to the Sultan that Louis acknowledged him as suzerain, would increase the tribute from 5000 to 10,000 ducats, would give James a pension of the same amount, and pay the Sultan 30,000 ducats for the expenses incurred in his behalf. Podocataro was supported by the Rhodian envoy, who warned the Sultan that help might come to Louis from the West, and Egypt would not go unpunished.[2] Podocataro was so far successful that the Emirs were convinced by his gifts of the justice of the Queen's claims, and order was given for the robes, the symbolic acknowledgement of her royalty, to be prepared for her. James was baffled, but once more Goneme came to the rescue. He trusted, he said, in God that there would never be other King than James; James might sleep secure and leave the matter to him. Taking the Mameluke Nassar Chus with him as interpreter, Goneme worked on the Emirs all night, and reported to James at dawn. That day Podocataro was to receive the robes for the Queen and himself; James, said Goneme, must go to the ceremony and see what would happen. The astute friar had outbid the other party. At the moment of the ceremony, when the robes were to be presented, the Mamelukes raised an outcry: 'What, deprive the male, and give the lordship to the female?' They tore the robe of the ambassador in pieces, seized that which he was taking for the Queen and put it on James's shoulders, crying 'Long live King James'. Inal was quite unable to resist the pressure of the Mamelukes. All the envoys of Charlotte and Louis, including Delfin, the representative of the Order of

[1] Vertot, II, p. 247; Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, II, p. 114. According to the latter, Philip (or Philibert) de Seyssel went on this and not on the preceding embassy.

[2] Aeneas Sylvius, *Opera*, 1551, p. 380; Navagero, cols. 1120–1. Instructions from the Grand Master to Delfin, M.L., *H.* III, pp. 96–9. On arrival at Cairo he is to get into touch with Goneme and Giannozzo Salviati, so as to know the requirements of James and regulate his procedure accordingly. He is to urge the Sultan strongly in the direction of peace with Cyprus, pointing out the disastrous consequences of war. If he finds the Sultan inclined to peace, he is to consult with the ambassador of the King of Cyprus, and urge a speedy settlement. Peace is desirable not only for Cyprus, but for all the Levant, where both Christian and Saracen trade is stopped by war. If the Sultan is set on war, and on sending James to Cyprus, Delfin is to endeavour to secure immunity for the possessions of the Hospital there. From James's apology to the Florentines (p. 577) it appears probable that offers were actually made to him or to Salviati by the envoys.

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St John of Jerusalem, were arrested and handed over to James as his prisoners.[1] James's success was complete. He was even, to the scandal of the faithful, invited to the reception at court on the Anniversary of the Prophet.[2] The Sultan gave orders for his fleet to conduct James to his Kingdom. The news reached Cyprus, and Sor de Naves, who was sent to Alexandria to enquire, confirmed its truth. Louis and Charlotte went to Kerynia; many fled into the country, others to Famagusta. The capital was deserted.

It must be remembered that, so far as such technicalities were of weight in the decision of the Sultan, James would not be considered illegitimate by the Moslems. His claim that as a son he should take precedence of a daughter would, on the other hand, count for much. From a practical point of view, however, it may be taken as certain that he had achieved his object by offering larger bribes than Podocataro to the Sultan and, still more important, to the Emirs who controlled him. It was rumoured that he increased the annual tribute from 5000 to 15,000 ducats, but the historian who reports this is careful to say that he had no written authority for the statement.[3] He goes on to say that lying and malevolent tongues accused James of swearing an oath to the Sultan which involved denying the Christian faith, and spread other idle talk. Pius II believed this and libelled James in writing.[4] There seems to be, Florio continues, an explanation of the Pope's abuse of James. Pius offered him a niece in marriage; James refused, on receiving doubtful reports of the lady. Had James married her, he would

[1] Delfin was retained as a prisoner by the Sultan when James took the others to Cyprus. Bosio (II, p. 211, under 1460) says that reprisals were taken in Rhodes on three rich Saracen merchants for his imprisonment, they and their ships being arrested. On 22 June 1461 the Grand Master instructed the Catalan merchant Bartholomew de Parete to go to Egypt and deliver letters to Delfin, who was detained at Alexandria, and then to go to Cairo to protest to the Sultan against this violation of his status as ambassador. If he found good occasion he was to invite the Sultan to interest himself in the restoration of Charlotte to her Kingdom. M.L., *H.* III, p. 86. According to Bosio (II, p. 213) Delfin was not released, but died in prison.

[2] Ziada, II, p. 49.

[3] Fl. Bustron, pp. 393 f. Lusignan (*Chor.* f. 60) says the tribute was increased in the time of James II; from what he says, f. 71 and *Descr.* f. 179, he probably means after the massacre of the Mamelukes. Sanudo (*Diarii*, LVI, 1042) says that James was made King of Cyprus on condition of paying a tribute of 8000 ducats; but he has already given that figure for Janus.

[4] 'Ma le (ciancie) scrisse anco in mala forma.'

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have been the best Christian in the world. 'His Holiness was not a dispassionate writer.'[1]

James of course did homage to the Sultan as his suzerain; but that he should have sworn such an oath as is attributed to him is unlikely. Not that he would have been restrained by religious scruple; but the effect of such blasphemous apostasy, if it became known to the people whom he hoped to make his subjects, would have damaged his chances beyond repair. It is impossible to believe that so shrewd an adviser as William Goneme would have countenanced such a step.[2]

[1] Cp. p. 630, n. 2. Zilioli, the Venetian apologist (in Reinhard, II, Beyl. p. 184) says that the cause of the resentment of Pius II against James was not so much that he had usurped Charlotte's Kingdom, but that he oppressed the Latin Church in Cyprus, and had not sought dispensation from Rome for his marriage, which was necessary since he had been Archbishop of Nicosia. But Zilioli is only concerned to show that the charge of unlawful seizure of the crown was baseless.—Herquet (*Charlotta*, p. 120) argues, somewhat unconvincingly, that Pius was so hostile to James that he would never have made him such an offer as Florio Bustron describes.

[2] See M.L., *H.* III, p. 110n., who regards the text of the oath as an invention of James's enemies. Cp. Herquet, *Charlotta*, p. 119. James's own ambassadors in 1461 of course repudiated it. It was accepted by the Grand Master of Rhodes, James de Milly, in Nov. 1460 (p. 569). It is found in the Savoy Chronicle (*Mon. Hist. Patr.* IV, *Script.* II, cols. 624–5). The Rhodian envoys are said to have brought to Rhodes a copy in Arabic, from which a Latin translation was made and sent to Pius II. Pius inserted it in his own work on the war of Cyprus (*Opera*, 1551, p. 380; *Comm.* p. 325), whence Bosio (II, p. 206) took it. G. Bustron has no word of it; though an adherent of James, he was not blind to his faults. Fl. Bustron's opinion on the matter we have already quoted. Lusignan (*Descr.* f. 168b) accepts the story; but, surprisingly, Loredano ignores it. It is repeated by the *Trattato delle ragioni sopra il Regno di Cipro* (Turin, 1594), ff. 5*b*–6. M.L., *H.* III, p. 110n., prints the Latin text from a copy made at Rhodes 18 Nov. 1461. The British Museum MS., Eg. 1926, f. 23b, which contains a copy of the oath, is of the late fifteenth century. Rough translation in Reinhard, II, p. 53. James swears by God, the Holy Gospel, the Holy Baptism, by John Baptist, by all Saints, by the Christian Faith. He will have the same friends and foes as the Sultan, will conceal nothing from him, will harbour no pirates, will search them out throughout the island and send them to the Sultan (in other texts this is said of Egyptian slaves), will send 5000 ducats tribute annually to the temples of Mecca and Jerusalem, will warn the people of Gorhigos (other texts, the Rhodians) not to sell arms to the pirates, will tell the Sultan of all that is to happen, and will act according to justice and truth. Failing to do all this, he will become apostate from the Holy Gospel and the Christian Faith, will say that the Gospel is false, that Christ is not the only one, nor Mary a virgin, will slay a camel over the font of baptism, will deny John the Forerunner, will take his pleasure of a Jewess upon the altar, and take on him the curses of the Holy Fathers. Iorga (*F.d.C.* pp. 70

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It is possible that the Sultan Inal may also have been influenced in favour of James by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II. Here again there is no mention by the better authorities of this intervention. But it is in itself not unlikely that James should appeal to him, and the letter ascribed to him does not present the extravagances of the document we have just considered.[1] Mehmed had heard that Inal, having originally decided to place James on the throne, as was proper for him to do, and conducive to the religion of Islam, had changed his mind and was making peace with a Frankish prince; as if he did not know how bitterly the Franks hated, and what harm they had done to, the Moslems. If he persisted in this Frankish alliance, he might reckon not only on war with the Turks, but on the hatred of his own Egyptians, Syrians and Arabs. His own son would desert him, for betraying their religion to the Franks. But if he would fulfil his promise to James, and send a fleet against Cyprus, Mehmed would send another against Rhodes, and the Sultan of Egypt should have the booty from both islands; Mehmed himself desired only the possession of the island of Rhodes.

Inal followed up his decision in favour of James with a threatening letter to King Louis. It was for him, the Sultan, to decide who should reign over Cyprus, which was tributary to him. If Louis would not depart of his own accord, he would perish by the Egyptian sword. He might take his wife Charlotte with him, on condition that a second warning did not become necessary.[2]

James now began to distribute honours to his followers. Nicolas Morabit and Rizzo di Marino were knighted. In accordance with the Cypriote custom that this honour should be received at the hands of a baron of the Kingdom in the presence of the King, Peter Podocataro was compelled to dub them. He and the other knights of Savoy and

and 205) maintains that the text is absolutely authentic; its curious form is itself a great argument in its favour; he has found it in many other agreements between Christians and Moslems. But he gives no evidence for his statement. Failing it, the probability that the document was a forgery by some member of the Rhodian Order, a strong partisan of Charlotte, cannot be lightly dismissed.

[1] Aeneas Sylvius, *Opera*, 1551, p. 380; Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 168, cp. f. 177; *Trattato delle ragioni sopra il Regno di Cipro* (Turin, 1594), ff. 5, 5*b*; Loredano (Giblet), II, p. 248. Translation in Reinhard, II, p. 52.

[2] Aeneas Sylvius, *Opera*, 1551, p. 380 (whence Navagero, col. 1120), seems to be the only authority for this letter. He makes the Sultan send it before the arrival of the envoys from Louis who nearly upset James's plans.

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Rhodes in his company were then loaded with fetters and imprisoned.[1] James also began, in anticipation of his victory, to make appointments to offices. Morabit got the Viscounty of Nicosia; Rizzo di Marino became Chamberlain of Cyprus; Goneme Archbishop of Nicosia. Estates were also distributed among his followers.[2]

It is obvious that some sort of ceremony of inauguration[3] was performed in connexion with the recognition of James as King by the Sultan. But the formal coronation in Cyprus as King of Jerusalem, Cyprus and Armenia, if it ever took place, was long delayed. We know that James sent to Pius II in order to obtain the Pope's consent to his coronation, and was rebuffed.[4]

A fleet of eighty ships, great and small, with the Grand Devitdar in supreme command, conveyed James to Cyprus, which was reached on 18 September 1460. The ships first appeared off Constanza, but turned back to Ayia Napa, where some of the force landed.[5] James despatched Rizzo di Marino with fifty Mamelukes to collect men and oxen and wagons for the artillery train from the Mesarea and bring them to Aliki, where he landed the rest of his force. At Aliki many knights who sympathized with him, and many peasants, adhered to him, and he courted popularity by setting free a large number of serfs.

[1] James in his apology (p. 577) says that he let them go free. It is true that Podocataro was taken into his favour, but that was later.

[2] G. Bustron (pp. 444–5) says this was done as soon as James was declared King in Egypt; and he ought to know. From Fl. Bustron (p. 394) it would seem rather that these favours were conferred after James had reached Cyprus. Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 66b, agrees with G. Bustron; but *Descr.* f. 169 can be read either way.

[3] Coronation in the western manner was not a Moslem custom. But a circlet may have been among the robes and decorations presented to James at the ceremony; see the art. Tādj in *Enc. of Islam*, by Björkman.

[4] G. Bustron, p. 475; Fl. Bustron, p. 432. Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 168b, says that James was crowned in 1460; if his phraseology and the sequence of his narrative can be trusted, this took place before James left Egypt.

[5] G. Bustron, p. 444 (the landing was made at Ayia Napa at Constanza!). The Grand Master James de Milly, writing in Nov. 1460, supposed James to have landed near Famagusta (M.L., *H.* III, p. 111). Fl. Bustron, p. 394 (the fleet first appeared at Constanza, but this appearing too distant turned back 'alla parte di Famagosta dove è Santa Napa', and disembarked). Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 66b (landed at Capo della Grea); *Descr.* f. 169 (près le Promontoire de la Grée). Loredano (Giblet), II, p. 249 (landed at the harbour of Constanza near Famagusta). Ayia Napa is twice the distance of Constanza from Famagusta; Fl. Bustron's remark is unintelligible, and G. Bustron's makes nonsense. Lusignan's 'near Cape Greco' agrees well enough with Ayia Napa.

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On the arrival of the Mameluke invaders in the island, King Louis endeavoured to buy off the Emir in command. He sent an envoy, the Hospitaller, Br. Christopher, to him with presents of cattle and provisions, but the Emir distributed the gifts among his men, and handed Christopher over to James, who put him in chains, along with Peter Podocataro and other prisoners whom he had brought with him from Egypt.[1]

Leaving Famagusta alone—for it was not advisable at this time to interfere with the Genoese[2]—James's first step was to get possession of the Château Franc at Sigouri, which had been built by James I as an outpost against Famagusta (p. 446). He despatched against it his uncle Markios with a force of Mamelukes. The Commandant[3] was prepared to defend it; he had with him a Sicilian officer and some fifteen Savoyan knights. But the junior officers, commanding the crossbowmen and other troops, deserted and gave themselves up. The Commandant was obliged to surrender, but made terms for himself, his wife and property. The Savoyan knights were put in chains, and a Venetian adherent of James, Philip Pesaro, was placed in charge of the fortress.[4]

In possession of Sigouri, James was free to proceed from Aliki towards Nicosia, without fearing an attack on his right flank. King Louis, who was given more to prayer than to fighting, made no attempt to defend the capital; he had gone to Kerynia with the Queen and with the majority of the knights. Others scattered to the mountains and to their country estates; many went to salute the rising sun.

On 26 September 1460 James sent the ever useful William Goneme, with fifty Mamelukes and some foot-soldiers,[5] to occupy Nicosia and,

[1] G. Bustron, p. 447; Fl. Bustron, p. 396; Lusignan, *Chor.* ff. 67 sq.; *Descr.* ff. 170 sq.; Loredano (Giblet), II, p. 254.

[2] Genoa favoured Louis, and had obtained a promise that if he succeeded he would respect the rights of the Casa di S. Giorgio (Marengo, etc., *Banco di S. Giorgio*, p. 483).

[3] His name is given as Sir Thomas Μαχές by G. Bustron; *Marchie* by Fl. Bustron; *Mungies* (*Chor.*) and *Mougies* (*Descr.*) by Lusignan; *Murgies* by Loredano. Reinhard supposes him to have been a Savoyan noble (II, p. 55). See also the Commandant of Paphos (below, p. 565, n. 1).

[4] G. Bustron (p. 445) says that the captors 'sought out' the Savoyans; Fl. Bustron (p. 395) that they 'dismissed' them; Lusignan, *Chor.* (f. 67) that they 'imprisoned' them; *Descr.* (f. 169b) that they put them all, with the captain, in chains. Philip Pesaro, when James fled to Egypt, had been imprisoned in Kerynia, but had escaped and joined him in Cairo.

[5] Χαρφουσίδες (or χαλφουσίδες) ἀπεζούς, G. Bustron. *Chiaus*, Fl. Bustron. Lusignan speaks of the forces as consisting of Mamelukes and Saracens; in describing the invading army he speaks of 'Mamaluchi, & Ghalfusi, & altri Saraceni', or 'Gal-

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if possible, seize the Viscount, Hector Chivides. The Viscount, however, got away to Kerynia, though his *mathesep* was captured, and, being mistaken for Chivides himself, narrowly escaped being killed. He was allowed to retain his office, and Nicolas Morabit was proclaimed Viscount.[1] James entered the capital on the same day.[2] The Mameluke army under the Emir encamped outside the city at St Demetrios. Three days later (29 September)[3] he struck camp and marched on Kerynia, James remaining behind to organize the Christians who agreed to serve him, but following on the next day. King Louis had sent a party to demolish the road at the Pass of Monadi, to obstruct the passage of the enemy's artillery train, but they were attacked and killed, and the road repaired. The army passed on to Kazaphani.[4] By the 30th the Emir was encamped in Kerynia and the siege of the castle began.

The besiegers planted their artillery in various positions commanding the castle. A serpentine cannon placed on the top of a Greek church did great damage, killing over a score of men of the garrison. But a bombard at Kazaphani, specially cast for the purpose, turned out useless owing to faulty construction.[5] The castle itself was well supplied with artillery; the supporting naval forces in the harbour included, among others, a Rhodian galley and two galleys under Sor de Naves. Among the barons[6] who remained faithful to the King and Queen were her uncle Phoebus de Lusignan, Lord of Arsur, James II de Flory, Count of Jaffa, Morphou de Grinier, Count of Roucha, John de Montolif, Marshal of Cyprus, Tristan de Giblet, Peter Pelestri, Hector Chivides,

fuses, ou Caliphes, Mammelus & Sarrasins'. Dawkins, on Machaeras 672, n. 3 and p. 332, discusses this word, and in the first place inclines to translate 'sergeants'; but in his addenda, on the strength of Lusignan's equation with 'Caliphes', regards the word as corrupted from 'caliph', which means a high official. But they served as footsoldiers, and worked on road-repairs (G. Bustron, p. 447 and other passages), so that even 'sergeants' (favoured by *chiaus* in Fl. Bustron) seems too high a rank. 'Khalifah', as Mr Fulton observes, is a title of such widely varying meaning—from the highest down to almost the lowest professions—that it does not help us here.

[1] Morabit remained in the office of Viscount until 1468 (M.L., *H.* III, pp. 181, 251, 272); he was followed by William de Ras in 1469.

[2] Or the next, according to Fl. Bustron (p. 395). [3] G. Bustron, p. 446.

[4] G. Bustron, p. 448. This place was a good three miles from the castle of Kerynia, which however would be within the range of bigger guns; as to which, see Luke's note on Savorgnan's *Discrittione*, p. 18.

[5] G. Bustron, p. 448; Fl. Bustron, p. 396. The Saracen engineer who cast it, though he cut down 500 olives and other trees for the furnace, did not use enough metal.

[6] Long lists are given by G. Bustron, p. 448 and Fl. Bustron, pp. 396–7.

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Bernard Rieussec, Admiral of Cyprus, Thomas de Verni, Marshal of Jerusalem, as well as the Venetian, Andrew Cornaro, later Auditor of Cyprus.[1] Sor de Naves was put in charge of the defence of the walls and the Hospitaller Br. Telli was appointed castellan.[2]

A second attempt at negotiation was made. The Dominican Nicolas, Bishop of Lemesos,[3] was sent to the Grand Devitdar, who received him in the presence of James. He admitted the suzerainty of the Sultan, but protested that Louis was the rightful heir. Louis was willing to recoup the Sultan for the expenses of the expedition. Asked what was to become of James if Louis retained the throne, the Bishop said that he might remain Archbishop, with an annual revenue of 12,000 ducats; if he preferred to be a layman, he would be made a prince with a large revenue. To this James replied that if his sister and her counsellors had allowed him to retain her favour as servant, brother or archbishop, he would not have come to the point to which he had been driven by his persecutors. 'Tell her that I will always treat her as my sister and my father's daughter.' The Devitdar's answer was ambiguous: 'tell your lord that I have understood all you have said, and will do all that is right' [4]

After this attempt at settlement the siege lasted for eight days, when it was seen from the walls that the enemy was striking his tents and burning his engines, and going away 'like lost men', leaving all his provisions behind. The reason for this sudden move was that the Admiral of the fleet[5] had informed the Grand Devitdar that, since winter was coming on, and two of his ships had already been wrecked, he declined to risk the rest of his fleet, and proposed to return to Egypt.[6]

[1] Fl. Bustron: 'qual era auditor di Cipro.' But this office he obtained after going over to James.

[2] So Fl. Bustron, p. 397; Τζέλλη, G. Bustron, p. 449; *Elia*, Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 68; *Helie*, *Descr.* f. 171b.

[3] See Note 1 at the end of this Chapter. The interview is described by G. Bustron, pp. 450–1; Fl. Bustron, pp. 397–8; Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 68; *Descr.* ff. 171b sq.

[4] Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 172b, however, makes him say outright that he must do the will of the Sultan and make James King of Cyprus.

[5] Sobernheim, in *Enc. of Islam*, s.v. Inal, attributes the departure of the Mamelukes to Charlotte's having bribed the Admiral. The news of the Devitdar's retirement does not seem to have reached Savoy for three months, on 20 Jan. 1461 (Saraceno, *Due anni* p. 566).

[6] James himself said afterwards that the Grand Devitdar and the Admiral had heard that the Sultan was dead or dying, and, each having hopes of the succession, they determined to return to Cairo. Conditions there were very unstable, and this was the real reason why commanders of reinforcements to Cyprus were apt to throw up their

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The besieged at first suspected a stratagem, but on learning the truth from two deserters from the enemy's camp went out and took the provisions which had been abandoned; but they dared not adventure further. Some kind of containing force must have remained in the neighbourhood. Meanwhile the Devitdar with his army returned to Nicosia and, after encamping for a night at St Demetrios, was about to proceed to his galleys. James was in despair, and grovelled at his feet, but in vain. The army went on its way to Aliki. At the suggestion however of Archbishop William Goneme, James rode after it, and begged that he might be left two hundred Mamelukes and the same number of foot-soldiers.[1] The Devitdar and the other Emirs were moved by his tears and left him the force for which he asked, under the command of an Emir called Janibeg al-Ablak.[2]

James now concentrated such forces as he had in the capital.[3] He had all the prisoners (Sir Peter Podocataro,[4] Br. Christopher and others) whom he had confined at Sigouri brought thence; on 7 November he himself, with his Saracens, returned to Nicosia. George Bustron, who was commandant at Aliki, brought *parici* and *francomati*, archers and crossbowmen, whom he had collected between Aliki and Mazotos, to the number of 225 men, horse and foot.

While occupied chiefly with operations in the Mesarea, at Aliki, Nicosia and Kerynia, James had from the first days of his arrival sent Giannozzo Salviati, Nicolas de Cres and the Mameluke Nassar Chus to secure the western parts of the island.[5] The Captain of Paphos was

tasks and return without asking leave, although they may have been encouraged by the fact that their position in Cyprus under James was difficult. Ziada, II, p. 52.—Inal was succeeded in Feb. 1461 by Ahmad al-Muayyad, who was followed next June by Khushkadam az-Zahir.

[1] Called, as usual, χαλβουσίδες (χαλφουσίδες) by G. Bustron, *chiaus* by Fl. Bustron, *galfusi* by Lusignan. Loredano (Giblet), II, p. 258, has a wrong number (500) of foot-soldiers.

[2] Ziada, II, p. 51. The name takes various forms in the Christian sources: Τζανὴ Πέκ, G. Bustron, pp. 453, 459; *Gianubei*, Fl. Bustron, p. 399, *Zanibech*, p. 414; *Giovanni Pec*, Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 68b; *Jehan Pec*, *Descr.* f. 173; *Jean Pec*, Loredano (Giblet), II, p. 258. The last is the only evidence for his being a renegade.

[3] G. Bustron, pp. 453–4; Fl. Bustron, p. 399.

[4] Podocataro was afterwards taken into James's favour (M.L., *H.* III, p. 162, n. 1) and granted some valuable villages and the fisheries and salt of the lake of Lemesos (Fl. Bustron, p. 420).

[5] G. Bustron, pp. 458f.; Fl. Bustron, pp. 401f.; Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 67b; *Descr.* f. 170b.

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induced to surrender the castles and swear fealty to James, and was left in command.[1] From Paphos Salviati and his corps went on an expedition through the west,[2] sacking villages and monasteries, torturing rich men to make them reveal their treasures, and returning with their spoils to James, although it is hinted that he received by no means all their takings. Salviati would have done much more harm had he not fallen ill and died.

The besieged in Kerynia continued to hold out. On the evening of 9 November James took some of his mixed force of Egyptians and Christians and invested the place more closely; but they did little more than capture or kill the country folk, or a few of the garrison who had strayed outside the walls. A body of five hundred men did indeed, hearing that James had no more than a hundred with him, make a sortie, but their courage failed them, and they returned to the safety of their walls.[3] It is possible that bolder leadership, at the moment when James had been deserted by his Mameluke support, might have changed the whole fortune of the war.

The Genoese of Famagusta, although James had not attacked them on his first arrival in the island, were hostile, and gave trouble by raids in the Karpass.[4] Whether, as the Italian chronicler suggests, they realized that if James were able to establish himself on the throne they would next be attacked by him, or whether, by an understanding with Louis and Charlotte, they wished to divide his small force and relieve the

[1] He is called James Μαχές by G. Bustron, *Machies* by Fl. Bustron, *Mongies* by Lusignan. It must be the same surname as that of the commandant of Sigouri (above, p. 561, n. 3). James's officers on this expedition to the west are given as Sir James Salacha, Nicolas de Cres, 'Asarchous', and a Mameluke, by G. Bustron; Giannozzo Salviati, Nicolas de Cres, 'Nassar Chus Eferes mamaluco' by Fl. Bustron; Jacques Salviati, Nicolas Decres and 'Assar Ghus Mameluc' by Lusignan. Giannozzo Salviati is correct. He was an ardent partisan of James, who gave him the house of James Gurri. See M.L., *H.* III, p. 97, n. 4; p. 159, n. 2. G. Bustron has confused him with another partisan, James Salacha, who afterwards conspired against James: M.L., *H.* III, p. 126, n. 7.

[2] G. Bustron, pp. 458–9; Fl. Bustron, pp. 401–2; Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 170b. The last says that they brought over Lemesos in the same way as Paphos. The exploits of James's officers, as related by these not unfriendly chroniclers, throw light on his clemency and the discipline of his forces of which his envoys afterwards boasted to the Florentines (p. 578).

[3] G. Bustron, p. 456; Fl. Bustron, p. 400.

[4] G. Bustron, pp. 455–6; Fl. Bustron, pp. 400–1; Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 69; *Descr.* f. 174b; Loredano (Giblet), II, pp. 259–60.

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besieged in Kerynia, the nuisance had to be dealt with. Archbishop Goneme was despatched to the Karpass on 20 November, and with the Bailie of that district, Alexander Tarantin, ambushed the Famagustans, killing thirty-five. On 25 November, Rizzo di Marino also went with a hundred Saracens to the Karpass, and on to Famagusta, near which he killed forty of the enemy.[1] On 6 December he again went to the same district, where Genoese ships were reported. The captain of one of them had been a prisoner of James and had escaped; Rizzo captured him and sent him to Nicosia, where James had him hanged. Rizzo also took a ship laden with soap and corn.

James supplemented captures of this kind, and the plunder brought to him by Salviati, by the proceeds of a systematic sack of the houses of those who sympathized with Queen Charlotte.[2] The goods on which he thus laid hands in a series of raids from 15 December 1460 to 4 January 1461 were chiefly textiles or woollen materials, silks and iron.

The threat to Cyprus, and indeed to all Christendom, which was offered by the expected invasion of the island by the Moslem supporters of James, had naturally excited the liveliest fears in the West, and especially in Savoy. As early as April 1460 Duke Louis instructed his agent, Theobald de la Brigue, to approach the Governor of Genoa (which was once more under French protection) with an appeal for help.[3] He was to point out that the matter concerned all Christendom, the State of Genoa (on account of the colony of Famagusta and other Genoese interests in Cyprus), and consequently also the King of France. The Genoese Commune and the Office of St George were to be asked for assistance, at least that the ship which was about to sail for Chios should meet at Rhodes the ship which the Duke was about to despatch, and go on to Cyprus with the ship which the Hospital was to provide, for the assistance of King Louis. It was known that the Sultan, in support of the false claims of the Bastard pretender, was preparing to send an expedition to attack Cyprus and, it was reported, not only to expel the King, but occupy Famagusta and all the other Genoese possessions in the island. In consideration of the friendship between

[1] This is attributed by Fl. Bustron to James himself.

[2] G. Bustron, pp. 456–7; Fl. Bustron, p. 401.

[3] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 99–102. For Duke Louis's efforts to organize relief for Cyprus during 1460–2 see F. Saraceno, *Due anni*, pp. 551–71. On 24 Dec. 1460 he hired a ship to take 300 men with artillery to Kerynia, and there were other contracts for ships to convey 400 men with 25 to 30 horses, and again 100 men (pp. 553, 564–5).

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King Louis and the Genoese, and Genoa's long-standing friendship with Savoy, Genoa should take steps to prevent the Sultan and the Bastard from achieving their ends, and send help, just as the Duke himself was sending from Nice a force of five hundred foot-soldiers.[1] Among other items in the instructions to the Duke's agent, he was to enquire about two ships from Biscay which had arrived at Genoa, and try to hire one, if it was suitable and of sufficient tonnage for the transport of four hundred men to Cyprus; and he was to buy considerable quantities of arms, especially arrows and fittings for arbalests.

It is not clear how far the appeal to Genoa met with success, although it seems to have secured two ships. Venice, for her part, was unwilling to bestir herself. When King Louis asked that the Venetian Bailie might be prolonged in his office beyond the usual term of two years and might be sent elsewhere on the King's business, the Senate replied that it was unconstitutional that its Bailie should concern himself with the affairs of the Kingdom of Cyprus.[2] As a matter of fact, the Bailie had had no scruples in concerning himself with local politics, and acting, as we have seen (p. 540), in effect as a member of the Haute Cour. Since he had openly shown himself friendly to James, it is strange that King Louis should have wished to employ him on a diplomatic mission to the Sultan. For that, as appears from a later resolution of the Senate on 13 May 1460,[3] was what the King wanted and the Senate definitely refused to allow. Venice was at this time on good terms with the Sultan. Hence in the same resolution the Senate refused the request of the Duke of Savoy to allow its ships to transport munitions to Cyprus.

As the danger grew ever nearer, Pope Pius II, on 19 July 1460,[4] came forward with the only weapon at his command. Plenary indulgence was granted for sums ranging from three gold florins to half a florin according to the station of the contributor. He at the same time devoted to the same purpose the tithe which he had ordered to be raised in Savoy for the war against the Turks.[5]

[1] Possibly this is the force of 500, of whom King Louis later complained that there arrived only 280, 'et Dieu scet quelx!' (M.L., *H.* III, p. 137, § 5).

[2] 4 April 1460. M.L., *H.* III, p. 102.

[3] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 103 f.

[4] Raynaldus, 1460, p. 256, § 95; Reinhard, I, Beyl. 74, p. 108.

[5] If Saraceno is right (*Due anni*, p. 556), the Pope handed over to the Duke the tithe which at the Congress of Mantua he had ordered to be levied for the Turkish war from the whole body of Christian clergy, and not merely from those of Savoy.

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We do not know how much, if any, reinforcement reached Cyprus as the result of these efforts. The Order of St John, however, made early preparations to succour Louis and Charlotte.[1] On the arrival of the Mameluke army in Cyprus, Nicolas de Corogna,[2] Commander of Treviso, sent the news to the Grand Master James de Milly, asking for orders. He and John de Chailly, Commander of Auxerre, were instructed[3] on 11 October 1460 to proceed to Cyprus and bring away King Louis to Rhodes or elsewhere, if he should wish to leave his Kingdom. But they were not to remain, or allow other Hospitallers to remain, to guard the castle of Kerynia if the King left it. But, should he decide to depart, they were to urge on him to provide for the protection of the Commandery of Kolossi, so that the Hospital should not lose its revenues therefrom. The King was to be asked to give written licence to Br. William de Combort, lieutenant in command of Kolossi, to temporize with the 'Apostoles'. The castle of Kolossi was strong enough to resist attacks, no less than Kerynia Castle itself; and the King's rights would not be prejudiced, since the Commandery owed no homage to any King, and the 'Apostoles' should never have possession and seisin of it. The two commanders were at the same time confidentially instructed to get secretly into touch with Giannozzo Salviati[4] for the same purpose. A week later,[5] the Grand Master sent instructions to Combort as to how he was to act if the Sultan or the 'Apostoles' demanded possession of Kolossi. He was to assure James that the Order was ready to yield to him the same obedience as it had yielded to his predecessors, in such wise that the commanders and officers of the Commandery could conduct its affairs without let or damage. But to grant possession and seisin of the castle, or pay homage, or take any oath of fealty, was out of the question. No king had ever enjoyed possession of the castle. Combort on the other hand was to promise that James should suffer no harm or inconvenience from the castle, and that its guardians would be good and loyal subjects. Should James refuse this understanding, Combort was nevertheless to stand firm, and

[1] Bosio, II, p. 207.

[2] Bosio, II, p. 208, calls him George Corogna, and says that he commanded the guardship of Rhodes.

[3] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 104–6.

[4] It will be remembered that he was leading the expedition which was bringing the western part of the island over to James (p. 564).

[5] 18 Oct. 1460. M.L., *H.* III, pp. 107–8.

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to say that he could do nothing without the Grand Master's express command. He was also to inform James that the Order had heard from its envoy at Cairo[1] that the Sultan had promised it immunity for its possessions in Cyprus, and that the commander of the Sultan's army had confirmed the promise.[2]

These instructions were concerned with the interests of the Order in particular. But the Grand Master, James de Milly, was well aware of the wider bearings of the crisis, and on 6 November he addressed an eloquent letter to all the houses of the Order in France, Germany, England, Italy and Spain.[3] Since the lamentable fall of Constantinople, no deeper wound had been inflicted on Christendom than would be the destruction of the golden island of Cyprus. Should Cyprus, too, fall into the power of that mad dog the Sultan, who at present seemed to be slumbering, the two chiefs of the sect of Muhammad would be joined together, watching for the moment to ruin us. The letter then sketches in bitter outline the rise of the bastard James de Lusignan, his flight to Egypt, his apostasy and assumption of the royal dignity, his invasion of the island, the capture by his adherents of various towns and castles, and the investment of Kerynia. The Grand Master had given King Louis all the aid in his power; but the people, seeing the strength of the usurper, had submitted itself to him. James now ruled over almost the whole island; the supplies which the Order used to draw from it were cut off; and an attack upon Rhodes was threatened in the spring by those who had now become its deadly foes. Besides the enemy on its right, the Order was now menaced on its left by that ravening wolf, the Grand Turk; master of the Morea, he was sweeping the Aegean; Lango (Cos) had been besieged for eight days. Total destruction threatened Rhodes; and the Turk had ships and men and engines of war sufficient to effect it. To raise funds to meet this crisis, the Grand Master imposes a special responsion, the whole sum contributable by each

[1] John Delfin (who was a prisoner; above, p. 557, n. 1): Bosio, II, p. 209. The Grand Master wrote in Arabic to the Emir commanding the Mamelukes asking him to act in accordance with the Sultan's promise. The Order was bound to help Louis because of its numerous establishments in Savoy and other western lands.

[2] Combort seems to have negotiated satisfactorily with James, who on 3 March 1462 gave him and his household, to the number of twenty, leave to travel to Rhodes or come and reside in Cyprus. M.L., *H.* III, p. 164. But the good understanding between the Knights and the Egyptian Sultan did not last long; their estates in Cyprus were attacked again in 1464. Torr, *Rhodes in Modern Times*, pp. 15–16.

[3] The letter to the castellan of Emposta is printed by M.L., *H.* III, pp. 108–13.

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priory on the feast of St John Baptist next June amounting to 102,000 florins. The letter ends with a summons to certain Brethren known to be apt for war to present themselves with all speed at Rhodes, bringing with them a suitable following.

The King's father was also moved to more active measures for the succour of his son. On 22 October[1] we find him making an urgent demand on his subjects for a subsidy, which had been granted for the support of King Louis on his accession to the throne, in advance of the date which had been fixed for the second and last instalments.

By the beginning of the year 1461,[2] although James's rule may not have been very firmly established throughout the island, it had become clear that the only point at which the legitimate King and Queen had any control was the castle of Kerynia. Even within that stronghold were some who could not be trusted. In February Carceran Chimi and Antony Sinclitico deserted, and going to Nicosia offered their services to James. From information which they gave him, he was able to lay an ambush for his enemy Hector Chivides, and capture him on a foraging expedition to Lapithos.[3] James had him beheaded and his head hung, as though he were a common criminal, on the Bridge of the Pillory. Chivides was married to Héloïse, the daughter of Henry, Prince of Galilee, that brother of Janus who fell at Khirokitia.[4] Although James had obtained for him the Viscounty of Nicosia (p. 545), he had constantly intrigued against his benefactor, and James's vindictiveness is understandable.

[1] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 398–400. Addressed to the governor and other officials of Nice, Barcelonnette, Ventimiglia, etc.

[2] Events of 1461: G. Bustron, pp. 459–68; Fl. Bustron, pp. 402–10 (many of the events described by him under 1461, pp. 397–402, belong to 1460); Lusignan, *Chor.* ff. 68 b–70; *Descr.* ff. 173 b–177; Loredano (Giblet), II, pp. 261–75; Bosio, II, pp. 212–13 (Louis de Magnac's mission; Charlotte at Rhodes).

[3] Louis had expressed a desire to eat beef, and Chivides undertook to get him some. Provisions of all kinds were short in Kerynia. It was probably about this time that Louis laid hands there on all the sugar from Kouklia and Akhelia; it was the property of the Venetian firm of Martini, which had bought the sugar powder from those plantations for ten years. On 8 May 1461 the Venetian Senate forbade Venetians to buy from the King sugar in any form from Kouklia or Akhelia: M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 393. James II had difficulties later about this lease to the Martini, but they seem to have been settled in 1467: M.L., *H.* III, p. 178, § 4.

[4] M.L., *Gén.* pp. 32–3 (no. 53 b); Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 78 b. In *Descr.* f. 173 b Lusignan calls him James's cousin.

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The loss of Hector Chivides to the besieged was serious; it was followed by another blow. A Rhodian galley, despatched from Kerynia to seek help from Rhodes, was wrecked at Pendayia. Sir Walter de Nores, his two sons, Sir Thomas Careri and many other Cypriotes who were on board, were brought in chains to Nicosia. The Mameluke Emir Janibeg was for turning the two boys into Moslems and beheading the others. But William Goneme and James himself interfered. The prisoners were taken to see the melancholy sight of the head of Chivides on the Bridge of the Pillory. Careri paid the homage that was demanded of him, but Sir Walter stoutly refused, saying: 'I have but one faith and I have given it.' His stubborn loyalty, 'la fè de ser Galtier', became proverbial. He was deprived of his great estates—of which he held thirty-six—but James later gave him a small pension of a hyperper a day.[1] The more pliant Careri became Bailie of the Secrète.

The Queen, who, throughout her disastrous reign, showed all the initiative which her husband lacked, now with the assent of the barons decided to go herself with Louis to seek help from Rhodes.[2] They left the Sicilian Sor de Naves in charge, and sailed with two of his ships and one of the Hospital. They were handsomely received by the Grand Master. A galley and a galliot were placed at Charlotte's service; with these and a ship from Savoy which put in at Rhodes, while she was there, with reinforcements for Kerynia, she and her companions returned to Cyprus.[3] They landed at Paphos, where the captain, Sir John

[1] So G. Bustron, p. 460; confirmation on 26 April 1468 of the provision of 365 besants is recorded in the *Livre des remembrances*, M.L., *H.* III, p. 197.

[2] This would seem to have been early in 1461, and Lusignan in both his books puts it in February of that year. The two Bustrons say merely that it was some time after the Mamelukes retired from Kerynia. Bosio (II, p. 211) indeed mentions the arrival of Charlotte in Rhodes under the year 1460, the day after it had been decided that a galley should be sent to Louis in Kerynia and the Rhodian guardship should remain there to support him. But he does not say that Louis came with Charlotte.

[3] Aeneas Sylvius, *Opera*, 1551, pp. 380–1. I take it this is the expedition mentioned by Bosio (II, p. 218), who however says that it was on 14 Feb. 1462 that a large ship arrived at Rhodes commanded by Carlo de' Conti of Ventimiglia, with troops and munitions for Kerynia. In it the Queen went to Kerynia and rejoined her husband. As a result James retired from the active prosecution of the siege and, leaving only a guard to contain the place, went back to Nicosia and sent envoys to the Pope, who were not received. Louis and Charlotte made an attempt to attack Nicosia, but their force was cut to pieces and the siege resumed. Now Feb. 1462 will not fit in with our other fixed dates, and James's embassy to the Pope was, we know, in 1461.—The

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Mistachiel, was easily induced to hand over the castles.[1] The captain who had been left in charge of the castles by Salviati was deposed by the Queen, who appointed Sir Peter Palol[2] in his place and reinforced the garrison. She and the King then returned to Kerynia.

With the reinforcements he had received, Louis supposed himself in a position to make an attempt on the capital. He was however met in the pass through the mountains and roughly handled, and returned to Kerynia leaving many of his men on the field.[3]

A few days after the return from Paphos, a further expedition to that place was made. Sor de Naves sailed from Kerynia with his brother Peter, who was to take the place of the recently installed Palol at Paphos. On the way he landed at Pendayia and was worsted in a skirmish with the local Captain, Demetrios de Coron.[4] Having installed Peter at Paphos, he returned to Kerynia. Afterwards, however, the place fell again into the hands of James, who, indeed, had Peter in his own service towards the end of March 1461.[5] Demetrios de Coron was sent from Pendayia and, summoning turcopoles and francomati to his aid, invested the castles. Peter de Naves, with his Frankish and Cypriote garrison, made some resistance. But here again Mistachiel, who had been so useful to the Queen, seeing in which direction his advantage

Chronicle of Savoy cited by Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, II, p. 116, says under 1461 that Kerynia was reinforced by 800 men under Francis de Langins, Lord of Veygié. (In the *Chron. lat. Sab.* col. 624, he is called Franciscus de Larignio, dom. de Vegier.) The 800 men under Langins eventually, after the expulsion of the Queen, found their way to Rhodes.—Loredano (Giblet), II, p. 276, gives Charlotte six ships on this expedition. Guichenon (I, p. 541) and Reinhard (II, p. 62) wrongly associate Loredano's statement with the help given to Charlotte by the Pope and mentioned by Lusignan (see below, p. 583, n. 1). Herquet (*Charlotta*, p. 139), I suppose because of Bosio's dating, places this expedition to Paphos after Charlotte's return from the West in 1462.

[1] Salviati, it will be remembered (p. 565), had left James Maches, the captain, in command. Mistachiel is also called captain; it would seem from what now happened that he was *chevetain* of the whole district of Paphos, Maches only commandant of the castles. Lusignan makes Charlotte put first Palol, and then Maches (Mungies) in command of the castles, which seems mere confusion.

[2] Ἐμπαλό, G. Bustron; *Palol* or *Paulo*, Fl. Bustron and Lusignan. *Palol* is one of the noble families of Cyprus in Lusignan's list (*Chor.* f. 83; *Descr.* f. 83).

[3] Aeneas Sylvius, *Opera*, 1551, p. 381. Bosio, II, p. 218, relates this under 1462, after describing how James sent an embassy to the Pope (and that, as we know, was in 1461). Reinhard, II, p. 61.

[4] Herquet, *Charlotta*, p. 139, misplaces this incident on the return from Paphos.

[5] G. Bustron, p. 461.

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lay, turned his coat. His promises prevailed with Peter to surrender the castles to James, who rewarded him with a valuable fief. James hoped through Peter to detach his brother Sor from the side of the Queen. He had to deal with a tricky subject.

Renewing his desultory operations against Famagusta, James moved into camp on 22 March 1461. He seems to have made only one serious attack on the place, at a point in the walls near the arsenal, where a weak spot had been discovered. His scaling ladders, however, were too short, and the attack was abandoned.[1] The troops revenged themselves by damaging the vines and burning the houses of the countryside; and James returned to the siege of Kerynia.[2]

The Genoese meanwhile had for their part been attempting to re-provision themselves by sending out ships to raid the Karpass. But the Bailie, Alexander Tarantin, was more than a match for them. A Genoese captain of the Cibò family was killed, and the rest of his crew sent captives to Nicosia. Sir James Zaplana,[3] whose galliot was wrecked, was taken with all his crew and delivered to James in his camp before Famagusta. James was quick to recognize his value, and he rose high in the King's service, to play a considerable part in the crisis of 1473.

Sor de Naves, on whom James had been working through his brother Peter, now made a pretence of deserting the Queen. On 15 May he arrived with two galleys at Aliki[4] and sent to the capital to James to say that he had come to take service with him. James and the Emir went immediately to welcome him and give him provisions, money and letters to take to Tripoli in Syria, and recruit troops and obtain munitions there. James and the Mamelukes then returned to the capital and, hopeful of these reinforcements, took the field against Famagusta once more. James himself encamped in the neighbourhood of St Nicolas

[1] The defence of the place was assisted by the Protectors of the Bank of St George, who diverted to the purpose funds belonging to the Mahona of Chios. Marengo, etc., *Il Banco di San Giorgio*, p. 483.

[2] It is here that the chroniclers relate an adventure of Nicolas Morabit, who narrowly escaped being captured in the fosse of Kerynia; he was rewarded (one does not quite see why) with the gift of estates and was made Marshal of Cyprus. James also gave him for wife the daughter of Louis (Alvise) de Nores; but she died a few days after, it was said of chagrin, because she was of one of the noblest families of Cyprus, and Morabit was of low birth.

[3] M.L., *H.* III, p. 165, n. 2. He was a Catalan, M.L., *Nouv. preuves*, *B.E.C.* 32, p. 346n.

[4] Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 176, says *Cerines* by error for *Salines*.

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Yerasimos, the Emir with his Mamelukes at the Lemesos (i.e. the Land) Gate. James appears to have done little on land, but at sea he foiled an attempt of the Genoese to throw provisions into Famagusta, capturing a caravel off Aliki in an engagement about 2 June, though the ship of Imperiale Doria seems to have reached the harbour. Five days later, he was undeceived about Sor de Naves, who arrived from Tripoli with sixty[1] Mamelukes, fifty Saracen foot-soldiers, arms, gunpowder and two bombards. Instead of delivering them to James, he gave the bombards to the Genoese and sailed with the rest to Kerynia. James in disgust struck camp and returned to the capital. For the rest of the season he seems to have left Famagusta alone. The Genoese were able to send out foraging parties to raid the countryside, and ships to Italy for provisions.[2]

In the course of this year 1461, James had two important accessions to his side, in the persons of the Catalan, John Perez Fabregues of Barcelona, and the Sicilian Muzio Costanzo. The former arrived at Aliki and was sent to James by the Captain, George Bustron. At first he was not welcomed, and prepared to re-embark, but was persuaded by Bustron to stay.[3] James came to recognize his merits, made him Count of Jaffa, and as such first baron of Cyprus, endowed him with numerous fiefs,[4] and towards the end of his reign, in 1472, created for him a barony, the county of Karpass, which he declared to rank first among the dignities of the Kingdom.[5] Muzio Costanzo arrived at Paphos on the same day as John Perez at Aliki. James took him into his service, gave him some fine fiefs[6] and a house in the capital, made him Admiral of Cyprus and married him to the daughter of Sir Thomas de Verni. James had to build up a new body of officers, since the majority of the barons had

[1] So Fl. Bustron. G. Bustron's figure (six) can hardly be right.

[2] On 28 Sept. they made a great haul of cattle at Castelli and Styli; on 2 Oct. they captured at Akrotiri three men who had been very troublesome, and hanged them; on 9 Oct. Sir Imperiale Doria's ship went to fetch supplies from Gorhigos, returning on 5 Dec.; on 30 Oct. a caravel was sent to Ancona and returned with 3000 bushels of grain.

[3] So G. Bustron; but Fl. Bustron says that James saw his importance at once.

[4] Fl. Bustron, p. 418.

[5] 'E volemo e consentimo de esser lo più degno e principal contado del ditto nostro regno.' See M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 421–3 (4 March 1472). When later the two counties were separated, Karpass lost its precedence, which was retained by Jaffa.

[6] Fl. Bustron, p. 418. They included Glangia (Aglangia), the grant of which is dated 24 March 1472 (M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 415, where 'Scangia' is evidently Glangia).

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remained faithful to Charlotte; the example of Zaplana showed how quick he was to recognize and enlist competence when he had the chance.

He realized very clearly that recognition by Rome was essential to his security, and in this year 1461 he sent two envoys to Italy.[1] They were the Bishop of Lemesos[2] and Sir Philip Podocataro. They were at Venice in July, and asked for passports, which the Senate, on 18 July, decided it could not decently refuse. But in strict observation of its neutrality the Senate declined to recognize them as 'ambassadors of the King of Cyprus', or to write commending them to the Pope and cardinals. In the resolution they are spoken of merely as 'oratores Cipri', and in the passports merely as friends and well-wishers of the Venetian Republic. On their way to Rome they passed through Florence, but—having learned a lesson, perhaps, from the behaviour of Venice—postponed a meeting with the Signoria of the city (which in effect meant Cosimo de' Medici) until they should have seen the Pope. Their reception at Rome was hostile. Pius refused to listen to the representatives of the blood-stained apostate usurper, or to acknowledge the royal status of the person who sent them;[3] the legitimate heir to the throne was still alive and very soon to be a suppliant at the Pope's knees. James's envoys were at Florence again in October, on the 3rd of which month is dated the report of the orations of the envoys and the reply of the Gonfalonier. The envoys explained that it was owing to the urgency of their business at Rome that they had passed through Florence without saluting its rulers, to whom however they had their King's instructions to make a full report of all the happenings, favourable or adverse, in which he had been concerned. There follows, from the mouth of the Bishop of Lemesos, a skilfully distorted version of the facts, which must be fully analysed, since it is the only statement of the case directly from James's side that has survived. It must be read in the light of the narrative

[1] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 153–64; Müller, *Documenti*, pp. 191f. Raynaldus, 1461, p. 278, § 31; Aeneas Sylvius, *Comm.* pp. 301, 327; Navagero, col. 1121. Bosio (II, p. 218), who mentions this embassy under 1462, is a year too late. The embassy referred to by G. Bustron, pp. 474–5 and Fl. Bustron, p. 432 (which Hackett, p. 162, mentions in this connexion) was ten years later, in 1471.

[2] Antony di Zucco. See Note I at end of this Chapter.

[3] *Comm.* (1584), p. 301. The hostility of Pius was partly political; he counts the King of Cyprus among those who regretted that a friend of the Emperor should become Christ's Vicar (*Comm.*, ed. Gragg and Gabel, I, p. 107).

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which we have drawn from other sources, including George Bustron, who was in James's service, and not unfriendly to him. James's enemies, said the Bishop, had done everything to stir up enmity between him and his father. When King John grew old, fearing that if James succeeded to the throne he would avenge himself on them, they plotted to exclude him from the succession by persuading John to affiance his only daughter Charlotte to some great prince, than whom they found none more suitable than the son of the Duke of Savoy, who was bound to her by ties not of love but of affinity. From King John himself, whom they knew to hold the view that it was more proper for a son, endowed with all the qualities desirable in a king, to succeed him than a daughter, they concealed the object of their machinations, which was, by placing the Prince and Princess in authority, to facilitate their own accession to power, or his succession to the crown in the name of the King's daughter. So they waited quietly for John to die. When he was no more, they plotted to kill James, and would have succeeded, had he not fled by night with a few of his servants and household. His intention was to go to Venice, then to the Pope and to the Duke of Savoy, to complain of the injury done to him, and collect forces to recover his Kingdom and punish the authors of such a crime. They however, learning of his flight, sent out two galleys in pursuit, and he, fearing that if he attempted the longer voyage he might be captured, suddenly changed his plans and made for Alexandria. There he remained for some days before he was recognized, and the governor of the place reported to the Sultan that the King of Cyprus had arrived as a private person. The Sultan, fearing that since he was travelling *incognito* he might have some other project, gave orders that he should not be allowed to depart without permission. The King however, desiring to carry out his original plan, constantly pressed for leave to depart, but finding it in vain remained unwillingly in Alexandria. The Sultan sent him gifts worthy of a king, and allowed him five gold pieces a day; he also provided a mounted escort, that he might go to Cairo in royal state. So he went to the Sultan and opened to him his unhappy condition, and how he had been unworthily expelled from his Kingdom, which belonged to him in accordance with the custom of his ancestors, the law of nations and the judgement of his father. The Sultan was moved to pity, because he knew his excellent qualities and had become his friend, and detested the crime by which his enemies had robbed him of his Kingdom, and promised to aid him to recover it. When in Cyprus

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James's enemies heard that the Sultan was preparing to invade the island, they sent to the King three envoys, among them a brother (Peter) of Philip Podocataro. These offered him, if he would return peaceably to Cyprus, a revenue of 4000 or 5000 florins, and certain estates in the island in perpetuity. He, preferring to his own advantage the peace of Cyprus, accepted these terms. They however meanwhile insidiously sought to corrupt with gold certain of the Sultan's Emirs, to turn him away from giving aid to James. On discovering this treachery (in which an envoy of the Grand Master of Rhodes was also involved) he revealed it to the Sultan, who promised not only to aid him, but to punish the envoys. But James in his clemency pardoned them and let them go free. He reached Cyprus with a force of Mamelukes under two commanders who were his firm supporters, and many towns and cities immediately submitted to him. But suddenly something happened which all but destroyed his chances. The Sultan was reported to be dead or dying, and the commanders departed with their army and fleet, not because they were unwilling to help James to complete his task, but because they wished to assist in the election of the new Sultan, each hoping himself to be chosen. With difficulty, by dint of entreaties and gifts, James succeeded in retaining two hundred men. With these he, in spite of widespread rumours that the Sultan had changed his mind and would no longer help him, recovered, thanks to his popularity, almost the whole of the Kingdom. Defeating his enemies, though they greatly outnumbered him, he besieged them in a fortress; and after his envoys had left for the West, he won yet another victory over them. Soon he hoped to reduce the whole island to tranquillity, for he undertook the struggle not for his own advantage but for love of his country, knowing that it would be happier under himself than under a woman, endowed as he was with all the virtues which make kings illustrious; for it is quite absurd and contrary to common custom that while the son of a king survives, most apt to rule, the Kingdom should be given to a woman. James desired all these facts to be reported, and his action in seeking help from the Sultan justified, to the Signoria. The judgement of that wise body was of the utmost importance to him, in view of its excellence and wisdom, and of the friendship which he felt for it as well as for individual citizens, who had done him many services, especially Giannozzo Salviati, who had never deserted him in his flight, but helped him with money and in other ways. Such loyalty was all the more welcome to the King that his peril was so grave.

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All this the envoys had related to the Pope, but calumniators had poured into his ears various accusations, as that in seeking the aid of the barbarians he had renounced the Christian faith; the falsity of which is clear from the fact that on his return he had restored many churches and ordered divine worship throughout the island, was unfailing in his attendance at divine service, and omitted nothing that became a Catholic King. It was impossible to praise too highly his clemency and mercy and his desire for the restoration of the Kingdom. Finally the Bishop invited the Signoria to send their merchants to Cyprus, offering them any privileges they desired.

Philip Podocataro followed the Bishop, calling attention to the remarkable moderation displayed by the Mamelukes in the King's service; they had entirely abstained from looting, behaving with a continence that would hardly have been expected from members of a religious Order. In religion, clemency, gentleness and justice, he had surpassed all his predecessors, and had given especial care to divine worship and the dignity of the churches. Though many who had taken sides against him had fled to fortresses, to the sea, to caves, in fear of his vengeance, he called them all together, pardoned them most generously, and let them suffer no hurt. To which clemency the envoy could bear striking witness; for he and his brother Peter had at first been his adversaries. The King had pardoned Peter; and he himself, when his fears had been overcome by the King's letters and the assurances of many others, and he presented himself, had been received in the most friendly way. Philip goes on to an eloquent encomium of James, as a just ruler, accessible to all, regular in the administration of justice, seeking by every means to restore the prosperity of the realm, so that the people are all united in desiring no other than this scion of the royal stock to rule over them. He concludes with a repetition of the invitation to Florence to encourage trade with Cyprus.

The Gonfalonier replied to these orations, welcoming the envoys, sympathizing with the King in his trials, and congratulating him on successfully recovering his Kingdom. He accepted the relation of the envoys as entirely true, and believed that it was the cruelty of fortune that drove the King to ask the help of the infidels, not out of friendship for them, but for the liberation of the Kingdom from the ills that threatened it. It would not be right to believe anything else of a King whom all extolled as most excellent and wise and better than his ancestors. For his offer of friendship and free commercial relations, it was grate-

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fully accepted, and advantage would be taken of it as occasion presented itself. The usual complimentary messages and assurances of friendship, and an apology for his brevity (the Gonfalonier feared to weary the envoys with a speech more worthy of the length and ornateness of their orations) closed the reply. In detail it was non-committal; but it was important in that it frankly accepted James's statement of his case and recognized him as King.

To return to Cyprus. The only assistance which King Louis acknowledged later to have received from his father in 1461 was one shipload of provisions brought by Charles de la Brigue, and 1800 ducats.[1] The Duke raised money by 'voluntary' contributions from the Church. Thus on 16 November 1461 the Abbot of Entremont contributed 80 florins to the good cause. But King Louis protested that little or nothing of what was raised in this manner found its way to him.[2]

In order to raise money Charlotte was obliged to realize the value of such jewellery as she had been able to bring away to Kerynia. But she was also clever enough to induce the Dominican friars to come to her help. They had fled to Kerynia at the same time as the King and Queen and nobles and other religious, carrying with them the plate from their church. She appealed to the friars, who owed so many favours to the Lusignan Kings, and they handed over their treasure, for which she promised to reward them generously should God grant her safe restoration to her Kingdom. She (or Louis) took the treasure and handed it to the Hospitaller, Merle de Piozasque, to pawn at Rhodes.[3]

The good friars never saw their treasures again, or got their value. What was worse, when James learned what they had done, he deprived them of some of their estates, although later he relented to the extent

[1] M.L., *H.* III, p. 137, § 6.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 139 and n. 2.

[3] Bosio, II, p. 236. On 27 July 1466 the Queen made representations to the Grand Master and Council that certain relics brought from Cyprus, which had been pledged by the Admiral Merle de Piozasque to the Genoese Imperiale Doria, should remain sequestrated at Rhodes, 'since sacred things should not be pawned'; she feared that if Doria took them to Genoa they would never return to Cyprus. The Admiral replied that it was by order of King Louis that he had pledged them for a large sum, which would be due to Doria. The Grand Master and Council refused to be involved in the dispute, especially as Piozasque was the lieutenant of the King of Cyprus. On the pledging of these objects, cp. Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 174. In *Chor.* f. 33 b he implies that Charlotte took them to Italy.

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of granting them a small revenue.[1] This was the end of the great days of the Order in Cyprus.

The Grand Master of Rhodes, some time in 1461, made an attempt to bring about a reconciliation between Charlotte and James.[2] He sent Louis de Magnac, Grand Commander of Cyprus, to the latter. But nothing came of this well-meant effort. Meanwhile, on receiving a complaint from Charlotte that James was attracting recruits to his side by offering them high pay, the Grand Master issued a proclamation forbidding any vassal of Rhodes to enter the service of the Apostoles.[3]

In May and June of 1461 Charlotte was in Rhodes again.[4] She obtained from the Grand Master a licence to send a certain amount of biscuit to Kerynia, though Rhodes itself was very short of provisions. News reached her that help was about to arrive from the Duke of Savoy, and she pressed the Grand Master and Council to be ready with their own ships, so that an expedition might proceed to Cyprus. Thereupon two galleys were equipped. But while the Queen waited impatiently, instead of the promised aid from the West, there arrived, on 27 May, a message from the Duke to the Grand Master, saying that he was making preparations, and asking the Grand Master to lend all possible aid to Charlotte; and on the same day there came the Count of Jaffa (James II de Flory) and Francis Verante, with a message from Louis at Kerynia that he was in great straits. The Grand Master was ill, and nothing could be done until he recovered. Charlotte was in despair, and divided in her mind. Should she go to the West, to move the Pope

[1] Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 33b; *Descr.* ff. 173b, 174. These passages give details of the treasure. In earnest of her intention to repay the debt, the Queen gave the friars a valuable pax. Later, in order to bury George Contarini, Count of Jaffa, the tomb of Hugh II and James I was opened, and found to contain the latter's royal robe of brocade, his belt and his silver orb, from which the friars made new ornaments for their church.

[2] Bosio, II, p. 212; Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, II, p. 116; Reinhard, II, p. 61.

[3] Bosio, *loc. cit.*

[4] Bosio, II, pp. 213–14—Charlotte was seen at Rhodes on 6 June 1461, by William the Brave of Thüringen, who found her staying in the castle there, and says that there were 500 Savoyans who had been sent to her aid, and two fine Catalan galleys, and some large Genoese vessels, all intended to go to Cyprus in her support. J. G. Kohl, *Pilgerfahrt des Landgrafen Wilhelm des Tapfern von Thüringen zum heil. Lande im Jahre* 1461, quoted by Herquet, *Charlotta*, p. 134. Herquet observes that the two large galleys (one Catalan, the other Genoese), had originally been hired by the Order for its own defence, and were not intended for Kerynia (Bosio, II, p. 213); also that there were not 500, but only some 280 Savoyans. (See above, p. 567, n. 1.)

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and the Duke to more effective action, or ought she to stay with her husband? At first she decided to return to Cyprus, there to die with him, and the Order gave her a galley in which to go. On 12 June she asked for a galliot, and for leave to be given that Hospitallers who were vassals of Savoy should remain in Kerynia to help in its defence. Three days later she asked for two guns with ammunition, which were given her. Then she changed her mind in favour of going to Italy, and was provided with an escort to take her wherever she pleased; also with a loan of 1000 ducats. But she was still in Rhodes at the end of August. With the death of the Grand Master James de Milly (17 August) her hopes of help from the Hospital had faded. His successor, Peter Raymond Zacosta, who was elected on the 24th, was far away in Aragon. On the last day of the month[1] she asked the advice of the Council as to what she should do. The Council, considering the risks all round, refused to commit itself. At last she really departed for the West. Probably news of the approach made by James to the Pope decided her to go and plead her cause in person.[2] Galleys commanded by Sor de Naves conveyed her. In Rhodian waters however an unfortunate thing happened. The account of the incident given later by the Venetian Senate[3] seeks to lay the blame chiefly on Sor de Naves and his fleet, who, on sighting the Venetian galleys, immediately took to flight, just as if they were pirates. Some of the Venetians followed them, and in the confusion some Mameluke captives whom Sor de Naves had on board broke out, seized arms, cut the sheets of the galleys, and went near to making an attack on the Queen herself. The rowers and others who were enforced passengers also mutinied, and began to plunder the property of the Queen and her suite. It is admitted that when the Venetians caught up with them, some further damage may have been done in the confusion which reigned. The Venetian Admiral, Victor Capello, happened to be in the port of Rhodes. He made diligent enquiry not only there but throughout the voyage, and caused everything that could be recovered to be restored to the owners. Later, when the Queen

[1] Bosio, II, p. 217.

[2] In 1466 (M.L., *H.* III, p. 137, § 7) Louis says that she had intended to go to the Sultan, to arrange a peace, and hoped, if she failed there, then with the money and presents and goods which she carried, and with the favour of the Pope and the Duke, to raise an army for the recovery of her Kingdom. The robbery by the Venetians forced her to go direct to the Duke and Duchess.

[3] 6 June 1465. M.L., *H.* III, pp. 130–2.

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visited Venice, the Avogadori di Comun made further enquiry, with the assistance of her agent, and were unable to find that the Admiral or any of their men were to blame. It was clearly impossible to punish innocent persons; but an undertaking was given to restore anything that should later be proved to have been taken from the ships. To the Queen the Senate made a gift of 2000 gold ducats, to the King of 600. As to the Mamelukes, it was obviously the duty of the Admiral, since they had broken out and seized the galleys and the persons and property of the Queen and her suite, to imprison them again. It was true that a cargo of pepper and other goods had been seized, but this was justifiable, for they belonged to Sor de Naves, than whom no one had done more damage to Venetian trade.[1]

We have no details from the Queen's side of what actually happened, except that the Grand Master, Raymond Zacosta, came to her help and lent her money;[2] but from the 'gifts' which the Senate made to her and the King we may guess that the Venetians were more to blame than the Senate in its apology admitted. As to the Mamelukes, the Admiral carried them off to Crete. When the Senate heard this, it was alarmed at the possibility of reprisals on Venetian merchants in Egypt and Syria, and on 5 September ordered the Governor of Crete to send them back to Alexandria.[3]

The Queen sailed on to Ostia where she was met by the Cardinal d'Estouteville, whom Pius had sent to try and dissuade her from coming on to Rome.[4] He did not wish to be further entangled in this quarrel. But nothing could stop the pertinacious lady, who on 15 October presented herself at Rome.[5] At her first audience she did

[1] This last admission confirms the suspicion that the Venetians, recognizing their enemy Sor de Naves, deliberately attacked him. So, too, Georges Chastellain (*Chronique*, *Œuvres*, IV, p. 194): the Queen 'se mit en mer pour venir en France, là où en venant en ce navire, d'un Catalan mortellement hay des Vénitiens, ladite royne fut mise à saqueman, privée et despouillée de tout le sien très-confuséement'; though Sor de Naves was not a Catalan but a Sicilian.

[2] M.L., *H.* III, p. 119, para. 3.

[3] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 395. Noiret, p. 463.

[4] Pastor, *Hist. of the Popes*, tr. Antrobus, III (1894), pp. 253, 405–6 (despatches from B. Bonatto the Mantuan representative in Rome to Louis Gonzaga, 11, 12, 16 Oct.).

[5] Pastor, III, p. 253. *Vita Pii II*, in Muratori, *R.I.S.* III, pt. 2, col. 981. Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, I, p. 541, followed by Reinhard, II, p. 62, wrongly makes her go to Venice and then to the Pope at Mantua. It was later, on her return from Savoy, that she went to the latter city; and at that time the Pope was no longer there.

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little more than kiss the Pope's feet, but next day, through an interpreter, she made an eloquent appeal for his aid, without which she must perish. Pius was moved by the account of her misfortunes, and made a kindly reply. He did not, it is true, fail to remind her of the contempt with which her father-in-law and her husband had treated the Church and himself, the one by not responding to the appeal for help against the enemy of Christendom, the other by not paying his respects to him when passing by Mantua; 'so that we said to the cardinals, the House of Savoy despises the Church and deigns not to promise support to religion; this young man who is going now to Cyprus will pay the penalty; he thinks to gain possession of the Kingdom which he has acquired by marriage; he is mistaken; he will be thrown out'. But Pius bore no malice against her, and though he declined to excommunicate James, as she would have wished, he offered her horses to take her to Savoy, and promised that a ship laden with grain and wine should be ready for her at Ancona. Troops she must collect for herself in Savoy and France.[1] He also gave her letters of recommendation on 25 October 1461 to Florence and on the next day to Louis XI of France.[2] Meanwhile she sent Sor de Naves in his galley to Nice, with a letter of recommendation (dated 23 October), asking that he might be given all facilities in the port, and horses if he wished to visit the Duke.[3] She also despatched envoys to Genoa, the King of France, the Duke of Burgundy and elsewhere, appealing for help.[4]

Having finished her business at Rome, and obtained travelling expenses and an escort from Pius, she left on 29 October, and applied on 5 November to Florence for a safe-conduct to travel through Tuscany on her way to her father-in-law in Savoy.[5] Passing through Florence,

[1] Pius II, *Comm.* (1584), p. 330. Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 174b, speaks of one ship, lying at the time at Ancona, which the Pope loaded with provisions and gave her. She herself says that the Pope helped her generously with corn and wine (M.L., *H.* III, p. 119). Guichenon (*Hist. de Savoie*, II, p. 116) and Reinhard (II, p. 62) wrongly associate this help with Charlotte's expedition in which she took Paphos (above, p. 572).

[2] The letter to Florence, in G. Müller, *Documenti*, pp. 195–6 (the date, Pastor observes, should be VIII Kal. Nov.); the letter to Louis, Ep. 387, *Opera* (1551), pp. 861–2; Raynaldus, 1461, p. 280, § 34; Monod, *Ristretto*, p. 70.

[3] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 400, n. 1.

[4] M.L., *H.* III, p. 122, § 12.

[5] M.L., *H.* III, p. 114 and n. 2; Müller, *Documenti*, p. 196. On 7 Nov. she heard that she would be welcome in Florence. As Pastor points out (III, p. 254), her letter to Florence was not written from Rome. The San Quirico from which it is dated may

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she was at Bologna on 20 November.[1] She had made her complaint to Venice of the pillage which she had suffered on her voyage, and at Bologna Venetian envoys came to offer her an indemnity. We have seen what it amounted to, and, whether it satisfied her or not, it does not appear that she got any more. Some of her suite were even less fortunate; more than thirty years later, in 1493, the claim made by the Savoyan knight Sir John d'Allinges, for damage suffered by his father Sir William, had not been settled.[2] Charlotte went on to Savoy, and even before she reached Lausanne the Chancellor, Antony di Romagnano, set forth at length to the Council the reasons for supporting her and her husband in their struggle against the Bastard.[3]

Throughout the year 1462 she never relaxed her efforts, though it must be said that, in spite of the Duke of Savoy's encouragement, they had singularly little success. She stayed for about four months at Lausanne and Thonon at the expense of the Duke and Duchess.[4] Savoy had found her aunt Anna, with her horde of Cypriote parasites, a social and political curse. Charlotte was to ruin its finances.[5] Well might the Duke exclaim: 'These Cyprian women have devoured my Duchy of Savoy.' Nevertheless Pius II greatly exaggerates when he describes Charlotte as meeting with an entirely unfavourable reception from her father-in-law.[6] In spite of such natural outbursts, he did all that he could for her. He had already sent a large ship with troops, provisions and

be S. Quirico d'Orcia, prov. di Siena. She stayed three days in Florence, being honourably entertained by Cosimo de' Medici (Scip. Ammirato, *Istoria Fiorentina*, II, 1641, p. 91; G. M. Mecatti, *Storia cronol....di Firenze*, II, 1755, p. 437). Next year (Müller, *Documenti*, p. 197, 6 Feb. and 24 April 1462) the Florentine authorities sent her some rings and gems which had been stolen from her in Florence by two of her servants; they had caught one of the thieves, but now pardoned him at her request.

[1] *Cron. di Bologna*, in Muratori, *R.I.S.* XVIII, col. 742.

[2] Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, IV, p. 389 (letter of the Doge, Augustine Barbarigo, to Charles VIII); Reinhard, I, Beyl. 84, pp. 119–20; M.L., *H.* III, p. 130, n. 1.

[3] F. Saraceno, *Due anni*, p. 567. The Queen had reached Vercelli on 16 Dec. 1461.

[4] M.L., *H.* III, p. 137, § 7. [5] V. de Saint-Genis, *Hist. de Savoie*, I, p. 451.

[6] He makes the Duke complain of the ruinous expenses in which she had involved him in these words: 'Quoties auxilia misimus? quoties opem tulimus? nunc homines, nunc arma, nunc frumentum, nunc aurum suppeditavimus, et quis modus rebus erit? Sabaudiam exhausit Cyprus, quicquid pinguedinis fuit, ad vos transivit, vacua provincia est. Vos in Cypro regnum perdidistis, et nos propediem in Savoia carituri sumus imperio, quando eo ventum est, ut vestri causa vectigalia et omnes census alienare oportuit....' As is pointed out in Monod, *Ristretto*, p. 21, Pius had reason to dislike the Duke for siding against him and the Aragonese league.

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money to the relief of Kerynia.[1] Then he engaged himself on 3 February 1462 to finance an expedition under Sor de Naves.[2] That officer, we have seen, had gone to Nice about the end of the preceding October. From a judicial enquiry made in June 1462, it appears that he committed serious excesses at Nice, his armed press-gang ranging the streets and countryside, and pressing men into his service as galley-slaves.[3]

We have, from about this time, a piteous appeal addressed by Charlotte in her broken French to the Duke and Duchess.[4] She suggests that the quickest and surest way to succour her husband and recover her Kingdom is through the Genoese. The Republic had given a good reception to the ambassador whom she and King Louis had sent, and would probably be even more forthcoming to her She asked the Duke to send her suitable advisers, and give them power to engage the salt-gabelle of Nice for six years, more or less, to Genoa or to those who might finance her expedition.[5] She is ready to give the Duke any lien on her Kingdom that he pleases. For God's sake let him have pity on her and speed her parting that she may go on her way; for time is short 'et la choize est periliouze'.

Outside Italy also Charlotte sought help. We have the instructions which she gave to William d'Allinges, Lord of Coudray, and James Lambert, ducal secretary, who were to repair to the Grand Master of

[1] M.L., *H.* III, p. 119.

[2] M.L., *H.* III, p. 117. Sor de Naves is to be ready to sail with his galley from Villefranche at any time from 15 March to the end of October. The Duke is to pay 2000 gold écus, 300 down and the rest within a short time to be agreed upon.

[3] Nice, 9–14 June. M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 400–8. Among the witnesses was Johanna the wife (aged 22 or 23) of Julian Frioni of Folquier near Villefranche, who was up her cherry-tree gathering fruit, when four of the Catalans tried to frighten her into giving them some. Modestly drawing her skirts together, 'taliter quod tibie nec ejus carnes ab eis videri non poterant', she refused, saying that since they were in the service of the Doge, she was content that they should take the fruit when she was not in the orchard, but now that she was there she would not give it them for the asking. When they threatened to enter and take it by force, she said 'Si vos intrabitis, forte habebitis talem ictum in vestri persona citius quam non putatis'. How the dispute ended is not recorded. The fruit is called *duraya*, the tree *durayerius* sive *sereyerius*; Mr C. A. R. Radford compares *durau* (Langue d'Oc), O. Fr. *duraigne*, a kind of cherry, and N. Ital. *ciriegio*.

[4] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 115–16 (no date or place). Charlotte evidently wrote French with difficulty. This appears to be a holograph letter.

[5] This arrangement was actually made, as appears from the agreement of 18 June (below), and the sum involved was 10,000 ducats a year.

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the Hospital, Zacosta, then at Barcelona, and to Juan II, King of Aragon,[1] as well as the credentials which the same envoys carried from the Duke of Savoy to the King of Aragon.[2] The latter are quite general; the envoys were fully empowered to make any pact with the King of Aragon for the relief of Kerynia and the recovery of Cyprus. Charlotte's secret instructions are explicit; of the many points covered, the more important are the following. They were to thank the Grand Master for all the services rendered to her by the Order, and to report her adventures and progress, mentioning how the previous Grand Master had come to her help and lent her money after she had been robbed by the Venetians. She had seen in Savoy James de Valperga, counsellor and chamberlain of the King of France, who had assured her of his master's great desire to help her. Since the Grand Master was about to go to Rhodes, the envoys were to negotiate with him about the details of an expedition to Cyprus, if he was willing to undertake it. Charlotte reckoned that 3000 foot and 300 horse would be necessary, but she would be content if he reckoned two-thirds of that number. She suggested that he might join her at Nice and sail with her, on her galley commanded by Sor de Naves, to Rhodes and Cyprus. In making arrangements for payment, she was willing to grant the Order estates and other revenues in Cyprus to the value of 1000 or 2000 ducats annually in perpetuity. The Grand Master, for his part, was to undertake the relief of Kerynia and the reconquest of Cyprus, on the security of the property of the Order in Cyprus and elsewhere; or, if he would not give such a pledge, he must give his promise to send relief to Kerynia, and afterwards to accompany her, or to send after her, if she had already reached Kerynia, the forces above-mentioned, to remain in the service of the King and herself for three months. Proceeding to the King of Aragon, the envoys were to find out what assistance he was prepared to give, since that would so far reduce the sum which would have to be paid to the Grand Master. They were to point out that it was chiefly the King of Aragon's subjects who were supporting the Bastard and ask him to put a stop to such enlistment.[3] They were to negotiate with him

[1] 17 Feb. 1462, Lausanne. M.L., *H.* III, pp. 118–24.

[2] 15 Feb. 1462. Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, IV, p. 390; Reinhard, I, Beyl. 75, pp. 108–10.

[3] The complaint was justified; as we have seen, many subjects of Aragon and the Two Sicilies joined James: John Perez Fabregues, Nicolas Morabit, Muzio Costanzo, Rizzo di Marino, James Zaplana. M.L., *H.* III, p. 121, n. 1.

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for the hire of his fleet commanded by Bernard Villamarina. With neither the Grand Master nor the King of Aragon did these envoys have any success.

On 18 June 1462, before leaving Savoy, Charlotte made a formal agreement with the Duke and Duchess, regulating the payment for the help she had received, amounting to 10,000 ducats payable annually for six to eight years, and the arrears of the dowry of the Duchess, amounting to 85,000 out of the total of 100,000 ducats.[1] The important part of this contract concerns the question of the inheritance of the crown of Cyprus. It settles the succession as follows. If Charlotte dies without children by Louis, he remains King of Cyprus with succession to his heirs, as had been agreed at the time of the marriage. Should Louis die without issue, and Charlotte survive, and not marry again, the Duke and Duchess will make no claim on her. If she marry again, they may claim the arrears of the dowry of the Duchess, as well as the expenses they have incurred or will incur in restoring her to her throne. If both die without issue, the crown shall belong to the Duchess and her heirs.

The house of Savoy did not forget this last clause, which actually became operative.

Charlotte now left Savoy, without having penetrated to the French court.[2] The Hospitaller Merle de Piozasque and William d'Allinges remained behind to make final arrangements for the money, men and material which were to be provided by the Duke. She is next heard of at Mantua,[3] whence on 10 August 1462 she wrote to Allinges.[4] She begs

[1] Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, IV, pp. 391–3; Reinhard, II, Beyl. pp. 87–91; summarized in M.L., *H.* III, p. 124, n. 1. Cp. Daru, VII, p. 213. The representatives of the Haute Cour present were the Queen's uncle Phoebus de Lusignan, Lord of Sidon, John de Nores, Hugh l'Anglois and Pollin Clax, of whom it is stated that they all understood Greek and French. Charlotte needed interpreters for the latter language; Merle de Piozasque, Knight of St John, was also present, and with Pollin Clax acted as interpreter, and the Queen gave her affirmation in Greek.

[2] Although, as the French chronicler Georges Chastellain says (*Œuvres*, t. IV, p. 194), she 'threatened' to do so.

[3] Cp. Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 174. But she cannot have seen the Pope there, for he did not return to Mantua after he left it on the close of the Congress on 19 Jan. 1460.

[4] Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, II, p. 117; IV, p. 393; Reinhard, I, Beyl. 76, p. 110. Charlotte seems to have gone back to Savoy before the end of 1462; at any rate, in Jan. 1463 she was expected at Geneva, and the Council decided to make her a present to the value of 100 florins, composed of two tuns of wine, one white, one red, an ox,

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him to urge the Duke, to whom she is writing at the same time, to give effect without delay to his undertaking. 'If it happen otherwise, we take God and all good men to witness that we have done all that is possible, and more than ever woman of our estate and age has done; and if those who ought to aid and favour us abandon us, we shall take the road for the East, and God will provide for our troubles such remedy as shall please him.'

In the same month of August Charlotte was complaining to Venice of the injuries she had suffered at the hands of the Venetian Bailie, Arimondo, whose partisanship for James has already been described. She seems to have got nothing but vague promises of compensation from the Senate.[1] She returned once more to Rhodes, in much worse case than she had left it.[2]

Her appeal to the Doge and Anziani of Genoa was not likely to be effective, except in so far as it stressed the danger to the colony of Famagusta. That had now been besieged by James for something like two years. It had been possible to send some relief from Chios, at a moment when the city was reduced almost to the last extremity. The treasury of the Republic was exhausted, and on 13 September 1462 the Office of St George had to come to the rescue, advancing the sum which was necessary for the defence of the place.[3] Famagusta was thus enabled to hold out for another two years.[4]

The Duke of Savoy was still hopeful of sending galleys to Kerynia. But he had difficulty in providing crews; and on 24 March 1463 we find the syndics of Geneva refusing a request from him that they should hand over to him all their vagrants, in order that he might man two galleys which were ready to be equipped and sent to Cyprus.[5]

twelve sheep, twelve capons, two dozen partridges, twelve torches, twelve pounds of candles, twelve boxes of sweetmeats, and some hippocras. Grenus, *Fragmens hist. sur Genève* (1823), p. 38, quoted by M.L., *H.* III, p. 140, n. 1.

[1] M.L., *H.* III, p. 103, n. 1. We have already remarked the curious fact that Louis desired to employ the Bailie on a diplomatic mission (above, p. 567).

[2] 'Aussy à son arrivée en Rhodes se peust bien congnoistre quelle subvencion eust de par deça, car se assez petitement estoit venue de par deça, s'en retourna de par delà en pire et mineur estat', as Louis protested to Amedeus IX (M.L., *H.* III, p. 138). She was given, in the palace of the Grand Master, quarters which were known as the 'Palace of (the Queen of) Cyprus': Herquet, *Charlotta*, p. 148.

[3] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 166–9.

[4] Cp. R. Lopez, *Storia delle colonie genovesi nel Mediterraneo*, p. 427.

[5] Grenus, *Fragmens hist. sur Genève* (1823), p. 38; M.L., *H.* III, p. 140, n. 1.

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Louis, who had been left behind when Charlotte sailed for Rhodes and the West, was not long in following her. He arrived at Rhodes before 23 February 1463, when Charlotte mentions his presence there.[1] On 18 September he was still there, when he acknowledged a debt of over 4741 ducats to the Order.[2] On 26 October he was in Venice, having arrived a few days earlier.[3] He begged the Senate for a loan of 2000 ducats, and it lent him 600. Painfully he made his way to Savoy.

Meanwhile, at some date in 1463 not precisely known, the Count of Jaffa, James II de Flory, was sent from Kerynia to Constantinople, with the object of moving the Ottoman Sultan to favour the Queen's cause, and offering to pay tribute and surrender a city to him.[4] Far from succeeding in his mission, however, he was cruelly put to death by a powerful pasha with whom he had a private feud.

Kerynia, however, if we have interpreted the sources rightly, was to hold out for another year. Before it fell into James's hands, he had succeeded in recovering Famagusta.[5] He had reduced this place to such extremity that in January 1464[6] the garrison came to terms. If within fifteen days relief should arrive from Genoa, James agreed to raise the

[1] 'Le sieur de Monterey' (i.e. Antony de la Balme) 'est yssy en la compaignie de... Monsieur le Roy.' Guichenon, *Hist. de Bresse et de Bugey*, II, cont. of pt. 3, p. 39.

[2] Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, II, p. 117; *Hist. de Bresse et de Bugey*, *loc. cit.*; M.L., *H.* III, p. 125, n. 1. The Grand Master, on 16 Sept. 1463, authorized his ambassador at the court of Savoy to receive from King Louis certain sums which the King had engaged himself to pay in Venice: M.L., *H.* III, p. 88.

[3] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 396.

[4] Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 177b; Loredano (Giblet), II, p. 278; Raynaldus, 1462, p. 341, § 39 (who calls him Count of Paphos). A powerful pasha had a wife who was a Cantacuzene, and a sister of Flory's wife. The Count refused to go and live at Constantinople, as his sister-in-law wished, or even to send for his wife and children. The pasha had him sawn in half.—Some of the sources speak of Flory as having been sent from Kerynia by Charlotte. It was doubtless by her orders, but there is no evidence that she was in the besieged city after 1462. W. Miller (*Essays*, pp. 504–5) suggests that Flory's mission was the origin of the erroneous statement of Phrantzes (p. 94) that Mehmed made Cyprus tributary. See above, Ch. IX, p. 523, n. 1.

[5] Recovery of Famagusta: G. Bustron, p. 469; Fl. Bustron, pp. 411–16; Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 70b; *Descr.* f. 178; Loredano (Giblet), II, pp. 281–2. Epitaph of Muzio Costanzo (Du Cange-Rey, *Fam. d'outremer*, p. 664): the Admiral blockaded the port, 'duabus triremibus Cyprum navigans deditionis Famocustae ad regem Iacobum causa fuit.'

[6] This date is fixed by the treaty of capitulation preserved in full by Fl. Bustron. G. Bustron's date for the surrender, 29 Aug. 1464, is unexplained. Lusignan gives only the year, 1464. Loredano has twenty instead of fifteen days; he has misunderstood the fact that the period ran from 6 to 20 Jan. (Fl. Bustron, p. 414, art. 18).

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siege and make a truce for a year; but if it failed to arrive, or arriving could not enter the harbour, the place would capitulate, on terms which were fully set forth. Towards the end of the delay fixed, a large carrack laden with victuals appeared, but before it could enter the harbour, James in person attacked it with some small vessels, and captured it.[1] Famagusta capitulated.[2] The treaty of capitulation was sworn before the Haute Cour in the royal palace at Nicosia on 6 January 1464. When the relief failed within the specified term, James entered the city.

[1] Many years afterwards, the Venetian Senate ordered the payment from the Cyprus treasury of an indemnity of 1500 ducats to the master and shareholders of the ship Salona, which had been retained for a very long time in service by James, and by means of which he took Famagusta. It had suffered much loss in its munitions and cargo and had missed the Flanders voyage. M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 493, 5 Aug. 1477. Probably it helped to blockade the port.

[2] The following points from the articles of capitulation may be mentioned. The inhabitants and their households all received security for their lives and property. Estates and fiefs of the Genoese outside the zone of two leagues were to be restored to their owners. All the inhabitants, Venetian as well as Genoese, were to be confirmed in their existing franchises. The Greek and Latin churches and bishops were to be left in possession of their revenues. The Greek burgesses were to have their court presided over by the Syrian reis (something has evidently fallen out here, for there was no reason why the Cypriote Greeks should be subject to the Syrian court), and to be governed by their usages and assizes as before. The *parici* in Famagusta, within the zone of two leagues, as in other places, were to be free, as they had been under the Genoese, except those who had escaped during the reign of James; those were to be returned to their masters. The *francomati* of the two leagues were to have their franchises and property. All persons in Famagusta at the time of the King's taking possession were to be free to stay or go whither and when they pleased. The small change, both old and new, was to be current as in the time of the Genoese; if the King preferred that it should not, he was to bear the cost of calling it in. The city was to be governed by the King and his Christian lieutenants, not by Mamelukes, Moors or other infidels; the latter were to have no government or authority over the Famagustans. The King would undertake that the Sultan should not contravene any article of the pact, and his Emir Janibeg should give his word to that effect. The penalty for breach of the pact by the King was to be 50 gold ducats [surely an error for a much larger sum] payable to the treasury of the Pope. He was to furnish two hostages, who were to be restored if the expected relief came in time, that is by 20 Jan.; should it not come, the present captain would hand over the city; should it come, the above pact would be null and void. During the period of delay, the King was free to occupy the zone of two leagues, and any Famagustan leaving the city might rightly be captured by him.—Though nothing is said of it in these articles, it appears that Famagusta lost its monopoly of trade, and all ships were no longer compelled to put in there. This is proved by the reply which the Doge, Augustine Barbarigo, made to a petition of the Famagustans for the restoration of various privileges in 1491 (M.L., *H.* III, p. 491).

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Conella Morabit was appointed Captain, with strict orders to give admission at night to no one who asked to enter the castle, were it the King himself in person.

The rodent ulcer, which had sapped the vitality of Cyprus for some ninety years, was cut out, but it had done its work, and the enfeebled body was to fall an easy victim to the rival of Genoa. It is doubtful whether the Genoese, when all is counted up, had any profit from their colony. Certainly it became, long before they were expelled, a serious liability.[1]

A few days after the King's entry,[2] Janibeg, the Commander of the Mamelukes, came at night to the castle and called for admission. Conella refused, in accordance with his orders, which were that he was not to open at night, even to James in person. When next morning Janibeg complained, James passed it off with fair words; but suspecting the Mameluke's motive, made enquiries which revealed a plot to kill himself and seize the Kingdom. Sending a force of Franks and Greeks, whom he fetched from Nicosia, to the Mameluke camp at night, he massacred Janibeg and the whole body of his men, with the exception of two or three whom he wished to spare, and kept at the palace.[3] 'And the King remained in tranquillity and peace, lord of the whole island and Kingdom of Cyprus.'[4]

[1] In 1464 the shareholders of the Office of St George received less than half the interest which they had at the beginning of the century. M.L., *H.* III, p. 167, n. 1.

[2] The plot of Janibeg; massacre of the Mamelukes; attempt to assassinate James: G. Bustron, pp. 469–70; Fl. Bustron, pp. 416–17; Lusignan, *Chor.* ff. 70b, 71; *Descr.* ff. 178b, 179; Loredano (Giblet), II, pp. 282–4.

[3] One of these was Kourkoumas, probably the 'Amir Cursuma' to whom James gave the fief of Mamogna (Fl. Bustron, p. 419). From Charlotte's letter of 1 Sept. 1464 it appears that James sent him back to Egypt, but he may have returned to Cyprus. Years afterwards the Venetians declared to the Sultan Kaitbai that it was at the instigation of Rizzo di Marino that James ordered this massacre (M.L., *H.* III, p. 392).

[4] Reference may here be made to Sir W. Muir's *Mameluke Dynasty* for what he presumably found in Egyptian sources about the expeditions in support of James. The statement (p. 160) that 'the Queen retained her throne and things were left much as before' (in 1461) is, to say the least, misleading. On p. 168 we read that in 1461–3 Khushkadam sent several expeditions to Cyprus, partly to support James, partly to get rid of Mamelukes whom he feared. Some returning without his orders were roughly handled; others came back because they resented the fate of Janibeg (the supporter through whom chiefly the Sultan had won the throne, and whom he put to death in 1463); but these were passed by. One of the Egyptian commanders by his contemptuous treatment of the King so aroused his hostility that he slew him and many of the Egyptian troops. The last sentence presumably refers to the massacre of Janibeg al-Ablak and his men.

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The Sultan, Khushkadam az-Zahir, was naturally infuriated by the slaughter of his men, but the King succeeded in appeasing him. An envoy was sent to Cairo with valuable presents,[1] and testimony was adduced from Saracen sources justifying the King's action. James had many friends in the Egyptian court. In spite therefore of passionate appeals from Janibeg's sister, the Sultan did nothing, except perhaps to demand an increased tribute.[2] The lady then took matters into her own hands, and hired a Saracen, who went to Famagusta as a merchant. Approaching the King on the mole, and pretending to salute him, he attempted to stab him in the neck. But James, exerting his great physical strength, parried the blow, receiving only a superficial wound, and shook off the assassin, who fell into the water, where he was quickly despatched by the King's guards.

Charlotte's frantic efforts to relieve Kerynia were continued down to the autumn of 1464. Her letter of 1 September of that year,[3] so far as it is possible to make sense of it, indicates that she had returned to Rhodes[4] and that thence, on 17 August, she had sent Sor de Naves, who had sworn fidelity to her and King Louis, with quite a considerable fleet to the defence of the place. She had also been in communication with the Sultan of Egypt; it seems that, after the massacre of the Mamelukes, Khushkadam was inclined in her favour, and had gone so far as to send envoys to her at Rhodes, while she was represented in Egypt by Thomas Pardo. But Sor de Naves was soon to throw her over, and the Sultan was appeased by James's envoys.

While Charlotte was in Rhodes, a serious quarrel arose between the Order and Venice. The Sultan of Egypt had detained the Commander of Nisyros and some Rhodian ships. Two Venetian ships calling at Rhodes had some Saracens and their goods on board; the Grand Master seized them. The Sultan in reprisal imprisoned all Venetian merchants in Syria; consequently Venice sent an envoy from Crete who, on

[1] Cp. Charlotte's letter of 1 Sept. 1464 (below, p. 620).

[2] Herquet, *Charlotta*, p. 143, says that the tribute was increased from 5000 to 8000 ducats; the Sultan at first demanded 16,000, but came down to half. Lusignan, it is true, says the tribute was somewhat increased, but I find no other verification of Herquet's figures. Cp. above, p. 557, n. 3.

[3] Below, p. 619.

[4] This must have been not later than the spring or early summer, for she was seen in Rhodes by some pilgrims (Sebald Rieter and three others) who sailed thither from Venice on 14 May (Röhricht-Meisner, *Deutsche Pilgerreisen*, p. 484, and 'Reisebuch der Familie Rieter' in *Bibl. d. Litt. Vereins in Stuttgart*, no. 168, 1884, p. 15).

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20 September, demanded the release of the merchants and goods that the Grand Master had seized. The Republic enforced the demand by sending a fleet of forty-two sail, with the intention, it was said, of seizing a large number of inhabitants of Rhodes and handing them over to the Sultan. Here Charlotte intervened; her representatives acted as intermediaries and contributed greatly to a settlement, which was concluded on 12 November. The Saracen captives and their goods were given up, and the Order was reconciled with Venice.[1]

Pius II made a last effort to bring about a peaceful solution of the question between Charlotte and James. He despatched two briefs to the Grand Master,[2] thanking him for the help he had given to Charlotte and Louis, and exhorting him, while continuing in this way, to make an effort to reconcile them with James. The Grand Master showed the briefs to the Queen, and, finding that no progress was being made with negotiations which were apparently already on foot, despatched two knights to Cyprus. Agreement seemed to be so nearly in sight that the only difficulty was to find a means of sending Charlotte in safety to Kerynia to conclude peace. These hopes were however deceptive; James, while not absolutely rejecting the overtures, made the excuse that nothing could be decided in the Queen's absence; and, though the Grand Master proposed to send her in one of his ships, nothing came of it.

Kerynia's straits were such that its garrison was reduced to eating horses, dogs, cats and mice, and an egg cost a hyperper.[3] The fortress was very strong; but James was aware of its plight and, working on the personal ambition of the shifty commander Sor de Naves, achieved his object. James had an illegitimate daughter or cousin called Charlotte;[4] her he offered as wife to Sor de Naves, with promise of a position in the Kingdom in which he would not need to envy any other prince; he would be richer than his brother Peter. 'And straightway', says the

[1] Navagero, cols. 1124–5; Bosio, II, p. 228 (1464); Vertot, II (1726), pp. 250f.; Reinhard, II, p. 69; Herquet, *Charlotta*, pp. 144–5, and *Cypr. Kön.* pp. 81–3.

[2] Bosio (II, p. 232) has this under 1465. Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, II, p. 117; Reinhard, II, p. 64.

[3] The surrender of Kerynia: G. Bustron, pp. 468–9; Fl. Bustron, pp. 410–11; Lusignan, *Chor.* ff. 70, 70b; *Descr.* ff. 177b, 178; Loredano (Giblet), II, pp. 280–1.

[4] G. Bustron describes her as the natural daughter of James's uncle. But the Venetian Senate in 1469, mentioning her recent death, calls her the King's daughter lately affianced to Sor de Naves (M.L., *H.* III, p. 308).

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chronicler, 'James had Kerynia.' Sor de Naves became Constable of Cyprus, and was rewarded with estates which must have made him, as James had promised, one of the richest men in the island.[1]

The date of the surrender is uncertain, but may with most probability be put in the autumn of 1464. The siege must then have lasted nearly four years.[2]

With the loss of this last foothold in the island, the reign of Charlotte and Louis *de facto* came to an end, although she continued to be acknowledged and treated as Queen by many Powers, especially the Popes (on whose charity she lived in Rome), and for many years did not cease from her efforts to recover her crown.

Before describing the events of the reign of James II from the standpoint of Cyprus, we may dispose of the facts known about the history of this lost cause down to the period of the Venetian occupation.[3]

Louis, who had returned to Piedmont before 1464,[4] wrote from Evian on 12 October to the Archbishop of Tarentaise (Thomas of Susa) a letter giving his controller and treasurer John du Pont full powers to negotiate a loan.[5] The Archbishop had already refused a small loan of 200 écus. If the Archbishop did not fail him now, his affairs would be in better case than at any time in the last five years. In order to obtain the necessary funds, he was ready to engage the whole of his State (i.e. presumably his Kingdom of Cyprus) to the Archbishop and six others. We do not know what reply he received, but can imagine that the Archbishop regarded the security as doubtful.

[1] Fl. Bustron, p. 418: Lapithos, Vassili, Kormakiti, Dikomo, the gabelle of Kerynia, Stefani, Sclepini, Pissouri, Agridi, Koutraphas, Aia, Lefkara and gardens at Kythrea. Stefani and Sclepini (or Clepini) were in the bailliage of Lapithos (M.L., *H.* III, p. 510).

[2] This most puzzling chronological problem is discussed in the Note at the end of this Chapter.

[3] In doing so, we shall be obliged frequently to deal with happenings which are described, though usually from a somewhat different point of view, in the chapters on the reigns of James and Catherine.

[4] He spent the night of 7–8 Nov. 1463 at Mantua, being hospitably entertained by the Marchioness Barbara of Brandenburg, to whom he expressed his gratitude for a gift of grain from the Marquess, but for which Kerynia, he said, would have been lost. The Marchioness formed a shrewd estimate of his character. She wrote (8 Nov.): 'though I did not understand him well because he talks Savoyan and very fast, he seems to me un signore da non troppo gran facende'. A. Luzio, *L'archivio Gonzaga di Mantova*, II (Verona, 1922), p. 163; Magnante, *Documenti*, p. 231.

[5] Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, IV, p. 396; Reinhard, I, Beyl. 79, pp. 114–16; M.L. *H.* III, p. 139, n. 2.

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In 1465 Louis and Charlotte were still pushing their claims against Venice for the damage suffered four or five years before when Venetian ships attacked the Queen's in Rhodian waters.[1] (It is a puzzling fact that the envoys who represented Louis and Charlotte on this occasion at the same time presented the claim of Sor de Naves for compensation for a cargo of pepper of which the Venetian Captain-General of the Sea had lately relieved him. And yet Sor de Naves had by this time long deserted the cause of Charlotte and passed to the side of James.) To the protest of Louis's orators against the help given by Venetians to the cause of James II, the Senate denied outright that any favour had been shown to him, asserted that it had throughout been and would remain neutral, but if it inclined to any side it would rather be to that of Louis and Charlotte.

An interesting (if genuine) document[2] of May 1465 illustrates the conditions under which an Italian condottiere was willing to adventure himself in the affairs of Cyprus. Robert of Sanseverino, Count of Cajazzo, offered his services to Louis, with 700 horse and 1000 foot, on payment of a sum down of 30,000 ducats in May, and the same amount in June. He undertook to be ready to sail from Naples by 1 September, and his service was to be regarded as completed by May 1466. If the Kingdom had been recovered before that time, Louis was to transport Robert and his company with all their equipment and provisions back to Naples. This he was to do even if the object of the expedition had not been achieved by then, for the condottiere declined to remain with his men longer in the island, on account of its unhealthiness. Louis was to supply the ships for transport, and also two bombards and other artillery. Robert was to be his Captain-General for this undertaking, and to be solely responsible for the discipline of his troops. A condition was that the Sultan was not taking part in the struggle, for with so few men it would not be possible to resist so great a Power. The Duke of Milan was to guarantee the observance of the terms by Robert. Even if Louis had been able to raise the necessary funds, it may be regarded as unlikely that this somewhat impudent proposal could have been accepted as it stood. Nothing more was heard of it.

Towards the end of 1465 Louis went to France and Burgundy,

[1] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 129–32 (6 June 1465). Above, p. 581.

[2] Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, IV, pp. 395–6. Reinhard, I, Beyl. 78, pp. 113–14.

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presumably on a begging errand, as to the result of which we have no information.[1]

Louis, Duke of Savoy, died in January 1465 and was succeeded by Amedeus IX, the brother of Louis, King of Cyprus. Sometime in the next year, Amedeus presented to his brother a long and detailed statement of the expenses to which the Duchy had been put on account of the subventions to the castle of Kerynia, the maintenance of Queen Charlotte, and the embassy to the Sultan and the presents to be made to him. We have the reply of Louis to these complaints.[2] Throughout the document there is perceptible a tone of recrimination; the subsidies which Louis actually received were such as it was the duty of the Duke to provide for the honour of his Duchy; they were in any case very small; so small that Louis is sometimes ashamed to go into details; the jewels which were presented to him by his father and mother when he went to Cyprus were no better than such as the poorest baron of Savoy would give to a son or daughter whom he was sending into a foreign country; a very large proportion of the sums which were said to have been raised for him never reached his hands; and when it is said that the total amount expended on him was 600,000 florins or more, and that it was sufficient to conquer a great signory, he replies that if he now had that portion of the 600,000 florins which he never received, or which was not spent by his orders, it would amply suffice for the recovery of his Kingdom. Although the Duke's Council asserts that he has received all these subventions, the majority know well that it is not so. The King refuses to believe that these charges are prompted by the Duke and Duchess themselves, who have always treated him with affection. If the House of Savoy has such heavy expenses that it cannot provide for him, and his case is not counted among the others

[1] M.L., *H.* III, p. 141, § 13 and n. 1 (payment to him, 14 Dec. 1465, for his expenses at Orleans).

[2] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 132–44. The date is fixed by Mas Latrie as not earlier than 1466 (it mentions Louis's journey to France, where he is known to have been in Dec. 1465). In spite of that, the document and other subsidiary pieces show that Louis still spoke of the victualling of Kerynia as if that fortress was still in his hands (see below, p. 620). It is unfortunate that after its preamble the document makes no mention of the embassy from the Sultan ('l'ambassade du Soldan et les presenz à luy à faire'). Charlotte in her letter of 1 Sept. 1464 also speaks of 'les ambassadeurs du Soldan' (below, p. 619), to whom she has made personal presents. The reference is presumably to the same ambassadors, who would be sent back to Egypt with presents for themselves and the Sultan.

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belonging to the House, then let him be given the portion that is due to him as second son, so that he can provide for himself. The Duke, it is said, is willing to give him 1000 ducats for the provisioning of Kerynia. Louis thanks him cordially; but, since the amount is so small in relation to the matter at stake, that even if it were spent the castle of Kerynia would come to be lost, it were better that it should be lost for lack of that provision than that men should say it was lost in spite of having it. To this sting in the tail of his statement Louis adds only that he welcomes the Duke's proposal to send an embassy to the Pope; no possible remedy for the situation should be neglected.

By July 1466 Charlotte was back in Rhodes, minded to make it her headquarters. On 27 July, at the same time as she made the request about her pledged relics which has already been mentioned (p. 579, n. 3), her representatives begged the Grand Master to grant a subsidy to her and her household, and it was ordered that all her gentlemen and servants should receive the same subsistence-allowance from the treasury of the Order as was customary in the case of the Brethren.[1] Nevertheless, owing to the peaceful relations which the Order, in the absence of the Grand Master, maintained with the Sultan, she felt herself insecure in the island. She therefore asked for a safe-conduct, leaving her free to stay or go. On 22 December 1466 Zacosta, writing from Rome,[2] gave her a safe-conduct for herself and members of her suite of either sex. Any of them whom she had brought or might bring with her might marry while in Rhodes, and any of them who married she was to be free to take with her, should she wish to leave the island, whatever customs there might be prohibiting the emigration of married couples. She was still at Rhodes, however, in 1469, subsisting, at least in part, on a pension of thirty florins a month which was granted her by the Grand Master John Baptist Orsini.[3]

Little or nothing is heard of Charlotte for the next two or three years, which she appears to have spent for the most part at Rhodes. On one occasion[4] she asked to be provided with money and equipment to

[1] Bosio, II, p. 236.

[2] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 144–6.

[3] Mandate from the Grand Master to pay to Tobias Lomellini, 26 Feb. 1469. M.L., *H.* III, p. 148. On 20 July 1469 the Venetian Senate instructed its envoy to Cyprus, Dominic Gradenigo, to go, if requested by King James, to Rhodes and discuss with Charlotte the possibility of reconciliation (below, p. 637).

[4] Bosio, II, p. 265 (27 Feb. 1472).

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proceed to Rome with certain French ships which were leaving Rhodes for the West. She was liberally provided, and sailed, but had returned to Rhodes before the death of James II.[1] Nor did she appear again in the West until 1475.

On Christmas Day 1473 Louis appointed an ambassador to the Pope, Sixtus IV, and the Roman curia, who was to reside permanently at Rome.[2] The appointment of Aymon de Montfaucon, afterwards Bishop of Lausanne, mentions as the first object in having such a permanent representative the protection of the 'Kingdoms' of Louis and the recovery of part of them and of the lands which are unduly occupied even by some who acknowledge our most holy Lord the Pope. It is probable that he represented Louis on the occasion when the Duke of Savoy, in March 1475, appealed to the Roman curia to interfere in the quarrel with Venice (below, p. 602).

The death of James II, which had taken place on 6 July preceding, had stirred some hope in the hearts of Charlotte and Louis, and may have prompted this step. Certainly the year 1473 saw revived activity on their part, or on that of their supporters. As soon as the news reached Rhodes, Charlotte despatched Sir John de Giblet, Sir Odet Bussat and a number of others, with letters to her adherents in Cyprus, to obtain information on the situation. Anchoring off Chrysochou, they landed Valentine, a son of Sir John de Montolif, who went to Pendayia, where he was captured. The Captain of Pendayia, having extracted from him the object of his mission, informed Famagusta, whence John Perez Fabregues, the Count of Karpass, went out in search of the brigantine, but failed to find it. Valentine was beheaded and quartered on 11 August.[3]

The news of James's death reached the Venetian Admiral, Peter

[1] Bosio, II, p. 270.

[2] Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, IV, p. 398; Reinhard, I, Beyl. 81, pp. 117–18. Aymon is described as *Prior Prioratuum Endafellae, Coysiae et Doueni*, i.e. of the Benedictine houses of Anglefort in Bugey, Coise near Chambéry and Douvaine near Thonon. He became ducal councillor 14 Dec. 1471. See his biography by M. Reymond in *Mém. et Docs. publ. par la Soc. d'Hist. de la Suisse Romande*, 2e sér., vol. VIII (1912), pp. 388–90, also p. 52. The biography by the same writer in *Rev. hist. ecclés. Suisse*, XIV (1920), pp. 28–30, 99–111, is inaccessible to me. (Information from Prof. Previté-Orton and Dr Rose Graham.)

[3] G. Bustron, p. 478; Fl. Bustron, p. 435. Malipiero (p. 599) says that three men were captured; two confessed to having been sent by Charlotte and were executed.

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Mocenigo,[1] and he at once decided to go to Cyprus. But the Turcopolier Br. John Weston,[2] who was in command of the Rhodian contingent which was serving in accordance with the terms of the league against the Turk, had no wish to be involved in the support of Venetian interests against those of Charlotte, and made the excuse that his ships required refitting and that he must go into harbour at Rhodes. Charlotte herself decided to approach Mocenigo, not that she had much hope of gaining his support, but in order to dissuade him from taking an active part against her. Her messenger (according to one account the Rhodian Admiral, Br. Christopher de' Corradi di Lignana[3]) found Mocenigo at the fine harbour of Fisco or Marmarice (the ancient Physkos)[4] on the coast opposite Rhodes. Now, they urged, that the bastard usurper was dead, and she the rightful heir still alive, the Venetians should help her to recover her Kingdom, as they were bound to do considering the favourable treatment that they had received from her predecessors. Mocenigo, in the course of his reply, expounded the Venetian policy. He was ready to do all that he reasonably could for Charlotte, but was astonished that she did not realise that the possession of kingdoms was based on arms, not laws; that not only she but the Genoese, who had possessed the greater part of the island, had been robbed of their dominion. She ought to know that the widow of the dead King was a Venetian and the adopted daughter of the Signory; James had left her with child, and appointed her, with the child that she should bear, heir to his Kingdom. Against her, Charlotte must seek help from some other quarter; Mocenigo himself was bound to protect and defend Catherine. He made it clear that the Signory would do so against all the world. For he was disturbed by the evident sympathy with Charlotte's cause shown by the Order, which had allowed her to employ its Admiral as her spokesman, while its Turcopolier had withdrawn his ships, and showed no sign of rejoining the fleet.[5]

[1] Captain-General of the Sea, Procurator of St Mark, and from 16 Dec. 1474 to 26 Feb. 1476 Doge of Venice.

[2] John Weston was Preceptor of Newland and Dynemore, was appointed Turcopolier 16 Oct. 1471, and was afterwards Grand Prior of England. Whitworth Porter, *Hist. of the Knights of Malta*[2] (1883), II, p. 727.

[3] So Bosio, as below; others say she was represented by two French Hospitallers.

[4] C. T. Newton, *Travels and Discoveries in the Levant* (1865), II, pp. 39–40.

[5] G. Bustron, pp. 480–1; Fl. Bustron, pp. 434–5; Navagero, col. 1139. Coriolano Cippico, *de Petri Mocen. Imp. gestis* (1544), pp. 63f. (and in M.L., *H.* III, p. 351, n. 1); Sabellico, f. 259b; P. Giustinian, *Rer. Ven. Hist.* (1576), pp. 220f. Lusignan (*Chor.*

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Charlotte, undismayed by this rebuff, demanded two galleys from the Order. Mocenigo, fearing that she might get her way, insisted that those which the Turcopolier had withdrawn should return, in accordance with the undertaking of the Order to assist in the war against the Turk. The Order decided to avoid being involved in the affair. Charlotte's cause in Cyprus was hopeless. They would help her to go and seek assistance in the West if she desired. On 4 August 1473 her representatives the Chamberlain, Hugh Langlois, and Bernard de Rivesaltes went before the Council, and asked that some members should be sent to interview her and hear her plan of campaign. They also pressed for the galleys. The Council declined firmly to intervene. The Turcopolier was sent in person to make his excuses to Mocenigo: the crews of his ships were busy with the vintage; also since the galleys had been refused to Charlotte, it would hardly be fair to let them go to support Catherine.[1] Mocenigo, admitting the necessity of the Order remaining neutral, sailed without them. The final defeat of Uzun Hasan on 26 July at Terjan made it no longer useful for him to remain in Karamanian waters. He proceeded to Cyprus, where he arrived on 18 August.

In Cyprus the death of James encouraged Charlotte's adherents. A plot was hatched in Kerynia to seize the place for her on 15 August, on which day all the people were accustomed to go out to a festival at Psithia and Achiropietos. The plot, in which an agent, sent for the purpose by Charlotte, was to play a leading part, failed, and the conspirators were seized on 20 August, confessed under torture, and were beheaded and quartered. Immediately afterwards a number of Cypriotes and 'foreigners' in Kerynia were arrested as traitors and sent to Famagusta; one escaped on the way, the others were tortured but released when they could not be induced to confess anything.[2] Another youth, who had come as a spy from Rhodes, was hanged at the same time.[3]

f. 73; *Descr.* f. 184) has the Proveditor Victor Soranzo in place of Mocenigo, and makes him say, in justifying his refusal, 'che importa più la camicia che il giuppone', or 'qu'il étoit plus obligé à sa chair qu'à sa chemise'. Bosio, II, pp. 269–70.

[1] Bosio, *loc. cit.*

[2] G. Bustron, pp. 481–2; Fl. Bustron, p. 437; Malipiero, p. 599. Among others arrested in this 'round up' and released was King Louis's shoemaker.

[3] G. Bustron, p. 482. This would seem to refer to Valentine de Montolif, were it not that Bustron has already mentioned his execution on 11 Aug. (above, p. 598). The spy-mania that prevailed is illustrated by the story in G. Bustron (p. 483) of the serving-man Nicolas or Nicolino who eloped with a maid-servant from Rhodes and reached Cyprus in a Venetian ship. They were both imprisoned but released after a few days.

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In these days Charlotte once more appealed to the Sultan.[1] But Kaitbai refused to hear her envoys and handed them over to Queen Catherine's envoy to take to her that she might do as she pleased with them.[2]

Meanwhile Louis turned to the Duke of Milan. His envoy Sibuet de Loriol had approached the King of Naples, but Ferdinand, who was poor in military resources and preferred to obtain his ends by diplomacy and had no wish for an open quarrel with Venice, referred him to Sforza. Loriol went so far as to assure the Duke that if he had any claim on Cyprus, Louis and Charlotte would cede all their rights to him, provided he would give them some possession where they could live decently. Sforza declined to come out into the open and break with Venice. But on 20 March 1474 he informed the Vice-Governor of Genoa that Louis might be allowed to hire and equip Genoese ships, but they were not to fly the flag of Milan or of Genoa, the negotiations were to be secret and nothing was to be in writing. At the same time he characteristically informed Venice that Ferdinand was inciting Louis to recover Cyprus; a communication for which, and for his good will, he was thanked by the Senate on 21 May 1474.[3]

Charlotte, in Rhodes, was beginning to be ashamed of the burden which she laid on the Order, which was doubtless glad to provide her, for the last time, with the funds needful to make a voyage to the West. She was grateful, and vowed that she owed more to the Order than to her own relations. Most of her suite went with her, such as Bernard de Rivesaltes and Nicolas de Milias, whose safe-conducts were granted on 1 July 1474. But she left behind her a number of ladies who were tired of her perpetual wanderings. On 4 July she sailed for Italy.[4]

[1] Sanudo, *Vite*, col. 1197, says that immediately on hearing of the death of James she sent a brigantine to the Sultan with the news, asking him to restore her. Malipiero (p. 599) makes her ambassador warn the Sultan that if the Venetians establish themselves in Cyprus, they will set up warehouses in Famagusta, his merchants will be forced to bring their goods to that market, and he will lose his Syrian trade. Bosio (II, p. 273) dates Charlotte's appeal to the Sultan immediately after her rebuff by Mocenigo.

[2] G. Bustron, pp. 482–3 ('Repezarte' and Nicolas de Milias). Fl. Bustron, p. 434, mentions only Nicolin di Miglias. Since Bernard de Rivesaltes and Nicolas de Milias were on 1 July 1474 given safe-conduct by the Grand Master John Baptist Orsini, at Queen Charlotte's request, it would seem that Queen Catherine allowed them to return to Rhodes (M.L., *H.* III, p. 127, n. 3; p. 406, n. 1).

[3] Ghinzoni, p. 23. Magnante, *L'acquisto*, cap. IV, pp. 11–12.

[4] Bosio, II, p. 276. She herself says that she sailed on the 1st (Magnante, *Documenti*, p. 246).

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Before she reached Rome, however, a question in which she was deeply interested came up before the Roman curia. On 2 March 1473[1] ambassadors from the Duke of Savoy applied for a judgement as between Louis and Charlotte on the one side and the Venetians on the other. At a committee appointed to report on the question, it was urged, and apparently decided, in accordance with numerous precedents, that the Apostolic See could not take cognizance of such disputes concerning kingdoms and principalities, being competent only when a question of sin was involved. This matter belonged rather to the jurisdiction of the Emperor. As it was a matter which might have grave consequences, the Roman court had better pass it over entirely, and refer it to the Emperor, rendering unto Caesar that which was Caesar's and unto God that which was God's. An opportunist decision which fell in very well with Roman policy at this time.

Disappointed at Rome, Louis turned to another possible supporter, with equally little success. He had, it will be remembered, visited Burgundy in 1465, doubtless with the hope of interesting the Duke (Philip the Good) in his cause. Ten years later, Charles the Bold, who had succeeded his father in 1467, is found intervening with the Venetian Senate. His ambassador Antony de Montjeu reports on 18 September 1475[2] that, having visited the Duchess of Savoy at Moncalier and fully informed himself of the case, he presented to the Senate a long and detailed memorandum of the grievances of Louis and Charlotte. As he enclosed the Doge's reply, he unfortunately gives us no details. But it was evidently unsatisfactory, for he complains of the difficulty of handling these *matières perplexes et odieuses*.

The 'old Queen', as the Mantuan agent at Venice calls her, had proposed to go from Rhodes to Naples; but Ferdinand, unwilling to involve himself openly in her affairs, advised her to go to Genoa, where she arrived on 5 October 1474. She was three months at sea, being driven to the coast of Barbary.[3] As soon as she got to Genoa, she appealed to the Duke of Milan for help. But Sforza, having encouraged her to try and recover her Kingdom, and lent her ships in which to come to Italy, took care to inform Venice of the requests made to him

[1] [Jacobus Volaterranus], *Diarium*, in Muratori, *R.I.S.* XXIII, col. 95 = Card. Ammanati, *Diar. Concist.*, new ed. *R.I.S.* XXIII (iii), p. 148. Cp. Magnante, *Documenti*, p. 243.

[2] Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, IV, p. 400; Reinhard, I, Beyl. 82, pp. 118–19.

[3] Magnante, *Documenti*, pp. 246–7.

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by her and by the Duchess of Savoy, and to express his determination not to involve himself in the dispute about Cyprus. It was but recently that he had entered into an alliance with Venice, to which Queen Catherine was a party. He offered the Signory 60,000 ducats a year for the defence of Cyprus; the offer was politely refused, while his caution was approved. He was afterwards informed that he need not expel Charlotte from his territory, where she would be as safe, that is give as little trouble, as in Venetian territory.

The Queen, who had meanwhile visited her husband at Moncalier, wrote on 17 April 1475 to the Marchioness of Mantua describing her experiences since she left Rhodes in July preceding in a Genoese ship, with some forty persons in her suite. Similarly on 5 May she wrote to Louis Gonzaga lamenting her woes. She was about to go, to appeal to the Pope, in a foist provided by the Duchess of Savoy. On 8 June, five days after her arrival in Rome, where she was met by the Cardinals and her expenses paid by the Pope, she was formally received by Sixtus.[1] She was welcomed by the Pope so sympathetically, that it was said that her natural eloquence failed her, and she could find no words to express her gratitude. The Pope was so pleased by her reverential attitude that he had the scene commemorated in a painting in the sacristy of the church of S. Spirito, where she is represented kneeling before him and receiving his blessing.[2]

Among her suite were Louis Podocataro, the future cardinal,[3] Hugh Langlois, Chamberlain of Cyprus and Lord of Beirut,[4] and George Flatro.

[1] Pastor, III, pp. 282–3, quoting from the Gonzaga Archives letters of J. P. Arrivabene, 18 and 22 May 1475 (her arrival at Civitavecchia), and 8 June (her reception at Rome). Cp. Magnante, *Documenti*, p. 248; Malipiero, pp. 604–5.

[2] Reproduced in Loredana, *Caterina Cornaro* (1938) at p. 32. The inscription attached to the painting was composed by Platina: 'Carlotta, Cypri regina, regno fortunisque spoliata, ad Sixtum IIII supplex confugiens, ab eodem tanta benignitate ac munificentia suscipitur, ut prae incredibili admiratione animique gratitudine in eiusdem Pontificis laudes prorumpens, non solum satis eloquentiae haud suppeditari, verum etiam animi vires ad eas explicandas sibi defuisse videri fassa fuerit.' Monod, *Ristretto*, p. 29; Ciaconius, *Vitae et gesta pont. Rom.* III (1677), col. 123. Jeffery, *Hist. Mon.* p. 443, describes the painting. W. Miller, *Essays*, p. 507, identifies the figures behind the Queen. Charlotte was also represented as signing the register of the Confraternity of the Hospital of S. Spirito, to which she was admitted on 27 March 1478.

[3] 1498.

[4] He died at Tivoli on 14 Aug. 1476; his epitaph, Torrigio, *Sacre grotte vaticane*, p. 286; Monod, *Ristretto*, pp. 27–8; Puccinelli, *Memorie sepolcrali*, p. 123 (16 Aug.).

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She settled in what afterwards became the palace of the Convertendi in Trastevere,[1] From there she continued her campaign. Venice was committed to the cause of Catherine, and there was no hope of help from that quarter. Savoy had begun to find her troublesome; and the adoption of Ferdinand's son Alonzo, to be mentioned shortly, seemed to destroy any hope that the crown of Cyprus might be worn by the Dukes of Savoy. So that, when tithes were being levied elsewhere for the Turkish war, the Duchess of Savoy had forbidden their being levied in Savoy, because she feared that they would be used against Cyprus, and Sixtus IV had to write and allay her suspicions.[2]

The anti-Venetian party in Cyprus was led, after the death of James II, by the Archbishop of Nicosia, Louis Perez Fabregues, a younger brother of John Perez. Louis had been on a mission to Naples at the end of 1472;[3] on hearing of the King's death, he returned at once. Later, when he was obliged to fly from Cyprus towards the end of 1473, he transferred his activities to the Kingdom of Naples. Among the schemes which he favoured was one to marry Charlotte, or even Queen Catherine, to one of the children of King Ferdinand; another was to affiance Don Alonzo, Ferdinand's natural son, to a natural daughter of James II, also called Charlotte or Charla, a girl of six.[4] Queen Charlotte seems to have fallen in with this latter scheme, which was carried into effect in November 1473; and, having no son of her own, she adopted Don Alonzo. She planned to obtain the assistance of the Sultan Kaitbai to place this couple, with herself, in possession of Cyprus.[5] She hoped also to be assisted by Mark Venier, a knight of Crete, who had a grievance against Catherine Cornaro, and could command 200 crossbowmen.[6]

[1] Monod, *Ristretto*, pp. 30–1; M.L., *H.* III, p. 114, n. 1. Note on Burckard's *Liber Notarum* in the new Muratori, XXXII (i), pp. 207–8.

[2] Martène et Durand, *Ampl. Coll.* II, cols. 1508–9 (13 July 1475). Magnante, *L'acquisto*, as above, p. 34.

[3] M.L., *Arch.* p. 298.

[4] See below, Ch. XII, p. 671. For Forcellini's work on Alonzo, *Strane peripezie d'un bastardo di Casa Aragona* (Naples, 1915), see Addenda, p. 1159.

[5] Monod, *Ristretto*, says nothing of this or any other approach to Cairo by Charlotte, which he would have found difficult to condone in view of his reprobation of James for his dealings with the Sultan, and of his approval (pp. 44f.) of Emanuel Philibert for refusing to accept from Suleiman the bribe of Cyprus on condition of his attacking Venice.

[6] G. Bustron (p. 515) records that on 7 Feb. 1474 Mark Venier, a nephew of Queen Catherine, arrived in Cyprus with 70 men and 36 horses; he came on hearing of the

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The Venetian Senate was well informed of what was going on in Rome, and in the spring of 1475 sent reinforcements to Cyprus. On 15 June it warned the Captain-General, Antony Loredan, that Ferdinand was about to send an expedition to the East; in spite of the King's assurances to the contrary, the Senate believed that it was directed against Cyprus, especially as Charlotte was preparing to sail thither. Loredan was to send one of the Proveditors with enough galleys to meet these threats, and to throw reinforcements into Famagusta. When the danger was over, he was to touch at Rhodes, and warn the Grand Master that no attempt to disturb Cyprus would be tolerated, and to capture any ship, no matter whose, that should arrive there. For the Senate knew (as its orator Dominic Gradenigo was instructed to tell King Ferdinand) with what object the Hospitaller John of Canosa was equipping an expedition at Naples, and that Rizzo di Marino was at the bottom of the whole affair; it had ordered the Captain-General to prevent any attempt at landing in Cyprus. The Pope was also informed that the Signory would be glad if Charlotte would settle down at Rome and renounce her efforts to return to the East.[1]

murder of Andrew Cornaro. From Navagero, who says (col. 1160) that he brought 50 crossbowmen at his own expense, we learn that he hoped to be granted a fief in Cyprus as his reward; but when quiet was restored the Queen merely knighted him and dismissed him. When he got home he had to sell an estate to pay his men. He was so indignant that he vowed vengeance. We shall see how he tried and failed. The story that Venier had been affianced to Catherine before she was sought by King James is rightly dismissed as a fable by Magnante (as above, cap. VI, p. 50, n. 1).

[1] Magnante, as above, pp. 32–8; M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 487. Malipiero (p. 605, under 1476) seems to refer to this same expedition. He says that Ferdinand despatched his son on 8 July (but probably he means that the news reached Venice on that day) with two large ships and 500 soldiers, to occupy Cyprus; if he failed there, he was to go on to the Sultan. Alonzo went to Alexandria, and Catherine, advised of his arrival, sent an ambassador who obtained for herself investiture as Queen of Cyprus. Malipiero dates the Sultan's letter in 1477, but we shall see that it was written on 5 May 1476. It seems that this expedition is identical with one of which we have rather different accounts from Sanudo (under 1475), Navagero, and Malipiero himself (under 1473!). Sanudo's Chronicle (M.L., *H.* III, p. 437) tells us: the Venetian ambassador at Naples reported in 1475 that Don John of Canosa, a knight of Rhodes, had equipped four large ships for the Levant, intending to invade Cyprus. The ambassador was instructed to protest to King Ferdinand, and tell him that if the ships passed Castellorizo the Captain-General, who had a fleet of 70 sail out there, had orders to send them to the bottom. King Ferdinand withdrew from the undertaking when he saw it was discovered. Rizzo di Marino was the instigator of the enterprise. Malipiero (p. 603, under 1473): Ferdinand said he could send his ships where he liked, but did not persist, and indeed meddled no more

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Whether the reinforcements sent to the island in the spring were recalled or not, early in 1476 the Counsellors begged for more, which the Senate finally granted. It took the situation so seriously that it resolved that all decisions concerning Cyprus should be in its own hands, and any interference by the College and the Signory should be punished by a fine of 1000 ducats.

Meanwhile King Ferdinand continued to assure Venice of his good will, and to complain of false reports which were being circulated about his and Charlotte's intentions. The Senate (6 May 1476), returning the compliment, protested that it took no notice of vulgar rumours, and was well disposed towards Charlotte. Nevertheless it cannot have been with surprise that early in July it received a definite report that Don Alonzo, accompanied by Rizzo di Marino 'and other traitors', had sailed from Naples in two galleys, with Cyprus for his objective. It was decided on 9 July to send out the Captain-General Antony Loredan with his fleet; two other ships were ordered to Crete with up to 100 men in each, to be at his disposition.[1] But the expedition, if it ever started, did not get far. The King of Naples, finding himself discovered, withdrew from the undertaking. It was probably when it realized that the danger was over for the time that Venice (in September 1476) again approached Charlotte, through the Abbot of Holy Cross in Cyprus, with proposals for a settlement, though without success.[2] When the Duke of Milan offered his assistance to the Republic, he was told (4 October 1476) that the Senate did not regard the danger from Don Alonzo and Rizzo as serious. Meanwhile Loredan, having arrived in Cyprus, despatched Michael Salamon to Rhodes, where Rizzo was

with Cyprus. Navagero (col. 1146) partly bears out Sanudo, though he is confused, and says that Rizzo di Marino was to pick up Charlotte at Rhodes (it is doubtful whether she was there at the time) and take her to Egypt. Ferdinand tried to cover his tracks by writing to Venice that Alonzo had, by agreement with Charlotte and unknown to his father, equipped the expedition. It was this report that prompted the deportation of the children and mother of James, a measure which we know was initiated on 30 Oct. 1476 (M.L., *H.* III, p. 408; Ch. XII, p. 726).

[1] Loredan left his brother Peter, who had been appointed Proveditor in Cyprus, to recruit stradiotes in the Morea, and proceeded with 20 galleys to Famagusta (Herquet, p. 197). Further forces were despatched in the course of the year (*Relatione*, in Reinhard, II, Beyl. p. 31, 15 Oct. 1476; decision of the Senate, 20 Dec. 1476, M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 489; cp. A. Battistella in *Atti R. Ist. Ven.* LXXX (1920–1), p. 311, for various measures taken from 1475 to 1478 for the security of Cyprus).

[2] Magnante, as above, pp. 39–40.

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rumoured to be. Salamon presented to the Grand Master Peter d'Aubusson (the successor of Orsini, who had died on 17 June 1476) a letter from the Doge, Andrew Vendramin, requesting that the Order should not encourage Rizzo or any other of the rebels; otherwise the Signory, which had determined to defend Cyprus as its own possession, would consider the Order to have broken faith. The Grand Master replied verbally to Salamon, and by letter of 18 September to the Doge, that the Order never had given and was not now giving the Signory any cause for offence by interfering in the affairs of Cyprus, but would never renounce its right to give asylum to fugitives who behaved themselves. When Salamon left with this answer, the Council of the Order decided to strengthen the defence of the harbour by a heavy iron chain. In October, Loredan himself appeared at Rhodes in search of Rizzo, to receive the same answer as had been given to his messenger.[1]

Some time in 1477 Ferdinand made an attempt to kidnap the Princess Charla, to whom Alonzo was affianced, from Venice,[2] with the result that she and her brothers, with Marietta of Patras, were more closely confined and finally on 27 August 1478 placed in secure custody at Padua. The attempt at kidnapping was part of the scheme which the King entertained for sending Charla with Alonzo to Egypt, to enlist the support of the Sultan for the attempt on Cyprus.[3] Four Genoese ships had been chartered to convey the party. But in the meantime Venetian agents[4] intercepted secret letters which were passing between Charlotte and Genoa. Orders were at once issued (8 August) to Antony Loredan, the Captain-General, leaving the Proveditor Thomas Malipiero with a sufficient force in the Gulf, to take his fleet to Cyprus waters, or, if he could not safely leave Scutari himself, to send Malipiero thither with a squadron.[5] Arbalesters were to be picked up in Candia, and the four Genoese ships captured. Charlotte was to be put to death, and to be reported to have been killed in the heat of the fighting.[6]

[1] Bosio, II, pp. 293–4; Herquet, *Charlotta*, pp. 197–8.

[2] Navagero, col. 1156. Romanin (IV, p. 439) dates the attempt at kidnapping in 1477, citing a document of 21 March 1477. Charla was then transferred to the monastery of Corpus Domini, and later, after more scares, to Padua.

[3] Navagero, *loc. cit.*

[4] Report from Bernard Bembo, ambassador at Florence, received on 8 Aug. 1478 (Malipiero, p. 607). Charlotte was asking Genoa for two ships; she seems to have got four.

[5] M.L., *H.* III, p. 150n. (8 Aug.) from the *Secreti*, XXVIII, f. 10.

[6] Navagero, col. 1156.

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An ambassador was to be sent as soon as possible to Cairo with presents and the tribute for two years. It was to be impressed on the Sultan that Catherine had inherited the crown from James, whom Kaitbai's predecessor had himself set upon the throne, expelling Charlotte and her husband; he should not therefore now lend Charlotte any aid, but should invest Catherine with the Kingdom. Soon afterwards,[1] learning that the Pope and the Hospital were not ignorant of Charlotte's plans, the Senate issued fresh instructions to the Captain-General to keep an eye on Rhodes. Other Genoese ships were known to be at sea, and it was suspected that they might join with Charlotte's four; he was therefore, as already instructed, leaving Malipiero on guard in Albanian waters, to take the rest of his fleet to Cyprus. The order to send an ambassador with the tribute to Cairo was repeated. As a matter of fact the secretary John Diedo was hurriedly despatched to Egypt; he sailed with six large galleys which were ostensibly going to trade at Alexandria.[2] He was, as we shall see later, badly received by the Sultan.

In Cyprus itself, on the report that an expedition was being equipped in Genoa, the Counsellors Antony Erizzo and Ambrose Contarini requisitioned and armed all the ships that were in the ports; when the Proveditor arrived soon afterwards twenty-seven galleys and twenty-four other large ships were available for the defence.

On 9 August instructions were despatched by the Senate to Antony Vinciguerra, the Venetian representative in Florence, with the actual letters from Charlotte's friends in Genoa. The tone of these instructions,[3] which show that the Senate was determined to stand no nonsense from Charlotte, is impressive. The intercepted letters make it clear that arrangements are on foot to take the lady to Cairo to make trouble for Cyprus. The Senate has taken the necessary steps to meet this danger, but wishes to warn Charlotte as her good friend. Vinciguerra is to go to Rome or wherever she is, present his credentials, and assure her that the Senate has always been her friend and sympathized with her misfortunes, has never robbed her of her Kingdom or anything else, and has done all that it could honourably do for her in her adversity. God willed that the Kingdom should come into the hands of the late King

[1] Magnante, *L'acquisto*, cap. VI, p. 49. Cp. Navagero, col. 1157. But Malipiero (p. 605) shows that Queen Catherine had already been recognized and invested by the Sultan in 1476.

[2] Navagero, *loc. cit.*

[3] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 148–50. Cp. Navagero, *loc. cit.*

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James. He bound himself to Venice by taking the daughter of the Republic to wife, and pledging himself always to be on the side of Venice, while Venice undertook to protect him and his descendants. What Venice has done for the lady, her daughter, to whom James left his Kingdom, has been honourably, lawfully and loyally done. Vinciguerra is to assure Charlotte that the Senate knows all about her intentions, and has taken steps to prevent her carrying them out; to convince her he may show her the letters; but they are not the first nor the only notice the Senate has had of such proceedings. He is to urge her strongly not to put herself in unavoidable danger. Finally, he is to inform her that if she will come to reside on Venetian territory, wherever she chooses, she will be paid annually, out of the revenue of the island, a pension of 4000 to 5000 gold ducats.[1]

The Senate thus already envisaged the policy which it was to carry out in the case of Catherine Cornaro. But its remonstrances only stiffened Charlotte's determination. The Genoese ships which had been equipped by King Ferdinand's orders picked her up at a port near Rome and, passing Cyprus before the Venetian fleet, which hoped to catch them, could arrive, reached Alexandria. She had an encouraging reception from the Sultan. Don Alonzo, who came with her, was to remain there until 1487.[2] Even if the plan of marriage to the Princess Charla was not given up when the attempt at kidnapping her was foiled, it was brought to naught by the girl's death in 1480. That left an opening for another scheme, to marry Don Alonzo to Queen Catherine herself.[3] A side-light is thrown on this by the case of Donna Violante de Sibilia, a tertiary, who had approached Catherine with a

[1] Cp. Magnante, *Documenti*, p. 248 (Sept. 1476 and again Aug. 1478). On 10 June 1475 the Mantuan representative in Rome, Arrivabene, wrote that Venice had offered her a pension of 10,000 ducats; but she was pinning her hopes to the Sultan.

[2] Navagero, col. 1194, dates his return in 1486, and makes the release of Roucha and others on 21 June 1486 a consequence of it; but it appears that Alonzo made his solemn entry into Naples on 27 Sept. 1487 (Magnante, *L' acquisto*, cap. VII, p. 70). Afterwards, in 1488, probably in order to dispel Venetian suspicions, his father had him nominated to the see of Chieti. See p. 1159.

[3] Reinhard (II, p. 91, note *n*) thinks that when the original plan to marry Alonzo to Charla had to be given up, a new plan to marry Ferdinand's legitimate son Frederick to Catherine may have been adopted. He cites Bembo, who (in his *Opera*, Basle, 1556, p. 29) names Frederick as the son concerned. In his *Hist. Vinit.* Venice, 1552, f. 7b, however, Bembo merely speaks of a son of Ferdinand, without giving his name, and probably Frederick is a mere mistake for Alonzo, a mistake which is also found in Sanudo (see Ch. XII, p. 670, n. 3).

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proposal for her marriage with the son of King Ferdinand, had been arrested and sent to Crete, and then to Venice. On 22 November 1480 she was released, with the warning that she should not return to Cyprus.[1] This kind of plotting was to go on for years, while Don Alonzo enjoyed life in Alexandria. The Sultan was not likely to interfere, for his presence there made it easier to put pressure on Catherine when necessary.

A marriage of Don Alonzo to Queen Catherine presented, of course, no attraction to Charlotte, and when she found that negotiations for it were being actively pursued by Ferdinand through his ambassadors in Cairo, she returned to the West. A Dutch traveller who was in Cairo after she had gone (between April and September 1482) describes a reception of the ambassadors of the King of Naples, who had come to treat with the Sultan for the island and crown of Cyprus on behalf of his bastard son, then living at the Sultan's court. The King, in order to make his intention clear, had sent a ship laden with artillery and all kinds of munitions.[2]

In April 1482 King Louis, who had long ceased to count for anything in affairs of State, died at the priory of Ripaille near Thonon in Savoy.[3] He had been thoroughly ineffectual, but it does not seem that he can be blamed for anything worse than lack of courage.[4]

Charlotte had returned to Rome at the end of January 1482[5] from her excursion to Egypt, and continued to be treated with much honour by

[1] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 503. Magnante (*L' acquisto*, cap. VI, pp. 52–3) thinks that she was concerned with the plot of Mark Venier, to be related below. Both writers cite the records of the Council of Ten, but from different pages and under dates '22 Nov. and 22 March respectively.

[2] Joos van Ghistele, *T'voyage*, bk. III, ch. XIII, pp. 165–7 of the ed. of 1572. Ghistele also describes how ambassadors from the Queen of Cyprus came about the same time bringing the tribute, which amounted to 7000 (sic) ducats a year and was two years in arrears; they were given a golden robe and other presents for her.

[3] *Chron. lat. Sab.*, in *Mon. Hist. Patr.* III (*Script.* I), col. 617. Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, II, p. 120, dates his death in August.

[4] *Chron. lat. Sab.* col. 662. Malipiero, II, p. 597: 'fu homo molto devoto, ma non troppo atto al guerizar'. The *Relatione dell' isola di Cipro* (Bodley MS. Tanner cxvii, f. 12b) repeats this description. But hostile writers did not hesitate to attack his moral character. Alexander Zilioli, for instance (in Reinhard, II, Beyl. p. 183), rakes up from Coriolano Cippico (*de Petri Moc. Imp. gestis*, 1544, p. 63 = *de bello Asiatico*, 1594, lib. II, f. 41b) the quite baseless libel that he deserted his wife and spent his life in luxury among concubines (repeated by Navagero, col. 1138).

[5] Jacobus Volaterranus, *Diarium*, in Muratori, *R.I.S.* XXIII, col. 162; new ed. XXIII (iii), p. 87.

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Sixtus.[1] It was observed, not with the approval of all, that on 23 November 1483, when she, with her interpreter, had an audience of Sixtus, she was given a seat of no less height and dignity than the Pope himself.[2] Her last attempt, so far as we know, at an actual expedition was made in 1484.[3] At this time Venice was involved in the war of Ferrara, and was facing a formidable combination of Italian Powers, including the Pope, Milan, Naples and Florence. On 16 March 1484[4] Florence instructed her ambassador at Rome, Guidantonio Vespucci, to discuss with the Pope a plan, put forward by Ferdinand of Naples, to send Charlotte with a fleet of Genoese ships to recapture Cyprus from the Venetians. The Pope had agreed to it, and Florence also approved, but at the same time declined to bear any of the cost of the adventure. For this reason, or because all the parties concerned were tired of the war with Venice, which was to be concluded by the peace of Bagnolo (7 August 1484), the proposal of Florence was not taken up. It is possible that Venice heard of it, for early in 1484 it ordered Dominic Malipiero to cruise between Modon and the Archipelago and stop any expedition of the kind proposed.

At last Charlotte accepted the inevitable. Her uncle Phoebus, a natural son of Janus, who had always supported her against James, is said to have had much to do with persuading her to the step which she now took. On 25 February 1485 she formally ceded the Kingdom of Cyprus to the house of Savoy.[5] The act of cession was concluded at Rome, in St Peter's in the chapel near the sacristy, James Langlois acting as interpreter to Charlotte, who required everything to be explained to her in Greek.[6]

[1] Annual pension of 20 ducats granted in 1481 and 1484; see note on Burckard in Carducci-Fiorini, Muratori, *R.I.S.* new ed. XXXII, pp. 207–8. The amount is derisory, but it may have been supplementary. Jacobus Volaterranus, *loc. cit.*, gives her pension as 100 aurei a month.

[2] Jacobus Volaterranus, in Muratori, *R.I.S.* XXIII, col. 192; new ed. XXIII (iii), p. 127.

[3] It had been preceded, if Venetian suspicions were justified, in January 1483, when two large ships with 700 men aboard left Naples secretly for the Levant, but were driven by bad weather into the port of Mayno. The Castellan of Nauplia was informed of this, and he passed the news on to the Senate and the Captain-General. The captains of the two ships declared that they were bound for Egypt, but were not believed; and they got no further. Forcellini, *Strane peripezie*, quoted by Magnante, cap. VI, p. 59.

[4] M.L., *H.* III, p. 151.

[5] Br. Mus. MS. Add. 8634, ff. 79–88. Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, IV, pp. 401–3; Reinhard, II, Beyl. 5, pp. 91–5. Other references in Reinhard, II, p. 89, note *i*. Cp. M.L., *H.* III, p. 152n.

[6] She ought by this time to have understood French better than she did in 1462 (above, p. 587, n. 1), but this document is in Latin.

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Since the Venetian occupation has utterly deprived her of any enjoyment of her Kingdom,[1] Charlotte cedes to Duke Charles I and his heirs and successors the Kingdom of Cyprus with everything pertaining to it.[2] She retains only the right to use the title of Queen of Cyprus during her lifetime, but the Duke of Savoy is to be allowed nevertheless to use the same royal title.[3]

The donation by Charlotte was never accepted as valid by Venice, whose apologists argued that the Sultan of Egypt, as suzerain of Cyprus, had legally conferred the Kingdom on James. Charlotte therefore gave away what she did not legally possess.[4]

In 1487 Charlotte, who had resigned herself to a life of good works, was laid low for some months by a paralytic stroke. She had herself carried to the chapel of the Pope in St Peter's, where she ratified the donation made two years before to the Duke of Savoy.[5] She died on 16 July, and was buried the same day in St Peter's near the chapel of SS. Andrew and Gregory. The funeral mass was said on 31 July.[6]

[1] 'Considerato praecipue quod dictum regnum Cypri vi armis et potentia Venetorum occupatur, et ipsi Reginae Serenissimae penitus est infructuosum.'

[2] 'Cum omnibus et singulis actionibus, et directis et utilibus, realibus et personalibus, tam simplicibus quam mixtis, quas ipsa Serenissima Regina in ipso Regno quocunque iure directo vel utili habuit, habere potuit, habetque et habere potest, una cum mero, mixto Imperio, et omnimoda Iurisdictione Regalibusque, Urbibus, Villis, Oppidis, Castris, terris, territoriis, hominibus, homagiis, aquis, aquarum decursibus, piscationibus, venationibus et omnibus aliis dicto regno quomodolibet pertinentibus, adiacentibus, dictaeque Reginae Serenissimae pertinentibus et pertinere valentibus, nihil iuris, actionis, rationis, portionis, dreyturae, aut dominii in praemissis retinendo', etc. In token of the cession she placed a ring on the finger of Philip de Chevrier, President of Savoy, one of the two procurators of the Duke. Lusignan (*Chor.* f. 74; *Descr.* f. 186) wrongly says that the cession was made to Duke Amedeus, her brother-in-law.

[3] Next day, 26 Feb. 1485, Charles undertook to pay Charlotte, as long as she should stay at Rome, an annual pension of 4300 florins, and find her a lodging worthy of her rank. The Queen reserved her right to dispose in her will of this pension for two years in advance. On 7 March she gave a procuration to James Langlois to obtain from the Duke the ratification of this treaty of 26 Feb., and generally to act as administrator of all her affairs. On 7 April 1485 the Duke confirmed the treaty and assigned the Queen's pension on the gabelles of Nice. M.L., *H.* III, pp. 151–2.

[4] This is perhaps the only point worth noticing in a somewhat foolish reply by Alexander Zilioli to Monod's *Trattato del titolo Regio* of 1633 (see Reinhard, II, Beyl. p. 180). It would have been pleasant to hear a John d'Ibelin tear the specious argument to pieces.

[5] Monod, *Ristretto*, p. 34.

[6] Despatch of the Modenese envoy in Rome, 19 July 1487, cited by Pastor, *Gesch.* II[3] (1904), pp. 652–3, n. 1. Burckard, *Diarium*, ed. Carducci-Fiorini, in the new

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A more pathetic figure than Charlotte's never crossed the stage of Cypriote history. Married and widowed when she was barely fourteen, united again when she was but sixteen to a poor-spirited and ineffectual husband, despoiled by her own brother of everything when she was barely twenty, she fought tenaciously for her rights for over twenty

Muratori, XXXII, p. 207. Monod, *Ristretto*, pp. 35–9. Dawkins, *Mach.* II, p. 233. Writing on 21 July to the Duke of Savoy, announcing her death, Innocent VIII undertakes the expense of her funeral but suggests that the Duke should see that a monument is erected to her (Monod, *ibid.*; Segre, *Delle relazioni*, p. 24, n. 6; Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, II, p. 121). He hopes also that the Duke will not forget her numerous suite, many of whom had given up everything they possessed for her sake. M.L., *Gén.* p. 46, wrongly says that she was buried in the crypt. The funeral monument was removed in 1620. For the original slab with inscription giving the date of her death, 16 July 1487, see Ciaconius, *Vitae Pont.* 1677, t. III, p. 123. For this, which is lost, was substituted the one now in the crypt. See note on Burckard, as above (where also entries of sundry expenses for her funeral); to the references there given add Monod, *loc. cit.*; Jauna, II, p. 1048; Jeffery, *Hist. Mon.* p. 443 (after Jauna). Lusignan (*Chor.* f. 74; *Descr.* f. 186) goes curiously astray in saying that her body was taken to Assisi and buried in the church of the Friars Minor (Monod, p. 40).—One or two interesting relics of Charlotte survive. The most important is the Greek MS. of the Acts and Epistles (Vatican Gr. 1208), written in gold (Pal. Soc. i, pl. 131). It was a present from her to Innocent VIII (Monod, p. 32). The MS. is of the eleventh century, but the miniatures (reproduced in Pal. Soc. and S. Beissel, *Vatikanische Miniaturen*, pl. 12) seem to be of the fifteenth. See *Catal. della Mostra di Manoscritti e Documenti Bizantini*... 1936 (Vatican 1936), where the style of the miniatures is compared to those of the fifteenth century in Vindob. Theol. Gr. 300. (Information from Mr F. Wormald.) The suggestion may be hazarded that Charlotte had the miniatures, with the arms of Cyprus and of Innocent VIII, added when she presented the book to the Pope. Is this the MS. which Pastor (*Gesch.* II^3 (1904), p. 653 n.), following F. Blume, *Iter Italicum*, III, p. 32 and IV, p. 271, says was missing shortly before the French Revolution? Mr Wormald also calls attention to the Hamilton Psalter, a Graeco-Latin fourteenth-century MS. with miniatures in the Byzantine style, now in the Kupferstichkabinett in Berlin. At the beginning is an inscription with Charlotte's name, which however B. Wescher (*Beschr. Verzeichnis der Miniaturen HSS. u. Einzelblätter des Kupferstichkabinetts* (1931), p. 30) condemns as a forgery, although the MS. is thought to have come from Cyprus.—Another object connected with Charlotte, which came into the possession of Innocent's son Franceschetto Cibò, was probably in the first instance a present to Innocent; this was a relic of the True Cross of Stavrovouni brought to Rome by Charlotte. See above, Ch. VIII, p. 482, n. 2. An impression of the seal used by Charlotte in Rome is on a procuration of 7 March 1485 to James Langlois to obtain from Duke Charles I ratification of the agreement of 26 Feb. This is in the Royal Archives at Turin. (M.L., *Notice sur les monnaies et les sceaux des Rois de Chypre*, in *B.E.C.* ser. I, t. V (1843–4), p. 432, after Cibrario e Promis, *Sigilli de' Principi di Savoia* (Turin, 1834), p. 188, Pl. XX, no. III.)

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years. Much in her history recalls that of the 'Damoiselle Marie', but of the two fate dealt her the harsher blows. The way in which she was supported not only by her husband's kin of Savoy, but by the Popes Pius II, Sixtus IV and Innocent VIII and the King of Naples, even if the motives of the last were not disinterested, shows that she was not regarded as merely a tiresome, importunate woman; although contemporary evidence goes to show that the members of her suite—like the Cypriotes who accompanied the Duchess Anna to Savoy—did not by their conduct make a good impression on Italian society. Raphael of Volterra,[1] speaking from personal knowledge, said, after mentioning the lasciviousness of the women of ancient Cyprus: 'We ourselves saw the companions of Queen Charlotte in Rome, who in naughtiness were nothing behind the ancient reputation of their island.'

As to her person, Pius II described her, as he saw her on her first visit to Rome, as 'a woman of about twenty-four, of middle height; bright eyes; complexion betwixt dark and pale; speech smooth and flowing torrent-like after the manner of the Greeks; French costume; manners becoming her royal blood'. There is, as we have seen, a portrait of her in the sacristy of S. Spirito, but its condition leaves much to be desired.

The acquisition of the rights to the crown of Cyprus was taken very seriously by the Dukes of Savoy, who immediately quartered the arms of the Kingdom in their great shield, although they did not actually make use of the title of King until Victor Amedeus in 1633.[2] After

[1] *Comment. Urbani*, f. 111 of the ed. of 1530.

[2] On the whole question of the claim to Cyprus by the Dukes of Savoy, see the *Trattato delle ragioni sopra il Regno di Cipro* (Turin, 1594) and the *Trattato* by Peter Monod, already so often quoted, especially c. IV, pp. 41–55. Cp. Segre, *Delle relazioni*, pp. 25f., 34–42. The publication of Monod's pamphlet (which appeared in 1633 at Turin without any author's name but with a statement that it was commanded by the Duke to be printed) caused a breach of relations between Savoy and Venice which was not healed for some thirty years (Reinhard, II, Beyl. pp. 223–8), when the Duke suppressed it. It had been officially distributed; for instance, the Marquess of San Germano presented a copy to the King of England (*Cal. of State Papers, Venetian*, XXIII, p. 272, no. 349). It contained many slighting remarks about Venice, and disputed the right to the royal title, which the Republic claimed as the sovereign not only of what had been the Kingdom of Cyprus, but of Crete. A somewhat feeble defence of the Venetian claim was put up by Alexander Zilioli (in Reinhard, II, Beyl. 6, pp. 158–214) and the younger Meursius (*ibid.* pp. 215–23). More important is the *Parere* of the Venetian Gaspar Giannotti, published at Frankfurt a. M. in the same year as the *Trattato*: so far as the claim of the Dukes of Savoy to Cyprus is

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Charlotte's death, Charles I wrote on 18 August 1488,[1] to the Sultan Kaitbai, informing him that Louis and Charlotte had been the lawful sovereigns of Cyprus, that Charlotte had transferred all her rights to himself, and that he hoped with the help of God and his friends to recover the Kingdom, and that the Sultan would favour his cause. The Duke intended thereby no derogation to the rights of the Sultan himself. The Sultan's reply is unfortunately not preserved. When the League of Cambrai was formed, the Duke joined it, giving expressly as one of his reasons that he would thereby obtain the support of the Emperor in his schemes for the recovery of 'his Kingdom of Cyprus'.[2] Louis XII agreed to his inclusion in the League with this object.[3]

It is interesting to note that the deed of cession to Savoy was read in the presence of Clement VII and Charles V at the coronation of the

concerned, he bases his rebuttal chiefly on the arguments that the feudal suzerain (in this case the Egyptian Sultan) was legally able to override, in favour of the illegitimate James, the claim of Charlotte, the legitimate heir, and that her donation of her rights to Cyprus to the Dukes of Savoy was invalid, because she could not give away what she did not really own. Other pamphlets on the subject are mentioned by Daru, VII, p. 326. Graswinckel in his *Dissertatio de Jure Praecedentiae* also attacked the *Trattato*. At a later date two circlets of solid gold were added to the Doge's cap, to indicate the Kingdoms of Crete and Cyprus (P. Giustinian, 1576, f. 397). The same writer records the dispute between the ambassadors of Bavaria and Venice at the Council of Trent, the claim of Venice being based on her possession of two kingdoms (ff. 405 et seq.). After the loss of Cyprus to the Turks, the Porte attempted to refuse to the representative of Venice the privileges accorded to envoys from monarchs, such as invitation to a special banquet before an audience. Venice still claimed these privileges as mistress of Crete; an amusing diplomatic situation arose, and the Porte had to give way. See the report by Constantine Garzoni, 1573, in Albèri, ser. III, vol. I, pp. 374–8, and Brown, *Studies*, II, pp. 16f. In 1612 James I of England decided that, even if Cyprus was lost, Venice still held Crete, which was a kingdom. When Urban VIII ordered that only crowned heads should continue to address cardinals as *illustrissimo*, while all other Powers should call them *eminentissimo*, Venice adhered to the old form, and so did the Duke of Savoy (Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, III, p. 26).

[1] Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, IV, p. 431; Reinhard, I, Beyl. 83, p. 119. Monod, *Ristretto*, p. 40, says that the Venetians, after the death of Charlotte, endeavoured to give Duke Charles something to occupy him and prevent him from interfering in the Cyprus question; advising Louis, Marquess of Saluzzo, with whom Charles was at war, to seek the help of Charles VIII, and encouraging the Duke of Milan to aid the Marquess. Giannotti, *Parere*, p. 24, denies that the Venetians were in any way concerned.

[2] 10 May 1509. Guichenon, *op. cit.* IV, p. 491; Reinhard, I, Beyl. 85, pp. 120–3.

[3] 19 May 1509. Guichenon, *op. cit.* IV, p. 492; Reinhard, *ibid.* p. 123.

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latter at Bologna in 1530, and that it was then acknowledged by Pope and Emperor that the Kingdom of Cyprus belonged to the Duke of Savoy.[1] On this occasion the Duke Charles III[2] sent as ambassadors to Venice, with powers to assert his claim, Philibert Ferrer, Bishop elect of Ivrea, Aimon de Piozasque, and Louis de Bonvillars, Lord of Mézières. Venice refused to listen, and was not disturbed in its possession. The ambassadors returned humiliated. Here for the present we may leave the subject; we shall see that in the future, until late in the seventeenth century, the claims of the Dukes of Savoy continued to ruffle the surface of Cypriote history.

NOTE I. THE BISHOP OF LEMESOS IN 1461

The list of the Latin Bishops of Lemesos in the middle and second half of the fifteenth century has been established by Giuseppe dalla Santa (*Nuovo Archivio Veneto*, XVI (1898), pp. 150–87). The resignation of Peter de Manatiis

[1] Segre, *Delle relazioni*, pp. 37–42; Lusignan (*Chor.* f. 74; *Descr.* f. 186), who adds that every five years the Dukes made a rule of presenting a demand for Cyprus to the Venetian Senate (cp. Monod, *Trattato*, p. 77). On one occasion the Senate replied: 'Coelum coeli Domino, terram autem dedit filiis hominum.'

[2] By letters patent, Bologna, 6 March 1530. Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, IV, p. 494 (misprints *vigesimo* for *tricesimo*), I, p. 634; Reinhard, I, Beyl. 87, pp. 123–5 (also under the wrong year); M.L., *H.* III, p. 514, n. 1. The matter came before the Council of Ten on 5 March (Sanudo, *Diarii*, LIII, 14). Venetian representatives in Bologna reported on the 6th (*ibid.* 15) that the Duke knew he could not maintain his claim, and would renounce it altogether if the Signory would give him a pension. The Council of Ten replied (*ibid.* 17, 20) that Venice had received Cyprus from the Sultan of Egypt and King James, and now held it from the Turkish Sultan, to whom it paid 8000 ducats a year in tribute, and was not prepared to disturb these relations. The Pope and Emperor both offered to mediate, urging that the Duke had a good claim, but were given the same reply; if any change were made, the Turk would take the island, which would not be for the good of Christendom; so the Duke had better not mention the subject again (*ibid.* 48–9). On 18 March the Duke's envoys took their leave, saying that though it was not suitable to press the matter at this time, they would do so on another occasion (*ibid.* 51). The Doge's report on the discussion, in which one of the envoys, the Governor of Turin, had been arrogant and had been answered in his own fashion, is given by Sanudo (*ibid.* 53–4). Later there was a report from Constantinople, 14 April, to the effect that the Pope and Emperor had invested the Duke of Savoy with Cyprus (*ibid.* 214). The report to the Duke by the Bishop of Ivrea, 11 March 1530, states that the Doge courteously but firmly refused to discuss the question, and although he and his colleagues had been honourably received they were entirely unsuccessful (M.L., *H.* III, pp. 514–15; Segre, *Alcuni documenti*, p. 51).

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was accepted on 18 January 1460, and his successor Antony di Zucco was appointed on the same day, and occupied the see until 1479. The envoy sent by James II to Italy with Sir Philip Podocataro is not named, but is called *episcopus Limisso* and *episcopus Nimosiensis* in the Venetian and Florentine records (M.L., *H.* III, pp. 154–5); only Gobellinus calls him *ep. Nicosiensis*. That *Nicosiensis* should be a mistake for *Nimosiensis* is much more likely than *vice versa*. There is, so far, no reason to suppose that the envoy was any other than Antony di Zucco. Nevertheless it has been always assumed that he was one Nicolas. For the envoy whom Charlotte sent to the Devitdar when she was besieged in Kerynia is described in the various sources as follows: τὸν 'πίσκοπον τῶν Φράγκων τὸν φρα. Νικολό, G. Bustron, p. 449; 'fra Nicolo dell' ordine de predicatori vescovo', Fl. Bustron, p. 397; 'frà Nicolò Vescovo Latino di Limisso', Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 68; 'frère Nicolas Evesque de Lemisse', *Descr.* f. 171 b. Unless we assume that there were rival Bishops of Lemesos, one recognized by the Pope and the other not, and that Charlotte favoured the latter (which is highly improbable), it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Lusignan has made a mistake, and that Nicolas, the Dominican, was Bishop not of Lemesos but of some other see. I am inclined to identify him with the Bishop of a see which appears in the records as *Ebron, Embron, Euvron, Envron, Ceuvron*, which Mas Latrie supposes to be Hebron. This was frère Nicolas de Courio (or Couria). He helped to crown Charlotte on 15 October 1458 (M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 390) and is mentioned in the book of the Secrète on 21 April 1468 and 3 September 1468 and (as dead) on 24 December 1468 (M.L., *H.* III, pp. 202, 211, 282). [Is this the man whom Mas Latrie in the *Trésor de Chron.* describes as a *Minorite* Bishop of Lemesos 1461–8?] Since he assisted at the coronation of Charlotte with Peter de Manatiis, Latin Bishop of Lemesos, and the Abbot of Bellapaïs, and left a legacy to the *Dominican* monastery at Nicosia, he was evidently a Latin and a Dominican; if Hebron is the right reading of the name of the see, then he was a Latin Bishop *in partibus*, certainly not an Orthodox Bishop, as has been supposed (cp. Hackett, p. 328; Papaïoannou, II, p. 103). No such name is elsewhere recorded under the see of Hebron, but that is not surprising in view of the defectiveness of the sources. M.L., *H.* III, p. 202, n. 3 says that this Nicolas was *sans doute* of the family of Demetrios of Coron, which seems to be a mere guess.

Another Nicolas was about this time Orthodox Bishop of Nicosia. He was taken by James to support him after the abortive attempt of 15 December 1458, and is described as ὁ 'πίσκοπος τῶν 'Ρωμαίων ὁ Νικόλαος, G. Bustron, p. 437; 'Nicolas vescovo Greco', Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 64 b; 'l'Evesque de Nicossie, lequel estoit Grec', *Descr.* f. 164 b. He is doubtless

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identical with the Bishop who was at Nicosia at the time of the death of James and the proclamation of Catherine (ὁ ἐπίσκοπος τῶν Ῥωμαίων ὁ Νικόλαος, G. Bustron, p. 477; 'Nicolao Vescovo greco di Nicosia', Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 73; 'Nicolas Evesque Grec de Nicossie', *Descr.* f. 183).

NOTE II. ON THE DATE OF THE FALL OF KERYNIA (p. 594)

Mas Latrie (*H.* III, p. 128, n. 1) discusses the date, and concludes that it must have preceded 8 November 1463. Herquet, *Cypr. Kön.* p. 175, shows that this is improbable. The Report attributed to Attar (M.L., *H.* III, p. 526) says that Kerynia held out for about three years; but in one MS. (Κυπρ. Χρον. XIII, p. 15) the duration is given as about six years. Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 70b, says that the siege lasted two years: 'dipoi che fù assediata dui anni'. This would point to surrender in September–October 1462. He uses exactly the same phrase for the recovery of Famagusta, which we know was in January 1464; and that place was besieged as early as March 1461. Lusignan's chronology is seldom to be trusted, and is best ignored when it is not otherwise confirmed. G. Bustron seems to date the surrender of Kerynia in 1463; but, since he does not always mark the transition from one year to the next, this date cannot be pressed very hard. The edition of Fl. Bustron gives in the margin the date of September–October 1463; but all that we can rightly assume is that the event is mentioned before the surrender of Famagusta in January 1464. Navagero (col. 1121) dates the fall of Famagusta a few months after that of Kerynia. Sanudo, *Diarii*, LVI, col. 1042 (not a good authority for this period), has 1463. Loredano has 25 August 1464 for Kerynia; yet even he dates its fall before that of Famagusta. G. Bustron has from some unknown source the date 29 August 1464 for Famagusta, which is certainly wrong. Herquet, *Cypr. Kön.* p. 175, thinks that it may be the date of the fall of Kerynia; on the other hand, in *Charlotta*, p. 143, it is presumably to the same thing that he is alluding when he says that James, for some reason unknown, delayed his triumphal entry into Famagusta until 26 August.

Other evidence bearing on the point is the following. That the news of the surrender had not reached Rhodes by 22 September 1463 seems to be indicated by the fact that on that day the Grand Master Raymond Zacosta issued a letter of recommendation to William de Ras, who was about to go to Cyprus to reside there in the service of the Queen (M.L., *H.* III, p. 124). On the other hand, on 6 October 1463 the Grand Master gave a safe-conduct to Sor de Naves, permitting him to stay at Rhodes and in all lands under the rule of the Order (M.L., *H.* III, p. 164); this, however, can hardly be pressed

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as a proof that he had ceased to be in command at Kerynia. More definite is the fact that on 8 November 1463 the Grand Master issued safe-conducts for a number of refugees from Cyprus (M.L., *H.* III, pp. 126f.). And this is taken by Mas Latrie as a fairly sure indication that Kerynia was in the hands of James. Certainly it would seem, from the list of such refugees, that many of Charlotte's most prominent supporters had fled. Against all this we must set the letter written by Charlotte from Rhodes to her husband on 1 September 1464 (Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, IV, pp. 394–5; Reinhard, I, Beyl. 77, pp. 111–13), wherein she speaks as if Kerynia was still in her hands; she had sent 'Sorou' (Sor de Naves; cp. 'Soro', M.L., *H.* III, pp. 120, 138) there with quite a large force. The letter cannot be wrongly dated a year too late, since it is clear that when it was written King James, owing to his massacre of the Mamelukes, had broken with the Sultan. The solution, according to Mas Latrie, is that Charlotte refused to believe in the crash of all her hopes, and was deceiving herself. We may well believe that she would refuse to give up hope of recovering her Kingdom, but, unless she was the victim of complete hallucination or an outrageous liar, certain statements in her letter must be admitted as representing the facts. The letter states that she is in good health, but the most desolate woman in the world, deprived of the companionship of her husband, and disappointed in the hope of a fair son. (This son, who is not otherwise mentioned, must have been still-born or have died immediately after birth.) She goes on to say that two Hospitallers, George de Piozasque and Almeric Guichard, with some other Brethren, have come and returned Kerynia into her hands, and, seeing that 'Sorou' is well provided with funds and strong at sea, and has done homage to her and sworn to hold the place for King Louis, she has sent him thither on 17 August as Captain and Lieutenant-General, with nine ships. She has written to ask Br. George to hand the place over to him, and 'Sorou' will treat the Brethren who remain to defend it well, and has undertaken to wage great war against the Apostoles. She has sent the ambassadors of the Sultan with his fleet, (also?) her major-domo (Antony de Bon) and Thomas Pardo;[1] they will go and see the castle of Kerynia and afterwards to Alexandria. These ambassadors (she has given them handsome robes) are much pleased, and have promised her much, and assured her that the Sultan will give her back her Kingdom. One of them is much in the Sultan's favour, and she has had very encouraging letters from him and from the Sultan's officials; the Sultan and his officials

[1] Pardo had been among the enemies of James since 1458 (G. Bustron, p. 433); eventually he was reconciled to him and in 1468–9 was in receipt of a provision (M.L., *H.* III, p. 200). He was of illegitimate birth and a *marrano* (G. Bustron, *loc. cit.*; Fl. Bustron, p. 386).

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have written to her speaking very highly of Pardo, who has not yet returned from Cairo. From Cyprus she hears that the Apostoles is doing all he can to recover the good graces of the Sultan (an allusion to his breach with the Sultan owing to his massacre of the Mamelukes after he had recovered Famagusta). He has sent Archbishop Goneme to Cairo with valuable presents and the surviving Mamelukes. On the other hand a fugitive from Cairo says that the Sultan is preparing a great expedition to Cyprus. If she had 20,000 or 25,000 ducats she could recover her Kingdom. Now, if all this is a fiction, there must have been a general conspiracy to make the half-crazy Charlotte believe it; or else (as Herquet thinks, *Charlotta*, p. 146) there must have been an agreement between Louis and Charlotte to conceal the loss of their Kingdom, since the western Powers would have ceased to send them help. Neither hypothesis is acceptable. Her letter is extremely confused and so ungrammatical, sometimes apparently so self-contradictory, that the above analysis must be regarded as tentative only. Nevertheless, reluctant as one is to upset the sequence of the chroniclers by dating the surrender of Kerynia after that of Famagusta, it seems more reasonable to do so than to condemn all Charlotte's statements as fiction.

It is true that, even later than this, King Louis continued to pretend that the relief of Kerynia was a practical proposition. On 18 June 1465 Louis XI of France assigned to him a large provision of wheat secured on the revenues of Dauphiné, 'pour l'avitaillement des places de son royaume' (M.L., *H.* III, p. 142, n. 3). And some time in 1466 Louis acknowledges the offer of help from his brother Amedeus IX, Duke of Savoy, 'pour avitailler Cherines' (*ibid.* p. 144, § 20). These phrases, however, have hardly the same precision as the statements in Charlotte's letter. They may imply merely that it was hoped to recapture the fortress, and refer to the provisions which it would be necessary to have for the attacking force and for the victualling of the place when it should be retaken and would doubtless again be besieged. There was of course for some time to come a party in favour of Charlotte, as the plot of August 1473 shows. But it must have been something more substantial than the existence of such a party that justified the statements in her letter.

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CHAPTER XI

JAMES II (1464—1473)

The acquisition of Famagusta and Kerynia had established James firmly on the throne, and a great number of the Cypriotes who had so far adhered to the cause of Charlotte, and had left the island, now began to return. We have already more than once observed that James knew when it was politic to forgive his enemies; indeed his impulsive nature caused him occasionally to be too ready to do so. Those who were now reconciled to him were generously treated, being given in estates and revenues as much as they liked to ask for. The foreigners, Sicilians and Catalans especially, who had joined him, were of course liberally rewarded. A list has been preserved[1] of nearly two hundred names of persons of all kinds to whom James gave offices, estates, houses, pensions, provisions in kind (such as corn or wine). These include his own mother, Dame Marietta of Patras;[2] distinguished Cypriotes like Peter Davila,[3] Peter Podocataro, Morphou de Grinier, Count of Roucha, James de Nores; Catalans and Sicilians like Muzio Costanzo, John Perez Fabregues, James Zaplana, Rizzo di Marino; churchmen and religious like Archbishop William Goneme; and Orientals like Tangrivardi and Cursuma. Of the oldest noble houses of Cyprus, Ibelin, Lusignan, Lases, Lodroni and de Nores, there are none of the first (who had indeed almost if not quite died out by this time) or fourth, few of the second, third and fifth. The Lusignans, it is said, declined in the time of James II, who deprived them of their estates because they did not support him;[4]

[1] By Fl. Bustron, pp. 417–24.

[2] For her allowance of bread and wine and other provisions, cp. the entries in the Register of the Secrète, 23 and 27 Oct. 1468, M.L., *H.* III, p. 199.

[3] On whom see M.L., *H.* III, p. 364, n. 4, and Ch. XII. King James gave him a niece in marriage (Fl. Bustron, p. 433). His second name was James (*ibid.* p. 429).

[4] Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 82b; cp. *Descr.* f. 82. A Lusignan reduced to great poverty in 1516, Sanudo, *Diarii*, XXII, 350. Note however that in his will James II left the succession, failing his direct heirs, to the nearest of the Lusignan kin. A branch of the de Nores family, known by the sobriquet Kalimeri (derived from a former head of the family, about 1830, from his habit of greeting all and every) was supposed to be perhaps the only survivor of the feudal Frankish nobility in Cyprus (M.L., *Île de Chypre*, p. 363; Luke, *Cyprus under the Turks*, p. 138n.).

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so too the Lases and Lodroni. Thus Charles or Clarion de Lusignan was deprived of Kiti, Lapithos and no less than twenty-two other estates, as his great-grandson bitterly records.[1] Clarion remained obstinately faithful to Charlotte, and James's efforts to bring him over, alternately depriving him of his estate at Kiti and then restoring it, were quite ineffective. The family tradition, as recorded by his descendant, makes the hostility between the two men culminate in an outrageous scene—arising, as such quarrels were apt to arise in the chase-loving Lusignan society, out of a matter of sport, and presenting an instructive instance of James's uncontrollable ferocity. The King invited Clarion to go a-hawking, but forbade him to fly his falcon until permission should be given, knowing well that Clarion would be unable to resist the temptation. Clarion, indeed, whose hatred was only intensified by such an order, was determined not to lose a chance of a bird. As bad luck would have it, a fine pheasant offered, and Clarion, thinking that no one would report him, let fly his falcon. But the King was immediately told and coming up took Clarion by the beard, threw him to the ground and trampled on his face with his spurred boots, leaving him half dead. Not for some time did James enquire for him and, learning that he was alive, send for him. Clarion refused this and repeated commands; his indignation at the treatment which he had suffered combined with the suspicion that the King was on too familiar terms with his mother, Échive de Nores, to stiffen his resolution. James took the mean revenge of depriving him of all his estates. It would seem that he might eventually have been reinstated, but James's sudden death frustrated any such plan. Clarion, however, after Charlotte, was the nearest to James of any of the Lusignans, so that the reversion of the crown, as James eventually arranged for it in his will, must have envisaged Clarion rather than anyone else.

Outside his Kingdom, James had made his peace with the Sultan of Egypt. As to the Turk,[2] he could count on the support of the Hospital, whose headquarters in Rhodes were even more threatened by the Ottoman than was Cyprus, and also of Venice. The policy favoured by all

[1] Lusignan, *Chor.* ff. 10, 13b; *Descr.* ff. 22b, 28. Lusignan had the story from his grandmother Isabella, the wife of Philip the son of Clarion. She was born in the time of James II and lived to the age of ninety-five years: *Descr.* f. 181.

[2] The statement of Phrantzes (ed. Bonn, p. 94) that, shortly after the capture of Lesbos in 1462, Mehmed II made Cyprus tributary to himself has no foundation. See Ch. x, p. 589, n. 4.

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three Powers was to exploit the jealousy of the Sultan of Egypt and the fears of lesser rulers such as the Grand Karaman and the Emir of Scandelore. The latter[1] had been on excellent terms with Cyprus since John II's treaty with Louphtou Beg in 1450 (p. 521). In 1466 James II sent an expedition to the support of the Emir Kilij Arslan.[2] He planned an alliance with the Sultan of Egypt, the Grand Karaman, and the Emir of Scandelore, and in 1470 the Council of the Order of St John approved his scheme.[3] Next year, 1471, he sent munitions and 300 arbalesters to the Emir's help.[4] But these efforts were vain, and in 1472 Kilij Arslan surrendered to Keduk Ahmad Pasha, general of the Turkish Sultan, and was sent to him a prisoner, with his wives and son.[5]

Venice also interested herself indirectly in the negotiations with the Grand Karaman.[6] On 4 December 1464 the Senate wrote to him with reference to certain matters which were of interest to both parties as against their common enemy the Turk. Mark Cornaro had been the Venetian agent, and was reporting home on the matter, and at the same time sending the Grand Karaman a confidential messenger. In view of the intimate relations which we know existed between King James and Mark Cornaro, we may be sure that the King's interests were not left out of sight in these negotiations.

But no help rendered to the Grand Karaman and his successors by Venice or anyone else availed to save them from their all-devouring enemy. From 1466, when the Turkish campaign culminated in the battle of Laranda, to 1482, when Kasim Beg died, their extinction proceeded, gradual but sure. We need not follow its course here; Cyprus was only indirectly involved, in so far as Venice lent her aid to the Karamanian princes and attempted, but too late, to supply the Sophy of

[1] M.L., *H.* III, p. 321, n. 2.

[2] James asked for two galleys from Venice, and the Senate promised to provide them if he proceeded with his plan. M.L., *H.* III, p. 175 (11 Dec. 1466).

[3] 16 Nov. 1470. M.L., *H.* III, p. 321, n. 2.

[4] Malipiero, *Ann. Ven.* I, p. 69. The aid given to Scandelore was mentioned by James's envoys to Venice and highly approved by the Senate, which promised on 25 Oct. 1471 to do all in its power to prevent the place, so vital for the protection of Cyprus, from being taken by the Turk. M.L., *H.* III, pp. 321, 323.

[5] Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch.* II, p. 104. Cp. the resolution of the Venetian Senate, 19 Sept. 1472 (M.L., *H.* III, p. 335).

[6] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 393, no. 4. This was not the first occasion on which Mark Cornaro had been on an embassy to the Grand Karaman on behalf of Venice and Cyprus. Above, Ch. IX, p. 522.

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Persia, Uzun Hasan, with artillery and other munitions. After the first defeat of the Persians at Lake Karalis on 18 August 1472, the Venetian Captain-General Peter Mocenigo, who was cruising off Cilicia, recovered the cities of the sea-board, notably Gorhigos and Selefke, for Kasim Beg; and in this campaign King James's ships took part. But immediately after Uzun Hasan's disastrous defeat at Terjan in July 1473, all Karamania fell again into Ottoman hands. Mehmed was master of Asia Minor, and in no further danger from the side of Persia. The Karamanian Power was at an end, although Kasim Beg contrived to hold out in a manner until his death in 1482.[1]

Little help had come from that other Power to which, in their fear of the Turk, the Christians turned a hopeful glance. Venice had as early as 1463 begun negotiations for an alliance with Uzun Hasan. In 1471 Caterino Zeno was sent to Persia, and Josafat Barbaro was to follow later with munitions. It was in support of this policy that in 1472[2] James wrote to the Doge, pointing out that the salvation of almost all the Christian rulers hung on the chance of victory by Uzun Hasan; his defeat would be for them no slight calamity. The Persian is in great need of munitions for a land campaign, chiefly artillery, since he will have to fight two more powerful rulers, and he will be disappointed and most indignant (for James knows his Oriental) if when he gets to the Gulf of Alexandretta (from which he is distant a bare six days' march) he does not find there the supplies which he understands Venice to have ready for him. Let the Doge therefore lose no time in despatching a force of infantry well equipped with munitions for a land and not a sea campaign; it must consist of veterans, engineers and masons under experienced commanders.[3] The plan, proposed by some, of landing all the musketeers from any galley, is not good, for the galleys would thus remain defenceless and could not face an attack by an Ottoman fleet. James then makes practical suggestions for arranging how the allies can make most speedy contact with the Persian on his arrival, and concludes by informing the Doge that the Venetian merchants in Syria

[1] See Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch.* II, pp. 85–91, 108–11, 119–21, 127–30; Zinkeisen, II, pp. 343–56; and *Enc. of Islam* under *Karaman-Oghlu*. For James's contribution to the Venetian force under Peter Mocenigo (he sent four galleys) see Cor. Cippico, *de Petr. Moc. Imp. gestis*, 1544, pp. 44f.

[2] 18 Feb. 1472, Famagusta. M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 412–14.

[3] 'Sint veterani milites, sint architecti, sint plastici, et hi qui militarem disciplinam bene calleant.'

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have not been all arrested, as had been reported, but that they are in great fear, and the Syrians are very ill-disposed towards them.

After the capture of Scandelore, James entered into negotiations with the Ottoman Sultan, with the intention of keeping him in play until he should be able to concert measures with Venice. The Senate, to whom this was reported by his envoys, replied on 19 September 1472,[1] using words which might be taken as a formula for the description of the unscrupulous world-conqueror of any period, approving the King's action in temporizing with 'that most rapacious and perfidious ruler, the universal enemy, who has not and never will have a single friend from whom he will not take state, fortune or at length life, but only dissembles with one in order to obtain time to crush another'. It is reported that the Turk is equipping a strong fleet for next year, and Venice has determined to oppose him with a powerful force when he issues from the Hellespont in the spring. It is hoped that the Pope and the King of the Two Sicilies will do the same, and James is asked to have his fleet in readiness to join the allied force in good time. If the enemy finds the Christians thus united, he will probably not venture to attack them, and if he does he is likely to suffer defeat.

The Venetian ambassador Andrew Bragadin, who was given a copy of this letter when he accompanied Catherine Cornaro to Cyprus, was instructed[2] to impress upon King James the urgency of prompt and united action in the coming spring. On his way out or back he was to call at Rhodes, and remind the Grand Master of the danger threatening the Christians, and especially the Order, as being nearest to the Turk; and to exhort him to have the four galleys, which by the treaty with Venice and King Ferdinand he was bound to supply, ready to join up by the beginning of spring.

King James and the Venetians did not, however, always see eye to eye in the matter of relations with the Sultan of Egypt, to whom the King owed his throne.[3] James described himself to the Venetian envoy to the Sophy, Josafat Barbaro, as being, between the two Sultans, the Ottoman

[1] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 335–6.

[2] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 332–4. The Venetian Bailie in Cyprus was to support him, but he was to have precedence. He was expected to spend twelve or fifteen days in the island, and return by the Beirut or Tripoli galleys, or in a light vessel, via Rhodes or Modon.

[3] See the despatches of Josafat Barbaro, Venetian envoy to the Sophy of Persia, who was in Cyprus in 1473: H. Cornet, *Lettere al Senato Veneto di Giosafatte Barbaro* (Vienna, 1852). Extracts in M.L., *H.* III, pp. 336ff.

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and the Mameluke, in the jaws of a pair of wolves, *in faucibus duorum luporum*. So he explained to the Venetian envoys[1] when they tried to persuade him not to furnish a detachment of fifty musketeers which the Sultan's Devitdar demanded. On the other hand, when on 14 or 15 April 1473 Peter Soranzo reached Famagusta with a large galley laden with munitions, and convoyed by another galley, King James suddenly gave orders that these ships should not enter the harbour. When Barbaro protested James said that he might send the galleys to Paphos; Barbaro knew that he, James, was the servant and slave of the Sultán of Egypt, and dared not let the galleys into Famagusta. Uzun Hasan, who was now with the help of the Christian Powers attempting to recover the territories of the Grand Karaman from the Ottoman conqueror, might come to grief, in which case King James would be left in a very dangerous position, and he could not count on being protected by any Christian Power. The Venetian representatives found no reply on this occasion to these arguments of the King, but three days later Barbaro, with the envoys, the Bailie, and the *sopracomiti* (the gentlemen commanding the troops in the galleys), again approached him. James completely lost his temper, and made a violent scene. He had been robbed, he said, of more than 150 soldiers and *parici*, who had been impressed by the officers of the Venetian galleys.[2] If all the galleys at Famagusta did not leave within two hours, the King would see that they were blasted out of the harbour, and of any men found on land, from the masters downwards, he would make so much meat. The interview came to an end with this, but Barbaro succeeded soon afterwards in obtaining some kind of apology from James.

Uzun Hasan, as James feared, did actually come to grief, and that before Venetian aid could reach him.

Later (21 April 1473) the King informed Barbaro of the grievances of the Devitdar against the Venetians, who he said pretended to be the Sultan's friends but were just the contrary. The Devitdar was determined to expel all Venetians from Syria, and admit Genoese in their place. James proposed to send his Chancellor to the Sultan, and offered to do his best to bring about a better understanding between the two Powers. Barbaro, after consulting his colleague, replied that this was not the first time the Sultan had acted in an unfriendly way towards

[1] 13 April 1473. Cornet, p. 17.

[2] This charge is confirmed by the statement of the Venetian Senate itself. M.L., *H.* III, p. 389, § 8.

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Venice, but it was hoped that this dispute would be settled as, by God's favour, all the others had been. As to expelling the Venetians in favour of the Genoese, the King knew well what the Venetians did in Syria, and what the Genoese would do.[1] Finally, Barbaro thanked the King for the offer of his good offices with the Devitdar and the Sultan. James, throughout these discussions, was careful to emphasize his loyalty to Venice, as her adopted son.

From the beginning of James's reign his relations with the Republic had been occasionally disturbed by disputes of the kind with which the preceding narrative has made us familiar. There was, for instance, trouble with his Venetian creditors; it appears that he had attempted to satisfy them by offering them lands, fiefs or revenues belonging to other Venetians. The Senate forbade these creditors to accept such payments.[2] But James's friend Mark Cornaro played an effective part in smoothing over difficulties; it was said that he had assisted James with considerable sums of money in his campaign for the seizure of the throne, and James for his part repaid Cornaro with favours of which the Senate expressed its appreciation.[3] Nevertheless, disputes about financial relations with Venetian citizens continued to crop up. Thus in 1465 the King defaulted on a debt which he owed to the estate of the late Bernard Dandolo, and the Senate decided to send a secretary of the Chancellery to Cyprus to insist on payment.[4] Next year, again, the Senate had to insist on the restitution to Antony Audet, a White Venetian, of an estate which, with its revenues, had for several years been appropriated by officials of the Cyprus government.[5]

But the names which occur most frequently in respect of such claims from the time of John II onward are those of Cornaro-Episcopia and Martini. The water-supply at Episkopi was essential to the sugar-plantations owned by the former family—which had trouble also with the Order of St John over the same matter—and we find that in 1468, according to the protest of the Venetian Senate, the supply had been diverted by the King's officials, resulting in loss of revenue to the

[1] An allusion to the much greater volume of Venetian trade, which it was to the interest of the Sultan to foster. M.L., *H.* III, p. 343, n. 1.

[2] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 393 (11 Jan. 1464). Cp. the commission to Alvise Loredan, 4 Feb. 1463 (R. Lopez, *Il principio della guerra Veneto-Turca nel* 1463, in *Arch. Ven.* ser. 5, 1934, p. 107).

[3] M.L., *H.* III, p. 819 (13 Aug. 1464). See, however, p. 582, n. 1.

[4] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 394 (25 May 1465).

[5] *Ibid.* (7 June 1466).

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amount of 10,000 ducats and the destruction of canes which could not be replaced in the island, and for which the managers of the estate had to send to Syria.[1] No compensation had been given by 1471, in spite of claims by the Venetian secretary Dominic Stella who was sent out specially about this matter,[2] and the consul, Nicolas Pasqualigo, had still to make representations in 1472.[3]

As to the house of Martini, this firm had an important contract with the Order of St John for the farming of the sugar-powder from the estate of Kolossi.[4] But it also farmed the sugar-powder from the royal estates of Kouklia and Akhelia, and about this lease there was frequent trouble.[5]

Towards the end of 1466 James sent no less a person than the Archbishop of Nicosia, William Goneme, to Venice, to discuss with the Senate various outstanding questions, including that of his marriage, which now assumed great importance.[6] James offered, and the Senate gratefully accepted, six galleys and 500 knights for the war against the Turks, and he stated that he was building another ship for the same purpose. He assured the Senate that Venetian merchants in Cyprus would be well treated; to which, while thanking him, the Senate replied that this matter had long been neglected, and that the freedom and immunity which the Venetians had from old time enjoyed should be confirmed. Consulted on the subject of his marriage, the Senate recommended that he should ally himself with the family of the Despot of the Morea, Thomas Palaeologus. Thomas himself had died in exile in Rome on 12 May 1465; and it was his second daughter Zoe or Sophia, now living at Rome under the care of Cardinal Bessarion, that it was

[1] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 396–7 (18 Dec. 1468).

[2] M.L., *H.* III, p. 314 (1469); *Doc. Nouv.* p. 397, no. 2 (1 June 1471).

[3] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 397, no. 3 (15 Sept. 1472).

[4] It had had the lease for several years before the new contract was made in 1464 (M.L., *H.* III, pp. 88–90). John Langstrother, when appointed Grand Commander in 1468, had to engage to fulfil the terms made by his predecessor (*ibid.* p. 91).

[5] In 1455 the Venetian Senate complains that Mark Cornaro, Louis and John Martini have been unfairly treated by John II (M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 372); in 1461 that King Louis has sequestrated all the sugar-powder from Kouklia and Akhelia at Kerynia, although this had been purchased for ten years by the successors of Peter Martini (*ibid.* p. 393). In 1467 James agrees to continue the lease to Martini Bros., and if the Treasury is found to owe anything to the firm, it will be deducted from the price of the renewed lease (M.L., *H.* III, p. 178, cp. p. 180, § 19). In 1469 the Venetian envoy is to attend to the claims of the houses of Cornaro-Episcopia and Martini, which are evidently still unsettled (*ibid.* p. 314).

[6] Reply of the Senate to the Archbishop, M.L., *H.* III, pp. 173–6 (11 Dec. 1466).

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proposed that James should marry.[1] It is clear from the Senate's statement that the plan of marrying James to Catherine Cornaro had not yet taken shape, so far as that body was concerned, whatever her father's designs may have been. The Senate also agreed to the request of James, which has already been mentioned, for two galleys for his proposed expedition in aid of the Emir of Scandelore. But it concluded its resolution with a suggestion to the envoy that the settlement of outstanding questions about the delivery of sugar owing to the Republic, and about payment of the unsatisfied claims of individual Venetian nobles and merchants, should not be longer delayed; when these matters should have been adjusted, the Senate would be glad to deal with the others beforementioned. And, by a later resolution of the same date, it was decided that the reply should actually be held over, until settlement should have been reached about the large sum of money owing to the merchants.

It was not until nearly a year later that the Venetian envoy to King James, Clement Tedaldini, received from him a definite declaration on these points.[2] All the Venetian privileges were confirmed. In addition to the 14,000 besants secured on the octroi of Nicosia, Venice claimed a further payment of 10,000 besants secured on the royal dye-works, and an accommodation was made on this, as on the arrears of the old debt of 120,000 besants. The declaration undertakes to satisfy numerous other private claims, which are set forth in detail, but of which only one need be mentioned here. The galleys of that high-handed officer, Sor de Naves, Constable of the Kingdom, had intercepted one John de Forbinis, who claimed against him. The King replied that this did not concern the crown, but that Sor de Naves would pay what might be due, and would meanwhile allow the Venetian Senate to hold his villages as security.

James's declaration did not close the discussion, which was still going on in February 1468, when the Senate instructed the Auditors of the Savii of the Council and of Terra Firma to come to an understanding with the King's ambassador, and report.[3]

[1] M.L., *H.* III, p. 174, n. 1.

[2] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 176–81 (Nicosia, 11 Nov. 1467); *Libri Comm., Reg.* V, p. 159, n. 129. Magnante, *L' acquisto*, cap. II, p. 94.

[3] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 394 (8 Feb. 1468). For the six *savii grandi* and the five *savii di terra firma* of the Doge's Cabinet or Collegio, see Brown, *Studies*, I, pp. 300–1. When M.L., *H.* III, p. 829, speaks of sixteen *savii grandi*, he must be reckoning with the six *grandi*, the five *di terra firma* and the five *agli ordini* or *da mar*.

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It will be remembered that Florence had given a cordial reception to James's ambassadors in 1461. When he was firmly established on the throne, he did not forget the friendly attitude of the Signoria, and Florentine commercial relations with Cyprus were encouraged.[1]

We have seen that in 1466 James was entertaining the plan of marrying the Greek princess, Zoe or Sophia, at the suggestion of the Venetian Senate. The negotiations with Rome about this marriage had apparently been begun during the reign of Pius II, that is before August 1464, and they were a failure. They seem to have been involved with the request by James for the Pope's recognition of his position as King of Cyprus or, as the chroniclers put it, for his permission to be crowned.[2]

[1] Heyd, II, p. 421. In 1465 the Florentines asked for exemption from port dues on goods landed in Cyprus ports but not sold; Heyd considers it certain that this was granted. In 1467 Florence thanked James for favours shown to its merchants. James had asked that Florentine ships on their eastern voyage should call at Cyprus; Florence agreed to this with pleasure, and begged for continuance of his favours. Müller, *Documenti*, pp. 203, 206.

[2] The date of these negotiations requires clearing up. According to G. Bustron (pp. 474–5) they were in 1471, and the Archbishop of Nicosia was James's emissary. This would be Louis Perez Fabregues, as Fl. Bustron (p. 432) says; and he seems to have become Archbishop in 1470 or 1471 (M.L., *Arch.* p. 298). [The mission on which James sent him to the Pope on 27 Dec. 1472 had nothing to do with this matter, as Mas Latrie supposes, for James was by then already married to Catherine.] As a matter of fact, it was Goneme who went to Rome, as Lusignan (*Chor.* f. 71 b) rightly has it; in his *Descr.* f. 181, he has Fabregues. The Pope concerned is Pius II. If the negotiations were with him, this must have happened not later than 1464. G. Bustron does not name the Pope, but, if his date were correct, it would be either Paul II (who would be friendly to the protégé of Venice) or Sixtus IV. Fl. Bustron definitely attributes the rebuff to Pius II. According to him, Pius proposed a niece of his own as bride to James, as a condition of allowing him to be crowned; and James refused the lady after he had seen her portrait and heard the Archbishop's report on her character (cp. p. 557). On the other hand, G. Bustron says nothing about the niece, but gives as the Pope's reason for forbidding the coronation the King's bad record and the fact that the rightful wearer of the crown was still living. The Archbishop made all arrangements with Cardinal Bessarion for the marriage, and even brought back with him to Cyprus a bishop to celebrate it. But because the Pope refused to sanction the coronation, neither would James accept the proposed bride. Lusignan (*Chor.* f. 71 b and *Descr.* f. 181) gives the same reasons for the rebuff, mentions no niece, but says the Pope approved the marriage with Zoe; the envoy however had orders to refuse her unless the coronation were allowed. Of the account in Loredano (Giblet), II, pp. 301–4, it is only necessary to observe that he makes both Archbishop Goneme and Louis Perez Fabregues go on the mission to Pius II; either he has tried to reconcile

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That permission was refused by Pius II, because the rightful wearer of the crown was still alive; he seems to have added some unsparing comments on James's record. He however raised no objection to the marriage with the Greek princess, and all preliminaries were arranged.[1] But the King would not take the lady without the crown. He was so enraged at the refusal of the latter that he decreed that no ship from France or Savoy should be allowed to enter any port in Cyprus, and this prohibition lasted for some thirty years.[2]

James, however, received the recognition of Rome during the pontificate of Paul II (1464–71), who as a Venetian was naturally lenient to the protégé of the Signory. The Pope is said to have sent the Archbishop of Candia to Cyprus with the object of reconciling James and Charlotte. Of that there was no hope, but the formal recognition for which James yearned is said to have been granted.[3] If so, coronation would follow as a matter of course. Indeed, whether James was recognized by Rome or not, it is difficult to believe that Catherine would have herself received the crown on her marriage to James if he himself still lacked it.

In July 1468 James was married, his ambassador acting as proxy, to Catherine Cornaro.[4] The Venetian writers attribute the proposal for

the varying accounts, or he may be right, and both went on the mission, though the latter was not Archbishop at the time. The discrepancy in the evidence has caused it to be supposed that James went on with his scheme for the marriage with Zoe long after he had agreed to marry Catherine. We shall see indeed that after his betrothal to Catherine he did actually dally with the idea of yet another alliance. But it is unlikely that he had no less than three strings to his bow; that would have involved him in even worse trouble with Venice, of which as early as 1467 he acknowledged himself to be the son. There is, after all, a solution of the discrepancy which is based on a tendency in the chroniclers which we have more than once observed in other connexions; they push back or forwards the dates of an event in order to deal with it along with another similar to it. Here the date of the negotiations about Zoe, which were all over by 1467, has been attracted to that of the marriage with Catherine.

[1] Here G. Bustron may be followed, in view of his circumstantial detail that a bishop was brought to Cyprus to complete the (arrangements for the) marriage. If we follow G. Bustron we must reject the story of the offer of the Pope's niece. Loredano, it is true, says that the bishop was sent to arrange for the marriage of the niece; he has allowed the story of the niece to contaminate that of Zoe.

[2] Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 72; *Descr.* f. 181b.

[3] Reinhard, II, p. 76. See Addenda, p. 1159.

[4] Navagero, col. 1127: 10 July. Malipiero, II, p. 597 (cp. M.L., *H.* III, p. 182): 30 July. The *Relatione* in Reinhard, II, Beyl. p. 30 gives the year only. On the marriage generally from Cypriote sources see G. Bustron, p. 475; Fl. Bustron, pp. 432–3; Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 72; *Descr.* ff. 181b, 182; Loredano (Giblet), II, pp. 305–6.

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the union in the first instance to James himself, as inspired by his fear that Galeazzo Maria Sforza, Duke of Milan and Lord of Genoa, might combine with Louis, Duke of Savoy, to wrest his Kingdom from him. Venice, by its nearness to their territories, was well fitted to act as his protector, and would naturally wish to defend its own important interests in the island.[1] And the Venetian Senate frankly recognized that if a Venetian noble lady became Queen of Cyprus, it would not only contribute to the dignity and glory of the Signory, but would be of no small convenience and utility in connexion with its eastern trade.[2] On the other hand it is certain that Andrew Cornaro, though he may have in the first instance thought of the exaltation of his own family, also worked on behalf of the interests of the Republic. With the assistance of Donato di Aprile, James's Chancellor,[3] he actually induced James, before Catherine reached Cyprus, to make a donation *inter vivos* of his Kingdom to Venice, if it should so happen that he had no legitimate heir by Catherine.[4] What is more, there is evidence that, fully twenty years earlier, there was talk of Mark Cornaro and possible Venetian designs on Cyprus. The Senate, in 1447, asked the brothers Matthew and Ambrose Contarini to assure a Genoese correspondent, Balthasar Vivaldi, that it had no thought of conquering Cyprus by the agency of Mark Cornaro or any one else. If it had sent envoys to Cyprus, it was only about commercial difficulties.[5]

Catherine,[6] who was at the time fourteen years old, was the daughter

[1] Malipiero, II, p. 598; Navagero, col. 1131; Sanudo, *Vite*, col. 1185.

[2] M.L., *H.* III, p. 330 (31 July 1472).

[3] He appears as Chancellor in 1467 and 1468. M.L., *H.* III, pp. 181, 195.

[4] Donato's son cited this donation to the Council of Ten on 26 Sept. 1523. Donato, finding that James showed signs of changing his mind, escaped from Cyprus, abandoning all that he possessed there, and brought the document to the Venetian authorities. It had been written by James with his own hand. A. Battistella in *Atti R. Ist. Ven.* LXXX (1920–1), pp. 303f. Magnante (*L' acquisto*, cap. II, pp. 105–7) throws doubt on this affair. She cannot understand how, if the document ever existed, it has not only completely disappeared but is never alluded to by the Signory in justification of its seizure of Cyprus. If it did exist, it cannot have had legal value, or the Council of Ten would have acted on it and rewarded the son of Ser Donato. Circumstances, however, made it unnecessary for the document to be used. It was practically superseded by Catherine's adoption as daughter of St Mark and in the end by her cession of the Kingdom to Venice.

[5] 3 Aug. 1447. Iorga, *N.E.* III, p. 223.

[6] M.L., *Gén.* p. 48. Colbertaldi gives her birthday as 30 April 1454. The literature of her career is extensive, its circumstances having lent themselves to romantic and

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of Mark Cornaro,[1] of whose activities in Cyprus we have already heard something. Her mother was Fiorenza, or Fiorina, daughter of Nicolas Crispo, Duke of Naxos, and of Valenza, daughter of John Comnenus, Emperor of Trebizond.[2] Her uncle was Andrew Cornaro, who had for some reason been exiled from Venice and had been living in Cyprus.[3] Italian diplomatic opinion thought no plan too subtle for the Venetian Signory; it was, for instance, believed in Savoy that it had pretended to exile Andrew Cornaro to Cyprus in order that he might there form a connexion with James.[4] There is some reason to think that Mark may have originally sided against James; as to Andrew, we know that he was with Charlotte and Louis in the castle of Kerynia (p. 563). But both brothers eventually went over to James, and Andrew became Auditor of Cyprus.[5] It was said that it was Andrew who suggested his

sentimental treatment. Among the better modern biographies are those by K. Herquet, in his *Charlotta von Lusignan und Caterina Cornaro* (Regensburg 1870), and his *Cyprische Königsgestalten* (Halle a.S. 1881); L. Fietta, Catterina Corner del dott. Enrico Simonsfeld', in *Archivio Veneto*, XXI (1881), pp. 40–81 (including abbreviated translation of a sketch by Simonsfeld); A. Centelli, *Caterina Cornaro e il suo regno* (Venice, 1892); and H. F. Brown in his *Studies in the History of Venice*, I (1907). The latest, by 'Loredana' (A. L. Zacchia Rondinini), *Caterina Cornaro* (Rome, 1938), has useful illustrations of the portraits, and a full though inaccurate bibliography. For a brief popular sketch, reference may be made to 'Kate the Queen', by Arthur Stanley, in Blackwood's Magazine, Jan. 1943. On the biography by Antonio Colbertaldi, and that by Girolamo Lugato, written in 1620 at Asolo and based on Colbertaldi, with additions, see Fietta, pp. 59–60. The sketch, of which a Greek translation from a history of Cyprus by Leonardo Corona is printed in Κυπρ. Χρον. XII (1936), pp. 5–9, is full of inaccuracies. So also are the two letters from an unknown writer at Treviso to Ranuccio Benci, which, though dated 27 Aug. and 10 Oct. 1486, describe her abdication and return to Venice. They are printed in *Notizie intorno a Caterina Corner* by G. C. T. (Nozze Rota-Luccheschi, 1851). The description of Catherine seems to be taken from Colbertaldi, and the authenticity of the letters (which are still in the Treviso Library) may be doubted.

[1] For his career, see M.L., *H.* III, p. 819. He belonged to the branch known as the Cornaro della Ca' grande, and afterwards, from the connexion with the Queen, as Cornaro della regina. This branch is to be distinguished from the branch which held the fief of Episkopi, and was known as Cornaro della Piscopia. *Ibid.* p. 815.

[2] Romanin, IV, p. 358, n. 3. Fiorenza died 8 Dec. 1501 (Sanudo, *Diarii*, IV, 179).

[3] M.L., *H.* III, p. 820.

[4] Magnante, *Documenti*, p. 243.

[5] Fl. Bustron, mentioning him (p. 397) in connexion with Charlotte at Kerynia, adds 'qual era auditor di Cipro'; but this is proleptic. He appears as Auditor in the will of James II.

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niece as a suitable bride for James,[1] and her beauty, as represented in a portrait which was sent out to Cyprus, effectively backed his proposal.[2]

James was represented in Venice at the time by Sir Philip Mistachiel,[3] who had been there since the preceding year, and, as we find James in November 1467 already speaking of himself as the 'son' of Venice, it may be presumed that the negotiations for the marriage had by then already been nearly concluded. But it was not until July 1468 that the formal betrothal by proxy took place. On the 10th of the month Catherine was escorted to the Sala del Gran Consiglio from the Cornaro palace at San Polo by forty noble matrons.[4] The ceremony was staged with the utmost magnificence, in the presence of many diplomatic representatives and Venetian nobles and matrons, while an immense crowd surrounded the Doge's palace. The Doge, Christopher Moro, gave a ring to the ambassador, who placed it on Catherine's finger. Mark gave his daughter a dowry of 100,000 ducats,[5] besides estates and jewellery, and the total dowry was secured on the revenues of Famagusta and Kerynia.[6] Catherine was adopted as the daughter of Saint Mark, patron saint of the Republic of Venice,[7] and her name henceforward was Caterina Veneta, not Cornara, and her title Queen of

[1] Loredano has a story that, by dropping a portrait in James's presence, he contrived to excite the King's curiosity and inflame his desire.

[2] According to Colbertaldi's life of Catherine (M.L., *H.* III, p. 446, n. 7) the portrait was by Dario of Treviso. See Note II at end of Chapter XII, p. 758.

[3] M.L., *H.* III, p. 178, § 4; G. Bustron, p. 475; Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 72. Fl. Bustron's Philip Podocataro (pp. 432–3) is probably a mere slip, but it is followed by Loredano. Cigogna, *Inscr. Ven.* IV, p. 147, follows Loredano, saying that Philip Podocataro was sent by James to Venice in 1469 to conclude the marriage with Catherine and other matters. Philip Mistachiel had served John II as envoy to the Grand Karaman in 1448 (M.L., *H.* III, p. 48). He was of Charlotte's party, and took refuge at Rhodes in 1463 (*ibid.* p. 126), but must have made his peace with James. He died in 1469, soon after the betrothal to Catherine (*ibid.* p. 315).

[4] Malipiero, II, pp. 597–8.

[5] '80,000 tra dinari e roba', says the *Relatione*.

[6] Sanudo, *Vite*, col. 1185. In the 100,000 ducats were reckoned various sums owing by the King to Cornaro. The sum is equated by Simonsfeld to more than 3,000,000 marks (say £150,000 sterling).

[7] Malipiero, *loc. cit.* The Bishop of Turin drily remarked that he had never read that Saint Mark had been married, and if he had his wife must be too old to have, at the time, a daughter of Catherine's age. The Bishop, who was Savoyan envoy at Rome, had violent disputes with the Venetian representative. Magnante, *Documenti*, p. 243.

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Cyprus.[1] Since her daughter was now a Queen, the Republic had taken the first step towards acquiring a Kingdom.[2] Empty as that name may seem to be, it counted for much in Italian diplomacy, and became the subject of acrimonious discussion between the Dukes of Savoy, who claimed to have legitimately inherited it, and the Republic of Venice, which had purchased it by means of a legal fiction from the man who had usurped it.

That the possession of Cyprus gave Venice royal rank was, as we have seen, recognized even by the Turks.[3]

By adopting Catherine as her daughter, Venice acquired a legal claim to the Kingdom in certain contingencies, which the Signory doubtless had in view. If the King died first, the rulership would pass, under Roman law, to his family, but if he had no surviving relatives his wife would succeed. He left no legitimate children, except the posthumous James III, and we shall see that he bequeathed the Kingdom in the first instance to Catherine; as the will put it, Catherine was to be Lady and Queen of Cyprus, and if she bore a child it was to inherit the Kingdom. Normally, Catherine's husband having predeceased her, and the posthumous child doing likewise, her rights (whatever James may have said in his will about his illegitimate children) would have passed on her death to her Venetian family; and that would have been awkward, since a subject of the Republic would have become ruler of a foreign State. The adoption removed this difficulty; the rights of the 'daughter of Venice' would on her death pass to the Republic. This she quite well understood; as she bitterly remarked when forced to abdicate, the Signory might have been content to wait until she was dead. But Venice would not take the risk of waiting, and so she was forced in her lifetime to make a formal surrender of her Kingdom.[4]

The honour of being adopted as the daughter of Venice was at the time unique. Later, it was somewhat tarnished, when it was shared with the notorious Bianca Cappello, whom, for political reasons, the Republic declared to be its 'vera e particolar figlia'.

[1] Thus Michele Colli, Milanese official at Venice, writing to the Duke Galeazzo Maria Sforza, describes how at an entertainment in the Doge's Palace in February 1469, 'la rajna de Cipro' sat on the right hand of the Emperor Frederick III. P. Ghinzoni in *Arch. Ven.* XXXVII, p. 140. I owe the reference to Mr Malcolm Letts.

[2] Malipiero, *loc. cit.*

[3] See above, Ch. X, p. 615, n.

[4] The above statement on the legal effect of the adoption is based on an opinion for which I have to thank Mr F. H. Newark of Queen's University, Belfast.

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The marriage celebrated with such pomp was however only a marriage by proxy, and considerable difficulties arose before it was made valid. It appears that Ferdinand, King of Naples and Sicily, who throughout these years lost no opportunity of indulging his hostility to Venice, attempted to persuade James to break it off, and offered him a lady of his own house instead of the daughter of Venice.[1] This coming to the ears of the Senate provoked an energetic protest,[2] which the Venetian Admiral was instructed to despatch with the utmost speed to Cyprus, by the hands of an officer who was also to give a verbal message to the King. James had been greatly upset by the death of a natural daughter or cousin, who had been affianced to Sor de Naves, and this bereavement in some way, of which we have no explanation, provoked a quarrel with Andrew Cornaro, who was deprived of his estates.[3] It may reasonably be suspected that pressure from the Catalan party had more than a little to do with the continual procrastination of James in the matter of the marriage. The letter from the Senate, and the instructions to the officer of the fleet who was to carry it to Cyprus, were directed to healing this breach with Catherine's uncle, which had made James inclined to listen to the proposals of the King of the Two Sicilies. The see of Nicosia was at this time vacant, and King Ferdinand was

[1] 'tentando...regem Cipri ad novas nuptias, et affinitatem secum contrahendam.' This is sufficient to show that Ferdinand was not reviving the proposal of marriage with Zoe, as Herquet supposes (*Charlotta*, p. 154).

[2] 18 May 1469. M.L., *H.* III, pp. 307–10.

[3] The suggestion of M.L., *H.* III, p. 820, that it was in these circumstances that Andrew obtained a safe-conduct from Rhodes, is chronologically unacceptable, for the safe-conduct was dated 17 Oct. 1465 (M.L., *H.* III, p. 165), long before the betrothal with Catherine, which obviously preceded the quarrel. Another chronological difficulty is raised by the date 23 July 1468 of the King's order (M.L., *H.* III, p. 231) annulling the enfranchisement of the serfs of Andrew Cornaro, whom James had freed at the time when he held Andrew's estates. James now gives Andrew, whom he affectionately styles 'father', power to call on his serfs for corvée and other services, just as if they had not been freed; the enfranchisement was invalid, having been made at the request of the 'Moors'. This last detail is obscure, but it is clear that the King's quarrel with Andrew was over. And yet on 18 May and 20 July of the next year, 1469, the Venetian Senate did not know this. It is strongly to be suspected that the entry in the books of the Secrète, which if it is of 1468 is out of place since it is found after the entry of 23 Feb. 1469, the latest in the register, is really in place but misdated, and belongs to 23 July 1469. Magnante (*L' acquisto*, cap. II, p. 97 n.) suggests that Cornaro's disgrace was caused by the intrigues of the anti-Venetian party, who may have accused him of poisoning the princess. This is guesswork for which there is no foundation.

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moving in favour of the appointment of a Catalan, who would naturally favour his schemes.[1] James, as we have seen, was greatly indebted to Catalans like John Perez Fabregues, whose brother Louis, in spite of Venetian opposition, was eventually appointed to the see. The reports of James's intention to throw over the Venetian alliance growing more persistent, the Senate on 9 June 1469 decided to send a special envoy to Cyprus, and Dominic Gradenigo was chosen for the delicate mission.[2] On 20 July he was given his exact instructions.[3] He was to say that the Senate regarded as incredible, and unworthy of the dignity of the King as of itself, the report of the proposal for a new marriage. The marriage with a daughter of a Venetian patrician was regarded by the Senate as allying the King with the whole Senate and nobility of Venice. Seeing that James's marriage with Catherine had been formally[4] celebrated, the ambassador having full power to represent him, he could not with honour break it off. He must be exhorted to reject with scorn the vain promises held out to him by others, and adhere to his original purpose, and, in order to dispel all further rumours and doubts, he should send for his bride without delay. Gradenigo was to discuss with James the terms on which he was to be taken under the protection of Venice,[5] since owing to the death of Mistachiel there was no representative of James in Venice competent to deal with the matter. Finally, if requested, Gradenigo was to offer to accompany some envoy of the King to Rhodes, with a view to bringing about agreement with Charlotte; in negotiating which, if the King needed further support, he might claim authority from the Venetian Senate.[6] If James were still on bad

[1] On 4 June 1469 the Venetian Senate ordered instructions to be sent to its ambassador at Rome to oppose such an appointment, which Ferdinand was seeking to effect 'ut facilius machinationes sue in illo regno habeant locum'. On 7 Sept. 1469 the Senate told its ambassador at Rome, Francis Giustinian, to press the Pope not to give the nomination to a brother of Requesens, the Admiral of Naples, whom the King was pushing, and on the 23rd it thanked the Pope for postponing the appointment. Paul naturally fell in with the wishes of his native city, and the appointment was not made until his successor, Sixtus IV, gave it to a Catalan (Magnante, *L' acquisto*, cap. II, pp. 104–5).

[2] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 311–12; Malipiero, II, p. 598; Fietta, p. 56.

[3] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 312–15. [4] *Per verba de presenti.* Cp. Navagero, col. 1127.

[5] This had been decided on 10 July: M.L., *H.* III, p. 316, n. 1. On 9 Aug. the Doge gave Gradenigo his procuration for this purpose.

[6] Magnante (*L' acquisto*, cap. II, p. 103) suggests that this instruction was meant to convey a hint to James that the Signory, if he did not come to heel, might decide to

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terms with Andrew Cornaro, he was to endeavour to effect a reconciliation.[1]

The breach between the King and Catherine's uncle was somehow healed,[2] and the confiscated estates restored, and the unhappy serfs on them, whom James had enfranchised, returned to their old condition.[3] Nevertheless James continued his communications with the King of Naples; on 7 September the Senate, having heard of the arrival there of an envoy, had to instruct its representative Philip Correr to investigate his activities.[4] However, on 4 October 1469, Dominic Gradenigo, armed with the Doge's procuration of 9 August, formally took James and his Kingdom under the protection of Venice,[5] which bound itself to defend him and his descendants, with all their territory and subjects, against every other Power, excepting only the Sultan of Egypt and the King's own ships.[6] The King undertakes to supply at his own expense two armed galleys for three or four months at the most, at the request of the Venetian Captain-General of the Sea or of the Gulf. Venetian goods brought to Cyprus are to be free of import and export duty. The King is not to allow vessels belonging to any Power with which Venice is at war to enter or receive supplies from his ports (the Sultan of Egypt again excepted). The usual confirmation of Venetian privileges, old and new, concludes the agreement.

support Charlotte. According to a passage quoted by Cornet (*Lettere*, p. 13, n. 2) the ambassador actually threatened that Venice would restore Charlotte if there was any more delay, thus carrying to the King in one sleeve Catherine his wife, in the other Charlotte his sister'.

[1] Incidentally Gradenigo was to enquire into the perennial question of Venetian jurisdiction in Cyprus, and into the claims of the house of Cornaro-Episcopia, of the firm of Martini, and others.

[2] The entry in the Register of the Secrète which proves this is dated 23 July 1468; see above, p. 636, n. 3, for the reason for supposing 1468 to be an error of transcription for 1469.

[3] James makes the excuse that it was at the request of the 'Moors' that they had been enfranchised. As Mas Latrie says, it is difficult to see how the Saracens could have been concerned; but it shows how tight a hold the Sultan had on James if his officers could interfere in such a matter.

[4] Magnante, *L' acquisto*, cap. II, p. 103.

[5] Manifesto by Dominic Gradenigo: M.L., *H.* III, pp. 316–20; *Libri Comm., Reg.* V, p. 179, no. 178.

[6] The King's ships, whether armed or not, are to be free from Venetian control and to remain exclusively under his command and to have freedom to enter ports and revictual in any territory of Venice.

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Although nothing more is heard for the time of the scheme of Ferdinand of Naples to detach James from the Venetian connexion, the marriage with Catherine was still delayed. It was not until August 1471 that the King gave John Perez Fabregues, Count of Karpass and Jaffa, a special procuration, with full powers to conclude all the arrangements for the marriage.[1]

Even so the affair dragged on. The King's next recorded communication with Venice is about quite different subjects.[2] He was affronted by the supposed neglect of the Senate to mention him as the colleague of Venice in the treaties of peace which had been made with other Italian Powers in 1467 and 1468, whereas Ferdinand of Naples, with whom James had no particular connexion, had done so. The King observed and resented the same omission in the peace signed at Rome on 22 December 1470. To his ambassador, who asked for an explanation of this neglect, it was replied that in the treaty with Naples the King of Cyprus had actually been named first of all;[3] if the Signory had failed to notify him of the fact, it was unimportant, since the treaty bound both parties to defend those who were named by either, even if they were not informed at the time or even had not approved. It was customary that each of the parties to the alliance should nominate those whom it thinks good and who can ratify the nomination, whether made by both parties or by one of them. The King of Naples had thus nominated the King of Cyprus. In accordance with the custom the Senate was now handing to the ambassador letters notifying the nomination of the King,

[1] Kerynia, in the presence of the Haute Cour, 17 Aug. 1471. M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 409–10. This was followed (Famagusta, 4 May 1472, *ibid.* pp. 410–11) by a procuration to deal with all foreign Powers and condottieri, and especially with the Doge of Venice, to make leagues and agreements and to borrow money from merchants and bankers. Navagero, under 1471 (col. 1131), says that it was on hearing that the Duke of Milan was equipping a large fleet at Genoa, and suspecting that he was intending to conquer Cyprus in the name of his Genoese subjects, that James was moved to send ambassadors to Venice, undertaking to marry Catherine if the Signory would give him its protection.

[2] Reply of the Senate to representations of the ambassador, 25 Oct. 1471. M.L., *H.* III, pp. 320–25.

[3] See *Libri Comm.*, *Reg.* V, p. 203, no. 33 (13 Feb. 1471), nomination by the Doge of James as first among the adherents to the treaty between Venice and Naples, 1 Jan. 1471; he is also mentioned in the instructions to the ambassadors sent to treat with Mehmed II in January 1471 (Cornet, *Guerre*, p. 19); and he is similarly named first (*Libri Comm.*, *Reg.* V, p. 209, no. 56) in the alliance with Burgundy against the Turks, 15 June 1472 (*ibid.* p. 208, no. 51).

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that he might ratify it. As to the Italian peace of 1470, that was no new thing, but a renewal of the peace of 1455, which concerned no Powers outside Italy.[1]

In July 1472 the Senate began to make definite arrangements for sending Catherine to Cyprus. She was to be accompanied by a special envoy, Andrew Bragadin,[2] and no expense suitable to the importance of the occasion was to be spared.[3] On 19 September the Doge, Nicolas Tron, gave his final instructions to Bragadin.[4] Throughout the voyage he is to treat Catherine with due honour, declaring to her that he is sent as the representative of Venice to be present at the marriage of her as the daughter of the Republic, that she may journey to her husband under happy auspices. To James he is to express the joy of the Doge at

[1] On other points raised by the ambassador, the Senate replied: That the King would certainly be included in any peace which should be made with the Turk. That his aid given to Scandelore and his dispersal of Turkish ships were approved, and the Senate would do its best to help in preventing the Turk from occupying that place. That as to the King's request for two galleys and munitions, he must know well how many galleys Venice maintained for the defence of herself and him and all Christendom; nevertheless he should have them fully rigged and oared, so that he might arm them and use them for the common cause, and from time to time not only galleys but armaments should be supplied when necessary for the defence of his realm, which should be the object of the Venetian fleet no less than their own. [Nevertheless James failed to get the four galleys for which he asked in Dec. 1471: Magnante, *L' acquisto*, cap. II, p. 110.] That owing to the loss of Negroponte, and the necessity of providing for other Venetian possessions in the Morea, and for Crete, all existing munitions had been exhausted; nevertheless the ambassador would be given facilities for procuring munitions from all places in Venetian possession. The King had asked for men to be supplied to remedy the decrease in the population of Cyprus; it was against custom to allow emigration for such a purpose from Venetian territory, and it was suggested that immigrants should be drawn from the Despotate of Morea and neighbouring districts, which are full of Christians who are ill-treated by the Turks. Similarly, no men can be spared from the defence of Crete. To recruiting mercenaries in Italy for service in Cyprus the Senate raised no objection, and would help in their transport. Finally the King was thanked for the consignment of sugar which was owing to Venetian citizens.

[2] 13 Aug. 1472. Romanin, IV, p. 359.

[3] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 330–1. 14 July: the ambassadors to Cyprus to be allowed 120 ducats a month. 31 July: payments to be made to the galleys for Beirut which were to convey her (Malipiero, II, p. 598). 27 August: the ambassador to be present at the meeting of the Rogati. 5 September: the ambassador to take a chaplain with him. 26 September: the allowance of 250 ducats to Bragadin being perhaps insufficient, he is to be allowed to borrow up to 50 ducats more.

[4] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 332–4.

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the close union with Venice that is marked by this fortunate marriage, and to stress the fact that the King can do nothing more effectual for the preservation of his realm and dignity than entering into this intimate union with Venice. He is to say that he accompanies the bride in order that all may understand the truth of this declaration, and that honour may be done to the occasion by his presence as representative of the Doge. This he is to do, being careful in all things to act with dignity and decorum.[1]

On 26 September, before leaving Venice, Catherine made her will,[2] distributing the 15,000 ducats out of her dowry of which by the terms of her marriage contract she was allowed to dispose. She appointed as her executors King James, her father, her uncle Andrew and her brother George.

The Doge himself fetched Catherine on 10 November from her father's house at San Polo, and took her in the Bucentaur to St Nicolas on the Lido.[3] Thence she embarked with the Venetian envoy Bragadin, and sailed for Famagusta,[4] where the marriage was celebrated. She was afterwards crowned at Nicosia.[5]

The question of the succession to the throne, which had prompted James's search for a wife during the greater part of his reign, was thus settled so far as it could be by his marriage. And James had definitely committed himself to the tutelage of the Republic. Shortly before his death he recommended his Kingdom to its protection, and received

[1] This commission by the Doge contains further instructions concerning the preparations for war against the Turk; and the envoy took with him a copy of the reply of 19 Sept. addressed by the Senate to James's envoys, which has already been mentioned (p. 625).

[2] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 418–20. The bequests are mostly to members of her family, but include 500 ducats to be distributed among monasteries in the diocese of Nicosia and the same amount for dowries to poor maidens in Nicosia. A clause provides that this will is not to be prejudiced by any other subsequent will unless that contains the first verse of the psalm *Cum invocarem te, exaudisti me*, etc. The final will which she made in 1508 (M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 583) does not fulfil this condition.

[3] *Relatione*, in Reinhard, II, Beyl. p. 30 (gives the date 10 Nov.). It was there that a fortnight earlier she had made her will.

[4] Malipiero, II, p. 598; Navagero, col. 1131; G. Bustron, p. 475. Fl. Bustron, p. 433. Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 72. Bragadin returned to Venice on 12 Feb. 1473 (Cornet, *Guerre dei Veneti*, p. 83).

[5] So Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 182. In *Chor.* f. 72 he says that she was crowned at the same time as she was married. There seems to be no authority for the statement of Sakellarios (I, p. 530) that she and James were crowned at the same time.

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from the Senate the assurance that it would treat his realm as if it were its own[1]—a promise the significance of which was only later to be fully realised.

Since there was no longer any possibility of a marriage between James himself and a daughter of the King of Naples, Ferdinand evolved a new scheme, to marry his natural son Alonzo to Charla, James's natural daughter, a scheme which after James's death was to be adopted by the Catalan party, and carried as far as a contract of marriage. James was favourable, and agreement about the dowry was reached before his death.[2]

We may now return to the other events of James's reign.

The Order of St John of Jerusalem had been during the struggle between James and Charlotte more or less definitely on the side of the latter. It was at Rhodes that refugees from Kerynia took shelter; it was there that she made her headquarters. But the very important estates owned by the Order in Cyprus made its position in relation to James rather delicate. We have seen how careful it was to secure the immunity of the Commandery of Kolossi, though it stood boldly on its right to independence.

An example of the authority which the Order exerted dates from 1467.[3] In that year, the Chapter General being in session at Rome, a complaint reached the Grand Master to the effect that the Constable of Cyprus, Sor de Naves, had with his galley inflicted damage on certain citizens of Ancona to the amount of 3500 ducats.[4] The plaintiffs claimed instant compensation out of goods at Rhodes belonging to the

[1] Cessi, *Un falso eroe*, p. 1234, n. 6.

[2] Ghinzoni, p. 14 (Maletta's letter of 23 Jan. 1474). On 16 May 1473 the Duke of Milan had told Maletta (p. 9) to warn Ferdinand off this scheme; as lord of Genoa he himself had a claim to Cyprus; he was planning to recover it for himself, or else for Louis of Savoy, his brother-in-law, who was entitled to it and had actually possessed it. Genoa informed the Duke (with whom for various reasons it was dissatisfied) that it was not in a position to intervene in Cyprus (Ghinzoni, *ibid.*). [In the Duke's letter to Maletta 'lo Apostolero asserto re de Cypri', is probably not, as Ghinzoni thinks, the Archbishop Louis Fabregues, but James himself, the 'Apostoles'.]

[3] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 147–8 (12 Jan. 1467).

[4] This had happened long ago (*dudum*) but, since Sor de Naves is described as Constable of Cyprus, after he had deserted Charlotte for James. The incident was only another example of the piratical tendencies which distinguished this adventurer. An earlier example was his seizure of a Florentine ship off Tenedos; on 9 May 1464 the King of Cyprus and the Grand Master were asked by the Commune of Florence to arrest the 'Spanish pirate Suordinave' for this offence. Müller, *Documenti*, p. 200.

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offender. It seems that the demand was supported by Pope Paul II, for the Grand Master states that it is out of his desire to do justice to His Holiness's subjects that he takes the step of ordering goods belonging to Sor de Naves, up to the value estimated, to be consigned to the injured Anconitans or their agent, and promises that when he reaches Rhodes he will sequestrate the property in question over a period of two years. The safe-conduct given by the Order to Sor de Naves, dated 6 October 1463, is also annulled. It was this safe-conduct, doubtless, that gave the Order its powers in the matter; but, since Sor de Naves held one of the highest offices in the Kingdom of Cyprus, the risk of offending the King by such action must have been considerable.

How considerable, is shown by an incident, connected with another piratical adventurer, the corsair Michael of Malta.[1] The King not only gave this man shelter in Cyprus, but actually had an interest in his undertakings. In 1467 Michael was killed in an encounter with some Rhodian ships, and his galley with a prize it had taken was captured. James sustained a heavy loss, and sought to recoup himself by seizing all the cattle and movable property of the Grand Commander John Ram, and sequestrating all the goods and revenues of the Grand Commandery and of the Commanderies of Phinika and Anoyira. The matter came before the Council at Rhodes on 1 June, and, as soon as the new Grand Master, John Baptist Orsini, arrived from the West, he sent envoys offering to indemnify James, who was delighted to get on good terms with a person so influential at Rome. The envoys whom James sent in return came to an agreement on 3 March 1468, and he gave up all that he had seized.

The discipline of the Hospitallers in the island seems to have left something to be desired. The story of the affray in which the young man Sciarra was killed (p. 535) suggests that bands of the Brethren wandered about the streets of Nicosia at night, not necessarily on their lawful occasions. In 1465 we have definite evidence of indiscipline;[2] the Grand Master Raymond Zacosta orders John Ram, Grand Commander, to round up the Brethren who, he is informed, wander about the island, and obey the orders of neither Grand Master nor Grand Commander. All Hospitallers who do not hold office in the Grand Commandery or in Ram's own service are to return at once to Rhodes.

[1] Bosio, II, pp. 246, 248; Herquet, *Cypr. Kön.* pp. 83–4.

[2] M.L., *H.* III, p. 91 (24 April 1465).

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In 1468 it is reported by the King to the Grand Master, John Baptist Orsini, that a Hospitaller has murdered a layman.[1] Ram is given authority to judge and punish the culprit in exemplary fashion. Such scandalous incidents, we may believe, were exceptional. But the Grand Commander was sometimes involved in disputes with other officers of the Order. Thus in 1472 Br. Hisbert de Villeneuve maintained that the estate of Templos (Tembros) near Kerynia was a separate and independent Commandery, whereas Nicolas Zaplana, Grand Commander, argued that it was part of and subordinate to the Grand Commandery. A compromise was reached; Br. Hisbert, it was agreed, should remain in possession during his lifetime, after which the estate would be absorbed in the Grand Commandery.[2]

James's desire to stand well with the Order, whose support of Charlotte gave him so much trouble, is illustrated by an incident in 1472 or perhaps earlier. An acute disagreement had arisen between the Grand Master Orsini and the Procurator of the Treasury of the Order. James (describing himself as the devoted son of the Order) sent the Bishop elect of Paphos[3] to Rhodes with an offer to mediate in the dispute. He was politely informed that it was a domestic concern for the Order, and that he need not disturb himself about it.

James, like many of his predecessors, experienced a shortage of metal for his coinage. He began by issuing copper money, obtaining the metal by melting down the cauldrons of the public baths and the utensils of private householders.[4] For three years he issued sizins of six bits;[5] afterwards these were withdrawn and silver gros (with his figure on horseback) and half-gros (with his portrait) took their place (Fig. 8).[6]

[1] M.L., *H.* III, p. 91, 7 April 1468.

[2] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 93–4. Templos was one of the properties of the Temple, handed over to the Hospital at the suppression of the Templars. It is now represented by the hamlet of Tembros, about 1½ miles west of Kerynia, to the south of the Kerynia-Karavas road.

[3] Bosio, II, p. 266, under 1472 (*Fra Gugl. Goueni*). This was the Augustinian *Guilelmus Gometii* of Eubel, II, p. 234, Bishop of Paphos 13 May 1471. Cp. Hackett, p. 568; Papaïoannou, III, p. 113.

[4] There was a legend (recorded by Mariti, I, p. 139) that he also melted down five colossal 'fingers' of bronze, which had been erected on Mt Pentadaktylos to baffle the north wind.

[5] Schlumberger, *Num. de l'Orient lat.*, Pl. VII, 24.

[6] Schlumberger, *op. cit.* Pl. VII, 22, 23; G. Bustron, p. 461; Fl. Bustron, p. 405.

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Financial difficulties, indeed, confronted him from every side. There was great discontent among the paid servants of the State. The wholesale distribution of estates and fiefs to those who had sided with him or came over to him after the expulsion of Charlotte and Louis may have pleased the few favoured ones, but left him so impoverished that he was unable to pay the officers and men of the army. James was, in fact, in much the same situation as Aimery had been (p. 45) when he inherited the treasury which had been denuded by Guy de Lusignan. Like his predecessor he had to appeal to his barons. Summoning the Haute Cour he asked its advice, and was told that its members placed their




Fig. 8. Silver gros and demigros of James II.

revenues and persons at his disposal, and would approve any measure on which he might decide. Very heavy taxation was accordingly imposed, amounting to 20 per cent more or less on what was left of incomes after the payment of the existing taxes. Aimery's barons had sacrificed their fiefs for the general good; this taxation apparently fell upon rich and poor alike. To meet the new burden some had to hand over their estates, others other property, being unable to find the ready money. But after a short time, it is said, estates were restored and taxation in many cases remitted. Such generosity is recorded by the Italian chronicler as an example of the King's 'justice, wisdom, liberality and humanity'.[1]

The customary scourges of locusts, drought, famine and plague[2] made conditions unfavourable for the restoration of prosperity. In 1469 many died of hunger, although the King imported grain from abroad. In 1470 plague began and lasted for two years and a half; it is said that three parts of the population perished. The King and some of his court

[1] Fl. Bustron, p. 425; Loredano (Giblet), II, p. 289.

[2] G. Bustron, p. 470. Drought in December 1467, miraculously broken by a relic of the Holy Cross belonging to the Armenians: Grikor in Mogabgab, *Supp. Exc.* II, pp. 88–9.

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escaped by leaving the capital and going out to Akaki. One of the last recorded acts of James was an attempt to procure a remedy for the locust pest, which seems to have attacked the island again in 1473.[1] Letters of 23 August received at Venice reported that he had sent two Armenians to Persia to obtain a certain water which attracted the 'locust-birds' or 'birds of Muhammad' by which the locusts were destroyed. The devastation caused by the insects is mentioned again in a Venetian despatch next year.[2]

If later writers could be trusted, we might believe that James inaugurated a number of beneficent reforms in the administration of his Kingdom.[3] He cut short the delays and abolished other abuses which had crept into the courts of justice. He visited all parts of his realm, listened patiently to complaints, succoured the serfs in their misery, spent his own money in reconciling disputants, and would not allow the people to be oppressed by the cost of his progresses. He encouraged trade by granting to other ports the same privileges which Famagusta enjoyed. He took an interest in public education, bringing teachers from other countries, and founded in Nicosia an academy for the education of the sons of noblemen.[4] And he invited artists from all sources

[1] Malipiero, II, p. 604. Full details of the stories of this water and the locust-bird are given by Dawkins in Machaeras, II, pp. 69–71. Barbaro (*Viaggi*, Venice 1543, ff. 49b, 50) mentions James's sending an Armenian for the water, which he himself saw when in Cyprus. See also Ch. XIII, pp. 818f.

[2] 24 Sept. 1474. M.L., *H.* III, p. 392. Faith in this water persisted down to the last century in Cyprus, although more rational methods had already been used in the time of King Janus (above, p. 464).

[3] Loredano (Giblet), II, pp. 285–6. Jauna, p. 1014; Reinhard, II, p. 68; Zannetos, I, pp. 914–15.

[4] Of this we have confirmation to a certain extent from rather later sources. In 1601, when Charles Emanuel I of Savoy was considering an attempt to acquire Cyprus, he promised to maintain in all the principal cities the public schools of secular and religious teaching (*delle scienze et dottrine*) and pay the readers as they were paid in the time of the Kings; also to found a seminary or university at Nicosia such as there had been under the Kings, for the public education of the nobles and the people. (*Capitoli per Cipro*, M.L., *H.* III, pp. 572, 573.) And in 1490 it was stated by the Cypriotes to the Signory that in the time of James II the treasury provided a salary of 100 ducats a year for a public schoolmaster, and that under the Kings there had always been one or two salaried teachers. There is thus confirmation for the statement of Jauna, which is repeated by Hackett, p. 207, n. 1 (Papaïoannou, I, p. 270, n. 34); L. Philippou, Τὰ Ἑλλην. Γράμμ. ἐν Κύπρῳ, p. 28, and Peristianes, Ἱστ. τῶν Ἑλλην. Γραμμ. p. 21. Special schools for foreign languages were of course long established in Cyprus; they are mentioned by Ludolph of Sudheim in 1350 (Cobham, *Exc. Cypr.* p. 20).

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to settle in the capital. It is unfortunate that, except in regard to education, no early evidence for his activity in these spheres has been preserved.

On the other hand, the view that James showed any compassion for the lowest class of his subjects is far from being borne out by an actual mandate of 1468 which is preserved in the Book of the Secrète.[1] The Bailie of the Secrète is to make proclamation by crier in all towns, villages, monasteries and generally throughout the country; the *civitains* and *paracivitains* are to seek out the men, women and children who are not natives of the places where they live and are not known to be *lefteri*, arrest them, tie their hands behind their backs and present them to the Bailie, who will send them for examination to the Secrète. If they are truly the King's *parici*, the Secrète will punish them and send them to the King's villages; if they belong to others, the Bailie will punish them and return them to their masters. The civitains and paracivitains are to be fined 25 ducats if they let any one escape; the same fine is imposed on anyone who, knowing where an offender is hiding, fails to report him.

Nor does James's treatment of the serfs on the estate of Pelendria reveal any special tenderness for his over-taxed subjects.[2] In 1466, by putting up a sum of 1500 besants (which went to pay the crew of a ship commanded by Peter Davila) they had obtained exemption from the salt-tax of a besant a head. In 1468 James abruptly cancelled this arrangement. The law was that no serf or francomate in the villages should be exempt from the *mète du sel*. Therefore he directed that this sum of 1500 besants should be reckoned as payment of the *mète du sel* due from 1466 onwards, and, when it was worked out, the usual besant a head should be imposed.

A casual reference by Peter Davila[3] is evidence that a rising of the peasants took place about the time when Catherine left Venice to go to Cyprus. The peasants, he says, planned to kill James in order to make Charlotte queen. Davila takes credit for having saved the Kingdom from this danger, as he saved it from the Saracens who sought to conquer it, and lastly from the 'rebels' (that is the Catalan party) who tried to seize it after the death of James.

Such is the contemporary evidence regarding James's alleged zeal for the prosperity of his people, and the popularity which he won thereby. Of the writers who praise him as a wise and generous ruler, the nearest

[1] M.L., *H.* III, p. 192; Zannetos, I, p. 935.

[2] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 227–8.

[3] M.L., *Nouv. preuves*, *B.E.C.* 32, p. 352.

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in time to him, Florio Bustron, agrees with all others that his inability to control his passions provoked a conspiracy which nearly brought about his ruin in 1470.[1]

A number of gentlemen, whose honour had been touched by the gallantries of the King, conspired his death. They began to discuss plans at Morphou, whither they had gone to escape from the plague. The leading spirit was Balian de Nores; others were James, John and Carceran Chimi, Dimitrios Bustron, Marsilio, John Sebba, James Salacha, and Master Nicolas or Nicolino Constantino. The last was a man of the people, but much liked by the gentlemen. He was a musician, and had a special grievance, because the King, after having commanded him to play a solo, had had him beaten for playing badly. James had a narrow escape from being stabbed with his own dagger by the humiliated artist. Unfortunately for the malcontents, there was also present at Morphou a Maltese named James, who had come as a penniless adventurer to Cyprus at the time of the siege of Famagusta and, thanks to Peter Davila's protection (which he repaid with base ingratitude), had risen high in the service of the King, who had made him Captain of Pendayia.[2] He gained the confidence of Carceran Chimi, and joined the conspiracy. Returning to the capital after the plague had abated, the conspirators laid plans to attack the King one night in September near Agridi,[3] when he was on his way back from Famagusta to Nicosia. Sebba, however, who was set to watch for the King's approach, fell asleep at his post and failed to warn the rest. Next night the Maltese went to the King and betrayed his comrades. James, says the Italian chronicler, decided that, since he had given cause by his conduct for the hatred of the conspirators, he had better amend his ways, and bring them round by conferring honours and other favours on them. (A less charitable explanation suggests itself, that he proposed thus to allay their suspicions while biding his time for vengeance.) He meanwhile pardoned the Maltese, but warned him not to tell anyone what he had

[1] G. Bustron, pp. 471–4; Fl. Bustron, pp. 426–32; Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 71; *Descr.* f. 179b; Loredano (Giblet), II, pp. 290–301.

[2] His appointment to this post for a year is entered in the Register of the Secrète in March 1468. M.L., *H.* III, p. 204.

[3] Both G. and Fl. Bustron say that the ambush was at Agridi. The best-known place of that name is, however, at the entrance to the pass to Kerynia, and not on the Famagusta-Nicosia road. There were other places called Agridi, in the neighbourhood of Potamia, and in the Karpass (M.L., *H.* III, pp. 508, 511), equally out of the way. Cp. Menardos, Τοπωνυμικόν, p. 371.

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done, a warning which he naturally respected, not merely because of the King's command, but for fear of the comrades whom he had betrayed. But in the King's household suspicions were roused by the visit of the Maltese at an unusual hour, and someone who had overheard the substance of what he had said to the King told others, and so the story leaked out. The doubts of his fellow-conspirators were confirmed when the Maltese ceased to associate with them, and still more when the King proclaimed that he would hold a review. On such occasions all who held fiefs had to appear personally in arms and with their horses. On the appointed day, the conspirators did not present themselves on parade, but shut themselves up with their best horses in the house of the Chimi, sending their relations, with the sorriest animals they had, to make their excuses. The King made a show of accepting them, and the conspirators supposed that all was well. But in the course of the review the King called up Peter Davila, who presented himself with two horses, one good, the other poor. To the King's protest Davila retorted: 'Sire, you have accepted worse horses from those who are traitors, and me, your most faithful servant, you treat thus!' The King bade him hold his tongue for a rash fellow, but after the review called him aside and reproved him for speaking publicly of traitors and yet, though he knew them, not denouncing them. Davila's reply was that the King himself knew who they were, since James the Maltese had told him; that was the talk of the town. The King, seeing that his secret was out, abandoned the plan which the chronicler attributes to him, realizing that, if he pretended to know nothing of the plot but amended his ways, it would be put down not to prudence but to fear, and to lack of the spirit to punish those who had dared to conspire for his death.

John Tafur, Count of Tripoli, was given a list of the conspirators and ordered to arrest them, which was easily done, since they were off their guard. Next day the King laid his charge before the Haute Cour, handing the barons the keys of the prison. The accused made full confession without being put to torture, pleading that as gentlemen of honour they could not tolerate the insults and injuries which they had suffered and were likely to suffer at the hands of the King; but adding that, when they saw that he was amending his conduct, they too abandoned their intention. The Court was divided on the sentence to be passed on the guilty men. Walter de Nores, he who had refused to be false to his oath to Queen Charlotte, is reported to have said: 'Sirs, the Assize says that so many companions of an assassin as there are

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wounds in the body of the man he has killed shall be condemned; count up therefore the wounds in this case, and let us condemn the assassins.' But the majority of the Court, on the ground of *lèse-majesté*, voted for the death-penalty and confiscation of possessions. Next morning the condemned men were taken blindfolded in carts to be beheaded. The whole city rang with the cries of women, running dishevelled through the streets, wailing for their brothers, their sons, their cousins or kinsmen, while the headsman did his fell work on the three brothers Chimi, Bustron, Marsilio and Nicolino. The women sought out the King's mother and persuaded her to go with them to him. Though he had bolted himself into his chamber, and set armed guards to keep the door, Marietta made them burst it open and fell on her knees before her infuriated son. Tearing the veil from her head, so that her hair fell about her shoulders, she embraced his feet. 'My son, I have offended, but pardon your mother; I who am a mother know well the grief that mothers feel; I will not rise, unless you pardon me; take vengeance on me if you will, I am ready to suffer for so many gentlemen, who have not hurt you save in intention.' James bade her be silent, for she did not understand what such a conspiracy meant; they had sworn to kill him, and she would let them live to make good their oath. 'My son, my sweet lord,' she cried, 'one who says in anger that he will kill another, and does not do it, does not deserve to die; if he deserves punishment for what he has said, there is imprisonment, there is banishment; chastise them in some other way than by a cruel and shameful death.' James kept her in play until he thought that all was over, then took a rosary from his neck and sent it as a token of reprieve. But when the messenger who flew with it to the place of execution, crying 'Pardon, pardon', arrived, all were dead except Balian de Nores, John Sebba and James Salacha. On the return of the messenger James asked if Nicolino had been beheaded and, learning that he had, said 'God grant peace to his soul'. The survivors were imprisoned at Kerynia until the King's death, when they were released and went to Rhodes.[1]

[1] Balian de Nores went to France and became a physician; returning to Cyprus under the Venetian domination he lived there, practising his art, to a robust and hearty old age, dying in 1528. The Maltese James, who had betrayed his fellows, was arrested in 1474 after the flight of the Archbishop, but pardoned, although he lost two *prastii* at Kythrea 'because he was a traitor' (Fl. Bustron, pp. 448, 449; G. Bustron, p. 507). The latter (p. 538) describes a scene in which the Maltese and Peter Davila mutually accused each other of treachery.

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James II did not live to see the birth of an heir,[1] for he died unexpectedly and prematurely on 6 July 1473.[2] He had gone out from the capital to hunt near Famagusta, accompanied by his court, including his two intimate friends, the Queen's uncle and cousin, Andrew Cornaro and Mark Bembo. Returning from the chase he was seized with a dysentery, which was to carry him off in a few days. The fact that Cornaro and Bembo at first allowed no one to have admission to his bedside may have lent colour to the report, which even Loredano repudiates as baseless, that the Queen's relatives were poisoning him.[3]

[1] Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 72, says that Catherine bore a son, who died immediately after, and she conceived again. In *Descr.* f. 182 it is put differently, that the fruit of this first conception *ne vint à perfection*. Loredano says that this first child lived five days. Since her marriage did not take place until the end of 1472 (at earliest in late November), and James III was born on 28 Aug. 1473, it is hardly possible to accept these statements.

[2] His epitaph (Joh. Helffrich in Feyerabend, *Reysbuch*, f. 377; Fürer, *Reisebeschreibung*, Nuremberg, 1646, p. 300; Reinhard, II, p. 80; Enlart, p. 296; Cobham, *Exc. Cypr.* p. 78) gives the date 6 July, *aetatis* 33. Josafat Barbaro, despatch of 12 July (Cornet, p. 59; M.L., *H.* III, pp. 343 f.), gives the date as the night of Tuesday–Wednesday, 6/7 July. Malipiero, II, p. 598 (7 July). Sanudo, *Vite*, col. 1197 (7 July). Wrong dates are given by G. Bustron (pp. 475–6; took to his bed on 27 May, died aged 33 on 5 June, having reigned 12 years 8 months; the news reached Nicosia on 6 July!); Fl. Bustron, p. 433 (5 June); Loredano (Giblet), II, p. 311 (5 June); Navagero, col. 1137 (6 June); Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 183 (1474, aet. 33, reigned 12 years, 8 months, 4 days, including the two years of the siege of Kerynia); Monod, *Ristretto*, p. 25 (1474). Confusion between June and July is easy in French sources, where July can be *juignet*, and still easier of course in Greek. G. Bustron's statement that James took to his bed on 27 May must be a calculation backwards from his wrong date for the death, reckoning his sickness at about nine days, which is the duration given by Loredano.

[3] On the suspicion of poison, which, in view of the fact that James was in the best of health, Mas Latrie thinks not unreasonable, see his note, *H.* III, p. 344, and *Nouv. preuves*, *B.E.C.* 32, pp. 354–5. It is true that the Venetian Senate was not beyond contemplating the removal by foul means of a ruler whom it found troublesome. (H. F. Brown's essay on political assassination, *Studies*, I, pp. 216–54, may be consulted on this point; cp. Molmenti, *Venice*, *The Golden Age*, tr. Brown, I, p. 39.) But in Cyprus, in the height of summer, dysentery might easily be fatal to the strongest man. Barbaro (*Lettere*, ed. Cornet, p. 59), Navagero (*loc. cit.*), Coriolano Cippico (*de Petr. Moc. Imp. gestis*, 1554, p. 58), Sanudo (*loc. cit.*), the two Bustrons have no hint of poison. The charge was brought on the one hand against Cornaro and Bembo (who were supposed to be acting for Venice or trying to get the power into their own hands), on the other against Charlotte's partisans (Giblet, II, p. 311; cp. Sandi, *Principj di St. civ....di Ven. sino all' anno* 1700, pt. II, vol. II (1756), p. 849; this is due to Venetian

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The Venetian Admiral, Peter Mocenigo, who was engaged in the defence of Karamania, heard that James had fallen dangerously ill, and hurried to his bedside. After consoling him, and promising the protection of Venice for him and his Queen and the child she was bearing, he returned to his fleet.[1]

If Cornaro and Bembo really attempted to exclude others from the sick-chamber, they did not succeed for long. The barons, sending for the Queen, are said to have forced their way in. Before he died, James sent for his Chancellor, Thomas Ficard, and made his will, in the presence of all his barons.[2] He appointed as 'Commissaries of the Kingdom' and executors of his will: John Tafur, Count of Tripoli; John Perez Fabregues, Count of Jaffa and Karpass; Morphou de Grinier, Count of Roucha; Andrew Cornaro; John Aronion;[3] Rizzo di Marino the Chamberlain; and Peter Davila, afterwards Constable of Cyprus. His wife Catherine was to be Queen of Cyprus, and the child which she was bearing his heir. Should her child die, he named as next heirs his natural son Eugene, failing whom his other natural son John,[4] failing whom his natural daughter Charlotte or Charla, failing whom the nearest heir of the Lusignans. The will also mentioned a great treasure, which James had gathered together with much pains, and gave instructions that the galleys which he kept equipped should all be dis-

prejudice, as is remarked by Daru, *Hist. de Venise* (1853), II, p. 451). Monod, *Ristretto*, p. 25, says that the King was poisoned by the chief barons, 'as is gathered from the Greek history cited by Lusignan'—a gross misrepresentation. These slanders need not be taken too seriously. But, as evidence of what was believed of the convenience to Venice of the removal of James, we may note the observation of Malipiero (II, p. 599), that in his negotiations with the Sophy of Persia James had shown himself an enemy of the Signory, so that thanks are due to God for making him die and the Kingdom pass into the hands of Venice. Magnante (*L' acquisto*, cap. II, p. 116) has some sound observations on the weakness of the case for poisoning.

[1] Coriolano Cippico, *loc. cit.*; Navagero, col. 1137; Sabellico, f. 259; P. Giustinian (*Rer. Ven. Hist.* 1576), p. 220; Bosio, II, p. 269; Loredano (Giblet), II, pp. 309–10. Loredano makes the King himself send for the Queen, and says nothing about the exclusion of the barons from the sick-chamber.

[2] Sanudo, *Vite*, col. 1197; G. Bustron, p. 475 (cp. M.L., *H.* III, pp. 345–7); Fl. Bustron, p. 433; Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 72b; *Descr.* f. 182b.

[3] Messer Rognon Catelano: Sanudo, *loc. cit.* On whom see M.L., *H.* III, p. 181, n. 3. He died on 18 or 20 Aug. 1473 (G. Bustron, p. 479), the former date given by Sathas's text, the latter by Br. Mus. MS. Arund. 518, f. 74. Aronion is given by Lusignan among the noble families of Cyprus (*Chor.* f. 82b; *Descr.* f. 82b).

[4] On these children, see Note at the end of this Chapter, pp. 654f.

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mantled and the crews liberated from the cruel conditions in which he had kept them.[1]

The record of the career of James II, as we have been able to reconstruct it, leaves no room for surprise that extremely different verdicts have been passed on his character.[2] Endowed with brilliant personal qualities, generous or vindictive according to the impulse of the moment, recognizing no sort of moral restraint over his passions, he won the affection of many who experienced his charm and the hatred of those whom he had wronged. If western opinion was ready to swallow any report to his discredit, this was largely due to the violent antipathy which Pius II conceived for him and expressed in forcible language. To historians familiar with the fifteenth century he stands out as very much a man of his age, recalling in many respects the Italian

[1] The meaning of the last sentence has been misunderstood by Mas Latrie, who misreads (from the British Museum MS.) νά τά ἁρματώσουν μὲ τὰ ὁποῖα ἐκράτουν τοὺς λαοὺς πολλὰ κριταρεμένα, and translates 'qu'on entretienne toutes les galères que j'ai eu toujours armées, et avec lesquelles j'ai tenu les peuples en respect'. The MS. has να τὰ παρματόσουν, and all other versions of the will, as well as Barbaro's despatch (M.L., *H.* III, p. 345), prove that the right reading is ἀπαρματώσουν, and that it was a measure of mercy for the galley-slaves, unusual for the times, and to be put to the credit of James; as Lusignan puts it, que...pleine liberté soit donnée à ceux que i'ay faict mettre aux galères: car ie les ay assez tourmenté'. If it be true, as F. C. Lane thinks (*Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance*, p. 6) that the oarsmen of Venetian galleys were not, before the sixteenth century, slaves but free citizens, this was not true of Cyprus; there is plenty of evidence that the crews of Venetian galleys in Cyprus waters were recruited from the *parici* by press-gang. See for instance above, p. 626, the Senate's instructions to Counsellors and Proveditor in 1474 (Ch. XII, p. 709, n. 1), and Catherine's complaint in 1475 (below, Ch. XII, p. 719).

[2] It is interesting to find modern Greek historians at variance on this question. For Sathas he is ὁ παμπόνηρος τύραννος. Sakellarios expresses no opinion, except to say that he was distinguished as one of the greater rulers of his time. Zannetos on the other hand is an enthusiastic admirer of him as one of the best of the Lusignan Kings, rivalling in many points and surpassing in some Peter I and James I. He artlessly explains his partiality for both James and Charlotte on the ground that they both had Greek blood in their veins, and, had they not quarrelled, would have been great benefactors of the indigenous population (I, p. 924).—A contemporary characterization is perhaps worth disinterring from an (undated) letter from a needy Byzantine scholar, Michael Apostolios, who wrote to a friend asking for news τοῦ γενναίου καὶ ζηλωτοῦ τῶν ἀρχαίων τοῖς τρόποις καὶ τῷ πολέμῳ Κυπρίων ἡγεμόνος ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ, καὶ ἐμοὶ ὁμωνύμου Ἀποστόλη τοῦ θαυμαστοῦ. The writer, who was hoping for employment as a secretary to James, or as a teacher of Cypriote children, naturally flattered the King. Legrand, *Bibl. Hellén. XVe et XVIe s.*, II, p. 236.

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despots, his contemporaries, but lacking, so far as we can discover, those intellectual qualities which distinguished many of them and have caused them to be remembered as patrons of the arts, and not merely savage tyrants.

NOTE

ON THE NATURAL CHILDREN OF JAMES II

G. Bustron, in recording the will of James II, calls his sons *Tzenios* and *Tzias*. They themselves (as in their letter of 23 October 1502, M.L., *Nouv. preuves, B.E.C.* 32, p. 370) sign *Eugenius et Joanes*. Marino Sanudo (*Diarii*, II, 335, 15 January 1499) has *Eugenio et Jano*, though sometimes he mentions the latter before the former. Lusignan makes much confusion between them. In *Chor.* he has *Iano* or *Eugenio*, son of a Flatri lady, and *Giovanni*. In *Descr.* f. 182b (the will) and f. 187b they are *Gene* and *Iehan*, but on f. 206b he says the elder son *Iehan* died at Venice, the younger, *Gen*, at Padua in 1553. In his *Généalogies de France*, cited by M.L., *Gén.* p. 50, the elder, son of the Flatri lady, is *Jean*. On the vicissitudes of James's children after their transfer from Cyprus, see Romanin, IV, pp. 439–43, and the long series of documents published by M.L., *Nouv. preuves*, as above, pp. 354–78 and *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 564–8. To these sources may be added the references made by the diarist Sanudo. The princes were brought to Venice, with Marietta of Patras, by order of the Council of Ten dated 30 October 1476 (M.L., *H.* III, p. 408). [G. Bustron, p. 540, wrongly says that the order received in Cyprus on 26 May 1474 to send Peter Davila and the Count of Roucha to Venice included also Marietta and the King's natural sons.] Before they arrived, the Council of Ten decided first, on 9 January 1477, to lodge them in a convent in Venice; then, on 16 January, to send them at once to Padua. But they remained in Venice until King Ferdinand's efforts to kidnap Charla made it necessary to place them in security. (See Ch. X, p. 607.) According to Navagero (col. 1156), however, they were not sent to Padua until 27 August 1478. Sanudo (*Itinerario per la terra-ferma venez. nell' anno* MCCCCLXXXIII, ed. Rawdon Brown, 1847, p. 25) mentions 'quella Regina di Cypro' (*sic*) at Padua. A. von Harff (*Pilgrimage*, tr. Letts, 1947, pp. 251–2), who was at Padua in early summer 1499, also mentions that the "Queen of Cyprus" and her two sons (*sic*) were in the Castle there; they were fine, upstanding men, and were allowed to go out of the castle only under strong guard. (I owe the reference to Mr Letts.) They were provided with a tutor and generally well treated, and when they complained of one of the castellans, Andrew Dandolo, the Captain

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of Padua was told to see that he was civil to them (Sanudo, *Diarii*, II, 335, Jan. 1499). They said in this letter that for twenty-two years they had been on good terms with all the castellans. Charla died on 24 July 1480, Marietta on 12 April 1503. Navagero's statement (*loc. cit.*) that the girl died a few months after being sent to Padua is therefore incorrect. The report of her illness, by Francis Sanudo, Captain of Padua, on 23 July 1480, is in Rawdon Brown, as above, p. xiv. The suspicion that the Council of Ten had some hand in the death of Charla is fully refuted by Romanin, IV, pp. 440–1. Nevertheless Kretschmayr maintains that it cannot be altogether dismissed (II, p. 391). In 1504 the Captain of Padua reported that he had discovered that John had been secretly married to a young woman of his household, but there were no children so far (M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 564). During the occupation of Padua by Maximilian (June 1509) the two sons (the Rector of the place having failed to send them away to Venice) entered into communication with him with the intention of recovering the throne of Cyprus, but the Emperor was not interested, being characteristically unwilling to have the expense of keeping them (Sanudo, VIII, 354, 355, 427). The two 'puti', who had escaped on 6 June, were retaken on 17 July, and brought back to Venice, but escaped again on the night of 30/31 March 1513 (Sanudo, XVI, 74), and were next heard of in Florence, whence they went to Rome. Venice was so anxious to get them back that the day after their flight it was decided that if they returned they were to be granted an annual provision of 600 ducats, in addition to 400 ducats which they received from certain estates in Cyprus (*ibid.* 75). Their wives, whom for a moment it was proposed to shut up, were by a decision of the Council of Ten on 24 January 1514 allowed to go where they pleased, lest 'those persons of Cyprus at Rome' should make capital out of their being imprisoned (M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 566). In 1515 there was a rumour in Venice that the elder son had gone to Cairo, and that the Sultan (Kansuh al-Ghuri) was equipping an expedition to invade Cyprus (*ibid.* XIX, 385, 22 January 1515). In 1517–18 John was at Rome, his brother with the Emperor; a ruffian, Augustine del Sol, who had been banished from Venice, offered the Venetian ambassador to go to Germany and poison Eugene, if he were released from his banishment and received a sufficient fee (cp. M.L., *Arch.* p. 317; *Doc. Nouv.* p. 567). In 1518 an individual styling himself son of the late King of Cyprus, or John de Lusignan, legitimate son of a brother of the late King James, arrived in England, begging for personal favours, and seems actually to have been given some money. The Venetian ambassador's secretary saw him and decided that he was not one of the sons of James (*Cal. of State Papers, Venetian*, II, p. 443, no. 1035). From an order of Pope Leo X of

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January 1520 it appears that they were in receipt of a pension of 70 ducats from the revenue of the alum mines of Tolfa. In this year there was again talk of a scheme to put Cyprus in their hands (Sanudo, XXVIII, 658): one Paul Ungarelo, a shipmaster at Rhodes, was accused by a Cypriote, Hannibal Palaeologus, of being concerned in this plot. (Cp. XXIX, 482: one of the sons said to have been on board a French ship which had put in at Paphos, on its return from an unsuccessful raid on Beirut.) Among the lampoons on Leo X's favourites which were printed after his death was one depicting 'the son of King James of Cyprus', with the motto *Regnum meum non est de hoc mundo* (XXXII, 290). In 1523, Eugene was at Vienna, while John was probably in Rome. From Lusignan it would appear that both eventually returned to Venetian territory; but we have the more trustworthy testimony of Sanudo (30 April 1530, LIII, 177) that when the two escaped from Padua 'al tempo di la rota del campo', the elder went to Turkey to try and persuade the Sultan to take Cyprus, and was killed there; the younger, after being at the court of the Emperor, where he was ill-treated, came in 1530 to Bologna, where he approached the Venetian representatives, saying that he wished to return to die in Venice. Permission was given, and it was decided to grant him a life-pension of 60 ducats a month, the two casali which the brothers had possessed in Cyprus to remain in the possession of the Signory. An immediate grant of 300 ducats was also made, but he was not to go to any seaside place. Next year (11 September 1531, LIV, 582) the Council of Ten gave John (Janus), who had been in receipt of a provision of 600 ducats a year between himself and his son, permission to bequeathe the provision to any son or daughter he chose, since the son in question was not obedient to him. In 1533 (14 January, LVII, 417) his provision seems again to have been higher, if Sanudo is right in saying that it was proposed to add 200 to the 800 ducats of which he was in receipt. Since Sanudo's *Diaries* end in September 1533, we hear no more about him except that, as already noted, Lusignan makes him survive another twenty years, dying at Padua in 1553. In any case I can find no justification for the statement by Ziada (II, p. 53) that Venice 'put to death the bastard issue of James II'.

The Chronicle wrongly attributed to Stefano Magno (Sathas, Μνημεῖα, VI, p. 225) gives the inscription on the tomb of Charla in St Augustine's in Padua, which states her age as 12 years three months.

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CHAPTER XII

CATHERINE & JAMES III (1473–1474)

CATHERINE ALONE (1474–1489)

The news of the King's death reached the capital immediately.[1] John de Ras was sent from Famagusta to Nicosia, to the Admiral Muzio Costanzo, and Catherine was proclaimed, the Admiral and the Bailie of the Venetians receiving the oath from her lieges. Peter Davila, who was in military command, has described how he saw to it that the Queen's succession took place without disturbance. He sent an escort for the Venetian Bailie, Nicolas Pasqualigo (who was afraid to risk himself in the streets alone), and brought him to the palace; there Davila placed the royal standard in his hands, as representing Venice, the mother and protectress of the Queen. A military procession then went through the city, to cries, inspired by fear if not by loyalty, of 'Long live Queen Catherine'. Returning to the palace, Davila addressed the people, pointing out that the security of the island depended on the power of Venice, and that they must be loyal to the Queen, whom her mother, the Signory, would never allow to perish. There were more cries of 'Long live Queen Catherine'.[2] And indeed the people of Nicosia, so far as is known, seem never to have faltered in their devotion to Catherine.

Costanzo and the other notables then rode to Famagusta to pay their homage to the Queen. Officers were sent to Kerynia and Paphos also, to administer the oath to all feudataries there.[3]

[1] Though hardly, as G. Bustron (p. 476) says, on 6 July, since he died on the night of 6–7.

[2] See his narrative in M.L., *Nouv. preuves*, *B.E.C.* 32, pp. 344–5. Cp. Morosini, *Hist. Ven.* lib. VIII, p. 231. Since Davila is making out a case for himself as a consistently loyal supporter of Venice, his claim must be to a certain extent discounted; but the attempt which has been made by Cessi (*Un falso eroe*) to discredit him altogether is an unconvincing piece of special pleading.

[3] I have here chiefly followed Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 73; *Descr.* f. 183. G. Bustron, pp. 476–7, is confused. Fl. Bustron, p. 433. Muzio Costanzo is described by all these authors as being 'Viceroy' as well as Admiral; and his epitaph (Du Cange-Rey, *Fam. d'outremer*, p. 664) says 'saepe pro rege sedens jura administrabat'. See M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 602. But he played little part in subsequent affairs (pp. 685–6), and died, apparently, in 1479.

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In his will, James, as we have seen, had appointed certain persons as 'Commissaries'[1] of the Kingdom. They appear to have disagreed as to their powers; some held that the question ought to be referred to Rome, others that it should go to Naples, but Davila was in favour of a decision by Venice. The Proveditor, Victor Soranzo, agreed with him, and decided that they were to be regarded as Governors of the Kingdom. Davila maintained throughout that questions in dispute should be referred to Venice for decision.

James's body was embalmed and buried without pomp in the Latin cathedral of Famagusta.[2] The crews of his galleys were released, in accordance with his will, and so also were the nobles who had been imprisoned after the failure of the conspiracy of 1470 (p. 650).

An envoy, Andrew Casoli, a burgess, and afterwards Viscount,[3] of Famagusta, was sent at once to Cairo to announce to the Sultan Kaitbai the death of the King. He returned in August reporting that the Sultan had received him favourably, given him a robe of cloth of gold, and demanded the payment of the usual tribute.[4]

[1] Κουμερσάριδες, *commissarii*. For the question as to what powers were intended, see Davila's account, as above, p. 345, and Cessi, *Un falso eroe*, p. 1236, n. 2.

[2] 'They gave him no funeral,' says G. Bustron (p. 476), 'because there was no wax in Cyprus.' Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 72b: he was buried in wretchedness and dishonour because, for his sins, there was not enough wax in Cyprus to make candles; and then the customary funeral service was celebrated; cp. *Descr.* f. 183. According to the latter passage he was buried in a marble sarcophagus. On 30 July the Queen sent to Nicosia to bring away from St Sophia a porphyry sarcophagus, but the priests refused to allow it to be moved, under pain of excommunication, and sent the Dean to explain that it was forbidden by the Pope to take it away. The Queen considered asking Rome for permission, but nothing came of it. (G. Bustron, p. 478.) Fl. Bustron, pp. 433–4, calls the material of the sarcophagus jasper, and so does Otto Heinrich (Röhricht-Meisner, p. 381), who says it was made in the lifetime of Jesus Christ, since it was hoped that he would come to Cyprus to die; it was an object of great popular veneration; cp. Breitenbach, in Feyerabend, *Reyssbuch*, f. 56b.

[3] G. Bustron, p. 492.

[4] G. Bustron, pp. 476, 480, 482 (he says that on 18 Aug. they sent Constanti of Chios to 'Syria'—i.e. to Alexandria—to fetch Casoli, who arrived on the 20th, which is not possible). Fl. Bustron, p. 434: the Sultan sent the golden robe and rich presents to the Queen; the Devitdar, who had originally accompanied James to Cyprus, sent her a message advising her to pay the tribute without delay, when she would obtain all that she wished. Lusignan (*Descr.* f. 183b): the envoy was sent to announce her coronation; but this is probably a loose statement, meaning her succession as sole ruler. Loredano (Giblet, II, p. 315) calls the envoy Andrew Tollores; but this is his version of the name which G. Bustron gives as de *Lortes* or de *Lorsas*, the second envoy, to whom Charlotte's envoys were handed over (p. 322).

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Equally if not more urgent was the despatch of the news to Venice,[1] whose protection was required against any possible action by the adherents of Charlotte. Finally, whatever were at the time the relations with the Holy See, it was considered advisable to send an envoy thither who, in announcing to Sixtus IV the death of James, was to recommend Catherine to his favour.[2]

The people of the capital very naturally expected to see the Queen in their midst. She however, perhaps because she was near her time, was reluctant to leave Famagusta, where she felt safer than in her capital.[3] Later, when she was perhaps ready to go, others prevented her, until her father came and insisted on it. Doubtless with the object of appeasing the Nicosiotes, she sent them[4] a thousand bushels of grain, which was at the time very dear, and ten days later[5] the Count of Roucha took her greetings to the people, avowing her intention of coming to the capital. The citizens returned a loyal answer.

The news of the King's death was not long in reaching Rhodes, and Charlotte at once took action, the ship which she sent reaching Chrysochou on 31 July. But her activities on this occasion have already been described (p. 598).

It will be remembered that in his will James made mention of a great treasure which he had amassed. It was said that some ingenious people interpreted this as meaning the powerful body of supporters that he had gathered round him; but this, in itself unlikely, would not commend itself either to the lawyers or to the administration. Since the treasure, which was rumoured to amount to 6000 ducats, could not be traced, one Focas, the King's chamberlain, who was supposed to know all about James's affairs, was arrested on 12 August, and questioned, both without and with torture, but no confession could be extorted from him.[6] Nor was there more success with others who were put to the torture, or with the excavations which were made in various places. It is probable that the story of the treasure reached Cairo and excited the cupidity of the

[1] G. Bustron, p. 476; Fl. Bustron, p. 434; Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 73; *Descr.* f. 183b; Loredano (Giblet), II, p. 315.

[2] Fl. Bustron, p. 434. On 21 Aug. (G. Bustron, p. 483) an envoy arrived from the Pope, 'bringing many messages from Italy'.

[3] Malipiero, II, p. 599: the place is well fortified, surrounded by the sea and good fosses, and continually visited by the galleys of the Signory.

[4] On 19 July, G. Bustron, p. 476.

[5] *Ibid.* p. 477.

[6] G. Bustron, p. 479; Fl. Bustron, p. 436.

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Sultan, for he wrote[1] demanding the movable property of James as his right, since he supposed there was no heir; but on hearing later that the Queen had borne a son he desisted from his demand. By that time a second envoy, Andrew de Lortes (or Antony de Lorsas), who was despatched on 18 August, at the same time as Andrew Casoli was recalled, had reached Cairo.[2] News of Charlotte's new approach to the Sultan must have come to hand and prompted the sending of this second envoy. He returned later[3] with a message of goodwill from the Sultan, who asked for the payment of three years' arrears of tribute, amounting to 24,000 ducats, and for a present to commemorate the Queen's accession. It was to this envoy, it would seem, that Charlotte's representatives had been handed over (p. 601).

On 18 August Peter Mocenigo, who with a Venetian fleet of sixty galleys had been cruising in Turkish waters in support of the Karamanid princes against Mehmed II, and had heard the news from Cyprus in passing Rhodes,[4] arrived at Famagusta. Queen Catherine[5] sent all her knights to welcome him, and he came and presented his compliments to her at the palace. Leaving six of his galleys and a detachment of fifty men under two Greek officers, he sailed next day for Gorhigos.[6] He was anticipating the wishes of the Venetian Senate,[7]

[1] The letter arrived on 14 Sept. G. Bustron, p. 485; Fl. Bustron, p. 434. Malipiero (II, p. 599) says that the Sultan's action was instigated by Charlotte; he wrote to the consul saying that Cyprus belonged to him, that King James owed him 300,000 ducats; that there was a great stock of money (*cavedal*) in two stores in the island, and the consul was to write to Venice about it.

[2] G. Bustron, p. 480. I can make nothing of his statement on p. 483 that on 23 Aug. 'the envoy returned from Syria [i.e. doubtless Egypt] and as soon as he landed he fled, because he heard that he was to be arrested'. This cannot be Casoli, whose return on 20 Aug. has already been recorded.

[3] 26 Oct. G. Bustron, p. 487.

[4] When Queen Charlotte made an unsuccessful appeal to him (above, p. 599).

[5] Cippico, *de Petr. Moc. Imp. gestis* (p. 65). P. Giustinian (1576), p. 221, wrongly says that Mocenigo found the Queen at Nicosia.

[6] G. Bustron, p. 481. He was back at Famagusta for the baptism of James III on 26 Sept. (below, p. 663).

[7] Orders to the Venetian general in Candia to lend assistance to the Queen are mentioned by Fl. Bustron, p. 434. The detailed instructions of 24 Aug., 2 and 7 Nov., M.L., *H.* III, pp. 348–52. 2 Sept.: instructions to Mocenigo, if he came away from Cyprus, to leave not less than five galleys there (Magnante, *L' acquisto*, cap. III, p. 122). 4 Oct.: he was to prevent the Archbishop from taking any action, and was to send to Rhodes to warn the Grand Master not to favour any attempt to disturb Cyprus. The

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for the first instructions issued to the Captain-General of the Sea and the Proveditors of the fleet are dated 24 August. The news—as to the truth of which there was still some doubt—was regarded by the Senate as exceedingly grave, and it felt sure that the Captain-General and the Proveditors would not have waited for instructions, but have taken the steps they were now ordered to take. These instructions may be repeated in detail, as giving a picture of the policy of the Senate. If there was any danger from intestine disorder or otherwise, they were to leave from four to six galleys to protect Venetian interests in the neighbourhood of the Hellespont, and sail with all speed to Cyprus, present the condolences of the Senate, and concert with the Queen measures for securing the obedience of the realm to her and the heir whom she was expecting, or who might be already born, and for strengthening the garrisons of the city and castles of Famagusta, Kerynia, Lemesos, Paphos and any other fortresses. The government was to be purged of all persons of the opposite party or suspected by the Queen, and the Kingdom preserved for her and the King's heir by her; it was in no way to fall into alien hands. 'You understand our meaning; use prudence and tact, and be zealous in courage and counsel in such a way as to win the praise of all, the blame of none.' For securing the fortresses and suppressing any possible opposition, they might use not merely arguments such as promises of money, fiefs and the like, but if necessary force of arms and engines of war. When it should seem that all the fortresses and the government were in the Queen's hands, and quiet secured, and only a slight further gesture required, it would suffice to send one of the Proveditors, with such galleys as seemed adequate, to visit and encourage the Queen. The Captain-General, with the Apostolic Legate and the Admiral of Naples, was then to devote himself to the Turkish war, having regard to any news of the progress of the Sophy of Persia, and any further instructions from the Senate. If the Admiral

Grand Master, on receiving this message, showed annoyance, and protested to Venice through Ferdinand, saying he would lend the Republic no help except against the infidel; the Order, he added, could not bear the expense of four galleys. Venice replied insisting on observance of the terms of the alliance made three years earlier (though the Order had never supplied more than two galleys). The Signory suspected, from the attitude of the Grand Master, that some serious plot against Cyprus was being hatched at Rhodes (*ibid.* pp. 122–3). Further instructions to Mocenigo, 21 and 26 Dec. (M.L., *H.*, III, pp. 352–3) may have been given after receipt of the news of the murder of Cornaro and Bembo.

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of Naples should show a desire to proceed by himself to Cyprus, the Captain-General with the Apostolic Legate was to go thither with all speed, and see to it that he did not interfere with the intentions of the Senate. Finally, Mocenigo was to exhort the principal lords and barons to union and fidelity and obedience to the Queen, whom, and the King's heir, Venice was determined to support and preserve; and to promise all of them that they should keep their fiefs and benefices, with improvements and augmentations according to their deserts. Any other Proveditor whom he might put in charge was to see to it that those of the Queen's party should be confirmed in their loyalty, while others who might seem to be wavering should be brought round, so that a state of complete tranquillity should be established.[1]

A despatch of a similar tenor went on 4 October 1473 to Josafat Barbaro and the Bailie. The Senate, they were told, had written to the Pope, King Ferdinand, the Duke of Burgundy, and the Grand Master of Rhodes, informing them of the measures taken for the security of the island. It had received from Naples information, of which copies were enclosed, that the Archbishop of Nicosia had gone to Cyprus,[2] and was suspected of sinister designs.They were to show the copies to the Queen and to whom she thought fit. The Captain-General and the Proveditors had been instructed to protect her and her heir. The fortresses were to be placed in the hands of trustworthy persons. Any Venetians in the island who spoke contrary to the policy of the Signory were to be severely repressed; if they persisted, they would feel the weight of its displeasure.

The Signory had in fact written on 31 August to the Pope and on 2 September to the King of Naples, informing them of the death of

[1] These instructions were followed on 2 and 7 Nov. by others, warning Mocenigo of danger threatened by the intrigues of Queen Charlotte (perhaps supported by the Hospital and by the Genoese at Chios); five galleys ordered to remain on guard at Famagusta were considered inadequate, and another Proveditor was to be sent with three more, to remain there over the winter and until further orders. The Queen was to be allowed to enlist the services of Thomas of Imola, commander of the artillery, who had been sent by Venice to Uzun Hasan. At the same time, the Senate wrote on 2 Sept. to inform the Queen of the instructions which had been given to Mocenigo, and to assure her of its support and protection (M.L., *H.* III, p. 348, n. 2).

[2] Cornet, *Le Guerre dei Veneti*, pp. 100–1: 'cum la galia de bel prato.' The Senate said that it had been notified of 'la venuta in Cypri' of the Archbishop; but it is fairly certain that he did not arrive until early in November (p. 670, n. 1), and the notification must have been of his departure from Naples.

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King James, and of its firm determination to take the necessary measures for the security of the island and the protection of the Queen.[1] The promptness with which it had secured control of Cyprus was a matter of much annoyance to Sixtus IV, as the Mantuan envoy wrote on 5 March 1474. Nevertheless, faced with the accomplished fact, the Pope was obliged to say that he was content that Venice should do as it pleased with the island.[2]

The long-awaited birth of an heir to the throne took place on 28 August.[3] The happy event was the occasion for three days' rejoicing at Nicosia, and for the release of all prisoners. He was baptized on 26 September in the presence of Peter Mocenigo, Nicolas Pasqualigo, Bailie of the Venetians, the envoy Josafat Barbaro and the officers of the Venetian fleet. The Captain-General and the Proveditors were his sponsors,[4] and shortly afterwards Mocenigo left for Rhodes.[5] James III, as he was called, was crowned when he was but a few months old, and during his short life was brought before the public on all suitable occasions, and made to signify, by raising his hand, his assent to the proceedings of the Governors, in order that they should appear to be acting in his name.[6] But he survived only a year, dying on his birthday, or near it, in 1474.

[1] Magnante, *L' acquisto*, cap. III, p. 121.

[2] Magnante, *Documenti*, pp. 239, 241.

[3] G. Bustron, p. 483 (28 Aug., misread 27 Aug. by M.L.); Malipiero, II, p. 599 (28 Aug. at the fourth hour of the night).

[4] Barbaro, *Lettere*, ed. Cornet, p. 90; Malipiero, II, p. 602; Navagero, col. 1138; Coriolano Cippico, *de Petr. Moc. Imp. gestis* (1544), p. 70.

[5] Bosio's account of Mocenigo's movements (II, p. 273) ignores the fact that he made two visits to Cyprus (the first on 18 Aug., above, p. 660). He says that after hearing of the retirement of Uzun Hasan (that is, after the defeat at Terjan at the end of July 1473) he left Karamanian waters for Cyprus, where he found all quiet under the guidance of Andrew Cornaro. Leaving two galleys and three ships laden with artillery and munitions for Uzun Hasan, he sailed for Rhodes, arriving there at the beginning of Oct. 1473. On the ground that there was plague in Karamania and the Levant, the Grand Master would not allow communication between the city and the fleet, admitting within the gates only a few privileged persons. Mocenigo then went on to winter at Modon.

[6] Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 73b; *Descr.* f. 185b. So too Henry VI of England, though but a few months old, had to signify his assent to the Act of Parliament constituting the Duke of Bedford Protector (Maitland, *Constitutional History*, p. 201). A silver gros, now represented by a single specimen, was issued during the infant's reign. The obverse bears the name of Catherine as Queen of Jerusalem and Cyprus, with the shield of the

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The Venetian Senate had good reason for its anxiety about the situation in Cyprus. Three political parties could be distinguished.[1] There were the adherents of Charlotte, the relations of those who had gone into exile with her, and those who had remained in the island deprived of their fiefs. There were the foreigners, chiefly Catalans and Sicilians, who favoured the designs of King Ferdinand, scheming to marry Catherine to him or to a son of his, and Charla, the natural daughter of James II, to one of his natural sons, so that the Kingdom would fall into the hands of Naples. But that which proved to be the strongest of the three parties was Queen Catherine's; she had the support of Venice, she held the fortresses; and the greater part of the Cypriotes distrusted the Catalans[2] and looked to Venice to protect them from injury at the hands of other foreigners. Nevertheless, Catherine's position was not too secure. We have already described Charlotte's activities, culminating for the time in the abortive attempt to seize Kerynia on 15 August 1473 (p. 600). But among Charlotte's supporters were few, if any, in high position. The Catalan party, on the other hand, was headed by no less a person than the Archbishop Louis Perez Fabregues, the younger brother of John Perez Fabregues, Count of Jaffa and Karpass. The leadership would naturally have been kept by the Count himself, who was later described by Catherine as a traitor,[3] had not death removed him on 24 October.[4] But the party included Rizzo di Marino the Chamberlain; James Zaplana, who had been taken from the Genoese by James into his service and had risen to be Bailie of the Secrète; Louis Alberic, Zaplana's nephew;[5] and Tristan de Giblet, the only Cypriote among them. The Archbishop, it is true, was not to arrive from Naples until the beginning of November; but as early as 17 July the

Kingdom; the reverse the cross of Jerusalem and the inscription *Iacob(u)s D.G.R. I(e)r(usale)m Cipri A(nno) I.* Schlumberger, *Num. de l'Orient lat.*, Pl. VII, 25; L. Forrer, 'Caterina Cornaro Regina di Cipro e le sue monete' in *Rassegna Numism.* (Orbetello, 1905), p. 5 of extract.

[1] Fl. Bustron, p. 437; Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 73 b; *Descr.* f. 185.

[2] This comes out clearly in the attitude of the Nicosiotes after the murder of Andrew Cornaro.

[3] In her letter to the Doge Nicolas Marcello, 20 March 1474. M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 449.

[4] G. Bustron, p. 487. When he fell sick he had been brought to the palace of his brother the Archbishop, on 2 Oct. (*ibid.* p. 486). His other brother Gaspar afterwards, doubtless without cause, accused the Venetians of having poisoned him (Ghinzoni, pp. 12–13, where the document-date is misprinted 1454 20 Jan. instead of 1474).

[5] M.L., *H.* III, p. 403, n. 2.

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Venetian envoy, Josafat Barbaro, had reported the threatening nature of the situation.[1] Although, as Andrew Cornaro had assured him, all the barons, knights and principal officers of the late King James II had sworn obedience and fealty to the Queen, there was reason for serious doubt, especially because of the Catalans, who were the most important persons in the Kingdom.

It is desirable at this point to obtain some idea of what were the real intentions and the characters of the Governors who surrounded the Queen and dictated her actions, although to do so we must anticipate some of the events in our narrative. The chroniclers give us no help, being content with a dry record. Barbaro is extremely reserved, except for a criticism of Andrew Cornaro, the Queen's uncle. So far as Catherine herself was concerned, Andrew was much the most influential of the Governors. The Venetian chronicler says that, although James committed the government to the Counts of Tripoli, Roucha and Jaffa as well as to him, Andrew was the head of all, and it was his will, neither more nor less, that was done;[2] adding that 'up till now all are content with his humanity and prudence'. But another[3] describes him as kindly and gentle, excellently brought up from his youth, and ready rather to suffer than to inflict injury. These qualities, which implied unwillingness to take strong measures, made a different impression on Barbaro, in whose eyes they were merely indolence and pusillanimity.[4] The Venetian envoy's opinion may have been affected by a personal grudge, for he was evidently annoyed because Andrew had only spoken to him three times since his arrival on 23 September. In an interview the second night before the outbreak which is to be described, Barbaro reproached Cornaro to his face with his slackness, which would be the ruin of the Kingdom, and for his failure to strengthen and provision the garrison of Famagusta castle. Cornaro replied that he had not done so because he did not wish to exasperate his colleagues, and that he knew well the fate of the Kingdom hung upon a hair. Whatever may be the true estimate of Cornaro's character, it is clear that the anti-Venetian party regarded him as the most dangerous of their adversaries, and sought to compass the destruction of him above all others.

[1] 'E maximamente per la nation chatelana, la qual in ditto regno è principalissima.' Barbaro, *Lettere*, p. 67, and in M.L., *H.* III, p. 351 n.

[2] Malipiero, II, p. 598.

[3] Coriolano Cippico, *de Petr. Moc. Imp. gestis* (1544), p. 70.

[4] *Lettere*, ed. Cornet, p. 97.

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For the other Governors and their associates, we depend, apart from a later statement in his own defence by Peter Davila, almost entirely on the letters of the two Venetians, George Contarini, a cousin-german and counsellor of the Queen, who writes from inside her palace, and the Proveditor Victor Soranzo reporting to the Doge. Of the two, Contarini, writing to Victor Soranzo,[1] is much the more outspoken. He is writing because Peter Davila has told him that the Governors do not wish him to go in person to the Proveditor, to whose chancellor he has already given an oral message. He describes the Archbishop as a minister of Satan; James Zaplana as a ribald and a traitor; Rizzo di Marino as a most ignorant traitor; the Count of Roucha means well, but agrees to fall in with the majority; Peter Davila is a good man, but he too allows himself to be swayed by his own interests, and feels obliged to support the other Governors, chiefly Rizzo. And they have all sworn to stand together. Peter Davila (though Contarini believes him to be faithful to the Queen), asserts that he cannot do otherwise, since the other three (the Archbishop, Zaplana and Rizzo) are too strong for him. Contarini has advised him to ask the Proveditor for a guard of fifty or a hundred men; he says he would do so, but it would cause a disturbance, and he is right. If he would trust the Venetians, he could save the State, which is like to perish; it certainly will, if the revenue does not come in well this year. As to the Count of Tripoli, Contarini says, the Proveditor will give just so much credit to his words as they deserve; he veers with every wind, says what comes first into his head, and as he speaks without thinking forgets what he has said, and never sticks to his purpose; as a result of this instability he is never to be trusted.

The Proveditor Victor Soranzo, in despatches to the Doge,[2] describes the conditions in the palace thus: The Queen is kept under such strict control, in a sort of subjection, that neither Her Majesty nor the two gentlemen in waiting have liberty, I will not say to speak, but even to make the smallest sign, to each other, since they have the Archbishop and the others, but especially the Archbishop, continually on top of

[1] 15 Dec. 1473. M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 432–5.

[2] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 428–31 (9 Dec. 1473); 436–41 (17 Dec.). Davila (M.L., *Nouv. preuves, B.E.C.* 32, p. 347) similarly describes the Queen as being kept in strict confinement and not allowed to speak to any Venetian. Also (p. 348), the 'rebels' wished to send George Contarini and Peter Bembo, both nephews of the Queen, out of the island.

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them. The Archbishop pays her no respect and shows no reverence to her, but enters her chamber at his will. 'This malignant Archbishop', Soranzo calls him in another context. He speaks well of the Count of Roucha, who has a scheme, to be described later, for getting Catherine away to Nicosia, out of the control of the Catalans. The Count is not merely related to the Queen, through his mother-in-law, but is zealous for her good; both he and Peter Davila lament the usurpation of power by the Archbishop and Zaplana. As his secretary told Soranzo, he said to Peter Davila: 'these ruffians have combined to govern and dispose of this Kingdom at their will, and reduce Her Majesty and ourselves to nonentities. And when the King grows to years of discretion, the Archbishop and Zaplana will depart, and we shall be held responsible, and shall have to redeem their rapine and injustice; and deservedly, since we were appointed Governors by the King's will. Now you, Sir Peter, have the soldiers, and the people will follow me; if we wish, no one can say us nay. We must see to it that we have the Queen in our hands.'

On Peter Davila's policy and convictions and actions from the time of King James's death onwards we have an interesting statement from his own mouth. But this, which is contained in the appeal[1] which he made to the Venetian government, was written in 1479, some six or seven years after the events it records. In some details it may be inaccurate; and as the writer is making out a case for himself he may be exaggerating as regards both his consistency in supporting the Venetians and the power which he exercised. Certainly, if his account be accepted, he showed none of that lack of determination which others observed in him. An example of his promptitude, given at length by himself, is partly confirmed by the Greek chronicler,[2] who says that on 12 October 1473, the day when Peter Davila was knighted at Famagusta, there was a great disturbance (whether connected with that event or not, does not appear). 'And if Peter Davila had not arrived in time to close the sea-gates, there would have been much damage done.' Peter's own account illustrates the dangerous conditions which prevailed in Famagusta. Some 'foreigners', he says, and peasants of Famagusta began rioting against some men from the Venetian galleys, who withdrew to the

[1] M.L., *Nouv. preuves*, *B.E.C.* 32, pp. 342–53.

[2] G. Bustron, p. 486. Cessi therefore is incorrect in his assertion (p. 1238), that Davila's claim is unsupported.

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quay and prepared to defend themselves. Davila, all unarmed as he was, rode down to the quay and interposed himself between the combatants; but for him the men from one of the galleys (that commanded by Augustus Contarini) who were on shore would have been cut to pieces. On his return he met Zaplana and Alberic and others, who had armed themselves and come to the spot, and who abused the Venetians, as Contarini could bear witness. Returning to the palace, he armed himself and rode out again. Meanwhile the mob was about to attack the soldiers under Thomas of Imola;[1] again, Davila says, he saved the situation.

If Davila was playing entirely for his own hand, he certainly succeeded in deceiving Victor Soranzo, who wrote warmly of his devotion to the Queen, which nothing, not even the fear of assassination, could shake.[2]

Although the Venetian witnesses whom we have quoted may be prejudiced in favour of the Venetian party, and there is none who can be cited on the other side, few will hesitate to condemn the Archbishop, Zaplana and Rizzo di Marino. The Count of Tripoli, John Tafur, already had a bad record before the Famagusta *coup d'état* which we shall describe, and owing to his doubtful attitude was deposed from the captaincy of Famagusta, and arrested, but escaped from the ship in which he was being sent to Venice (below, p. 696). Louis Alberic followed his uncle and protector Zaplana. Of all these, the Count of Tripoli and Rizzo di Marino had been actually named among his executors by James II. So too had the Count of Roucha and Peter Davila, but these two, as we have seen, had to proceed warily. The Archbishop and Zaplana had usurped a position among the legitimate Governors, and natural death or assassination removed three other members of the government, Andrew Cornaro, John Perez Fabregues,

[1] The text as given by M.L. has *Thomaxo de Puola*. But we know that Thomas of Imola was guarding Josafat Barbaro at the time (p. 674). He had been sent out to Cyprus in command of 100 picked bombardiers at the time when Josafat had been elected ambassador to Uzun Hasan. Coriolano Cippico, *de Petr. Moc. Imp. gestis* (1544), p. 42.

[2] In a curious passage of the despatch of 9 Dec., omitted by Mas Latrie, but quoted by Cessi, p. 1240, n. 4. The writer plays on his name, which he supposes to be Piero d'Aquila. 'Et veramente conosco maior fede in lui che non fu in S. Piero, perchè nè per temor nè per paura de morte s' ha mosso de tal sua laudevol fede verso la Maestà Regia. Bene adonque porta el cognome d'Aquilla a similitudine de S. Zuanne, che ha conosciuto i secreti altissimi de Dio, cusì lui saviamente ha discernuto la segurtà regia', etc.

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Count of Karpass, and John Aronion, of whom the first had been the Queen's firmest friend. Nothing but the deepest sympathy can be felt for the unfortunate young woman, the instrument which was designed by the Venetian Signory to carry out its high policy, and which the Catalan party was intriguing to wrench out of its hands, while the Venetian commander looked on almost helpless. Venetian statecraft may have been cold, cynical and calculating; but Soranzo was human, and, in sending home to Venice letters from George Contarini and the Queen, he exclaims: 'these letters have wrung my heart, especially the Queen's, since I cannot give her more aid and consolation than I am doing'.[1]

It is not always clear how far the party was working for the special interests of the King of Naples, how far for those of Charlotte, and how far these could be considered identical. The marriage of Catherine to Ferdinand would have definitely excluded Charlotte; on the other hand, later, in 1473, Charlotte adopted Don Alonzo, the bastard of Ferdinand to whom it was proposed to marry James II's natural daughter Charla and thus give a claim to the throne of Cyprus. And it is hardly to be supposed that Sixtus IV, who had received Charlotte so kindly, would have encouraged any policy that was directed to ousting her from her rights. Yet he did, it was said, openly support the Archbishop, who was the leader of the Catalan party. Archbishop Louis and his brother Gaspar Fabregues were at Naples on a secret mission from James II to Ferdinand when James died. It appears that this mission actually had as its object the marriage of the children of the two Kings.[2] The Archbishop devoted himself energetically to the scheme for the marriage, brought Ferdinand round to his opinion, and was sent to Cyprus.[3] An

[1] It is interesting here to note the warm testimonial given a few years later to George Contarini by Victor Soranzo. Writing on 3 June 1476 from Padua, to congratulate him on his restoration to the County of Jaffa, Soranzo says: 'ever since I have known you I have always esteemed your intelligence and strength of character, shown at a time when it was of great importance to have you acting with prudence and extreme tact; everything that was wisely and discreetly done I attributed to your intelligence and character, everything else to the malignant and ignorant'. M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 488.

[2] Cp. Fl. Bustron, who says, p. 436, that James had sent Louis to negotiate this.

[3] Letters of Maletta to the Duke of Milan, 23 Jan. and 31 Mar. 1474 (Ghinzoni, pp. 14, 26). Coriolano Cippico, *de Petr. Moc. Imp. gestis* (1544), p. 72, followed by Navagero, cols. 1138–9. The insinuation, found in Cippico, Sabellico (f. 261b), P. Giustinian (1576, p. 221) and Loredano (Giblet, II, p. 322), that the Archbishop aimed at the crown for himself, may be mentioned for the little that it is worth. His ambition was rather

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envoy of Ferdinand named Severo had previously been despatched on this business. Arriving on 19 August, he appeared before the Governors in the palace at Famagusta, and urged the conclusion of the marriage contract between the two natural children. His arrogant and insolent manner incensed the Governors so much that they expelled him and some of the Catalan party (who had perhaps been going too far and too fast) from Famagusta, and he retired to Paralimni.[1] Further efforts, however, were more successful, for when another envoy, Simonetto di Belprato,[2] who arrived with the Archbishop, presented himself before the Queen on 15 November, he was able to congratulate her on the betrothal which had recently been concluded.[3] The news of this contract reached Nicosia on 19 November.[4]

to be viceroy of some other ruler, such as the King of Naples or the Duke of Milan (Ghinzoni, p. 13: agreement between Gaspar Fabregues and the Duke's ambassador). On 4 Oct. 1473 the Venetian Senate, having heard that the Archbishop had quietly left Naples with a secretary of King Ferdinand, reiterated its orders to the Captain-General of the Sea to take all his fleet to Cyprus, if the Admiral of Naples went there; and Josafat Barbaro was informed. M.L., *H.* III, p. 350, n. 2; Romanin, IV, p. 361. Cp. above, p. 662.

[1] G. Bustron, p. 481; Fl. Bustron, pp. 436–7. G. Bustron gives the date of the arrival of Severo as 19 Aug., and (p. 488) that of the Archbishop, who brought an envoy with him, as 5 Nov. Fl. Bustron makes the Archbishop bring Severo; he has run the two envoys into one. The Venetian Senate (see previous note) did not hear of the Archbishop's departure before 4 Oct.

[2] Maletta to the Duke of Milan, 20 Jan. 1474 (Ghinzoni, p. 11). P. Giustinian, *Rerum Ven. hist.* (1576), pp. 221–2, describes this man as one of the King's *purpurati*, *Belprato nomine* (cp. the 1576 Italian ed., f. 219b: *uno de' gentilhuomini secreti del Re, detto Belprato*). Giustinian goes on in the passage which was afterwards condemned as a libel on Peter Davila (see p. 702) to say that it was decided in the house of Peter Davila, who with Rizzo di Marino supported the cause of the King of Naples, that Catherine should be married to King Ferdinand, and that a natural daughter of King James (i.e. Charla) should be affianced to a natural son of Ferdinand (i.e. Alonzo).

[3] Immediately after the murders: Maletta, 23 Jan. 1474 (Ghinzoni, p. 14); Cippico, p. 76; Navagero, col. 1139. Cp. Sanudo, *Vite*, col. 1199, where however *Federigo* should be *Alfonso*; the same mistake in his Chronicle (M.L., *H.* III, p. 435); also in Bembo, *Opera* (1556), p. 29. In the Italian edition of 1552 of Bembo (f. 7b) no name is given. See Ch. XI, p. 609, n. 3.

[4] G. Bustron, p. 495. It is impossible to accept the statement of Malipiero (II, p. 601) that immediately after the conclusion of the betrothal the Archbishop went to report it at Naples; for he did not leave Cyprus again until he fled with his associates at the end of December. Possibly Malipiero's text should be emended to 'e fo mandà dall' Arcivescovo' or 'e mandò l' Arcivescovo'. It was Belprato who was sent back to Naples (Sabellico, f. 262; P. Giustinian (1576), p. 222).

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Before that date, events began to happen which were to lead to the overthrow of all the schemes of the Neapolitan party.[1] The Archbishop had no sooner set foot in Cyprus than he engineered a plot for the murder of Andrew Cornaro which, though it was successful in its immediate object, recoiled on the heads of the plotters.[2]

The Archbishop's plan, it was believed, and we have no reason to doubt it, was by effecting a marriage between King Ferdinand's son and the daughter of the late King James, both of tender age, to cause the control of the Kingdom to fall into the hands of his associates, although it is not necessary to suppose that he aimed at the crown for himself. The chief obstacle to his project, the Queen's uncle Andrew Cornaro, must first be removed.[3] The Archbishop began operations at Nicosia, where he produced a letter from the Pope,[4] openly accusing Andrew Cornaro and Mark Bembo of having poisoned James II, and expressing his astonishment that they and Paul Chappe and the Queen's physician Gabriel Gentile should have been allowed to assume the reins of government. The letter was read publicly on the steps of St Sophia. It is improbable, from what is known of the feelings of the people of the capital, that they took part in what followed, or even sympathized with the Catalan party, of which they had a deep distrust. But the letter had the desired effect on the Archbishop's adherents, who rode with him

[1] On the date of the assassination of Andrew Cornaro and others of his party, see Note I at the end of this Chapter, pp. 757 f.

[2] The murder of Andrew Cornaro, etc.: G. Bustron, pp. 488–93; Fl. Bustron, pp. 437–40. Josafat Barbaro, despatch of 15 Nov. (Cornet, pp. 95–101 and M.L., *H.* III, pp. 353–62), has no details of the murders, but describes his conversations with the Archbishop and other persons concerned. Navagero, col. 1139; Malipiero, II, p. 600; Cippico, *de Petr. Moc. Imp. gestis* (1544), pp. 74 f. Memorandum from the Senate to Ferdinand's ambassador, Angelo de Adria, 22 Jan. 1474, quoted by Romanin, IV, p. 361, n. 3. Sabellico, *Hist. Vinit.* (1544), ff. 261 b–263.

[3] Malipiero, II, p. 600. Compare what the Count of Roucha's secretary told Victor Soranzo, M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 431 (above, p. 667). The Archbishop accused Cornaro of the murder, not only of his brother, the Count of Jaffa, but of another great person, possibly John Aronion (Ghinzoni, p. 14).

[4] Loredano hints that the authenticity of the letter rested on the statement of the Archbishop that it was written by the Pope, but no other writer expresses any doubt of it. Louis Alberic, according to G. Bustron, describes it as addressed to the Queen and all the knights; Fl. Bustron speaks of two letters, one to the Queen, the other to the knights; in Lusignan, *Chor.*, it is a letter addressed to the Governors and Commissaries of the Kingdom; in the *Descr.* he speaks of letters addressed to all the Princes of the Kingdom.

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to Famagusta.[1] A report was put about that Andrew Cornaro had arranged with John Visconti, an Italian in command of a company of soldiers, that at the sounding of the tocsin he should take his men and kill the members of the government: the Constable, the Count of Roucha, the Count of Tripoli and the Chamberlain Rizzo di Marino. When therefore, three hours before dawn on 13 November, the tocsin did sound (by the Archbishop's orders), his adherents, according to arrangement, gathered fully armed at the palace.

Their first victim was Paul or Paulin Chappe, Seneschal of Jerusalem, who had been in the royal service since the time of John II.[2] He was awakened by a friend at the sound of the alarm, and the two, mounting the same horse, rode to the palace. As Chappe was dismounting, Rizzo di Marino stabbed him, and his body was dragged out and thrown into a well. Master Gabriel Gentile, the physician,[3] who when he heard the alarm also armed himself and went to the palace, witnessed the murder of Chappe, and took refuge in the Queen's chamber. He was followed by the Archbishop, who did not know him, but took him for one of the Queen's guards. But Rizzo di Marino, entering, seized him, in spite of the Queen's resistance, and stabbed him twice in the breast, but failed to pierce the brigandine that he wore. Rizzo then dragged him out by the hair, and took his sword; but the wretched man, who throughout seems to have made no effort to defend himself, slipped from his grasp, and was escaping up the kitchen stairs when he was caught by his pursuers and brought before Rizzo. 'What wrong have I done, that you wish to kill me?' he cried; but Rizzo lifted up his skirt and stabbed him in the belly, so that he died.

Andrew Cornaro, learning from his servants that the streets were full of armed men, was going to the house of the Venetian Bailie, when he met the Count of Tripoli, who told him to go back home; but he refused. The Bailie said that he had been warned not to stir from his house, and declined to go with Cornaro to the castle. Cornaro on a pony, with his nephew Mark Bembo on foot, made his way thither, but was denied admission by the Castellan Ferrandetto di San Luca, who said he had orders to let no one enter, not even the Queen if she came in

[1] The final plans were concerted in the house of James Zaplana.

[2] M.L., *H.* III, p. 66 n.; cp. above, p. 524. Sabellico (f. 261 b) calls him 'Polizapa Cipriotto'.

[3] Grants of fiefs to him by James II in 1468, M.L., *H.* III, p. 261, n. 8; cp. Fl. Bustron, p. 421.

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person.[1] Andrew dismounted and took refuge with Mark in an outwork.[2] Hard on their heels came Rizzo and the Count of Tripoli, with Andrew Casoli, Viscount of Famagusta, and some twelve horsemen;[3] calling to the Castellan, they were told that no one had come there save Sir Andrew. Hearing their voices, Andrew came out of his hiding-place, and was summoned by Rizzo to go with him to the Queen. Casoli dismounted and offered his horse to Cornaro; but Rizzo reproved him, fetched the pony and made Cornaro mount it. The Count of Tripoli proposed to go on before, and bade Cornaro follow with Rizzo. But Cornaro said he preferred to ride with the Count; whereupon Rizzo drew and cut him over the head, throwing him to the ground, where he was despatched by others. Mark Bembo was at the same time killed by a *marrano* (a recently converted Moslem), and both bodies were thrown into the fosse of the castle.[4]

The chief opponents of the Catalan party having been thus eliminated, there was no more disturbance. But next day John Visconti was imprisoned, lest he should reveal the deceit which had been practised,[5] and thirty Sicilians and many others who were under his command at Famagusta were sent away to Nicosia, where on their arrival on the 15th they told the whole story.[6] The carrying of arms in the streets of the capital was at once forbidden.

In his despatch, Josafat Barbaro describes the discreet attitude preserved by the Venetian representatives during this tumult. Andrew Cornaro, on the fatal night, had sent for him from the house of the

[1] So G. Bustron. But on p. 523, like Fl. Bustron, he has another, less probable version: 'no one except the Queen'. Cp. James II's orders to the Castellan, p. 469.

[2] G. Bustron: ριστέλλο. 'In a place which was like a *rastello*', Fl. Bustron.

[3] P. Giustinian (1576, p. 222) does not mention the Count of Tripoli's part in this affair, but names Tristan de Giblet, 'one of the conspirators', as helping Rizzo to murder the two victims. Bembo (*Hist. Vin.*, 1552, f. 8) also says that Tristan killed Andrew Cornaro.

[4] Mastichi, the *marrano*, and Nicolas Spetsieri afterwards confessed to the deed, and were hanged on 25 Jan. 1474 (G. Bustron, p. 511). Malipiero (II, p. 600) says that the nude corpses were left to lie in the fosse, and were only taken up by Cornaro (which?) after the dogs had begun to eat them. H. F. Brown (*Studies*, I, p. 274), on what authority I do not know, says that they lay for many days in sight of the Queen's windows, and it was she who had them taken up.

[5] This I take to be the meaning of Fl. Bustron's words 'per coprir l' error già commesso'.

[6] G. Bustron, p. 490; Fl. Bustron, p. 440.

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Venetian Bailie, next door to his own, and tried to persuade him to go to the palace; but Barbaro, like the Bailie, thought it wiser to stay at home. He was joined there by the captain, Thomas of Imola, and his company, whom he had summoned. From other officers who also arrived with their musketeers he learned that the palace was full of armed men, and that Chappe and Gentile had been killed. The leaders of the uprising were naturally nervous about the attitude of the Venetian envoy, who was now visited by the Count of Tripoli, by an agent of James Zaplana the Constable of Cyprus[1] (who came twice on the same errand), and by the Archbishop with Sassons de Nores, Constable of Jerusalem, in succession. They were all most urgent that he should disarm the men who were in his house, and send the arms to them, or to the galleys. After a conference with the Bailie, it was agreed that Barbaro should disarm the men, but keep the arms in his house.

Barbaro informed the captains of the two galleys which were in the port of this arrangement, and instructed them to remain and watch developments. The gates of Famagusta, he says, were locked and well guarded.

On the morning of the 14th the Count of Tripoli called on him again, and told him that Peter Davila had arrived with his soldiers. Barbaro was not to wonder at this, because they had been summoned by the Governors to receive their pay, which was long in arrear. From Davila's own account of the incident it appears that Zaplana and the others had seduced the soldiers of Davila from their allegiance to their commander, and that they were going to Famagusta to ask for the pay which Zaplana promised to give them, and to demand that they should

[1] That the Constable was James Zaplana is proved by G. Bustron (p. 494, 17 Nov. 1473). M.L., *H.* III, p. 356, n. 1, wrongly supposes Carceran Suarez to have been still holding the office (see below, p. 687, n. 2, for the confusion with his son; Carceran is not heard of after 1458). Peter Davila is also out of the question; for although G. Bustron in his version of the will of James II calls him the Constable, that is an anticipation. Lusignan (*Hist.* f. 70; *Descr.* f. 81) says that the hereditary office of Constable was given to Davila by James II or, as some say, by Catherine. The appointment of Davila is rightly attributed to Catherine by Attar (M.L., *H.* III, p. 531) and Fl. Bustron (p. 449); Catherine herself, writing to Sir John de Ras on 3 Jan. 1474, says that she has made Peter Constable (G. Bustron, p. 506). A man under the rank of knight would not have been made Constable of Cyprus and Peter was knighted on 12 Oct. 1473 (G. Bustron, p. 486) or possibly as late as 12 Nov. (Fl. Bustron, p. 440). It is to be assumed that he was not created Constable until after the disappearance of Zaplana.

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be put under his command. Davila, who had been for nearly a month confined to his bed at Nicosia owing to a kick from a horse, rode, weak as he was, to rejoin his men, who gave him a warm welcome. Riding with them to Famagusta, he was met by a messenger with a letter from the Queen, ordering him to keep the people quiet; it was, he says, a forgery, designed to prevent him leaving the capital with his soldiers. Then came Louis Alberic with another letter ordering him, if he was on his way, to turn back, or fall out of the Queen's grace. Nevertheless Davila pressed on, and saw the Queen, whom he found deprived of all freedom and carefully guarded from speaking to any Venetian.[1]

The Count begged Barbaro, if he was reporting to Venice, to describe merely the 'inconvenience' which had resulted from the disorder, and not to exaggerate it; the Governors would also write and send an ambassador with a full account and explanation of the incident. Barbaro undertook to show the Count his report. He then saw the Bailie, Pasqualigo, and arranged that their reports should tell the same tale. Sending for the Count, he had his report, so far as written up to the moment, read to him, and the Count passed it as being 'as true as the Gospel according to St John'.[2]

This day (the 14th) the city gates were opened, and things appeared to be normal. In the evening, at the 24th hour, the two Neapolitan galleys arrived and anchored by the chain of the harbour.

[1] Davila's account, M.L., *Nouv. preuves*, *B.E.C.* 32, p. 347. He says he spoke to the Queen in the presence of the rebels, *dissimulando per 4 zorni poi la morte de messer Andrea predicto*, which I do not understand. Barbaro's account of Tripoli's visit: M.L., *H.* III, p. 359 (both Barbaro and Victor Soranzo have *d'Aquila* instead of *Davila*). Fl. Bustron (p. 440) says he had been knighted three days before (which cannot be true if he was sick at Nicosia) and that he had come with his soldiers to demand their pay, or else have leave to disband; and that when he learned from Louis Alberic what had happened, he refused to enter the town, lest he should be accused of complicity with the murderers. Davila's own version appears to me to be more likely to be correct. Those who regard him as a fraud may accept the view expressed by Magnante (ch. III, p. 126), that he came not to support the Venetians but to throw himself on the winning side; knowing this, the Governors mistrusted him; so they assured Barbaro that he had come only to get pay for his troops (see next note), and his visit was of no importance.

[2] According to Malipiero (II, p. 600), the conspirators assured the Bailie that Cornaro had been murdered by the soldiers for refusing them their pay, offered to remain loyal to the Queen, and begged him to report the truth about the affair to the Signory, to whom they would send an envoy. The Bailie, well knowing the truth, yielded to the situation and promised to do as they wished.

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Immediately after the murders, and after they had seen Barbaro and the Bailie, the Governors pressed the Queen to give her consent to the marriage between the children of Ferdinand and James II, promising that the girl should be dowered with castles and estates, and that the boy should have the title of Prince of Galilee, as heir to the crown. The Queen was unwilling, but the contract was nevertheless made, and reported to Naples.[1] The Governors also forced Catherine, much against her will, to sign a letter to Paul Contarini, her cousin-german, who was Captain of Kerynia, ordering him on sight of it to present himself to her, to receive instructions.[2] Now also, or soon afterwards, they took away the baby James from his mother, and gave him in charge to the late King's mother, Marietta of Patras.[3]

Next morning (the 15th) the Queen sent for both Barbaro and the Bailie and, in the presence of the Archbishop, the Count of Tripoli and Rizzo di Marino, said to the Bailie in a low and tearful voice that she had sent for him because the Governors wished to dismiss her cousin from the command of Kerynia, for some reason unknown to her. The Bailie, turning to the Governors, expressed his astonishment that they, devoted as they were to the Queen, should seek to act contrary to her wishes, and especially in this case to dismiss from her service a Venetian gentleman, her cousin and faithful servant. The Governors excused themselves, saying that they did it only to quiet their men, and that if Contarini would come the Queen would send him back as the best possible guardian of the fortress. To this somewhat transparent excuse the Bailie returned a reply which Barbaro, though he does not say what it was, describes as suitable. Whatever he may have said, he took the practical step of sending Nicolas Pesaro to take to Contarini provisions and munitions, and then to go on to inform the Captain-General of the Sea and the Venetian Senate of all that had happened.[4]

Soon after the Bailie had returned to his house, Philip Podocataro[5]

[1] Letter of Maletta, 23 Jan. 1474, in Ghinzoni, p. 14. Malipiero, II, p. 601. See above, p. 670, n. 4, for the necessary correction in his text.

[2] Barbaro says 'to do that which Your Excellency [i.e. the Doge] should consider best'. This attempt of the Governors to get Kerynia into their hands failed at this time, as we shall see.

[3] Maletta, as above.

[4] Barbaro, *Lettere*, p. 103.

[5] On whom see M.L., *H.* III, p. 361, n. 1. He had been the colleague of the Bishop of Lemesos in the embassy sent by James II to Italy in 1461 (above, p. 575); and he went to Venice in 1471, if Fl. Bustron is right, in connexion with the marriage of Catherine; but this is probably a mistake (see above, p. 634, n. 3).

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sent, in the name of the Governors, to ask him to be good enough to write to Paul Contarini to obey their summons. Barbaro leaves it to the Bailie to report to the Signory the reply which he gave, and which was doubtless also 'suitable'.

In the evening, at the 22nd hour, Barbaro and the Bailie were summoned to the palace to the reception of the Neapolitan envoy, who made the proposals to which we have already referred (p. 670). Presenting his credentials, Belprato condoled with the Queen on the death of her husband, congratulated her on the birth of her son and on the new alliance of betrothal between the son of the King of Naples and the Princess Charla, and offered all assistance towards the defence of the Kingdom against infidels and others, the more so because Catherine was the daughter of the Signory, with whom King Ferdinand was in close alliance. He would supply twenty armed galleys and three hundred foot-soldiers at his own expense whenever required for the defence of the Kingdom. Alonzo, it was agreed, was to have the title of Prince of Galilee, usually borne by the heir of the crown. Belprato also offered a natural daughter of Ferdinand as a bride for the infant James III.[1] The Archbishop replied on behalf of the Queen, deferring a full answer by the Governors until the morrow.

To justify themselves, the Governors as soon as possible despatched their envoy, Sir Philip Podocataro, to Venice. They had made him Vice-Chancellor, and given him two estates and the house of the murdered Master Gentile, and provided him with 300 ducats. He left in a Venetian ship, accompanied by some of King Ferdinand's people, on 17 November.[2] He took with him a letter from the Queen, forged or dictated by the Governors,[3] in which she said that her uncle had been murdered by the soldiers for refusing them their pay, that she and her son were not under duress, and that the Cypriotes were loyal and well-disposed. But the Senate had had its report from another source, and the envoy was ill-received; the galley was ordered back to Cyprus at

[1] Barbaro, *Lettere*, p. 101. The Count of Tripoli afterwards told Victor Soranzo (M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 437) that Charla's dowry was to be no more than 12,000 ducats in property and estates, and the bridegroom, when he came to Cyprus, was to be accompanied by a suite of only ten or a dozen, and was to do homage to the Queen. Maletta (to the Duke of Milan, 23 Jan. 1474: Ghinzoni, p. 14) says that the amount of 12,000 ducats had been agreed with the late King. See Addenda, p. 1159.

[2] G. Bustron, pp. 495, 521; Fl. Bustron, p. 451.

[3] Cp. Navagero, col. 1139; Malipiero, p. 601; Sabellico, f. 262; P. Giustinian (1576), p. 222. The last two say the letter was addressed to Mocenigo.

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once, and Podocataro was given six hours[1] to remove himself from Venetian territory. On his return to Cyprus, which he reached on 18 February 1474, he was deprived of the estates that had been given him. But the Signory restored them later, when it realized that he was not to blame, and took him into favour again.

The Catalan party made strenuous efforts to get the fortresses, especially Kerynia, into their hands.[2] Kerynia was held, as we have seen, by the Queen's devoted cousin, Paul Contarini, whom she had appointed to the post on 20 or 23 August 1473.[3] We have already seen the first move in the contest (p. 676). Louis Alberic went to Kerynia, armed with the summons. But, as Alberic at once reported on 15 November, Contarini refused to hand over so important a fortress to a foreigner who, as he said, had in Cyprus neither wife nor child nor any estate.[4] If however the Queen would send Nicolas Morabit, the Viscount of Nicosia, Contarini would surrender it to him. The Queen thereupon wrote (presumably still under pressure from the Governors) ordering Contarini to surrender the castle to Nicolas Morabit, whom she at the same time instructed to appoint a deputy in his own place and go and take over Kerynia. When he arrived there (he was accompanied by Alberic, who entered the town with him), Contarini readily agreed to hand over the castle if he might be assured of his personal safety. This assurance was given, the gates were opened, and Morabit was welcomed by all the garrison. But it was at the same time made clear to Alberic that the castle was being surrendered not to him but to Morabit. A dispute arose, and Morabit wrote to the Queen for further instructions, while Alberic communicated with his uncle Zaplana. His letter brought Zaplana to Kerynia, raging against Morabit for not surrendering the castle to his nephew. Morabit justified himself by the Queen's order, that the castle was to be held by him and no one else, and Zaplana retired to Nicosia, leaving Alberic to await the Queen's reply from Famagusta. It came next day, the 18th, and in accordance with its instructions Morabit admitted Alberic and himself returned to the

[1] So Fl. Bustron. Three, according to G. Bustron.

[2] G. Bustron, pp. 493, 497–9; Fl. Bustron, pp. 440–1, 443–4. The Senate to Angelo de Adria, Romanin, IV, p. 361, n. 3: they forced the Queen to write letters to the Castellans to yield up the fortresses.

[3] G. Bustron, pp. 482–3.

[4] Barbaro, however, says his reason for refusal was that the order did not bear the tokens of authenticity which had been arranged with his uncle Andrew Cornaro.

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capital.[1] On the 23rd he was called to Famagusta; the Queen received him with every mark of favour, and on 1 December once more ordered him to take command of Kerynia. She also created him Viscount of Nicosia for life, with power to appoint a deputy, and he did homage to the infant King. Rizzo di Marino, this time by the order, or at any rate with the sanction, of the Queen, accompanied him on his departure. They visited the capital on the way, and assured the citizens that they might expect to see the Queen soon. On their arrival at Kerynia, Alberic was at first unwilling to admit Morabit, but was obliged to obey the Queen's behest.[2] He slipped out and departed, without seeing Morabit, to Nicosia, and Rizzo followed soon afterwards. So ended, shortly after 9 December 1473, the efforts of the Catalans to secure the fortress.[3] The tide had now turned against them.

About 19 or 20 November a Venetian galley commanded by Coriolano Cippico arrived. From him the Queen learned that it was held at Venice to be certain that the Sultan had promised Cyprus to Charlotte; but the Proveditor, Victor Soranzo, was on his way with eight galleys for the defence of the Kingdom; if necessary, the Captain-General would come with the whole Venetian fleet.[4] The news was received with great joy by the Queen, who sent to Nicosia to have the city illuminated and the bells rung, and with confusion by those who cherished designs against her. On 24 November[5] Victor Soranzo

[1] G. Bustron says that Morabit went on the 19th to Famagusta. If so, he must have returned immediately, for on 23 Nov., when the Queen summoned him, he was again in the capital.

[2] In his despatch of 9 Dec. (*Doc. Nouv.* p. 430) Soranzo says that Alberic (who is at Kerynia) has been told of the Queen's intention that he should surrender the castle to 'Colletta', and he has refused; Colletta has gone thither, and Rizzo with him; we shall see whether Alberic will obey. It is clear that 'Colletta' is Nicolas Morabit. G. Bustron (p. 494) has another name for Morabit, 'Konellas'. I suppose both are derived from Nicolas.

[3] Contarini was reinstated at Kerynia by the Queen, and took charge on 28 Jan. 1474 (G. Bustron, p. 512; the Queen's commission 21 Jan.–10 Feb., M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 441); but he was not to hold office for long.

[4] Cp. Malipiero, p. 601; Sabellico, f. 262; P. Giustinian (1576), p. 222; Cippico, p. 77.

[5] Writing on 17 Dec. Soranzo himself says (*Doc. Nouv.* p. 441): 'it is now 22 days since I arrived here', which would point to 24 Nov. at earliest (not counting the days of arrival and writing). G. Bustron makes him arrive on 23 Nov. He does not mention Cippico, of whose coming four days earlier we are told by Fl. Bustron (p. 442). Sabellico and P. Giustinian (1576, p. 222) also make Soranzo arrive four days after Cippico.

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arrived at Famagusta with ten galleys.[1] On learning what had happened he allowed no one to land, and did not enter the harbour, but lay outside at St Catherine's.[2] A galley was immediately despatched to Venice for orders. The Archbishop went out to the Proveditor's galley and had a long conversation with him, the gist of which was that Soranzo demanded possession of Famagusta or Kerynia,[3] and that the Archbishop said he must first consult his colleagues, who by the late King's will were left in charge of the Kingdom. The Governors were inclined to yield. But next day an attempt was made by Antony de Lorsas,[4] whom we have met with before as envoy to Egypt, to get possession of the castle of Famagusta. Through a Portuguese servant[5] he offered Ferrandetto, who had refused admission to Andrew Cornaro, a bribe of 2000 ducats, on behalf of the Signory of Venice, if he would hand over the castle. Ferrandetto held him in play, and next morning reported the offer to the Governors. The servant was arrested and imprisoned, and his master took refuge in a Venetian galley.

The letters of Victor Soranzo and George Contarini bear witness to the state of tension which prevailed in Famagusta. The Governors had seized the Queen's treasure-chest and jewels, and her seal-ring.[6] They laid hands on the silver plate[7] which had belonged to James, and made

[1] So G. Bustron; Fl. Bustron says eight.

[2] According to Malipiero (p. 601) the Governors had forbidden the raising of the harbour chain, so that he could not enter. He lay outside, therefore, so that no one else could enter without his knowledge.

[3] Navagero (col. 1140) makes Soranzo tell the Governors that if they wished their story of the death of Cornaro to be believed, they must return to the Queen's obedience, give her back her son, restore what they had taken of the property left by her husband, and give her control of the fortresses. They replied that they would obey, but did none of these things. Malipiero says much the same in a later context (p. 687, n. 1); cp. also Sabellico, f. 262 b.

[4] G. Bustron, p. 497; Fl. Bustron, p. 443.

[5] The text of G. Bustron shows that in Fl. Bustron, p. 443, we must read *mandò un servitore dal* (not *del*) *castellan*.

[6] The Senate to Angelo de Adria: 'la cassa e le zoie, l'anelo del sigilo'. Romanin, IV, p. 361, n. 3.

[7] Some of which was broken up to strike money: *Doc. Nouv.* p. 433; Cippico, p. 77; Malipiero, p. 601. Davila says (M.L., *Nouv. preuves, B.E.C.* 32, p. 351) that this had first been done by Andrew Cornaro, who produced coins inscribed 'Catherina Veneta', that this displeased the Governors, and the Archbishop threw them away. Catherina Veneta', we may note, was her legal name, as the daughter of Venice, and a gros actually was issued reading on the obverse *Katerina Veneta Regian* [sic], on the reverse *Ierusalem Cipri et Armi(nie) Re(gina)*. It represents her seated, crowned and

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continued demands on her for money. They were in desperate need of cash to pay their followers, and would have it whether the Queen was willing or not. Thus Rizzo took 1000 ducats to pay his men, and he and the Count of Jaffa were suspected of having robbed her of 60,000 ducats.[1]




Fig. 9. Silver gros of Catherine Cornaro.

Soranzo also describes how the whole city was policed, by horse and foot, all day and all night, and how a ship in the harbour was broken up to provide material for strengthening the fortifications—mantelets, as Davila mentioning the same fact explains, for the battlements. Davila claims also that he was instrumental in releasing some galleys which were going to carry munitions to the Sophy of Persia, but were held up at Famagusta for three days. At the same time, in order to conform to the expressed desire of the Proveditor that 'the Queen should be Queen', and personally content with her situation and secure against any offence, the Archbishop made a show of going to her, asking her commands and consulting her desires. She was also made to show herself riding about the city, and appearing to give orders. On Sunday, 5 December, she was made to ride to mass at the Carmelite church, which was so far from the palace that her appearance was a sort of public demonstration. There were 136 horsemen and some fourteen or fifteen ladies in the procession. During the life of James II she had not been in the habit of going to mass in this way, either riding or afoot.[2]

holding sceptre and crucigerous orb (Fig. 9). It is not possible to say whether this is one of the coins rejected by the Governors, or was issued when she became a free agent. Other of her coins do not give her surname. Schlumberger, *Num. de l'Orient lat.* p. 204, Pl. VII, 26; Forrer, *Caterina Cornaro...e le sue monete*, in *Rassegna Numism.* (Orbetello, 1906), p. 6 of extract.—Davila adds that he himself requisitioned the silver in question, and paid the troops with coin from his own funds. The Queen had sent him a message that, under God, he was her only hope, and begged him not to spare anything in expenditure or otherwise, for if she ever regained her freedom she would remunerate him. The most he received from her for the pay of his troops was 200 ducats; the rest came out of his own pocket.

[1] Cp. Maletta's letter to Sforza, Ghinzoni, p. 21.

[2] This demonstration is described by Soranzo in his despatch of 9 Dec. Davila (M.L., *Nouv. preuves*, *B.E.C.* 32, p. 349) describes something very similar, for which

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The Queen's best friend among the Governors in this trying situation, unless we accept Davila's story in full, was the Count of Roucha. In his despatch of 9 December, Soranzo reports having received a secret message from him to the effect that he hoped that week to get the Queen away to Nicosia. All the people there dislike these seditious proceedings, and will be loyal to her; then he and Peter Davila,[1] who has command of the mounted troops, will be able to control affairs without regard to 'Catalans and ruffians'. In order to effect this, the Count had explained to Zaplana and the Count of Tripoli that, although the Proveditor was keeping very quiet, he might well propose to visit the Queen, and if he did so would come in state as the representative of the Signory. They could not refuse him access without exciting suspicion; and, once inside the city, how could he be resisted? He was doubtless expecting the Captain-General with all the fleet. Therefore, the Count

he takes credit to himself. He says it took place after the fortresses of Kerynia, Paphos and Lemesos had been got out of the power of the 'rebels', but at a time when Josafat Barbaro and the soldiers of Thomas of Imola had taken refuge in a galley because of the dangerous state of affairs. One Sunday Davila arranged for the Queen to be taken to mass in the chapel of the palace. The next Sunday, *against the wish of the rebels*, he decided to send her to mass at the Carmelite church. Barbaro and the Bailie came to court, and Davila presented the Queen to them, saying 'Take your daughter'. He then placed her between them, and raised the cry, which was echoed by many people, of 'Long live Queen Catherine!' and so the procession went to the church, and returned to the palace. And on the following Sunday she went in the same way to the Greek church, to win over the people to the Queen'. If these two accounts refer to the same thing, it is impossible to reconcile them, for if Barbaro and the Bailie were present, how could Soranzo describe the demonstration as a contrivance of the Governors for their own purposes? Possibly the accounts refer to two different occasions, on the second of which Davila took a leaf out of the book of the Governors. The other explanation, adopted by those who regard Davila as a fraud, is that there was only one such occasion, and Davila's account is false (Cessi, pp. 1241–2).

[1] Who, according to George Contarini (*Doc. Nouv.* p. 435), was very keen to go to Nicosia, to be in touch with his men and also enjoy the favour of Roucha. Davila himself, on the other hand (M.L., *Nouv. preuves*, *B.E.C.* 32, p. 348) says that the 'rebels' it was who planned to send the Queen and her son to Nicosia, in order that no Venetian might remain at Famagusta, or enter the port, so that the place, with all the rest of the Kingdom, might be in their power. Magnante suggests (ch. III, p. 130) that Davila planned to send the Queen to Nicosia in order to diminish Venetian influence in Famagusta; had she gone, the Venetians, to protect her, would have had to occupy a city jealous of its own liberty and the Queen's. Whatever the truth may be, and it seems impossible now to disentangle it, the discrepancy illustrates the prevalent conditions of intrigue and suspicion.

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suggested, the Queen should go to Nicosia, and if the Proveditor asked to see her he could be told that he must go to the capital; there were strict orders not to admit anyone else into Famagusta. Soranzo, reporting this subtle scheme, of which and of the whole policy of Roucha he highly approved,[1] thought that the Catalan party would agree, for fear lest Roucha and Davila should ask for his support. It was not however until long after the final discomfiture of the 'Catalans and ruffians' that the Queen went to Nicosia.[2]

The Count, it is seen, had to communicate secretly with the Proveditor, for the Catalan party did its best to prevent all such contacts. Thus when the Count of Tripoli, who seems throughout this crisis to have played fast and loose, opened the sea-gate (which as Captain of Famagusta he was able to do) and went out and had a long interview with the Proveditor,[3] Zaplana protested that he had no right to do so without consulting the others. This led to high words, and a challenge to mortal combat. On 14 December Zaplana went out of Famagusta with some forty-five horsemen, and the Count was about to follow. But before he could do so, the Archbishop, at the Queen's behest, forbade him, and going personally to find Zaplana ordered him back. The Queen admonished him, but not too severely, and he was very well satisfied with his reception.[4] He seems to have been confined to his house, but after two days obtained leave to go to Nicosia. The quarrel with the Count was made up, for before he left he went with Peter Davila and confirmed to Soranzo the assurances which the Count had given for the safety of the Queen.[5] He rode with twenty-five horsemen to

[1] The Queen however said later (in her letter of 14 April 1475, M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 461) that Victor Soranzo would not let her leave Famagusta, and blamed him for the death of her infant son.

[2] George Contarini (*Doc. Nouv.* p. 435) wrote on 15 Dec. that preparations were being made to send the Queen to Nicosia, but there was talk of leaving the baby at Famagusta.

[3] G. Bustron, p. 499; Fl. Bustron, p. 444; Soranzo's despatch of 17 Dec., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 439 f.

[4] Those who had left the city with him excused themselves on the ground that they had heard that the Count of Tripoli was combining with the Proveditor to 'kill anyone they came across'. On hearing this, Tripoli was furious, and swore that he would find out who spread such tales, resign his office into the Queen's hands (*tornar la bacheta alla Rezina*), and knife them thoroughly. The Archbishop, on the other hand, says Contarini, insisted on making peace, threatening that if these quarrels went on he would dismiss them all and put others in their places.

[5] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 440. This was on 17 Dec.

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Nicosia, but was not allowed by the people to enter the city; he was told to go back and fetch the Queen, and did actually return to Famagusta.

The Count of Tripoli's interview with the Proveditor, to which Zaplana took such exception, was not his first. Understanding that Soranzo was sending a galley to Venice, he made cautious enquiries whether one of the Governors would be admitted to an interview. Receiving a guarantee of safety, he came in bad, rainy weather, late at night, and, expressing all humility and reverence to the Venetian Signory, said that all his companions had sons and daughters, and were willing to send them as pledges for the security of the Queen; he himself was childless, but was willing to go himself as ambassador or hostage. These pledges were offered in order to dispel from the mind of the Signory any suspicion they might have, especially on account of the contract between King Ferdinand's bastard and Princess Charla. Again the Count came, this time accompanied by Louis Alberic and two others, who all repeated the above offer, giving assurances that they were most ready to do whatever it pleased the Signory to command. Finally, the Count returned to Soranzo alone, about the first hour of the night, and explained that he wished to say what he could not say in the presence of Louis Alberic, Zaplana's nephew. Did Soranzo know the commission on which John Mistachiel had been sent with the Bishop of Lemesos to Venice?[1] Since he did not, the Count explained that, in view of the possibility of the Queen and her son dying, they had decided to send this ambassador to enquire whether the Signory would approve of marrying a sister of the Queen to the natural son of the late King James.[2] The ambassador had full power to complete the contract of marriage if the Signory approved.[3] It was on the Count's return from this last interview that Zaplana quarrelled with him.

Meanwhile Rizzo di Marinõ, as we have seen, had left Kerynia. He went, like Alberic, to Nicosia, where he heard that the Venetians had

[1] Barbaro, *Lettere*, p. 91. The Count of Tripoli and Peter Davila had previously enquired of George Contarini whether the Queen would approve of their telling Soranzo about the proposed marriage (*Doc. Nouv.* p. 434).

[2] This would presumably be Eugene. He was only about five years old in 1473. See M.L., *Gén.* p. 50.

[3] This is confirmed by George Contarini (*loc. cit.*), who also gives the impression that the Queen approved of the match, though the Governors made her write what they pleased.

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landed a force with the object of arresting him.[1] Taking a guard of fifty men he rode to Famagusta. He was there, as doubtless he supposed, in safety, being with the Archbishop.

But Davila, if his own account is to be trusted,[2] was preparing to take strong measures, believing his own life to be in danger. He made preparations to attack the 'rebels' in the palace, and sent a message the day before to Soranzo that, when he heard the tumult, he should land his men and break into the city and come to Davila's aid. However, only one of the 'rebels' put in an appearance; the others for the first time absented themselves, and staying in their houses prepared to defend themselves; only Zaplana came unarmed, and said to Davila 'if you wish me to leave the Kingdom, I will go, but shall ask a safe-conduct from Victor Soranzo; but if you wish me to stay, I stay'. Davila replied that Zaplana knew very well what he had to do. He went away, and Davila, hoping the more easily to meet them all together in the palace, took no further action. It must have been after this that Zaplana went out of the city, and afterwards called the Archbishop and Rizzo to him to fly the country. On 31 December the Proveditor landed a force of 700 men, and Famagusta was no longer safe for the Catalans.[3]

The attempt of Zaplana to enter the capital had caused great excitement there.[4] A rumour was spread that Rizzo di Marino was hidden in the city, although, as we have seen, he had gone to Famagusta. The lead was taken by Stephen Kuduna, a man of the people.[5] The tocsin was sounded, and the people assembled and marched under the Queen's banner to the royal palace, where they found the Admiral Muzio

[1] G. Bustron (p. 499) says 'three armed men'; Fl. Bustron (p. 443) has the more probable figure of 300. Both say that they killed a servant of the Count of Tripoli.

[2] M.L., *Nouv. preuves*, *B.E.C.* 32, pp. 349–50. No one else mentions this incident, but that is no reason to doubt it, although Cessi does so (p. 1243, n. 3). It must have happened before 29 Dec., when Davila went to Nicosia.

[3] Magnante, *L' acquisto*, cap. III, p. 132.

[4] G. Bustron, pp. 500–3; Fl. Bustron, pp. 444–5. The account in Malipiero (p. 601) differs considerably from the local version, which is followed in the text. According to him, the Nicosiotes wrote to the Proveditor, begging him to protect the Queen, and let her come to the capital. He replied that they should persevere in their loyal attitude, but have patience for a few days. His reply was read to their messenger in the presence of the Queen and the Commissaries. The flight of the Commissaries followed.

[5] A stout supporter of the Queen, Stephen was afterwards rewarded with an annual pension of 1000 nomismata, 100 bushels of grain and 100 measures of wine. G. Bustron, p. 507; Fl. Bustron, p. 449. Later, the Venetians imprisoned him (p. 703).

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Costanzo. He was put under arrest, and made to write to the Queen, asking her to come to the capital. John de Ras[1] and Benedict Cartagena, who had come to Nicosia, were not allowed to enter until they had taken an oath to be faithful to the Queen, and, if necessary, to die for her with the people. On receiving the Admiral's letter, the Queen sent the Count of Tripoli and Peter Davila to Nicosia, where the people had placed themselves under the orders of John de Ras. Arriving on 29 December, they were not allowed to enter, but the Captain of Sigouri, Sir Philip Sinclitico, negotiated on their behalf with de Ras and the people. The one wish of the Nicosiotes was that the Queen should come to them. They were given an assurance that she was much pleased by their loyalty, and desired to know their wishes. The Count and Davila were then made to swear the same oath as had been taken by de Ras and

[1] Sir William and Sir John de Ras. In a minute of the Venetian Senate of 2 March 1479 (M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 494) it is stated that Queen Catherine had given Sir William de Ras a pension of 100 ducats, in exchange for the office of Viscount of Famagusta, which he had held and which she made him renounce in favour of one *Collela* (read *Colletta* or *Conella*). Here Famagusta is an error for Nicosia; for (1) on 10 Sept. 1473 William was deposed from the Viscounty of Nicosia and succeeded by Nicolas Morabit; (2) *Colletta* and *Konellas* are both names of Morabit (above, p. 679, n. 2). Sir William de Ras was with Queen Charlotte in Kerynia in 1460; so also was Sir John (G. Bustron, p. 448). When Sir William left Kerynia he got a safe-conduct from Rhodes in 1463 (M.L., *H.* III, p. 124), but later went over to James, and appears as a member of the Haute Cour in 1468 (*ibid.* p. 272). James gave him certain estates (*Doc. Nouv. loc. cit.*). He is mentioned as Viscount of Nicosia in 1469 (M.L., *H.* III, p. 275) and in July–Aug. 1473 (G. Bustron, pp. 477, 479). When the Queen deposed him on 10 Sept. she gave him the pension mentioned above. When the Queen's grants were revoked by the Counsellors and Proveditor in 1477 he lost this, but the Senate allowed his claim, 2 March 1479 (*Doc. Nouv.* as above).

John de Ras was William's son. He witnessed the capitulation of Famagusta in 1464 (Fl. Bustron, p. 415); was rewarded by James (*ibid.* p. 422); is mentioned in 1468 as a member of the Haute Cour (M.L., *H.* III, p. 245, etc.); witnessed the creation of the County of Karpass in 1472 (*Doc. Nouv.* p. 423). After the crisis of Nov. 1473 he was admitted by the people of Nicosia to the city on swearing fidelity to the Queen, and was acclaimed Captain; but Fl. Bustron (p. 452) must be wrong in calling him Viscount at the time of the anti-Frankish disturbances. On 23 Jan. 1474 the Queen ordered him to appoint (his father) Sir William in his place, and come to Famagusta (G. Bustron, p. 508); on 31 Jan. G. Bustron describes him as being 'in the place of the Queen' (p. 513). Eventually he fell under suspicion and was sent to Venice and imprisoned, but released, on condition that he did not leave the city, on 15 Feb. 1475 (M.L., *H.* III, p. 397). It was he who in 1477 put forward the claim of his father and obtained restitution (above).

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Cartagena, and were admitted to the city. De Ras was confirmed as Captain, and the Count and Davila returned to Famagusta.

Now came exciting news to the capital.[1] Zaplana, who was lying hid outside Famagusta, when he learned of the departure of the Count of Tripoli and Peter Davila, sent a message to the Archbishop and Rizzo to join him, and if possible to bring with them the Count of Roucha. The first two went, but Roucha was turned back by the officer in command of the city gate; fortunately, one may guess, for him, since his sympathies were with the Queen, and it was probable that Zaplana wished to make away with him. Next day, 1 January 1474, it was learned at the capital that the Archbishop, Rizzo, Zaplana and Louis Alberic had embarked and sailed in a galley captained by Matthew Corso and belonging to King Ferdinand.[2] They took with them jewels and money to the amount of some 60,000 ducats.

[1] The flight of the Catalans: G. Bustron, p. 503; Fl. Bustron, pp. 445–6. Malipiero's account (p. 601) again differs considerably from the local version. The Commissaries, alarmed by the movement in Nicosia and the Proveditor's reply, took to flight. Some went to 'Colcos', a place belonging to the Rhodian knights (presumably Kolossi); others went to justify themselves to the Proveditor, who told them that he would punish the guilty. After the Commissaries had left Famagusta, the people there rose and acclaimed the Queen, and the fugitives went to the seaside, and took ship to Naples. Cypriotes, fearing that the Queen might be kidnapped, went to the palace to guard her. To some of the conspirators who approached the Proveditor, pleading that the murder of Cornaro was due to his avarice, and that they were all ready to obey the Signory, he replied that the murder was a domestic affair, and that, if they wished to please the Signory, they must be loyal to the little King, and hand over the fortresses to the Queen. They promised to do so, but the Proveditor, seeing that they were merely putting him off with fair words, asked for instructions from Venice. Cp. Navagero, col. 1140 and Sabellico, f. 262b (above, p. 680, n. 3). The local account has been preferred to this somewhat confused version. Bosio (II, pp. 274–5) relates what happened to the fugitives at Rhodes.

[2] Alfonso, the natural son of Carceran Suarez, the Constable of Cyprus, came to Famagusta and told how he had been invited by Zaplana to fly with them, but had refused. G. Bustron, p. 504; Fl. Bustron, p. 446. M.L., *H.* III, p. 346, n. 1, has misread these passages as referring to Carceran himself, who was probably dead by this time. As to Louis Alberic, we know from Fl. Bustron that he fled with the others. G. Bustron omits him, but since he says (p. 505) that on 2 Jan. the Queen ordered his estate to be put under seal at the same time as those of the Archbishop and Zaplana, and his house was cleared of its contents next day (p. 506), and his estate seized later (22 Jan., p. 508), it is clear that he had gone. We hear of him, presumably in Italy, plotting against the Queen at the end of 1474 (M.L., *H.* III, p. 403). Yet on 23 Jan. 1474 G. Bustron (p. 509) mentions a Louis Alberic as being summoned to Famagusta by the Queen. Estates that had belonged to one 'Luise Almerico' or 'Lois Almerico Tognaciamo'

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Two Venetian galleys[1] were sent out in chase, and orders were given for the arrest of the servants of the fugitives. King Ferdinand's galley, however, made good its escape to Rhodes.[2] There the fugitives had to put in and land. The pursuing Venetians found their galley in the harbour, but did not venture to attack it, since the Grand Master Orsini showed himself ready to resist any such attempt. Peter Mocenigo arrived on 25 January, and demanded that the Grand Master should hand over the fugitives. It was replied that Rhodes owed no allegiance except to the Order and to the Pope, and they would not be given up. Besides, they had hidden themselves, and could not be found. Mocenigo accepted the situation, only insisting that they should not be harboured in Rhodes. Then he returned to pacify Cyprus.[3] The Grand Master had his suspicions that the Venetians actually had designs on Rhodes itself, and decided to find the refugees and expel them. On 14 February Zaplana, who had been discovered, was told that if he did not embark in a Genoese ship that had put in, he would be handed over to the Venetians if they asked for him. The Archbishop left with a letter from the Grand Master on 23 March. The others also made their way to the West, save one member of the party, on whom the Venetians laid hands: Tristan de Giblet. He was brought back in irons to Famagusta on 25 January.[4] According to his report, the intention of the fugitives was to go to the Sultan, but 'their wickedness and the weather'[5] drove them to Rhodes.

Nothing more was heard of Zaplana and his nephew Alberic, except that they continued to plot against the Queen with the Archbishop and

were given by the Queen to George Contarini on 24 Feb. 1474 (M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 445). It would seem that Zaplana's nephew had a namesake. Another of the fugitives was Tristan de Giblet (see below, n. 4).

[1] Six, according to Bosio.

[2] It was spoken on the way by a galley which reached Famagusta on 2 or 3 Jan. 1474. G. Bustron, p. 506.

[3] Bosio, II, pp. 274–5.

[4] G. Bustron (pp. 510–11) calls him Τζιαβιλότ, Τζανβιλιότ or Τζιβηλώτ. Comparison with *Zibeloto* in Malipiero (p. 609) indicates that the name is *Giblet*, and the man doubtless Tristan, who, as we have seen above (p. 673, n. 3) was one of the murderers of Cornaro and Bembo. But he was released or escaped, for he appears in Nicosia in or before 1485 (below, p. 739, n. 2), then in Venice and Naples (*ibid*), and was concerned with Rizzo in the plot of 1488, which brought him to a bad end. His capture at Rhodes is not mentioned by Bosio.

[5] τὸ κρίμαν τους καὶ ὁ καιρός.

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Rizzo.[1] The Archbishop wrote to the Queen, explaining that he had taken to flight only lest worse should come of the matter.[2] The letter from the Grand Master, which he took with him on leaving Rhodes, recommended him to all members and subjects of the Order.[3] We hear of him again in November 1475. In spite of his flight, he still drew the revenues of his see of Nicosia, and the Queen complained on various grounds of the Bishop of Lemesos, who acted as his agent in Cyprus, collecting his revenues and remitting them to Rome.[4]

As to Rizzo di Marino, the Senate offered a reward for his capture, as the chief mover in the conspiracy, 10,000 ducats if he were taken alive, 5000 for his corpse.[5] It was long before he was captured.

The news of the crisis took a full month to reach Venice, for it was not until 20 December that the Senate issued its first instructions[6] to the Captain-General of the Sea, Peter Mocenigo, and to the Proveditors of the fleet. Further instructions followed in rapid succession during the first half of January.[7] The Senate had no doubt that, knowing its desire that Cyprus should not fall into alien hands, Mocenigo and the Proveditors had, on hearing of the murders, at once proceeded thither in full force. Lacking information about the actual position, the Senate could only give the general instruction that they were to neglect no method of preserving the Queen in her government and securing the succession of her son, if he should live.[8] Should anything happen to either of them, the Kingdom should nevertheless not be allowed to pass to another

[1] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 402–3 (28 Dec. 1474). M.L., *ibid.* p. 165, n. 2, says that Zaplana was taken by the Venetians and imprisoned, but was released at the request of the King of Naples. But the decrees to which he refers concern not Zaplana but his family (*ibid.* p. 413). The Signory gave his wife (who belonged to the Calergi family) a pension of 300 ducats a year. Sanudo, *Diarii*, LVIII, 293.

[2] G. Bustron, p. 511.

[3] M.L., *H.* III, p. 165.

[4] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 454 (9 Nov. 1475). We return to this incident later (p. 724).

[5] Sanudo *ap.* M.L., *H.* III, p. 437.

[6] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 362–4. Mocenigo's despatches up to 13 Dec. 1413 were acknowledged by the Senate on 15 Jan. 1474 (M.L., *H.* III, p. 365). In the *Relatione* (Reinhard, II, Beyl. p. 30) 'a dì 12 Nov.' gives the date of the outbreak, not of the news reaching Venice, and should follow, not precede 'qualmente'.

[7] 5 Jan.: M.L., *H.* III, p. 364. 8 Jan.: Romanin, IV, p. 362. 10 Jan.: M.L., *H.* III, p. 365. 15 Jan.: *ibid.* pp. 365–6.

[8] In view of the ordinary risks of infant mortality in those days, this 'si vixerit' suggests that there was doubt, soon to be justified, of his survival. But the Senate actually feared that both mother and son were in danger of being murdered. See the Senate's letter to Mocenigo, 15 Jan. 1474, M.L., *H.* III, p. 366.

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Power, and, if it had so passed, must be recovered and brought back 'under our protection and to freedom'. No foreign troops were to be allowed to reach the island. Force was to be used, if necessary, to prevent the proposed marriage alliance with Naples. Venetian interests in Cyprus being in the eyes of the Senate the most important of all, they must be protected from injury, and could only be secured if all the castles and fortresses were placed in Venetian hands, to be munitioned and guarded by them. All this could be more easily achieved if the Governors were given to understand that the Senate was moved by no vindictive spirit, but was wholly inclined to treat them generously if they acted in good faith and in accordance with the demands of justice and the wishes of the Signory. It was to be made known that the Republic would not punish anyone for the recent happenings, and the excuse that Cornaro had been murdered solely because of his avarice was to be accepted. The Senate authorized the summoning from Crete[1] of troops and ships, and making use of the galleys employed in the usual voyages to Alexandria and Beirut. It was sending 20,000 ducats by the Beirut fleet, and 4000 ducats by Nicolas Pesaro,[2] and authorized purchasing of provisions in Syria if required.[3] Finally, the Senate emphasized once more that Famagusta, Kerynia and other strong places should be held by Venetian castellans and garrisons. If not possible by peaceable means, this was to be effected by force.

Diplomatic action was also at once taken at Naples. It has been observed that, interested as Ferdinand was in making trouble in Cyprus, he did not, when the Catalan plot actually came to a head, lend the rebels effectual support, beyond supplying them with funds. The reason was that he had been warned by the Count of Urbino that he should not let himself be involved in the affair, lest he should lend colour to the reports current that he was responsible for the murder of the Venetians,[4] and lest he should further irritate the Signory. As soon as the news of the outbreak reached Venice, the Senate (on 21 December 1473) instructed

[1] The arrival in Cyprus of troops from Italy and Crete is recorded by G. Bustron on 18 Feb. (p. 522) and 24 Feb. 1474 (p. 525).

[2] He (see above, p. 676) after reinforcing Kerynia had gone with despatches from Barbaro, and perhaps brought the first news of the murders to Venice.

[3] Not to hamper the measures which were being taken against the Turk, a special levy of two-tenths was imposed on Venetian territory.

[4] This accusation is found in an anonymous contemporary Venetian chronicle quoted by Cessi (*Un falso eroe*, p. 1243, n. 1). Belprato, Ferdinand's own envoy, told Maletta the same story (Ghinzoni, pp. 11–12).

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its envoy in Naples, John Emo, to inform Ferdinand that it knew well that the Archbishop was responsible, though it was reluctant to believe it, considering the friendly terms on which the Republic stood with the King. Ferdinand was to be warned that no one should be encouraged by him to persevere in his evil disposition. A lively correspondence ensued.[1] The King continued to protest that he knew nothing of the outbreak, which he much regretted, and to offer his help in restoring order; the Senate affected never to have suspected him, but if he wished really to help the Queen, he should prevent galleys sailing from Naples to Cyprus. To his complaint that Venice was spreading slanders about him, and his request that Catherine should be restored to her previous position as ruler of the island with the help of the Governors, the Senate replied (22 January 1474): it denied that it was spreading such false reports, stressed the gravity of the crimes of the Catalans, and expounded the spirit of the will of James II, which was that the Governors were to aid and obey the Queen, and not reduce her, as she had been reduced, to the position of a mere servant, deprived of her fortresses and of all royal authority, and left with only her clothes and ornaments. As to restoring the Governors, some of them were dead, and there was no provision in the will for the appointment of successors, or to the effect that their office was hereditary. The rebels would be treated mildly if they submitted, and their crimes attributed not to felony but to private enmity. An evasive reply was given to the proposal about the marriage of Ferdinand's son, which the Senate professed should be referred to the Queen. The correspondence continued, Ferdinand expressing his desire to maintain friendly relations with the Republic, and receiving polite assurance (5 February) that the Republic was equally anxious for their maintenance. With pleasing irony, when the flight of the rebels and the pacification of the island became known, the Signory officially congratulated Ferdinand on a solution as satisfactory to him as to itself. If, as Ferdinand feared, the relations between Venice and the Duke of Milan were more cordial than he liked, he was assured (26 March) that his anxiety was groundless; relations were normal, though the Duke may have been making more of them than usual.

On 21 December[2] the Senate resolved on raising 600 stradiotes from the Morea and the Ionian Islands for Cyprus, and recruiting mercenary

[1] Magnante, *L' acquisto*, cap. IV, pp. 1–6. Cessi, *Un falso eroe*, p. 1251. Cp. Romanin, IV, p. 362.

[2] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 352–3.

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foot-soldiers to the number of 2000 for despatch thither. The Captain-General and Proveditors were authorized to spend up to 5000 ducats in obtaining possession of the castles of Famagusta and Kerynia; if they could not be otherwise acquired, even up to 10,000 ducats might be spent on each, or annual pensions of from 500 to 1000 ducats offered to those who would betray them.[1] All the infantry and cavalry sent to Cyprus were placed under the command of the Proveditor James Marcello.[2] Further instructions to Mocenigo followed in January. He was to see to it that Peter Davila's devotion to the Queen was to be secured by the promise of a provision of 1000 ducats annually, over and above his salary.[3] The Senate had received letters from Naples, friendly in tone, but expressing the desire of the King to co-operate in the support of the Queen. The Senate informed Mocenigo[4] that it did not intend to share this task with any other Power, its own forces sufficing for the purpose. Therefore, if a Neapolitan galley or other ship should appear, Mocenigo was to hold it up and by no means let it put into port, since its doing so could only have ill results. Suspicion of Ferdinand's designs could not be more plainly expressed, and we are left in no doubt of what the Senate's view of the betrothal of Charla to Alonzo must have been.

By 15 January, the Senate had received letters from Mocenigo and the Proveditors dated as late as 13 December.[5] It approved the steps which he and the Proveditors had taken. It recognized the impossibility of harmony among the Governors, considering their diverse nationalities and personal interests. Though the rest might be hostile, Peter Davila and the Count of Roucha could not but side with the Queen and Venice, and they would be followed by the people of the whole island. It therefore instructed Mocenigo to win over Peter by gifts and promises, and desired him to do the same by Roucha, and had written to both of them letters of which it enclosed copies for his use, if convenient. It

[1] M.L., *H.* III, p. 353 (26 Dec. 1473).

[2] Decision by the Senate to commission him to organize the stradiotes for Cyprus, 21 Dec. 1473, Sathas, Μνημ. VII, p. 12. His commission, 2 Jan. 1474, cited by Romanin, IV, p. 363, n. 1. Cp. M.L., *H.* III, p. 353, n. 2 (6 Jan.).

[3] 5 Jan. 1474. M.L., *H.* III, p. 364. For the despatch of 8 Jan., see above, p. 689.

[4] 10 Jan. 1474. M.L., *H.* III, p. 365.

[5] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 365–6. G. Bustron (p. 514) reports the arrival of Mocenigo in Cyprus only on 3 Feb. 1474. The measures which the Senate approved, therefore, had been taken not by him directly, but by Soranzo.

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repeated the warning about King Ferdinand, and the instructions to prevent any agent of his from having access to the island.

The King of Naples was not the only Italian ruler who was turning covetous glances towards Cyprus. At this very time, Gaspar Fabregues, the brother of the Archbishop of Nicosia, dissatisfied by the unwillingness of Ferdinand to take effective action, even secretly, was promoting a plan for the seizure of the island by the Duke of Milan, Galeazzo Maria Sforza. Gaspar had remained behind at Naples when the Archbishop returned to Cyprus after the death of James II. On 20 January 1474[1] he drew up with Francis Maletta, Sforza's envoy to the court of Naples, a secret treaty for submission to the Duke. He either did not know, or pretended not to know, that his brother had fled from the island; for he says that as Governor of the Kingdom the Archbishop holds all the strong places and will give them up to the Duke. The terms he makes are that certain sums of money are to be paid to the Archbishop, he is to retain the position of Viceroy, and the Duke is to persuade the Pope to give him a cardinal's hat; while the sons of the Count of Jaffa (who, he twice asserts, was poisoned by the Venetians) are to be confirmed in the title and revenues of their father. This scheme (which was of course kept secret from the King of Naples), like all others counter to the Venetian policy, was nipped in the bud by the prompt action of the Senate and its officers on the spot. Sforza's policy, which was to make himself seem necessary to both Naples and Venice, while playing for his own hand and hindering both of them from securing possession of Cyprus, so as to leave the field clear for himself in his scheme for attaining the royal status which the acquisition of the island kingdom would confer, came to nought.[2] The Venetians were not blind to the fact that Sforza's aim was to provoke a quarrel—and he very nearly succeeded—between Ferdinand and Venice. The Signory trusted neither King nor Duke. When Sforza offered Venice four ships for four months, or a sum of 16,000 ducats (18 January 1474), the Signory pretended to accept; but at the same time the Duke's representative in Naples

[1] Ghinzoni, pp. 10–13 (1454 by a misprint for 1474); cp. Gaspar's letter to the Duke, 16 Feb. 1474 (*ibid.* p. 19). M.L., *Arch.* p. 300, n. 460. On Sforza's intrigues, besides Ghinzoni's article, see Magnante, *Documenti*, pp. 235–8, 247.

[2] On Sforza's ambition for the royal crown, see the letter from the Mantuan representative at Milan to Louis Gonzaga, 2 April 1474 (Magnante, *L' acquisto*, cap. IV, p. 7, n. 3): Sforza has asked the Emperor and, failing in that quarter, has offered the Pope 200,000 ducats, ostensibly for the Turkish war, but really for the royal title.

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informed him that the Signory would not accept his offer. Having refused help from Ferdinand, it could not let Ferdinand think it was taking it from the Duke. By judicious delays the Signory saw to it that the offer never took concrete shape.

There is evidence that for a time the Marchioness of Mantua, Barbara of Brandenburg, also dallied with the idea of marrying a son (probably Frederic, the future Marquess) to the widowed Catherine or to one of her sisters, with a view to staking out a claim on the crown of Cyprus. But this plan, which is but partly revealed by a letter to Barbara from the Mantuan envoy in Venice, was evidently not seriously pursued.[1]

In Famagusta the disappearance of the 'rebels' gave Peter Davila a free hand. He reports[2] that he at once invited Victor Soranzo to land and visit the Queen,[3] and drew in the chain so that he could enter the harbour. After the audience, he invited the Proveditor and all his captains, with the Venetian Bailie, to a banquet in his own house. The Counts of Roucha and Tripoli were also present. Davila formally announced that, holding as he did in his hands all the fortresses of the Kingdom, he invited the Haute Cour to consign them to the keeping of the person most nearly attached to the service of the Queen and her son.[4] Then turning to his guests he said: 'We offer this Kingdom to you as representing the most illustrious Signory of Venice, mother and protectress of the Queen and her son the King, with access to the fortresses and all parts of the island as free as to the Piazza of St Mark in Venice, as was the custom during the life and after the death of King James.'

Vigorous measures were taken, after the flight of the Archbishop and his associates, against their adherents, real or suspected, who had remained behind.[5] The Queen, it is to be observed, prevented a general

[1] Letter of Giov. de' Strigi, 27 Nov. 1473 (Magnante, *Documenti*, pp. 233–4). He says that the Sultan has recognized the newly born James III; that the barons are trying to take or have already taken him away from his mother; that the greatest secrecy must be observed, for if they knew she was going to marry they would kill her; and it might be necessary, for the plan to succeed, to kill half of them.

[2] M.L., *Nouv. preuves*, *B.E.C.* 32, pp. 350 f.

[3] Malipiero (p. 602) attributes the initiative here to the Queen, and puts the opening of the harbour after her departure to Nicosia. His chronology in respect of local happenings need not be taken very seriously.

[4] In the case of a regency, according to the Assizes, the fortresses were held by the barons, not by the regent.

[5] G. Bustron, pp. 505 ff.; Fl. Bustron, pp. 446 ff.; Malipiero, p. 601.

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attack by the loyal people of Nicosia, by sending a nephew of the Archbishop (who reached Nicosia on the same day as the news of the flight), with an order that the servants of the Archbishop, Zaplana, Alberic[1] and Rizzo should not be molested until the Queen should give her commands. Provision had already been made at the capital for its safety when it was first heard that the Archbishop and Rizzo had gone out of Famagusta to join Zaplana; now, leaving the Captain Sir John de Ras in charge, Peter Davila and the Count of Roucha returned to Famagusta and reported the goodwill of Sir John and the Nicosiotes towards the Queen. The Proveditor replied thanking them for their loyalty and sending a present of money. On 2 January by the Queen's orders the Archbishop's palace and the houses of Zaplana, Alberic and Rizzo were sealed up.

The Archbishop's secretary was arrested on the same day, and under torture or the threat of it produced papers and gave evidence implicating a number of others. Confiscation of property and expulsion from the island was the lot of those who were considered guilty of treason; thus some eighty Famagustan suspects were expelled, and on 8 January a ban was published expelling all Catalans, Sicilians and Neapolitans; those more directly concerned in the murders were hanged.[2] The undertaking by the Venetians, to regard the murders as a purely domestic affair, clearly did not tie the hands of the Queen's government.

On 3 February the Captain-General of the Sea, Peter Mocenigo, arrived, and visited the Queen, offering her every assistance.[3] Landing his troops he held a review of all arms before St Nicolas at Famagusta, in the presence of Catherine.[4] The Famagustans appear to have been

[1] The text of G. Bustron (p. 504) here calls him Τζουὰν 'Αλπερήκ. His name was Louis; that of Zaplana is given by G. Bustron sometimes as James, sometimes as John (e.g. p. 494). The text here omits Zaplana, who would obviously be covered by the Queen's orders. It is to be suggested therefore that the words Σαπλάνας καὶ τοῦ Λοῆς have fallen out between Τζουὰν and 'Αλπερήκ.

[2] Maletta to the Duke of Milan (Ghinzoni, pp. 23, 25, 26).

[3] Sanudo, *Vite*, col. 1198.

[4] Cippico, *de Petr. Moc. Imp. gestis* (1544), p. 82; Malipiero, p. 603; Sabellico, f. 263; P. Giustinian (1576), p. 223. According to the last two the Proveditor James Marcello brought letters from the Senate appointing Mocenigo Governor and Lieutenant of Cyprus. He is not so called in any document, and the office of Lieutenant dates from 1489. At the same time Cippico (p. 83) says that letters from the Doge to Mocenigo communicated a decree of the Senate *quo provincia Cypri ei demandebatur* (*sic*).

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astonished at his being able to do this in mid-winter. Under his direction the hunting down of the anti-Venetian faction continued vigorously, the examinations being conducted by a sort of tribunal consisting of himself, the Proveditor Victor Soranzo, George Contarini, Count of Jaffa, the Count of Roucha, the Constable Peter Davila and the Chancellor Thomas Ficard. Before Mocenigo sailed from Cyprus, the Queen acknowledged his services by presenting him with a gilt shield of the arms of Lusignan, and a red standard.[1]

It would be tedious to recount in detail the series of prosecutions,[2] but a few of the more important may be noted.

The attitude of John Tafur, Count of Tripoli, during the crisis had been equivocal. On 19 January the Queen removed him from his office of Captain of Famagusta, putting in his place Gonsalvo Perez.[3] A month later, on 18 February, Tripoli was arrested: his complicity in the murder of Cornaro had been proved by the evidence of the Castellan, Ferrandetto di San Luca, who deposed that it was the Count and Rizzo di Marino who on the fatal night had given him orders not to admit anyone to the castle.[4] The Count, on the strength of this evidence, was sent to Venice, but a friend, whose ship intercepted the one in which he was being conveyed, rescued him, and he reached Naples on 28 March 1474.[5] At the end of the year he is mentioned, with the Archbishop of Nicosia, Zaplana, Rizzo and Louis Alberic, as continually engaged in plotting

[1] Malipiero, *loc. cit.*; Navagero, col. 1140; P. Giustinian (1576), p. 223. According to Sabellico, f. 263, she also granted him a rich fief.

[2] Navagero, *ibid.*; P. Giustinian, *ibid.*; Fl. Bustron, p. 447 (cp. G. Bustron, p. 516). These last two authors may be read for accounts of measures taken against the accused. As Lusignan says (*Chor.* f. 74) the Venetians punished many nobles and citizens, put some in prison, to avenge the murder of Cornaro and Bembo, others in the galleys, others in fetters, and sent them to Venice, whence some in course of time were returned, while others were rooted out altogether; and here was the final ruin of the nobles of Cyprus, which began with the first year of King James the Bastard, and lasted down to the writer's time. The chroniclers may be supplemented by extracts from the Venetian records, such as those printed by M.L., *H.* III, pp. 395, 398 about Nicolas the Turk, who was sent to Venice by the Proveditor Victor Soranzo, kept in prison for several months, ordered on 16 Nov. 1474 to be examined (if necessary tortured), and then to be returned to Cyprus to be dealt with by the Queen, but was retained in Venice until April 1476, when he escaped from prison. A large reward was offered for his capture.

[3] G. Bustron, p. 507; Fl. Bustron, p. 449.

[4] G. Bustron, pp. 512, 522–3.

[5] Maletta to the Duke of Milan, 31 March 1474. Ghinzoni, p. 26.

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against the Queen.[1] All that the Senate could do was to fetch his family and household away from Cyprus.[2]

Ferrandetto, the Castellan, was deposed from his office on 21 January. His evidence has already been mentioned; it is clear that he had only obeyed the orders of a superior officer, but he was banished from the island.[3]

An interesting prosecution was directed against Simon de Saint-André, Abbot of the Monastery of Holy Cross, Stavrovouni.[4] On 31 January he was arrested and imprisoned. The authorities had intercepted a letter which he had written to his brother at the Pope's court. It said, among other things: 'By the power of God the Bastard is dead, the tyrant who held the Kingdom with great tyranny, so that it was in bitter affliction; and the Queen has borne a son; and King Ferdinand is secretly aiming at the Kingdom, and so, on the other hand, is Charlotte. It is in a very evil pass. And now it is in the hands of the Venetians, and we have escaped from the grasp of the dog to fall into that of the lion.'[5] Letters in the hand of the Archbishop were also found at the monastery, which with its estates was put under seal. The Abbot was banished, but soon succeeded in gaining the ear of the Venetian Proveditor, Francis Giustinian, and returning to Cyprus. For the Queen found cause to complain to the Doge[6] that the false Abbot Br. Simon, whom she had ordered to be banished for his treachery, had a few days before she wrote ventured, by favour of the Proveditor, Francis Giustinian, to return, and had even had the audacity to go to the church of Holy Cross. She and her counsellors took this very ill, and had him expelled again. She called the Doge's particular attention to this and other similar cases of derogation from her authority, which meant that she was unable to prevent

[1] Order to the Venetian Captain-General, 28 Dec. 1474, M.L., *H.* III, p. 403.

[2] This was ordered by the Senate on 30 Oct. 1476 (M.L., *H.* III, p. 409) at the same time as for the households and families of Rizzo and Zaplana.

[3] G. Bustron, pp. 507, 512, 522–3.

[4] G. Bustron, pp. 514, 516, 524, 531; Fl. Bustron, p. 447; M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 455.

[5] ἀπὲ τὰ χεργία τοῦ σκύλλου, καὶ ἐπέσαμεν εἰς τὸ κουκοῦτιν, G. Bustron; *dalle man del cane...nelle onge del lione*, Fl. Bustron. The latter is more appropriate to Venice than κουκοῦτιν, whether that means 'pig' (see Dawkins on Machaeras, 713, 1) or 'puppy', as Dawkins now suggests.

[6] 9 Nov. 1475. M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 454–5. The Abbot was an agent of Charlotte, and it was through him that Venice approached her in September 1476, with a view to a settlement (above, Ch. x, p. 606).

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traitors, who gained the favour of some official, from forcing their way into the island.

Among the more extensive of the properties confiscated were those of James Zaplana.[1] A relative of this fugitive, Sir Nicolas Zaplana, held the Grand Commandery of Cyprus.[2] It was therefore natural that the officials who executed the orders of confiscation should go to Kolossi and other estates of the Commandery, and enquire whether any property of James Zaplana was deposited there. The lieutenant in charge at first denied that anything was concealed at Kolossi, but being put on his oath revealed a treasure of gold, silver, clothes and sugar-powder, amounting in value to 4000 ducats. Nicolas Zaplana was deprived of his Commandery and the Grand Master was asked to appoint a successor. It was an opportunity that was not to be missed for increasing the control of Venice over the most important estate in the island, the more so as it belonged to the Order which had done so much to thwart the policy of the Republic by supporting the cause of Queen Charlotte. The appointment to the Grand Commandery of Mark Crispo, the Queen's uncle, made by the Order whether of its own motion or at the suggestion of Venice, was the first step in the process which ended in the permanent attachment of the Grand Commandery to the Cornaro family.[3]

It was but to be expected that when the Archbishop and his friends fled the country, the populace should attempt to loot their houses and estates. The Queen, as we have seen, issued orders to prevent this, as she did again when the Count of Tripoli was deported.[4] The authorities

[1] G. Bustron, pp. 508 (22 Jan.), 531 (24 March 1474).

[2] Appointed 26 Nov. 1471. M.L., *H.* III, p. 93.

[3] According to Bosio (II, pp. 277, 280) the appointment of Mark Crispo was made by the Order because it saw that thereby it would have the favour of the Queen, without which it had no prospect of enjoying the full profit of its estates in Cyprus. On 13 July 1474 the procurators of the treasury of the Order reported that the Grand Commandery was in the hands of laymen not connected with the Order, which had no profits from it, and the Commander Charles de Nores who administered it was unable to pay his responsions. The Council therefore appointed Mark Crispo, Commander of Verona, with the object mentioned above. On 9 March 1475 Charles de Nores was sent by the Grand Commander to Queen Catherine to ask for the repayment of a large debt to the Order which had been incurred by James II, and to hand over the *bulla* appointing Mark Crispo; the chief condition of his appointment being that he should pay the responsions on the old scale. Jauna (p. 1043) has a garbled version of these proceedings under the date 1479.

[4] G. Bustron, p. 524.

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seized the contents of the houses of Zaplana and Alberic.[1] Nevertheless, before the orders arrived, the servants of others of the fugitives had thoroughly pillaged their houses; what they could not take themselves, however, they gave up to Sir William de Ras,[2] the deputy Viscount of Nicosia. What could be collected was ordered to be sold, and the proceeds to be shared among the citizens of the capital. Some embezzlement which took place became known, and nearly caused a riot, but the offenders were duly punished.[3]

Among those, however, who suffered at the hands of the Venetians, it is disconcerting to have to count two or three in whom the Queen had hitherto placed her confidence, the Count of Roucha, Peter Davila, and Sir John de Ras. On 26 May 1474 ships came from Venice with secret despatches, and two hundred men for the garrison. Among the despatches was one from the Council of Ten to the Proveditor, ordering that Davila and many other knights, as John de Ras and John Attar,[4] as well as Stephen Kuduna, should be banished from the island and sent to Venice.[5] The resolution of the Council of Ten, on 30 March 1474, recalled that, in order to divide the ranks of the 'ribaldi', Davila and Roucha should be promised rewards for loyalty to Venice; but nevertheless, owing to Davila's ambition and his insatiable and sinister aspirations towards the 'occupation of the Kingdom', the danger from him was no less than it had been from the Archbishop and his fellows. Therefore he was to be sent to Venice, treated with all due respect but well guarded, so that he should not escape like the Count of Tripoli, who remained at Ragusa. It was at first resolved to deal in the same way with Roucha, but this decision was for the time suspended. The Council

[1] G. Bustron, p. 506 (3 Jan.).

[2] He had been appointed, on 23 Jan. 1474, deputy for his son the Viscount Sir John de Ras, when the Queen summoned John to Famagusta. Above, p. 686, n. 1.

[3] G. Bustron, p. 527.

[4] Fr. Attar (*c.* 1540, M.L., *H.* III, p. 527) has a passage about John Attar. He was a Cypriote knight, Captain of Paphos under James II and Catherine, and after the expulsion of the Catalan party was the first to rally to the obedience of the Signory, and came and offered the keys of the castle to the Proveditor. When those Cypriotes who had been sent to Venice, but were found to be loyal, were allowed to return, he alone, being then 45 years old, remained in the military service of Venice and died there. Attar wrongly, however, supposes that his relative had been sent to Venice in 1489.

[5] G. Bustron, p. 540; Fl. Bustron, p. 453. These do not mention John de Ras and Kuduna, for whom see below; and they wrongly include in this order Marietta of Patras and James's two natural sons.

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however was firm about Davila, who was accused of being privy to the previous seditious movement, and likely to be a danger to the state in the future.[1] Some months later, however, action was taken against the Count of Roucha. He had been placed by the Queen in the highest possible station, having been made Viceroy at the same time as Peter Davila became Constable of Cyprus.[2] The Venetian chronicler[3] reports that, soon after the death of the young King, the Cypriote peasants showed signs of rising in revolt, and that by their favour the Count 'was as it were king'.[4] The Queen for this reason twice summoned him to her presence, but he made difficulty about obeying. A third summons, accompanied by a threat of arrest, brought him to Famagusta, and he and some of his followers were arrested on the charge of sedition, and sent to Venice.[5] It was not until 1487, when it became known that Don Alonzo of Naples, who had been waiting at Cairo for a chance to

[1] Cessi, *Un falso eroe*, p. 1244.

[2] The Count was at the same time granted the fiefs of Marathasa and 'Alexandra' and Letimbou and Diorimi; while Davila received estates which had belonged to Rizzo, Yenagra and Stremmata, two farms at Pelendria, Rizzo's house at Famagusta, Zaplana's house at Nicosia (which had once belonged to the Count of Tripoli) and the Armenian vineyard at A. Dometios. Letter of the Queen to Sir John de Ras, 3 Jan. 1474, in G. Bustron, pp. 505–6; cp. Fl. Bustron, p. 449. For Marathasa, presumably Marathase du Comte, see M.L., *H.* III, p. 505, n. 3. The Count had already received Alessandretta from James (M.L., *H.* III, p. 261; cp. Fl. Bustron, p. 422). 'Alexandra' is perhaps the same place; if so, it was between Lefka and Chrysochou (cp. M.L., *H.* III, p. 224, n. 2 and p. 507). Letimbou was in the Paphos district; Yenagra near Lefkoniko; Stremmata in the Lakatamia bailliage in the district of Orini, south-west of Nicosia (*ibid.* p. 510). The Pelendria mentioned here may be the one in the same neighbourhood; a better known village of that name in the Troödos district has an interesting 14th-century church (Gunnis, p. 372). A. Dometios (wrongly called San Demetri by Fl. Bustron here) is just outside Nicosia, on the west. I have not identified Diorimi.

[3] Malipiero, II, p. 604; M.L., *H.* III, p. 396, n. 2.

[4] That he had great influence over the people, who would follow his lead, we know from what he said to Peter Davila (above, p. 667).

[5] On the authority of the Bustrons, it would seem that the Count was sent to Venice at the same time as Davila, when the order arrived on 26 May 1474. But in the instructions to the Counsellors of 4 June (M.L. *H.* III, p. 377) they are told to show the Count, of all people, not only courtesy and favour, but even honour. And Malipiero says the trouble arose after the death of the young King. Finally, if, as appears from Romanin (IV, p. 433), his deportation to Venice and the despatch of reinforcements to Cyprus are connected with each other in a document of 8 Jan. 1476, his defection must have taken place in 1475.

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seize Cyprus, had given up his hopes and returned to Italy, that Roucha and his followers were allowed by the Council of Ten to go back to the island.[1]

Peter Davila appealed, some years later, for permission to retire to his country of origin, Spain.[2] He had been treated with much apparent consideration;[3] but the Council of Ten had given him to understand that it would prefer him not to return to the island. He complains that he suffers from a continual flux of blood, caused he supposes by the coldness of the climate. And he asks that all the grants which had been

[1] Navagero, col. 1194. He died, aged 64, on 14 June 1501, and was given a magnificent funeral in St Sophia: G. Bustron, p. 543.

[2] M.L., *Nouv. preuves*, *B.E.C.* 32, pp. 342–53. According to Cessi (*Un falso eroe*, p. 1233) this *supplica* was presented to the Signory towards the end of 1479, and rejected outright by the Council of Ten, to whom it had been referred, on 3 Oct. 1480; the record has a marginal note (not noticed by Mas Latrie): 'non fuit audita quia non placuit consilio'. But according to Mas Latrie it is endorsed '1480 die VIII Octobris'. Cessi also quotes (p. 1245, n. 3) protests by Davila attached to his *supplica*, but unpublished. He had sacrificed his own funds for the Queen, who had been robbed of her treasure. His own property was ruined, the authorities having taken no care of it. But he and Roucha were accused of having taken the opportunity of the flight of the rebels to appropriate their property. Garcia Navarro, another exile, appealing on 15 March 1480, if he may not return to Cyprus, for leave to bring his wife to Venice, mentions Davila as having, like himself, risked his life for the Queen. M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 501–2. This Garcia Navarro (whom G. Bustron also calls Mastrantonio Garcia) was a companion of Davila. A tailor by trade, he was favoured by James II, who married him to a noble widow. The Queen knighted him and gave him the fruit-market of Nicosia and two farms at Kythrea, which she took from James the Maltese —favours, says Bustron, of which he was unworthy. Otherwise he is only known from his being involved in violent quarrels with other people (G. Bustron, pp. 507, 513, 528). In his appeal he says the only reason he can imagine for his being banished from Cyprus is that he was too faithful a servant.

[3] He himself says that the Doge, Nicolas Marcello, in the presence of the Great Council, said to him 'Peter Davila, our Signory has sent for you, to make your acquaintance, reward and honour you, and hear what is necessary about the affairs of Cyprus'. See also Magnante, *L' acquisto*, cap. V, p. 23, who quotes a report that he was suspected of aspiring to seize the island (as indeed the Council of Ten believed, above, p. 699). After the death of the infant King, he and his companion were called before the Ten, in October 1474, and he was told that he must remain in Venice, 'quia eum libenter vidimus et habemus carissimum confirmaturque in fide et devotione nostra'. He was offered an advance of 150 or 200 ducats a month during such time as he remained. (Cessi, p. 1245, n. 1). It is obvious that the Council, true to its character in suspecting everybody, had no real case against him. Otherwise it would not have scrupled to treat him more severely, or even put him out of the way.

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made to him by King James—they included a number of important fiefs[1]—may be confirmed to him and his heirs, and that his property in Cyprus may be treated as it was in the King's time. It is not known whether he was ever allowed to leave Venetian territory.[2] What there was against him, except that he was of Spanish origin, is not really known.[3] It was very easy, in those days of deep suspicions and high passions, for perhaps unfounded accusations to be flung about. Thus we read that John Attar had a quarrel with Peter Davila at the palace, and accused him of treachery. The disputants were parted but not appeased.[4] It is interesting to find that nearly a century later his family complained that the historian Peter Giustinian accused him of being in league with Rizzo di Marino, and the Council of Ten ordered the cancellation of the libellous page in all copies of the history in question. But some copies escaped this mutilation.[5]

No definite charge is recorded against Sir John de Ras, whom the Nicosiotes had chosen to be their captain at the time of the crisis, or against Stephen Kuduna, the man of the people, who had, so far as we know, been entirely loyal to the Queen.[6] But both of them were shipped

[1] Fl. Bustron, pp. 417–18.

[2] On 16 Nov. 1474 he had obtained leave for one John Parchus, who had voluntarily come to Venice with him, and who was ascertained to be a harmless person, to return (M.L., *H.* III, p. 396); and on 18 July 1475 he was allowed to send for his wife and children (Council of Ten, in M.L., *H.* III, p. 365 n.). This is contradicted by Cessi, who (p. 1245, n. 2) cites the same record to the effect that the Council refused the Queen's request for his repatriation and his own request to be allowed to send for his family. However, they actually came, for it is recorded that the ship which conveyed them miraculously escaped an attack by seven Turkish foists (*Nouv. preuves*, as above, p. 353). If Davila himself returned to Spain, his descendants were living in Venice a century later (see below).

[3] The sources do not tell us how he came into James's service; but he himself speaks of Spain as his fatherland (*Nouv. preuves, loc. cit.*).

[4] G. Bustron, p. 525 (26 Feb. 1474). For another typical quarrel arising out of a charge of treachery, see the scene described by G. Bustron, pp. 533–4; or that between Peter Davila and James the Maltese, p. 538.

[5] M.L., *H.* III, p. 365 n. The resolution of 19 Feb. 1561 is given by Cigogna, *Inscr. Ven.* IV, p. 192. The page is 304 in the edition of 1560. Cessi's opinion that the Council of Ten ordered the cancellation, not because the charge was untrue, but because of services to the Republic by Davila's descendants, is unsupported by any definite evidence.

[6] As M.L. remarks (*H.* III, p. 397, n. 1) Venice seems to have had nothing against de Ras except excess of zeal in doing his duty; and probably the same was true of Kuduna.

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off to Venice. John de Ras, with the Count of Roucha, was imprisoned on 4 December 1474,[1] and six Venetian citizens were made responsible for their custody, the costs of which fell on the prisoners. The Queen's Counsellors were ordered to take charge of their estates, and remit as much as was necessary. On 15 February 1475 they were released, on condition that they should not quit Venice without leave from the Council of Ten; but Stephen Kuduna was still confined in the lower prison, pending further decision.[2]

Punishments were partly balanced by rewards to others who had been faithful to the Queen. Some of these have already been mentioned. George Contarini, whose sympathetic letter about the Queen's troubles we have already had occasion to quote, was created Count of Jaffa and Ascalon, and given valuable fiefs, including Vavatzinia, Dali, A. Sergios near Famagusta, Platanistasa and Kalopsida.[3] This barony had been held by John Perez Fabregues, who, as a member of the Catalan party, would have been deprived of it had he not died first.[4] His heirs suffered for his misdeeds. The grant was made on 27 January 1474,[5] but the deed was not drawn until 10 February, when it was passed by the Haute Cour (represented by the Count of Roucha and Peter Davila) and sealed with the great seal.[6]

In compensation for the loss of the county and these estates, the heirs of John Perez Fabregues were allowed to have ten measures of land at Aglangia.[7] The process adopted was for these fiefs to be taken over by the royal domain, in exchange for the land at Aglangia, held for two or

[1] M.L., *H.* III, p. 396.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 397.

[3] See M.L., 'Les comtes de Jaffa et d'Ascalon du XII^e au XIX^e siècle' in *Arch. Veneto*, XVIII (1879), pt. 2, pp. 401–3, and *Revue des questions historiques* (1879), p. 199. The fiefs are all well known, except Vavatzinia, which was at the foot of Mt Machaeras between Pano Lefkara and Mathiati; see also M.L., *H.* III, p. 259, n. 2. They are not mentioned in the first document, but appear in the second, of 24 February.

[4] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 449, n. 2, assumes that the Queen deprived him of it. But he died in Aug. 1473, long before she could have been in a position to do so.

[5] G. Bustron, p. 512. Fl. Bustron gives no date. Josafat Barbaro on 1 Feb. reports that the Queen has conferred certain dignities on Contarini (*Lettere*, p. 120).

[6] The original was in French, but is not now to be found in the archives of the family. M.L., *H.* III, pp. 366–9, prints it from an Italian translation made for a *vidimus* of the Doge, Peter Lando, of 20 July 1542. In a very mutilated and abbreviated form in Reinhard, I, Beyl. 80, p. 116.

[7] Louis, the son of John Perez, did homage to the Queen on entering into possession of his estates on 12 Jan. 1483. M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 424.

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three days, and then conferred with the barony on Contarini and his heirs, on the sole condition of paying liege homage. A supplementary deed followed on 24 February 1474,[1] going in detail into the donations, the conditions on which they were held, relations with the *francomati* and rights over the *parici* affected. Besides estates which had belonged to John Perez Fabregues, others were added which had been held by Louis Alberic and James Zaplana. Unfortunately for Contarini, the Proveditor-General at first declined to approve these generous donations, and the Queen had to write to the Doge, Nicolas Marcello, begging him to confirm them.[2] She speaks with warm affection of her cousin, who, after her uncle Andrew had been removed by the traitors, remained her 'only relative, uncle, counsel, hope and refuge in adversity', whom she must love the more and treat as her own son, and be as zealous for his honour, dignity and interests as for her own. That is why she has conferred on him the barony left vacant because of the treachery of John Perez; and the more willingly because others were pressing on her their own claims for it. In view of the opposition of the Proveditor, Contarini has been anxious to renounce the dignity, but, trusting in the benevolence of the Doge, she has refused to accept his offer.

The Queen's appeal, for the time at least, was without effect, for the county of Jaffa was included in the scope of the orders by which the Queen's Counsellors were compelled to annul all the donations made by Catherine since the death of her husband.[3] However, the Senate relented, and in 1476[4] Contarini was reinstated, though no longer on such favourable terms. The concession was made in response to his energetic and frequent protests, to present which he went in person to Venice. As he pointed out, if the county and its revenues had been held by Catalans and Spaniards, it was not improper that the Queen's own cousin, whom she had rewarded for his immense services to her, should enjoy them. The Senate saw the force of this argument, and restored Contarini to his county, but on condition that, receiving a revenue of

[1] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 443–8.

[2] 20 March 1474. M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 448–50.

[3] 4 June 1474 and 29 July 1474: M.L., *H.* III, p. 378, § 16 and p. 388, § 5. See below, p. 708 n., and p. 709, n. 1). The widowed Countess of Jaffa was then sought in marriage by Catherine's brother Luke, but this proposal came to nothing (below, p. 722, n. 2).

[4] 30 May 1476. M.L., *H.* III, p. 407.

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1000 ducats therefrom, he should furnish a troop of ten horse with their attendants, armed and equipped, or more in proportion if the revenues exceeded that sum.[1]

In order to make sure that the fortresses should be in the hands of officers whose loyalty to Venice was beyond suspicion, a number of changes were made in the commands. Nicolas Galimberto, who had taken the place of Ferrandetto di San Luca as Castellan of Famagusta on 21 January 1474, was now superseded by a Venetian.[2] Paul Contarini, as we have seen (p. 679, n. 3), had been reinstated at Kerynia by Catherine in January, but Mocenigo removed him, with the approval of the Senate, which somewhat harshly censured him for having consented, on the receipt of a mere letter, to yield up his command.[3] Ten Italians took the place of Cypriotes in the garrison of the castle.[4] Other officers were removed from the commands at Paphos and Chrysochou; the Cypriote guard at the gates of the palace in Famagusta gave place to Italians, and at the gates of the city to Cretans; Nicolas Benedetto superseded a Frenchman at the Arsenal.[5]

[1] George Contarini also held the post of Captain of Famagusta. Letters to him from Nicosia from the Counsellors Antony Bicio and Ambrose Contarini, about the provisioning, etc. of galleys, 4 Oct., 6 Oct. and 2 Nov. 1478: M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 499–501. In Dec. 1482 he obtained leave from the Queen and the Counsellors Bernard Tiepolo and Christopher Venier to go to Venice on his private affairs; they gave him warm letters of commendation to the Doge, John Mocenigo, 1 Dec. 1482 (M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 515–17). It is noted that before leaving he has provided that his men and horses should be ready for the service which he owes his sovereign. In 1484 he was still at Venice, having married his cousin Isabel, daughter of Nicolas Contarini. Writing to congratulate him on 1 Nov., Catherine insists that he should return to Cyprus without further delay, since she has great need of his help in the government; otherwise he will forfeit the high place which he holds in her favour. *Ibid.* pp. 517–18. For Victor Soranzo's high opinion of Contarini, see above, p. 669, n. 1.

[2] G. Bustron, pp. 507, 528. He dates Galimberto's removal on 6 March. But the Senate had already heard of it by 28 March (M.L., *H.* III, p. 371), although the latest letter it had received from Cyprus was of 15 Feb.

[3] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 371–2. We have seen (p. 678) that he did so only on receiving a second letter from the Queen. The Senate continued to harp on the subject of his weakness; cp. the instructions to the Counsellors, 4 June 1474, M.L., *H.* III, p. 376.

[4] G. Bustron, p. 528.

[5] G. Bustron, p. 529 (13 March); Fl. Bustron, p. 449. The Queen's guard consisted of 35 men, a *societas ad stratiotam*, i.e. mounted, and armed with shield, lance and sword, like the stradiotes, commanded by Matthew Rossi. This body was abolished in 1489. M.L., *H.* III, pp. 464–5, § 36.

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Friction between the incongruous nationalities caused the authorities a great deal of trouble.[1] An incident of the year 1474 may be described.[2] It was rumoured at Nicosia that 'all the Franks were preparing to make a great tumult'. A prominent knight, known as Sir John the Moor,[3] was sent with letters to the Queen at Famagusta, with a small escort. On 6 May it was reported in the capital that the party had been killed at Sigouri. The Nicosiotes rose in arms, and demanded the blood of the Franks, and their possessions. The Viscount, Sir Peter Bembo and other knights were unable to control the mob, who sacked the houses of the Franks, taking their horses and their arms. The Viscount and Sir Peter could only report the affair to the Queen, who ordered an enquiry. On the 16th the Franks who had attacked Sir John (though it was untrue that they had killed him) were arrested and banished.

While serious trouble threatened, the Captain-General had kept the Levant fleet on the spot. When he thought that quiet had been more or less restored, he dismissed it to other waters. Troops were sent back to Italy; but the Cretan archers and arbalesters were distributed among the fortresses of the island.[4]

Meanwhile the Senate had been taking measures for the permanent organization of the administration of Cyprus in such a form that, though it might be a Kingdom and have a Queen of its own, the real ruler—subject to the agreement for the payment of a tribute to the Sultan of Egypt—should be the Republic of Venice. On 28 March 1474[5] the Senate, acknowledging letters of 6 and 15 February from Mocenigo, approved the action he had taken in securing the fortresses and in superseding Galimberto and Paul Contarini. It insisted further that, in view of the importance of Famagusta, not merely the castle but the city, its gates, tower, walls and piazza, should be held by Venetian soldiers. These were immediate measures. For the permanent organization, the Senate on the same day decided[6] that two nobles should be appointed as Counsellors of the Queen, at a salary of 200 gold ducats a month

[1] See below, p. 754, n. 4.

[2] G. Bustron, pp. 535–7; Fl. Bustron, pp. 451–2.

[3] Or Sir John Sarrasin, or Negro. He figures in another incident between Franks and Cypriotes, to be related later (p. 710).

[4] Malipiero, p. 603.

[5] M.L., *H.* III, p. 371.

[6] *Ibid.* p. 370; Navagero, col. 1140 (24 March); *Relatione* in Reinhard, II, Beyl. 3, p. 31 (no date).

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each,[1] and that in place of Victor Soranzo, who had served the Republic so well and so long, a Proveditor should be appointed with the same salary and on the same terms as the Counsellors. It was also decided to send a hundred good crossbowmen under four officers, to be distributed between the castles of Famagusta and Kerynia.[2] John Soranzo was elected Proveditor,[3] and Francis Minio and Louis Gabriel Counsellors. Elaborate instructions to all three followed on 4 June and 29 July.[4] The Counsellors are sent to advise the Queen, preserve her against the machinations of her enemies both at home and abroad, and enable her to establish herself in a well-constituted and governed realm. The whole power of Venice is offered to defend and preserve her; and not only she but all her subjects, of every class, are to understand that Venice desires nothing but the security of the crown, and that no one, unless he seeks his own destruction, need hope for any change in the order of things. It is made clear to the Counsellors that, while carrying out strictly the policy of the Senate, they are to act throughout with the participation and agreement of the Queen 'so that everything may appear to proceed from her', and the impression may be given that the policy of Venice aims at nothing but what justice and honesty demand, and all her solicitude is for the improvement and preservation of the Kingdom, fulfilling the office of a father, and not ambitious of empire.[5] To this

[1] Half their salary was left with the Venetian treasury as a sort of caution-money. M.L., *H.* III, p. 379, n. 4. This condition is commonly found in similar appointments, as in that of the Captain of Famagusta (see p. 866, § 3). Each Counsellor was to be allowed to keep eight servants and six horses at his own expense. The decision of the Great Council on the method of electing the Counsellors and Proveditor of Cyprus in 1486 is printed by Theotokes, p. 182.

[2] On 9 May the Senate ordered the Counsellors and Proveditor with the crossbowmen to sail in two ships (of Mudazzo and Morosini) which were starting for Syria; failure to do so involved a fine of 500 ducats. On 13 May they were ordered to leave without fail within eight days (M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 442 and note). They had not left by 4 June.

[3] On 29 March, according to Navagero, cols. 1140–1.

[4] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 372–82 (the Counsellors); 382–5 (the Proveditor); 386–90 (both).

[5] Other points on which instructions are given: There must be impartial administration of justice. The old forms are to be followed as far as possible: 'nihil enim est quod magis satisfaciat populos quam in suis vetustis rebus conservari'. Great attention is to be paid to the collection of the revenues and the improvement and increase of all that pertains to the royal domain. The Kingdom is to be thoroughly purged not only of all foreigners, but of all suspect persons, lest they afford means of communication with the island to the Lady Charlotte or those who conspire on her behalf. The

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artless attempt, as to the inevitable failure, to produce such an impression, there is no lack of parallels to be found in the history of aggressive nations.

commandants and garrisons of the fortresses are to be of undoubted loyalty, and are to be appointed in the name of the Queen and the infant King, and the royal standards and ensigns are to be flown on them. No commandant is to hand over a fortress to anyone unless the Counsellors and Proveditor, or at least two of them, are personally present. In all things the customs of the Kingdom are to be maintained, and in such a way that the Queen and chief men may seem to take part in the affairs of the State. In case of any disagreement between the two Counsellors on a matter outside the province of the Proveditor, he is to be called in and have a vote. Many alienations of property belonging to the royal domain have been made, for the most part by violence, since the death of James II; all these are to be carefully reviewed, and arrangements made with the Queen that they be suspended or cancelled, *sine scandalo*. [So too some ten years later (2 June 1484) Syndics going out to Crete and Cyprus were ordered to enquire into the fact that many provisions, fiefs, and also other ecclesiastical properties had been taken from their lawful owners and given to other persons, *contra leges et ordines nostros* (Noiret, p. 551).] The Republic must take precedence of any individual Venetians who have claims as creditors on the royal domain; no such private claims are to be satisfied until a full account of them and of the revenues of the State has been submitted, lest the royal domain be utterly exhausted. The Counsellors are always to be in residence wherever the Queen may be. [This seems to have been interpreted too strictly, and the Senate by a letter of 4 June 1479 had to tell the Counsellors that it did not mean they must reside in the Queen's apartments. M.L., *H.* III, pp. 414 f.] Though the offices of the Counsellors and Proveditor are distinct, they are both directed to the same end, the protection and preservation of the Kingdom, and these officers are to work in complete harmony. They are not to engage in any sort of trade, directly or indirectly, or accept any gift or present or fief or benefice, or grant any concessions or privileges, on pain of the penalties exacted from Venetian rectors for such offences. They are not to act as agents, or transact business, for any private person, without express mandate from the Doge (penalty, 500 ducats). Their salary is to be 2400 ducats a year (half being withheld as caution-money); after the first year they are to be paid out of the royal domain every four months at the rate of 100 ducats a month; any deficit on this payment from the royal treasury being made up by the Venetian 'Office of the Governors'. A notary from the Chancellery, with an assistant, is to be attached to them. The Counsellors are to take precedence of the Proveditor, and the Bailie of them. It has been reported that there is dangerous dissension and rivalry between persons related to and in the service of the Queen; they are to enquire into this and take measures to prevent any offence or seditious action by them or any other persons. All such persons are to be immediately excluded from any participation in affairs of State; in case of resistance, they are to be expelled from the island and, if they disobey the order, to be sent under guard to Venice. Special mention is made of dissension between Peter Bembo and George Contarini; the Queen is to be persuaded to send one of them away, at least for a time, within fifteen days of the arrival of the Counsellors. If she cannot make up her mind, they are to consult with the Bailie, and banish the one who

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The instructions to the Proveditor, who is to have supreme command of the forces, follow the same general lines, with special reference to the military side. There is the same insistence on preserving the show of government by the Queen: 'it is our intention that the royal name should be acclaimed everywhere'. Great attention is to be given to the regular payment of the troops. He need not however always be in residence with the Queen, but is regularly to inspect all parts of the island.

Further instructions issued to Counsellors and Proveditor jointly on 29 July add details as to the strengthening and provisioning of the fortresses. They are to be allowed to draw on munitions which had been destined for Uzun Hasan, to wit, bombards, springalds, muskets and powder. The payment of the mercenaries is most important; otherwise they may turn to theft, brigandage and other naughtiness.[1]

Long before the Proveditor and Counsellors reached Cyprus, Mocenigo had gone. He had been there since 3 February, and was wanted elsewhere. Triadan Gritti had been appointed as his successor and awaited him at Modon.[2] On 14 May came two galleys with a letter summoning him to join the main fleet, and three days later he sailed,

seems the more dangerous. The one who remains, and all others attached to the Queen, and other Venetian nobles and citizens, are to be warned to withdraw from all affairs of State. [This attempt to get rid of Bembo and Contarini failed, for both are described as present in a letter of the Counsellors of 16 April 1475: M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 471.] Further orders concerning the duties of the Counsellors were issued in 1479: No one of them is to come to any judicial decision alone, without his colleague or the Proveditor (penalty, 100 ducats). They are not to interfere in matters within the jurisdiction of the Viscount; not to receive any presents; not to travel in the island at the expense of the domain. 24 May 1479, M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 497.

[1] Other details: The ruthless revision of alienations made from the royal domain since the death of James II is again insisted upon. They must not expect any pecuniary subsidy from home, in view of the heavy expenses incurred on account of the invasion of Albania by Mehmed and the siege of Scutari. It has been reported that officers in command of Venetian ships have impressed many serfs; this abuse is to be investigated and stopped. [Nevertheless in April of next year the Queen complains that the island will soon be without inhabitants if it goes on: *Doc. Nouv.* p. 463.] The Queen is to be allowed to retire to Kerynia or any other place in the island for greater security.

[2] Gritti received instructions, on 19 March 1474, to keep an eye on Cyprus, and see that there was sufficient force in Famagusta. On reaching Modon, he was to send to Rhodes to demand the surrender of the Archbishop and the other rebels, and of the jewels and money which they had carried off. Otherwise Venice would take all necessary measures, and would regard any attempt on Cyprus as directed against itself. Magnante, *L' acquisto*, cap. v, p. 17.

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leaving ten galleys and two armed caravels to guard the island.[1] He could ill be spared. It was on that very day that the quarrel, already mentioned, between Maltese James and Peter Davila took place. And at Famagusta on 19 May[2] there was a riot, arising out of a brawl in a brothel. The 'Franks' and the Cypriotes concerned were alike thrown into prison by the Proveditor, who however immediately released the Franks. Sir John the Moor (whom we have met with before as a champion of the Cypriotes) went with some of the relatives of the Cypriotes who had been left in prison, to demand that they should be released. The Count of Roucha and Peter Davila, who were with the Proveditor, warned him that Sir John the Moor was coming with an armed force to kill him. The Proveditor promptly arrested Sir John and put him in irons in a galley. The degree of disorder may be gauged by the fact that a Slavonian[3] soldier penetrated to the Queen's chamber. When Sir George Contarini asked him what he was doing there, he said 'I seek my fortune'. Contarini went to lay hands on him, but he drew his dagger and was with difficulty disarmed and thrown into prison. 'And the Queen was much frightened.' All Famagusta was in tumult, everybody taking up arms. But the Proveditor resisted all attempts to persuade him to release Sir John the Moor, saying that he was a disturber of the peace and the cause of many quarrels.[4]

On 26 August 1474 the little King James III died of malaria, having lived all but a year.[5] He was buried at Famagusta in the same grave with

[1] G. Bustron, pp. 537 f.; Malipiero, p. 603. This is the end of Mocenigo's connexion with Cyprus. In his epitaph on his monument by Peter Lombardo and his sons in SS. Giovanni e Paolo (Venturi, *Storia dell' arte Ital.* VI, pp. 1082–4, fig. 737) we read (cp. Sanudo, *Vite*, col. 1203): 'Petro Mocenico Leonardi filio...qui Asia a faucib(us) Hellesponti usque in Syriam ferro igniq(ue) vastata, Caramannis Regibus Venetorum sociis, Othomano oppressis, Regno restituto pyratis undique sublatis, Cypro a coniuratis non minore celeritate quam prudentia recepta', etc.

[2] G. Bustron, pp. 539–40; Fl. Bustron, p. 452.

[3] Presumably a mercenary. Slavonians are mentioned by G. Bustron (p. 499) as having killed one of the Count of Tripoli's men outside Famagusta.

[4] G. Bustron (pp. 533–4) describes a scene at court, when Sir John threw out general accusations of treachery which, on being challenged, he refused to particularize.

[5] A rumour reached Italy that the Queen was so distressed by the loss of her child that she hanged herself. (Magnante, *Documenti*, p. 240, n. 2; letter of 26 Nov. 1474.) As to the date, see Malipiero, p. 604 (26 Aug. 1474 on the authority of a letter from the Queen herself); Fl. Bustron, p. 454 (died on his birthday); Bembo, *Hist. Vinit.* f. 7b (on his birthday); Loredano (Giblet), II, p. 338 (do.). Lusignan (*Chor.* f. 73b; *Descr.* f. 185b) makes him survive two years. A. M. Graziani, *de bello Cyprio*

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his father.[1] As usual, there was talk of poison. Doubtless his disappearance was to the advantage of those who were plotting to recover the throne for Charlotte. At the same time it cleared the way for Venice, which now had a legal claim to the Kingdom as Catherine's parent.

The day after James, 27 August, there died also one of the two Counsellors so recently appointed, Louis Gabriel.[2] Nothing is heard of Francis Minio after his appointment, and he too probably died soon after reaching Cyprus; for the Queen says later that two Counsellors had died.[3]

Outside Cyprus also the Senate had good reason to beware of the activities of Charlotte's supporters. Reports reached it in September that Rizzo di Marino had sailed for the Levant, with the intention of going to the Sultan Kaitbai at Cairo.[4] A Genoese flotilla was waiting for him at Alexandria. The Senate sent orders to the consul Francis Bembo and merchants who were going to Egypt not to land if they learned that the Sultan was hostile; at the same time it addressed to the Sultan on 24 September a conciliatory letter, thanking him for his favours recently shown to Venetian merchants, and hoping that he would continue in the same disposition. Kaitbai was not too well disposed to Venice. Catherine had fallen into arrear with the tribute; Venice's designs on the island were suspect. So the Senate decided that an ambassador should at once be sent to Cairo direct from Cyprus. He

(1624), p. 8 (did not complete his first year). Sanudo (*Diarii*, LVI, 1043) is alone in giving him a life of only some three months. That he died of malaria is stated by his mother in a letter to the Doge Peter Mocenigo, 14 April 1475 (M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 461). Navagero, col. 1141, speaks of very bad weather *with snow* in Famagusta which caused great mortality; among the victims was the Queen's little son, who fell ill of acute fever and died at the end of his first year.

[1] Otto Heinrich, Count Palatine of the Rhine, describes the tomb, through a hole in the top of which could be seen the child's body lying between his father's legs. Röhricht-Meisner, p. 383.

[2] The Queen announced this in her letter above-mentioned. Order from the Senate, 17 Nov., to the Consul in Cyprus, who in dealing with the estate of Gabriel has retained 5 per cent as an honorarium for his staff, to return it to the estate, since Gabriel was a public functionary, not a private person (M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 443).

[3] Letter of 14 April 1475, M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 461.

[4] Instructions to the Counsellors and Proveditor, 24 Sept. 1474 (M.L., *H.* III, p. 391, with other documents cited in the note). Malipiero, p. 603 (quoted by M.L., *loc. cit.*), writes with knowledge of the text of the Senate's despatches. Cp. Magnante, *L' acquisto*, cap. V, p. 21.

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was to soothe the Sultan, assuring him (and the Devitdar and Emirs and other important persons) that the Queen wished for no other suzerain. As for the tribute,[1] the default was due to the heavy expenses which had fallen on Cyprus since the death of James II, to the spoliation of the Kingdom by the rebels, and to devastation by locusts. She will be able to pay all the sooner, the less she is harassed by the machinations of Rizzo di Marino. The ambassador is to express the hope that if Rizzo falls into the Sultan's hands, he may be brought to a bad end, and to remind the Sultan that he was the prime mover in the massacre of the Mamelukes. The Queen is to be urged to send the tribute, at least for one year, by the hands of the ambassador.

Another reason for the Sultan's ill-will was to be found in the raids which were being made on his coasts by, as he believed, people of Cyprus, subjects of the Queen.[2] The continual plotting by the Archbishop of Nicosia, Rizzo di Marino, the Count of Tripoli, Zaplana and Louis Alberic, was always in the minds of the Senate; but it also knew that many others of various nationalities who had been expelled from the island had equipped light vessels and were ravaging its coasts and those of the Sultan to his great indignation. It therefore ordered the Captain-General of the Sea to lose no opportunity of seizing any of the rebels whom he might find in any ship, no matter to whom it belonged, and to send them securely guarded to the Queen for due punishment.

The news of the death of King James III and of one of the Counsellors had reached Venice in October,[3] at the same time as letters from the Proveditor and other persons in the Senate's confidence, reporting that the situation was very critical; many people were calling for Charlotte and were ill-disposed to Catherine; the Senate was advised to put some of the principal malcontents to death. On 19 October, that is immediately on receipt of the news, it was decided to send Mark Cornaro,

[1] It was not only the tribute for which demands were made on Cyprus. It will be remembered that the 'Moors' had interfered with James II in matters concerning the enfranchisement of serfs (p. 636, n. 3). Again, in 1475, envoys from a Devitdar came to demand munitions from the Queen; they were put off with fair words and presents by Mark Cornaro, who explained that there was nothing of the sort left in Cyprus, since it had all been carried off by the rebels who had fled the island. M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 476; cp. p. 484.

[2] Order of the Senate to the Captain-General of the Sea, 28 Dec. 1474, M.L., *H.* III, pp. 402–3.

[3] Malipiero, p. 604 (19 Oct., evidently the date of the receipt, not of the writing of the letter).

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Catherine's father, out to Cyprus, to console her in her present affliction. But it was not until 11 November that he was given his instructions. And the year had ended before he sailed, for only on 3 January 1475 did the Senate inform the Captain-General of his imminent departure.[1] He was sent in a galley as far as Modon, where he was to obtain from the Proveditor four galleys[2] to take him on to Cyprus, and relieve four of the galleys stationed there, that they might return to Modon. He was to call at Rhodes, and present letters to the Grand Master Orsini, pointing out that, if the Order was unwilling to support Queen Catherine and the Venetian cause, it should at least not act directly in the contrary sense, by harbouring and comforting the exiled rebels. The Senate considered itself concerned equally with Cyprus in anything to the advantage or disadvantage of the Kingdom that might be done by Rhodes, its men or its ships. Venice would treat Rhodes precisely as Rhodes treated Venice; and doubtless the Order would prefer the two Powers to be friends rather than enemies. Cornaro was to transact this business without landing, partly for his own safety, but also to give more weight to his words; if the atmosphere was unfriendly, he was to adopt an attitude not of asking a favour, but of admonition and menace. The further instructions to Cornaro repeat and emphasize those given to the Counsellors and Proveditor; he is to insist on loyalty to the Queen in such a manner that loyal persons are confirmed in their feeling, and those inclined to revolution will understand that such a move would mean their own destruction. Previous instructions are repeated about the security of the fortresses and the payment of the troops out of revenue, so that no further burden falls on the Venetian exchequer; any surplus is to be accumulated with a view to placating the Sultan. Though the Counsellors and Proveditor are the official representatives of Venice, Cornaro has a special position as a Venetian noble and father of Catherine; but the aim of one and all is to be the same, to preserve the Kingdom under the rule of the Queen; and while they execute the Doge's mandates, he by his counsel is to contribute to the same effect. Harmony between him and the others is above all essential. In view of his age, and still more of his rank and station, he is to have precedence

[1] Magnante, as above, pp. 25, 26. Instructions to Mark Cornaro, 11 Nov. 1474, M.L., *H.* III, pp. 398–402. Cp. Malipiero, *loc. cit.* Mark had long wished to join his daughter, but for some reason had not been allowed to do so. Navagero, col. 1141.

[2] But if the Proveditor thought he could not risk depleting his force, Cornaro was to proceed in the one galley.

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over all others, that the royal name may be the more respected in so far as all see it respected by the Venetians in his person. Since he is going of his own free will, no limit is placed on the time of his sojourn. At the same time, the surviving Counsellor and the Proveditor of Cyprus were assured that their authority was not diminished, although they were to consult with Cornaro at their discretion.

The appointment of the Queen's father with such indefinite powers was the worst possible step that the Senate could have taken if it wished its policy to be effectively administered. And that speedily became clear.[1]

In November 1474 Venice had concluded a treaty of alliance against the Turk with Galeazzo Maria Sforza of Milan, the Commune of Florence, and Ferrara.[2] The Queen of Cyprus was expressly named by the Doge as a partner in this alliance. It will be remembered that her husband in 1471 had had a grievance against the Senate for its failure to include him by name in treaties which it had made with other Italian Powers (p. 639). The Queen wrote on 3 April 1475 to thank Peter Mocenigo, who had succeeded Nicolas Marcello as Doge on 14 December 1474, for his courtesy, and on the next day signified her formal adhesion to the alliance. Such nomination as party to an alliance between Venice and another Power was valued as an acknowledgement of the Queen as a sovereign in her own right. Venice continued to keep up this formality. Thus she was nominated by the Doge, Andrew Vendramin, along with the Emperor Frederick III and King Charles VIII of France, as an ally in the *santissima lega* of August 1484,

[1] Since as early as 23 Nov. 1474 the newly appointed Counsellors, James Quirini and Peter Diedo, were instructed by the Doge to report to him any disagreement between Mark Cornaro and others (M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 470), it would seem that the expectation of harmony was not too bright.

[2] Romanin, IV, p. 373. The alliance was initiated by Galeazzo Maria, and concluded on 2 Nov. 1474 (*Libri Comm., Reg.* V, p. 215, no. 76; Navagero, col. 1144C). The Doge Nicolas Marcello's nomination of Ferdinand King of Naples and Catherine Cornaro as adhering with him followed on 28 Nov. (*Reg.* V, p. 219, no. 85). The Pope and the King of Naples were given a month to join it; Sixtus however, at the instigation of Ferdinand, played fast and loose, and Venice broke off relations. The Pope liked neither the alliance nor the action of Venice in Cyprus, of which he had been informed immediately on the receipt of the news of the King's death. Ferdinand was informed at the same time. As before, the Pope had to accept the situation, and profess to be content. But 'motteggiava che quello reame speti alla sede apostolica' (Arrivabene to Louis Gonzaga, 13 Nov. 1474, Magnante, *L'acquisto*, cap. V, p. 24).

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and again in 1485 when Venice, owing to the delay in the negotiations for a general Italian peace, entered into a separate engagement with Milan.[1]

The unhealthy climate of Cyprus, which had already carried off one of the two Counsellors first appointed, soon struck down John Soranzo, the Proveditor who had succeeded Victor. The Queen on 6 January 1475 reported to the Doge, Nicolas Marcello, that he had died recently of fever.[2] She writes expressing her great grief at such a loss, and her difficulty in making decisions, for lack of someone acquainted with the wishes of the Doge.[3] Therefore, after consulting with the Venetian nobles at Famagusta, she has taken it upon herself to appoint Victor Pasqualigo, Captain of the galleys, to the post of Proveditor, pending the Doge's decision; he has accepted it and been most helpful with his advice, and she has hope of the most satisfactory results from this appointment.

The hope, so piously expressed by the Doge, of harmonious co-operation between Mark Cornaro and the official representatives of Venice, was speedily belied.[4] The letters from the parties concerned to the Doge, Peter Mocenigo, make it clear that the Counsellors were interpreting with the utmost severity the sense of the Senate's instructions to consult before everything the interests of Venice. James Quirini and Peter Diedo, who had taken the place of the two Counsellors first appointed, complain, in their letter of 26 April, that they are in continual conflict with Mark Cornaro over the administration; if he is to have his way, he will be supreme, and there will be no need of Counsellors, which will mean that the authority of the Doge will no longer be represented. Although by their commission they are bound to act in consultation with the Queen and her father, he insists on doing every-

[1] *Libri Comm., Reg.* v, p. 291, no. 58; p. 298, no. 97.

[2] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 450–1. His successor was Francis Giustinian, to whom orders to go out as soon as possible were given on 6 May (*ibid.* p. 486). He is to be allowed to have a trumpeter to precede him only when he rides in force through the island on the affairs of the Kingdom (*ibid.* 22 Feb. 1476).

[3] Had she written confidentially, as she did later to complain about Victor Pasqualigo, whom she described as treating her even worse than she had been treated by John Soranzo, her tone would have been different.

[4] Letters from the Queen to the Doge complaining of Quirini and Diedo, 14 April 1475, M.L. *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 456–63; of Mark Cornaro, on the same subject, 15 April, *ibid.* pp. 463–8; of Quirini and Diedo, complaining of Mark Cornaro, 26 April, *ibid.* pp. 468–73.

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thing in his own way, turning everything to his own advantage. As they are bound to resist him, not a day passes without a conflict. In order to control the Queen's actions, they insist on countersigning her orders, which is a cause of great contention. He maintains that the administration of justice belongs to the Queen, by whom, as her father, he would be favoured. For instance, he sent his son Luke to Nicosia to extort from a Venetian woman, Marietta Bragadin,[1] payment of a pledge of some 100 ducats, without first obtaining judgement, and complained that the Counsellors were robbing the Queen when, in order to show the people to whom they might appeal when they were oppressed, they called Luke to account for it. Mark is doubtless writing to the Doge to complain that they are acting as lords and masters; but they promise that not a penny will be spent without the order of Her Majesty, and the joint signature of her and themselves. They have protested to the Queen about the way in which she is disposing of her estates, the revenue of which is required for the troops, for the guarding of the fortresses, for the tribute to the Sultan and the expenses of her court. All that is necessary for her court is provided therefrom, and she has only to say the word to obtain it. She cannot rightly be said to depend upon alms, but her expenditure needs to be controlled, for she spends more than her predecessors on the throne. Scenes take place every day very prejudicial to the good of the Kingdom. When the Counsellors accompany Mark to the palace, to do him honour, he stands at the head of the stairs and, in the presence of many Cypriotes, abuses them, saying that they wish to be the masters, and make her not a Queen but a slave, and put her in fetters, and other such outrageous words. They reply with the frank and honest assurance that His Magnificence should not use such language, that the Queen is to be treated with all due honour, and that the Doge will do everything for her and the preservation of her Kingdom. Such disputes have arisen out of the decision of Mark to send the Queen to Nicosia, which is very undesirable at present, especially in view of the Turkish crisis. He has demanded foot-soldiers to accompany her, which will denude Famagusta of its defence; while the most secure places for the Queen are Famagusta and Kerynia. Diedo proposes to stay at the former for its defence and government. The Counsellors will do their best for the Kingdom, but,

[1] Marietta's brother Luke had done homage to the Queen for himself and his sisters Marietta and Clara in Aug. 1473. G. Bustron, p. 479; Fl. Bustron, p. 436.

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though they are by nature averse to quarrels, they cannot avoid them, since new ones arise every day, because Mark will tolerate no contradiction. The Doge must choose between leaving the government in the hands of, not the Queen, who is a most notable lady, but her father on the one hand, and in those of the Doge's representatives, on the other. They would have no trouble with the Queen; it all arises from a source which the Doge knows without being told.

The two letters to the Doge written by the Queen on 14 April (one of them so confidential that she could not entrust the writing of it even to one of her own secretaries) and her father's letter of the next day agree with the account just summarized only in the description of the situation as altogether unseemly and unworthy of a Queen's court. She expected great things from her father's coming, hoping that he would reduce the Kingdom to order, since he is greatly respected there, and all except those who are devouring and robbing her revenues welcome him. But his presence has done more harm than good; for he refuses to interfere in the administration of her estates and revenues, since he is unwilling to come into conflict with the Counsellors. They have little experience of Cyprus, and must depend on information from Cypriotes, many of whom are ill-disposed. They have forced her to write a letter consenting that their orders are to be obeyed in all matters. She would not have consented had her father not constrained her to it, for the sake of peace. She will abide by the Doge's decision; may he deign to regard her as a good daughter, and let her enjoy her royal dignity. The Counsellors insist that she must not communicate with any of her officials in the island, but they must sign the orders and send them to her to be confirmed. Letters to her from her subjects and others must be addressed to them, opened by them and sent on to her; but so far she has not received a single one. Petitions are answered by them, and she is only allowed to countersign their answers. She is not allowed to change or give commands to any officials, bailies or clerks; they act in this not as counsellors but as superiors and governors. Questions concerning justice, civil or criminal, and the treasury, are never referred to her; they decide and she has only to countersign. It is wrong that anything should be done without her consent; it were much more proper that her will should be done, than that they should act contrary to it. But she asks for no power over the castles of Famagusta and Kerynia, unless it should be necessary for her to retire to the latter. As to her person, she has been constrained up to this day to have her meals on a

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small table in a private room, served by two maids, like a simple citizen's wife; and she has to hear mass in a room, seen by nobody; instead of having a chapel as would be proper, and eating sometimes in public, with squires to serve her like a royal lady.[1] That requires revenue, and she wishes to draw on the royal domain and transfer estates and revenues to her private chest. They have refused this as being without precedent; and they insist on complete control, making her allowances from time to time. Strange that she may not dispose of her own revenues. She informs the Doge that she intends to take 10,000 ducats in money or provisions for her court. She submits in all things to his wishes, but begs him to tell them that they must be her counsellors and not her superiors. The deduction of this amount will not mean that there will be nothing left to pay the troops or the Sultan and support the State. The Sultan will be paid out of the balance in the royal domain, and if her father is allowed to make reforms there will be a surplus of some thousands. She begs the Doge to write her a little letter (*leteruza*) to comfort her. In view of the bad state of her affairs she has persuaded her father to remain over the summer, instead of returning, as he had proposed, with the galleys from Beirut. She reports a rumour that the Sultan of Egypt is preparing an expedition; a payment of tribute will be sent him. Later in the year she will go to Nicosia. The locust has not been so destructive as in the past year, and a better harvest is expected.

In the second, very secret letter, she lets herself go on the personalities of the officers of the Republic. In the time of the previous Proveditors she was revered and honoured as a queen should be. Of Victor Soranzo she will say no more than 'God forgive him';[2] it was owing to his refusal to let her leave Famagusta that she lost her little son, her only consolation in this world. Then came John Soranzo, who after the death of the two Counsellors behaved not as her counsellor but as lord and governor of the Kingdom, sparing neither knight nor burgess nor peasant in his brutal language—such as her husband never used—and humiliating her to the condition of a slave. She was not mistress of ten ducats, could not give orders to man or woman of her subjects, and was

[1] The importance of letting her be seen in public was recognized by others; see above, p. 681. In feudal society it was not considered fitting that a Seigneur should take his meals alone.

[2] This is the phrase commonly used in mentioning a person recently dead; but here it is more than a mere form.

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not allowed to write to any of them, and letters were not allowed to be read by her until they had been submitted to him. The way in which she is attended upon is damaging to her royal dignity in the eyes of her subjects. Soranzo appropriated and spent the revenues without her knowledge or any order from the Secrète, and no account was rendered. He had enfranchised many peasants against her wish, and if she refused to sign he flew into a rage and abused her relations, saying to them 'we will send you in irons to Venice', and once even threatened to send herself thither. A woman, young and unprotected, she had been obliged to yield to him. After the death of John Soranzo, Victor Pasqualigo treated her even worse, completely robbing her of all authority. When, in order to relieve her miserable state,[1] which was worse than death, she decided to take 10,000 ducats from the royal domain, his language to her was such that if she had stolen his house and belongings it could not have been worse; so that she decided to wait until the arrival of her father, who was expected to come in a few days, with two Counsellors. In a postscript she begs the Doge to put a stop to the impressing of serfs for service in the galleys.[2]

Mark Cornaro's letter of the next day assures the Doge and the College that the Queen's two letters were not inspired by him, but proceeded entirely from her. He says that he found her seriously ill, and had he not been there with the physicians she might have died.[3] She has only four menservants and a steward. He confirms her account of the way in which she takes her meals ('one of his own daughters is better used and better treated'); of the rudeness of Pasqualigo (he himself has given her 300 ducats out of his own pocket); of the interference to which her correspondence is subjected; of the lack of control of the finances, which are managed according to the will of a few greedy Cypriotes; of the refusal of the Counsellors to let her draw 8000 to 10,000 ducats a year from her estates. He himself dare not meddle; but

[1] It must be admitted that towards the end of her reign, her mother, Donna Fiorenza, expressed herself as shocked by Catherine's extravagance. Below, p. 738. A traveller in 1482 was told that she enjoyed an income of more than 30,000 ducats (Paul Waltheri von Guglingen, p. 93).

[2] See above, p. 709 n. The Signory had to take measures to check this depopulation of the island; see the Commission to Balthazar Trevisan in 1489. (Note at the end of Chapter XIII, p. 867, §§ 12, 13.)

[3] *De squementia.* Mr L. Edelstein, of the Institute of the History of Medicine, Johns Hopkins University, suggests that this word is a corruption of *squinancia*, i.e. quincy.

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it breaks his heart to see the Queen thus kept close and the Kingdom go to rack and ruin. In a postscript written painfully with his own gouty hand he beseeches the Doge to maintain the dignity of the Queen, so that the people may know that she is the lady of the land and not what she has been up till now. Let the Doge be assured that this will be for the good of Venice, and that the writer is a good Venetian. Finally he repeats that if there is proper control, if the Queen has authority, and if the Counsellors are counsellors and not lords and masters of the State, the affairs of the Kingdom can be set right in a few months.

The statements made (though not always lucidly) by both sides in this miserable quarrel leave little doubt that the Queen was treated with unreasonable harshness. The indignation felt by her father, and expressed in doubtless unmeasured terms, did not ease the situation, but excited recrimination. On the other hand, if the Proveditors and Counsellors behaved with what seems a cold-blooded combination of meanness and severity, the fault lay to a great degree in the Venetian system. The Republic kept a very tight hand on her colonial administrators, who were obliged to screw every penny out of their charges, and were hedged round with ferocious penalties for every departure from the terms of their commissions.

The Signory replied to the complaints of the Counsellors,[1] assuring them that they were to be real governors, Cornaro only an adviser, without a vote. At the same time, it assigned to the Queen a civil list of 8000 ducats. The Counsellors were to reorganize the finances, resuming for the treasury all fiefs which had been wrongly alienated; after deduction of the Queen's civil list, of the tribute for the Sultan, and of the pay of the troops, the balance was to be handed over to the Captain-General for the defence of the island. Three days later, on 10 June, the new Proveditor, Francis Giustinian, received his instructions, similar to those given to his predecessor. The Queen's civil list was however not regularly paid to her; on 18 March 1477 the Senate had to insist on this being done; and on 22 August of the same year the Counsellors were told that the order that they should always be in residence where the Queen was meant that they must reside in the same city, not in her apartments.[2]

On the night of 26 April 1475 the Queen left Famagusta for the

[1] Magnante, as above, p. 29. 7 June 1475.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 43. It seems to have been necessary to repeat this order about the place of residence two years later (see below, p. 732).

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capital.[1] Her father had demanded an escort, 'for her honour and safety'. The Counsellors replied that her honour and safety lay in the preservation of the Kingdom and especially of Famagusta. Since there were no ships there, and the place was full of undesirable characters, they could not spare twenty of their best foot-soldiers. But they allowed Thomas of Imola[2] to escort her with twenty musketeers, and also gave her six springalds with their carriages from among those in Famagusta castle, and these were taken to the palace at Nicosia. The Counsellors were bound by their commission to accompany the Queen wherever she went; but considering the defenceless state of the port, it was decided that Diedo should stay there for some days.

Diedo, Andreoni (a captain of mercenaries) and a number of other gentlemen and knights escorted the Queen for about a mile outside the town, some of them then returning with Diedo and Andreoni, while Quirini went on to Nicosia with her and her father. With her suite and knights, and the escort of armed Greeks and Thomas of Imola's musketeers on foot, there was a cavalcade of some 200 horse. Three miles from the capital she was met by knights and others, and many Armenians with three of their headmen; loud cries of 'Long live Queen Catherine' greeted her. At the gate she was welcomed by a large crowd, with all the clergy, and rode under a gilt umbrella, amid acclamations, to the cathedral, where she prayed at the High Altar. More cries of 'Long live Queen Catherine'. She then rode to the palace, where Quirini took his leave of her. He got the general impression that the people held her in affection and honour. He reports that he has arranged with the Secrète to recover money and send it to Diedo to pay Andreoni and all the troops at Famagusta, also those at Kerynia and Paphos, so that they may get their pay monthly. At Nicosia a great many (more than 200) *provvisionati* (nobles serving the crown for stipends), of Spanish and other nationalities, have complained that they have had no pay for many months. They have been temporarily satisfied with grants of wheat and barley. Quirini also reports that the Queen's steward has attempted the life of her father with a poisoned fowl; the plot was discovered in time by his seneschal. From Diedo's despatch from Famagusta we learn that Mark, in whose service the would-be assassin had been for thirty years,

[1] Report of James Quirini, who accompanied her, Nicosia, 10 May 1475, M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 474–7. Report of Diedo, same date, Famagusta, *ibid.* pp. 477–86. Fl. Bustron (p. 453) seems to date her return to Nicosia in 1476.

[2] He was in command of mercenaries; see above, p. 668, n. 1.

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had pressed him for a debt of some ten ducats, hence this desperate attempt. Torture failed to extract from him any evidence that others were concerned in the plot.

Diedo's long and querulous despatch is a series of complaints of the behaviour of 'this new king'. The Queen has been received in Nicosia with a great popular demonstration of loyalty. He understands that she will probably soon go to Kerynia. But anyone who tries to make her decide anything against the wishes of her father will need to use armed force. Mark has summoned the Haute Cour for 28 April; it has not met since the death of James II.[1] The business before it is the question of the marriage of five rich widows. They cannot marry without licence from the Queen, which means that they will have to marry whom she chooses.[2] It is no fault of hers; everything is done by Mark without her knowledge. Mark indeed repeats every day that the Counsellors, the Doge's representatives, are without any powers, and that the Queen has to give her commands in consultation with him and decide everything. In word and deed he behaves like a king. Diedo's burden is heavier than he can bear; he would rather die than stay on where he can only report the dangers which threaten the Kingdom and the way in which the commands of the Signory are disobeyed by Mark, who screens himself behind the Haute Cour. Diedo has asked Quirini to order Mark to cease his interference in the administration, since his commission authorizes him only to advise, not to decide. But Quirini prefers not to act alone, but to wait until Diedo can join him. The tribute to the Sultan, when it is arranged for, will be sent. Mark wishes it to be taken by Pasquale Pisani, but the orders of the Doge are that it should be taken by a Cypriote, so that Venice should not seem to be concerned. The Queen in Nicosia is being assailed by all sorts of demands from the people, to which, owing to the state of the finances, she can return only fair words. She ought not to have gone to the capital so soon; a good

[1] This is not strictly correct; doubtless there had been no full assemblies; but it acted through one or two members, as when Roucha and Davila approved the grant to George Contarini on 10 Feb. 1474 (above, p. 703).

[2] This was the custom of the Kingdom, and the Senate approved its observance (28 Aug. 1477, M.L., *H.* III, p. 413): no widow, holder of a fief, should marry again without licence from the crown, on pain of losing her fief, which should revert to the royal domain.—One of the widows on this occasion was Apollonia of Pendayia, Countess of Jaffa, with an income of 2500 ducats, and Catherine's brother Luke was actually a candidate for her hand. He did not however win it, and Catherine, as we have seen, succeeded in recovering the county of Jaffa for George Contarini (p. 704).

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harvest would have made it easier to do something. 'I was not listened to, and was unable to command.'

When he can forget his grievances against Cornaro, Diedo gives details of the measures he is taking for the defence of the island, but it is clear that Venice, owing to her war with the Turk, is unable to spare galleys for its protection. He himself is sending munitions from surplus stores at Famagusta to Modon—400 muskets, springalds with their carriages, and fifty cannon. At the same time he begs that Cyprus be not abandoned, and that two or three galleys may be spared to guard it.

The despatch, which gives the impression that Diedo is more hostile than his colleague Quirini to Mark Cornaro, is that of a sick man. He complains that he has been down with fever for six days. 'Such are the fruits of this place; falling sick is certain, cure uncertain.'

Although, from Diedo's lamentations, it looked as if the Senate was likely to abandon the defence of Cyprus, a despatch addressed on 15 June 1475 to the Counsellors and the new Proveditor, Francis Giustinian,[1] shows that it had already taken decisions for the supply of warships and troops, both foot and horse.[2] Since these decisions advices from Naples and Rome had been received to the effect that King Ferdinand, indulging his propensity to cause trouble to the Kingdom of Cyprus, had equipped a fleet which was to go to the East on various pretexts, and that the Lady Charlotte was about to sail to Cyprus with some galleys. The Counsellors and Proveditor, the Senate ordered, were to be alert to see that the fortresses were defended and the people especially prevented from rising. The Senate would provide against external dangers. These orders were to be communicated to the Queen and her father, and carried out by all working in harmony together.

One of the agents of the Neapolitan party was Antony di Zucco,

[1] M.L., *H.* III, p. 404.

[2] Opinions differed as to the best kind of forces for the defence of the island. In 1474 Malipiero (p. 604) reports that the Proveditors in Cyprus advised sending, instead of galleys, 500 troopers, who would be more useful and less costly. In the spring of 1475, says P. Giustinian (1576, p. 226), John Giorgi had been sent to Cyprus in command of five galleys, with many other ships of burden, on receipt of a report, which turned out to be false, that King Ferdinand was preparing to invade the island.—A. Battistella, in *Atti del R. Ist. Veneto*, LXXX (1920–1), p. 311, enumerates various decisions of the Senate for the defence of Cyprus, from 12 May 1475 to 8 Aug. 1478.

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Bishop of Lemesos.[1] He had been concerned in activities against the established government both before and after the death of James II.[2] Catherine got rid of him by pretending to send him on an embassy.[3] But he succeeded in gaining the ear of the Doge, and returned to Cyprus,[4] with letters of commendation from him. The Queen, however, had certain information that he was the agent of the Archbishop, and was engaged in collecting all the revenues of the see of Nicosia and sending them to Rome. She was therefore desirous of expelling him again; but in view of the fact that he was much in the favour of Peter Diedo and the new Proveditor Francis Giustinian—it is to be noted that she does not mention James Quirini—she had deferred her decision until she knew the Doge's wishes. Let him consider what a serious thing it was to have in the island a pastor of souls who was giving the Doge false information, not to say deceiving him, and was the vicar of the treacherous Archbishop. In the same letter the Queen reports the return to Cyprus, by favour of the Proveditor, of the Abbot of Holy Cross, which has already been mentioned (p. 697). Since she has lost her authority, it is for the Doge to decide how to prevent the penetration of exiled traitors into the Kingdom, by favour of anyone.

The Bishop, perhaps owing to his attachment to Archbishop Louis, was victimized by the Queen's officials; in 1475 he complained to Sixtus IV that he had been robbed over some years past of 200 ducats of his revenues. The Pope on 18 April issued a bull threatening with spiritual penalties anyone who treated Antony or his successors in this way. The Queen's complaint seems, however, to have had some effect; for when next year Antony, who was apostolic administrator of the

[1] Letter of the Queen to the Doge, 9 Nov. 1475, M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 454–5. See also M.L., *Arch.* p. 300 and above, p. 617. The Bishop, who is not named by the Queen, is identified as Antony di Zucco by Gius. dalla Santa, *Nuovo Archivio Veneto*, XVI (1898), p. 171.

[2] He may have been the Bishop of Lemesos who is mentioned in connexion with the conspiracy of 15 Aug. 1473 to seize Kerynia for Queen Charlotte, but if so Catherine could not complain of his action on that occasion, for he helped to try the conspirators and unfrocked the clerics among them before they were executed. G. Bustron, p. 481; Fl. Bustron, p. 437.

[3] M.L., *H.* III, p. 456 n. and *Doc. Nouv.* p. 454.

[4] On 12 March 1474 a Venetian ship coming to Famagusta announced that he was on his way (G. Bustron, p. 529). In the transcript of the Queen's letter about him he is said to have returned 'de Neapoli ab archiepiscopo', but the reading of the place-name is doubtful.

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property of the church of Nicosia, and had, contrary to the wish of the Republic, sent a priest, John Baptist of Fossombrone, to Rome, to obtain the archbishopric for him, the Council of Ten detained the messenger and sent him back to Cyprus with an expression of its displeasure.[1] Three days later the Senate, as will be seen, intervened with the Pope in favour of its candidate for the vacant see.

The long delayed Egyptian tribute, to which Diedo refers in his letter of 10 May 1475, was at last sent. A year later, on 5 May 1476,[2] Kaitbai wrote to the Queen that he had received her ambassador Thomas Ficard. He congratulates her warmly on having overcome all her enemies, the Catalans, and accepts her excuses, on account of those troubles and the locusts, for the delay in paying the tribute. He now acknowledges the payment for two years. At the request of her ambassador he has declared that she is Queen and Lady of Cyprus, that all her enemies may be confounded. He has also released and returns her previous ambassador, sent in the time of her distress, whom he had imprisoned. He sends her a robe of cloth of gold lined with ermine and many other presents; she is to wear the robe as a symbol of her obedience to him, and to the confusion of her enemies, praying for his long life. He has also clad her ambassador and paid his expenses. She is to welcome with honour any of his 'Moors' who go to Cyprus, and to redeem and send home any of his subjects who have been enslaved.

This was very well, but it is to be observed that the Sultan left nothing to chance. For in 1478, as we have seen (p. 609), he allowed Queen Charlotte to bring Don Alonzo of Naples to Cairo,[3] where he stayed for many years, a pawn in the hands of the plotters, who after the death of the Princess Charla conceived a plan to marry him to Catherine herself.

Meanwhile one of the most powerful of the supporters of Charlotte and enemies of Catherine had disappeared from the scene. The Arch-

[1] 8 May 1476. *Nuovo Archivio Veneto*, XVI (1898), p. 171, n. 2. Soon afterwards, however, a nephew and a brother of Bishop Antony are found holding high church offices in Cyprus, which suggests that he may have been taken back into favour.

[2] 10 Muharram A.H. 881. M.L., *H.* III, pp. 405–6, prints the letter from the Paris MS. of Malipiero (p. 605, under 1477), under the wrong date 10 May, although he has the correct equation in his note 6 on p. 406.

[3] A subject of King Ferdinand, a servant of Don Alonzo, who was with the Sultan, owned an estate in Cyprus, given him by James II. The Bishop of Famagusta claimed to have rights over it, and the Senate on 12 June 1478 asked Catherine to allow summary justice to the Bishop in the matter. M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 496.

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bishop of Nicosia was translated to the see of Capaccio on 22 March 1476, and died before August of the same year. On 11 May 1476,[1] the Venetian Senate instructed its ambassador to inform Pope Sixtus that it would be much gratified if the protonotary Victor Marcello could be appointed to the see, as, it understood, was the intention of His Holiness.

In pursuance of the policy of purging Cyprus of all possible sources of disaffection, it was moved in the Council of Ten, on 30 October 1476,[2] to send secret instructions to Antony Loredan, Captain-General of the Sea, after consultation with the Counsellors and Proveditor, to transport to Modon, whence they are to be sent on to Venice, the mother of the late King James II (Marietta of Patras), his natural children (Charla, Eugene and John), with other women or persons whom he should think fit; also the wives and daughters and households of Rizzo di Marino, Zaplana, the Count of Tripoli,[3] and Michael Cortesi.[4] All these persons, but especially the mother and children of the King, are to be honourably treated, although every precaution is to be taken against their escape. Such was the resolution moved in the Council; but it met with considerable opposition;[5] out of forty present at the sitting of the Council (in which members of the government and various committees took part with the Council proper), fifteen voted for it, fourteen

[1] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 488; *Arch.* p. 301. On 14 July 1477 the Senate gave orders for the mandatary of Victor Marcello, Archbishop elect, to be put in possession of his Church and administer it and collect the revenues. *Doc. Nouv.* p. 492.

[2] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 408–10; Navagero, col. 1146. Malipiero (p. 608) has this decision under the wrong date (1478) and in the wrong connexion.

[3] On 8 Jan. 1481 the Countess of Tripoli, appealing to the Council of Ten, says that she has been in Venice three years, and is in extreme misery, since she can get no revenue from her estates in Cyprus, the agents having seized it all. She begs for leave to return to the island and live there with her sisters. M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 503. The result of her application is not known.

[4] A member of the anti-Venetian party, who had been brought to Venice by Victor Soranzo, and imprisoned there (M.L., *H.* III, p. 396). G. Bustron mentions one Cortesi who took the oath to the Queen (p. 477; perhaps the same man who was sent to Paphos to take the oaths of the people there, Fl. Bustron, p. 433); one who was sent for by her as suspect on 23 Jan. 1474 (pp. 508–9); a Sir *John* Cortesi who was arrested with others on 8 Feb. following, taken out of prison on 1 April and sent to the palace (pp. 516, 531). I find nothing more about him or any Michael Cortesi.

[5] The Council of Ten seems to have been going through a difficult time. Its deliberations should have been a dead secret; but there must have been some leakage, for on 31 Oct. 1476 a resolution was passed emphasizing the necessity of absolute secrecy. It is to be noted that a minority of three (out of forty) voted against this resolution (M.L., *H.* III, pp. 410–11).

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against, while eleven were undecided. Eventually the instruction was amended to exclude the two sons of the King. On 1 November the Council wrote to the Captain-General to place Princess Charla in the care of the Queen until she should be brought away. However, Loredan acted on his own responsibility and sent the whole family away, reporting his reasons for doing so in a despatch to the Doge from Paros, 5 December 1476.[1] He has consulted the Bailie, the Counsellors, Proveditors past and present, and a number of other gentlemen, about the persons whom it is desirable to deport. The King's mother is an intelligent and pertinacious woman (*savia e seguace*), and more likely to disturb than to tranquillize the situation. As to the sons, the elder especially is of so attractive a nature and disposition that he is adored not only by the men, but in a way by the very stones of the island. They have all been put in a galley and sent to Paphos to await further orders. As for the rest, after long discussion, it has been agreed to deport eight people, of whom seven have embarked, without any fuss, in a ship at Famagusta; the eighth will follow by the Beirut fleet.

Dealing with other matters, Loredan advises the abolition of the Secrète and the appointment of one or two chamberlains, since the saving of salaries thus effected will alone suffice to pay the troops.[2] The way the revenues are wasted is a sin; Venice pays all the expenses and others enjoy the income. He describes the state of Famagusta, 'the key and heart of Cyprus', as most distressing; it is uninhabited or rather deserted,[3] and everything is going to ruin in consequence. It would be better if the Queen could return and also the Bailies; then the place would be inhabited again. From its ruins, it may be seen how fine a city it has been; he has never seen a better situation. Whoever holds it is lord of the island. At present there is a garrison of only twenty arbalesters from Candia, whereas there should be at least a hundred. As to Kerynia, the town is not strong; the castle is a target for guns.[4] One thing in its favour is that it would be difficult to effect a landing there.

[1] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 489–92. According to Magnante (cap. v, p. 38) Loredan's action was taken on fresh orders from Venice, and he sent the families of James and the rebels in January 1477.

[2] In 1479 something of the kind he suggested was done. See below, p. 732.

[3] Fr. Francis Suriano, it is true, who was in Cyprus in 1484, says Famagusta and Nicosia were both well inhabited (Cobham, *Exc. Cypr.* p. 49). But all other sources agree with Loredan.

[4] 'Bersaglio de bombarde.'

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The Council of Ten, on hearing of Loredan's action, took decisions on 9 and 16 January 1477 as to the disposal of the deportees.[1] The allusion to the popularity of the boy Eugene—who was seven or eight years old at the time, and had evidently inherited some of his father's charm—shows how precarious was the hold of Venice on Cyprus.[2] His deportation, however, left on the spot no rival to Catherine, who seems to have gained a strong hold on the affections of the people. It is to be noted that the representatives of the legitimate Lusignan line, after the death of Charlotte, accepted the situation and made no claim to the throne, some of them even accepting office under the Venetian rule.[3]

Loredan's warnings about the state of the island, however, fell for the moment on deaf ears. It was not until August 1477 that the Senate decided to send out two syndics or inquisitors (in anticipation of the system which we shall describe in the next chapter) to enquire into the administration and conduct of officials of all ranks, from the Counsellors downwards. The instructions which they received on 27 August[4] empowered them to make a searching investigation, punish all offenders (including those who had taken *parici* out of the island), and strengthen the fortresses, especially Famagusta. The wholesale banishment of disloyal elements had created a panic, since no one knew whether he might not be arrested. Blackmailers who had taken advantage of such fears were to be punished, and the people reassured. Orders were also given prohibiting the export of cereals from the island, with the object either of preventing scarcity there, or of securing supplies for Venice itself. As a special concession, in March next year, the Grand Master of Rhodes was allowed (provided the island did not suffer) to export so much as corresponded in value to the revenues drawn from the estates of the Hospital.[5]

Loredan's picture of Famagusta omits the shadows cast by its extreme

[1] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 411–12. As to the family of Zaplana, on whose behalf King John of Aragon intervened, they were to be set free on their arrival. The further adventures of James's family are described elsewhere (Ch. XI, p. 654). The other families were to be allowed to live in Venice at their own expense.

[2] That the authorities were anxious about the popular feeling is shown by their instructions to the officials to behave gently to the people. 22 Aug. 1477, cited by Romanin, IV, p. 435, n. 2.

[3] Herquet, *Charlotta*, p. 233. It may be mentioned, as a curiosity, that a claim by an alleged descendant of the Lusignans (Charles) was put forward four centuries later (below, p. 789n.).

[4] Magnante, *L' acquisto*, as above, p. 42.

[5] *Ibid.* pp. 43–4.

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unhealthiness, which was probably largely responsible for its decay. The representations made by him and doubtless by others may have been listened to, but the Senate was slow to take action, and failed to master the situation, and the attempts which it made to encourage settlement in the island were altogether unsuccessful.[1]

The scare caused in Venice in the late summer of 1478 by the news of Charlotte's sailing for Egypt, and the instructions issued to the Captain-

[1] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 822–4, from Malipiero, p. 606. Cp. Fietta in *Arch. Ven.* XXI, p. 56 (with wrong date 1474). Navagero, cols. 1149–50, gives a list of the acceptances, when on 20 Sept. 1477 it was decided to choose one hundred nobles to settle in Cyprus with their households, numbering not more than four per household. They were to have provisions or fiefs to the value of 300 gold ducats, half in cash from the Cyprus treasury, half in produce; 25 were to settle at Famagusta, 25 at Kerynia, 50 in Nicosia. Furlough for one year would be allowed after five years if they wished to come to Venice, for six months elsewhere. Fiefs could not be alienated before fifteen years, and then only to Venetian nobles. Only 88 families offered themselves at the ballot on 13 March 1478. Also, it appeared that the island could not bear the expense of supporting such a colony. The project was suspended, and no more was heard of it. When in 1478 Venice gave up Scutari to the Turks, it offered to settle the Scutariotes in Cyprus; no one accepted. They preferred to return to Italy and take positions under Government as civil servants or in the army. The Venetian state pensioned the forty families which had been in Scutari at the time of the siege, and their descendants. In time many others pretending to be Scutariotes fraudulently crept into the list; in 1499 the Great Council ordered the Proveditor for Cyprus affairs to revise the list and expel the intruders (Priuli, *Diarii*, I, p. 237). Thus Venice was unable to treat Cyprus as a commercial undertaking, and made it merely a military and naval base. Later nibbles at the problem were in 1486, when on 7 April it was decided that all holders of benefices in the island, whether clerks or laymen, must reside there or forfeit half their revenues; and in June 1487, when this order was repeated, 8000 ducats levied from the Cypriote clergy, and 4000 from the royal domain, to pay the stradiote garrison (Malipiero, pp. 608–9). In 1489 an offer was made to all inhabitants of Corfù and Morea to transport them free and give them financial help, if they would go to Famagusta; even Cypriotes banished for homicide might return, if they avoided the places where their crimes had been committed; and all, except rebels banished from Venetian territories, might go to live at Famagusta (M.L., *H.* III, pp. 459 ff., §§ 17 and 18; where for *impium* read *iniquum*, and for *conceptionibus*, *exemptionibus*; repeated *verbatim* in the commission to John Contarini, Ch. XIII, p. 867). Hitherto the custom was for such criminals to be banished from the whole island, 'which is not only unjust but contributes to the depopulation'. In 1490 (M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 545) the Cypriotes themselves suggested further inducements to settlers. They understood that free passage and three ducats a head, with land to cultivate, had been offered to intending immigrants; it was now suggested that they should be free from all *corvée* to the government for ten years, and from the salt-tax in perpetuity. The Signory agreed to the former, but limited the exemption from the salt-tax to twenty-five years.

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General, Antony Loredan, have been described on a previous page (Ch. x, p. 605). Loredan reached Cyprus with twenty-four galleys on 16 December, and the ambassador arrived at Alexandria at the end of February 1479. The Sultan's reply was however anything but satisfactory. Diedo was told that the Venetians ought to give Charlotte back her Kingdom, and the Sultan swore that he would make them do so. She had, it was said, also received encouraging reports from her partisans in the island, and it seemed likely that the Sultan would supply her with forces sufficient for her purpose.[1]

The year 1479 saw another abortive attempt against Queen Catherine.[2] The malcontent Sir Mark Venier (p. 604) had been brought to Cyprus in 1478 by the Proveditor in command of 200 arbalesters, and had been put by him in command of the garrison of Famagusta. He plotted with some Cypriotes to assassinate Catherine and the Counsellors in church, and seize the Kingdom for Charlotte. The King of Naples had promised to equip twenty-two galleys to go to Alexandria and embark Charlotte, with Don Alonzo and a force of Mamelukes promised her by the Sultan. The go-between was a Catalan called James Moleres. But one John Valderas (apparently a secretary of the Viceroy of Sicily) got wind of the plot in Cairo and coming to Venice revealed it to the Council of Ten, who immediately sent orders to the Captain-General Loredan to arrest Mark Venier and, if the information was found to be correct, hang him; or, according to another account, the Counsellors were to arrest Moleres and Venier, and send the former to Venice and the latter to Candia. At the same time one Nicolas Bon of Candia, who had a disreputable private quarrel (*per puttane*) with

[1] Letter of Bart. Marasca, Bishop of Città di Castello, to the Marquess Frederic Gonzaga, 10 Jan. 1479 (1480); Magnante, *Documenti*, p. 249; Navagero says merely that the Sultan's reply was doubtful.

[2] Magnante, *L' acquisto*, cap. VI, pp. 50–2. Navagero, cols. 1160–1. The same episode seems to be briefly mentioned by Malipiero, p. 608, though he has Marco Corner, instead of Marco Venier, of Candia. He and four Cypriote accomplices, who had planned with Charlotte to murder Catherine, were to be rewarded with 2000 ducats a year and the castle of Kerynia. The authorities were warned on 6 June 1479 by Nicolas Bon of Candia, and the plotters were taken and hanged. Herquet, *Cypr. Kön.* pp. 142–3, discussing the whole story, but not connecting it with the statement in Malipiero, comes to the conclusion that Venier's plot had not the widespread ramifications which have been attributed to it, but must be reduced to an attempted attack on the Venetian Rectors, inspired by personal desire for vengeance. His objection to the story on chronological grounds is not convincing.

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Venier, also informed the Captain-General. Venier was immediately arrested and confessed all. The execution of the plot was fixed for the morning of Holy Thursday (8 April); the conspirators were to have the castle of Kerynia and 200,000 ducats. Venier implicated many of the leading men of the Kingdom; five of them, with himself, were hanged the same Holy Thursday from the battlements of the palace; the others suffered after Easter.[1] Moleres was not found. Valderas, Bon and a third informer were rewarded for their services.

From despatches dated 7 June 1479, conveying the thanks of the Council of Ten to the Counsellors and the Captain-General, it appears that a 'traitor'—not necessarily Venier himself—had made a deposition implicating the Queen. The Council of Ten thought the accusation might be false; the authorities were to endeavour to find out the truth, but no action or demonstration against her was to follow. Nevertheless other persons who were suspect, as being 'too devoted to the Queen', namely the Admiral of the Kingdom and the Chancellor, Thomas Ficard, were arrested by order of the Council of Ten (8 August 1479) and sent to Venice. Ficard was however allowed to return to Cyprus next year.[2]

A sidelight on the intrigues which were rife in Cyprus about this time is thrown by the story of a Dominican whom Felix Fabri came across on his first visit to Cyprus in 1480.[3] When he left the island this man came on board his ship, and explained that he had been suddenly arrested, and was being taken to Venice, because he had unguardedly said something about the election of a king for Cyprus. The Venetians, says Fabri, employed spies to go about listening to any talk of restoring the King, or criticism of the government, and send offenders in chains for trial at Venice.

Gradually, it would seem, the situation of the Queen in relation to her masters became slightly easier, or it may be that she resigned herself to the conditions imposed on her; the records are no longer so full of

[1] Navagero adds that Charlotte and Don Alonzo, discomfited, the Sultan having granted the investiture of Cyprus to Catherine, went home. We have seen that the investiture had been granted not later than 1476; Charlotte returned to Rome at the end of January 1482 (and may have reached Naples earlier), but Don Alonzo stayed on in Egypt until 1487.

[2] Magnante, as above, pp. 54, 69. The Admiral was either Muzio Costanzo, who had been appointed by James in 1461 and died in 1479 (above, p. 656, n. 3), or his son Alexander, who was appointed to succeed him, but failed to obtain confirmation from Venice. Lusignan, *Histoire* (1579), f. 71b.

[3] *Evagatorium*, ed. Hassler, III, p. 229; Hackett, p. 171 (Papaïoannou, I, pp. 224–5).

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complaints and recriminations as they have been. She was, it is true, still kept under strict surveillance; but we find the Senate again issuing orders to the Counsellors[1] that they are not to interpret the order, that they must be in residence wherever she may be, in the sense that they are to live in her apartments. She is to be free to go to Kerynia or Famagusta or anywhere else in the island for the sake of her health or for any other reason; and wherever she might be, proper provision for her should be made. At the same time the Senate insists on the regular payment of the 8000 ducats which had been assigned to her as her annual allowance; that payment was to take precedence of all others.

The control of the finances of the Kingdom, of the extravagant mismanagement of which complaints had from time to time reached the Senate, was tightened in 1479. Antony Loredan had actually advised the abolition of the Secrète and the appointment of one or two chamberlains (p. 727). By a decision of 16 May[2] two nobles were to be appointed *camerarii*, to hold office for two years, to keep the accounts of the revenues, which were thus taken out of the hands of the treasurers of the Secrète, and subjected to periodical inspection by the auditors of the Republic.

Another subject of complaint by Loredan also began to receive attention, and that was Famagusta. On 27 August 1480[3] the Senate sent orders for the repair of its buildings and fortifications ('since, as all understand, the city of Famagusta is of the greatest importance for the preservation of the Kingdom of the island of Cyprus'), and the Proveditor was to hold from time to time a review of the land and sea forces there. But the Senate found it difficult to combat the unpopularity of the Cyprus service, of which the failure to induce Venetian families to settle there has given us an indication. It is further illustrated by a decision of the Senate on 6 May 1480.[4] Since, it says, many persons have

[1] 4 June 1479: M.L., *H.* III, pp. 414–15, from Colbertaldi; Br. Mus. Add. MS. 8631 f. 113 b.; Fietta, from *Cod. Marc.* VIII, ch. VII. Mas Latrie has put the right interpretation on this letter; it does not mean that the Counsellors had been seeking to establish too familiar relations with Catherine. See also above, p. 720. Mark Cornaro returned to Venice, but when, is not recorded (M.L., *H.* III, p. 819).

[2] M.L., *H.* III, p. 843 and n. 2.

[3] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 498.

[4] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 497. The impression given by Mas Latrie (*H.* III, p. 843), that the Captaincy of Famagusta was an innovation in 1480, is misleading. Captains distinct from and having authority over the castellans functioned before that time: e.g. the Count of Tripoli, whom the Queen superseded by Gonsalvo Perez on 19 Jan. 1474 (G. Bustron, p. 507). The Proveditor, however, had no hesitation in arresting Gonsalvo on one occasion (*ibid.* p. 510).

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been elected Captains of Famagusta, and have all refused the office, and 'tired this Council to no purpose', it is decided to proceed to a new election, and whoever is chosen may not refuse office.[1] The commission to John Diedo, who was appointed on 4 September following,[2] gives him the government of Famagusta and its district in the name of the Queen and Venice, with administration of justice, civil and criminal, according to the statutes and customs of the city; where they fail, he is to decide according to his conscience. Appeal is to lie from him to the Counsellors and Proveditor. He is responsible for the care of the fortifications, in accordance with the orders which he will receive.[3] This office was soon to develop into the Captaincy of Cyprus.

The increasing importance of the island in Venetian politics is marked in 1481 by the creation of a special Committee of the Venetian College or Cabinet, three *savii* being appointed to deal with the affairs of the Kingdom of Cyprus.[4]

The evident complicity of the King of Naples with the conspiracy of Mark Venier increased, it has been suggested, the hostility of the Signory to Ferdinand, and may explain the malevolent neutrality of Venice when Otranto fell into the hands of the Turks. Ferdinand in 1480 had renewed negotiations with the Egyptian Sultan and next year attempted to organize an expedition, ostensibly against the Turks. When the news of this reached Venice, Victor Soranzo, the Captain-General, was ordered to keep an eye on the movements of the fleet besieging Otranto. In August, when it was heard that four Genoese ships had sailed for the East, he was told to send a Proveditor with four

[1] Nevertheless, as will appear in the next chapter, such refusals continued to be made, and with success. On this occasion Francis Barbò refused (Sathas, Μνημεῖα, VI, p. 225). The trouble was of long standing. See V. Lazzarini, *Obligo di assumere pubblici uffici nelle antiche leggi Veneziane*, in *Arch. Ven.* 5 ser. XIX (1936), pp. 184–91.

[2] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 498–9.

[3] Further: in the absence of the Proveditor, he has jurisdiction, civil and criminal, over all the troops. In the city, he has precedence over the Proveditor, but outside it the Proveditor goes first. His salary is 140 ducats a month—as against the 200 of the Counsellors and Proveditor, and the 250 which was later the salary of the Captain of Cyprus—and he is allowed to have a household staff of four (at his own expense) and a secretary (*cancellarius*) with a salary of 50 ducats a year; and he is forbidden to accept any gift or present.

[4] Malipiero, p. 608. It is true that they dealt with other matters as well, having to review the business of the affairs of the boards of the Avogaria, Grain, Arsenal, Salt and Cazude (arrears of tax). As early as 1367 Venice had appointed a Cyprus Affairs Committee of three (above, Ch. VI, p. 347).

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galleys and a hundred foot-soldiers to guard the island, especially Famagusta. If Otranto was recovered, and the ships sailed for the Levant, he was to follow them and attend to the protection of the island and Venetian shipping in those waters.[1]

Another King Ferdinand, the Catholic, of Aragon, was also the cause of perturbation in the minds of the Signory. During the siege of Otranto he proposed to send ships to join the allies, and asked for facilities for victualling his forces in Venetian possessions. On 2 October 1481 the Senate informed the Counsellors in Cyprus that they were to allow him no such facilities, on the ground that to do so would be an unfriendly act in the eyes of the Sultan of Egypt. But Otranto was recovered, the plan for an eastern expedition came to nothing, the allied fleet dispersed, and Soranzo was told that, the danger having passed, he might disband some of his ships.[2]

There was, however, considerable unrest in the island, and it was perhaps in order to calm the people that the Council of Ten ordered the proclamation, in the name of the Queen, of an amnesty for political offences. Excluded, however, from its terms were those persons who, suspect for one reason or another, had been removed from Cyprus. And most careful control was exercised on the movements of all persons of the slightest importance.[3]

Nothing, however, seemed to discourage the plotters.[4] Intercepted letters revealed the fact that one Teodorino, a Cypriote, had gone from Naples to Cyprus with plans for the seizure of the castle of Kerynia. Soranzo, however, being warned in good time from Modon, sailed with twenty-six galleys, and the plot failed. A reward of 5000 hyperpers was offered for the capture of Teodorino, but nothing more is recorded of the matter. Charlotte, it was heard, was about to leave Cairo for Rhodes, and Soranzo was ordered to send the tribute to the Sultan, that he might be dissuaded from forwarding her plans. As a matter of fact this was the end of Charlotte's activities in the Levant, and she was back in Italy at the beginning of 1482, not to leave it again. But Neapolitan intrigues were to continue.

Harmony, as we have seen, did not always prevail between the Venetian officials in the island. In this same year there was a quarrel between the two Counsellors, and Mark da Leze made an armed assault

[1] Magnante, *L' acquisto*, cap. VI, pp. 55–6.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 58.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 56. Cessi, *Un falso eroe*, p. 1246, n. 2.
[4] Magnante, as above, p. 57.

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on his colleague Laurence Gritti. The Captain-General was ordered to Cyprus to try the case.[1]

The question of the tribute to Egypt again became acute in 1483, and in February of that year the Chancellor, Thomas Ficard, who had been so successful in 1476, was again sent to Cairo.[2] At first he was coolly received, the Sultan ordering that he must remain at Cairo until two further payments were sent. The Queen replied humbly protesting her obedience, and begging for his release, which he obtained by means of bribes and other transactions. On 25 September the Sultan gave him and one of his interpreters the robes of honour and the usual presents for the Queen. Ficard informed the Counsellors and asked for a galley to be sent for him. As it did not come, he went to Damietta, where he waited about a month; then on 8 December he embarked on a *gripparia*, which after a very stormy passage landed him at Paphos on the 15th. He describes himself as having achieved a complete triumph over the Queen's enemies, putting them to utter confusion. King Ferdinand's ambassador, though disabled by gout, had had himself carried to the palace, merely in order to interfere with Ficard's mission, but was not admitted. The Neapolitans were so much put out that all they wanted was permission to go home; it was even said that they were seeking leave for the King's son Alonzo to return, though some denied this rumour. Ficard is sure that the Sultan is wholly on the side of Catherine, and does not want the Catalans, being the sort of persons they are, as his neighbours.[3] He urges the sending of the tribute, to confirm the Sultan in this favourable disposition.[4]

As the years passed, they brought no comfort to the Senate in its anxiety for Cyprus, threatened on the one side by Naples, on the other

[1] Malipiero, p. 608.

[2] We have his report of 30 Dec. 1483 to George Contarini at Venice: M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 518–21.

[3] As an instance, he says that the Sultan, when it was reported that fifteen Neapolitan galleys had entered Damietta, asked him whose they were. Ficard said they were Catalans, 'with other words much to the point'. The Sultan was much excited and decided to send his second devitdar with 400 horse to defend the Kingdom of Cyprus.

[4] Ficard, who was inclined to optimism, adds that he will not say anything in praise of his own efforts, leaving it to his correspondent and the Counsellors to judge if they have been of importance and advantage to the Queen and the Signory. When he afterwards fell under suspicion, this record was of great service in his defence. M.L., *H.* III, p. 420, n. 1.

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by the Turk. A new Captain-General, Francis Priuli, succeeded Loredan on 21 January 1486:[1] and he was to have his hands full with Cyprus. A delicate situation arose when on 15 March Bayazid sent to ask leave for his ships to put in there on an expedition against the Sultan of Egypt.[2] The Senate, it is said, refused, fearing that he would make some outrageous attack on the Queen and damage Venetian interests in the island. On 6 June, the rumours that the Turkish fleet was about to sail increasing in strength, the Captain-General was ordered to take his whole fleet to Cyprus, and not to leave it until he had secured it from the Turkish menace. Two months later, the orders were repeated; the Turk, if his fleet neared Cyprus, was to be treated in a friendly way, but so as not to give offence to the Egyptian Sultan; not more than eight or ten of his ships were to be allowed to enter Famagusta harbour, force, if necessary, being used to keep them out.[3] A report of seditious intrigue by one Antony of Santa Maura came to the Council of Ten, who on 1 September wrote ordering the Counsellors to arrest him and a Greek priest, supposed to be his father-in-law. It was discovered that he was related to no such *pope*, but to the Bishop of Lemesos, though he was an agent of the Turks.[4] Nothing happened, however, either this year or the next. Eventually, Bayazid took matters into his own hands and when he had equipped his fleet sent it in the spring of 1488 to Cyprus, with the intention of seizing Famagusta; but a timely demonstration by a Venetian fleet of twenty-five galleys was sufficient to send the Turkish ships back to the Dardanelles.[5]

Meanwhile the Senate continued its desultory efforts at making Cyprus secure, increasing the number of stradiote mercenaries, strengthening the fortifications of Famagusta. At some time during his Captain-Generalship, Francis Priuli decided that a tenth of the revenue of the Camera should be spent on the latter object, and it was enjoined on the first Captain of Cyprus in 1489 that he should see that this was carried out;[6] it is probable that the order speedily became a dead letter.

[1] Malipiero, II, p. 608, who says that the appointment was made because it was suspected that Ferdinand was meditating another attack on Cyprus.

[2] Malipiero, *ibid.* [3] Magnante, p. 65. [4] *Ibid.* p. 64.

[5] Bembo (1552), f. 7b; P. Giustinian (1576), p. 249; Zinkeisen, II, p. 522. The heavy defeat inflicted by the Egyptian army on the Ottomans on 18 Aug. 1488 between Tarsus and Adana may also have had something to do with the retreat of the Ottoman fleet.

[6] See Note at end of Ch. XIII, p. 867, § 23.

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On 21 February 1487 the Senate considered the advisability of flying the standard of St Mark in the island.[1] The treaty of peace with the Turk in 1479[2] had covered not only the lands, islands and cities which were actually in the possession of Venice, but also all those on which thereafter the standard of St Mark should be flown. The flying of the standard in Cyprus would thus be significant to the Turk of Venetian claims to the island. But there was also the susceptibility of the Sultan of Egypt to be considered, and, although the matter was again discussed in August 1488, the decision of the Senate was not carried into effect until the Lusignan flag was hauled down on the departure of Queen Catherine. But Venice was determined to make it clear that it regarded Cyprus as its own possession. In January 1487 an envoy, sent to Constantinople to endeavour to ascertain the probable movements of the Turkish fleet, was instructed, if he should be asked about Cyprus, to say that 'it has for many years been ours, and we have dominion over it and all its fortresses, and send our rectors and proveditors thither, who rule over, govern and guard the island as our own, and not otherwise than we do for all other places belonging to our state'. There is no mention of the Queen.[3]

In the same session of the Senate which considered the question of hoisting the flag, it was resolved to order the Captain-General Francis Priuli to equip more ships and nominate ten new *sopracomiti*, so as to have forty galleys ready for any emergency. The Counsellors and Proveditor of Cyprus were told to expect 500 more stradiotes, and urged to press on with the fortifications. The reinforcement was undertaken in response to an appeal from Catherine. The Sultan of Egypt, expecting to be attacked by Bayazid, had told her to be prepared to defend the island, and remitted the tribute due for the last two years, to the amount of 16,000 ducats. This coming to the ears of the Cypriotes, 'who did not understand whether they were to be defended by the Queen or by someone else', provoked rioting. So she appealed for help. The new corps was actually sent in April, under the Proveditor Francis Cicogna, who was soon after commissioned to pick 300 more men for a permanent garrison, to be given lands for themselves and their heirs, to be exempted from taxation for twenty years, and paid at the rate of three ducats a month, provided by the tithe which had

[1] M.L., *H.* III, p. 416 with n. 2.
[2] Zinkeisen II, p. 433.
[3] Magnante, *L' acquisto*, cap. VI, p. 66.

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hitherto served to pay ecclesiastics who held benefices in the island. But when things quieted down, Cicogna was recalled, and further measures for the defence of Cyprus were not taken.[1]

Other measures which Venice took were from hand to mouth, and not inspired by any plan.[2] Finance was a perpetual difficulty; the Senate's own liabilities were such as to make it impossible to subsidize the island, and the payments to the troops were inadequate and in arrear.[3]

The time approached when Venice was to put an end to the pretence of maintaining Catherine on her throne, and take over the Kingdom in its own name. It had delayed taking this step as long as possible, for fear of complications with the Egyptian suzerain. Queen Charlotte was dead, and the danger from that source was in a degree removed, although the Duke of Savoy had inherited and did not cease to press her claims. Neapolitan intrigue was a more serious matter, directed as it now was actually to a marriage of Catherine to Don Alonzo. It was no longer safe to leave her in Cyprus, especially as there was reason to believe that she was not averse to such a union, and had entertained or was entertaining relations with Neapolitan agents.[4] A report made by her mother, Donna Fiorenza, who visited her in Cyprus, and was shocked, so she said, at Catherine's extravagant way of living—possibly she regarded her daughter not as a Queen but merely a Venetian lady—is thought to have influenced the Senate to take the final step.[5] But the

[1] Magnante, pp. 67–8. Navagero, col. 1193.

[2] An order was issued on 18 April 1488 to the Captain-General to take the Queen to Famagusta for her greater safety, and to see to the munitions and provisions of the place (Romanin, IV, p. 435). But she seems to have remained at Nicosia.

[3] N. Le Huen, *Des sainctes peregrinations*, Lyons, 1488 (M.L., *H.* III, p. 824 and Cobham, *Exc. Cypr.* p. 51), says that the Venetians are in danger of losing Cyprus, for the soldiers or gendarmes are not paid, 'and have not wherewithal to live, except meanly and very ill at their ease. No man can leave it without permission, wherefore at times many of the dwellers in the land go to give themselves up to the Turks, so as to escape from the place and its government'. Le Huen has been described as merely a translator of Breydenbach (*Peregrinatio*, Mainz, 1486), but here Breydenbach says only that Cyprus is *hodie sub Venetorum ditione*.

[4] 'Stantibus hujus modi praticis et desideriis maritandi sese' (the Council of Ten, 28 Oct. 1488, M.L., *H.* III, p. 421).

[5] Fl. Bustron (p. 454) mentions this report of Catherine's mother together with the attempt by Rizzo di Marino as causing the Senate to act. He says Donna Fiorenza stayed a year in Cyprus, but gives no date. G. Bustron (p. 542), on the other hand, says she was there in 1486; that she made Catherine agree to come home, and herself returned to Venice, saying that she would send her son George Cornaro, and George

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decision to remove Catherine was probably precipitated by an adventurous attempt of Rizzo di Marino and another conspirator, Tristan de Giblet, to get into touch with her.[1] Tristan, in 1485, had murdered a man in Venice,[2] and fled, with a price on his head, to King Ferdinand at Naples, where he entered into the plot for marrying Don Alonzo to Catherine. He went out to Egypt, disguised as a Franciscan friar, in a Neapolitan ship, and found in Alexandria Rizzo di Marino, who had returned from a mission to Rhodes. Rizzo was in high favour with the Sultan, who, moved especially by the fact that Bayazid's brother Jem was in the Grand Master's hands, had sent him to Rhodes earlier in 1488 to negotiate for an alliance against the Turks.[3] As to Tristan, he had arranged to secure his own safety in case the scheme should fail. For in

came in 1487. This last date is certainly wrong, for we know that it was not until Nov. 1488 that it was decided to send George for his sister. If this date is nearly two years out, so may the others be. According to Navagero's story of the capture of Rizzo di Marino (see next note), Fiorenza was in the Captain-General's ship, on her way home at the time, and that was in late summer or early autumn 1488. Malipiero (p. 611) has a story, which he tells under 1488, after the return of the Queen to Venice and the fate of Rizzo (but his sequence cannot be pressed): the Loredana galley in which she was returning was encountered between Paphos and Satalia by the Turkish fleet, but succeeded in slipping away. Catherine's mother was accompanied to Cyprus by Lucretia Zeno, who entered and remained in the Queen's service, and was rewarded by her on 7 Feb. 1493 with a gift of 3000 gold ducats. See Simonsfeld in *Arch. Ven.*, XXI (1881), p. 294.

[1] The fullest contemporary account of this affair is in Sanudo's *Chronicle*, *ap.* M.L., *H.* III, pp. 437–44. This is a rough draft, and not a finished product, and in some details actually self-contradictory. In some respects it is completely at variance with the narrative in G. Bustron, pp. 540–2, which makes Tristan de Giblet the chief actor. Sanudo must be accepted on what happened at Venice, Bustron is probably more correct for the adventure in Cyprus. Malipiero, pp. 609–11, also gives the Venetian version. Navagero (col. 1197) makes the Captain-General, bringing Donna Fiorenza to Venice, capture a French ship, in which he found Rizzo and three confederates. They had been hidden in Famagusta fifteen days, plotting with others to seize the Kingdom. For the rest, he agrees with the others. As to Tristan's earlier history, see above, pp. 673, n. 3; 688, n. 4).

[2] He quarrelled in Santa Sophia, in Nicosia, with one Kouettos. Though peace was made between them, and confirmed by oath, he nursed his hatred. Kouettos having gone to Venice, Tristan transferred his estate to his wife and followed. In a barber's shop he found Kouettos, seized the razor and cut his throat. He was banished from Venetian territory, and 1000 ducats offered for his capture.

[3] Bosio, II, p. 408. He arrived in Rhodes on the same day as an ambassador from Mathias Corvinus, King of Hungary, 10 June 1488 (not, as Herquet, misreading Bosio, says, on 27 June).

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July 1488 a Cretan, one Michael Catanati, was sent by him to Venice, offering to reveal a great plot against the Republic, and asking for a safe-conduct. This plot can only have been that which was now on foot. The Council of Ten agreed that he should receive a passport at Rhodes, and that he should be suitably rewarded.[1] The Sultan was persuaded to wink at the proceedings of the precious pair, indeed seems actually to have given Rizzo (who was also in disguise) orders enabling him to obtain what assistance he required. Finding a French barque, the two made their way to Cyprus.[2] But they had excited the suspicions of Antony Giustinian in Cairo, and of the Venetian consul, Peter son of Peter, in Damietta, who recognized Rizzo and, since the ship he sailed in carried no merchandize, guessed that it was bound for Cyprus. The consul sent a warning to Francis Priuli, the Venetian Captain-General, who with the Proveditors Nicolas Capello[3] and Cosmas Pasqualigo was cruising off Cyprus, with an eye to the Ottoman Sultan Bayazid's fleet which was reported to be about to attack Lajazzo but which eventually retired without showing fight. The French barque was found off the western end of the island, but not before it had landed one or both of the conspirators at Fontana Amorosa.[4] It had been arranged with the French captain that after four days a signal should be made from the land, for a boat to be sent in. The Frenchman, questioned by Priuli, confessed everything, and when Rizzo, or Tristan, or both, made the agreed signal, it was duly answered. But Priuli's men were hidden in the French ship, and the rest was a simple matter. The two prisoners

[1] Magnante, cap. VI, p. 73. Sanudo's description of Tristan as 'traditore di Rizzo de Marino' is thus accurate.

[2] Here Sanudo says that there was a report that Rizzo had been to Cyprus before and spoken with Catherine, and that envoys had passed between Cyprus and Cairo. But this is, I think, another case of Sanudo's having noted down two versions of the affair, which duplicate or contradict each other, and not having had the opportunity of correcting his narrative.

[3] See below, p. 743 and the epitaph formerly in Sant' Antonio di Castello and afterwards in S.M. della Salute (Cigogna, *Inscr. Ven.* I, p. 160; G. A. Moschini, *La Chiesa e il Seminario di Sta Maria della Salute*, 1842, p. 59).

[4] Here G. Bustron and the Venetian chroniclers go wide apart. The former says that Rizzo did not land, but was found in the ship; that Tristan went to Nicosia and gained admission to the Queen through his sister Vera, who was in her service, had friendly talk and did what he wished with her, stayed a week and then returned to the coast. The Venetians say that both landed, but (except for what we have quoted above from Navagero) tell us nothing of what they did until they returned to the coast; both were captured at the same time.

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were despatched to Venice;[1] but Tristan never reached there, for he committed suicide on the way.[2] Rizzo confessed everything to the Captain-General, but protested that he was the Sultan's ambassador, and showed his credentials. Priuli, for fear of complications, lost no time in sending him, with two of his servants, to the Council of Ten. He reached Venice on 17 October 1488.

Meanwhile Giorgino, one of Rizzo's secretaries, who had been captured with him, was released. He wrote from Rhodes informing the Sultan of the part played by the Venetian consul in Damietta in the capture of Rizzo. The Sultan immediately imprisoned Peter, who was only saved from a miserable death by the help of the Sultan's grand-interpreter Tangrivardi and a considerable expenditure in bribes. He spent sixteen months in irons, and was not released until Venice settled the question of Cyprus with the Sultan.[3]

The fate of Rizzo di Marino may be briefly dismissed. He was tried, condemned to death, and eventually, after some three years in prison, secretly hanged.[4] When in 1489 Peter Diedo was sent as ambassador to

[1] Priuli wrote from Naxos on 20 Sept. announcing the capture. M.L., *H.* III, p. 419.

[2] Sanudo is obscure, and seems to contradict himself, but may mean that Tristan made two attempts on his life, the first with poison, the second by swallowing a diamond ring. G. Bustron and Fl. Bustron both report the diamond story, adding that the stone was crushed. Bembo (*Hist. Vin.* (1552), f. 7b) says that he swallowed the diamond and then drank some of 'quella acqua che parte i metalli'. The best known story about attempting to kill a man by mixing crushed diamonds with his food is of course that related by Benvenuto Cellini (*Autobiography*, ch. 25).

[3] The interpreter was in the pay of Venice: M.L., *H.* III, p. 477 ('Tanzer Baïd'). Malipiero, p. 610; Sanudo, M.L., *H.* III, pp. 442–4; *Doc. Nouv.* p. 525. The Council of Ten on 22 April 1491 ordered the repayment to Peter of his expenses, amounting to 665 ducats. It was the Venetian consul at Alexandria, Lunardo Longo, who finally obtained Peter's release. A Catalan merchant, who went from Cyprus to Cairo and intrigued against Venice, was, by the agency of Mark Malipiero, then in Cairo as envoy from Cyprus, acting in concert with Longo's agent at Cairo, Bernard Valaresso, and the interpreter, adroitly delivered into the hands of the Captain-General.

[4] The Council of Ten wrote to the Captain-General, 22 Oct. 1488 (M.L., *H.* III, pp. 419–20), acknowledging letters from him from Naxos dated 20 Sept., announcing the capture, and the papers (especially those found on Tristan) which revealed the whole plot. [G. Bustron, p. 542, however, says that Tristan threw his papers into the sea when he was caught.] He was to send Thomas Ficard, whom he had with him, under good guard to Venice. On 8 Nov. the Council ordered Rizzo and his two servants to be examined, if necessary under torture (M.L., *H.* III, 431). On 13 May 1489 he was condemned to death, within three days, by strangling or suffocation; the mem-

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Cairo to bring about a settlement, he was instructed[1] to tell the Sultan that Tristan died on his way to Venice and that Rizzo truly died in the same way (*similiter*) after reaching Venice. It was doubtless hoped that the Sultan would believe that, like Tristan, he committed suicide.

How far the Queen was actually a party to Rizzo's plot, it is not now possible to decide;[2] but that she knew something about it there is every reason to believe; and the Signory realized that prompt action must be taken. On the day after the arrival of Rizzo, the Council of Ten met to deliberate on a matter of great importance touching the person of the Queen of Cyprus, doubtless the question of her being brought back to Venice. It was decided that her two uncles, John Contarini and Nicolas Mocenigo, should be excluded from the discussions.[3] On the 22nd further decisions were taken. Orders were sent to the Captain-General to proceed at once to Cyprus, with such galleys as he thought necessary (leaving the force required for the protection of the Gulf of Venice), embark the Queen in a galley and send her home, he himself remaining on the spot. Ficard, whom he already had with him, was also to be sent in custody.[4] On the arrival of the Queen, election was to be made of a Duke and a Captain of Cyprus, to hold office on the same conditions as

bers of the Council present were authorized to carry arms for their defence (M.L., *H.* III, pp. 433–5). The two servants were to be imprisoned at Verona, to be expelled from Venetian territory later if necessary (*ibid.* p. 434, n. 1). It appears that the execution was long delayed: Sanudo (ap. M.L., *H.* III, pp. 441–2) says he was three years in the Torricella and in the dungeons; Nicolas Foscari, fearing that trouble might arise from his talk (for he protested all the time that he was the Sultan's ambassador) persuaded the Council to hang him secretly. Sanudo describes his end with detail. Malipiero (p. 611) says that he had demanded to be executed in public, but was not heard. The body was taken to Murano; the monks of the Monastery of San Cristoforo, where it was buried, were told to ask no questions. His death was kept so secret that the Bustrons say it was never known what became of him.

[1] 10 Sept. 1489. M.L., *H.* III, p. 477. It seems then that Sanudo's statement of three years in prison is an exaggeration, unless the Council were keeping Rizzo alive, but wished the Sultan to suppose him dead.

[2] Fietta, p. 58, maintains that Simonsfeld is unjustified in believing that her connivance verged on high treason. That term is at any rate too strong, since she was nominally an independent sovereign.

[3] M.L., *H.* III, p. 417 (18 Oct. 1488).

[4] He was imprisoned, but released by a decree of the Council of Ten, 19 Sept. 1489. M.L., *H.* III, p. 420, n. 1 and *Doc. Nouv.* p. 521, n. 2, where 1480 is a misprint for 1488 (1489 N.S.). George Cornaro wrote strongly in his favour to George Contarini, 18 Feb. 1489. He appears in the list of feudataries, *c.* 1510–21, with a revenue of 550 ducats (M.L., *H.* III, p. 499).

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the Duke and Captain of Crete.[1] The Queen is to have the same provision (that is 8000 ducats) as she has in Cyprus. But next day the Council met again and partly rescinded its resolutions (they had been passed at a late hour and without full discussion), and postponed discussion on the manner in which the Queen might, with decency and without risk, be removed, until further communication should be received from the Captain-General.[2] But by 28 October letters had arrived from Nicolas Capello, Proveditor of the Fleet, then in Cyprus, dated 21 September from Famagusta, and from the Counsellors and Proveditor of the island, which made further delay unnecessary, and the Council of Ten drafted definite instructions to Priuli.[3] The measures taken by him had, it appeared, been effective, the island was quiet, and the Queen had gone to Kerynia, which was convenient for the execution of the Council's plan. The time was therefore opportune to give effect to the resolution to remove her from Cyprus, since her desire to marry again, and dealings to that end, might easily lead to the loss of the Kingdom. The matter was of such moment that it could only be handled by Priuli, of whose authority and tact the Council had a very high opinion. The removal was to be effected without prejudice to the honour of the Queen and the dignity of the Signory. Priuli therefore was to leave the Proveditor of the Fleet, Cosmas Pasqualigo, with four galleys to guard the Gulf,[4] and hasten to Kerynia, or wherever else the Queen might be. He was to seek an interview with her, and persuade her to agree to leave the island, explaining that the object of the Signory is the good of the Queen and the Kingdom, on acquiring which the Turk is wholly bent, since it would mean for him an indubitable defeat of the Sultan of Egypt; whereas if he knows that the defence of

[1] They are each to have 500 ducats more than each of the said Rectors of Crete, and the expenses of their passage, and must leave Venice within a month of their election, or pay a fine of 1000 ducats.

[2] The letter to the Captain-General dated 22 Oct. (M.L. *H.* III, p. 419) seems to represent this revised resolution, since it says nothing about the removal of the Queen, but asks for a full report. If so, it ought to be dated 23 Oct.

[3] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 420–5, 28 Oct. 1488; but this letter was not despatched until those of 3 Nov., to the Captain-General and the Queen, were taken by George Cornaro when he sailed on 7 Nov. (M.L., *H.* III, pp. 425–8).

[4] His reappearance was to be on the pretext that the Turkish fleet was reported not to have returned to Constantinople, but to be going back to protect Adana and Tarsus, with some design on Cyprus, if opportunity should arise, such as the absence of the Venetian fleet especially would provide.

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the island falls on Venice, he will abstain from such an enterprise. Priuli is to use his most winning language[1] to gain Catherine's consent to the wishes of the Signory, promising her that when she comes to Venice she will be treated as a Queen and the dear daughter of the Signory, and guaranteed the revenue of 8000 ducats which she at present enjoys. If she consents, she is to be received with all her suite in the galley to be brought to Venice with becoming state and dignity. Priuli is to assure everybody that the whole proceeding arises rather out of her own deliberate wish than from any intervention and prompting on the part of the Signory, and to publish, in consultation with her, reasons for her retirement consistent with her dignity, making such dispositions as may prevent any untoward disturbance arising after her departure. But, if she will not be persuaded, she is to be told that she has forfeited the favour of the Signory and will be regarded as a rebel; and Priuli, if she persists, is to give effect to the Signory's wishes whether she will or no. It is left to his tact and prudence to take what steps he thinks proper to this end. On quitting Cyprus he is to leave behind as many galleys as he thinks necessary for its security, and to order the standard of St Mark to be flown throughout the island. To all Cypriotes, and especially their chief men, he is to show a good and cheerful countenance and use friendly and acceptable language, such as will assure them of the fraternal affection in which the Signory will hold them.

Having agreed on these instructions to Priuli, the Council decided to summon the Queen's brother, George Cornaro, and induce him if possible to go out to Cyprus and persuade her to consent. Whether he accepted the mission or not, the letter agreed upon was to go forward. If he went, the expenses of himself and his suite would be borne by the State.[2]

George Cornaro gladly accepted the delicate mission, as the Council wrote to Priuli on 3 November.[3] He was not, however, to be told of the evidence which the Council had gathered from Rizzo's and Tristan's papers concerning the Neapolitan intrigue. George had suggested that on arriving at Famagusta he should be sent on ahead, to talk his sister round. As to that it was left to Priuli to decide, but the Council repeated that, if all efforts at persuasion failed (which they could not think

[1] 'Omnibus illis dulcibus, humanis, placabilibus et gratiosis verbis', etc.

[2] He was given 150 ducats, and spent in addition 262, for which he was reimbursed on 11 Feb. 1490 (M.L., *H.* III, p. 426, n. 1).

[3] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 425–7.

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possible), he was free to act as instructed in the previous letter; in fact, to use force.

In despatching to Egypt the galley bearing the usual payment of tribute, which had been held up by Nicolas Capello, Priuli was to send a special envoy to explain to the Sultan that the reason for the spontaneous retirement of the Queen was that she did not wish to be subjected to the risk she had run in the previous year—a reference to the threat to the island from Bayazid, which was only averted by the presence of the Venetian fleet. It was at the instance and demand of the Queen that the Signory had consented to her going to Venice. Priuli was to see that Catherine wrote a letter to this effect, and signed it with her own hand. The flying of the standard of St Mark was to signify to all and every, especially to the Turk, that Venice was determined to devote all its powers to protect the Kingdom from attack by any potentate. If the galley had already gone with the tribute, this envoy was to be sent after it in another, to act in concert with the first. The Sultan was to be assured that Venice would see to it that the customary tribute should continue to be paid.

Another letter of the same date[1] was addressed by the Council to the Queen herself. It repeats, but more briefly, the assurances of the Signory's paternal affection for Catherine and interest in the well-being and honour of herself and the island, and promises her an annual provision of 8000 ducats.[2]

It has seemed worth while to analyse these letters of the Council of Ten in some detail, since they illustrate so plainly the difference between the actual policy of the writers and the bland professions with which they sought to impose—one can hardly believe with any success—on the Queen, the Cypriote nobles, and the Sultan of Egypt.

George Cornaro left Venice on 7 November[3] in a fast *gripe*, to join Priuli. On the following day the Council of Ten received a letter from Nicolas Capello, the Proveditor of the Fleet, dated 29 September

[1] M.L., *H.* III, p. 428.

[2] When Catherine was installed as Lady of Asolo, it was arranged that her pension should be secured on the revenues of that fief, any balance being made up from revenues from Cyprus. In the Commission to Balthasar Trevisan, Captain of Cyprus, 27 Aug. 1489 (M.L., *H.* III, p. 461, § 23), mention is made of the remitting to the Council of Ten of the money which the Queen is due to receive from time to time. See Note at the end of Chapter XIII, p 868, § 23.

[3] Sanudo says that the decision to send him was taken in January 1488 (1489 N.S.). This date is certainly wrong, and may be a confusion with that of his arrival in Cyprus.

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from Famagusta.[1] He reported that he had been informed by Nicolas Michiel, one of the Counsellors, that the sister of Tristan de Giblet—presumably that Vera of whom we have already heard (p. 740, n. 4)—had gone to Rhodes, and it was understood that the Queen proposed to do the same. The Council accordingly sent another fast *gripe* after the first, with orders to Priuli with George Cornaro to make all speed, so to speak fly, to Cyprus, calling at Rhodes on the way. If he found Catherine there, he was to send her brother, with the Council's letter addressed to her, to persuade her to yield. If she remained obstinate, Priuli was to request the Grand Master Peter d'Aubusson to bring her to reason and, persuasive methods failing, to hand her over, warning the Grand Master of the trouble that might otherwise ensue. If, finally, he could not get the Queen into his hands, he was to remain in Cyprus waters for the protection of the island.

If it was true that Catherine wished to escape to Rhodes, she was unable to elude the vigilance of her Counsellors. Cornaro, who caught up with Priuli at Corfù, proceeded in a galley to Cyprus, reaching Nicosia on 24 January 1489.[2] He persuaded Catherine, much against her will, to resign herself to the orders of the Signory.[3] To her mournful protest: 'Are not my lords of Venice content to have their island when I am dead, that they would deprive me thus soon of what my husband left me?' he replied with arguments that can well be imagined with the help of the long speech put into his mouth by the Cypriote and Venetian chroniclers: the exposed position of Cyprus, which the year before had only been saved from Bayazid by the presence of the Venetian fleet, but which, remote as it was, might at any time be attacked before Venetian help could reach it;[4] the glory which she would acquire by making a gift of her Kingdom to her fatherland; the wonderful reception which awaited her, and the promise of quiet and happy days, free from all anxiety, living as lady on her own fief; her debt of gratitude to Venice, which had defended her in time of danger, and enabled her to reign in peace; and finally (and this must have seemed to Cornaro the conclusive reason) the ruin of the whole family which would follow if she refused, and it was thought that he, far from trying to persuade, had

[1] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 429–31.

[2] Navagero, col. 1197.

[3] Sanudo, in M.L., *H.* III, pp. 436, 441; Bembo, *Hist. Vin.* (1552), ff. 8 sq.; P. Giustinian (1576), p. 249; Fl. Bustron, pp. 454–7; Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 74; *Descr.* ff. 186b, 187.

[4] How defenceless Cyprus was appeared within three months of Catherine's departure, when the island was raided by Turkish ships. See Ch. XIII, p. 829.

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dissuaded her. If she would not give way, the Signory had its General there; he would take her by force, she would forfeit the favour of the Signory, 'and we shall be ruined'.

Catherine yielded, her family affection perhaps moving her more than any other argument. Her brother, rather than herself, might claim to have made the gift of her Kingdom to his country. And such, as will appear, was the opinion of the Signory.[1]

The documents, so far as published, and the earlier chroniclers lend no support to the statement of Lusignan that the barons of the Kingdom were consulted by envoys from Venice. They were, in any case, powerless, and were forced to submit to conditions dictated by the Signory. It may be doubted whether they can fairly be said to have made terms, agreeing to the island being governed by Venice, on condition that the *Assises* were observed. They doubtless, as we shall see, petitioned to that effect, and the Senate definitely expressed its intention of upholding the ancient customs, and not remodelling the offices of the Kingdom.[2] Considering how jealous the oligarchy was of admitting outsiders to its privileges, we may also hesitate to believe that the barons of Cyprus were offered admission to the ranks of the Venetian nobility—an offer which, we are told, they declined for reasons of their own. Admission to Venetian citizenship could only be obtained, at the best, after residence in Venetian territory for a number of years.[3]

[1] Cp. P. Giustinian (1576), p. 249: by his means alone the Kingdom of Cyprus came under the Dominion of Venice. George Cornaro's part in the affair leaves an unpleasant impression. He was doubtless aware of the inflexible determination of the Signory; but he knew how to profit by the circumstances. And Venetian opinion considered him a very fortunate man. The diarist Priuli (*Diarii*, II, p. 59), when George's son Mark was made a Cardinal in 1500 at the age of seventeen (paying, it was said, though there was no knowing the truth, 20,000 ducats and more for the hat), remarks: 'and without doubt this noble Venetian messer Zorzi Corner saw himself in these days very lucky, nay most fortunate, first because he was the most honoured man in the city for his years, then because he had a sister who was Queen of Cyprus, and now he has a son who is Cardinal and very rich'. When the news came from Rome George was specially summoned to the College to receive its congratulations. Sanudo gives the sum paid by Mark for his hat as 15,000 ducats in cash, and a jewel for 5000. Cessi's note on Priuli, *ad loc.*

[2] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 522–3 (8 Aug. 1489).

[3] Thus in 1521 two Cypriotes were admitted to be *citadini de intus*, who had lived in Venice (*in questa terra*) ten and eight years respectively; but this was against the law, which required a residence of fifteen years (Sanudo, *Diarii*, XXXI, 491). A rich Cypriote, Alvise F(i)latro, was knighted by the Doge, 10 Aug. 1525 (*ibid.* XXXIX, 295). On citizenship *de intus* and *de extra*, see Romanin, IV, p. 469.

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The preparations for the Queen's departure occupied some time. She made a formal pilgrimage to Psithia[1] on 1 February, with a great cavalcade, and accompanied by the Proveditor.[2] On the 15th she rode from the capital to Famagusta, clad in black silk, and escorted by all the barons and their ladies, and by three hundred stradiotes; 'and when she left Nicosia the tears never ceased falling from her eyes, and at her going there was great weeping'. 'Be of good cheer,' she said to her people; 'I shall return'. She had a triumphal reception at Famagusta, and after her arrival there was jousting.[3] She was received by the rectors of the city, the Proveditor, the captains (*sopracomiti*) of the fleet, and finally by all the people and soldiery.[4] She was conducted under a richly decorated umbrella by the clergy, to the sound of bells, to the palace. There the Captain-General presented to her the letters from the Signory exhorting her briefly to do its will. The Count of Jaffa (Sir George Contarini) replied on her behalf that she was content, and commended the island and her Kingdom to the Signory. The Counsellor Nicolas Michiel then communicated to the people the desire of herself and the Signory. The knights and people (says the Venetian historian) were satisfied and, proceeding to the Captain-General's galley, expressed their loyalty to the Signory and begged him to ask that their privileges should be observed, as they would send envoys to supplicate. The solemn farce was then crowned by the Queen's praying the Captain-General that, before he left the island, he would cause the standard of St Mark to be hoisted everywhere. So on 26 February, Carnival Thursday, after celebration of a solemn mass of the Holy Spirit in the palace, a standard of St Mark, duly blessed, was presented by Catherine to the Captain-General as representative of the Signory. In accepting it he promised that the Signory would always defend it against everyone. The standard was immediately flown in the piazza of Famagusta,[5] and orders were given for the same to be done throughout the island.

Catherine sailed in the galley of Sir Nicolas Cornaro, with her brother

[1] Near Kerynia; see above, p. 600.

[2] G. Bustron, p. 542.

[3] G. Bustron, pp. 542–3 and n. 1.

[4] The ceremonies are described by Navagero, col. 1198.

[5] The inscription on a stone behind the altar in the Cathedral said that the banner of St Mark was happily raised in Cyprus on 26 February, Francis Priuli being Captain-General of the Fleet (Joh. Helffrich in Feyerabend, *Reyssbuch*, f. 377). Christoph Fürer, *Reisebeschr.* p. 300 (p. 106 of the Latin ed.) misread the date as 28 Feb. Enlart, p. 296.

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George, for Venice, where she arrived on 5 or 6 June 1489.[1] The Senate was busy making arrangements for her reception, which were modified when the time came.[2] She was received with unprecedented honours, and all Venice was in festival.[3] The galley, with its companion in which her suite had travelled, lay off the monastery of St Nicolas on the Lido.[4] Thither the Doge, Augustine Barbarigo, proceeded in the Bucentaur, with all the Signory and a great company of nobles and ladies. All Venice was there, in little boats festally arrayed. When the Doge arrived, on the 6th, a storm blew up, terrifying the ladies on the barge, which had to be anchored. As soon as it abated, Catherine came on board, dressed in black velvet, with a veil on her head, and jewels, in Cypriote fashion, as we see her kneeling in Bellini's *Miracle of the Cross*.[5] 'She is a beautiful lady', exclaims Sanudo. To the sound of church bells, trumpets and drums and gun-salutes, the Bucentaur carried her—an unheard-of honour for a Venetian lady—to the heart of Venice; as it passed the Cornaro Palace the Doge called her brother George to him and dubbed him knight.[6] Catherine alighted at the palace of the Duke of Ferrara,[7] where she stayed three days, afterwards going to visit her mother and relations.

[1] G. Bustron, p. 543, says that she embarked on 1 March 1488 (1489 N.S.). But Fl. Bustron, describing how the standard of St Mark was hoisted in her presence, and the Kingdom of Cyprus in this manner reduced to a province, on 14 March, says that she afterwards embarked. Navagero's date (col. 1198) for her departure, 14 May, may be right; but his statement that the Captain-General sailed with her is incorrect. Sanudo (M.L., *H.* III, p. 444) dates her arrival on 5 June (Rawdon Brown's 1 June, in his notes on the *Itinerario*, p. xiv, is evidently an error); Navagero on the 6th. Colbertaldi's dates are quite wrong (see Fietta, p. 61).

[2] M.L., *H.* III, p. 432 (10 May and 5 June). Thus the Bucentaur went to meet her at the Lido, instead of only as far as the palace of the Duke of Ferrara.

[3] Sanudo, in M.L., *H.* III, p. 445; Navagero, cols. 1198–9; Malipiero, p. 611; Bembo, *Hist. Vin.* (1552), f. 9.

[4] Sanudo, as above, p. 436, says that Catherine and her suite were all in the Cornaro galley, and that the other galley, the Tragurina, was wrecked with great loss. Later on, p. 445, he makes her and her brother arrive in the Cornaro galley, and her suite in another, the Curzolana.

[5] H. F. Brown, *Studies*, I, p. 285; below, p. 760.

[6] He was also, in 1508, made Procurator of St Mark. He and his family were allowed to quarter the Lusignan arms. For the other rewards which fell to him and his family, see M.L., *H.* III, p. 821 and cp. above, p. 747, n. 1. Eventually, the Grand Commandery of Cyprus was assigned in perpetuity to the Cornaro family, the head of which bore the title of Grand Commander of Cyprus. George died in 1524.

[7] On this palace and those where her mother and brother lived see Fietta, p. 61.

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The formal abdication and cession of her Kingdom to the Signory, which took place with solemn ceremony in St Mark's, was followed on 20 June by the grant to her of the territory and town of Asolo,[1] and the castle outside it, with all rights, jurisdictions, revenue, lands, etc. pertaining to it, with *merum* and *mixtum imperium* and the power of the sword and every other power, for such time of her life as she should remain in Venetian territory. Certain conditions were attached; for instance, she was not to increase any burden or *corvée* already laid on the inhabitants. No one was to be admitted to the territory who would not be admitted if it were in the hands of the Signory. The Doge and his successors were to have the same claim on the labour and service of the inhabitants as on their own subjects. They were to buy their salt from the Venetian salt-pans, and not from any other, at the price charged to other subjects of the Treviso district. In the provision of 8000 ducats a year, which Catherine is to receive from Venice, is to be included and reckoned just so much of the revenue as the Signory draws from Asolo and its territory, so that she may receive just the 8000 ducats and no more.[2] This was the same civil list as she had been allowed in Cyprus.[3] She took possession of her fief on Sunday, 11 October 1489.[4] There, making occasional visits to Venice[5] (she acquired a palace at Murano), she held her court, with a retinue of twelve maids of honour, and altogether a household of eighty. The subject of her life there, passed amid feasting and music and song and the polite conversation of literary men (Peter Bembo the chief among them) and gallants, has attracted so many pens that it has become hackneyed.[6]

[1] Navagero, col. 1199. Text of the donation, 20 June 1489, in M.L., *H.* III, pp. 452–4, from the *Commemoriali*, XVI, f. 135 (*Regesti*, V, p. 316, no. 163.)

[2] Cp. Magnante, cap. VII, p. 77. The balance, if any, was made up from the revenues of Cyprus. In 1499 Sanudo learned that she was getting 4500 from Cyprus and 3500 from Asolo. (Incidentally he mentions that she called herself the Sultan's slave). *Diarii*, III, 906. Mas Latrie, *H.* III, p. 428, n. 1 (writing in 1855), calculated the 8000 ducats as equivalent in weight to 60,000 francs of his time, in relative value more than 300,000 francs (about £12,000).

[3] Sanudo, in another place (M.L., *H.* III, p. 436), and Malipiero give the incorrect figure of 10,000 ducats. Bembo's figure (*Hist. Vin.* (1552), f. 9) is 50 lb. of gold a year, and a lump sum of 10 lb.

[4] Until then she lodged in a palace on the Grand Canal, which came to be called the Palazzo Corner della Regina. It was rebuilt in 1724 and is now a Monte di Pietà. Romanin, IV, p. 436.

[5] As in 1497, when there was a threat of a Turkish invasion.

[6] Bembo's *Asolani* is the chief source. Modern descriptions in English are in H. F. Brown, *Studies*, I, pp. 285 ff.; Edw. McCurdy, *Essays in Fresco* (1912), pp. 78–

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Although her brother had been the instrument employed by the Signory to force Catherine to relinquish her crown, she, far from bearing him a grudge, continued to hold him in the liveliest affection to the end of her days. In 1490 she executed a donation *causa mortis* to him of the Barco, with all its appurtenances, and of everything that she had acquired or should acquire at Asolo, reserving to herself the usufruct during her life.[1] And this donation was confirmed by her will in 1508.

The pseudo-royal state of Catherine excited the ambitions of her kinsfolk. In 1495 there was a proposal to marry her niece, a daughter of George Cornaro, to King Ferdinand II of Naples, with a dowry of 50,000 ducats (which Catherine demanded as her due from the Signory). As security, the fief of Manfredonia was offered to the protection of the Signory, which agreed to adopt as its daughter the Cornaro girl, as it had adopted Catherine, and to take the Kingdom of Naples also under its protection. But Pope Alexander VI saw the implications of such 'protection', and reminded Ferdinand of what it had led to in Cyprus. Allied as he was to the Holy See, Ferdinand could not act against the Pope's wishes, and broke off the negotiations.[2]

But, though the Signory might favour such a plan if it fell in with its own political ambitions, it would have nothing to do with schemes which seemed to aim at making Catherine's royalty something more than the pretence it was. It has been said that when her brother George, as podestà of Brescia in 1497, entertained her there with royal state, he suffered for it, being removed from his post;[3] it is in fact certain only that he resigned the office, though it may have been suggested to him

127; Arthur Stanley, in *Blackwood's Magazine*, Jan. 1943, pp. 29–31. In the Bibliographical Appendix to his *Exc. Cypr.* (1908) Cobham enumerates, between 1675 and 1783, at least seven light operas, tragedies, historical romances, or comedies about the Queen of Cyprus. For some of these, see Fietta, pp. 52–4.

[1] Fietta, p. 59; the text of the donation, pp. 80–1.

[2] Malipiero, p. 612.

[3] So Brown, p. 291, referring to Sanudo, *Diarii*, I, 741. The magnificent reception given to the Queen, with triumphal processions, jousting, etc., is described by the diarist, cols. 741–3, 762–7. But, as to the removal of Cornaro from office, what Sanudo says (col. 767) is that George Cornaro wrote and *refused* the office of podestà, and Mark Sanudo was elected in his place on 1 Oct. Cornaro remained for a time in high favour. On 18 April 1499 he was present at the College (it was irregular, but the Doge wished it) when it was debated whether the Queen should have some of the presents sent to the Signory by the Sultan. No one opposed the proposal, which was put into effect; Marino Sanudo himself and another were against it, but thought it more discreet to be silent. *Ibid.* II, 629, 644.

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that he had better do so. As an instance, however, of the rebukes which were administered to her when her thoughts were known to be returning towards that realm to which, on leaving it, she had said 'I shall come back', it may be noted that as late as the year of her death[1] the Council of Ten administered to her a sharp reproof on account of certain intrigues conducted on her behalf by one Antony Rubeus (Rossi?) in Cyprus. Out of consideration for her the offender was released from the prison to which he had been committed.

In 1508 Catherine made her last will, which is dated from her residence at San Cassiano, 1 May. She left everything to her only brother George, asking him to provide for her relations and household, and to arrange for her burial, masses for her soul and other alms.[2] Her health was failing; at the time of writing the will, or immediately afterwards, she was very ill with some form of colic. Her brother, who was at the time at Gorizia as Proveditor-General, asked permission to go and see her, returning immediately to camp, but was refused by the Council of Ten.[3] As a matter of fact, she had already recovered. Not long afterwards she was driven out of her tranquil retreat by the Imperialists. In February 1509 she went to Venice, and, although she returned for a while, the place was too insecure,[4] and she had to retire again. On the morning of 10 July 1510[5] the College was informed that Catherine had died in the night. Clad in the habit of the Order of St Francis, she was buried with much pomp two days later in SS. Apostoli, a bridge of boats having been built for the passage of the funeral procession across the Grand Canal.[6] Andrew Navagero pronounced the funeral oration.

[1] Romanin, IV, p. 437, n. 1 (3 April 1510); Fietta, p. 77, n. 2; V. L. Paladini, *Asolo*, 2nd ed. p. 171.

[2] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 583–6. The document is holograph.

[3] Sanudo, *Diarii*, VII, 477 (17 May).

[4] On 28 June, her nephew Francis, son of George Cornaro, made an attempt to save Asolo from the Imperialists. It was not approved by the authorities, it was said out of spite against George, who was out of favour at the time (Sanudo, *Diarii*, VIII, 449–50). At the end of July, Antony Venier was sent to take possession of it in her name (*ibid.* 566). See Fietta, p. 76.

[5] Sanudo curiously contradicts himself later, making her die in 1511 (*Diarii*, LVI, 1044).

[6] Sanudo, *Diarii*, X, 744: 'morta da doja di stomacho'. He gives her age as 54; so does Bembo (1552), f. 148b; Colbertaldi, M.L., *H.* III, p. 448, as 50 and three months. There seems to be no doubt that she was more like 56. The monument and chapel to her memory in SS. Apostoli were erected by her brother George. She is commemorated by a slab in San Salvadore, whither her remains were removed before 1620 and

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Thus the Kingdom of Cyprus came to an unhappy end in a struggle between two women, both of whom must claim our sympathy. In this conflict the Cypriote nation played, so far as we can tell from the records, a passive part. It was conducted between the legitimate heiress of the Lusignan dynasty which had been imposed on the island some three centuries before, and the widow of a bastard usurper, used by Venice as a pawn in her game of commercial domination of the Levant. Of the two women, Charlotte had much more character, and fought to the bitter end for a hopeless cause. Catherine made at times some attempt to stand up against the sinister machinations of the Neapolitan-Catalan party on the one hand, and the cold, cynical policy of her adoptive parent, the Venetian Signory, on the other. And indeed some of the Venetian officials were moved to admiration of her; 'she is a notable woman', said one of them. She abdicated with tears and reluctance, but not as one might have done who was being robbed of a right which had its roots three centuries deep in history. The peaceful course of her twenty years of life as Lady of Asolo, over which literature has shed a romantic glow, makes of her a much less tragic figure than is presented by her rival.

It has been observed that women played a remarkably prominent part, not only in the social, but in the political life of Frankish Greece.[1] The figures of the Queens Eleanor, Helena, Charlotte and Catherine show that, for evil as well as good, this is equally true of Frankish Cyprus. Catherine cannot compare with the others for strength of character, but there was dignity in the way she carried off a part which was not of her own inheritance or choice, so as to earn the affection of her subjects, and the admiration of her contemporaries.[2]

probably in 1570 (Selvatico and Lazari, *Guida di Venezia*, cited by Fietta, pp. 78–9) and not in the seventeenth century as others suppose (e.g. Romanin, IV, p. 439). Sanudo records (*Diarii*, XXXIX, 345) that on 25 Aug. 1525 the friars of San Salvadore celebrated her *annuario, per esser il suo deposito lì*, though her remains lay in SS. Apostoli behind the high altar.

[1] Miller, *Essays*, p. 79.

[2] Sabbadino degli Arienti, *Gynevera de le clare donne*, ed. C. Ricci and A. Bacchi della Lega (Bologna, 1888), p. 400, speaking of Catherine, says: 'Haverei saputo recordare cum quanta gratia de li cypriani populi se portava; et quanto ella da quilli è desiderata, et quanto honore a facto a le Venetiane donne; et cum quanta honestate et magnificentia vive in Vinetia, et cum quanta dilectione observa lo inclyto Senato, come sua figliuola.' The editors say that the MS. bears date 1483; but this passage clearly refers to a period after her abdication.

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That she was beautiful in her youth there seems no doubt, though her charm may have lain more in expression than in features. We have noticed the involuntary tribute to her beauty of the Venetian chronicler when she came home in 1489, a woman of some thirty-five years. She is described[1] as of middle height, inclined to plumpness (which seems to have become stoutness with increasing years), with very lively eyes, very eloquent and of cheerful conversation; faithful to her word and stable in all she undertook; ready to give her opinion in matters of dispute, but without obstinacy. She did not seek with strange artifices to embellish the beauty which God gave her, and she would that her maidens followed her example. She was very devout and fond of reading the lives of her patron and other saints. A traveller, who was in Cyprus about 1482, agrees as to her beauty, plumpness and pleasant conversation, adding that she was fond of hunting, falconry and dancing.[2]

Modern historians[3] have spoken of the gigantic strides by which the Hellenization of the foreign element had progressed during the fifteenth century, a process much encouraged by the last 'Gallopeloponnesian' King James II. It has been observed that the Hellenized writer George Bustron refers to the French and Greeks as Cypriotes, while he calls the Venetian and Spanish foreigners contemptuously 'Franks'.[4] 'Franks' also is the term used by Florio Bustron for the foreigners, such as the foreign soldiers in Famagusta, who quarrelled with the Greeks. By the time of James II there was then something like a Cypriote feeling which united the descendants of the old French nobility and the Greeks in their opposition to Italian, Savoyan and Spanish intruders. But how far it can be described positively as national, rather than negatively as anti-

[1] Colbertaldi, quoted by M.L., *H.* III, p. 448. On Colbertaldi's description of her as a girl and on her portraits, see Note II at the end of this Chapter, p. 758, n. 3.

[2] Joos van Ghistele, *Tvoyage*, bk. v, ch. iv.

[3] Sathas, Μεσ. Βιβλ. II, p. ρι'; Zannetos, I, pp. 924–8.

[4] See Sathas, *loc. cit.* George Bustron, on p. 539, distinguishes the 'Franks' of Famagusta from the 'Italians', on the occasion of the riot of 17 May 1474, when the 'Franks' and 'Cypriotes' were imprisoned. The Proveditor released them but left the 'Cypriotes' in prison. I take it that here 'Italians' must mean the Genoese of Famagusta, while the 'Franks' are Venetians. But there can have been no Venetians among the 'Franks' whom George Bustron describes as being banished by the Queen (pp. 530–1). In Florio Bustron's account of the riot, 'Franks' and 'Italians' are equated (p. 452); previously (p. 451) he has equated the 'Franks' with the foreign soldiers. See also above, p. 710.

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foreign, may be doubted. This feeling was to show itself very strongly, so far as the Spaniards were concerned, after the death of James and the murder of Catherine's uncle and cousin. The people of Nicosia expressed very clearly, by word and action, their dislike and suspicion of the 'Catalans'. At the same time, curiously enough, they were intensely loyal to the Venetian lady who had been brought in to rule over them. The obscure movement to which the Count of Roucha was suspected of lending his support was perhaps directed not so much against Catherine as against Venice. It may have been a matter not so much of national feeling as of personal likes and dislikes. Otherwise, is it likely that the process of Hellenization which had begun in the reign of John II would have been so easily cut short as it was by the Venetian domination?

The strong preference for the Greek tongue over the French which was shown by Queen Charlotte may have been an idiosyncrasy. It is true that she used an interpreter, at least when the tenor of her words or those which were addressed to her was important, and when she attempts to write French, it is clear that she had more than 'slightly neglected the language of her fathers'.[1] Since she did actually on occasion use the French language, the statement that 'to the day of her death she allowed no language but Greek to be spoken in her court'[2] must be dismissed as an exaggeration.

The French stock, after three hundred years' experience of in-breeding in the semi-Oriental moral climate of Cyprus, had lost its vigour. It could spare no vitality to infuse into the native race. It has been thought that if James II and Charlotte had worked together instead of fighting each other, the Greek strain in their blood might have made them the creators of a healthy Graeco-Cypriote nationality. This would be more credible if any noticeable tendency had been shown by either of them to choose Greek advisers, or if the Greek element had thrown out any expression of national feeling instead of looking on apathetically at the quarrels between the rival rulers. When a Greek leader arises among the people, like Stephen Kuduna, he leads them not to the fight for independence, but to the defence of one of the foreign rivals. Or else, as in the case of the Count of Roucha, they seek a leader among the non-Greek nobles. It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that long centuries of foreign domination had left in the people nothing of the stuff of which a nation could be made.

[1] M.L., *H.* III, p. 115, n. 2.

[2] Zannetos, I, p. 927.

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It has been said[1] that by some fatality every political change in the history of Cyprus from the Ptolemaic period onwards has marked a stage in the retrogression or, more accurately speaking, the degradation of its people, alike from the spiritual and from the material standpoint. This is, to say the least, an over-statement, and, so far as it is true, ignores the fact that not fate, but inherent weakness, drives a people on such a downward path. The stage which we have completed with this chapter has shown the gradual decay of the feudal system, transplanted from the West into the uncongenial soil of a semi-Orientalized island, in which it could neither itself flourish, nor encourage a healthy growth in the native population; although it must not be forgotten that at the time of its introduction there was no better system available. It has already been remarked that, had the French ruling class from the beginning shown the power of fusion with the natives that characterized the Normans, something like a strong nationality might have emerged. But it did not, and it came up against a race which, for its part, opposed a sullen resistance to any such adaptation to a foreign regime. Thus, gradually degenerating—a process in which, as already observed, inbreeding was probably a factor—it passed away without having contributed any element to the making of a Cypriote nation; for the survival of a few French customs and fashions down to the sixteenth century, and of a number of French words in the language, indicates no deeply penetrating influence.[2] So too, its yoke-fellow, the Latin Church, disappeared without leaving any mark on the Cypriote Church over which it had tyrannized so long; although, by the buildings of which the splendid remains, so obviously the work of foreigners, still witness to its past glories, it influenced the native architecture to a certain degree.[3] Rather than brand the history of the Cypriote people as a tale of progressive degradation, it would be true to say that its character, passively resisting with an almost Oriental stubbornness, has remained unchanged through centuries of foreign domination.

[1] Zannetos, I, p. 1020.

[2] Cp. Jodocus v. Meggen, *Peregrinatio*, p. 76; Mogabgab, *Supp. Exc.* III, p. 151, n. 2.

[3] Zannetos (I, p. 1023) goes so far as to say that the influence of the gothic style distorted the native church-architecture, so that almost the whole of the Greek churches built since the French period are the most inartistic that can be found anywhere, and the Holy Synod has attempted to prevent the erection of such monstrosities by insisting on the submission of plans to metropolitan control. It is hardly fair to drag in French gothic as responsible for what is after all a very natural decadence.

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NOTE I. ON THE DATE OF THE MURDER OF ANDREW CORNARO AND OTHERS, ETC. (p. 671)

It is generally assumed that the alarm was sounded at the third hour before dawn on Saturday 15 November 1473 (G. Bustron, p. 489; Loredano-Giblet, II, p. 325). But 15 November 1473 O.S. was a Monday, and the real date was 13 November. (3 November in Sanudo, M.L., *H.* III, p. 437, should be corrected accordingly; in the *Vite*, col. 1199, he has the right date.) This can be proved from various sources, including Barbaro's despatch, which, though dated 15 November, was begun on the day after the outbreak and finished on the night of the 15/16th. When at the beginning of his despatch he speaks of hearing the tocsin at the eleventh hour of 'this last' night, he means the early morning of the 13th. As stated above, it was at the third hour before dawn, according to G. Bustron and Loredano. Barbaro then describes how, in the course of the day, he was visited by the Count of Tripoli and others, and how in the morning of the 14th the Count came to him about the report he was writing, and told him how Peter Davila had arrived. G. Bustron (p. 488) also says that Peter arrived on the 14th, and Fl. Bustron that he came on the day after the murders. After the murders the Queen was forced to write a letter relieving Contarini of his command at Kerynia, and in the morning of the 15th she sent for the Venetian Bailie and complained about this. The same day in the evening, she again sent for the Bailie and Barbaro, to hear the Neapolitan envoy give her King Ferdinand's message.

15 December in G. Bustron, p. 490, is a mistake for 15 November; on that day proclamation was made in Nicosia that no one should go armed in the streets, and the thirty Sicilians who had been sent away from Famagusta arrived with a report of the occurrences.

There is some obscurity about the dates of the Archbishop's movements. Writing on 12 November (Cornet, p. 93; M.L., *H.* III, p. 351 n.), Barbaro says that *hozi terzo zorno*, i.e. on the 10th, two Neapolitan galleys arrived at St George 'on this side of Paphos'[1] with the Archbishop, who landed there and has come to Famagusta. The Archbishop says that in one of the galleys is an envoy of King Ferdinand, who, says Barbaro, has not come on to Famagusta, though the weather is fine. In his later despatch (Cornet, p. 97; M.L., *H.* III, p. 358) he says that *hozi terzo zorno* the Archbishop has arrived *a piedi* from Lemesos, and that *hozi* the envoy (evidently also coming by land) has entered Famagusta by the land-gate. (The two Neapolitan galleys

[1] Perhaps the St George not far from Lemesos where in 1306 the Grand Master of the Hospital met Vignoli (p. 201).

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reached Famagusta on the evening of the 14th at the 24th hour.) *Hozi* here might mean the 15th, for it was in the evening of that date that, as we have seen, the envoy presented himself to the Queen; or it might mean the 14th (for soon afterwards Barbaro describes what happened on that day), which would make the Archbishop arrive at Famagusta on the 12th, thus agreeing with the despatch of that date already quoted.

On the other hand, G. Bustron (p. 488) says that the Archbishop with an envoy from Ferdinand arrived in Cyprus on 5 November. This would give time for Louis to go to Nicosia, show the papal letter to his adherents, and arrange for the outbreak at Famagusta. Of such a visit to the capital, Barbaro says, and apparently knows, nothing.

NOTE II. ON THE PORTRAITS OF CATHERINE CORNARO[1]

Since the story that Catherine's uncle attracted the attention of James II, by allowing him accidentally to see a portrait of her, rests on no better authority than the romancer Loredano, we need waste no time in speculating on the existence of some early miniature of the girl.

Though it also depends on a writer of small authority, Colbertaldi, who wrote some eighty years after the Queen's death, the story that a portrait was sent out from Venice which effectively supported Andrew Cornaro's proposal has more probability, if only because the artist by whom it is said to have been painted was obscure. Dario[2] of Treviso, 'pictor vagabundus', entered the *bottega* of Squarcione about 1440. Leaving Padua after January 1448, he was in 1455 at Treviso, from 1459 to 1466 at Asolo, in 1467 at Conegliano, in 1469 again at Asolo and Serravalle, in 1470 and 1471 at Treviso, in 1473 at Conegliano. One or two of his paintings have survived, but no portrait of Catherine that can be attributed to him has been identified.[3]

[1] This note has appeared in a Greek translation in *Paphos*, X (1945), pp. 50–8.

[2] G. Gerola, 'Dario pittore' in *Miscellanea di studi in onore di Attilio Ortis* (Trieste, 1910); summary in Venturi, *Storia dell' arte italiana*, VII, pt. iii (1914), pp. 19–20.

[3] Gerola is sceptical of the value of Colbertaldi's attribution of the portrait to Dario. Colbertaldi was born forty-six years after the Queen's death. He may have seen an old portrait at Asolo, representing Catherine as a girl; but was there any good tradition that Dario was the painter, or was Colbertaldi simply making an attribution which added something to the fame of Asolo? Colbertaldi's description of the girl Catherine, it is true, must not be taken seriously. There is no reason to suppose that his effusion of commonplaces—rose-red cheeks, coral lips, pearly teeth, snow-white neck, milk-white bosom, golden hair, etc.—is inspired by an actual picture.

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Vasari's statement,[1] that Jacopo Bellini painted portraits of Catherine and her brother George, has been doubted on chronological grounds, and it has been suggested that he attributed to Jacopo the portrait by Gentile. But if we discount the qualification that it was an early work of Jacopo, the statement becomes possible, since the artist did not die until 1470 or 1471.[2]

Vasari also says[3] that, when he was in Venice in 1541, he saw in the possession of John Cornaro a portrait of Catherine painted by Giorgione from the life. Of this work he afterwards lost trace.[4]

It is generally supposed that in 1500 Catherine gave a portrait of herself to one of her maids of honour, Fiammetta Buccari, as a wedding present on her marriage to Rambaldo di Avogari of Treviso.[5] This belief in what seems to be a mare's nest is based on the inscription on a portrait, which was first published in 1905, and was then and in 1911, and may be still, in the possession of Count Avogadro degli Azzoni of Treviso.[6] No one seems to have taken the trouble to translate the inscription, which reads: 'Catherina Cornelia de Lusignano Hyerusalem Cypri et Armeniae Regina quae Flamettam Buchari Cipriam puellam suam nobilem Rambaldo Actionio Advocato nuptam datam an. Sal. MD picta Deiparae imagine Antonelli Messanensis rarissima in tabula donavit.' What this tells us is that this portrait represents Catherine, who presented her maid of honour Fiammetta Buccari, who was given in marriage to Rambaldo Azzoni Avogadro in 1500, with a very rare picture of the Virgin

[1] *Vite*, ed. Milanesi, III, p. 151.

[2] E. Schaeffer, *Bildnisse der Caterina Cornaro*, in *Monatshefte für Kunstwissenschaft*, IV (1911), p. 14 n.

[3] *Vite*, IV, p. 99.

[4] Herbert Cook, *The Portrait of Caterina Cornaro by Giorgione (finished by Titian)*, privately printed, no date [1915] and no pagination. We shall return to Cook's theory below. He thinks that the phrase 'from the life' indicates that Vasari knew of posthumous portraits of the Queen, and that when he wrote he may have known the portrait, now in the Uffizi, which Titian, according to an old inscription on the back, is supposed to have painted in 1542. It has no claim to represent Catherine.

[5] Sanudo, *Diarii*, III, col. 108 (13 Feb. 1500), says: this morning was married (*sposà*) one of the maids of honour of the Queen of Cyprus, in the Queen's house at San Cassiano, called Frumeta [*l.* Fiammetta], who already two years ago was married (*maridà*) to one Rambaldo di Avogari of Treviso, and had had a boy by him. The passage is puzzling; it seems that although the marriage of two years earlier must have been quite regular, and not a mere betrothal, the formal celebration of it, and the giving of the wedding present, were postponed until 1500. According to Molmenti (see next note) the nuptial contract was dated 12 July 1500.

[6] P. Molmenti, 'Un ritratto della Regina Caterina Cornaro', in *Emporium*, XXII (1905), p. 119, and in *Venice, The Golden Age*, tr. H. F. Brown, II (1907), pp. 145–6. Schaeffer, *op. cit.* Pl. 10.

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by Antonello da Messina. It is clear that this inscription gives no evidence whatever for the supposition that Catherine gave Fiammetta a portrait of herself, still less that the Treviso picture is that portrait or a copy of it.[1] No doubt the family desired to possess a portrait of Fiammetta's old mistress, and, when copies of a portrait by a well-known artist became available, secured one and put this inscription on it. The family tradition of the portrait, as well as Antonello's picture, having been given to Fiammetta by the Queen, may well be based on misinterpretation of the inscription.

With this Treviso portrait go at least four others, varying from it in quality and details, all of them probably copies from some lost original. Of these the finest, according to Cook, is or was in the possession of the Duca delle Grazie, in the Palazzo Vendramin Calergi at Venice. A second is in the Kestner Museum in Hanover.[2] A third is in the Cook Collection at Doughty House, Richmond.[3] A fourth, from the Holford Collection at Westonbirt, was presented by Lord Duveen to the Government of Cyprus, and hangs in Government House, Nicosia.[4]

Catherine is represented,[5] in this group of pictures, as a stoutish young lady, life size, three-quarter length, three-quarters to right. Her right hand hangs at her side and holds back a black velvet train falling from her shoulder. Her left arm is extended, the palm upwards, as if she were making a speech. She wears a transparent veil, and a gold chain round her neck, with a pearl in front from which hang three other pearls. On the back of her head is a spiked crown. In the background on the left is a curtain, on the right (in the Richmond and Cyprus versions) the base and lower part of a column. In the Treviso version there is no column, the inscription filling the space. The versions vary in other unimportant details. If the Vendramin version is the best, the buxom wench at Hanover is easily the worst, being a mere caricature. In the Richmond version much of the character has been refined away, and the other two seem to me, so far as I can judge without closer

[1] Molmenti observes that no notice of either the portrait or the picture occurs in the nuptial contract or in the wills of the couple dated 1529 and 1549 respectively. Antonello's picture is first mentioned in a deed of 1601; both picture and portrait in a catalogue of 1701.

[2] No. 52. Schaeffer, Pl. 8. 'Loredana', *Caterina Cornaro*, Rome (1938), at p. 96. Inscribed, in very bad and unconvincing lettering, CATERINA. CORN. REGINA. DE. CIPR.

[3] Cook, Pl. V. Inscribed CATERINA CORNARA REGINA DE CIPRO.

[4] *Catalogue of the Holford Collection at Westonbirt*, Oxford (1924), no. 23, Pl. XXXI; Christie Sale Catalogue, 15 June 1927, lot 13; *The Times*, 30 Nov. 1927; R. Gunnis, *Famagusta, Short Guide* (Nicosia, Cyprus, 1934).

[5] I have seen no reproduction of the Vendramin version; the remarks in the text apply to the four others.

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comparison than is now possible, to be more probably nearer the presumed lost original.

Now Ridolfi[1] has the remark that there were an infinite number of copies of a portrait by Titian, which represented Catherine in widow's weeds; the original was remarkable for the contrast between the clear complexion and the dark dress. That means, as Schaeffer remarks, that she was represented as comparatively young, not as she was when Gentile Bellini painted her in 1500; and therefore Titian's portrait was not from the life. There is thus very great probability that these five very unsatisfactory portraits are some of the 'infinite number of copies' of a lost fancy portrait by Titian.[2]

The most important of the undoubted extant portraits of the Queen is that by Gentile Bellini at Budapest (Plate VII).[3] The inscription on it reads: 'Cornelia genus, nomen fero virginis quam Syna sepelit, Venetus filiam me vocat Senatus. Cyprusq[ue] servit novem regnor(um) sedes. Quanta sim vides, sed Bellini manus maior, quae me tam brevi expressit tabula.'[4] Although this reads as if she were still reigning Queen of Cyprus, it is generally agreed, from her apparent age, that the picture must have been painted about 1500. Catherine

[1] *Meraviglie d'arte* (1648), I, p. 137; (1835), I, p. 198; in Detlev v. Hadeln's edition, I, p. 153.

[2] Painted, perhaps, as Schaeffer suggests (p. 18, n. 2) at the request of George Cornaro, who may well be represented in the 'man with the falcon' at Berlin (Simon Bequest, *ibid*, Pl. 10). The name of Catherine has got itself attached to some at least of another group of Titianesque portraits, of which the Uffizi example (no. 648; Reinach, *Répertoire*, VI, 196; Fischel, *Tizian*, 74) is the best known. They represent a beautiful young woman in Oriental dress, sometimes with the attributes of St Catherine, and they all derive, more or less freely, from Titian's lost fancy portraits of the wife of Suleiman II (the 'Rossa Sultana') and his daughter Cameria. See Schaeffer, p. 14, n. 2, quoting Gronau, 'Tizian's Bildnisse türkischer Sultaninnen', in *Beiträge zur Kunstgeschichte, Franz Wickhoff gewidmet* (Vienna, 1903), pp. 132 ff. Among them is the Holford picture of a young woman wearing a veil over a tall hennin-like head-dress (Exhibition of Venetian Art, 1895, no. 252; Gronau, *loc. cit.* Taf. IV a; Reinach, *Répertoire*, I, 147; *Catalogue of the Holford Collection, Dorchester House* (Oxford, 1927), no. 51, Pl. XLVII; *Pantheon* (Feb. 1931), p. 85; now in the John Ringling Museum, Sarasota).

[3] No. 117. Frequently reproduced; e.g. Centelli, *Caterina Cornaro* (Venice, 1892), frontispiece and p. 134; *L'Arte* (1900), p. 207; Reinach, *Répertoire*, IV, 598; Cook, Pl. II; Schaeffer, Pl. 8; McCurdy, *Essays in Fresco* (1912), at p. 78; Venturi, *Storia*, VII, pt. iv, p. 251; 'Loredana', *op. cit.* at p. 232. According to Molmenti, there is, or was, a contemporary copy in the possession of Dr Günther in his villa at Gardone.

[4] If Gentile thus exalted himself at the expense of his sitter, he was himself treated in the same fashion by Victor Gambello, who inscribed the medal of him 'Gentili tribuit quod potuit viro Natura; hoc potuit Victor et addidit'.

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is represented in half-figure, three-quarters left. She wears crown and transparent veil, wimple-fashion, and besides a fine chain with three pendent pearls another necklace of pearls crossing in front and joining the row of pearls which borders her bodice; and finally, on another chain, two pendants, apparently a pearl, and one of those *glossopetrae* or 'serpent's tongues' which were worn as charms against poison.[1]

The features in Bellini's portrait show considerable variation from those in any other portrait identified as Catherine; the nose especially appears straighter and stronger; and the whole expression is so different, so lacks the engaging, lively character which the others endeavour with more or less success to indicate, that it is safe to say that but for the inscription it would not have been identified as Catherine. The difference in the shape of the nose may be due to the fact that it is foreshortened. In any case, the head-dress and peculiar jewellery and its arrangement make it almost certain that the same lady kneels at the head of the matrons in Bellini's 'Miracle of the Cross' in the Accademia,[2] which was painted in 1500; and in that representation there is no such difference from the features of the other portraits.

Such is the material on which the identification of a number of other portraits as Catherine has been based. It is unnecessary to discuss them in detail here.[3]

[1] See Clifford Smith, 'The Goldsmith and the Young Couple, or the Legend of S. Eloy and S. Godeberta by Petrus Christus', privately printed 1915, p. 13.

[2] Detail in Schaeffer, Pl. 8; Cook, Pl. I; Venturi, *Storia*, VII, pt. iv, p. 244. Simonsfeld thinks (ap. L. Fietta, p. 50) that the eight ladies who accompany the Queen in this picture are members of her family.

[3] (*a*) The foundress in Jacopo de' Barbari's altar-piece at Berlin (no. 26A). (*b*) The standing figure in Titian's fresco of the 'Miracle of St Antony' in the Santo at Padua, 1511. (*c*) The marble bust at Berlin, from the Pourtalès Collection, which was bought at Asolo and is dated 1505. Bode in *Jahrbuch*, IV (1883), p. 143; Cook, Pl. IV. Schaeffer (p. 17, n. 1) is sceptical about this, but I see no reason to doubt it. (*d*) The 'Paul Veronese' at Vienna (no. 395) has since been called 'Portrait of a Veronese lady' and attributed to Antonio Badile (Wickhoff, cited by Schaeffer, p. 17, n. 1). (*e*) Dresden, no. 276 (Woermann, *K. Gemälde-Galerie zu Dresden* (1884), p. 310), was attributed to Pordenone as a portrait of Catherine, and engraved as such by C. G. Schultze. The later view is that it is perhaps Flemish of about 1600. (*f*) I have not been able to trace 'la belle Turque', formerly in the Manfrin Gallery at Venice, which is described by Mas Latrie (*Hist.* III, p. 183 n.) as incontestably Catherine, in Cypriote costume: 'ce sont ses yeux mêmes, noirs et brillants, son teint blanc et coloré, son embonpoint'. Possibly it was one of the two half-figures of St Catherine attributed in the Catalogue of 1872, nos. 144, 145, to Parmigiano or Girolamo Mazzuoli. (*g*) Fietta (p. 74) mentions a portrait in the possession (in 1881) of the Beltramini family at Asolo, who acquired it from the Farolfi, also of Asolo. He conjectures it to be the one which, according to her

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But something must be said about the remarkable picture from the Doughty House Collection which is the subject of Sir Herbert Cook's monograph, and which was presented to the National Gallery in 1942 by Sir Francis Cook.[1]

It has been frequently reproduced, and full bibliographies up to 1915 will be found in Cook's monograph and in the reprint thereof in the third volume of the Doughty House Catalogue.[2] It has been traced back as far as 1641 when it was in the possession of the Counts Martinengo Colleoni at Brescia, and was known as 'La Schiavona' by Titian. In 1878 Crowe and Cavalcaselle mention a tradition that it represents Catherine Cornaro. In 1897 and again later Mr Bernard Berenson described it as a copy of a lost original by Giorgione, but his later view[3] is that it is an early Titian. For Adolfo Venturi in 1900, it was by Bernardino Licinio; for Claude Phillips in 1905 it was by Titian in his Giorgionesque phase; for Ludwig Justi in 1926 it was by Giorgione. Cook's own view, following on certain suggestions of Sir

biographer Colbertaldi, the Queen gave to Bartholomew Colbertaldi when in 1497 she fled to Venice for fear of a Turkish invasion, and made Bartholomew vice-podestà. The portrait, says Fietta, resembles that in Bellini's 'Miracle of the Cross', though the Queen is some years younger. Is this one of the group discussed above? Representations of small iconographic value are found in various historical pictures, for which reference may be made to Schaeffer. The Departure of Catherine with her brother George from Cyprus, Venetian School of the sixteenth century (Neu-Schwanenburg, Transehe Collection; Schaeffer, Pls. 8 and 9; 'Loredana' at p. 200), has evidently been over-restored; the portrait before restoration, as shown by Schaeffer, had apparently not been refined out of all character. The most interesting in quality of these historical pictures is that at Stockholm (no. 19, attributed in the 1928 Catalogue to Pietro della Vecchia, 1605–78: 'in composition it may go back to Giorgione or some other master near him, but the execution betrays a later hand'). Catherine, identified by her likeness to the traditional portraits, and still comparatively young, is seated at a table, on which she has laid her crown and a pearl necklace. Holding her long flowing hair in her left hand she bends forward anxiously to receive a letter which is brought by a messenger, wearing a curved sword at his side, a bugle slung from his shoulder, and carrying his cap in his left hand. Between them a small negro page with his back to the observer; behind her, a woman attendant. The catalogue description, 'Catherine Cornaro receiving a letter from the Council of Venice', sounds plausible.

[1] *The Times*, 13 Nov. 1942.

[2] *Catalogue of the Paintings at Doughty House, Richmond*, vol. III (by M. W. Brockwell), pp. 172–8. I have to thank Mr Brockwell for much information about the history of the picture. For publications later than 1915 I need refer only to the Catalogue of the Exhibition of Italian Art at Burlington House, 1930, no. 385, which also has a bibliography; Brockwell's *Abridged Catalogue of the Cook Collection*, Pl. XXII (see p. 63); and the 39th *Annual Report of the National Art Collections Fund*, 1943.

[3] *Italian Pictures of the Renaissance* (1932), p. 574.

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Charles Holmes, is that it was begun by Giorgione about 1500; that it is the picture which Vasari saw in 1541; that afterwards it was altered by Titian, who signed it T V. Originally the lady was represented with her left hand resting not on a parapet, but perhaps on a skull placed at the lower edge of the picture. The parapet and the grisaille bust in relief (which being a profile gives the ground for the identification with Catherine) belong to the many modifications which were made by Titian when he altered the picture. Holmes held that 'the lady's hair and her right hand are the only parts of the first picture which seem to have survived with little or no change, and from such faint indications as they give it seems probable that the original work was not by Giorgione, but was a Giorgionesque Titian'. Putting aside such speculations, we may accept the position that the picture is a portrait of Catherine, originally painted during her lifetime when she was about 45 years old, but so drastically remodelled between forty and fifty years later that it can now only count with the posthumous portraits. Still it remains the most lively of all presentments of her, though completely lacking in the dignity to which the official presentment by Bellini has sacrificed the more genial aspect of her character: *quanta sim vides*, his inscription makes her say. Ricketts has put his finger on a feature which this portrait shares with other women by Titian, and which makes it so inadequate as the representation of a distinguished lady, when he writes[1] of the 'slightly animal expression' which the artist's rendering of eyes imparts to the gaze of all his women.

[1] *Titian* (1910), p. 31.

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CHAPTER XIII

CYPRUS UNDER VENICE (1489–1570)

On the removal from Cyprus of the last of its independent rulers, followed a drastic reorganization of the administration, on lines which had been indicated by measures already taken after the death of James II, and which in a year or two assumed the form which was to remain in essentials unaltered during the eighty years of Venetian domination.[1]

[1] See Malipiero, p. 611 and Sanudo, *Vite*, both quoted by M.L., *H.* III, p. 844. Brief sketches in Fl. Bustron, pp. 458 f., and Lusignan, *Chor.* ff. 80 sq.; *Descr.* ff. 214b sq. Exhaustive note (on which the following pages are based) in M.L., *H.* III, pp. 844–55. Summary in Romanin, VI, pp. 280–1. Report of the meeting of the Senate at which the scheme for the organization was drawn up, Cigogna, *Inscr. Ven.* V, p. 229. For information on the condition of Cyprus and the working of the organization we are dependent, apart from the historians, chiefly on the following sources: (*a*) *Relatione del Regno di Cipro* of about 1510–21, in M.L., *H.* III, pp. 493–513 (as to its date, see below). (*b*) *Diarii* of Marino Sanudo the Younger, 1496–1533, 58 vols., Venice, 1879–1903 (cited as Sanudo, with number of volume and column). (*c*) Minio (Silvester), Report of 1529, in Sanudo, II, 442–9. (*d*) Attar (Francis), Report attributed to, *c.* 1540, in M.L., *H.* III, pp. 519–36. One MS. of this Report contains the statement that the copy was made by Francis Bustron, 13 Dec. 1533 (Κυπρ. Χρον. XIII, p. 44), but it is not clear whether this applies to the whole report, or only to certain portions interpolated, viz. the *Relatione* (*a*) and a section on the old cities of Cyprus (pp. 26–44). Another MS. (in the possession of G. Leimonidas) contains a section (*ibid.* pp. 45–55) giving statistics of the villages, population and products of Cyprus. (*e*) Sagredo (Bernard), Report of 1562, M.L., *H.* III, pp. 540–56. (*f*) Savorgnan (Ascanio), *Discrittione*, 1562, in Reinhard, II, Beyl. pp. 33–53; translated by H. Luke, from an inferior MS. (Malta 1195), Inst. of Hist. Research, Malta, 1932. The *Relatione* (*a*) cannot be earlier than 1500, as Mas Latrie holds, on the ground that many persons who held office under James II or Catherine appear in the list of feudataries as living. Thomas Contarini appears as Count of Jaffa, a title which he cannot have enjoyed before the death of his father George late in 1510 (Sanudo, XI, 682). Eugene Sinclitico, who appears without any title, was Count of Roucha in 1521. The document therefore, in its present state (and there is no reason to suppose it ever had any other), dates from between 1510 and 1521. The date of Savorgnan's *Discrittione* (*f*) is established by Luke, p. 7, as 1562; it was written at Famagusta in June, at Kerynia in August, and at Paphos in October of that year. According to Enlart (II, p. 567) the MS. of this report at Paris (Bibl. Nat. MS. Ital. 1500) written in 1565, says that Savorgnan instructed a military engineer, Sebastian Venier, to make a plan for the improvement of Kerynia. But this MS. (for a microfilm of which I have to thank the Director of the Bibliothèque Nationale) is not

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The disappearance of the monarchy carried as its corollary the suppression of the Haute Cour. That was a body of which the King was, constitutionally, only the chief among the members; nevertheless it had sunk to be a mere instrument in the hands of the King. After the death of James II the Governors had practically taken the reins out of the nerveless hands of the Haute Cour; it did not meet again in full assembly until 28 April 1475, when the Queen had returned to Nicosia. Such business as it continued to transact must have been of small importance (such as the question of marriage of widows), and although the Queen might appear to be functioning as a sovereign her acts were really dictated by the Counsellors appointed by Venice, who were instructed, as we have seen (p. 707), to maintain the pretence of acting in her name. With the abolition of the royal authority, and of the Haute Cour, Cyprus came, like all other possessions of Venice, in form as well as in actuality, under the legislative authority of the Senate and Great Council, and judicial functions which had been left to the Haute Cour were taken over by the magistrates sent out to the island.

Of the grand serjeanties[1] only two survived, having been conferred as hereditary honours, with which Venice did not think it necessary to interfere. These were the offices of Seneschal, which had been granted by James II to Onofrio Requesens and his heirs, and of Constable, which Catherine had similarly conferred on Peter Davila and his heirs.[2]

dated, and is only one of the many versions of the *Discrittione* which, while it mentions Venier, says of him only that he designed to erect a fortress in some other place than Kerynia. Venier was appointed Proveditor-General in 1551, Lieutenant in 1569, and Proveditor again in 1570, but failed to reach Cyprus to take up this last appointment. Luke thinks that the Paris MS. may be the original Report, but since it omits several long passages it must be a copy. To the various copies enumerated by Luke and Daru (VII, pp. 99–100) may be added the Oxford MS. Bodley Ital. e. 11, which is due, like others at Venice, to Francis Marcaldi, who dedicated it to Cardinal Lomellini, and dated it at Rome 2 May 1575. It is much abbreviated, so that not much more than half the original Report is represented. Four copies in the British Museum were also made for Marcaldi: one (Add. 8632), dated 30 July 1572, he presented to Robert de' Rizzi; another (Eg. 2859), apparently in the same hand, dated 10 Oct. 1573, he presented to Baron Sfondrati; the two others (Add. 8632 and 8633), undated, were for Francesco de' Medici. Kyriazes also prints in Κυπρ. Χρον. XII, pp. 85–102 a Greek translation of another much abbreviated version.

[1] Above, Ch. I, p. 52.

[2] Attar, p. 531. Calceran, grandson of Onofrio, and Francis, son of Peter, held these offices in the time of the *Relatione* (1510–21) and Attar (*c.* 1540).

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In July 1489[1] the new organization was taken in hand. The head of the administration was to be a Venetian of noble birth, elected by secret ballot, to hold office for two years, with the title of Lieutenant and a salary of 3500 ducats a year.[2] He was to be free of *contumacia*, that is, of the obligation, after the end of his tenure, not to be eligible for the same or another office for a certain time; and he might be elected a Procurator of St Mark's. He was to have a staff of eight servants with eight horses, and to be paid the expenses of his passage. With him were to be two Counsellors,[3] with salaries of 2400 ducats (on the same condition),[4] four servants and four horses, and passage-money. These three officials, known collectively as the *Regimento* or Rectors, were stationed at Nicosia. There was also a Captain, elected in the same way for two years, and known as the Captain of Famagusta,[5] with the same salary as the Lieutenant.[6] From 1489 he was properly, though by no means commonly, called Captain of Cyprus.[7] Primarily a civil official, he also had the military command in chief in peace time; in war he might be subordinated to a Proveditor-General specially sent out to the island. His jurisdiction was not so wide as that of the Rectors, to be presently described; even in his own district, nobles, holders of fiefs and *parici* were

[1] Navagero, col. 1199 (20 July); Malipiero, p. 611 (28 July).

[2] With the usual obligation to leave half of it as caution-money. [This obligation to draw only half the salary (the other half being held as caution-money) was decided upon, for Dukes and Captains elected to Crete, on 23 Nov. 1477 (Commission for Bartholomew Minio as Captain of Candia, Rawdon Brown MS., Public Record Office, no. 102).] In 1509 it was decided to reduce the salary to 2000 ducats, and not to pay passage-money (Sanudo, IX, 27, 29).

[3] Also, according to Lusignan, called Senators, but this is not otherwise confirmed. Sanudo often calls them *governadori*.

[4] So Navagero and Malipiero. But in the Commission of 1489 (Note, p. 870, § 64) the salary is put at 2200 ducats. If the Lieutenant's salary was reduced to 2000 ducats in 1509, theirs must have been reduced at the same time. In 1510 a further cut of 100 ducats was proposed, but apparently not carried (Sanudo, XI, 590).

[5] As shown above (Ch. XII, p. 732, n. 5) the captaincy initiated in 1489 was not a new office, since it was already in existence in 1474.

[6] In 1503 his salary was still 3500 ducats (it is stated as 1750 ducats, Sanudo, V, 197, but half was left at home as caution-money). The Collateral then drew 910 ducats. The Syndic and Proveditor on this occasion proposed that a Captain of Famagusta should no longer be appointed, but that there should be two Proveditors or Counsellors. This was not done. The salary was doubtless reduced at the same time as the Lieutenant's, in 1509; the Commission to John Contarini in 1538 (see Note, p. 866, § 3) gives it as 2000 ducats.

[7] Sanudo regularly calls him Captain of Famagusta.

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under the jurisdiction of the latter. Appeals from his judgements went, however, not to the Rectors, but to Venice. He had no financial authority or treasury; taxes and dues raised in his district went to Nicosia. The first occupant of this post was Balthasar Trevisan, to whose Commission, dated 27 August 1489, as to that of John Contarini of 1538, we shall often have to refer.[1]

The Rectors, representing the old Haute Cour, had however no legislative power, and though they exercised judicial functions, appeal lay from them to Venice. They had the power of capital punishment throughout the island, except at Famagusta, where it was in the hands of the Captain.

The government having been centralized in the hands of the Venetian officials, it was considered desirable to offer to those, who would have

[1] Fl. Bustron and Lusignan enumerate other officers as follows: At Famagusta, two castellans; at Paphos, a captain; at Kerynia, a castellan or captain; at Salines and Lemesos, captains; at Pendayia, Avdimou, Mazotos and Chrysochou, civitains; in the Mesarea a captain (usually called captain of Sigouri); and in the Karpass a bailie or civitain. [These, with the Viscontado of Nicosia, represent the twelve great administrative divisions of the island. The writers who reckon only eleven *contrade* omit Famagusta.] The Captains of Paphos, Kerynia and Salines were appointed from among Venetian nobles by the Great Council of Venice; the governors of the Mesarea and the Karpass by the Captain of Famagusta; the others were elected by the Great Council of Nicosia, subject to confirmation by the Rectors. The Captain of Famagusta appointed his subordinate officers, and those in charge of the Mesarea and Karpass, from among the notables of Famagusta. The other offices were reserved for Cypriotes, elected by the Great Council of Nicosia and confirmed by the Rectors. These regional officers mostly, if not all, held office for two years, and were responsible for the policing of their districts. Their jurisdiction was strictly limited, especially in criminal cases; appeal from their decisions lay to Nicosia and Famagusta. The actual policing of the villages, and prevention of breaches of the peace, was effected by officers called *paracivitani*; they could arrest offenders and release them on bail. The castellans of the villages (to be distinguished from those of the castles) were stewards in the service of the local seigneurs, keeping the accounts of their revenues and seeing that tithes were duly paid to the church. All the captains and civitains had their *matheseps* (see above, Ch. I, p. 54). [In 1524 a stradiote was appointed to this office in the Karpass (*mactossipato*, Sathas, Μνημ. VII, p. 131; *macrasipeto*, Sanudo, XXXVI, 140); but it is odd that so minor an appointment should require confirmation by the home authorities.] Minio in 1529 (*ibid.* LI, 445) says that the captaincy of Lemesos was worth 200 ducats a year, the civitanate of Pendayia 250, of Chrysochou 150, of Mazotos 60, of Avdimou 60, the captaincy of Sigouri 350, the bailieship of the Karpass 250. Attar (p. 533), *c.* 1540, says that the feudataries, who had originally had jurisdiction over both *francomati* and *parici* of their estates, had in his time lost it in the case of the former.

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been members of the Haute Cour, some shadow of their former importance. The Great Council of Nicosia, a weak imitation of the similarly named body at Venice, included all noble Cypriote citizens who had attained the age of twenty-five years. But it was stiffened by admission to its ranks of any Venetian patrician who settled in the island, and also any subject of Venice (thus including not only men from places in the *terra firma* such as Brescia, Verona, Bergamo, but also White Venetians from the Levant) who had lived for five years in Cyprus and did not practise any mechanical art. It was a cheap way of becoming ennobled, and attracted a certain number of immigrants.[1] The Council thus formed had few prerogatives. It could depute assessors to the Rectors' courts, and it could elect (subject to confirmation by the Rectors) to certain offices, such as those of Captain at Lemesos and Civitain at Pendayia, Avdimou, Mazotos and Chrysochou. It is also to be assumed that it was delegates of this Council who consulted with the Rectors on matters concerning the interests of the Kingdom, at a kind of annual conference, for which permission was given at the request of the Cypriotes in 1490.[2]

As the chief financial authority the Rectors controlled the public exchequer and exercised judicial powers in connexion with it. Generally, they presided over the government of the island, over the military organization (but without the command in war), and over relations between the feudataries and the Signory, in whose name homage was paid to them; although in the last respect, by a distinct breach of the *Assises*, exception could be made, and homage paid direct to the Council of Ten, as in the case of Charla Fabregues, heiress of the County of Jaffa and Karpass, and her husband Nicolas Giustinian.[3] Among their duties was also the taking of the quadrennial census, which, since it gave details of the taxable population, was important for the collecting of the

[1] Lusignan in the *Chor.* (ff. 82b sq.) names 126 families, old and new, qualified for the Great Council; in the *Descr.* (ff. 82b sq.) he names one fewer, and says he has forgotten the names of two others. In the former list there are four (Castrighi, Lodroni, Mirani, Martin) which he omits in the second; the second, on the other hand, has three (Cudune, Fabrices, Provost) omitted in the former. But in his text he says that many burgesses had been admitted by royal privilege, so that, counting nobles of Cyprus and of Venice there residing, and burgesses and citizens of the Venetian state (as of Brescia, Bergamo), there are in all 145 families. Kyprianos (p. 273) merely reproduces the list from the *Chorograffia*.

[2] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 542.

[3] *Ibid.* pp. 424–5 (26 Nov. 1511), 426 (30 June 1512).

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revenue, and was rightly described by Sagredo as one of the nerves or sinews of the Real.[1]

The basis of the jurisdiction continued to be the *Assises*, of which the French text was contained in books from different hands, so that, as Silvester Minio remarked in 1529, cases were conducted with the two sides pleading from different texts.[2] What is more, Italian soon superseded French as the language of the courts;[3] and in 1531 an Italian translation of the *Assises* was authorized.[4] Even before that time, owing

[1] The census was known as the *pratico*, *pratticho* or *patico*, whence the terms *patiolica*, *angheria pattiale* (M.L., *H.* III, p. 540). Each of the Counsellors was responsible for half of the island (*ibid.* p. 465). Every two years the Rectors elected two gentlemen (*cavalieri*) who received no salary, and two citizens who were paid 100 ducats each, to ride through the island and make the census of the serfs (Sanudo, LI, 447). In 1500 Peter Sanudo said that the Census had been neglected for ten years, with disastrous results (Sanudo, III, 432). There was more complaint to the same effect in 1519 (*ibid.* XXVI, 370–1). No attempt was made to keep up a systematic register of lands. In 1529 it was realized that a number of persons were in possession of lands belonging to the royal domain. All who had usurped such estates since the death of James II were ordered to report within one month, and pay the rent due; otherwise they would lose the land, pay for the usufruct, sacrifice the improvements that had been made, and be fined one-quarter more. Also, *parici* who informed against them would be granted their freedom (Sanudo, LI, 431, 29 Aug. 1529). These threats had little effect. In 1562 Sagredo stated that the census had been neglected for a long time, in some bailliages as much as sixty years. *Parici* had been defrauded, and lands usurped, and owing to the lack of census reports it was impossible to check such practices. He himself in nine days had completed the census of the bailliage of Lefkara, which the two Counsellors had not been able to accomplish in five months and ten days; and in ten months and six days he had completed the census of all the estates of the domain. We shall note some of the effects of this neglect below.

[2] In the burning of the palace at Nicosia in 1426, it is said that many of the records of the law perished, and though commissions were appointed by James II and later by the Lieutenant, Laurence Giustinian, to examine the laws, nothing was done (Sanudo, LI, 448). It is not clear how far the body of the *Assises* was affected; but probably not seriously, for the official copy was kept in the Cathedral of Nicosia (*Ass.* p. lxxi).

[3] Mésenge (1507), quoted by Enlart, I, p. iii: 'en paravant ilz faisoient leurs procès et escriptures et plaidoient en françoys et maintenant ilz les font en italien; de quoy les habitans sont bien mal contens, car tous ceulx du pays et speciallement les gentilz-hommes sont aussy bons françoys que nous sommes en France, et sont merveilleuse-ment mal contens d'estre en la subgection de la seigneurie de Venise.' Good Cypriotes 'du pays' would have been surprised at this description of themselves.

[4] The proposal for the translation was made in the Council of Ten on 15 Feb. 1530 (Sanudo, LIV, 295). On 2 March 1531 the Doge, Andrew Gritti, ordered the Lieutenant, Francis Bragadin, and the Counsellors to have it made: M.L., *H.* III, pp. 515–16. Report of the commissioners on the best texts, *ibid.* pp. 516–18. Other orders by the

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to the displacement of the French language, the proceedings of the courts had begun to be conducted in Italian.

As the supreme judicial authority in the central and western parts of the island (and also, in certain circumstances, in the districts under the Captain of Famagusta), the Rectors tried all cases in which the nobles, holders of fiefs or salaries, were concerned. Criminal cases concerning serfs, in which the penalty involved shedding of blood, and in which the feudal lords were therefore not competent, came before them. With the Viscount of Nicosia they tried cases involving capital punishment for the burgesses of Nicosia and of such parts of the island as did not come under the Captain of Famagusta; the civil and criminal appeals from the courts of the Viscount and of the officers already mentioned as governing those districts also came before them. In Famagusta, the Mesarea and the Karpass, the Captain (subject to the limitations already mentioned) exercised analogous powers. Appeal from their decisions, as already stated, could be made to Venice.[1]

The mass of work which thus fell to the Rectors was more than they could grapple with. Attar, about 1540, said that there were serious delays in the courts, the fear of which led many persons to abstain from recourse to justice.

The offices (which were reserved to Cypriotes)[2] of Viscount at Nicosia and Famagusta, with their *matheseps*, as described under the Lusignans (p. 54), were maintained. At first, as regards the Viscounty of Nicosia, John Mistachiel was continued in the office which he held at the time of the reorganization,[3] and later was confirmed in it for life;[4]

Lieutenant, Mark Antony Trevisan, concerning the translation, all of 1531: Reinhard I, Beyl. pp. 125–30. Certain chapters allowing the challenging of evidence by personal combat were annulled by the Council of Ten, 10 April 1535, at the request of the Cypriotes: Reinhard, *ibid.* p. 130. Fl. Bustron made the translation of the Assises of the Haute Cour and part of those of the Basse Cour into the Venetian dialect which was published in 1535. The documents mentioned above are most easily consulted in the preliminary pages of this publication.

[1] In 1490 (M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 534) the Cypriotes protested that the expenses of appeals to Venice were so great that many litigants abandoned their suits. The Signory promised to consider the protest, but evidently decided against making any change.

[2] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 541.

[3] *Ibid.* p. 523 (8 Aug. 1489). Mistachiel at one time fell under suspicion of disloyalty, and was removed to Venice, but had been allowed to return (Magnante, *L'acquisto*, cap. VII, p. 68).

[4] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 555 (4 March 1490). Also in the Commission for Balthasar Trevisan, 1489 (M.L., *H.* III, p. 456; see Note, p. 867, § 8, below).

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but after his death the Viscounts normally held office for two years only. Nevertheless exceptions were made. Since Queen Catherine had promised the succession to the Viscounty on Mistachiel's death to one Sir John of Aragon, the Signory agreed, in 1490, when the Cypriote deputation brought up the matter, that he should have it, but for two years only; which term, it was decided, was to be the rule. But when the time came, in 1498, Sir John was granted the office for life in reward for his fidelity to the Signory.[1]

The court of the Viscount of Nicosia, the old Cour des Bourgeois, was the court of first instance for the territory of the Viscounty, that is for Nicosia and three leagues round. The Viscount presided over it with two assessors elected by the people from among notable burgesses, indifferently Greeks or Latins.[2] In criminal cases this court could not condemn to more than mutilation of nose or ears; sentence of death required the concurrence of the Rectors. By a curious exception it was competent in all cases concerning the dowries and marriage-settlements, not only of burgesses but also, what would naturally have belonged to the Haute Cour and thus to the Rectors, of nobles. Appeals lay from it to the Rectors.[3]

The court of the Reis, who was appointed by the Rectors, continued to function as a court of first instance for the Syrians, Armenians, Copts, Jacobites, Nestorians, Maronites and 'Indians', i.e. Ethiopians.[4] It

[1] Sanudo, II, 191 (10 Dec. 1498). In 1510 a Cypriote, whose name Sanudo (XI, 74–5) does not give, was appointed. He paid the Signory 1000 ducats down, and promised another 2000 to be paid in Cyprus. In 1529 the office was worth 500 ducats a year (*ibid.* II, 445).

[2] A minute of 20 Dec. 1563 (M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 522 n.) shows the way in which the court was constituted. It consisted of the Viscount, Dardano Squarcialupi, seven jurates (*giudici et giurati*) and a proctor. These nine elected a *forzzo*, or additional body of thirty-four persons, whose names are given, with the numbers of votes for, against, or neutral (thus '7, 0, dui non ballotto'). Since three of the thirty-four did not attend, the court comprised forty members.

[3] One version of the Report attributed to Attar (M.L., *H.* III, p. 529, n. 1) says that, owing to the negligence of some of the Viscounts, all the Franks had formed the custom of being judged by the Rectors.

[4] Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 81; *Descr.* f. 216b; Attar, p. 529. Nothing is known as to how far, if at all, the native Greeks had a court and judges of their own. Zannetos (I, p. 955), arguing from art. 8 of the capitulation of Famagusta, supposes that they were under a *reis*; but, as already remarked (Ch. X, p. 590, n. 2), the text here seems to be mutilated. He also sees in the office of *juré*, which he translates δικαστής, which a serf in the time of James II could acquire by paying 100 or 200 besants (M.L., *H.* III,

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showed a tendency to usurp some of the jurisdiction of the Viscount's court, but it is nevertheless described in 1529 as being of small account.[1]

The administration of justice lost much of its efficiency owing to the scandal of benefit of clergy, which was favoured by the Greek bishops, who gave the tonsure to criminals and then claimed to have jurisdiction over them.[2]

Famagusta was provided, in addition to its Viscount, with a governor or rector of the city, two castellans (from 1562 onwards only one), and three or four captains of men-at-arms. The garrison varied greatly in numbers from time to time (see below).

The Proveditor, or Proveditor-General, of Cyprus was an officer appointed, unlike those already mentioned, when military circumstances demanded a stiffening of the defence of the island.[3] He was elected by the Great Council of Venice for two years, and took precedence, with the two Counsellors, immediately after the Lieutenant. He was military Commander-in-Chief and had jurisdiction over the gentlemen and holders of fiefs in cases concerning the military service to which they were bound. His command included those who received grants from the public domain, the *provvisionnati*.

The military forces were composed of infantry, under captains and constables, and cavalry consisting of the turcopoles (light horsemen) and stradiotes.[4] They were hopelessly inadequate for the defence of

pp. 234–5), that of a sort of village-justice with jurisdiction over Greeks. One of the mandates just cited speaks of *bailli* where the other has *juré*. It seems probable that these *jurés* were minor officers under the local magistrates, of nothing like the importance which Zannetos would assign to them.

[1] Sanudo, II, 445. The Reis nevertheless had to be one of the leading burgesses (M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 541).

[2] Sagredo, p. 542. The bull of Clement VII of 11 Feb. 1529 against criminous clerks of the first tonsure and the four orders had to be published every Easter. See Note at the end of this Chapter, p. 872, § 96.

[3] Thus in 1520 Zacharias Loredan was sent out as Proveditor-General, with a salary of 100 ducats a month; he was to succeed Bartholomew da Mosto as Captain of Cyprus (Sanudo, XXVIII, 537). The salary, when Francis Bragadin was appointed in 1537, was 150 ducats a month (Sathas, Μνημ. VIII, p. 309). These amounts, allowing for the retention of half as caution-money, came to 2400 and 3600 ducats a year. Sebastian Venier, appointed in 1570, had 200 ducats a month (Molmenti, *Seb. Veniero*, pp. 47–8). To the list given by M.L., *H.* III, p. 851 add Stephen Tiepolo in 1532 (Sanudo, LV, 610).

[4] In the following table are analysed the forces of various kinds according to six different sources: (A) Estimate of the Captain of Cyprus in May 1500 (Sanudo, III,

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the island. In the year 1517, which saw the chief threat to it transferred from Egyptian to Ottoman hands, there was a long debate[1] on the question of sending a mere 300 men to Cyprus. It was argued that they were too few; that there were no funds available for their transport; that by the time they got there the Turk would have done his will; that it was unwise to irritate him. When, after much opposition, they did sail, the diarist Sanudo, who had been against sending them and

687). (B), Do., Sept. 1500 (Sanudo, III, 1118). (C) Minio, 1529 (*ibid.* II, 444). (D) Attar, *c.* 1540, p. 536. (E) Savorgnan, *Discrittione*, 1562. (F) Lusignan, end of Venetian period (*Chor.* ff. 81, 81 b; *Descr.* f. 218). Attar's figures of 500 and 50 for Famagusta and Kerynia are confirmed in 1542 by Jodocus v. Meggen (*Reisebeschreibung*, Dillingen, 1580, p. 69), who however says there were 600 Albanian horsemen and 1000 of Cyprus; by the latter he must mean turcopoles and mounted *francomati*. Of the Famagusta garrison of 500 (which could be increased in time of war) he says that the governor, who was appointed for five years, commanded 200, while three centurions had 100 each. The men were paid 20 crowns a year and not allowed to leave the service.

	A	B	C	D	E	F
Famagusta	800 (good and bad)	900 (600 efficient)	726	606	500	500*
Nicosia	—	—	96	102	—	—
Kerynia	150	200	140	150	50	—
Paphos	—	30	6	—	—	—
Lemesos	—	8	7	—	—	—
Other castles	—	—	33	—	—	—
Stradiotes	340	330	437	800	833	1000
Other mounted troops (turcopoles, peasants)	150	380	252	150	—	—
Knights, feudataries, salaried gentlemen (mounted)	—	200	205†	182	181	—
Mounted arquebusiers	—	—	—	200	205	—
Companies of Cypriote villagers under Italian captains, each with 300 men	—	—	—	4500	4500	5400‡

* The pilgrim John Helffrich in 1565–6 says (Feyerabend, *Reyssbuch*, f. 377) that Venice keeps 1000 mercenary foot-soldiers in Famagusta, but pays them too little, and many of them die.

† Including 65 citizens of Famagusta and Nicosia.

‡ Calepio enumerates at the siege of Nicosia (Lusignan, (*Chor.* ff. 96 b, 97) 17 Italian captains with 1300 men.

[1] Sanudo, XXIV, 237–8.

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believed in the Sultan's friendly intentions, admitted that they were a *brava compagnia.*

There were frequent complaints of the inefficiency of the stradiotes. Of those under the command of Andrew Mavressi in 1519 about two-thirds were said to be useless.[1] Vincent Capello, Captain of Cyprus from 1516 to 1518, had on his return reported that among them were some hundred sons and descendants of the first Levantine stradiotes sent to the island, of no military experience or value. On 6 September 1519 orders were given for the complete reorganization of all the stradiotes under Mavressi, and the dismissal of all of Cypriote origin; a hundred new picked men were to be sent out.[2] Yet only ten were dismissed next year by the Proveditor, Zacharias Loredan, who kept on 294 under the same commander. But money, he said, was thrown away on them, for they had been born in the island (meaning that they were not picked men such as would be recruited in Albania or Morea) and were poor horsemen.[3] In 1521, however, Bartholomew da Mosto, Captain of Famagusta, said it was the money, 8000 ducats, spent on the turcopoles that was thrown away; they should be disbanded and the money spent on galleys, while the stradiotes should be retained.[4] When a Turkish fleet appeared at Salines in October of this year and all the people fled, the few stradiotes who were on guard behaved well.[5] At Kerynia,

[1] Sanudo, XXVII, 43; cp. 630. The number is given in one place as 300, in the other as 267. If they could be reorganized with the turcopoles, *francomati* and sons of stradiotes, they would make a body of some 1000 horse, 'che è una bela cosa'.

[2] Sathas, Μνημ. VII, pp. 123–4.

[3] Sanudo, XXIX, 261.

[4] *Ibid.* XXX, 112. Troilo Malipiero, Captain of Famagusta, had already said that two galleys were better and more necessary than 400 foot-soldiers, because their crews would work at the fortifications, and they would protect the island from corsairs, who were rather plentiful (*ibid.* III, 1118). Of the cost of galleys there are of course various estimates. In 1387 the cost of keeping a galley fully equipped in service was reckoned at 5000 besants a month (white besants, as to the value of which see Dawkins on Machaeras, 9, n. 1): perhaps between 600 and 700 ducats (Ch. VII, p. 304, n. 4). On the other hand, another estimate in 1395 put the cost of maintaining a fleet of 25 galleys as high as 35,000 to 40,000 ducats a month, i.e. no less than 1400 to 1600 ducats a galley (D.L.R., *F.O.* p. 230). From Sanudo, XXVII, 648, we see that in 1519 they cost 450 ducats each a month. Donato Giannotti (*Rep. et Mag. di Venetia*, p. 224 of ed. of 1591), writing about 1525 (for he says, p. 223, that it is less than two years since Francis Maria della Rovere was made Captain-General of the Venetian forces), reckons the cost of crew and fighting men, munitions and victuals, at 700 ducats a month.

[5] Sanudo, XXXII, 139–40.

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however, a review in the same year showed that of the 288 many were very badly mounted, and many would be doing better as agricultural labourers; a number of them lived ten or fifteen miles from the coast.[1]

In spite of criticisms such as these, or perhaps because of them, the stradiotes seem to have become a fairly efficient force; certainly the impression to be gathered from the accounts of the sieges of Nicosia and Famagusta (Ch. xv) half a century later is that they acquitted themselves well against the Turks.

Besides what may be called the regular forces, there was the coast-guard, which was manned by *parici* and *francomati*.[2] This, according to Sagredo in 1562, was in a very unsatisfactory state, great numbers having paid to be excused from the service. He recommends that soldiers should be substituted for them; the guard would be more efficient, being manned by soldiers and not peasants, men and not little boys. For most of them at present are *putti*; and when an enemy ship appears they make for the hills with their families; whereas if the soldiers with their supporting cavalry were there they might take courage and help in the fighting. He calculates that if all the *francomati* who escaped service[3] were made to contribute, enough could be raised to pay for some 800 footsoldiers. For the cavalry he suggests recruiting some 200 in Dalmatia or elsewhere, and 500 Italians wearing the burgonet,[4] to serve for terms of five years, refreshing them with new drafts of 100 men every year. To these he would add fifty younger sons of the feudataries; at present these pensioners were chosen from among the poorest, who had not the means of buying and keeping horses. They should be selected

[1] Sanudo, XXXII, 99.

[2] The organization of the peasant militia in the last days of the Venetian rule is briefly described by L. von Rauter, who was in Cyprus in April 1570 (Röhricht-Meisner, p. 445). After mentioning the 1000 stradiotes, he goes on to say that the peasants serve in companies of 300 men, of whom 100 are mustered every Sunday, and the whole 300 every three weeks. Their captains are posted among the villages round the island, so that on the approach of enemy ships everyone knows whither to repair.

[3] All those in the country as well as those who have come to live in the cities, not excepting priests, tonsured clerks, *civitani*, *bannieri* (a kind of minor officers), castellans, White Venetians and Genoese, and all those who are quartered in the casali, except the sons of gentlemen and burgesses.

[4] 'Alla borgognona.' The burgonet was a form of helmet much worn by light horse in the 16th century. Meyrick mistook it to be a close helmet engaging with the gorget, and this error persists; but it was normally an open helmet, occasionally closed by the addition of a *buffe* (Mr J. G. Mann).

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not by the Rectors, but by the Proveditors. There was excellent military material in these young nobles. It was regarded as a point of honour among them to be good horsemen; they delighted in feats of arms and were especially fine jousters with the spear. He had been present when they tilted with spears twice as heavy as those of the professional soldiers. It was the rule that they should not raise the vizor until they had ridden ten courses in succession. They would regard it as a great privilege to be called gentlemen of the Company of the Proveditor, which might be their designation. The government would then have a fine body of 750 cavalry. But these interesting suggestions of Sagredo's seem to have been ignored.

We shall return to the question of the defence of the Kingdom when we come to describe the condition of the chief towns and fortresses of the island.

The Treasury of the Kingdom was in a chronic state of depletion, as it had been under the Lusignans, and the reports to the home government are full of lamentations about its mismanagement. The Senate was not always ready to listen; when Bartholomew Contarini reported in 1519 on the defective accounting in the exchequer, and offered to give further information, 'the Council was tired of listening to him and so he stopped'.[1] All sorts of expedients were tried to ease the situation.[2] Thus many villages belonging to the royal domain were sold to private persons. A typical proposal for purchase, which came before the Council of Ten in 1525, concerned an estate which yielded a revenue of 1400 ducats, 300 in cash and the rest in grain; a Cypriote offered 10,000 ducats for half the estate, and for the other half 500 ducats a year, and the rest in grain. The offer was rejected.[3] A more important estate at

[1] Sanudo, XXVII, 43–4 (10 March 1519).

[2] Though the proceeds were not allocated to Cyprus, the practice of taking loans to the State from successful candidates for office, which prevailed at Venice, may be mentioned in passing for the sake of some instructive examples offered by elections to offices in the island. Thus, in an election of a Chamberlain which was made *cum imprestido* in 1526, Gabriel Benedetto, the successful candidate, offered a loan of 1800 ducats, of which he brought 1500. He tied in the voting with John Francis Lipomano, who offered 2000 ducats, but was ready with only 1000 (Sanudo, XLII, 11). On 6 July of the same year, so urgent was the need for money, that the Senate proposed (subject to the approval of the Great Council) to advance the elections for a Lieutenant, Counsellor and Chamberlain, and a Captain of Salines, 'in order that the Signory may have the use of the largest possible sum of money' (*ibid.* XLII, 48).

[3] *Ibid.* XXXVII, 540.

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Palo Cuto or Pelucuto was leased to a Cypriote in 1529; the revenue from the villages on it was from 2500 to 2700 ducats a year, and the price paid was 34,000 ducats, partly at the date of the contract, the rest at the end of September.[1] The records of such sales are so numerous that it is certain that, in Sanudo's time at least, there was no lack of Cypriotes with money to invest in such property. From 1504 to 1528 the capital of the Camera was reduced, by the alienation of sixty-two villages and farms, by 134,516 ducats. Under Silvester Minio's own government seventeen estates and other sources of revenue were alienated, totalling 69,270 ducats, which gave an annual revenue of 5321 ducats; the revenue remaining amounted to 80,000 ducats.[2]

In 1490 the Cypriotes represented to the Signory[3] that benefices both in the Latin and in the Greek Church, when patronage was in the hands of the public domain, were sold simoniacally by public auction to the highest bidder, without the slightest consideration of his fitness, and these purchasers were apt to plunder the property of the churches, cut down the services and generally let them go to ruin. The Signory was asked to order that in future this practice should cease, that no benefices should be given to anyone who was not a worthy churchman and an educated man, approved by the gentlemen and other citizens of the place; and any money received from the beneficiary should be spent on the administration and repair of the church. The Signory replied that before coming to a decision it must make further enquiry. It would appear that the results of such enquiry were not enough to move the Signory to reform. A few instances will suffice to prove this.

The year 1510 seems to have been profitable.[4] A Greek abbot of Santa Maura wished to succeed to the Greek archbishopric of Cyprus. He was ready to pay a good price, 1500 ducats or more, *justa il solito*. He was recommended by the Captain of Cyprus. The College gave orders to treat with him and find out how much he would actually pay. He lent 9000 ducats to the Signory, 900 down and the rest to come, to be repaid by the Cyprus Treasury in instalments.[5] Similar arrangements were made for the appointment to the abbey of Santa Maura of Papa

[1] Sanudo, XLIX, 448, 495.

[2] *Ibid.* LI, 447–8.

[3] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 529–31.

[4] Sanudo, X, 76, 91, 259, 443, 644, 712: Papa Fava (or Sava), son of Papa Antony Serano.

[5] Of 70 ducats a year; but at this rate, repayment would have taken over 128 years; the figure is perhaps an error for 700.

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Dimitrios Doria, who lent the Signory 600 ducats, 500 down and 100 in Cyprus, to be repaid by the Cyprus Treasury at the rate of 40 ducats a year. The Greek see of Famagusta also fell vacant, and choice had to be made of the 'better' of two candidates, who both offered loans. The Queen of Cyprus favoured Papa Symeon, but Andrew was elected. He had offered to give, not lend, 500 ducats to the Signory. In 1521 we hear[1] that the Greek Archbishop of Nicosia came before the College complaining that although he had bought his position for 2000 ducats, the Rectors were trying to deprive him of his authority.

The Lusignan Kings had from time to time raised money by the sale of freedom to the serfs.[2] This practice was continued, and gave opportunities for corrupt dealings by officials. In 1494 the Council of Ten[3] forbade the enfranchisement or sale of any *parici* of the royal domain without express deliberation by the Council. It had learned that several Rectors had enfranchised *parici* for the derisory sums of 40, 30, 25 ducats or even less—these being the amounts paid into the Treasury, although they were much less than the Rectors had actually received. The Council ordered that all the *parici* of the royal domain who had been sold, and all those belonging to knights who had been sold since the abdication of the Queen, should be recovered and returned to servitude in their respective villages.

Various plans for the enfranchisement of serfs were made, and some of them were carried out.[4] In 1516 the 'proveditor for raising money' proposed that, in addition to selling some of the more distant villages,

[1] Sanudo, xxxi, 165.

[2] Lusignan, speaking of the time of the Kings (*Descr.* f. 69b), says that the serfs of private masters could obtain their freedom for 60 ducats (Venetian money), but the masters were not compelled to accept such offers. The price asked from serfs of the King was 50 ducats. Many masters freed their slaves for much less than the statutory amount, or even *gratis*. On the other hand, we know that under James II from 100 to 200 besants were charged to serfs, who acquired thereby not merely freedom but the right to become a priest or a *juré* (M.L., *H.* III, pp. 234–5; above, p. 772, n. 4). In the Venetian period we have the case of the Archbishop of Nicosia, Livio Podocataro, freeing a serf (*mancipium rusticale*) of his church, because of his good services (confirmation by Pius IV, 27 July 1563, M.L., *H.* III, p. 539, under wrong year 1553; *Reg. C.N.* no. 140).

[3] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 526 (8 March 1494). At the same time the Council abolished the privilege, enjoyed by the cathedral of Nicosia, of enfranchising any infant deposited at its doors; if investigation showed that it came from serf parents, it was to be returned to servitude.

[4] Cp. Sanudo, v, 956 (22 Nov. 1503).

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a number of the 26,000 to 27,000 serfs on the estates of the royal domain should be freed at 50 ducats each; and the *francomati* were to be allowed to buy themselves off from the *corvée* on the walls of Famagusta, to which they were liable for ten days in the year. This was in March; in September it was reported that the *parici* were so poor that only one had presented himself to accept the offer.[1] On the other hand, ten years later, the Rectors reported that many *parici* desired to purchase freedom on the terms which had been offered.[2] In the interval, one of the secretaries of the Rectors, Antony Corona, seems to have taken matters into his own hands; for it was reported by Bartholomew Contarini in 1519[3] that he had freed 811 *parici* for two or three ducats apiece. In 1529 Silvester Minio reported that, presumably during his term of office, 250 male and female serfs had been given their freedom for 14,747 ducats (an average of 59 ducats each) and 85 *francomati* had bought themselves off for 8420 ducats, that is nearly 100 ducats each. In his report of 1562 Sagredo says[4] that he allowed 67 *parici*—they happened to be all descended from one woman, who acknowledged that she and all her progeny belonged to the royal domain—to purchase their freedom at 50 ducats each. He also took back into the domain, or exacted a fresh payment from, 672 serfs who had been enfranchised for 20 or 25 ducats each. It is clear that the prohibition of 1494 had long been a dead letter. A great many exemptions, as he said, had been granted by the Rectors and other officials to both *parici* and *francomati* in violation of the law.[5] And owing to the neglect of the census, it was impossible to keep track of the changes in these classes of the population. Since foundlings were classed as *francomati*, new-born children were exposed in the night and then in the morning said to have been found. Then the royal domain lost many of its serfs: a serf of a private lord took a wife from among those of the royal domain; no record was kept of this, and thus their descendants were absorbed among the serfs of private lords. On the other hand, if a serf on the royal domain took a wife from a private

[1] Sanudo, XXII, 21, 541.
[2] *Ibid.* XLI, 484 (24 April 1526).
[3] *Ibid.* XXVII, 42 (10 March 1519).
[4] M.L., *H.* III, p. 551 n.
[5] He describes (*ibid.* p. 549) how some *francomati* stayed for a time in the city, escaped paying the *fabrica* (for exemption from work on the fortifications) and the salt-tax, were absolved from service in the coastguard or work at the Salines, had a small house in the city, though they continued to till the soil like other peasants and were registered in the census, yet paid nothing, and in time fell out of the census lists and passed for citizens.

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estate, another woman was demanded in her place; thus the royal domain was defrauded by private owners.

Such measures as the selling of estates and benefices and freedom could afford no permanent cure for the impoverishment of the Camera. The total revenue from taxation was small in consideration of the potential richness of the island. In 1510 the Lieutenant, Laurence Giustinian, estimated that it should be 90,000 ducats.[1] Seven years later the ex-Lieutenant, Donato Marcello, stated that it had been 76,000 ducats, but during his tenure of office had risen to 84,000 ducats.[2] In 1529 it was 86,000 ducats.[3] Figures for later years of the Venetian dominion are unfortunately lacking. The revenue suffered considerably from seasonal conditions—droughts, locusts, etc. In 1510 the total revenue of 90,000 ducats was not collected because of the damage done by locusts. But more fatal to the prosperity of the island than any such visitations of nature was official maladministration.

But these comparatively modest amounts represent only a fraction of what Venice drew out of the island. After the Turkish conquest, Bernard Sagredo received in 1585 from a Cypriote, who had recently come thence, detailed estimates of what the Venetians and the Turks respectively received from Cyprus.[4] On the basis of these, he reckoned the revenue of the Signory to have been 546,000 ducats, of which 300,000 ducats was drawn from salt, the remaining 246,000 ducats from the produce of the *casali*, the proceeds of customs, gabelles, and dues paid by *francomati* and *parici*. Of this 246,000 ducats some 156,000 ducats came from the *casali*, leaving 90,000 ducats for the taxation revenue, which corresponds fairly well with the amounts mentioned above from earlier sources. Contrasted with this total of 546,000 ducats for the Signory is a sum of 394,000 ducats, given as the revenue from their estates enjoyed by the lords and owners of *casali*, not reckoning the income of tenants, *francomati* and *parici*.[5] From the gross revenue of the Signory had to be deducted the pay of the civil, military and naval services, cost of public assistance and other expenses, which in 1566 amounted to 184,331 ducats, leaving a net annual revenue of 361,669

[1] Sanudo, XI, 265–6.
[2] *Ibid.* XXV, 80.
[3] *Ibid.* LI, 443.
[4] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 560–3.
[5] Kyprianos (p. 274) has the figure of 500,000 ducats for the revenue of the Signory from lands, customs and taxes, and excluding the proceeds of the Salines. But, he adds, this sum represents only what was collected in the island, and was only about half of what really went to Venice.

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ducats. In contrast to this, the Turks seem to have had, in 1585, a deficit of some 68,000 ducats.[1]

The actual control of the revenue from the royal domain and the disbursements from the Treasury was, as it had been since 1479, entrusted to two Chamberlains, *Camarlenghi* or *Camerarii*.[2] They received all the revenues, paid the salaries of magistrates, officers and troops, and sent the balance to Venice; but their payments, to be valid, had to bear the authorization of the Rectors.[3]

In 1497, however, defects in the administration not merely of Cyprus, but of the other possessions beyond the seas, had become so notorious, that two inspectors were appointed with great powers.[4] These 'Syndics'

[1] In 1575, as Sagredo records in the same report, on information supplied by two other Cypriotes, the island was in a wretched state; the population had much decreased, in spite of the Turks having imported a number of families; many of these immigrants died, unable to endure the climate; the revenue was about 140,000 ducats, barely enough to pay for the 1000 horse and 8000 foot which formed the garrison of the island. Seb. Münster (*Cosmographia univ.*, Basle, 1572, lib. v, cap. 30, p. 1159) puts the annual revenue at 700,000 ducats, but the expenditure on the army and building at 300,000. For the annual tribute to the Turk he has the fantastic figure of 40,000 ducats. He is followed by H. Pantaleon (*Militaris Ord. Johann....Hist.* 1581, p. 126).

[2] Sagredo in 1562 points out the disadvantages of the system by which the secretaries of the Secrète were changed every two years, so that it was always served by newcomers who knew nothing of the work. He recommends that juniors from the Venetian Chancellery should be sent out for four or five years, to keep the books of the Secrète, and also to record everything of interest to the Signory. They must know French, because the books are all in that language. He also recommends that, in order to correct the abuses in the Camera, three Senators, of some standing in the Council of Ten, should be sent out to devote themselves for two years exclusively to bringing into order the Camera, the Secrète and everything else connected with the revenues, especially as regards the grain crop. He complains that the grain purchased by the State is often sold at a loss on the pretext that it has deteriorated, and he accuses the measurers and inspectors of Famagusta of assisting the frauds of speculators. M.L., *H.* III, p. 554 and note.

[3] Special paymasters of the troops at Famagusta, called Collaterals, seem to have been appointed from 1495 to 1505: M.L., *H.* III, p. 852, who also notes that John Antony Quirini, who was killed at the siege in 1571, is called paymaster of the army by Calepio; Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 120b, 'pagato [*sic*] dell' esercito'; *Descr.* f. 286b, 'payeur de l'armée'; cp. Contarini, f. 13b. The Collaterals doubtless had the payment of all the troops, not merely those at Famagusta: Romanin, VI, p. 281.

[4] To secure impartiality, no one who had held office in such a possession in the last twelve years, or had had a relative there in the last six, could be appointed. Sanudo, I, 650–1 (17 June 1497). These officers were not a new institution. Such syndics had long

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of the *terre del mar* visited the possessions regularly, taking with them two secretaries, tried offenders when necessary, reported, and made recommendations. Peter Sanudo, who visited Cyprus in this capacity, made a scathing report, describing the appalling confusion in the books of the Treasury.[1] One of the most serious cases of maladministration for which the offender was prosecuted by a Syndic (Philip Tron), was that of Francis Contarini, Captain of Paphos.[2] The indictment contained no less than sixty counts, including association with corsairs, converting to his own use the 'salt of St Mark', causing it to be sold and distributed as he pleased, ill-treating the poor, condemning persons to fines without cause or evidence, torturing the accused, cropping their beards and hair. He was found guilty and barred from all offices and benefices for four years, and from offices in Cyprus for life, and ordered to present himself at the prison in three days and pay a fine of 500 ducats, to be given to his victims. If he failed to appear, he was to be banished for ten years, with another fine of 500 ducats, secured on his property; if he was caught, he was to go to prison for a year and then to serve his sentence of banishment.

Another case was that of Troilo Malipiero, Captain of Cyprus.[3] The Syndic, Bernardino Loredan, was sent out because of the complaints received of Troilo and his son, John Francis. He reported to the Council of Ten in 1502 that he had tried and imprisoned father and son, a secretary and a servant, and was bringing them home in irons. On arrival Malipiero was thrown into prison, and accused of immorality and disobedience to the Signory's orders. Found guilty, on 17 March 1503 he was sentenced to be deprived for ever of all office in Cyprus, and for three years of any other office, to pay whatever sum the Syndic should show to be justified, to be fined (apparently in addition) 100 ducats, and to be banished from Venice for five years.

Bartholomew da Mosto, Captain of Famagusta, was arrested in 1524 by the Syndic, who preferred eleven charges against him, including

been sent to the overseas possessions. The ducal commission issued by Michael Sten in 1408 gives a good idea of their duties (Hopf, *Chroniques gréco-romanes*, pp. 210–22).

[1] 14 March 1500. Sanudo, III, 432 ff. The Cypriotes sent to Venice to complain that the Syndic had made many exactions and carried off much money from the island (*ibid.* 829); and it is amusing to find that he got into trouble for not having the accounts of his expenses in order (*ibid.* 839).

[2] 1525. *Ibid.* XXXVII, 632, 665–6; XXXVIII, 34–5.

[3] *Ibid.* IV, 260, 308, 318, 457, 825. Cp. Priuli, *Diarii*, II, p. 227.

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sodomy and murder. But he had his defenders among the Commune of Famagusta itself, from which a letter was written in his praise, deprecating the way in which he had been treated. The Senate after considering his case decided not to proceed against him.[1]

In 1515 the Syndic John Nadal Salamon made an estimate of outstanding debts to the State; those from the death of James II to 1483 alone represented 170,000 ducats which had been forgotten by lapse of time; there were other categories from 1483 to 1490, and from 1490 to his time; his conclusion was: 'we have bad ministers'.[2]

In 1531 the Syndic James Semitecolo exposed to the Council of Ten an extraordinary case of fraudulent indebtedness to the Treasury.[3] A family called Paleologo had been for years accumulating an enormous debt, by acquiring the right to farm the revenues from one estate after another, and never paying anything. Although their debt amounted to over 15,500 ducats they succeeded in acquiring another lease (Pallurocampo), for which they paid 3751 ducats. The Syndic, holding that they bought the revenues of the Treasury out of money which belonged to the Signory, took Pallurocampo back from them, and put 3751 ducats to the account of their debt. They had persuaded the Rectors that they owed only 2500 ducats instead of over 15,500.

As we have seen in the case of Bartholomew da Mosto, the action of the Syndics was not always endorsed by the Senate. Thus in March 1516 the Syndics John Nadal Salamon and Mark Antony Calbo brought eighteen charges against John Paul Gradenigo, who had been Lieutenant of Cyprus; charges which the diarist describes as frivolous and of no account. There was a lively debate, and the motion for prosecution was defeated by 116 to 30 votes (with 28 indecisive), 'to the great shame of the Syndics'.[4]

In 1521 another attempt was made to check maladministration. It was decided to appoint a Grand Chancellor for Cyprus.[5] His duties[6] were to have the custody and control of all records, civil and criminal and pertaining to the public accounts,[7] and of all the records and registers of

[1] Sanudo, XXXVI, 479–80; XXXVII, 470–2.

[2] *Ibid.* XXI, 64–5 (11 Sept. 1515).

[3] *Ibid.* LIV, 415, 450–3 (10 Feb. 1531).

[4] *Ibid.* XXII, 31.

[5] *Ibid.* XXX, 370 (18 June). Andrew di Conti was appointed (*ibid.* XXXI, 442: 20 Sept.).

[6] *Ibid.* LVI, 411.

[7] 'De le pertinente a la rason de la Signoria nostra.'

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Chancellors and notaries of the island who had completed their terms or died. Nevertheless, in some ten years, the affairs of the Chancellery were reported to be in great confusion; the Grand Chancellor Andrew di Conti and his notary Antonello Bon, who had charge of the records of the Camera and the civil court, were both dead.[1] It was decided to elect another Grand Chancellor, who was to have under him two chancellors or secretaries, one civil and one criminal.[2] The department was unlucky; next year a sensation was caused when Gaspar Spinelli, who was going out as Grand Chancellor, was captured in the Gulf by Moorish pirates, with his wife (one of the beauties of Venice), brother and sister.[3] Any further attempts at reform, if they were made, were without effect. Thirty years later Sagredo reports that the Chancellery, both civil and criminal, is in very bad hands, those of the local notaries; they have knowledge of all the secret communications between the Signory and the Rectors, and are in a position to influence decisions in favour of those who have access to them. He remembers a decision of the Signory to send out with the Grand Chancellor four junior secretaries, but this was never carried into effect.[4]

It must not be supposed that these offices were always eagerly sought by the Venetians eligible for them. Just as in 1480 the Senate had declared itself weary of the way in which persons who had been elected to the post of Captain of Famagusta refused to go (p. 733), so we find frequent refusals to accept the office of Lieutenant or Counsellor. In April 1499 Peter Marcello refused the latter office; in June 1501 he again declined the Lieutenancy, for fear, it was said, of the Turks. In August of the same year, Balthasar Trevisan (who had been the first Captain of Famagusta in 1489) declined the same office for the same reason.[5] In 1518 the same Peter Marcello, who the day before (3 March) had been elected Proveditor in Cyprus, excused himself to the College, pointing out that he had already been elected once Counsellor and twice Lieutenant, and had always declined, and at his age he could not now serve

[1] Sanudo, LVII, 245 (24 Aug. 1532).

[2] Each with a salary of 120 (or 100) ducats a year (*ibid.* LVII, 302, 417; 4 Dec.).

[3] *Ibid.* LVIII, 268, 357.

[4] Of Grand Chancellors other than those mentioned above there are few records; I have noted only Vincent Fedeli in 1558 (*Libri Comm., Reg.* VI, p. 287, n. 52, 20 June), and Peter Albini in 1570 (Contarini, f. 10b); the latter was killed at Nicosia (Calepio, f. 110b).

[5] Sanudo, II, 654; IV, 51, 83, 98.

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the Signory as he had always done; further, Francis Marcello was going out as Counsellor, and it was illegal for two of the same family to serve at the same time. His excuse was accepted.[1] Lunardo Emo, who was then elected, accepted on certain conditions (among them, that he should take 1500 men with him), but finally withdrew.[2] Alvise d'Armer was then chosen (17 March) to go out as Lieutenant, but it was not until 9 May that he sailed, partly owing to difficulties made by him on account of the way he was treated, it having been decided to retain Bartolo Contarini as Proveditor, partly owing to bad weather.[3]

At home, Cyprus affairs were handled by the special committee of three, first appointed in 1481 (p. 733), who appear as the 'proveditori sora il regno' or 'sora i officii e cose del regno di Cipro'.[4] The diarist Sanudo had himself nominated for membership of this committee in 1512, but to his mortification in the balloting, with two others, no one was elected. 'And this', he grumbles, 'is my reward for the labour I take to go on writing this Diary.'[5]

The records from which extracts have been given in the preceding pages present an unedifying spectacle of the inefficiency and corruption of the Venetian colonial service. At every turn the student must be prepared to meet with a member of a great family involved in some disgraceful affair. The harshness of the sanctions, with which, as we see from the extant texts of the ducal commissions to Captains of Cyprus, the officials were hedged round, is evidence at once of the rottenness of the service and of the inefficacy of the attempts which were made to remedy it.

The two years' term, which was the rule for nearly all the appointments, had the advantage of giving experience to the greatest number of Venetian nobles. That was the principle which inspired the whole Venetian constitution. From the point of view of efficiency however, and of the interests of the people over whom the officials were set, it was disastrous. As we have already seen (p. 782, n. 2), Sagredo pointed out the disadvantage of a system by which the secretaries of the Secrète had to begin to learn their business every two years. Yet no one seems to have

[1] Sanudo, XXV, 284.

[2] *Ibid.* XXV, 301.

[3] *Ibid.* XXV, 303, 389.

[4] On 27 Nov. 1499 the Senate, considering that this committee was no longer necessary, decided to abolish it when the members for the time had completed their duties. Priuli, *Diarii*, I, p. 234. The decision evidently did not take effect.

[5] Sanudo, XV, 188.

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perceived that the fault, which he noticed in this particular branch of the service, ran through the whole organization.

The population ruled over by the officials whose functions have been described seems to have numbered, during the Venetian period, between 100,000 and 200,000. That would be a sad decline if we could accept the guess that in the best days of the Frankish rule it had reached something like half a million.[1] Some figures, not too trustworthy, may be derived from reports to the home government from the Rectors or from visiting Syndics. They differ considerably, and are difficult to compare owing to variation in the method of classification. In 1490 the Cypriote deputation to Venice asserted that the island contained only some 106,000 souls, of whom 6000 were the garrison.[2] In 1504 the Lieutenant reckoned 110,000, but said that the Syndic put the figure as low as 90,000—the lowest given by anyone.[3] The total in the *Relatione* of about 1510–21 is 147,701. In 1523 a census mentioned by Silvester Minio[4] gave it as 121,179. According to Minio himself by 1529 it had increased by 5000 to 126,179. Attar, about 1540,[5] has a much higher total, 197,000. John de Nores, Count of Tripoli, in 1559,[6] has the more modest figure of 150,000. Sagredo, in 1562, unfortunately gives no total, but Savorgnan, writing in the same year, estimates 180,000. Antonmaria Graziani, referring probably to about 1570, has 200,000.[7] Accidas, in the memorandum prepared for him by the Archbishop of Cyprus in 1600 for presentation to the Duke of Savoy, and therefore perhaps not free from exaggeration, numbers the population at some 250,000, of whom 80,000 could use a sword. On the whole, it would seem that the population increased rather than declined during the Venetian occupation.[8]

[1] Cp. Zannetos, I, p. 952.

[2] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 537. From the same document (p. 545) we see that the Signory accepted certain suggestions for exemption from *corvée* and salt-tax, in order to attract immigrants (cp. Ch. XII, p. 729, n. 1).

[3] Sanudo, V, 943.

[4] *Ibid.* LI, 442.

[5] M.L., *H.* III, p. 534.

[6] *Ibid.* p. 519, n. 1; p. 534 n.

[7] *De bello Cyprio*, p. 2. The same, 'The Sieges of Nicosia and Famagusta', ed. C. D. Cobham (1899), from Midgley's trans. of his *History of the War of Cyprus* (first published 1624), p. 5. Graziani (1537–1611) acquired his information at the time of the League against the Turks.

[8] Kyprianos (p. 301), citing Coronelli as his authority, says that the population before the conquest of Cyprus was about 197,000. In his *Isolario* (vol. II, 1696, p. 292) Coronelli says that the total population under the Kings was 196,986 (56,044 in Nicosia, i.e. the city and the Viscontado; 6616 in Famagusta, and 134,926 in other *contrade*—

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And with that increase, it would seem, went a rise in production.[1]

Although the population comprised more or less the same classes as have been described at the beginning of this volume, there had taken place in the course of three centuries a sort of *osmosis*, or diffusion through the barriers separating them. Serfs had become free, burgesses had become ennobled, the old Cypriote and Frankish blood had become mingled with many foreign elements, notably Spanish and Italian. The general level of social life had fallen; the nobles were idle and improvident, given as much as ever to the pleasures of the table and of the chase, so far as their increasing impoverishment permitted. Many of them found it difficult to furnish the horses which were due for the military service in virtue of which they held their fiefs. Since estates descended to the eldest sons, the younger ones had to earn their own living, and had difficulty in finding suitable occupations. Towards the end of the fifteenth century, for instance, Peter Lase, Lord of Psimolofo, appealed to the Signory[2] for leave to expend some of his savings on acquiring another estate in fief. Psimolofo, being his only fief, would descend to his eldest son. If he might buy another from someone who had leave from the Great Council of Venice to sell, he could leave it to one of his younger sons. Though this was in accordance with the *Assises* and was customary, he asked leave that his eldest son, being due to succeed to Psimolofo, and his daughter, who was married, might, since they were already provided for, be the last to succeed to the newly purchased estate, which should be held in fee by one of the other sons.

figures which, however, add up to 197,586); reduced in his time to a mere 28,000 Christians and 8000 Turks, not counting women and children. The Grand Vezir, in his letter announcing to Charles IX, 16 Nov. 1570, the capture of Nicosia, boasts that the people of the island, to the number of 400,000, have submitted (Charriere, III, p. 137). I have not included these very doubtful details in the analysis of the statistics which will be found in Note II at the end of this Chapter (p. 875). Nor have I included Bartholomew Contarini's estimate of the number of *francomati* in 1519 as 15,844, suspecting it to be misread (Sanudo, XXVII, 42). After the Turkish conquest, a census taken showed about 85,000 taxable persons, from fourteen to fifty years old, Greeks, Armenians, Maronites, Copts and other races, not reckoning women, children and old men (Kyprianos, *loc. cit.*). Karachelebizade Abd al-Aziz (Κυπρ. Χρον. v, p. 46) on the other hand says that the census showed 120,000 inhabitants. The statement of Kretschmayr (*Gesch. v. Ven.* II, p. 392) that under Venice Nicosia quickly doubled its population, while Famagusta changed from a populous commercial city to a fortress, seems, as regards Nicosia, to require substantiation.

[1] Heyd, II, p. 425.

[2] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 504–5.

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Another instance of the straits to which some of the old families were reduced is furnished by the case of Ponce de Lusignan and Jerome Cadit, who were reported to the Senate in 1516 as being in great poverty. They belonged, as the diarist says,[1] to two of the most ancient families of Cyprus, and in 1459 Antony Cadit had given 300 ducats from his revenues *ad pias causas*. They were promised a grant of 60 ducats each from the provision made for poor gentlemen (which is about to be described) as soon as vacancies should occur in the list.

In their appeal to the Signory in 1490[2] the Cypriotes pointed out the effects of this 'harsh and cruel law' of primogeniture. In the time of the Kings some of the younger sons entered the service of the royal court, or obtained stipends for military service, or were employed by the barons; sometimes they became more prosperous than their elder

[1] Sanudo, XXII, 350. *Cadit* is the *Ghatiti* (*Gatites*) of Lusignan (*Chor.* f. 83; *Descr.* f. 83). On the Lusignans, see below, p. 791, n. 4. The work of Prince Léon de Lusignan (*The Royal Family of Lusignan in the 19th century*, tr. by Princess de Lusignan, London, 1880) gives information about survivors of the family. It claims (p. 19) that Archbishop Christodoulos (1607–31) was one. In 1814 Archbishop Kyprianos and all the clergy of Cyprus officially acknowledged 'Prince Louis de Lusignan, son of H.R.H. Prince Christodoulos de Lusignan, Lord of the Island of Cyprus', as lineal issue of the Lusignan family (p. 20; document dated 18 July 1815). In 1878 Louis, 'Prince Royal of Cyprus, Jerusalem and Armenia' (living in St Petersburg, where his titles seemed to be officially recognised) and his nephews Guy (living in Paris and using the same titles) and Korene Nar-Bey, Prince de Lusignan, Archbishop of Beshiktash, Constantinople, addressed a memorial to Lord Salisbury, hoping for 'an equitable remuneration' for their rights (see *The Times*, 12 Aug. 1878, p. 10b). In Feb. 1879 their uncle Prince Louis confirmed this to Lord Dufferin, Ambassador at St Petersburg. Other curious claims are described in *The Times*, *loc. cit.*, and 9 Sept. 1878, p. 5b. The Almanac de Gotha for 1889 has an entry of the Princes de Lusignan, according to which the elder branch (Greek Orthodox) was represented by Michael (son of Louis II, who was born at Larnaka in 1808); and Prince Amaury-Joseph, of the younger branch, born at the castle of Kerynia, 10 June 1861, became a general in the Egyptian army and was assassinated at Cairo, 14 June 1800 (*sic*). In 1880 a claim was put forward by one calling himself Prince Charles de Lusignan, who addressed a letter from Prinkiponesos on 24 Sept. to τοὺς Κυρίους Προέδρους καὶ τὰ Ἐντιμότατα μέλη τῶν Συλλόγων Λευκοσίας, Λεμησσοῦ καὶ Λάρνακος, suggesting that they should ask the British Government to grant Cyprus autonomy under himself as independent ruler. The Cypriotes, who retained no pleasant recollections of Lusignan rule, returned him an uncompromisingly discouraging reply; and he died soon afterwards. See Zannetos, II, pp. 187–92; Κυπρ. Χρον. IV (1926), pp. 291–307; VIII (1930), pp. 52–8. Gunnis, in spite of all these claims, says (p. 33) that the last relic of the house is said to have died in London in the middle of the 19th century.

[2] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 532–3.

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brothers. Now there was no longer any court, the barons were reduced in numbers, nay annihilated and dispersed, stipends had been suspended, and many of them were driven to abandon their country. It was asked that an annual sum of 4000 ducats should be dispensed to gentlemen and burgesses who for such or other reasons had no means of living. The grant should be for life and should pass on death to the pensioner's legitimate son, if he had one of fifteen years or more; if he had none, then to some other duly qualified youth. The selection should be made by the Rectors in consultation with the Great Council of Cyprus.[1] If the amount of 4000 ducats seemed too large, three-quarters might be given in cash and one-quarter in provisions. The Signory, in view of the heavy expenses it was incurring for the fortifications of Famagusta, declared itself unable to promise this relief, but within a few days relented and agreed to the provision.[2] The sum came from the Cyprus exchequer, fiefs which fell vacant being allocated to it, up to 4000 ducats. No one was to receive more than 60 ducats, for which he was obliged to serve with one horse. The number of these pensioners seems to have been limited to sixty, leaving an ample margin in the fund.[3] The money seems, however, to have found its way into the wrong hands, as the Syndic reported in 1500.[4] In 1529 there were fifty-seven such needy gentlemen and citizens on the list, with 48 ducats a year each.[5] We have seen what Sagredo suggested should be done with this material.

The military service to which feudataries were bound was of course in accordance with feudal custom. It had been the practice for the King to provide them when on campaign with victuals and all necessaries. But when in 1489 it was necessary to meet the threat of invasion, the Rectors forced them to ride out at their own expense. The Cypriote deputation in 1490 protested, and the Signory ordered that in future the old practice should be observed.[6]

Something might have been done to improve the health of the body politic, had Venice been willing to allow the Cypriote gentlemen a

[1] *Università nostra*, the general community of Cypriotes, in the name of which the Great Council would act. Cp. Sagredo, p. 547.

[2] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 549–52, 557–9 (4 March 1490).

[3] Cp. Sagredo, p. 547; Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 215.

[4] Sanudo, III, 434.

[5] *Ibid.* II, 445. There were (*ibid.* 446) eight such pensioners at Famagusta, but it is not clear whether they were included in the fifty-seven.

[6] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 548–9.

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greater part in responsible offices. A Genoese visitor[1] remarked that the majority of the Cypriote nobles residing in Nicosia were discontented at being subordinated to Venetians; while he was there, the Cypriotes sent an ambassador to Venice petitioning to be allowed to command the four galleys which guarded the island; but, as they complained to him, the request was refused. Although he could not understand their language he gathered that they were very friendly to the French. The Signory, however, for reasons which we may understand, hesitated to give Cypriotes too much control over the armed forces. When in 1490 the Cypriotes asked that they might have as great a share as possible in offices, such as those of *civitains* and captains, they expressly said that they did not ask for such offices when they involved command of fortresses.[2] And Ascanio Savorgnan relates that, a Cypriote captain of horse having recently died, the Proveditor prudently appointed in his place a man who was not a Cypriote.[3]

There was, it must be recognized, a wealthy upper class, though its numbers may not have been large, and we have seen that there were many Cypriotes who had money to invest in land or leases. In the *Relatione* of about 1510–21 the revenue of the chief lords and owners of estates was reckoned at 56,575 ducats, that of the clergy and Orders at 26,400.[4] In 1529, when the revenue of the Camera from all sources

[1] M.L., *H.* III, p. 547, n. 2.

[2] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 541, 554. The Signory agreed to reserve such offices, when military command was not involved, to Cypriotes and other Venetian subjects who had lived in the island for five years, and to make the appointments biennial.

[3] *Discrittione*, p. 51, Reinhard; p. 33, Luke.

[4] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 498–504. This report gives no figure for the total revenue of the Camera. George Cornaro's revenue was 7000 ducats; that of Thomas Contarini, Count of Jaffa, 3000 ducats; Angelo Giustinian, Count of Karpass, the Cornaro-Episcopia, Sir John Costanzo, Francis Davila, had 2500 ducats each. Contrast with these the surviving holders of the Lusignan name (we have already seen that Ponce de Lusignan had to have public assistance): the heirs of Phoebus de Lusignan had 300 ducats; Isabella de Lusignan jointly with her sister Orsola Podocataro, 400 ducats. These two ladies were, however, not Lusignans by birth, but daughters of John Perez Fabregues, Count of Jaffa and Karpass. Isabella married Philip II, son of the Clarion de Lusignan who was so badly treated by James II. Of their sons, Phoebus was for six years Captain of Lemesos under the Venetians; in 1521 he vainly applied (as his father had done before him) to the Signory for the restitution of the fiefs of which his grandfather had been deprived. His younger brother Jason (born 1497) succeeded him as Captain of Lemesos at the age of eighteen, and was killed at the siege of Nicosia. His son was the historian, Father Stephen: M.L., *Gén.* pp. 33–4.

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was 86,000 ducats, that of the knights, feudataries, gentlemen, etc. was nearly the same, 84,980 ducats, that of the clergy and Orders 24,700 ducats.[1]

The most extensive landowner in the island, after the Real, was the Hospital of St John. The history of the Grand Commandery in these days, however, only nominally concerns the Order, since it became attached to the Cornaro family.[2] The Kings of Cyprus had naturally had a voice in the recommendation of candidates for this valuable benefice;[3] although the appointment lay in the hands of the Grand Master, subject to confirmation by the Pope, who, as we found in the case of Janus and his son Louis, sometimes did not see eye to eye with the Grand Master. In Queen Catherine's time the Grand Commandery had been held by her uncle Mark Crispo, who was succeeded by Mark Malipiero.[4] The latter, in 1503, proposed to give the estate of Kolossi to his natural son Andrew; but it was then discovered that the expectative had been granted by the Grand Master to George Cornaro's son, the nephew of the Queen, Cardinal Mark Cornaro. Both the Pope and the Council of Ten objected.[5] On 9 January 1508 Mark Malipiero died, and Peter Grimani persuaded Pope Julius II to grant him the succession. Peter, as Catherine was careful to observe in the indignant letter which she addressed to the Doge and Council of Ten, was the son of that Antony who had suffered disastrous defeat at the hands of the Turks at Sapienza

[1] Sanudo, II, 443. The richest individual was Sir Eugene Sinclitico, Count of Roucha with 8000 ducats. Next to him came the Grand Commander, Alvise Cornaro, with 6000 ducats. Sir Thomas Contarini's revenue remained at 3000 ducats, to which sum that of the Count of Karpass had now risen. Sinclitico appears in documents as Zegnus Singlitico (M.L., *H.* III, p. 499), Xegni or Guagni Xagraticho (Sanudo, XXXI, 289), Zagni Singratico (*ibid.* II, 443). In the *Relatione*, about 1510–21, his revenue is only 800 ducats. But by 1521 he had already obtained from Venice the title of Count of Roucha; it carried no revenue, but in order to obtain it he made the Signory a loan of 1500 ducats which was to be repaid in three equal annual instalments.

[2] M.L., *H.* III, p. 821.

[3] As Catherine observed, in her letter cited below, her predecessors had been accustomed to nominate candidates to the Grand Master. It was this prescriptive right which was threatened by Peter Grimani.

[4] See above, Ch. XII, p. 698, and the Queen's letter of 16 Jan. 1508, M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 573. In view of Catherine's definite statement that Crispo was Malipiero's predecessor, it must have been only nominally, as Herquet observes (*Charlotta*, p. 237, n. 11) that Guy de Blanchefort held the office in 1485 when he was in France in charge of Sultan Jem (Bosio, II, p. 402).

[5] Sanudo, IV, 611 (13 Jan. 1503).

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in 1499, and had been 'the cause of the loss of all the Levant, which would have involved Cyprus in the same fate but for God's help'. The Signory was all in favour of the Cardinal Cornaro.[1] But its ambassador reported[2] that the Pope had given the benefice to Peter Grimani, because no one should have any benefice from the Religion who did not bear the cross. The ambassador was advised from Venice that the Signory did not propose to interfere.[3] Nevertheless it had its way, and Cardinal Mark became Grand Commander. From this time onwards the title of Grand Commander of Cyprus was always borne by the head of the branch of the Cornaro family to which Mark belonged, that is the Cornaro della Ca' grande or della Regina.[4]

As the wealthiest landowner in the island, the Grand Commander was naturally regarded by the Rectors as liable to play his part in paying tithes. The Order of St John, however, always considered itself exempt from such payments, from which it had been excused by Martin V, Eugenius IV and earlier Popes.[5] In 1516 Julius II exempted the Grand Commander from paying tithes to the Real. The Rectors protested[6] that these tithes went to pay the stradiotes and foot-soldiers for the defence of the island. The question was not decided, but the Commandery was excused from payment, until the matter came up again in 1525, when it was proposed that payment should be resumed. After much discussion, agreement was reached; the Commandery was to pay 1400 ducats a year to the Council of Ten; the debt owed by the Commandery on account of Cardinal Mark was to be remitted, and the Rectors were to repay what had been exacted on that account, and make no further demands.[7]

Cardinal Mark, Grand Commander, Patriarch of Constantinople, Abbot of St John Montfort, to name only some of his benefices, died on

[1] Sanudo, VII, 243 (9 Jan. 1508). The revenue was then estimated at 3000 ducats only; in the *Relatione* (M.L., *H.* III, pp. 502–3) it is put at 8000 ducats.

[2] 15 Jan. Sanudo, VII, 249. [3] *Ibid.* 250 (19 Jan.).

[4] Hackett (p. 644; Papaïoannou, III, p. 198) gives the wrong impression that the Commandery came into the possession of the branch della Piscopia. The statement of Colbertaldi (accepted by M.L., *H.* III, p. 821, n. 2), that the Cornaro and Lippomani were the only noble Venetian families whom the Republic allowed to enter the Order, is, as Herquet points out (*Charlotta*, p. 237, n. 15) incorrect; he notes that in the 15th century members of the families Vendramin, Diedo, Marcello, Querini, Dolfin entered it.

[5] *Monum. Concil. Gen. Seculi XV, Concil. Basil., Script.* II, p. 619.

[6] Sanudo, XXIV, 21–2 (11 Jan. 1517).

[7] *Ibid.* XL, 358, 373, 524, 557–8 (29 Dec. 1525).

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26 July 1524. The Grand Commandery fell to Alvise Cornaro, the Abbey of St John Montfort to a nephew of the late Cardinal.[1] The last Cornaro to enjoy the Commandery before it became merely titular, owing to the Turkish conquest, was Louis son of John, who was promoted cardinal in 1551, contributed large sums to the State at the time of the invasion, and died in 1584.[2]

The much less important Commanderies of Phinika-Anoyira and Templos were also subjected to the payment of tithes, in spite of occasional protests by the Commanders, who claimed to be exempt as holding from the Grand Master of the Order.[3]

Of the great laymen, the chief in rank at the death of James II was the Count of Jaffa and Karpass.[4] We have seen that in 1472 James created the barony of Karpass, bestowing it on John Perez Fabregues, who as Count of Jaffa already took precedence over all other barons of Cyprus. In the charter James ordained that the precedence should belong to the new County. This was an arbitrary act, and ceased to have effect when Catherine deprived the heirs of John Perez Fabregues of the County of Jaffa and gave it to her cousin George Contarini.[5] But the heirs of John Perez were allowed to retain Karpass and other fiefs, and did not cease to utter their pretensions to the county of Jaffa. His widow Apollonia of Pendayia continued to rank as Countess of Jaffa until Venice confirmed Catherine's donation in 1476. When Alvise, the son of John Perez, died in 1511, his elder sister Charla claimed to succeed, and the

[1] Sanudo, XXXVI, 492, 495, 523 (26 July, 8 Aug. 1524).

[2] For the later Grand Commanders, see M.L., *H.* III, p. 821. Probably the latest incident in the history of the title occurred in 1878, when Count Alvise Mocenigo, to whom it had descended through the marriage of his great-grandfather with Laura Cornaro, preferred a claim for the recognition of his title and the restitution of the estates. Cp. Zannetos, II, p. 187.

[3] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 563. In 1500 Zacharias Garzoni rented the Phinika Commandery for only 400 ducats; in 1539 the estimate of the revenue was 450 ducats. In the *Relatione* (of 1510–21) the revenues of Phinika and Templos had been estimated at 1600 ducats and 200 ducats respectively (M.L., *H.* III, p. 503).

[4] See above, p. 574. On the Counts of Jaffa, see Mas Latrie, 'Les comtes de Jaffa du XIIe au XIXe siecle' in *Arch. Ven.* t. 18 (1879), pt. 2, pp. 370–417; the same article under the title 'Les comtes de Jaffa et d'Ascalon du XIIe au XIXe siècle' in *Revue des questions historiques*, t. 26 (1879). On those of Karpass, the same, 'Les comtes du Carpas' in *B.E.C.* XII (1880), pp. 376–92; *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 421–7.

[5] Above, p. 703. He died in 1510 (Sanudo, XI, 682) and was buried in St Dominic's (Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 153b). I have failed to find the source for Mas Latrie's statement that he died in 1491.

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claim having been allowed her husband Nicolas Giustinian and herself did homage for Knodara and Karpass and other fiefs not named, which had belonged to Alvise.[1] The County of Jaffa remained in the hands of the Contarini, in spite of the pretensions of the Giustiniani. In 1526 rival claims between the brothers Thomas and Giustinian Contarini were decided in favour of the former.[2] Angelo Giustinian continued to annoy the Contarini by his agitation. Failing to obtain the precedence by claiming the County of Jaffa, he succeeded in getting his name inscribed, as Count of Karpass, in the first place in the roll at the reviews of 1538 and 1539. But in 1542 the Council of Ten definitely instructed the Rectors to establish Thomas Contarini in his place at the head of the roll,[3] and so he appears in 1544, with Angelo Giustinian, Count of Karpass, in the second place, James (Zaco) Sinclitico in the third, and Alvise de Nores, Count of Tripoli, in the fourth. Henceforward the precedence of the Contarini as Counts of Jaffa was undisputed. Thomas was succeeded in 1560 by his son George.[4] The domain included twelve Cypriote villages; George, having been authorized in 1562 to sell four of them, substituted in their place various estates in Venice or its territory, which, after the Turkish conquest of Cyprus, formed the fief of the Counts of Jaffa.[5]

On assuming control, the Venetian government made strict investigation into the title-deeds of all holders of fiefs in the Kingdom. We have seen that all grants made by Catherine after the death of her husband, and all alienations of lands belonging to the royal domain, were strictly reviewed and for the most part annulled in 1474.[6] But the government went further back; on 27 March 1490 the Council of Ten decreed that unless a privilege granted in the life-time of King James II, according to

[1] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 424–6 (6 May and 30 June 1512). In the Doge's letter of 26 Nov. 1511, referring Charla's claim to the Rectors, Alvise is called 'comes, ut dicitur, Zaffi et Carpasii'. The 'ut dicitur' indicates the doubtful nature of Alvise's claim to Jaffa. Later, in 1534, Angelo Giustinian was still pretending to the title, and had to be formally forbidden by the Council of Ten to use it.

[2] *Libri Comm., Reg.* VI, pp. 188, no. 32, 189, no. 35 (14–16 Sept. 1526). But Thomas had already held the title since the death of his father George in 1510 (Sanudo, XI, 682).

[3] 25 Feb. 1542. M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 427.

[4] *Libri Comm., Reg.* VI, p. 298, no. 7 (15 Dec. 1560).

[5] The elder branch died out in 1675; Mas Latrie traces the descent of the title in the younger branch down to 1870.

[6] Ch. XII, pp. 708, n., 709, n. 1.

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the constitutions of the Kingdom, could be produced, no claim could be heard to fiefs, lands and other property said to have been given or promised by the late King.[1] Such royal concessions could not be proved by witnesses or by any documents other than actual royal privileges. This decree followed on an earlier decision, taken on 16 January 1490,[2] on the representation by the envoys of the Cypriotes that there were many persons who held fiefs not only by donations and privileges granted by James II, but by grants from earlier Kings; they had been left by James in peaceful possession, although in the lapse of time they had lost their title-deeds, because they and their predecessors were known to have been in possession from old time. The Cypriotes asked that such persons should be allowed to retain possession, according to the constitutions of the Kingdom. Their request was granted, but only in the case of those who had been in possession before the death of James II. The same Cypriote envoys brought up again the question of the donations and privileges granted by Queen Catherine, which had been annulled, and were told, on 4 March 1490,[3] that the Rectors would be instructed to make particular investigation into all such privileges and concessions and report home, on which the Signory would decide as might be just and right. One of the envoys, Peter Goul,[4] held the lease of the customs for 500 besants a year, which had been granted to him by the Queen, and this particular concession was now confirmed. Another attempt to clear up the uncertainty prevailing as to estates acquired since the death of James II, which was made in 1529, has already been described.[5]

Contemporary accounts of the character and condition of the population are generally unfavourable. The estimate given by Lusignan[6] of the qualities of the people makes a much better impression than is gathered from most other writers, who usually find it difficult to forget the reputation of ancient Cyprus for luxury and lasciviousness, or who stress all the bad features of the various elements of the population and ignore the good, as Dietrich of Niem had done in his much-quoted epigram on

[1] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 525. [2] *Ibid.* p. 542.

[3] *Ibid.* pp. 552–4.

[4] This man, who had been an official (segretain) of the Secrète in 1468–9 (M.L., *H.* III, p. 187 and in the *Livre des remembrances*, *passim*) was still in office, as secretary of the Rectors, in 1510 (*ibid.* p. 513; *Reg. C.N.* no. 137).

[5] Above, p. 770, n. 1.

[6] *Descr.* ff. 219 sq.; cp. *Chor.* ff. 84b sq.

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Cyprus, 'the island in which French pride, Syrian effeminacy, and Greek flattery and fraud came together.'[1] Lusignan, on the contrary, considers that the women, in spite of that reputation, have by their virtue tamed the unchaste desires which seek to breach the defences of their honour. He speaks almost as well of the men, who are saved from vice by the grace of God, which they obtain by their tears, their prayers, almsgiving and other good works. Thus they devote themselves to virtue and, urged on as it were by a God-given impulse (and he says this without affecting to overpraise his country) surpass all other nations in spiritual matters. The proof is that in this little land there have been so many saints that it has been called, by some who can claim to be filled with the Holy Spirit, the Island beloved of Jesus Christ, a name earned by no other country, and one to which the Holy Land offers the only parallel.

The worthy Dominican, in spite of his attempt to disarm criticism, seems to have been carried away by his enthusiasm, and other witnesses, reading his eulogy with a smile, would prefer to lay stress on the admission which he himself makes, when he says: 'I can assure you that if the Cypriotes gave rein to their desires, and set their affection on earthly things, they would be worse, more licentious and wicked than their predecessors, who were regarded by the ancients as gods, and more wanton and lascivious than ever was the lecherous Venus.'

Of the life and character of all classes of the people, as he knew them, he gives an engaging picture. They were, he says, generally gentle, affable, humane and friendly towards strangers, in whom they took more interest than in their own people.[2] They delighted in fencing and feats of arms, and in music; there was hardly a lord who could not sing and play the lute, or a lady the spinet, to perfection. The people, the burgesses and others of mean condition were fond of games and dancing, and had a natural bent for poetry. The dirges which they composed for persons of note were such as to move one to tears; particularly he mentions the laments which he had heard on the Turkish attack on Malta and on the ruin of Nicosia. All delighted in the chase, and there were few citizens and villagers who did not possess quails trained to fight. No

[1] *Nemus Unionis* (1609), p. 477.

[2] Cp. Porcacchi in Cobham, *Exc. Cypr.* p. 168: 'the nobles were very fond of foreigners; most of them lived after the fashion of Latin nations, the rest like the Greeks. They were quick-tempered, lively and active, and lived in lavish splendour and refinement'. So too Lithgow found the people 'exceedingly affectionated to strangers' (*ibid.* p. 202).

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gentleman was without three or four falcons and as many hounds. He describes in detail the jousting which took place at Carnival time.

It is a significant description of a gay and insouciant society, dancing to its ruin. For beneath the bright surface there was a good deal of rottenness; and any writer looking at it from the point of view of the Greek population and the serfs, rather than of the French aristocracy to which Lusignan belonged, would have painted a much more gloomy picture. And the impression made on most of the visitors to the island, though it may be inaccurate in details, confirms this darker view. Martin von Baumgarten, who was there in 1508,[1] tells us:

All the inhabitants of Cyprus are slaves to the Venetians, being obliged to pay to the state a third part of all their increase or income,[2] whether the produce of their ground, or corn, wine, oil, or of their cattle, or any other thing. Besides every man of them is bound to work for the state two days of the week wherever they shall please to appoint him; and if any shall fail, by reason of some other business of their own, or for indisposition of body, then they are made to pay a fine for as many days as they are absent from their work. And which is more, there is yearly some tax or other imposed on them, with which the poor common people are so flayed and pillaged that they hardly have wherewithal to keep soul and body together.

At the other end of the Venetian period, in a description of the unrest in the island of which advantage was taken by Turkish intrigue, we find a very similar picture of the oppression of the serfs by the nobles, who treated them like cattle, so that their whole course of life, their marriages, the bringing up of their children, their personal liberty, their property, the honour of their daughters, were at the mercy of the privileged upper classes.[3]

[1] Cobham, *Exc. Cypr.* p. 55.

[2] It was noted in 1521 that for twenty years past the stradiotes, or some of them, had evaded this tax. Sanudo, XXXII, 100.

[3] Natale Conti, *Univers. hist. sui temp.* (1545–81), 1581, p. 423. Cp. Sereno, *Commentarii*, p. 61: 'a tanto era il dominio dei nobili Cipriotti sopra ai contadini cresciuto, che non che un minimo podere o villa posseder li lasciassero, ma nè li figliuoli, nè anche le vite lor proprie libere ad essi lasciavano', and sold them to each other like slaves. Either these two passages go back to the same source, or one is inspired by the other. Stephen Gerlach (*Tage-Buch*, 1674, p. 123) was told in 1575 that the Venetians (like the Genoese in Chios) had treated their subjects worse than slaves, using them to gratify their worst passions; but that when the Turks came the poor people were freed, and their masters, who had plagued them, were taken and sold for slaves in Turkey. His informant doubtless had Turkish sympathies.

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Even before the abdication of Catherine, a visitor, after remarking that the Venetians were in danger of losing the island, because the troops were not paid,[1] added, in words that have already been quoted, that many inhabitants gave themselves up to the Turks to escape the intolerable conditions in the island.[2] Mutual arrangements were made with the Grand Master of Rhodes for the return of serfs who had fled to the respective islands.[3] In 1490 the Cypriote deputation dwelt at length on the serious loss suffered by the Kingdom owing to the escape of serfs, which was facilitated by the negligence of the civitains of places on the coast, and made a number of recommendations which were accepted in all essentials by the Signory.[4] Nevertheless it was noted in 1518 that there were still in Rhodes many serfs who had escaped from Cyprus; the number in Rhodes was said to be something like 500, and one died in Candia worth 2000 ducats.[5]

Again, in 1562, it is no casual visitor, but a Venetian official, Bernard Sagredo, who had been out as Proveditor-General, who paints a gloomy picture of the misgovernment of the island. All the *contrade*, except Paphos, Kerynia, Salines and the Viscontado, were deplorably misgoverned, the judges being corrupt and encouraging the oppression of the lower classes, so that, unless the Signory would send out judges of its own appointing, a serious outbreak was to be feared. The victims of

[1] So in 1521 the men at Kerynia 'could not live because their pay was so small'. Sanudo, XXXII, 100.

[2] Nicolas le Huen (1488) in Cobham. *Exc. Cypr.* p. 52; above, Ch. XII, p. 738, n. 3.

[3] Commission to Balthasar Trevisan, below, p. 867, § 13.

[4] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 545–8: the authorities in all Venetian territory to be ordered to allow fugitives to be taken back to Cyprus; 10 ducats to be paid by the lord of each fugitive serf to his captor, with the cost of bringing him back; if he returned of his own accord, he was to have the reward and expenses (this the Signory disallowed in the case of future fugitives); no ship to carry away a serf without licence; a ship's master who did so to pay 1000 ducats to the lord and 1000 to the Real, restoring the serf in person or his value; the civitains to have notice of all sailings and inspect all ships; if a serf was so hidden as to escape detection, and afterwards discovered, the informer to have 25 ducats; the Grand Master of Rhodes to be asked to hand over fugitives (this had already been done); harbouring a fugitive in the island to be punished by a fine of one ducat a day. Free men who travelled about the island in search of employment to carry certificates of status from the lord or leaseholder of their villages. The Signory further imposed a fine of 100 ducats on anyone who gave a false certificate of freedom to a serf, the fine to go half to the Rectors, half to the informer. But such certificates were not to be refused to free men, nor any payment exacted for them.

[5] Sanudo, XXVI, 371; XXVII, 43.

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the tyranny were forbidden direct access to the Rectors. The coastguard, which was served by the *parici* by day and the *francomati* by night, had become an intolerable burden, because the magistrates had allowed so many men to buy themselves off from the service.

Finally, when the Turk had actually declared war, the Signory took the step of authorizing the liberation of all the *parici*. It would appear that, while the private owners agreed, the Rectors prevented this reform from being carried out. In any case, it was too late.[1]

It would be unfair to the Venetian government, as a modern historian has pointed out,[2] to accept the view, which has sometimes been expressed, that it deliberately sought to impoverish the island in order to enrich the metropolis. Many were the recommendations received from Rectors and Syndics 'to re-establish the mercantile marine, encourage and increase by every possible means the cultivation of corn, promote the working of the Salines[3] and the activity of commerce, for which the extraordinary fertility of the island supplied so many products in the shape of wine, flax, hemp, cotton, wax, honey, sugar, indigo, oil, saffron, etc., while the island industries were able to draw on various materials for manufactures to be exported'. But such recommendations, even if adopted, which they infrequently were, could not more than indirectly touch the problem of the poverty of the lower classes. The same writer admits that, although the government did make efforts to

[1] See below, Ch. xv, p. 958.

[2] Romanin, VI, pp. 282 f.; cp. IV, pp. 483 ff. In connexion with the mining privileges mentioned by this writer, it may be noted that in 1504 a letter was received from Cyprus enclosing a specimen of gold from a mine; it was handed over to an expert to be tested (Sanudo, V, 941). As no more is heard of it, the verdict was probably unfavourable. Villamont, in 1588, was told that there were gold mines which the Cypriotes had not yet chosen to show to the Turks (Cobham, *Exc. Cypr.* p. 177). In 1605, the traveller Peter Teixeira was assured that gold was to be found in some places in the island (*Travels*, tr. Sinclair, Hakluyt Soc., p. 137). I take this opportunity to amplify a remark on gold in Cyprus, in vol. I, pp. 9–10, by reference to the article by J. A. Bevan in *Great Britain and the East*, Supplement, Feb. 4, 1937, pp. 7–8. It was discovered in 1934–5 that many of the 'gossan' outcrops contain precious metal in payable quantity. During 1936 gold was discovered at nearly all the mining sites. The production figures in kilogrammes for the years 1934 to 1939 are 407, 214, 653, 736, 910, 510 (*League of Nations Statistical Year-Book*, 1940–1, p. 156). I owe the references to Miss Elizabeth Monroe.

[3] It must be observed that this was a government monopoly, with all the defects to which such an institution is liable.

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alleviate the lot of the *parici* by enfranchising them,[1] and conferring benefits, as by giving to every woman of the class a coverlet for the winter, granting portions to their daughters and provisions to their sons, distributing food, yet out of natural lethargy it did little or nothing in the way of improvements that went to the root of the matter. 'Meanwhile came the Turkish war, and the island was lost.'

The inadequacy of the provision for public services may be illustrated from what we know of the organization of education and medicine. The interest taken by the home government in the former[2] appears to have been slight, and to have required stimulation by petition from Cyprus. In 1490 there was no public grammar-school master, although in the time of the Kings there had been one or two in receipt of salaries from the Treasury. The Cypriotes found that the salary provided by Venice, of 40 ducats, with wine and corn, was not sufficient to attract a competent teacher. The Signory agreed to provide a salary of not more than 100 ducats, 80 in cash and the rest in wine and corn, which it understood had been the provision under the Kings.[3] In 1491, a petition from Famagusta that an appropriation of 400 besants[4] a year should be made for a master to teach grammar to the children was grudgingly granted to the extent of 250 besants.[5] One or two records survive of teachers being summoned to Cyprus from Italy.[6]

[1] For which, however, it exacted a stiff payment, in order to bolster up its own finances.

[2] On education in Cyprus under Venice, see Peristianes, Ἱστορία τῶν Ἑλλην. Γραμμάτων, pp. 23–6; L. Philippou, τὰ Ἑλλην. Γράμματα ἐν Κύπρῳ, pp. 29–30. Ph. Georgiou's statement (p. 66) that the Venetians closed the Greek schools seems exaggerated.

[3] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 538–9.

[4] The ducat was worth 10 besants at this time.

[5] M.L., *H.* III, p. 491, § 17.

[6] M.L., *loc. cit.*, n. 2, cites Sebastian Foscarini, who in 1512 went out as reader in logic and philosophy, and also as Counsellor, and John Giustinian, who was invited in 1552 to go as instructor of youth, but was dissuaded by his friends from accepting the invitation, owing to his great age and the risks of the journey (Cigogna, *Inscr. Ven.* III, pp. 362, 363 n., 367). There was also the Flemish schoolmaster whom Fürer saw in Famagusta in 1566 (*Exc. Cypr.* p. 78). James Diassorin is said to have founded a school at Nicosia in 1562, but his activities were cut short when he was executed for treason. That it was possible to get some sort of education in Famagusta in the days before the Turkish conquest we learn from Neophytos Rodinos (born in the last quarter of the 16th cent.), who says that his father Solomon went to school there and got a little instruction in grammar and the poets and the Italian tongue (Περὶ ἡρώων, Rome, 1659, p. 154, quoted by Sathas, Μεσ. Βιβλ. II, p. ρνβ′ and E. Legrand, *Bibliogr. Hellénique, XVII siècle*, III (1895), p. 302). Solomon's chronicle of Cyprus (1570–85) is lost.

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In medicine, a public service was maintained, though on a very small scale, the salary of one or two physicians being paid by the government. In 1490 the Signory granted the request of the Cypriotes that a Cypriote physician, John or Janet de Rames, living and teaching at Padua, should be engaged at a salary of 200 ducats.[1] There were already in the island two salaried physicians, Alvise Sudan, a Cypriote, and Bartholomew of Faenza, but the latter's practice was confined to Famagusta. He also, next year, was assured a salary of 200 ducats, having shown signs of dissatisfaction with his position and a desire to give it up.[2] Another Cypriote physician was Balian de Nores, who as already related[3] had been a ringleader in the conspiracy against James II in 1470, escaped execution and went to France, where he qualified in medicine. Returning to Cyprus he practised there until his death in 1528. But it is not known that he was a public servant; and the same is true of the Flemish doctor who was practising at Famagusta in 1566.[4]

[1] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 539–40, 555–7. Jerome of Parenzo, previously in the employ of the Cyprus government, had had a salary of 150 ducats in cash with his daily expenses; it is asked that John de Rames may have 200 ducats in cash without such provisions. A passage in the letter of Elias of Pesaro (1563; Hebrew text in *Hayye Olam*, I, Paris, 1878; French trans. by Schwab in *Rev. de Géogr.* V (1879), p. 227; from which Cobham, *Exc. Cypr.* p. 76) falls to be considered here. Dr Cyril Moss, who has kindly examined the Hebrew text, informs me that Schwab's translation, as I had suspected, is not correct. Dr Moss's interpretation is as follows: 'The ordinary payment [i.e. salary] which people make, i.e. 200 zecchins, they give only to non-Jews, and there is also another payment which officials (?) make to a physician, viz. one Venetian gazzetta for each patient *per mensem*, i.e. 120 quattrini *per annum*. These two payments the people give to the two physicians. But there are here two Jewish physicians, one a Portuguese and the other a Romano [presumably Greek] who derive great profit', etc. From Schwab's rendering it had appeared that the Christian doctors had 200 zecchins a year for each patient (which was absurd), while the Jewish doctors got only 120 zecchins, about a gazzetta a month per patient. But Elias says 120 quattrini, not zecchins. Since one gazzetta was 96 quattrini, it seems impossible to make sense of his statement. On the other hand if he wrote quattrini by mistake for zecchins, a calculation, based on the equation 1 zecchin = 80 gazzette, shows that an annual salary of 120 zecchins meant that the doctor had 800 patients. Although Elias does not say so, it would seem that the second salary was paid to Jewish doctors. It is also certain that Schwab's rendering '200 zecchins a year for each patient' is without authority.

[2] M.L., *H.* III, p. 490, § 16 and note: the Famagustans ask that he should receive the same salary as had been paid to Jerome of Parenzo. The Signory at first refused, but in July next he was guaranteed a salary of 2000 besants, equivalent to the 200 ducats of Jerome of Parenzo, the ducat being reckoned at 10 besants.

[3] Ch. XI, p. 650, n. 1.

[4] Cobham, *Exc. Cypr.* p. 78.

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The commercial instinct of the Venetians caused them to pay somewhat more attention to the problems of currency than to the public services just mentioned. The currency in circulation in the island in this period was almost entirely Venetian. The government made an attempt to fix the value of the Cyprus besant at eight to the ducat, but it was found in 1490 that it was impossible to maintain that rate, owing to the scarcity of the gold coin, ducats being allowed to go out of the island in great quantities. The Cypriotes therefore asked that an embargo should be placed on the export of more gold than was required for the expenses of voyage; instead of exporting it, it should be spent in the purchase of island products such as cotton, sugar, camlet and samite. The request was granted.

But if the export of gold was checked, and it is doubtful if it was, there was still the question of small change. Like the Genoese before them, the Venetians found it necessary to provide coins for the daily needs of the population. From 1515 onwards to the last days of Venetian Cyprus, the Council of Ten made efforts to supply small change, at first in the shape of base coins bearing no sign of Venetian origin, afterwards with the Doge's name.[1] They were all struck at Venice; there is no evidence that a regular mint was established by the Venetians in Cyprus (except possibly for a very few years in 1518 and later, and even then the punches were engraved at Venice). During the siege of Famagusta, Bragadin issued a fiduciary coinage of copper besants.[2]

It is beyond dispute that the representations which the Cypriotes made to the home government on various matters of policy received most careful consideration. The outstanding instance of this treatment is found in the answers which were given by the Signory to the *capitula* presented by the envoys of the 'Universitas Cypri', Sir Hannibal Babin,

[1] See Note III at the end of this Chapter, p. 876.

[2] See Fig. 11, p. 956, Gatto, p. 32; Graziani, p. 182; Natale Conti, *Hist.* 1589, ff. 66b–67; Schlumberger, p. 208; Papadopoli, p. 486. On the obverse, forepart of the lion of St Mark, PRO REGNI CYPRI PRAESIDIO (or PRESSIDIO); on the reverse, the words VENETOR[um] FIDES INVIOLABILIS BISANTE, above which a little Cupid, which has been explained as an allusion to the goddess of the island. Ant. Riccoboni, p. 16, says that some of the coins (the penalty for refusing which was hanging) were of 12 *asses*, and others of four *quadrantes*. Gatto, again, says that they were *bisanti* of ten *soldi*, and *soldi* of four *quattrini*. Yet there is no doubt that all the coins which have survived (and they are exceedingly common) are of the same value, although their weights range from 9·47 to 3·0 grammes.

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Peter Goul and John Strambaldi, in 1490. Each article is transcribed in full and, with the decision on it, sent to the Rectors, with instructions as to action to be taken. The document gives a very favourable impression of the spirit in which the Signory undertook the task of governing the Kingdom, however lamentable may have been the failure of many of its officers to act up to its principles.[1]

Complaints against individual administrators always found a hearing at Venice.[2] In 1521 the Nicosiotes forwarded a complaint against Zacharias Loredan, Captain of Famagusta, who, they said, was following in the footsteps of Bartholomew da Mosto and would not give corn to the poor. This and other charges were presented in May and by August had received attention.[3] Another instance of a grievance redressed is recorded in the same year, when the *francomati* of a village[4] appealed to be relieved from going to work at the fortifications of Famagusta, because it was so far a journey. After the views of the Proveditor-General, the Captain of Famagusta and others had been considered, the petitioners were relieved of all *angaria*, real or personal, in connexion with the fortifications of Famagusta, but were obliged to serve in the coast-guard. As we have seen, however, this service was regarded as a heavy burden.

As to the burdens borne by the people, we have some information more or less precise, though much remains vague and uncertain. Baumgarten's remarks in 1508 have already been quoted. The *francomati* from 15 to 60 years of age, who were not excused for certain reasons, were compelled to do work on the fortifications.[5] From what they re-

[1] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 527–59 (16 Jan.–14 March 1490). Brief summary in Romanin, IV, pp. 443–4. Reference to most of these decisions is made in the present Chapter.

[2] The Commission to John Contarini of 1538 (see Note, p. 873, § 112) gives instructions for the forwarding of petitions by the Captain with his credentials and views; complaints against a Rector needed credentials only from the community.

[3] Sanudo, XXX, 265. Romanin, IV, p. 445. For Bartholomew da Mosto, see above, p. 783.

[4] Ethimal (which I have not identified) was under the Captain of Paphos and therefore somewhere in that district. Sanudo, XXXI, 226.

[5] Minio, in 1529, giving the number of *francomati* as 41,579, says that there were 14,000 males from 15 to 60 years, but only 11,000 were liable, the remainder being excused: abbots, priests, *zagi* (tonsured clerks), officials of casali, and physically incapacitated persons. Sagredo, on the other hand, in 1562, numbers 47,503 male *francomati*, of whom 31,352 were liable to *fattion francomatica*. How to reconcile these widely differing estimates I do not know.

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covered from the soil, the owners of the villages in which they lived took a certain proportion.[1]

All *parici*, from 15 to 60 years old, served their masters for a certain number of days in the week. In 1529 it was three days; later, according to Attar and Lusignan, two.[2] The *parici* were also subject to heavy impositions. Besides a payment in cash,[3] which is variously stated, they had to give a third and a tenth, that is about 40 per cent, of all they got in produce from the land. In Lusignan's time the imposition had increased so much that some paid 50 besants a year, while the owners took a third of their produce (after taking out the seed-corn), paying them, on the days of their work, only six *quattrini*, without food or drink.[4]

[1] In 1529, according to Minio, the *francomati* were liable to ten days' labour or five besants, but this appears to be labour on the fortifications. On the other hand they had to give the owners of their villages, in some places a fourth, in others a fifth or a sixth, of what they produced. The Real deducted the five besants for the fortifications. Lusignan, writing in 1573 (*Chor.* f. 30), says that the produce was divided into 5, 6, 7 or 8 parts, of which the owner took one part, the peasant the rest; but the owner was not obliged to give the seed-corn, except when he wished to sow it in his own land. Elsewhere (*Descr.* f. 70), he says that the *francomati* gave their lords a seventh, eighth, or tenth of their fruits. The lord, if he wished for any service from his francomate, had to pay him a wage, just as if he were a stranger, but the francomate was content with little.

[2] Farmers of estates were in the habit of forcing *parici* to work for them without pay, as is shown by the prohibition of this practice in 1489 (Commission to Balthasar Trevisan, below, p. 867, § 14), when offenders were liable to pay the serf three besants for each day he had been thus illegally employed. But the practice seems to have continued. Sagredo, in 1562, after giving the number of *francomati* and *parici*, says that his predecessor as Proveditor-General compelled them (it is not clear whether he means both classes or one only) to work for the owners of their *casali* thirty-six days in the year, with a payment of 12 *soldi*, and providing a pair of oxen at their own expense, which caused great bitterness. Some of the owners did not pay them at all, but put them in the stocks or beat them, and the local magistrates did not interfere, having no authority over feudataries or gentlemen, with whom, had they had such authority, they would in any case have sided.

[3] Minio says 15 besants; Sagredo 23, though some paid less.

[4] The *quattrino* was one-fourth of the *denaro*, which was a twelfth of the *soldo* or a twenty-fourth of the *gazzetta*. Elias of Pesaro (Cobham, *Exc. Cypr.* p. 73) in 1563 says that the money in circulation at this time was entirely Venetian. The Venetian sequin or ducat was worth 8 *lire*; since the *lira* was worth 10 *gazzette* or 20 *soldi*, 7680 *quattrini* went to the ducat. On the exceedingly complicated Venetian system, see F. C. Lane, *Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance*, pp. 251–2, who rightly says that any attempt to translate the sums mentioned in the sources into modern equivalents would be delusive.

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The moral atmosphere of the island cannot have been improved by its being used by the Venetian government—as it had been by the Byzantine, and was to be by the Turkish—as one of the various places to which undesirables might be banished. Many instances are recorded of such banishment, as punishment for crimes ranging from murder and unnatural vice to seditious talk. So desperate was the need of remedying the depopulation of Famagusta, that a clause in the Captain's Commission provided that persons who had been banished from Cyprus for simple homicide might return to Famagusta, provided that the crime had not been committed there; if it had been, they might go to live at Paphos. Also, persons banished from Venetian territories, except rebels, might live at Famagusta.[1]

[1] Bembo (*Hist. Vinit.* 1552, f. 13b) gives a striking case of banishment in 1492. Gabriel Bon, president of the Quarantia criminal, instigated by his friend Francis Falier, proposed to the College a law which would grant to all poor citizens of 40 years or older a pound of gold a year, and to those between 25 and 40, half that amount. The proposal was recognized as introducing a mischievous precedent, and its promoters were suspected of seeking to curry favour with the citizens and secure their own election to offices. They were therefore warned to say no more about it. For a few days they obeyed, but, egged on by some who would have profited by such a law, and assured that if it passed they would be elected to any offices they liked, and always be among the leading men in the Republic, they resumed their canvassing. The Council of Ten thereupon threw them into prison and then banished them to Cyprus, on pain of death if they left Nicosia. Two public clerks who had advised them were similarly banished to Retimo in Crete. Three other cases may be culled from many in Sanudo: IV, 303–4 (Aug. 1502): Sister Mary, Prioress of S.M. Maggiore, banished to Cyprus for a love-affair with a priest, Francis di Sant' Eustachio, who was condemned to ten years imprisonment. *Ibid.* XLVI, 234 (23 Oct. 1527): perpetual banishment to Famagusta for *sodomitio sforzato*. *Ibid.* LI, 608 (1529): John Antony Lombardo, absent but lawfully cited on the steps of the Rialto, for having used words malignant and scandalous about our peaceful state; to present himself within eight days at the prison and be banished and relegated to Famagusta for ten years, and report himself daily to the Rector there; if he break his bounds, whoever takes him shall have 1000 *lire* from his property, otherwise from the Signory, and he shall lie in prison closely confined (*in prexon Forte serado*) for one year and be returned to banishment so that he stay ten years full at Famagusta. If he does not present himself within the stated time, he shall be banished from Venice and all its possessions on land and sea and from all ships armed or unarmed, with reward of 1000 *lire* to whoever takes him and returns him to custody; he is then to be locked up as before for one year, and returned to his banishment. In 1498 Dominic Calbo was banished to Cyprus *in perpetuo*, but with a provision of 10 ducats a month, for assaulting Bernardino Minotto in the Great Council and making his nose bleed (Priuli, *Diarii*, I, p. 77 and n. 1). A harmless exile in Famagusta was Peter Paul Scaliger, a descendant of the erstwhile rulers of Verona. Banished as a boy

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As for the morals of the Greek population, Elias of Pesaro, writing in 1563, is harsh and uncompromising in his condemnation.[1] 'The Greeks do not allow their women to show themselves in the town by day; only by night can they visit their friends and go to church. They say this is by way of modesty, but it is really to avoid the frequent adulteries, for their rule of life is thoroughly perverse. They are all liars, cheats, thieves. Honesty has vanished from their midst.' One suspects that the Jewish merchant had had some unfortunate experience at the hands of the subtle Cypriotes.

It is clearly impossible, in the face of the evidence that has been collected above, to accept the verdict given in the concluding sentence of the Chronicle of Florio Bustron, whose prejudice in favour of Venice is obvious: 'And in such manner are the people of Cyprus ruled and governed, with the greatest equity and justice, by the Venetian lords, under whose government they desire to remain for all centuries to come.' It is true that the same note is struck by the speech of one of the orators of a deputation to the Doge, which went to present a petition from the general body of Cypriotes in 1520:[2]

For some 47 years [says John de Nores], during which under the protection and fortunate auspices of your Sublimity we have been your most faithful subjects, we have tasted the fruits of most happy peace, to the great satisfaction

by the Venetians after the capture of that city, he lived to an old age; forbidden to marry, he was allowed a concubine, who bore him a son and two daughters. These latter he married to two Flemings, one a physician and the other a schoolmaster. Fürer was kindly treated by these men in 1566 (Cobham, *Exc. Cypr.* p. 78).

[1] Cobham, *Exc. Cypr.* p. 75.

[2] Sanudo, XXIX, 470–3: speech of John de Nores (incorrectly *Nordes*). On this man see Sanudo, L, 45, 540; LVI, 724; LVII, 354, 494; M.L., *H.* III, pp. 498, 519, n. 1, 531; Lusignan, *Descr.* ff. 210, 210b. He had a revenue of 400 ducats. In March 1529 he acquired as a fief from the Signory an estate in Cyprus, for which he paid 10,000 ducats, 8000 down and 2000 within two months at 8 per cent. Soon afterwards the Signory sold him the lordship of Strongylo and other villages, and on 23 June 1529 gave him the title of Count of Tripoli for himself and his heirs, for which he lent the Camera 3000 ducats and gave 1500 *stara* of wheat (the *staro*, *staio* or *ster* was between 138 and 145 English pounds). In 1532 he was again orator of the community of Cyprus, and his eloquence made a great impression at Venice, although being gouty he was obliged to deliver his speech sitting. He is represented on a medal by an unidentified hand: Hill, *The Dreyfus Collection, Renaissance Medals* (1931), no. 495 bis. Rawdon Brown's volume containing the *Relatione* of Francis Attar is signed 'il conte di Tripoli, ambassiator de Cipri, Venezia 28 April 1559', but this was probably James de Nores, who played some part in the defence of Cyprus (see pp. 846 n., 978).

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of the whole people. How many buildings and inexpugnable constructions, how many palaces and buildings have risen again from their ruins, and are continually being erected, how many arid and barren places have been transformed to most fertile estates; what love, what affinity and kinship have grown up between the blood of Venice and Cyprus, etc.

Since the deputation was evidently asking for concessions from the Signory, the unctuous generalities of which this is a sample must not be taken too seriously, albeit the oration was much approved by those to whom it was addressed.

There is no doubt that agitators, who wished to see the Venetian yoke thrown off, played upon the feelings of the people, who were easily persuaded that a change of masters could not be for the worse. The heavy taxation and the harsh treatment of the lower classes by the landowners were real grievances; they have already been described. There were some at Venice who were moved by more humane feelings, but the fear of alienating the nobles by restraining their tyranny was too strong to allow of reform. Thus the oppressed listened eagerly to those who, for their own reasons, sought to bring in the Turk.[1] It is, however, to be observed that such movements in that direction as will be described later had no immediate results, and were easily suppressed. Nor is there any record of any effective contribution, when the invasion actually took place, to the collapse of the Venetian dominion; although it is true that in some places the invaders were welcomed (as probably at Lefkara, which paid a heavy penalty), and the peasants refused, when Nicosia was besieged, to come to the help of the nobles who had maltreated them. It was not the Cypriote Greeks, but the Jews, Copts, Maronites, Armenians, Syrians and 'Indians' that Astorre Baglione thought it necessary to intern when he made preparations for the defence of Nicosia.[2] Nevertheless the frequent reports of popular unrest were disturbing enough to the home government; and no doubt the Turks achieved their object more easily than they would have done had the people been contented with their actual rulers.

We pass to the description of conditions of civilian life in the chief towns of the island, reserving for the present military considerations. The capital remained at Nicosia. At the time of the reorganization a proposal was made to shift the seat of government to Famagusta, but

[1] Cp. Natale Conti, *Univ. hist.* (1581), p. 423; Paruta, *Hist. Vinet.*, Pt. II, p. 9; Sereno, *Commentarii*, p. 61 (above, p. 798, n. 3). [2] Sylvestrani Brenzone, *Vita*, p. 38.

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was defeated in the Senate.[1] Later, the transfer was again urged from time to time, more than once by the Lieutenant. The more moderate recommendation was that one at least of the Counsellors should have his office there; others advocated moving the government as a whole, and forcing all the *feudati* to reside there. The Senate wavered, decided to make the change, and then rescinded its resolution. It was a question whether it would have strengthened the administration by making contact between the civil and military authorities closer. But it is to be noted that the military expert, Jacometto da Novello, disapproved of the proposal. He objected specifically to the influx of the barons who would come to reside there; maybe he feared interference by the civil authorities. It may have been this opinion that prevented the Great Council from adopting the suggestion; or it may have been moved by tenderness for the feeling of the Cypriotes, for whom Lefkosia-Nicosia had been the capital from time immemorial, while Famagusta was associated with foreign domination.[2]

But the population was too small for the wide area enclosed in the walls. In 1507 Peter Mésenge[3] found the city only a quarter inhabited, although the walls were still quite intact, as though they had been newly built: 'and methinks I never saw so fine and complete a wall'. He was probably not speaking with military knowledge. For Minio in 1529 describes the walls by which the city is surrounded, four miles or more in circuit, as old and weak. There are churches and monasteries in good repute, Latin and Greek, well furnished and served, such as the Latin archbishopric of Santa Sophia, and Santa Eferia,[4] which is that of the Greeks. There are five Latin monasteries (Augustinian Eremites, Preachers,[5] Carmelites, Conventual and Observant Friars Minor), two

[1] Cigogna, *Inscr. Ven.* v, p. 229.

[2] The community of Famagusta petitioned for the transfer in 1491, and the Doge replied that the Great Council had already decided against it (M.L., *H.* III, p. 487). For the various later recommendations see Sanudo, v, 962; VII, 150; XI, 265–6; XXIV, 263; XXV, 81; XXIX, 473 (petition from the community of Famagusta again, 21 Dec. 1520); Jacometto's objections, XXV, 213. Jacometto was succeeded in command of the infantry in Famagusta in 1526 by Count Alexander Donado; he returned to Venice in November of that year, having lost an eye (*ibid.* XLI, 7; XLIII, 108, 221).

[3] Quoted by Enlart, II, p. 523.

[4] I am unable to find any other authority for this name.

[5] From Sanudo, XXVI, 57 (25 Sept. 1518) we learn that the Observant Friars Preachers had monasteries in Cyprus; a grant was made to the Friars who were going out to Cyprus for the repair of their buildings.

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Greek (Our Lady of Andrio[1] and St John the Evangelist of Bibi, where there are many fine relics).[2] The city is distinguished by fine dwellings and gardens, and has a decent population of knights and gentlemen, citizens and merchants, Latins, Greeks, Maronites, Copts, Armenians, Jacobites and Nubians, i.e. Indians,[3] all Oriental Christians of divers tongues, all under the Latin Archbishop. Most persons ride through the city for their convenience. The gentlemen have no revenues; they engage in trade and farm estates leased from the Real and others; some hold offices.

In 1562 Sagredo describes Nicosia in glowing terms, praising the convenience of its situation, equidistant from the northern and southern coasts and from the extreme points of the island at Paphos and Karpass, in the middle plain, between the mountains that shut it in on either side, plentifully supplied with good water[4] and pure air, where in the summer the gentle zephyr revives bodies which have been exhausted by the great heat. It has and always will have the largest population of all the cities, and it is not possible that any other in the island should have more inhabitants than Nicosia, because of its superiority to other places in the essentials mentioned. Sagredo seems to be anticipating the arguments of those who favoured the transfer of the government to Famagusta.

[1] *Andaio*, the text. It must be the *abbadia di Andro* which in the *Relatione* is stated to have an annual revenue of 200 ducats (M.L., *H.* III, p. 504); *monasterio di Antrio* of Lusignan (*Chor.* f. 32), Andrie or Andrion (*Descr.* ff. 31b, 84b); τὸ τοῦ Ἀδρίου, Kyprianos, p. 394. Its abbot officiated at episcopal ordinations in the absence of any of the three other Orthodox prelates: Hackett, p. 361 (Papaïoannou, II, p. 155).

[2] Minio also mentions the church of St John de Montfort, belonging to Observant Franciscans, and containing the head of the Saint. This was the abbey of Beaulieu or N.D. des Champs outside the Paphos Gate. See Dawkins on Machaeras, 33, n. 3.

[3] Lusignan (*Descr.* f. 67) mentions twelve tongues as current in the island: Latin, Italian, corrupt Greek, Armenian, Coptic, Jacobite, Maronite, Syriac, Indian, Iberian, Albanian or Macedonian, and Egyptian. (French and Hebrew he ignores.) Jacobites and Maronites presumably spoke Syriac dialects. By Indians Lusignan, like Minio, means Nubians or Ethiopians (*Descr.* ff. 31, 74b: 'qui sont soubs la iurisdiction de Prestre Iehan'). As to the Copts in Cyprus, see O.H.E. Khs.-Burmester in *Bulletin de la Soc. d'Archéologie Copte*, VII (1942), pp. 9–13. First actually mentioned in 1483, though they may have reached the island as early as the 12th cent., they had a church of St Antony in Nicosia and a monastery in the Kerynia range dedicated to St Makarios (but this can hardly have been the monastery near Halevga, the Surp Magar of the Armenians). Their metropolitan resided in the capital. They seem to have disappeared before the census taken in 1777.

[4] The only river (Pedias) was a torrent, but there were excellent wells (Savorgnan, in Reinhard, II, p. 39).

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Later in the same report Sagredo repeats his praise of the seat of government, with its very pure and plentiful water and perfect air, where live all the feudataries and gentlemen. Ascanio Savorgnan, in his report of the same year, describes the city within its four miles of walls as having many empty spaces, owing to its numerous gardens; the houses are not fine, nor the piazze, the streets are full of dust—an untidy, disordered city.

The present Nicosia, within the walls, occupies but a fraction of the area over which the city came to extend under the Lusignans. Although the Venetians, in taking over the Kingdom, razed the citadel which had been built by James I, the circuit of the city was, or came to be, no less than nine miles, compared with the three of the existing fortifications. In the space between these lines, which was cleared in 1567, there had arisen, besides citadel and palace, some eighty churches, probably for the most part since the Lusignan occupation.[1]

Famagusta interested the Venetian government chiefly as a fortress and harbour. From the point of view of the citizens, the depressed condition of the place in 1491 comes out clearly in the petition then addressed to the Signory, or rather (for the petition itself is not preserved) in the Doge's reply, which deals one by one with the demands.[2] They ask that the seat of government be transferred thither from Nicosia; that at least one-third of the 4000 ducats promised for the relief of poor Cypriote nobles and burgesses be ear-marked for Famagustans; that the Republic maintain always 150 arbalesters recruited from men of the town, each commander of a company of twenty-five men having double the pay of the privates; that the bishopric of Lemesos be united with that of Famagusta; that the farmers of the lease of the dye-works at Nicosia

[1] Lusignan, *Chor.* ff. 15 sq.; *Descr.* ff. 32 sq.; Enlart, I, pp. 70 ff. Minio and Savorgnan, as we have seen, both give the circumference of Nicosia as about four miles. How are we to reconcile this with Lusignan's nine? Probably Lusignan is speaking of the whole area, largely open town, whereas the others mean the part enclosed by the walls begun by Peter I (Fl. Bustron, p. 26). These would have taken in the area occupied by the château, and thus been perhaps a mile longer than the present enceinte. We must not think of the present circular walled city as occupying the centre of the medieval town; probably on the east the circuit was much on the lines of the present walls, whereas the city had—in accordance with the general rule for the growth of cities where the nature of the ground permits—spread out to the west.

[2] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 485–92. Aimilianides, in Κυπρ. Σπ. I, pp. 33 f., exaggerates, I think, the part played by the Genoese element in Famagusta in this approach to the Signory.

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be compelled to maintain a dye-works at Famagusta, such as existed in the time of King James II and the Genoese; that the citizens be allowed, like the Venetians, to leave their merchandise in bond or pass it through without paying dues; that the inhabitants of the zone of two leagues round Famagusta be exempted from the tax on cattle (*marzason*) and that every head of a family in that zone should have a house in Famagusta and bring half his grain there annually; that all cotton from the island be brought to Famagusta, so that all the masters of the industry should live there, other persons being forbidden to prepare any cotton except that required for their own use; that Famagusta once more be the only port of entry for merchandise (for James II had abolished the Genoese monopoly when he took the place), and even salt be not taken on board at Salines unless the ship come afterwards to Famagusta. All these requests were more or less bluntly refused; the demand for a salary for the town-physician, Bartholomew of Faenza, which has already been mentioned, was at first refused, but afterwards granted. A favourable reply, more or less, was given to the requests that the gabelles on foodstuffs for the population of the city be removed (this was granted for twenty-five years),[1] and also that on wine from the two-leagues zone (this was halved); that no more houses or stores for merchandise be built at Salines, since that had attracted Famagustans thither (it was agreed to renew previous prohibitions to this effect); that the privileges granted by James II to the inhabitants of the city and zone be confirmed (details asked for); that every village in the island be obliged to send one man out of thirty families to work on the fortifications (agreed); that the Rectors see that rent is paid for the houses and churches in which soldiers are lodged, because the owners cannot maintain them, having received no profit from them during the eighteen years that they have been used for troops (this use of churches is disapproved, and rent is to be regularly paid for billets in houses); that a large quantity of timber and forged iron be sent and sold to the inhabitants at cost price for the repair of their houses (agreed); that a third part of the offices in the

[1] Cp. below. Perhaps as a result of this concession living became very cheap in Famagusta. This was remarked by a Jewish visitor in 1495, who found the city better supplied with meat, bread and other things than any other he had seen; you could live there very decently for six ducats a year (*O.C.* p. 25). On the other hand, Peter Mésenge in 1509, though he found that living was very cheap, says that the standard was low (Enlart, II, pp. 611–12).

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island be filled by men of Famagusta and its district[1] (agreed that offices in districts depending on Nicosia and Famagusta be filled by inhabitants of the respective districts); that 400 besants a year be paid to a schoolmaster (we have already seen that 250 besants was the salary granted); and finally, that master-masons and skilled workmen be sent out for working lime, making fosses and other constructions, and a good engineer to direct them. This is willingly granted; but our account of the work on the fortifications will be given later.

The heterogeneous population of a port like Famagusta was a cause of some anxiety to an intelligent observer like Sagredo, because of the opportunities it gave to agents of the enemy. Many subjects of foreign rulers, and especially Syrians, had made their way into offices and salaried posts in the city, and there were many who paid the *kharaj* or yearly poll-tax to the Sultan. In 1520 a Spaniard was caught making plans of the port and castle for the Viceroy of Naples.[2]

Another grievance voiced by Sagredo was that the city was governed not by the *Assises* and by the laws of Venice, but by the statutes and laws which the Genoese had introduced during their occupation, and which they had been permitted to retain when the city capitulated to James II. To such a degree was this fact exploited by the Genoese, that they were in the habit of boasting that the Kingdom of Cyprus belonged to them, inasmuch as the principal fortress in the island was governed by their laws. The Famagustans abused the privileges which had been granted to them. In 1491[3] they had been allowed exemption from gabelles on all imports of foodstuffs for twenty-five years, and this was renewed from ten years to ten years. Under cover of this privilege they smuggled in, as goods required for their food and clothing, everything that they required for any purpose.

Salines, towards the end of the Venetian occupation, had become the busiest port in the island, and that not only on account of the importance of the salt trade; it had superseded Famagusta as the port of call for ships on the Syrian voyage. Lemesos had also by this time begun somewhat to revive.[4]

The most important products of the island were salt, grain (especially

[1] That is Famagusta, Mesarea and Karpass, in addition to which a claim is here made to the civitanate of Mazotos.

[2] Sanudo, XXIX, 485 (15 Oct.). Cp. Otto Heinrich's observation in 1521 (p. 855).

[3] Indeed in 1489; see the Commission to Trevisan, below, p. 867, § 15.

[4] Heyd, II, p. 426.

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wheat and barley), cotton, sugar and wine. Salt, which came almost entirely from the Saline of Larnaka, was a government monopoly.[1] The estimates of the amount which the Venetians gained from the sale of salt vary widely, from 100,000[2] to 800,000 ducats a year. A figure of 300,000 ducats is perhaps near the true amount. After the Turkish conquest neglect of the works, which served to prevent the flooding of the lake by torrents of fresh water, caused the revenue to fall off disastrously.[3] The report of Silvester Minio in 1529 shows that the cutting of a channel three miles long to carry off the flood, similar to that which Sagredo says was begun by Marino Gradenigo, prefect of the Salines, in 1553[4] and, according to Fürer, was finished by 1566, had been made much earlier by Francis Zaccaria. Minio also tells us that the fine salt[5] from the edges of the lake was used in the island, whereas that which came from the middle, and was coarser, was exported; and that the lake of Lemesos, because it gave so small a return, had reverted to a fishery. It was however subsequently restored to its former use.[6]

The Venetians maintained the salt-contribution or *mète du sel*, which had been instituted by James I,[7] as the means of collecting the salt

[1] See the exhaustive account of the Salines in *O.C.* pp. 111–18.

[2] This is the figure given by Hans Stockar in 1519; he found 700 persons at work there. *Heimfahrt von Jerusalem*, Schaffhausen, 1839, quoted by Herquet, *Charlotta*, p. 18. The Venetians must have greatly increased the output, if Joos van Ghistele (*c.* 1482) rightly puts the value of the Salines at 20,000 ducats a year (*Tvoyage*, bk. v, ch. iv). Heyd, II, p. 426.

[3] Cotovicus in 1598 (*Itin.*, p. 97) describes the neglect of the works. Sagredo (M.L., *H.* III, p. 560) put the revenue in his time at 300,000 ducats, under the Turks in 1585 at no more than 8000. Other writers, such as Drummond (1744), give similarly depressing figures. Jean Palerne, who was there in 1582, and still put it at 300,000 ducats (*Peregrinations*, p. 330) perhaps copied an older source. But towards the end of the Turkish occupation the income rose again. See Vol. I, p. 11, n. 3.

[4] The pilgrim Melchior von Seydlitz (in Feyerabend, *Reyssbuch*, f. 251b) says that in 1554 (he was in Cyprus a year or two later) there were great rains and rough seas, and much salt was destroyed; as a consequence works of the kind described were undertaken.

[5] The *sal della Regina*, as it was called (Savorgnan, in Reinhard, II, p. 40).

[6] Minio in 1529 gives the circuit of the Larnaka lake first as six miles and then (a few lines lower down) as two. Sagredo had it measured, and reported that neglect had caused it to shrink from its original circumference of 10,941 paces to 2410 paces (that is from 11·4 to 2·5 English miles). Savorgnan (*loc. cit.*) says the total circuit was 12 miles, but that of the part where the coarse salt was deposited was only 2½ miles. Minio's two measurements are thus explained.

[7] Above, Ch. VII, p. 440, n. 5.

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revenue. Towards the end of the Lusignan rule it seems to have been imposed on the serfs and *francomati* only, and could be paid either in money or in personal labour at the Salines, or exemption could be purchased.[1] In 1490 the Cypriotes complained that all male villeins whether *parici* or *francomati*, and all females from the time of their marriage being over fifteen years old, paid a besant a head for salt, but that often the stewards (*guardiani*) or contractors forced them to pay before they reached that age. The result was that many of them, unable to bear the burden, had fled the island. They asked to be relieved entirely of the tax, but the Signory would do no more than order that the age limit should be observed, and that they should be given salt to the value of their payments.[2] Indeed, it seems that the tax was extended to others, for in 1527 we hear that some three hundred stradiotes, who had been given certain lands with exemption for twenty years, that term having now expired, were to resume payment of dues, including salt-tax, which would come to about 3000 ducats.[3]

Of the agricultural products, grain (wheat, barley, oats) was in the Venetian as in other periods by far the most important. 'All our substance and riches consist in corn, and when the harvest is good, we can keep ourselves, and when it is bad we suffer no little harm', says the memorial of 1490.[4] Corn was the chief staple of the export trade, and whenever there was a shortage in Venetian territory ships were sent to Cyprus for it, as in 1497.[5] The export was however strictly controlled. Some grain would not keep more than a year or even six months; it was therefore desirable, in years of surplus, to export it without delay. In 1490 the Cypriotes asked that they should be allowed, as in the time of the Kings, to export to the best markets. That the home supply should not

[1] M.L., *H.* III, p. 228 and n. 1; p. 545. [2] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 536.

[3] Sanudo, II, 431. Also some *rustici* in the Karpass, it is said in 1489 (M.L., *H.* III, p. 462, § 29), obtained exemption from the salt-tax of two besants a year on condition of appearing at every review of the forces, and in time of danger serving in person with one horse.

[4] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 537. On grain in Cyprus, see especially *O.C.* pp. 274–82. The following figures (in bushels) for the total yield are taken from (A) the *Relatione* (M.L., *H.* III, p. 496); (B) Silvester Minio, 1539; (C) Attar, *c.* 1540:

	(A)	(B)	(C)
Wheat	999,290	1,500,000	1,400,000
Barley	1,254,907	2,500,000	1,600,000

[5] Sanudo, I, 733; cp. VIII, 292: ships carrying salt from Cyprus ordered to throw it overboard and return for grain. Cp. Bembo (1552), f. 112.

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suffer, they asked for a board of four proveditors, Cypriote gentlemen or burgesses of standing, to be appointed, who should calculate the yield of the harvest and the numbers of the population, and reserve enough for a year and a half, notifying to the Rectors what balance might be exported; licence to export being given in the first place to landowners and feudataries of Cyprus. This reasonable proposal received the approval of the Signory.[1] But, subject as it was to damage by drought and locusts, the crop was too often insufficient for the island's own needs. Reports of bad seasons are frequent.[2] In 1565 there were serious grain riots.[3] There had been a dearth, and the authorities were accused of serving their own interests (contrary to the wishes of the Senate and the barons) by exporting the grain. The people rose against the Proveditor and his staff, stoned his office, and were with difficulty prevented from doing worse by the 'soft words of the gentlemen of the country'. In good seasons, a year's crop would suffice for two years, were it all kept in the island.[4]

The Venetian period saw the decline of the cultivation of sugar.[5] The most important plantations were at Episkopi and Kolossi, less extensive ones at Morphou, Lapithos, Emba (near New Paphos), Phinika, Akhelia, Kouklia. The refinery of the Cornaro at Episkopi in 1494 employed 400 hands. But sugar gradually gave way to cotton; Lusignan observed that the latter gave better profits with less outlay.[6] The real cause of the decline, as Sanudo already noted in 1496,[7] was that Madeira had entered into competition and ruined the trade of Cyprus and other places in the Levant. Sugar-planting in the island therefore came to an end soon after 1600.

[1] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 537–8. Something of the same kind is in the Commission to Balthasar Trevisan (below, Note, p. 869, § 45).

[2] E.g. 1500 (Sanudo, III, 936, 1121): in August it is reported that when the seed-corn has been set aside there will hardly be enough to last until January. In 1510 the locusts had done so much damage that the full revenue, which should have been 90,000 ducats, could not be raised (XI, 266). Cp. below, p. 818, n. 3. In 1527–9, there was a great famine (Κυπρ. Σπ. II, p. 133).

[3] Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 211. Fürer (1565–6) arrived in Nicosia at the time of the rioting. We shall see that the reason given for the execution of Diassorin and his fellow conspirators was that they tried to prevent the export of grain when there was not enough to spare.

[4] Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 86.

[5] *O.C.* pp. 282–5. See above, p. 512, n. 4, for other references.

[6] *Chor.* f. 86b.

[7] I, 271.

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Cotton,[1] which seems to be first heard of in Cyprus in the fourteenth century, began in the sixteenth, as just remarked, to oust sugar, and finally displaced it about 1600. It was so profitable that it was known as the 'plant of gold'. Savorgnan in 1562 still speaks of the sugar-crop as important, but says that the popularity of cotton makes it a serious rival even to grain.

The wine[2] of Cyprus kept its reputation throughout the sixteenth century, although some travellers objected to the taste which was imparted to it by the pitching of the jars in which it was stored; and it was an insidious drink.[3] The attempt of Francis I to naturalize the Cyprus grape at Fontainebleau seems to have been a failure, unlike the Portuguese experiment in Madeira. The story—or myth—is well known that it was Selim II's taste for Cyprus wine which was one of the chief inducements for him to attack and conquer the island.

The industries which derived chiefly from the agriculture were spinning and weaving cotton, silk[4] and wool, manufacturing samite and camlet.[5] The last was especially valued, and the tribute to the Egyptian Sultan was largely delivered in this form.[6] In the cities there was a

[1] *O.C.* pp. 285–9. [2] *O.C.* pp. 310–29, 456. See Vol. I, p. 11.

[3] An Englishman who visited Cyprus in 1344–5 was shown in the chapel of La Cava at Famagusta the tombs of many English knights, who, he was told (perhaps as a warning), died of not watering the wine and not conforming to the usages of the country. Golubovich, IV, pp. 430–1, 447. James of Verona says that if the native wine called *Marea* were drunk neat the heat of it would burn up a man's entrails; though it does not taste strong, it should be mixed with four parts of water (Cobham, *Exc. Cypr.* p. 18). Ludolf of Sudheim says it was usual to mix one part of wine with nine of water; a whole cask would not make a man drunk, but would burn and destroy his bowels; yet many hold it wholesome to drink this wine neat on an empty stomach. In all the world are no greater or better drinkers than in Cyprus (*ibid.* pp. 20–1). Cp. also Porcacchi (*ibid.* p. 166); Cotovicus (*ibid.* p. 199); Heyman (*ibid.* p. 247). From the later writers one gets no idea that the wine was in any way dangerous.

[4] On the silk industry, see *O.C.* pp. 347–53.

[5] Minio's report, Sanudo, II, 445. On camlet, see Dawkins on Machaeras, 454, n. 3; A. Evans's Glossary to his edition of Pegolotti's *Pratica della Mercatura*, p. 416 (Ciambellotti). On Cyprus textiles in general see Heyd, II, pp. 697–705 and Mrs Talbot Rice in *Ill. Lond. News*, 7 Aug. 1937.

[6] In 1490 the Cypriotes said (M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 534–6) that under the Kings the tribute was paid entirely in camlet, which was valued in Egypt at 20 ducats the piece, more than double what it cost the Real. The manufacturers employed a large number of hands. For some time the tribute had been paid chiefly in silks and woollens, so that the camlet industry had greatly fallen off. The Signory was asked to order that in future it should be paid entirely in camlet. The sale and export of camlet and samite

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certain number of merchants, but neither so rich nor so numerous as in the golden days of the fourteenth century. The trade with Asia Minor and Syria, however, continued lively, and one of the Lieutenants in 1510 remarked that it was the Syrian trade that supported large numbers of the poor people in the island.[1] A fairly large clerical class (*scrivani* and *scrivanelli*) found employment in the administrative offices.

The sixteenth century saw little if any diminution in the severity of the visitations of nature to which the island had always been subject.[2] The locust problem continued to cause much trouble to the Venetian authorities, although they came to adopt more rational and successful methods than the use of 'Persian water' and 'birds of Muhammad'. In 1510 we hear of the collection of the eggs of the insect (not for the first time, for Janus had used this method), and of an attempt to counter the superstition which made the people reluctant to interfere with what they regarded as a divine visitation.[3]

were subjected to a tiresome official control to the detriment of the poor workers. The Signory refused to alter this system, but agreed that the tribute should in future all be paid in camlet, providing that its quality should not give the Sultan any cause for complaint. [It had already in 1489 (Commission to Trevisan, § 21, below, p. 867) ordered that it should contain the largest possible quantity of camlet.] The Egyptian Sultan, as we shall see, frequently did complain. When from 1517 onwards the tribute became payable to the Turkish Sultan, cash or uncoined gold was preferred, although silks and gold brocade were sometimes demanded (Sanudo, xxv, 379). Below, p. 833, n. 4.

[1] *Ibid.* xi, 266.

[2] See generally, for the years of these troubles, Indianos in Κυπρ. Σπ. ii, pp. 131–40.

[3] For Janus, see above, Ch. viii, p. 464. In 1507 (Sanudo, vii, 106) it was reported to Venice that the locusts had damaged the crops because the water had touched the earth; more had been sent for. But in 1510 a more than usually enlightened Captain of Famagusta, Peter Lion, while reporting another mission to Persia for the locust-water, on which the envoy had got into trouble with the authorities, made some interesting observations on the subject (*ibid.* xi, 645–9). Cyprus, which used to be the warehouse of wheat for all the Levant, is now in want of it herself, and the locusts are the cause; they covered the island like snow. The Persian water is a superstition; sea-water is the remedy. But still better is the destruction of the eggs. He has attempted, by offering rewards, to persuade the peasants to collect them. In Famagusta and the Mesarea alone they have collected enough to account for the devastation not of Cyprus merely but of all Asia. Twenty-eight years ago there had been a plague of locusts in Lombardy; this method had been adopted, and they had not been seen there again. But in Nicosia district the peasants think it a sin to kill locusts. [This was therefore not only a Turkish belief, as (following Mariti, i, p. 170) I supposed, Vol. i, p. 13, n. 5.] Lion has suggested to the Rectors that a money-fine should be inflicted on those who disobey the order to collect and destroy the eggs, and that the priests should

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Besides locusts, the other great enemy of agriculture, drought, has already been noted in connexion with the grain crop. In contrast, the year 1547 was marked by heavy rains and floods.[1] Of other tribulations,[2] mention must be made of earthquakes. The island was severely shaken in 1491, when part of Santa Sophia and other buildings in Nicosia and elsewhere came to the ground.[3] The Signory, in reply to a request for help, made a grant of 1000 ducats towards the restoration of the cathedral, to which was added a further annual grant of 250

also excommunicate such recalcitrants. In 1521 the Lieutenant reports (Sanudo, XXXII, 101) that fresh measures never adopted before have been taken, which it is hoped will be very useful. All the *francomati* and others have to collect each a bushel of eggs, the *parici* half a bushel; the Signory and the feudataries are to pay 1 per cent on their revenues, and leaseholders half of 1 per cent, towards the expenses. Already 8000 bushels and more have been gathered. The work is proceeding on a great scale, and everybody is pleased. Later, Locke, who was in Cyprus in 1553, describes the procedure (Cobham, *Exc. Cypr.* p. 68). The water was being brought from Persia in 1525 by two Armenians (Sanudo, XL, 199), and the superstition survived into the nineteenth century.—A bad visitation by locusts is mentioned in 1542, coinciding with earthquakes (Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 211). Processions carrying relics, such as the heads of St Michael of Synnada or the Apostle Philip, to destroy the insects, long continued in practice (Κυπρ. Χρον. XII, pp. 137, 181–5).

[1] Lusignan, *loc. cit.*

[2] Among which the superstition of the time reckoned the comet which was seen in 1501 (but apparently only in the Viscontado! was it then not a comet but a meteorite?): *Relatione del Isola di C.*, Bodleian MS. Tanner, CXVII, f. 14b. Another comet appeared in Nov. 1569 and was visible for forty days, its tail pointing down on Cyprus (Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 212b; Calepio, f. 108b; Gatto, p. 27, who however says that it appeared on 7 Oct. and was seen for twenty-two nights). In these times, says Calepio, great fires were seen in the night sky, lasting for two or three hours; and in the summer, in this year and earlier, there was frequently a continual noise of large flights of locust-birds, cranes and geese passing over, coming from Syria; all which was taken for a bad sign. The 'fires' in the night sky were the aurora borealis. This phenomenon, being rare in so southerly a latitude as Cyprus, would naturally cause alarm. In recent times it was observed on 25 Jan. 1938 in the Mediterranean from H.M.S. *Shropshire* in approx. lat. 36° 30′ N., long. 2° W., while from H.M.S. *Repulse*, in position 35° 30′ N., 16° 30′ E., S.E. of Malta, it appeared as a sort of red band across the sky. (Information from Lt.-Comdr. C. R. Burgess, R.N.)

[3] *O.C.* p. 142. To his references add Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 210b; Bodleian MS. Tanner, CXVII, as above. The description of the damage at St Sophia by Dietrich von Schachten, from Röhricht-Meisner, p. 211, is translated in Gunnis, pp. 54–5. The Venetian authorities devoted to the needs of the church the gold treasure found on this occasion in the tomb of King Hugh III (see above, Ch. III, p. 177, n. 6). Dietrich says (p. 187) that one of the two towers on the shore at Paphos fell, and part of the castle at Lemesos, where also the bishop's house was destroyed (p. 213).

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ducats for the next four years.[1] Severe earthquakes are also recorded in 1542, 1546, 1556 or 1567, 1568 or 1569.[2] Lusignan, who was at the time at Lemesos as vicar of the last Latin Archbishop, Philip Mocenigo, describes the effects there of the earthquake which began after the procession on St Mark's Day, 25 April 1567. The shocks continued for ten days. In 1568 there were shocks of varying intensity throughout the whole year, some so severe that 'they were heard all the way from Lemesos at Nicosia'. Towards the end, Famagusta was also shaken for eight days, and then followed a tornado, which levelled to the ground a large palace and several houses, and carried away people who were in the streets.[3]

Plague,[4] however, was the most dreaded of the visitants. It was raging in Cyprus in the summer and autumn of 1494.[5] In 1497 there was an outbreak in Syria. A letter of 13 May from Damascus reported it at

[1] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 559–602 (27 Oct. 1491). The grant was to be in materials; the balance, if they did not amount to 1000 ducats, was to be paid in cash. The same sum of 250 ducats was to be exacted from the Archbishop for four years. The clergy and laity were also taxed; the Pope was to be asked to issue indulgences. If the work was not completed in four years, a further proportional contribution was to be exacted.

[2] Lusignan, *Descr.* ff. 211–12 and Calepio in *Chor.* f. 108b. Minor shocks at Paphos and Lefkara, *ibid.* Gatto, p. 27, says there were three of the severest shocks within memory on the night of 7 Oct. 1569. *O.C. loc. cit.* The latter gives a record of earthquakes down to 1870. The earthquake of 29 June 1896 was studied scientifically by G. Agamemnone (*Il terremoto nell' isola di Cipro del 29 Giugno* 1896 in *Boll. della Soc. Sism. Ital.* VIII, 1903). I note as the latest a shock in the morning of 20 Jan. 1941, which did some damage in and near Famagusta and elsewhere (*The Times*, 21 Jan. 1941). The mole at Famagusta and the church of St Barnabas near Enkomi suffered seriously; also the two khans at Nicosia, Kerynia Castle and Bellapais. See also Indianos in Κυπρ. Σπ. II, pp. 137–40.

[3] Lusignan adds that the tornado was broken up by certain sailors who with a knife made the sign of the cross in the air, while repeating the first words of the Gospel of St John. He had twice seen this spell work, and regards as the only superstitious feature about it the necessity that the handle of the knife must be black. The men, he thinks, must be what the Spaniards call 'Saviours', endowed with certain gifts by divine grace. A similar spell is described by Thévenot (*Voyage au Levant*, 3rd ed., IV, 1727, pp. 650–1) but the black-handled knife was used to cut athwart a waterspout, not to make the sign of the cross. He condemns the spell as forbidden magic, but used the first words of the Gospel of St John. For the magical virtue of the 'in principio', see Atchley in *Trans. St Paul's Ecclesiolog. Soc.* IV, pp. 168 ff. As to the black-handled knife, cp. W. H. D. Rouse, in A. Eftaliotis, *Modern Tales of the Greek Islands* (1942), p. 11: to keep off Nereids you draw a circle round you with one.

[4] *O.C.* pp. 240–3.

[5] Casola, pp. 215, 305.

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Aleppo, and one of 5 July from Cyprus said that merchants escaping from Syria had been accommodated in an airy place in the island. Nevertheless many Venetian residents had gone from Cyprus, where the marshes of Constanza poisoned the air, to Syria, only to perish there. In July the plague abated, and by August had ceased.[1] In 1505 the epidemic carried off a quarter of the citizens of Nicosia.[2] In 1533, beginning in Syria, it spread to Cyprus, and raged for some five months, more especially in Famagusta, ceasing before the end of July. By 4 May as many as 5500 souls had perished.[3] A serious outbreak of crime coincided with it, and on 4 June the Rectors at Nicosia asked for an enlargement of powers of banishment for themselves and the Captain of Famagusta.[4]

In the preceding pages we have endeavoured to present a picture of the conditions in Cyprus under Venetian domination, from the deposition of Catherine down to the eve of the Turkish invasion. We now turn to a narrative of the part which it played in the relations between the Republic and the Moslem Powers during the same period.

The envoy selected to proceed to Egypt and justify to the Sultan Kaitbai the action of the Signory, in deposing Catherine and annexing Cyprus,[5] was Mark Malipiero, Grand Commander of Cyprus. He carried with him fabrics of silk and camlet, and 16,000 ducats, being the tribute for two years. Reaching Damietta on 20 April 1489, and Cairo five days later, he met with an unfriendly reception. The Sultan took the presents, but refused to see him privately, and referred him to his Devitdar. Malipiero declined; that, he said, was not in his commission. Then he learned what had happened to the Venetian consul, who had caused the capture of Rizzo di Marino. He reported the treatment of the consul to the Signory,[6] which decided to send another special envoy. Peter Diedo was elected to this office on 1 September, and received full instructions from the Doge, Augustine Barbarigo, on the 10th.[7] He was to proceed without delay to Alexandria, and, after making the usual presents to the Emir in command, to go on to Cairo, obtain an audience of the Sultan, and offer him the customary presents, compliments and

[1] Sanudo, I, 739–40, 756, 801, 807, 1071; II, 18.
[2] *Ibid.* VI, 212.
[3] *Ibid.* LVIII, 187, 251–2, 589, 682, 720, 733.
[4] *Ibid.* LVIII, 734.
[5] See above, Ch. XII, p. 745.
[6] Navagero, cols. 1198–9. Cp. the report from the Florentine ambassador at Milan, M.L., *H.* III, p. 442, n. 1.
[7] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 472–8, with the notes; Malipiero, p. 612.

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congratulations, especially on the peace between him and the Turk, if that had actually been completed. Complimentary visits were also to be paid to the Sultana and the chief officers of the court. At the second audience with the Sultan or the chief Devitdar, he was to say that the Signory, anxious to maintain the long-subsisting friendly relations with the Sultan, had sent him to explain the reasons for the anxiety which it felt, and to try and remove the causes of friction and ease the situation of the Venetian merchants in the Sultan's territories. He was given particular instructions as to claims which he was to make on behalf of such merchants at Damascus, Aleppo, Tripoli and Alexandria, for services rendered or damage incurred, but was to make these matters an excuse for broaching tactfully the question of Cyprus. If Mark Malipiero was still at Cairo, and his mission had met with success, Diedo was not himself to mention Cyprus affairs, except incidentally. But if he found the Sultan had taken offence at the departure of the Queen and the raising of the standard of St Mark without his leave or knowledge, and had used words which seemed to threaten trouble, he was to go into the whole affair, being careful to conform to the version presented by Mark Malipiero in accordance with the instructions he had received from the Queen and the Captain-General, and with the letters from her which he had carried to the Sultan. On the reasons given in those letters —the fear of Rizzo di Marino and Tristan de Giblet, who had so long plotted against her, and the false reports which they, and especially Tristan, had made to the Sultan in regard to her marriage—Diedo was to comment that it was improbable, and no one ought to let himself believe, that she would have employed as agents such traitors, who had not only sought to deprive her of her life and Kingdom, but had imbrued their hands in the blood of her uncle, an injury which was indelibly—and rightly so—impressed on her heart. To the fear of other enemies and secret rebels was added that of the Turks; therefore she had prayed the Captain-General, whom the Signory had sent with his fleet to bring her away, with all the honour due to her as its beloved daughter, that, lest the island should be left derelict and at the mercy of the Turk, he would raise the Venetian standard and ensigns, as a token that Venice would defend it against the world; to which she was moved, among other things, by the agreement which Venice had with the Turk, that all the places and islands which flew the ensign of St Mark should be safe and secure from attack by him. The Sultan had therefore no ground for complaint against her, much less against Venice, since the

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island will be in the hands of men of peace, not of corsairs by whom he and his subjects would be molested, as would have happened had it fallen into the hands of Catalans, Spaniards, French, Rhodians, or other Powers. Much worse would have been the case had the Turk seized it, since it would have afforded a port for his fleet from which he could conveniently attack the whole of the coast of Syria. The Sultan ought therefore to be content, the more so as he may be certain of receiving regularly from the Rectors the annual payments due to him. Diedo is to put these arguments in gentle terms or with vehemence, according as he finds the Sultan at peace or at war with the Turk. Should he on his way out find letters from the Venetian Bailie at Constantinople or from Mark Malipiero, addressed to the Signory or to Francis Priuli, formerly Captain-General of the Sea, he is to open and read them (he is provided with the code), so as to be in possession of the latest pertinent information, communicate them to no one but his secretary John Borghi, and forward them under seal. As he will probably find Mark Malipiero still at Cairo he is to take letters written by the Queen to him and to the Sultan, that Mark may present the latter and be allowed to return. If he is asked about Rizzo di Marino and Tristan de Giblet, he is to say that, having as it seems to him done wrong to not only the Queen and the Signory, but also the Sultan, by the lies they have told, both of them have poisoned themselves with diamonds which they had on them.[1] If he comes into touch with an interpreter of the Sultan called Tanzer Baïd,[2] a man who is said to be very astute and of great authority, he is by secret presents to secure his services for the successful carrying out of his mission.

Reaching Cairo about 7 December, Diedo had an audience of the Sultan, and spoke of the envoy sent by the Queen and the Captain-General. To which the Sultan replied that he knew of no Queen of Cyprus, nor of Francis Priuli the Captain-General, nor of any ambassador of theirs; but if Diedo wished to speak in the name of the Signory he would be heard. Diedo reached agreement with the Sultan's representatives in February 1490; the Signory was granted the investiture of the Kingdom of Cyprus, on condition of payment of the customary tribute of 8000 ducats. No remission of the tribute, such as had been

[1] Rizzo, as we have seen, was strangled at Venice.

[2] This is Tangrivardi, who has already been mentioned in connexion with the Venetian consul at Damietta (Ch. XII, p. 741). He was present at the negotiations with Diedo and Borghi (M.L., *H.* III, pp. 478, 481).

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hoped for, was granted. But no sooner had the ambassador achieved this success than he suddenly fell ill and died, between 15 and 22 February. The arrangements had to be completed by Mark Malipiero and Diedo's secretary, John Borghi,[1] and it was the latter who received the formal document and, clad in the customary golden robe; left for Cyprus and Venice.[2]

The Signory had thus obtained recognition in due legal form by the Sultan of its right to the Kingdom of Cyprus, a right which it had secured, as we have seen, by the fiction of the adoption of Queen Catherine as daughter of the Republic, and by her resignation of the crown into its hands, in anticipation of the day when, should she die without issue, it would pass by inheritance to the same successor. The belief that any voices were raised in Venice itself against the legality of the acquisition rests on an egregious forgery which has unfortunately

[1] The Senate, having received letters of 22 Feb. from Cairo, reporting the death of Diedo, whose latest despatch was dated 15 Feb., appointed Borghi his successor, and informed the Sultan accordingly. M.L., *H.* III, p. 472, n. 1. Borghi went out again in 1492 as envoy to settle matters concerning Venetian trade with Egypt (*ibid.*).

[2] (1) On 28 Feb. 1490 the representative of the Sultan Kaitbai confirmed with John Borghi the agreement made with the late Peter Diedo (*Libri Comm., Reg.* V, p. 318, no. 171). (2) On 9 March other representatives of the Sultan gave their confirmation, recognizing Venice as mistress of Cyprus, on condition of continuing to pay the tribute. M.L., *H.* III, pp. 478–81, from *Libri Comm.* XVII, f. 123. (The date is given as 'scrito nel dì de Marti benedeto, a dì 17 de la luna de Rabilg el tani, el quarto mexe del 895, al nostro modo a dì 9 Marzo 1490'. But 17 Rabi' II corresponds not to 9 but to 10 March 1490. In the précis of the document in *Reg.* V, p. 318, no. 172 the date is given, perhaps by a misprint, as 4 March 1490.) The payment to be made is 16,000 ducats, tribute due for two years past, that is 4000 down, 6000 through the *cotimo* of Damascus (the dues levied by the consul on Venetian merchants), and materials to the value of 6000 to be sent this year from Venice; failing which the consul and merchants at Alexandria will be arrested. (Romanin, IV, p. 443, misleadingly gives the price of the bargain as 10,000 ducats.) (3) The receipt for the payment on account of 4000 ducats is dated 11 March (M.L., *H.* III, p. 481; *Libri Comm., Reg.* V, p. 318, no. 173). (4) The translation of a letter from the Sultan to the Doge announcing that John Borghi has left for Venice (M.L., *H.* III, pp. 481–3; *Reg.* V, p. 318, no. 174) bears no date but must be of March. It recites the history of the negotiations with Mark Malipiero and Diedo; the death of the latter; the completion of agreement with John Borghi; the investiture of Venice with Cyprus (the Doge to be allowed to send his governor, the people of the island to be well treated and defended against their enemies and their differences settled; the tribute to be paid regularly); the presentation to Borghi of a robe of honour for himself and one for the Doge; similar honour for Malipiero who has been sent back with letters to the Proveditor; and a 'small present' to the Doge (of which a schedule is annexed).

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been accepted as authentic by some modern writers.[1] That there should be seditious talk in the piazze of Venice, and that it was severely punished, we know from such a case as that of John Antony Lombardo in 1529,[2] nor need we doubt that on occasion resort might be had to secret drowning. But the evidence of the 'Statutes of the Inquisitors of State' on such a matter is worthless, and must be relegated to the same category as the text of the oath taken by James II to the Sultan.[3]

The Egyptian question was apparently settled for the time, though the uncertain temper of the Oriental rulers, and the chronic difficulty which the Cyprus government found in meeting its obligations, made any approach to a stable equilibrium impossible. There were constantly recurring complaints about the tribute, or presents, as the Venetians

[1] The so-called Statutes of the Inquisitors of State, published by Daru, contain an addition relating to Cyprus. It states that *voci licentiose* have been heard to say that some Venetian nobles, descendants of the brothers of Queen Catherine, claim to be called princes of the blood, and other nobles, though not related to her, but entitled to fiefs in the islands of the Archipelago and other places in the Levant, pretend to the same dignity. All persons who have dared to utter such notions are to be summoned and warned to do so no more, on pain of death; and if they persist one of them is to be drowned as an example to the others. Many persons also, not only nobles, but citizens and foreigners, dare to discuss the rights of the Republic over Cyprus, taking upon themselves to be judges in the case, and maintaining that the acquisition of Cyprus is based solely on possession, since the rights of Catherine herself lack foundation. Those chiefly responsible for such talk are to be examined; if they are found to have acted out of mere carelessness or curiosity, they are to be severely reprimanded and warned to abstain, and no more rigorous action is for this time to be taken against them; but if their talk is shown to have arisen from malice, or if, after being reprehended, they persist in their offence, from any motive whatever, they are to be sent to death by drowning. Any foreigner offending in this way is to be expelled within twenty-four hours on the first offence, unless he is found to be acting from malice; but if malice is proved, he must pay for it with his life. The authenticity of the Statutes in question was disputed by Count Dominic Tiepolo in his criticism of Daru's history, but Mas Latrie nevertheless accepted them as genuine, and reproduced in full in his documents the passages which we have analysed. (M.L., *H.* III, 484–5.) Romanin, however, in 1857 (VI, ch. III, pp. 67–197), in an exhaustive discussion of the whole history of the Inquisition, conclusively proved them to be a gross libel, and published a copy of the authentic *Capitolare*, not statutes properly speaking, but a collection of the resolutions or deliberations relating to the authority of the Inquisitors. If it seems extraordinary that serious historians like Daru and Mas Latrie should have been deceived by what has every appearance of being a clumsy invention, it is still more remarkable that the conscientious Herquet in 1870 (*Charlotta*, p. 225) should cite the passages relevant to Cyprus without any indication that their authenticity has been disputed.

[2] Above, p. 806, n. 1.

[3] Above, Ch. X, p. 558 and n. 2.

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sometimes preferred to call the annual payment of 8000 ducats or stuffs to the value thereof. Jerome Giustinian, who was sent in 1498 to convey the usual consignment to Cairo,[1] returned with a letter from the Sultan's successor,[2] demanding the tribute, complaining that the things sent were miserable and the camlet moth-eaten; if payment was not sent it would be extracted from the Venetian consuls. This was, so to speak, common form in the correspondence about the tribute, and the envoy, to show as it were that there was no ill-feeling, received the customary presents from the Sultan. Next year there was difficulty in finding a suitable vessel to take the tribute to the Sultan, to whom Jerome Giustinian had again been sent as envoy, and in March the Captain of Famagusta was asking for a light galley, which would also be useful as a protection against corsairs, while its crew could help with the fortifications.[3] In July there is another report of a threat to imprison the consul and merchants in Cairo if the tribute is not paid,[4] and in August the consul in Alexandria writes that the Sultan demands tribute for four years, and 1000 ducats in addition,[5] but has contented himself with a hundred. Still by the end of November the tribute was delayed; it was learned that the consul was still detained at Cairo, because the Sultan was demanding tribute for four years, that is 32,000 ducats; he has claimed it from Cyprus, and has been told that it is in order, but there is no safe ship available; let him send a *gripe* at his own risk.[6] The consul was released, but the Sultan insisted that if the tribute did not come he would have it out of him and the merchants.[7] But Jerome Giustinian eventually reached Cairo with the tribute and was

[1] Sanudo, II, 90 (11 Sept. 1498).

[2] Report of the Lieutenant, Andrew Venier, 6 Jan. 1499 (Sanudo, II, 608, 614–15). The Sultan's letter is dated 12 Nov. 1498. Muhammad II, who had succeeded his father Kaitbai in Aug. 1496, was murdered in Oct. 1498, az-Zahir Kansuh succeeding him.

[3] Sanudo, III, 302 (22 March 1500).

[4] *Ibid.* III, 924 (23 July 1500). Janbelat succeeded az-Zahir Kansuh in June 1500, and was followed in Jan. 1501 by Tumanbai I, who gave place in April 1501 to Kansuh al-Ghuri.

[5] For his 'staffa'. Sanudo, III, 941 (15 Aug.). Dr Wittek is confident that this word represents 'istîfâ', Chamber of Finance. It looks as if the extra 1000 ducats were to go to the Sultan's own chamber of finance, while the tribute went to another.

[6] Sanudo, III, 1121–2, 1198, cp. 1225 (30 Nov. 1500). By a slip the sum of 32,000 ducats is said to be for tribute for five years, instead of four.

[7] *Ibid.* III, 1526 (3 Dec. 1500).

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well received.[1] Common fear of the Turk helped to ease the situation. It was reported from Alexandria that Turkish ships were selling in the Sultan's territories slaves captured in Cyprus, and the Sultan had given orders that wherever Turkish ships put in with such slaves on board, the captives were to be retained and returned to Cyprus.[2] Next month followed a report[3] that Bayazid had sent an envoy to the Sultan of Egypt (Kansuh al-Ghuri) to say that with the Sultan's permission (but only with his permission) he proposed to take possession of Cyprus next year; that Kansuh al-Ghuri had replied with a blunt refusal: Cyprus belonged to him and paid him tribute every year. Whereupon Bayazid offered to pay the tribute. The Egyptian Sultan's reply was not known, but it was considered certain that he would never consent.

In 1503 the usual complaint about the quality of the stuffs sent in tribute recurred; Vincént Soranzo, who had brought it, was arrested, but released at the instance of certain Egyptian grandees.[4] Next year seems to have passed without trouble. Jerome Giustinian, who was again selected as envoy in September, returned safely early in 1505.[5]

Egyptian claims on Cyprus were liable to cause friction with the Rhodian knights. It was reported from Cyprus in 1506 that the Sultan, on the ground that the island was subject to him, was demanding the revenues of certain churches which belonged to the Hospital, to indemnify him for a ship which had been captured by its forces.[6] It is not known whether his claim was met in any way.

The scant respect with which the Venetian envoy was treated is described in a letter of 1512 from John Marcello. The Sultan attempted to tear up the agreements about the payment of tribute and greatly increase it. The quality of the stuffs was again matter of complaint; the Sultan protested that he was being swindled.[7] In this year there was a general discussion between an envoy of the Sultan and representatives of Venice

[1] Report mentioned by Priuli, *Diarii*, II, 166 (Aug. 1501).

[2] Sanudo, IV, 169–70 (letter of Contarini to Querini, 4 Sept. 1501).

[3] Received in Venice 27 Oct. 1501. Priuli, *Diarii*, II, 184. The threat to Cyprus stirred the Senate, on 14 Dec., to order 200 stradiote horse to be collected and sent out under three captains, two *contestabili*, etc. Sathas, Μνημ. VII, p. 64.

[4] *Libri Comm., Reg.* VI, p. 66, no. 13 (June 18 ?); p. 68, no. 21 (Sept. 1503): inventory of the presents brought by Soranzo on his return. Cp. Sanudo, V, 91.

[5] Sanudo, VI, 93 (21 Sept. 1504), 129 (letter received Feb. 1505).

[6] 22 June 1506. Sanudo, VI, 356.

[7] Sanudo, XV, 18 ('refazimento di tributi di Cipro più di ducati 30 mila'), 200. Cp. Romanin, V, p. 372.

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concerning the tribute payable for Cyprus, the guarding of Cyprus waters against corsairs (both the Egyptian Sultan, and later the Turkish, considered that this was the duty of the tributary),[1] and the obligation of Venetian merchants to pay certain dues and buy a certain quantity of pepper from the Sultan.[2]

The presents brought back from Egypt by envoys who conveyed the tribute have been mentioned more than once; the diarist Sanudo sometimes gives lists of them. On 6 March 1515 he describes a scandalous scene when they arrived; there was a general scramble for them among members of the College: 'one man took one thing, and another something else, with such fury that it was a great shame to see such behaviour'.[3]

The strain on Venetian relations with Egypt was never for more than a moment relaxed. In 1514 the Sultan was reported to be contemplating a descent on Cyprus, with a view to putting in the place of the Signory some vassal he could trust.[4] The garrison of the island was at this time without a commander-in-chief, and on 8 July it was hurriedly decided to send out Andrew Mavressi to take command of all the stradiotes and turcopoles.[5] But an enemy whose little finger was thicker than the Egyptian Sultan's loins was soon to supersede the master of Cyprus. Kansuh al-Ghuri fell in battle against Selim I on 24 August 1516, and was succeeded in October of that year by Tumanbai II. In that same month the Ottoman conquest of Syria was completed, and the Venetian Bailie at Constantinople wrote that Ali, the dragoman of the Porte, was going to Venice to demand the tribute for Cyprus.[6] Next year saw the end of the Mameluke dynasty with the defeat and capture of Tumanbai and his execution on 15 April 1517. Henceforth the tribute was paid at Constantinople.

We may now turn to trace the history of the Turkish question from the beginning of the Venetian domination down to the time when the invading army actually set foot on the soil of Cyprus. From the first

[1] And it was acknowledged by Venice, as when the Bailie at Constantinople compensated a Jew named Rafael for damage which he had suffered from a Spanish corsair in Cyprus waters. *Libri Comm., Reg.* VI, p. 245, no. 83 (10 Nov. 1543).

[2] *Libri Comm., Reg.* VI, p. 120, no. 244 (1512, 1 July?).

[3] Sanudo, XX, 41.

[4] Report of 3 July 1514 to the Council of Ten, cited by Iorga, *G.O.R.* II, pp. 334–5.

[5] Sathas, Μνημ. VII, p. 115. Mavressi was succeeded in the command in 1525 by Dimitrios Megaduca. *Ibid.* pp. 135–6, 160.

[6] Sanudo, XXIII, 385 (24 Oct. 1516).

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the sources are full of reports of raids and rumours of the Turk's preparations for war. What one of the diarists says in 1499 he might have said in many another year down to 1540: 'how loudly it was noised abroad in these times at Venice and also through all Italy and all the lands of the Levant and, in fine, throughout the world, about the great preparation which the Signor Turk was making on sea and on land, *non mihi si lingue centum, etc.*, could I relate nor yet express; yet everyone will easily be able to judge of it'.[1]

Hardly had Catherine sailed for Venice when the island was thrown into excitement by the appearance of Turkish raiders. Six foists and a brigantine, we are told,[2] came on 9 June 1489 from Karpasia and landed at Khelones (that is to say, presumably, they reached Karpasia first and then sailed round to Khelones, which is on the coast of the Karpass south of Rhizokarpaso). They took prisoners men, women and serfs, destroying villages and killing thirty-seven persons. The Proveditor called up the feudataries who were liable for military service,[3] but failed to find the raiders on land; nor were the galleys (there were no less than six in Cyprus harbours at the time) more successful at sea. These were armed and sent out under Sir James Morabit and Sir Peter Gurri, but after cruising round the island for eight months returned empty-handed. The history of sea-warfare, of course, proves amply that nothing is more difficult than to protect a coast against sea-raiders.

Much agitation was caused at Venice in 1498 by rumours of Turkish preparations.[4] Was the Turk going to attack Rhodes or Cyprus or Corfù? Nicolas da Ca' da Pesaro was appointed Proveditor of the Fleet and commissioned on 14 March. On the receipt on 23 March of a letter from the Lieutenant Andrew Venier and the Captain Bartholomew Minio reporting that the Turkish fleet was preparing to come out, and asking for troops, the Senate decided to send 500 *provvisionati* to Cyprus, and warn the Proveditor that if he heard of other moves of the Turkish fleet he was to send four galleys to defend the island. It was heard from

[1] Priuli, *Diarii*, I, 137 (July 1499).

[2] G. Bustron, p. 543. This writer's geography is weak.

[3] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 548. See above, p. 790.

[4] 26 Feb.: Priuli, *Diarii*, I, p. 76. 4 March: Sanudo, I, 897. 23 March: *ibid.* 910. 16 Aug.: *ibid.* II, 18–19. Dec.: *ibid.* II, 291: rumour that the Turk, who was allied with the Emir of Damascus Kartibai (Karthibey), the enemy of the Egyptian Sultan, was going to send an army into Syria, land it in Cyprus, and then, with Kemal Reis, take his Janissaries to Alexandria disguised as pilgrims.

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Cyprus in October that on 16 August the Turkish fleet was in those parts; the ships to Syria were ordered to sail in convoy, because corsairs were working in those waters.[1] Similar rumours continued to fly about in 1499.[2] The Captain, Bartholomew Minio, wrote on 5 March that the stradiotes and turcopoles had been ordered to stand by, with their horses, on the coasts. He clamoured for reinforcements and cannon great and small (he had only one good bombardier, Thomas of Brescia); incidentally, he was having much trouble with the Rectors.[3] In May Andrew Zanchani, the envoy to Constantinople, returned with the report that the Turk was making a great show of benevolence towards Venice, with which he had sworn perpetual peace. His great armada of 250 or 300 sail and his large land army appear to be intended against Rhodes; but Venice must not cease to arm, for the infidels are not to be trusted.[4] In 1500 the Turks were again in Cyprus waters and captured a great many ships.[5] Several raids were reported in the summer of 1501.[6] But the Ottoman Sultan had his own particular enemies on his flank or in his rear. Venice sent Constantine Lascaris to the Karaman with a view to concluding an alliance;[7] and it was thought that the threat of danger from Persia was inclining the Sultan to peace with the Republic.[8] And indeed the Sultan took the first steps early in 1502, and after long negotiations peace was concluded, the Doge swearing to the treaty on 20 May 1503, and the Sultan finally confirming it on 6 October.[9]

Turkish ships were again reported raiding in Cyprus waters in the summer of 1506.[10] But otherwise, since the peace concluded with

[1] The corsair Arsine, who was reported (16 Aug. 1498) to be working between Famagusta and Salines, was perhaps the same as Arfani, who with Franceschetto Novaglio (report of 9 Nov. 1498) had done some damage, including capturing a Famagusta *gripe* with a cargo of soap (Sanudo, II, 19, 301).

[2] Sanudo, II, 542 (March); 685 (5 March); Priuli, I, 120 (May).

[3] Sanudo, II, 685, 1039.

[4] 'Perchè in la fede deli infideli non se pol dar fede, ne infidarsi' (Priuli, I, 120).

[5] Report of the Captain Troilo Malipiero, 29 June (Sanudo, III, 776).

[6] *Ibid.* IV, 144 (before 6 July, near Kerynia), 161 f.

[7] He reported on 14 Oct. 1502 (Sanudo, IV, 353). He was a stradiote captain much trusted by the Venetians, and was appointed Captain of Lemesos for two years on 31 Dec. 1502, while his son was promised the next vacancy among the pensioners when he should have reached the age of fifteen. Sathas, Μνημ. VII, pp. 68, 69.

[8] Priuli, II, 226 (Sept. 1502).

[9] Romanin, V, pp. 152–4.

[10] Letter from Cyprus received 22 June (Sanudo, VI, 356).

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Bayazid in 1503, there is little of importance to record for the rest of this peace-loving Sultan's reign in regard to the interests of the Republic in the Levant.

Venice was indeed fortunate in that her relations with both the Ottoman and the Mameluke Sultans were easier during the deadly peril which threatened her at home, when she had to defend herself against the Powers which united in the League of Cambrai. During the worst months of 1509 rumours were current of impending expeditions against Cyprus.[1] On 1 July it was reported that French ships were at Ostia,[2] and some said they were to join the Papal fleet and sail against Cyprus. A few days later the report was repeated in the form that the French and Spanish fleets had combined with the same object.[3] So desperate seemed the plight of the Republic that in September 1509 it even approached both the Porte and Cairo with suggestions for joint action against its enemies. In May of next year King Ferdinand was said to be preparing in Spain and Naples an expedition against Cyprus.[4] A letter from Palermo[5] added the detail that the design was, with Papal and Rhodian help, to seize the island as a step towards the conquest of Jerusalem. The plan was connected with negotiations which had been going on for some time for the marriage of Joanna, daughter of Ferdinand I and widow (since 1496) of Ferandino (Ferdinand II) of Naples, to Charles II (III) of Savoy; Cyprus had been promised as her dowry.[6] But the design on Cyprus, like the negotiations for the marriage, came to nothing.

[1] Bembo (1552, f. 125) tells us that the bad news from home caused great distress in Candia, and, the Captain of the Fleet having written that preparations should be made in case some neighbouring Power should take advantage of the difficulties of the Republic to attack Cyprus, the sum of 160 lb. of gold was raised to equip galleys and other vessels and send them thither.

[2] 2 galleys and 8 *barze*. Sanudo, VIII, 474.

[3] 6 July 1509. *Ibid.* VIII, 487, 489, 559.

[4] *Ibid.* X, 290 (May 1510).

[5] *Ibid.* X, 678 (5 June 1510).

[6] July 1510, *ibid.* X, 695, 717; 16 April 1511 (letter from Rome), *ibid.* XII, 136. Negotiations for the marriage had been begun by Duke Charles in 1507. On 13 July 1510 Sanudo learned that the marriage was *sferdito* (had cooled off); but negotiations went on until by the end of 1511 they had finally broken down. (Guichenon's date for the contract of marriage, 18 Oct. 1516, II, p. 228, is an error.) The 'infanta regina' died at Naples, 27 Aug. 1518. The index to Sanudo wrongly identifies the lady as Beatrice of Portugal, whom Charles married in 1521. See A. Segre, 'La politica Sabauda con Francia e Spagna, 1515–23', in *Mem. Accad. Sci. di Torino*, ser. II, vol. I (1901), sez....morali, etc. pp. 252–3. (Information from Prof. Previté-Orton.)

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In 1516, Selim I, in whose favour his father Bayazid had been forced to abdicate in April 1512, and who also in 1514 had crushed his most dangerous enemy Ismail, the Sophy of Persia, at Jaldiran, was preparing his attack on Egypt. His envoy in Venice, on 12 October, demanded the use of Famagusta for his fleet, and gave warning that the tribute was not to be sent to Cairo.[1] The Rectors asked what they were to do if the fleet demanded admission to the harbour; they could not resist.[2] The Grand Master of Rhodes warned the Captain to beware of the Turks, whose friendliness was only a pretence.[3] 'Look to Famagusta', which is in bad order. The Turkish fleet was at Pendayia in March of next year, and its attitude was friendly.[4] In April the Mameluke dynasty came to an end,[5] and with Egypt a Turkish province there was no longer any resisting the demands of Sultan Selim. There was every reason to fear that he might demand possession of Famagusta.[6] But this fear was not realized, and the reports on 9 July that a fleet of 150 Turkish sail which was at Alexandria would attack Cyprus on its return, and in August that the fleet was actually at Famagusta, were false.[7] Meanwhile, on hearing the news from Egypt, the Signory on 26 May 1517 sent Bartholomew Contarini and Alvise Mocenigo to congratulate Selim, inform him that orders had been sent to Cyprus to pay the tribute to him, and request the confirmation of trading privileges for Venetian merchants in Egypt.[8] Meanwhile an envoy, with four ships, was sent from Cairo to Famagusta in June, and it was decided to receive him, the Rectors coming from Nicosia; the troops were to be kept at strength in Famagusta, that it might not appear denuded. Arriving on 30 June, the envoy demanded five tributes, 40,000 ducats, which it was stated had been found, from the books of the defeated Sultan, to be owing. But Selim did not press for more than a token payment in sign of good will; he did not care about the tribute; what he desired was friendship, and he would be content with four payments. These the government agreed

[1] Sanudo, XXIII, 420.
[2] 12 Nov. Sanudo, XXIV, 16.
[3] 28 Nov. *Ibid.* XXIV, 41.
[4] *Ibid.* XXIV, 215, 255.
[5] A Turkish galleon laden with booty from Alexandria came to Famagusta on 19 May (*ibid.* XXIV, 604).
[6] Sanudo, XXIV, 599; cp. 635–6.
[7] *Ibid.* XXIV, 459, 580.
[8] Romanin, V, p. 373. On 20 Sept. Alvise Mocenigo wrote confirming letters written by him and his colleague on 5 Sept. on the conclusion of the arrangements about Cyprus and Venetian trade in Egypt and Syria. *Libri Comm., Reg.* VI, p. 145, no. 67.

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to make.[1] Eventually the Signory received the firman of the Sultan, in which he announced that, he being now ruler of Egypt, the tribute (*kharaj*) of 8000 ducats a year is in future to be paid to the Turkish Treasury at Constantinople.[2] Nevertheless, the tension was not wholly relaxed; the captain of the Venetian galleys at Alexandria wrote from Aboukir that Cyprus was in great danger owing to the exalted temper of the Turks, 'whose heads were lifted up so high that they seemed to touch the heavens'.[3] The arrangements about the tribute were not fully settled; the Cypriote envoy attempted to pay it in stuffs, which the Sultan refused to accept, and he had to return to Cyprus and sell them to raise the money.[4] Bartholomew Contarini, reporting on 10 March 1519 on the experiences of the envoys in Cairo, said that the defterdar claimed five years' tribute, 40,000 ducats or *saraffi*, and gave them three months to find the money. Eventually he allowed them a year's grace. The envoys managed to raise 10,000 ducats between them.[5] The refusal to accept Cyprus camlet and samite in lieu of coin must have been a blow to Cypriote industry, and it was no easy task to find the requisite amount of gold ducats.[6] In 1519, however, the Sultan agreed to take the payment in uncoined gold, the cost of minting being added.[7]

[1] Sanudo, XXIV, 648 (27 June), 649 (4 July), 651 (9 July).

[2] *Libri Comm., Reg.* VI, p. 143, no. 64 (1517, 8 Sept.). Cp. Sanudo, XXV, 144 (20 Sept.; cp. 151): the Sultan expresses himself as satisfied with Venice, and renews the treaty of peace, which is sworn to again with the addition of an article on Cyprus; the tribute to be paid in cash at Constantinople. Cp. Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch.* II, pp. 525–6 (17 Sept.).

[3] Sanudo, XXV, 60 (18 Sept.).

[4] *Ibid.* XXV, 79–80 (report received 13 Nov.). The Sultan did not always refuse stuffs. In a letter to the Rectors, 28 Jan. 1518 (Sanudo, XXV, 379), he says: 'Know that we have need of silk for thirty garments of gold brocade' (then follows a long list of requirements); 'for this service I send my slave, and command that when you receive my glorious, mighty and blessed commandment, you do not otherwise, but find as quickly as possible the above-mentioned stuffs in your island, and send them by the same slave to my sublime and victorious Porte, and the money to pay the *kharaj* (tribute) which you owe if the said stuffs do not suffice...and the stuffs must be fine and not poor.' But generally the Sultan insisted on Venetian gold ducats as provided in the treaty. (Sanudo, XXV, 440; XXVI, 157; XXVII, 78, 151, 466–7, 475.)

[5] *Ibid.* XXVII, 38–9. Albèri, ser. III, t. III, p. 59.

[6] Cp. above, p. 803, and Sanudo, XXVII, 620.

[7] 11 July 1519. *Libri Comm., Reg.* VI, p. 155, no. 107; cp. p. 158, no. 114 (30 Aug. 1519) and Sanudo, XXVII, 598.

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Except for a certain difficulty caused by some attacks on Turkish shipping by Venetian subjects, nothing further disturbed the relations between the two Powers during the reign of this Sultan, now drawing to a close. Selim died on 22 September 1520, and was succeeded by Suleiman 'the Magnificent', on the 30th. The Signory in due course sent to offer its congratulations, and to renew the previous treaties. The new treaty was concluded in December 1521.[1]

The fatal effect of neutrality in the face of a ruthless aggressor, allowing him to attack his objects one by one, while the others stand aside and hope to escape, was well illustrated in these years. Hungary, first to be assailed, unsupported by all the other Christian Powers, fell an easy prey, and Suleiman returned to Constantinople flushed with victory, to prepare his expedition against Rhodes. Those rumours of such preparations which had for so many years caused scares in Venice and everywhere else, now came true, and the Christian world looked on without moving a hand in defence of the gallant island fortress. During Suleiman's Hungarian campaign, the Venetian ambassador to the Porte had been instructed to avoid contact with the Sultan, lest the Republic should become involved in the struggle. The instructions issued to the Captain-General of the Sea, Dominic Trevisan, were equally cautious. On no account was he to interfere on behalf of Rhodes if it was besieged; his only affair was to see to the security of the Venetian possessions, especially Cyprus.[2] The fall of Rhodes (on which the Signory actually sent to congratulate the Sultan) left Cyprus more isolated than ever. It is remarkable that it was able to survive in Venetian hands for nearly half a century longer. From time to time a crisis suddenly developed. In 1525[3] the Sultan complained that Sicilian corsairs had attacked a Turkish ship in the roadstead of Lemesos; it was said that the crew and the Janissaries on board were forced to land and robbed and

[1] Sanudo, XXXII, 343, 498. *Libri Comm., Reg.* VI, p. 168, no. 156 (translation of the firman of the Sultan Suleiman concluding peace with the Venetian ambassador Mark Minio, 11 Dec. 1521). Cp. p. 169, no. 157 (18 Dec.). Hammer, *Gesch.* III, p. 16 (cp. Zinkeisen, II, pp. 635–6), gives the substance of the new treaty concluded on 1 Dec. by Mark Memmo [*sic*], according to which Venice was to pay two annual tributes, one of 10,000 ducats for Cyprus, one of 500 for Zante. The former figure is suspect, for the amount of the tribute before and after this time remained steady at 8000 ducats. Sanudo does not mention the tribute in the passages of his Diary cited.

[2] Romanin, V, p. 375; cp. Sanudo, XXXIII, 359 (14 July 1522).

[3] Sanudo, XXXIX, 429, 476; XL, 21–5, 31–4, 125–6, 254.

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insulted. The Venetian consul in Rhodes wrote that war was imminent, the Sultan threatening to seize Crete and Cyprus, since they offered shelter to pirates. The Venetian Bailie disclaimed responsibility: 'Famagusta was the only port in Cyprus'; the authorities at Lemesos would have helped the Turkish ship, but were powerless against the pirates. The storm blew over. And indeed the Sultan could not justly complain, since Turkish pirates, making Rhodes their base and openly encouraged by the Turkish authorities, made the seas 'much worse than in the time of the Rhodian knights', as a Venetian captain remarked.[1]

Anxious as Venice was not to fall into open war with the Turk, it was difficult to avoid awkward incidents. Relations must have been very similar to those which prevailed between England and Spain in the years before the Armada. But neither side had a Francis Drake, although Khair ed-Din Barbarossa was a sufficient terror to his enemies.

On 1 November 1533 a hot-headed commander, the Proveditor Jerome Canale, sighting a squadron of twelve Turkish galleys, and supposing them to be corsairs, attacked and captured five of them with their commander, and sank two.[2] Even this did not cause an open breach, for the apologies which the Signory hastened to offer were accepted.[3] Nor did the refusal of the invitation which Suleiman sent in 1536 to join the Franco-Turkish league against Charles V But there were other incidents, as when a Venetian ship with a valuable cargo was captured in Cyprus waters,[4] and soon there was open war. Although the attack on Corfù in August–September 1537 was a failure, the redoubtable Khair ed-Din Barbarossa captured a number of islands in the Aegean which were held, if not by the Republic directly, yet by members of Venetian families. Cyprus naturally in these circumstances did not escape attention. The Senate made an effort to strengthen its defences. Francis Bragadin was appointed Proveditor-General, with orders to organize the stradiotes and turcopoles. These forces were largely increased and provision in cash and barley assigned to them for the duration of the war.[5] Nevertheless, on 14 May 1539 a descent was

[1] Iorga, *G.O.R.* II, p. 374 (report of 9 May 1525). Four galleys and six other ships sailed for Cyprus from Rhodes on 9 July 1525.

[2] Paruta, *Hist. Vin.* I (1605), pp. 540–3; Morosini, I, p. 389; Hammer, *Gesch.* III, pp. 180–1; Romanin, VI, pp. 9–10.

[3] *Libri Comm., Reg.* VI, p. 218, no. 135; Albèri, ser. III, vol. I, pp. 3–4.

[4] Romanin, VI, p. 23.

[5] Sathas, Μνημ. VIII, pp. 308–9 (8 Feb. 1537); cp. p. 368.

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made on Lemesos,[1] which was razed to its foundations, and the castle nearly destroyed. The peace concluded on 2 October 1540, though it may have been humiliating to Venice (Nauplia and Malvasia and all her Aegean islands which had been captured in the course of the war were given up[2]), at least procured a cessation of hostilities for thirty years.[3] The amount of the tribute for Cyprus was not raised, but remained fixed at 8000 ducats.[4] It continued to be paid with fair regularity for many years.[5]

There is little doubt, however, that the peace which reigned for the next thirty years sapped the foundations of Venetian domination in the Levant. The policy of bribery, which the Bailies in Constantinople practised with apparent success,[6] was not constructive; it surmounted immediate crises, but it created the impression that the Signory would never fight. The ease with which the potential enemy was bought off caused the Signory to neglect its navy, while the Turks developed theirs, and to make no methodical plans for the defence of its colonial possessions. Cyprus had to be lost before it awoke from its lethargy. This was not for lack of warning from the Signory's representatives at Constantinople. The ex-Bailie Cavalli in 1560 pointed out that it was not by bribery that success was to be won, but by the reputation of the

[1] The date is given by Jodocus v. Meggen (1542), *Reisebeschreibung* (Dillingen, 1580), p. 64. See below, p. 863, n. 3.

[2] Dumont, IV (ii), pp. 197–200; Hertslet, *Treaties, etc. between Turkey and foreign Powers*, p. 701. Stradiote refugees from Nauplia and Monemvasia were given grants of land in Cyprus, Crete, Zante, Cephallenia and Corfù. Sathas, Μνημ. VIII, pp. 335–6 (30 April 1541). One of those from Nauplia, the cavalry captain John Valami, was appointed commander of the stratia in Cyprus, and knighted. *Ibid.* pp. 349–50 (16 Sept. 1541). Sixty troopers were sent out to serve under him (*ibid.* pp. 352–3, 3 Dec. 1541). But on 10 Oct. 1542 it was decided to disband the extra stradiotes and turcopoles who had been sent out to Cyprus in 1537 (*ibid.* p. 368).

[3] Romanin, VI, pp. 65–6.

[4] *Libri Comm., Reg.* VI, p. 237, no. 43. Final ratification in April 1541 (Hammer, *Gesch.* III, pp. 220, 704). Lusignan (see below, p. 863, n. 3) says that the castles of Lemesos and Paphos were destroyed by the Venetians after peace was made, but dates the destruction in 1539.

[5] Receipts are frequently noted in the *Commemoriali* from 1546 onwards; in 1562 the sum is 472,000 *aspri bianchi* (*Reg.* VI, p. 302, no. 90).

[6] Marino Cavalli's total expenses for 24 months amounted to 12,260 ducats, in salaries and presents; but he adds that when he was in the right he did not use bribes, though a little *cortesia* to the ministers when all was settled was only in keeping with the custom of the country. (Report, 1560, Albèri, ser. III, vol. I, p. 276.)

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State, its fortresses and galleys, its arms and the prospect of Spanish aid. Constant pouring out of money makes the Turks think the giver is weak. At the present rate, the expenditure will come to 300,000 ducats a year, if the Signory is not to break with the Porte. The Turks always 'credono che quel che non si fa non si possa'. Certainly Venice must not go to war, but it must not let them suppose that it cannot do so. It must play off the King of Spain and the Emperor against the Turks.[1]

For many years, nothing occurred openly to disturb the current of affairs in the island. In 1558 there was a revival of the familiar scare of a Turkish invasion, which led to the despatch to the island of troops and munitions,[2] and of the engineer John Jerome Sanmicheli, who was to report on the improvement of the defences. The Senate ordered a levy of 3000 picked footsoldiers. The *francomati* were to be trained, granted a military franchise and a small stipend. The number of the Albanian horse was to be raised from 600 to 800; they were to be paid, instead of being given land to cultivate, which made them soft. A hundred arquebusiers were to be selected from Italians in the island to guard the coasts. The fortification of Famagusta and Kerynia was to be pressed on, and the country round them to be cleared of timber. How much of these measures was carried into effect we do not know; certainly not all. And always there were some optimists who made themselves heard; in 1560, Marino Cavalli,[3] in spite of the warnings which we have just quoted him as uttering, gave it as his opinion that Cyprus was well provided for; it could not be conquered in one year, and it would be dangerous to leave an army to winter in an island so vulnerable to naval attack. Also the Turk knew very well that Venice would have the help of Spain and the Emperor; he would not have attacked Rhodes if he had expected it to have such assistance. Cavalli was in the minority, however, and for once the minority was sadly mistaken.

It has already been mentioned (p. 799) that in 1562 Sagredo warned the Signory that a serious outbreak of the lower classes was to be expected unless something was done to remedy the shocking misgovernment of the Kingdom. And indeed just about this time a

[1] Albèri, *ibid.* pp. 276, 286–8.

[2] Morosini, bk. VIII, p. 303. P. Giustinian (1576), p. 391. Cp. Romanin, VI, p. 246: the Venetian Bailie, Antony Barbarigo, was warned that Cyprus was at the mercy of the Sultan whenever he might wish to take it. This was a year or two earlier; Barbarigo was Bailie in 1556–7. For Sanmicheli's mission, see below, p. 859.

[3] Albèri, ser. III, vol. I, p. 282.

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dangerous movement occurred which showed how ready the Cypriotes were to revolt against those whom they regarded, not without some reason, as their oppressors. It was led by one James Diassorin, a picturesque person of dubious origin, and cousin of the better-known adventurer James Basilicos, called the Despot, who succeeded in occupying the throne as Voivode of Moldavia from 1561 to 1563.[1] Diassorin himself is known for some minor literary work and as a copyist of Greek manuscripts; but he aspired to something more spectacular and, prompted perhaps by his cousin the Despot, attempted to expel the Venetians from Cyprus and set himself on the throne.[2] Having found

[1] On the Despot, see the lives by Antonmaria Graziani (*de Ioanne Heraclide Despota Vallachorum Principe*, Warsaw, 1759, and in Mai, *Spicilegium Romanum*, VIII (1842), pp. 172 ff., written in 1567) and Joh. Sommer, first printed in 1587; both in E. Legrand, *Deux vies de Jacques Basilicos* (Paris, 1889); N. Iorga, *Nouveaux matériaux pour servir à l'hist. de Jacques Basilikos l'Héraclide dit le Despote, Prince de Moldavie* (Bucarest, 1900); the same, *Gesch. des rumän. Volkes*, I (1905), pp. 390–3. When James Basilicos ascended the throne he took the name of John, and styled himself 'Ioan Voevod'.

[2] The chief authority is Graziani, *de Iacobo Didascalo Ioannis Fratre*, in the same volume as the life of the Despot, Warsaw, 1759, and, with the title *de Iacobo Despotae fratre ad Nicol. Thomicium liber unicus*, in Mai, *op. cit.* pp. 219–84; also in Legrand, *op. cit.* Graziani also mentions the episode briefly in his *de bello Cyprio*, p. 62. See also Ferencz Forgách, 'Magyar Historiája 1540–1572', in *Mon. Hungar. Hist. Scriptores*, XVI (Pest, 1866), pp. 267–8. Both these authors call him brother of the Despot, but the relationship seems to have been that of cousins. Next comes Natale Conti, *Univ. hist.* (1581), p. 423, who seems to date the episode in 1568. But it is narrated as a piece of fresh news in a letter written from Venice in March or April 1563 (Charrière, II, p. 723 n.) by M. de Boistaillé, who got most of his information about events in the Levant from the French resident in Constantinople, M. de Petremol. He writes: 'Il s'est icy descouvert un traicté en Cypre, manyé par un Grec qui faisoit profession de maintenir l'Église grecque contre la romaine, et avoit ja attiré à soy et assemblé plus de cinq mil hommes, et par l'intelligence qu'il avoit en Levant, délibéroit de brouiller ceste isle soubz couleur d'une faulse investiture du feu empereur Charles. Dont adverty le lieutenant de ces seigneurs audit lieu par le bayle de Constantinople l'auroit faict estrangler: non sans quelque esmotion de ce peuple séduict.' The Doge, Jerome Priuli, in a letter of 15 Dec. 1563 (Hurmuzaki, VIII, p. 97), says that in the previous year he had information of a Cypriote monk sent by the late James Diassorin to the Despota James Vasilicò his cousin with letters of importance connected with a plot concerning Cyprus. Finally, the military governor of Cyprus who put him to death was John Matthew Bembo. This man was Captain of Cyprus in 1546–7, which caused Mas Latrie to assign the episode to that time (M.L., *H.* III, p. 855); but he was also named Proveditor-General on 14 July 1561 (*ibid.* p. 851; cp. for his presence in Cyprus as 'duca e governatore' in that year, Cigogna, *Inscr. Ven.* III, p. 502). Bernard Sagredo followed him, being elected 27 Sept. 1562, and doubtless going out soon afterwards.

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his way to the island, he remained for some time in comparative obscurity. Then he opened a school in Nicosia, and was so successful that he became known as Didascalos, the Teacher—a fact which throws some light on the meagre organization of education at the time. From this he proceeded to the practice of medicine (at one time in Venice he had served in a pharmacy, which doubtless sufficed to qualify him), and in this art, as in teaching, he won much popularity by making no distinction between rich and poor, but treating all alike without regard to what they could afford to pay. In his lectures he stirred the enthusiasm of the Cypriotes, as it is so easy to do, by recalling the glories of ancient Greece. Accused of machinations against the Roman Catholic Church, he was forbidden to continue his lectures, and compelled to leave the city; but he behaved with such discretion that his friends secured the lifting of the ban. He however thought it best to leave the capital and prosecute his designs in the countryside. Gradually he stirred up discontent among all classes; gradually he established himself in a position of authority, and began to let it be known that he was of noble origin, producing in attestation thereof some kind of investiture which he had obtained from the late Emperor Charles V through his brother the Despot.[1] A Greek captain of stradiotes, one Megaducus,[2] in

We shall see that Diassorin was still a free man in Aug. 1562; so that the crisis must date from the early autumn of that year. Iorga is wide of the mark in debiting Graziani with mistaking John Matthew Bembo for Laurence Bembo, who as a matter of fact did not become Captain of Cyprus until 1564, long after the affair was over. Boistaillé, it will be noticed, speaks of the 'lieutenant of the Signory in Cyprus', but is doubtless not using the term in its technical sense.—For modern accounts of Diassorin and his literary activities, see Sathas, Νεοελλ. Φιλολογία (1868), pp. 210–11, and Μνημ. IV (1883), p. lix; E. Legrand, *Bibliographie hellén*...XV *et* XVI *siècles*, I (1885), pp. 297–302; also A. Ludwich, 'Ein neuer Beitrag zur Charakteristik des Jakob Diassorinos', in *Byz. Zeitschr.* I (1892), pp. 293–302. He corresponded with Melanchthon (Legrand, II, p. 354).

[1] On the title of his defence of Matthew Francowitz (1558) he describes himself as 'vir illustris dominus Doridos, eiectus a Turcis patria et ditione, qui multis annis fuit conductor equitum Graecorum in exercitu Caroli V imperatoris in Italia et Gallia'. Sathas, Μνημ. IV, p. lix.

[2] Megaducus, says Graziani, 'stirpem suam ad illum Megaducum referebat qui in illa Byzantii expugnatione, qua unum omnium maximum christiano nomini vulnus inflictum est, imperatori proximum dignitatis locum obtinuerat'. The Cypriote captain believed, or pretended to believe, that the title μέγας δοῦκας, which was held by Lucas Notaras, was a personal name which had descended to him. Megaduca was, however, a well-known Cypriote name; thus we have Sir D. Dimitrios Megaduca,

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command of some 2000 horse, joined him, and he also gained the support of some Cypriote nobles; although in the event no names were revealed, not even that of Megaducus, whose death or execution followed closely on the execution of James himself. Realizing, however, that, even if he should succeed in upsetting the existing government, he could not hold the island against the Venetians without outside help, he sent one of his most trusted accomplices to Constantinople.[1] This man, who was instructed to promise that the payment of the annual tribute would be continued if the movement succeeded, got into touch with the pashas and Suleiman himself, and received some encouragement in those quarters. But there happened to be in the city a Cretan, who knew the emissary of old, having had a slight dispute with him about some money matter. His suspicions were aroused by the man's intimacy with the pashas. By an elaborate trick he gained the agent's confidence, wormed all his secrets out of him, and promptly communicated them to the Venetian representative at Constantinople and to the governor of Crete. The agent was enticed into the Bailie's house, tortured and made to

who was on 12 Aug. 1525 appointed to succeed Mavressi in command of the stradiotes and died in 1533 (Sathas, *op. cit.* VII, pp. 135–6, 160) and Meaduca Dimitri Lascari, who led the punitive expedition to Lefkara in 1570 and afterwards fell at Nicosia (Calepio, ff. 99, 110b). The Dimitrios Lascari who was rewarded for his services in 1487 (Sathas, *ibid.* p. 44) may have been an ancestor.

[1] Natale Conti gives a different account of the communications with the Turks, saying that the frequent correspondence between Diassorin and 'Scander superioris Mysiae despotus sive praefectus' (Iskender Pasha, Beylerbey of Anadoli) excited suspicion. These letters were partly in Greek, partly in a code. Of the code he says: 'Erant notae illae parvula animalia, ut muscae, formice, culices, vespe, araneae ceteraque huiusmodi complura.' As to this code, Dr Wittek makes the plausible suggestion that the letters were written in Turkish in the form 'Siyaqat qirma', 'an extremely difficult derivative of Arabic script which was known to only very few of the clerks. It is in fact a secret code for the uninitiated, and really looks like a mass of insects'. He adds: 'The code was generally known among the Osmanli ministries of finance only in connexion with the use of figures, but for the laymen even the symbols for the figures remained obscure. Now the text says there was an exchange of letters with Iskender Pasha (the seat of the Beylerbey of Anadoli was Kutahiya, which is in fact in Mysia superior), and that this correspondence was partly in cypher. The cypher may therefore very well have stood for certain figures; or these figures may in their turn have stood for something else; they may have represented certain personages—which in the 16th cent. was a customary method.'—Suspicion was aroused also by the numerous gifts which James seemed to be receiving. The letters were intercepted, resealed and forwarded; and James was eventually arrested.

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confess. The informer was sent with despatches to Venice, where he was rewarded. Information was sent to John Matthew Bembo, then Proveditor-General of Cyprus, who immediately arrested the Didascalos at Paphos.[1] But, when the prisoner was brought to the capital, there was such an alarming demonstration by the excited people who flocked thither from all parts, that the authorities had to act promptly. He was tried, put to the question, and strangled the night after his arrival. Order was issued that all persons who had newly arrived in the capital should depart at once. The fact that 8000 or more persons were affected showed how serious the crisis had been.

Under torture, the Didascalos had implicated a number of Cypriotes of standing. Some of these were executed. But for diplomatic reasons it was put about that their offence was not treason, but attempting to prevent the Rectors from sending corn to Venice when it was scarce in Cyprus.[2] But the people knew the truth.

An echo of these events is heard about a year later, when the Signory was still trying to disentangle the ramifications of the conspiracy. In September 1563 there is a report from the Venetian Bailie at Constantinople, Daniel Barbarigo, about an undertaking, in which the Despot of Moldavia was concerned, to set on the throne of Cyprus an adventurer who claimed to be a grandson of King James II. Barbarigo's language is very obscure, but from the Doge Jerome Priuli's instructions it is clear that a plot by the Despot in agreement with certain Cypriotes (one of whom seems to have been Hercules Podocataro) had been revealed by a Cypriote monk. The monk has been detained in irons by the Bailie and, pending his being sent to the Council of Ten, he is to be examined, promised his personal safety, and a reward of 200 ducats, as well as a life-pension of 100 ducats a year, if he will reveal details of the practices of the Despot and the late James Diassorin, and the names of any Cypriotes concerned. If nothing can be extracted from the monk, the Bailie is to do what he thinks best with him.[3]

What Venetian Bailies did with such witnesses, if necessary, may be guessed from an incident which occurred a little later. Victor Bragadin, who held the office from 1564 to 1565, learned of the arrival in Constantinople of two Cypriotes, bearing letters to the effect that many

[1] Not before 17 Aug. 1562, since a letter from Diassorin bearing that date is cited by Legrand.

[2] Cp. above, p. 816 (the grain riots of 1565).

[3] Hurmuzaki, VIII, pp. 95–7.

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of the serfs were anxious to exchange Venetian for Turkish rule. The Grand Vezir was persuaded, it is said by a liberal bribe from Bragadin, to hand the men over to him. Nothing was ever seen or heard of them again.[1]

Such movements as we have described explain why it was possible for a French agent, writing from Constantinople when the invasion was imminent, to say that the Sultan hoped to become master of Cyprus not so much by the power of his fleet, as because of the secret intrigues which he was conducting in the island; for he had to do with a people in itself insolent and proud, easily persuaded to rebel and rise against its master, by whom it feels itself grievously oppressed and offended, both by the burden of taxation and by the way in which dignities are conferred and distributed.[2] The Signory at one time, it was said, entertained the idea of removing almost all the nobles from Nicosia to a fortress which it was proposed to build at Akrotiri.[3]

Turkish intrigue did not confine itself to Cyprus. Suleiman, or his advisers, conceived the idea of tempting the Duke of Savoy, Emanuel Philibert, to embarrass Venice by reviving the claims of his dynasty to the Kingdom.[4] The Grand Vezir Mehmed Sokolli summoned to Constantinople Nicolas Petrokokkino, a Chiote Greek and Portuguese agent, and furnished him with credentials dated 28 November 1563, countersigned by the Portuguese Jew, Joseph Miquez (Joseph Nasi), an intimate of Suleiman and of his son and successor Selim.[5] Reaching Nice on 20 February 1564, Petrokokkino put Suleiman's proposal before the Duke at Turin. The Duke hesitated long, and much corre-

[1] Calepio, f. 93 b.

[2] Memorandum of Claude du Bourg, Charrière, III, p. 74 n. It was supposed that there were some 50,000 serfs who would be ready to join the Turks (Natale Conti, in his account of the conspiracy of Diassorin, p. 424).

[3] See below, p. 863.

[4] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 577–8; *Trattato delle ragioni sopra il Regno di Cipro* (Turin, 1594), pp. 12–15; J. Tonsus, *De vita Emm. Philiberti* (Turin, 1596), pp. 153–8; Giov. Botero, *Prencipi Christiani*, pt. II (1603), pp. 688–95; Guichenon, II (1778), p. 258. Cp. Magni, p. 13; Sforza, pp. 331–3 (from Turin Archives). Two years earlier the Duke's ambassador at Venice, Claude Malopera, had imprudently offered to cede all rights to Cyprus if the Republic would aid the Duke against Geneva; he was immediately recalled (4 March 1561; Segre in *Arch. Veneto*, N.S., III (1902), p. 55).

[5] On this man, whom Selim made Duke of Naxos and Count of Andros, see Romanin, VI, pp. 270–3; Iorga, *G.O.R.* III, pp. 140–1. I have not seen M. A. Levi, *Don Josef Nasi, Herzog von Naxos* (Breslau, 1859).

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spondence ensued with Joseph Miquez, conducted through two other Chiotes, Michael Soffiano,[1] a cousin of Petrokokkino, and Nicolas Giustiniani. The last named brought a letter from Miquez dated 9 November 1565, signifying the goodwill of all the pashas, and the certainty of a successful issue, and urging the Duke to lose no time in sending an ambassador to the Porte. Finally Emanuel Philibert (aware perhaps of the untrustworthiness of the Turk and of the difficulty of holding so distant a possession) decided that his duty was to sacrifice his ambitions to the cause of Christendom, and reject an alliance with its enemy. He disclosed the whole proceedings to the Pope, to the King of Spain, and above all to the Venetians. 'Testa di ferro' seems generally to have taken a sensible view of the Cyprus question, if we may believe the reports of the Venetian representatives at his court. Michael Suriano in 1558 reported that the Duke had never said a word to him about his claims to the Kingdom of Cyprus, nor had people about his court ever expressly mentioned the subject, though he drew certain inferences from what they said.[2] Andrew Boldù told the Senate in 1561[3] that the house of Savoy made a sort of claim to Cyprus, and the Duke's subjects talked openly about it; but Boldù (here he is of course wrong) does not believe that Charlotte ever made any such will or donation as is reported; and even if she did it would not matter to the Signory, since the Kingdom was no longer hers to give away. He adds that he has never heard a word on the subject from the Duke or Duchess, and the Duke, when it was mentioned in his presence by an officious orator, went out of the room. Boldù gathered from the Duke's secretary that he wished the Senate to know his views. Again, in 1566, John Correr[4] said that although there was a certain amount of talk about the claim, in all the time he was at the court he had never heard anyone whose opinion was worth considering speak of it. Similar evidence is forthcoming from other reports of ambassadors in 1564 and 1570.[5]

The Signory was already well informed by its Bailie of the sinister intentions of the Turkish Sultan, and, confirmed in its suspicions by the Duke's communication, began to think more seriously of preparations

[1] On whom see Legrand, *Bibl. Hellén.* xve *et* xvie *siècles*, II, pp. 168–71.

[2] *Cal. of State Papers, Venetian*, VI, p. 1491, no. 1223 (14 May 1558).

[3] 12 Dec. 1561. Albèri, ser. II, vol. I, pp. 455–8.

[4] Albèri, ser. II, vol. V, p. 45.

[5] Sigismund Cavalli, 1564, in Albèri, ser. II, vol. II, p. 40; John Francis Morosini, 1570, *ibid.* p. 149, n. 1.

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for the defence of the island. Meanwhile Emanuel Philibert's refusal to listen to Suleiman's invitation caused the Sultan to divert the blow, which might have fallen on Cyprus, to Malta.[1]

We may here pause to consider what was actually done by Venice to strengthen the defences of Cyprus against the attack which never ceased to threaten the island.

The walls of Nicosia, as we have seen (p. 809), were old and weak. There was considerable disagreement about the desirability of replacing them by modern defences. In 1562 Sagredo said that all the rulers of the island had sought to fortify the place.[2] Thus, in 1525, the Lieutenant, Donato da Leze, describing work which was in progress, especially on the Misericordia, thought it would be possible to make the place into a great fortress.[3] Sagredo thought it could be fortified, or at least the walls repaired, in a few months; there were, he said, 700 paces (a little more than two English miles) of old walls which were good and sufficient; elsewhere the old material could be used. The plan of Colonel Piacenza to take in the neighbouring heights was, he considered, quite impracticable. Ascanio Savorgnan, however, in his report, also of 1562, definitely advised against attempting to fortify the capital.[4] He describes it as surrounded by walls four miles in circumference, with circular turrets of an old-fashioned kind. Its situation, far from the sea, is such that it could not be succoured thence; about a third of the circumvallation, with the consequent economy, would suffice for a

[1] Cp. Herre, p. 9.

[2] A Genoese visitor about the middle of the 16th cent. (M.L., *H.* III, p. 547, n. 2) says that the site and walls are very weak; it cannot be fortified because it is commanded by certain heights, so in time of war the gentlemen retire to Famagusta. Foglieta's opinion (col. 949) that the site is suitable to fortification on any plan, *nullo colle, aut edito loco alicunde urgente*, is of course incorrect.

[3] Sanudo, XL, 198.

[4] The statement (M.L., *H.* III, p. 556 n.) that the fortification of Nicosia was carried out in conformity with the views of Sagredo, supported by the engineer Savorgnan, 'whose report has been published', is not borne out by any text of that report known to me. It is true that Maggiorotti (*Architetti e Architettura Militari*, I, p. 429) quotes Ascanio as saying that Nicosia can be fortified, 'ritraendo le nuove difese lontano dai colli dominanti'. As usual, Maggiorotti does not say where this passage occurs. It must mean merely that if the fortification, of which he disapproved, was undertaken, it should be done in the way suggested.

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fortress on the seaside. Incidentally he complains of the difficulty of getting any building done in this region, owing partly to the scarcity of material (which could only be obtained by pulling down private houses), but also to the inertia, laziness and lack of industry of the population.[1]

Ascanio's advice was not taken. Perhaps the 'gentlemen' who resided in the capital brought pressure to bear;[2] perhaps his report was felt—and it certainly gives that impression—to be somewhat overcritical and not always fair to his predecessors. Unlike, so far as the sources allow us to judge, any other expert who considered the matter, with one exception, he came to the conclusion that if it were a question of constructing a single fortress in the island, it should be either at Salines or at Lemesos.[3]

In 1567 Sforza Pallavicino was commissioned to prepare a memorandum on the best method of fortifying the island, and Ascanio Savorgnan's elder brother, Count Julius, who was familiar with the localities, was sent out to construct the defences.[4] Accompanied by other experts, he was received with all honours by the nobles, who contributed very large sums to the cost of the works, as well as provided

[1] Sagredo remarks (p. 542) that the peasants, both men and women, were slow and lazy, 'and four of them do less work than one of ours from Lombardy'. This refers to Cyprus generally; Savorgnan's reference seems to be especially to the Nicosiotes. But labourers could be fetched from all over the island, as we know was done for Famagusta.

[2] There is a hint of this in Foglieta, col. 949. A proposal seems to have been made, rather than to fortify the city itself, to build a fort on Mandia, but to have been strongly and successfully opposed by the Nicosiotes, on the ground that it would serve rather to dominate a faithful city than to protect it. P. Giustinian (1576), p. 425.

[3] The decision to fortify Nicosia, says Foglieta (*ibid.*) was taken *abjecto consilio portus Limisi.*

[4] Romanin, VI, p. 266, citing *Annali*, 4 and 7 March 1567, and referring to various writings by Pallavicino and Savorgnan in the filza 'Relazioni della guerra di Cipro e delle isole del Levante'. Jeffery (*Hist. Mon.* p. 27) refers to letters in the Ambrosiana from Julius Savorgnan to the Duke of Parma, dated 1584, describing his design for Nicosia, with a plan. On Julius Savorgnan, see Sereno, *Commentari della guerra di Cipro*, etc., pp. 9–10; Bonaiuto Lorini, *Delle fortificationi* (1596), p. 62; Luke, *op. cit.* p. 5; Maggiorotti, *op. cit.* (1933), pp. 427 (Savorgnan had been in Cyprus in 1552), 430–3. Julius is commonly described as Proveditor-General of Cyprus; but this office seems at the time to have been filled by Francis Barbaro, although according to Morosini (*Hist. Ven.* lib. VIII, p. 231) Julius was given 100 foot-soldiers, ten *honorarii milites* and *totius militiae praefectura.*

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manual labour.[1] He worked for ten (some say only eight) months on the defences of Nicosia, but was then recalled,[2] and owing to the inertia of the authorities, especially the Lieutenant, Nicolas Dandolo, they were not completed by the time the Turks invested the city.[3] The fortification is an earthwork; originally it was revetted with stone for only half its height, above which there was a grassy slope. It was never Savorgnan's intention to carry the revetment over the whole work, as the Turks afterwards did.[4] His plan, which included a wet ditch and a counter-

[1] Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 211b; Morosini, *loc. cit.* Eugene Sinclitico, Count of Roucha (see above, p. 792, n. 1), James de Nores, Count of Tripoli, and Antony Davila were especially zealous, and were officially thanked by the government, 31 May 1568 (Romanin, VI, p. 284). Davila, the grandson of that Peter Davila who had been a faithful supporter of Queen Catherine, made an immediate gift of 10,000 ducats, distributed a large quantity of grain from his own stores to the workmen, and placed at the disposal of the Rectors his silver plate, which he had intended to send back to Venice, in order that they might use it as security for a loan. Roucha and Tripoli each gave 10,000 ducats; Archbishop Philip Mocenigo all his fortune; and the city of Nicosia 60,000 ducats. The Venetian Senate, when it was informed of these patriotic contributions, voted 50,000 ducats for the same purpose. Not only the nobles, says Natale Conti (*Hist.* 1589, II, f. 60b), but the commoners contributed, notably Andrew Curazzer, who offered 5000 Venetian ducats, 1000 silver ducats, 3000 bushels of barley and salted provisions to the value of 600 ducats, to be paid for or returned when convenient. As to Savorgnan's assistants, Maggiorotti (p. 430) says that he took with him John 'Sosomeno', Alvise or Louis Brugnuoli and Antony Migliani; that the first worked under him constructing the Avila and Tiepolo (*sic*, for Tripoli) bastions, and that Brugnuoli worked at the St Mark's bastion at Famagusta. He does not explain how this squares with the statement of Vasari (see below) that Brugnuoli returned to Italy after the death of John Jerome Sanmicheli some ten years earlier, and died soon after. Sozomeno commanded the sappers during the siege of Nicosia, and tells us himself (Cobham, *Exc. Cypr.* p. 84) of his work on the Davila and Tripoli bastions (cp. Calepio, f. 101). He was taken prisoner when the city fell, but ransomed himself; we shall meet with him again. Antony Davila escaped with his daughter and settled in Padua, where his son, Arrigo Caterino, the historian, was born. Brantôme (*Oeuvres*, ed. Lalanne, VII, p. 394) knew 'Madamoiselle Davilla, Cipriote, eschapée du sac de Chipre', in the suite of Catherine de Médicis.

[2] Romanin (VI, p. 283, n. 1) seems to imply that Julius was sent out again in December 1569, unless he is referring to the earlier mission in 1567.

[3] So marked, says Foglieta (col. 972), was Dandolo's cowardice and apathy that it was even secretly proposed by leading Venetians and others (*primores tam Veneti quam exteri*; but who were the latter?) to remove him from office and imprison him; Savorgnan himself is believed to have been ready to force this disreputable person (*profligatis moribus hominem*) to abdicate, or kill him if he refused to do so; which would perhaps have saved the situation. Foglieta seems to be alone in mentioning this plot.

[4] Jeffery (*Hist. Mon.* p. 27) justifies this statement from Savorgnan's own letters.

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


Fig. 10. Plan of Nicosia. From Lusignan's *Chorograffia*.

scarp, was only partially carried out.[1] The four-mile circuit was reduced by about a quarter.[2] Of the eight gates of the old city only three were

[1] The plans in Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 16 (see Fig. 10, above), in Camoccio's *Isole famose* (1571 ?), and in Simon Pinargenti, *Isole che son da Venezia nella Dalmatia*, etc., diagrammatic though they may be, show the counterscarp and the river diverted as it enters the enceinte so as to fill the ditch instead of flowing through the city.

[2] Zannetos (I, p. 971) calls attention to a trench of about the same dimensions as the present fosse which is clearly traceable in the plain to the south and east sides of the city. This he takes for the old fosse, and says that, if his supposition is correct, one of the reasons for drawing in the line of the fortifications was to increase the distance from the heights from which artillery could command the city. He seems to be referring to the entrenchment marked in Cobham's plan (*Exc. Cypr.* p. 87), which is more likely to be a work thrown up by the Turks during the siege (cp. Jeffery, *Hist. and Arch. Buildings*, III, p. 9). Where it approaches nearest to the points of the bastions, the distance is about 660 feet (120 paces). Mr Dikaios has kindly examined the remains of this entrenchment, and writes (21 April 1942) that it has not the appearance of a fosse alongside a wall, and the surface indications are against the possibility that there

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kept, which were known as the Porta di S. Domenico, del Proveditor or di sopra, and Giulia or di Sotto,[1] corresponding to the present Paphos, Kerynia and Famagusta Gates. There were eleven bastions which in their construction represent an advance on the Martinengo bastion at Famagusta, to be described below, the projecting angle being obtuse, which was considered to make defence easier.[2] Of the eleven, those which had the names of Tripoli, Davila, Constanzo and Podocataro bore the brunt of the Turkish assaults.[3]

existed such a wall. Its width is 23 to 25 metres, its depth 2 to 2·50 metres, whereas the fosse of the Venetian walls, in its present condition, is 40 to 50 metres wide (Cobham's section makes it about 110 feet from brink to brink, which agrees with the 20 paces of Calepio, f. 99b).

[1] The latter two were also called the Trakhona and Salines Gates (e.g. in Sylvestrani Brenzone, *Vita di Astorre Baglione*, p. 39). In Foglieta (col. 975) Trakhona is corrupted to Trojana, and wrongly identified with the Porta San Domenico, while the northern (Kerynia) Gate is called the Gate of the Citadel. Yet another name for the Kerynia Gate seems to be *Bemba*, so called by Calepio (f. 105). The Proveditor was either, as Jeffery suggests, Bernard Sagredo (1562) or else Francis Barbaro (1566–8), who gave his name to the adjoining bastion. 'Bemba' was probably derived from Laurence Bembo, who was Proveditor-General from 20 Aug. 1568 until his death on 30 Dec. 1569. An inscribed panel over the south archway of the Kerynia Gate, dated 1562, has been taken to refer to the repair of the fortifications (Jeffery, *loc. cit.*; Gunnis, p. 46). No one has yet made sense of the inscription, which appears to be incomplete. Dikaios, to whom I owe a careful drawing of it, suggests that it may have been moved from some other place. The Porta Giulia was perhaps named after Julius Savorgnan.

[2] Megaw, *R.D.A.C.* 1936, pt. II (1939), p. 107, quotes Vasari (*Vite*, VI, p. 352) on this point. Paruta (p. 93) gives the dimensions of the bastions (the faces 65 paces, the shoulders 30), which had room for 2000 infantry, and four guns; on each side were ports from which the soldiers could issue under cover to the counterscarp. The *terrepleins* or platforms, more than 30 paces wide, gave additional security. Down to 1934 the destruction of the fortifications, owing to natural decay, pilfering of building stone from the revetment, and the active 'improvements' which misguided municipal authorities were making with the object of constructing a boulevard round the city, proceeded apace. The Department of Antiquities has since done much in the way of judicious restoration.

[3] There is some uncertainty about the names of the bastions. The most commonly accepted list (e.g. in Foglieta, col. 975) beginning north of the Famagusta Gate and going against the clock, is Caraffa, Flatro, Loredano, Barbaro, Quirini, Mula, Roucha, Tripoli, Davila, Constanzo, Podocataro. (Sylvestrani Brenzone, *loc. cit.*, has the Tripoli bastion out of place, between Podocataro and Caraffa.) Of these the four last and the first are the only ones mentioned in the accounts of the siege, the Turkish attacks being directed mainly against them. Jauna's list differs curiously from this (see Jeffery,

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The work of carrying out the plans of Savorgnan after he left the island was directed by Colonel Leonard Roncone.[1] In a few months he had revetted with stone and mortar four bastions (Tripoli, Roucha, Mula and Quirini) and the curtain between the first two, and heightened the other curtains and cleared away obstructions in the neighbourhood. He continued this work until January 1570.

The omission of the revetment for the upper part of the walls, while it had the advantage that the besiegers' cannon-balls buried themselves ineffectively in the earth, had on the other hand the defect that the earth, brought down by the bombardment, made it easier for the attackers to cross the fosse; while the failure to dig out the fosse to the requisite depth prevented the bastions from adequately enfilading the curtains.[2] But there was no fault to be found with the planning of the defences. A competent observer, who saw them two months before the siege began, describes them as the finest and most scientific construction, although of earth, that could be.[3] And many maintained that, had the expected succour come and had the garrison been sufficiently numerous, Nicosia need not have fallen.[4]

Hist. Mon. p. 28). He omits Loredano, Barbaro, Quirini and Mula. His Sinclitico is evidently Roucha. His de Nores one would naturally suppose to be Tripoli, but he mentions Tripoli as well. He adds Sosomeno, Fabrice and Decres. Natale Conti (*Hist.* 1589, II, f. 82) explains that seven of the bastions were named after Cypriote nobles, such as Roucha, Tripoli and Davila, who had borne the expense (cp. Paruta, p. 100; Graziani, p. 79), while the four which were built out of the funds of St Mark were named after Venetian officials. Sylvestrani Brenzone says the bastions were named 'da' Capitani e da' Reggimenti' at the time when they were building. Quirini took its name from Nicolas Quirini, Lieutenant in 1566 (Paruta, p. 227); Loredano probably from the Doge, Peter Loredan, in whose time (1567–70) the fortifications were being built; Barbaro from Francis Barbaro, who was appointed Proveditor-General in 1566 with the special charge of attending to the fortification of the island; Mula from Benedict Mula, who was Counsellor in 1566–8 (Natale Conti, *Hist.* 1589, II, f. 60b). Even if one of the bastions was really called Sozomeno, it is unlikely that it took its name from the engineer, or he would have told us so.

[1] Natale Conti, *loc. cit.*: 'Leonardo Roncone Governatore delle ordinanze del regno.' During the siege he was in command of the Italian troops (Calepio, f. 96b).

[2] B. Sereno, *op. cit.* p. 10; Foglieta, col. 949.

[3] An anonymous Count, who was taken prisoner at Famagusta (three Counts captured there are mentioned by Calepio, ff. 120b, 121: Hercules and Nestor Martinengo, and James della Corbara). He is quoted by Lorini, *Delle fortificationi* (1596), p. 62: 'la più reale e meglio intesa opera (benche di terra)'.

[4] Cp. Lorini, *loc. cit.*

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Two other strong places of the island, Kerynia and Famagusta, received attention from the government, thanks to constant pressure from the authorities on the spot. The former[1] was described by Peter Sanudo in 1500 as a very fine fortress, but going to ruin; 'he who holds Kerynia is master of the island'—an observation which others preferred to make about Famagusta. In 1506 a decision was taken to spend 100 ducats a month for two years on it. But in 1518 it was still described as ill-fortified; it contained a lot of useless peasants, three-quarters of them women; it had no artillery or provisions. Bartholomew Contarini, the Proveditor, at first thought it ought to be dismantled; but after inspecting it with Jacometto da Novello he changed his mind; it could and should be made very strong. Jacometto went so far as to say that if there was no fortress at Kerynia it would be necessary to build one. In 1519, in the course of a long report to the Senate, Contarini described it as an important fortress; but there were only sixty men there and the *borgo* was in ruins; but the place ought to be held.[2] Ten years later Silvester Minio[3] described the castle as very strong, with high thick walls, 250 paces[4] longer than Famagusta in circuit. Besides two strong towers on the west and east, there was one towards the north above the sea, but old and rebuilt. It commanded the fosse from a casemate in the middle, but a great tower like the other two ought to be built there.[5]

[1] Enlart, II, pp. 559–78; Jeffery, *Hist. Mon.* pp. 306–17; *Hist. and Arch. Buildings*, New Ill. Ser. no. 4, pp. 5–30; no. 5, pp. 24–34; A. H. S. Megaw in *R.D.A.C.* 1936, Pt. II (Nicosia, 1939), pp. 105–7.

[2] Sanudo, III, 818, 839; VI, 288, 449; IX, 112; X, 108 (it could be made stronger than Famagusta); XXV, 213; XXVI, 157, 187–8; XXVII, 44.

[3] *Ibid.* II, 446.

[4] The *passo* may be taken at 5 *piedi*, the *piede* at 1·1 English feet; thus 250 paces are about 458 yards. He is comparing it with the citadel, not the whole enceinte, of Famagusta. Sagredo (p. 556) says that the circuit of Kerynia is only 330 paces, while Savorgnan puts the length of its fosse at 370 (360 in Reinhard, p. 37, should be corrected to 370 by the Malta MS. and MS. Bodley Ital. e. 11). That is at the most 678 yards. The circuit, according to Jeffery's plan (*Hist. Mon.* p. 304), including the towers and bastion, is about 700 yards. Savorgnan's measurement may therefore be accepted; but I find it difficult to reconcile Minio's statement with the dimensions of Famagusta citadel.

[5] It is possible to identify these points from the existing plan. The old rebuilt tower above the sea on the north must be what Jeffery calls the Tower of Queen Alice (at the north-east angle); then the strong towers on the west and east must be the circular towers at the north-west and south-east angles. Minio says nothing of any other tower; so the Venetian heart-shaped bastion at the south-west corner, which is the earliest example of its kind in Cyprus, had not yet been built.

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Since 1504, 33,868 ducats had been spent on the works, in cash, materials and labour. In the little harbour there was shelter for four galleys.[1] The cry for more and more munitions was repeated next year by Bartholomew da Mosto.[2] For Kerynia and other castles he required another thousand *stipendiati*, including 100 arbalesters or musketeers. He complains that while in Famagusta, to save money, many able-bodied foreigners are being dismissed, at Kerynia, Paphos and Lemesos all the men are married, old, useless and expensive. He repeats next year that all the garrison are married men who would have to be cleared out in an emergency. In 1532 the Lieutenant, Mark Antony Trevisan, and the Proveditor, Stephen Tiepolo, make a bad report about the place. It should, they say, be held only as a matter of prestige. It would be better to fortify Salines.[3] The date 1544 inscribed on the back of the curtain on the west has been taken to mark the complete transformation of the château into an artillery fortress.[4] But the criticisms which have been quoted were supported in 1562 by Ascanio Savorgnan, who advised strongly against wasting efforts in fortifying so vulnerable a place.[5] It was commanded by the neighbouring heights, which were within a mile and a half, whereas culverins could carry more than three miles.

[1] Sanudo himself, in the debate of 1519, said that Kerynia was a *tristo porto*, and Famagusta the only one usable by galleys. But he had not been there.

[2] Sanudo, XXIX, 261–3 (4 Aug. 1520), 367 (15 Sept.); XXX, 112 (5 April 1521).

[3] Sanudo, LVII, 245.

[4] Jeffery, *Hist. Mon.* p. 315.

[5] Savorgnan's arguments are repeated by Natale Conti (*Univ. hist. sui temp.* 1581, p. 424), who probably knew his report. He also adds that some suggested it would be better to fortify Salines. It is necessary to warn the reader that the analysis by Enlart (II, p. 568) of an important passage in the Bibl. Nat. MS. Ital. 1500 (which corresponds in all essentials to the printed text of Savorgnan's *Discrittione*) is ludicrously incorrect. According to him, Savorgnan says: 'dans le bas de la ville de Cérines, à soixante pas de là, on trouve encore deux clochers de l'église Saint-Marc, qui s'élèvent à un mille et demi de la place et la commandent. Eux memes sont commandés par une position voisine.' What the *Discrittione* says (to quote Luke's translation, which is accurate) is: 'I have measured the lowest terrace [on the rising ground behind Kerynia] and found it to surmount Cerines by about 60 paces [Reinhard has 600, evidently a misprint], that is to say the height of the campanile of S. Mark, while it is distant from the sea not more than a mile and a half. The other terraces that are immediately behind it...are higher than twice the height of the campanile of S. Mark.' Savorgnan is merely using the height of the campanile as a measure which his Venetian readers would easily recognize. That height is given as 99 metres, approximately 325 English feet, whereas 60 paces would be 330 English feet.

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The site was too cramped for anything but a small fortress, and large bodies of soldiery could not be accommodated. The climate was the best in the island, so that the enemy could encamp near it without risk to his health. Such an encampment could get plentiful supplies of timber from the neighbouring forest, and could be revictualled from the Karamanian coast. On the other hand, ships with reinforcements from Venice would find little shelter on this inhospitable shore. As to the existing fortifications, the three towers at the angles are weak; the bastion at the fourth angle is unintelligently constructed and weak (he is referring to the Venetian heart-shaped bastion at the south-west angle). The wall, had it been constructed on modern principles, that is, with more attention to ramparts than to height and thickness, would have been adequate for a large city. In fine, says Savorgnan, it would be best to destroy the fortress (rather than let it fall into the hands of the enemy) and build one elsewhere as Sebastian Venier[1] had proposed to do; he himself suggests placing a fortress to command the pass to Nicosia.

It has been justly observed[2] that such a fortress in the hills as Savorgnan demanded could have been provided by St Hilarion, which the Venetians had deliberately dismantled, and that his criticism is founded on the hypothesis of an attack from the land, whereas the strength of Kerynia itself had been proved by its history to lie in the facility with which it could be defended and revictualled from the sea. Of course the conditions had been altered by the development of artillery. Sagredo, about the same time,[3] made much less drastic but practical proposals for deepening the port, building a mole and improving the fortifications. Finally Astorre Baglione, when he visited the place shortly before the invasion, did what he could to put it into a state of defence. The walls being high, without any internal backing, he lowered them by two feet, made terrepleins within, widened the fosse in some places, and heightened the counterscarp, and brought in munitions and provisions.[4] Nevertheless Kerynia surrendered without a blow after the capture of the capital by the Turks.

[1] Venier may have made this suggestion when he was Proveditor in Cyprus in 1551; but see above, p. 766 n.

[2] Enlart, II, p. 568.

[3] Quoted by Enlart, *loc. cit.*, from a MS. (Ital. 1230) in the Bibliothèque Nationale. Not in his report as printed by Mas Latrie.

[4] Gatto, pp. 28–9.

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The fortification of Famagusta (Pls. III and XVII) had, from the beginning of direct Venetian concern in the affairs of Cyprus, been the subject of frequent recommendations to the Senate—recommendations which were in no way incompatible with disapproval of the proposal to make it the seat of government. The innumerable observations by officials on the spot preserved by the diarist Sanudo down to 1533, of which only a selection can be given here,[1] serve to supplement the information which is available from other sources, especially the actual remains.[2]

We have seen (p. 813) that in 1491 the Famagustans petitioned for master masons and skilled workmen to be sent out for working lime, and making the fosses and other constructions, with a good engineer to direct them. And as though recording the answer to this prayer the year 1492 is inscribed on the relief of the lion of St Mark above the doorway of the 'Othello Tower' of the Citadel,[3] dating the work of the Captain, Nicolas Foscarini, who began the transformation of the gothic fortress into what has been described as perhaps the finest and completest example of an enceinte that we owe to the engineers of the Renaissance.[4] Removing the upper portion of the citadel, he put in its place an artillery platform.[5] The marble sea-gate bears an inscription showing that it was completed by the Captain, Nicolas Priuli, in 1496, and another similar inscription records that he completed the Moratto bastion in the middle of the west side of the enceinte. Nevertheless those on the spot found that the necessary funds were dealt out by the government with a niggardly hand. In 1498 the Captain pointed out that he had only 286 men; it was only sixty miles to Turkey, and landing was easy. The allocation of 300 ducats a month was much too small for the work required, and even that, Troilo Malipiero complained in 1500, was not paid. There was a lack of gunners; the only competent one,

[1] Sanudo, II, 19, 128–9, 685, 1039; V, 964; X, 60, 107–10; XI, 265–6; XXI, 64-5; XXIV, 215, 237–8, 256, 258, 474; XXV, 381 (letter from Fr. Zaccaria); XXVI, 345; XXVII, 151–2, 666; XXVIII, 57, 440; XXIX, 261–3; XXX, 113; XXXI, 123–4; LI, 445 (Silv. Minio); LVI, 880; LVII, 244–5. The figures for the garrison mentioned in some of these places differ from those in the estimates analysed above.

[2] See especially Enlart, II, pp. 611–22; Jeffery, *Hist. Mon.* pp. 105–16.

[3] On the association of this tower with Shakespeare's tragedy, see Jeffery's note, *Hist. Mon.* pp. 105-6. He is however wrong in saying that Shakespeare does not mention the castle (Act II, Sc. 1: 'let us to the castle' and 'bring thou the master to the citadel'). Christopher Moro was Lieutenant 1505–7.

[4] Enlart, II, p. 611.

[5] Jeffery, *op. cit.* p. 105.

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Thomas of Brescia, had the gout. Malipiero demanded that two light galleys should be stationed there; two galleys were better than 400 men; they would protect the island from corsairs and Turks, and their crews would help with the fortifications. The Lieutenant in 1510 said that 5000 men, rather than 500, were needed. In the critical year 1517 the Captain reported that he could not defend the place, for lack of troops, gunners, munitions and fortifications. Four hundred paces on the side of the Arsenal were still unfortified, although in 1515 the Syndic for the Levant had reported that the defences were nearly complete. Of 500 ducats a month allocated by the Nicosia Treasury he had received only 680 in seven months. The stradiotes were of little use, having been long in the island, married and grown old.[1] He had only 600 infantry. But it is evident that some progress was being made, if we may judge from the impression on witnesses about this time, although, it is true, they were not military experts, but private persons like Francis Zaccaria, who wrote favourably in 1518; or the silk-merchant from Douai, James Le Saige, whose ship anchored at the port on 28 August of the same year. He writes: 'We were greatly astonished to see so strong a city. For vessels cannot come nigh by reason of the rocks, and the walls too are terribly thick, and there are fosses lined with masonry along the town. Hence you may gather that one might attack it from without, yet be unable to injure the city....In brief, it is an impregnable city if it had a sufficient garrison. But there are only 800 soldiers in the pay of the Venetians, for they have the whole land of Cyprus under them.'[2] No expert witness, evidently. Next year, again, the master of a pilgrim ship, Alvise Dolfin, described the place as inexpugnable, though the soldiers were *tristi e malcontenti*. But the experts were not satisfied. In the same year the Captain complained that, although the Council of Ten had ordered the Nicosia Treasury to pay him 1000 ducats a month (the doubling of the allocation of a few years before shows that the home government's intentions were good), he had received only 550 a month. He had done what he could, employing 250 men. A letter of 1 March 1520,[3] however, from the expert Jacometto da Novello, was encouraging; much progress had been made, so that, as far as the fortification was concerned, Famagusta was in good case; but it lacked provisions. Traces of a painted inscription with the date 1520, now vanished, indicated that the east wall of the enceinte, on the harbour side, was

[1] Cp. above, p. 775. [2] Cobham, *Exc. Cypr.* p. 57. [3] Sanudo, XXVIII, 440.

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rebuilt in this year.[1] On 4 August, Bartholomew da Mosto asks for 1000 *provvisionati* and 100 mounted arbalesters or musketeers. He could collect 2000 men from the island to defend the place in two or three days. The population (some 700) are loyal, but discontented because of the soldiers and their women billeted on them, and the knights who come in for safety. The fortifications were apparently making good progress, and when he left in 1521 he was able to describe the place as a great fortress and inexpugnable (just as in 1525 we again find it called inexpugnable and one of the strong places of the world). But, he adds, almost in the same breath, more is still required; with 5000, or at least 3000 soldiers, it would be impregnable. A weak point, the Rectors report in the same year, is that the two reefs, of the Ox and of St Catherine, could be used by the enemy for artillery emplacements. They add that the commander Jacometto da Novello and the men are very discontented, and some of them desert or die every day. Instead of reinforcing the defence, however, we find that it was decided (3 August 1520) to reduce the 1500 foot-soldiers in Cyprus to 700, dismissing all those who were married or inefficient. But the Proveditor Loredan disapproved (29 September), and held up the order; they were good men, he said, and it would mean denuding the place; so he dismissed only 90 of the weak ones, retaining 75. We have, about this time, in the record of the visit of the Count Palatine of the Rhine, Otto Heinrich, in 1521, an account of the impression made by the place on an intelligent observer. It is described as very strongly fortified and difficult to take. The Venetians maintain a garrison of seven companies of good fighting men, Germans and Italians. They employ no Greeks, since they do not trust them; a soldier or mercenary who marries a Greek woman is at once dismissed. The city is well provided with guns, powder and provisions, to last for a year and a day, and being a port can be relieved from the sea. It is fortified not only against the Turks, but perhaps even more against a King of Spain.[2] But the garrison was not kept up even to the standard of 1520. In 1528 it was decided to reduce the 700 foot-soldiers in the place to 500, or rather 400, sending out, however, 100 good arquebusiers. (This reduction was effected in 1532.) In 1529 Minio confirmed the opinion of Jacometto da Novello. In situation, walls and fosses, he says, the place is very strong. It has a circuit of 1800

[1] Jeffery, *Hist. Mon.* p. 110; *Hist. and Arch. Buildings*, no. 5, p. 42.
[2] Röhricht-Meisner, p. 379.

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paces.[1] The walls are 18, 20 and 22 feet thick, 8, 9 and 10 paces high; the fosse is 12 paces wide and the counterscarp 6 paces high. It has two gates, one on the sea, the other towards the land; fifteen great towers, very strong, the majority 35 paces each in circumference, others 30 and 22. The ravelin of the land-gate is very strong, 92 paces in circumference. The sea-castle by the harbour is 320 paces in circumference; with four great towers it commands the city, but the walls are low, the fosse small,[2] and it has no drinking water. He recommends certain improvements, which could be completed in three years. From 1491 to 1528 there had been spent on these works, in cash and materials, 178,092 ducats. Some quarters for the garrison were needed, and three or four magazines for provisions. There ought to be more guns; it is not far to Syria and Turkey. In 1532 it is with a shock that we read the opinion of the Lieutenant, Mark Antony Trevisan, and the Proveditor, Stephen Tiepolo, that the castle and the whole place are very weak. On reviewing the troops they found more than eighty with wives and children. In time of war, if the families were sent away, they would excite the compassion of husbands and fathers; if kept in the place, they would eat up the provisions. It would be well to send out 300 more foot-soldiers, unmarried, for five years, and then replace them by new drafts.

For the next thirty years, owing to the termination of Sanudo's Diary, we lack reports on the defences of Cyprus. But it must have been during the early years of this period that the most famous Italian military engineer of his time, Michael Sanmicheli, visited Cyprus, if Vasari is right in saying that after he had restored the fortress of Corfù, he 'did the same in all the places in Cyprus and Crete'. Unfortunately there is no work which can be directly connected with him, and it is unlikely that he stayed in the island for any length of time; his letters, which give full accounts of his activities in other Venetian possessions are apparently silent on Cyprus.[3] The great bastion of the Land or Limassol Gate of Famagusta bears the date 1544. The Captain to whom it is due (probably Nicolas Giustinian, though the engineer may have been John Jerome Sanmicheli, nephew of Michael) did not remove the

[1] Say 3300 yards, about the circuit of the existing walls.

[2] The wet ditch was filled in in 1880 for hygienic reasons (Report for 1880, C. 3092 (1881), p. 25).

[3] Vasari, *Vite*, ed. Milanesi, VI, p. 346. Langenskiöld, pp. 20f. He was ordered to Corfù in Oct. 1537 and went on to Crete; as he did not return to Corfù until the new year of 1539, he may have gone to Cyprus in the interval.

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ravelin, which, though much altered by the Turks, who turned it into a sort of secondary bastion, survives as an example of a form of defence which went out of favour in the sixteenth century.[1]

The impression made on the ordinary observer by the defences and garrison of Famagusta about this time may be gathered from the words of John Locke, who was there in 1553.[2]

This is a very faire strong holde, and the strongest and greatest in the Iland. The walles are faire and new, and strongly rampired with four principall bulwarkes, and between them turrions, responding one to another, these walles did the Venetians make. They have also on the haven side of it a Castle, and the haven is chained, the citie hath onely two gates, to say, one for the lande and another for the sea, they have in the town continually, be it peace or warres, 800 souldiers, and fortie and sixe gunners, besides Captaines, petie Captaines, Governour and Generall. The lande gate hath always fiftie souldiers, pikes and gunners with their harnes, watching thereat night and day. At the sea gate five and twentie, upon the walles every night doe watch fifteene men in watch houses, for every watch house five men, and in the market place 30 souldiers continually. There may no soldier serve there above 5. yeres, neither will they without friendship suffer them to depart afore 5. yeres be expired, and there may serve of all nations except Greekes. They have every pay, which is 45. dayes, 15 Mozenigos, which is 15 shillings sterling. Their horsemen have only sixe soldes Venetian a day, and provender for their horses, but they have also certaine lande therewith to plow and sowe for the maintenance of their horses, but truely I marvell how they live being so hardly fed, for all the sommer they feede onely upon chopt strawe and barley, for hey they have none, and yet they be faire, fat and serviceable. The Venetians send every two yeeres new rulers, which they call Castellani. The towne hath allowed it also two gallies continually armed and furnished.

[1] Jeffery, *Hist. Mon.* pp. 107–8; Mogabgab in *Hist. and Arch. Buildings*, New Ill. Ser. no. 5, p. 46. Much work has recently been done, under Mr Theo. Mogabgab's direction, especially in clearing out the ravelin and throwing light on its construction. See *R.D.A.C.* 1935 (Nicosia, 1936), pp. 20–2; 1936, Pt. II (Nicosia, 1939), pp. 103–4. Mogabgab holds that work was done by Italian engineers in the ravelin under Catherine Cornaro, since, though the work is Venetian, a Lusignan coat of arms has been found in the eastern postern gallery and Jerusalem crosses painted over the lintels of the western gates. Generally, he holds, the Venetians in constructing their walls followed the lines of the old defences, and built most of their bastions in front of older towers.

[2] Hakluyt, *Principall Navigations*, etc. II, i, p. 108. Cobham, *Exc. Cypr.* p. 70.

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Since the date 1544 is found inscribed on portions of the fortifications of both Famagusta and Kerynia, it seems reasonable to associate these works with the military engineer John Jerome Sanmicheli, if it is true that he was in Cyprus in that year.[1] But his main work in the island seems to have been done some fifteen years later. Meanwhile the Venetian government entrusted the Brescian Count Hercules Martinengo[2] with the task of providing fortifications for Famagusta.[3] His plan is said to have been to construct a *terreplein* behind the existing walls, and a series of cavaliers or gun-platforms high enough for the guns to command the country, and strengthen the north-west angle, which was the weakest salient, by adding a bastion in the Italian style. This was the famous Martinengo bastion,[4] which was begun but had not been completed by 1562, when it is mentioned by Ascanio Savorgnan. The bastion Mozzo was so called because it was incomplete at the time of the siege.

Further research is required before it is possible to disentangle the facts about Hercules Martinengo's work from the incompatible state-

[1] See below, p. 859, n. 1.

[2] For what follows concerning this man, reference (with due precaution) must be made to Maggiorotti, I, pp. 428, 434–5, 447, 593. He states that Martinengo's plans for the fortification of Famagusta were made in 1555 and carried out by himself; that his nephew, Count Nestor Martinengo, wrote a description of them—which he quotes without giving its source—as they were in 1558 (in the course of which he says that the *baluardo*, i.e. the Martinengo bastion, was built by his uncle Count Hercules III Martinengo when he was Proveditor-General of the island); that the great cavaliers known by the names of the Arsenal, the Camposanto, Andruzzi, etc. were initiated by Martinengo about 1560. Nestor Martinengo, according to Maggiorotti, was born in 1518; he went out as a volunteer to defend Cyprus in 1571. Unless he went out earlier, his statements about the condition of the fortifications in 1558 can have only second-hand value; but his assertion that his uncle was responsible for the Martinengo bastion must be accepted, though not necessarily in the sense that he was the engineer. If he was Proveditor-General, John Jerome Sanmicheli may have been working under his orders. He is not included in Mas Latrie's list of Proveditors-General, but that list is incomplete. We have seen that Julius Savorgnan was wrongly credited with that office, but Nestor can hardly have been wrong about his uncle. Cp. Morosini, lib. X, p. 418.

[3] One of the two wooden models in the Arsenal at Venice shows the fortifications without the Martinengo bastion; therefore, says Maggiorotti (p. 451), it is earlier than 1558. Jeffery (*Hist. Mon.* p. 116) observes that both of the models were 'restored' in 1878.

[4] Plans in Jeffery, *Hist. and Arch. Buildings*, no. 5, p. 44, and Maggiorotti, p. 447.

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ments which have come down to us concerning John Jerome Sanmicheli. This engineer-architect[1] was the favourite pupil of his uncle Michael. He may have been in Cyprus as early as 1544, for a short visit. More important was a visit in 1548, when he was engaged, probably for some six months, in drawing up plans for strengthening and rebuilding older fortresses, in Famagusta, Nicosia and Paphos. If the *loggia* of the Captain's house in Famagusta, supposed to be after his uncle's design, is rightly attributed to him, it may belong to this visit. His last visit to the island was in 1558. If Vasari's account is accurate, and (though he appears to date the mission immediately after John Jerome's marriage, five or six years too early) there is no reason to doubt what he says about the mission itself, John Jerome, who had been suddenly ordered to Cyprus to survey and report on the defences of the island, had not been there more than three months when he was carried off by fever after an

[1] Vasari, *Vite*, ed. Milanesi, VI, pp. 360–3; H. Willich in Thieme-Becker, Künstlerlexikon 29 (1935), p. 411; Baron Eric Langenskiöld, *Michele Sanmicheli* (Uppsala, 1938), pp. 166–77. I have not had access to articles by Bertoldi and Gerola referred to by these two later writers, but have to thank Baron Langenskiöld for his replies to my enquiries. He does not mention John Jerome's going to Cyprus in 1544, and I have failed to find Willich's authority for the statement that he did so. He was much employed in Venetian territory in that year. From Cigogna, *Inscr. Ven.* V, pp. 542–3, we know that in March 1548 the College debated whether to send out him or the engineer John Thomas Scala, and he was chosen. He was instructed to visit Candia on his return from Cyprus, and he did so, appearing on 6 Dec. (so that he may have had more than six months in Cyprus) and leaving for home on 3 Jan. 1549 (Gerola, *Monum. Ven. nell' isola di Creta*, I, p. 319). There seems to be no evidence for the assumption that he returned to Cyprus in 1550 or shortly afterwards, and then added the *loggia* to the palace of the Captain of Cyprus in Famagusta (Langenskiöld, p. 167; Jeffery, *Ann. Rep. of the Curator of Ancient Mon.* 1929, Nicosia, 1930, p. 5). He was at any rate at home in 1552, and married Ortensia Fracastoro, from whose side he was summoned after only eight days. Jeffery's date for the *loggia*, 1552, is based on the assumption that he was sent out to Cyprus in that year after his honeymoon with Ortensia; we only know that he was then ordered to Corfù. It is true that the story of his having been torn from his bride seems to be connected by Vasari with a mission to Cyprus, but the connexion must be wrong, since that mission, as Vasari describes it, was the one which ended with his death. But though Jeffery's date may be based on a wrong assumption, the *loggia* was certainly built in the years 1552–4, since it bears the arms of Renier, and John Renier was then Captain of Cyprus. It is hardly necessary to add that Maggiorotti's statements (pp. 430, 433) that John Jerome was sent out in 1569, that he arrived shortly before Julius Savorgnan (who actually was recalled in 1568) left, and that Julius took out with him Louis Brugnuoli, have no relation to the facts.

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illness of only six days. But he had already completed his survey,[1] and had sent in a memorandum to the Signory on the fortifications of Lemesos. His plans and other papers he entrusted on his deathbed to his brother-in-law Louis Brugnuoli, himself an architect, engaged at the time on the works of Famagusta. Brugnuoli took them back to Venice, but did not return to Cyprus, being sent to complete the fortifications of Legnago, where he died soon after.[2] As to the work at Famagusta, it has long been believed that the Martinengo bastion was designed by John Jerome. Some doubt however has recently been thrown on this view by the statement cited from Nestor Martinengo that it was built by his uncle Hercules III.[3] But Hercules was not, it would seem, an architect or engineer, but a fighting man, and we may reconcile the two views by supposing that the bastion took its name from him, and his nephew said he built it, because he ordered its construction. It was not finished in Sanmicheli's lifetime.[4]

The report of Ascanio Savorgnan—which was finished, so far as Famagusta was concerned, on 25 June 1562—gives the total circuit of the enceinte, including the sea-wall, as two miles.[5] The harbour would take about ten galleys; little could economically be done to improve it. After the usual remarks about the unhealthiness of the place owing to the swamps of Constanza, he criticizes the defences severely. The twelve old-fashioned turrets are suitable neither for offence nor for defence, and a few cannon-shots would destroy them. They are its only defence, except the Martinengo bastion, which though new and in the modern style, and very handsome,[6] is not sufficiently solid, too small and

[1] His plan of Kerynia is mentioned by Ascanio Savorgnan (Reinhard, II, Beyl. p. 36).

[2] Langenskiöld, p. 178.

[3] Cp. Morosini, II, Lib. X, p. 418.

[4] The view formerly accepted by Langenskiöld, apparently from Jeffery, that this bastion was named after Jerome Martinengo, seems to me unlikely. Why should it be named after a man, however popular, who only arrived as a corpse at Famagusta in 1570? Langenskiöld now (16 Dec. 1942) considers the suggestion made above very plausible.

[5] Reinhard, II, Beyl. p. 38. If he is using the Tuscan or Roman mile of 1487 m.= 1625 yd., his figure for the circuit of the walls is fairly near to Minio's (above, p. 856, n. 1). But both are well under the measurement (2130 paces) given by Morosini (lib. X, p. 417).

[6] 'Ricco d' attilatura di muraglia' may refer to the beauty of the construction and masonry, which, especially in the underground galleries, still excites the admiration of every observer (Plate XIX).

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situated too much within the line of the enceinte for properly enfilading the curtains. He also finds the platforms (*terrapieni*) too few,[1] the moat too narrow and the scarp too low. He all but despairs of making it into a satisfactory fortress, which should have six bastions,[2] and the larger reef of the harbour should be connected with the land. The Martinengo bastion, still incomplete, cost 50,000 ducats,[3] the six would thus cost some 300,000 ducats, and the work of connecting the reef with the town would double that cost, while the total time required would be something like sixty years, more than the enemies of Venice would be willing to allow. It has been argued that the place could be better defended from the present fortification, with its towers, by arquebusiers, who could be used in greater numbers, and who had a more rapid fire, than cannon. It is curious that so late as 1562 a school which refused to admit the superiority of cannon should have been making its voice heard. Savorgnan has no difficulty in rebutting its arguments.

Nevertheless, in spite of Savorgnan's criticisms, in 1567 the fortifications, which were a few years later to offer a creditable resistance to the Turkish besiegers, were so impressive that Famagusta was described —perhaps, as Enlart remarks, not without justice—as *omnium urbium fortissima*.[4] Further improvements were determined on at the eleventh hour by Astorre Baglione in consultation with Mark Antony Bragadin: besides increasing the stores of munitions and bringing in provisions from the Karpass and Mesarea, cavaliers were to be erected within the walls, the fosse widened and deepened, the esplanade improved, churches, houses and other obstructions in the neighbourhood levelled. What provisions could not for lack of time be collected were burnt.[5] The beautiful 'gardens' to the south were cut down, the timber brought in, and the region reduced to a sandy waste.[6]

[1] If Martinengo had begun his work of providing a terreplein along the whole length of the wall, and the cavaliers with which Maggiorotti credits him, in 1558 or even in 1560, it is strange that Savorgnan says nothing about them. Nestor Martinengo describes terrepleins along certain stretches of the walls, which is a reason for doubting the early date, 1558, ascribed to his account.

[2] The length of the walls on the land-side being about 1300 paces, and the range of the guns about 200.

[3] So the text as printed by Reinhard; the Malta text and MS. Bodley Ital. c. 11 have 54,000. But Morosini (*Hist. Ven.* lib. VIII, p. 232) puts the cost of the bastion at 120,000 ducats.

[4] Bartholomew de Salignac, *Itinerarium Ierosolym.* t. IV, ch. V, quoted by Enlart, p. 614.

[5] Gatto, pp. 29, 33.

[6] Brenzone, p. 59.

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Of the minor fortresses, St Hilarion, Buffavento and Kantara were all deliberately dismantled by the Venetians.[1] In his report of 1519,[2] Bartholomew Contarini observed of Kantara that it is two miles from the shore, and three light vessels (*fuste*) could land a force which could secure it. It is in a bad state for lack of guards, but it is important, and it would be wise to entrust its custody to the men of some villages in the neighbourhood, exempting them from other service; once lost, it would be difficult to retake. What he said about Buffavento and St Hilarion is not recorded; nor do we know whether his advice about Kantara was followed. All three castles were still occupied in 1529, when Silvester Minio reported that they were very strong places.[3] In 1562, all three were in ruins.[4] Yet Astorre Baglione, when preparing the defence of Nicosia on the eve of the Turkish invasion, sent away those who could not fight to St Hilarion and Buffavento;[5] perhaps primarily to get them out of the way, but also because the Turks would not be likely to follow them there.

The two castles on the shore at Paphos were also abandoned.[6] In 1500, though useless as fortresses, they were maintained to guard the shore.[7] In 1503 it was decided to abandon them as a measure of economy.[8] Consequently, in his report of 1519, Bartholomew Contarini does not mention the place. The towers still existed in 1529, but were without munitions.[9] The town was all ruined, with but few inhabitants.[10] The little harbour was still used for small ships,[11] and its roadstead was regarded as good.[12] Ascanio Savorgnan, after describing the existing harbour as useless, makes the somewhat surprising assertion that it could easily be made to accommodate 60 galleys, and could even

[1] Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 18; *Descr.* ff. 35b, 36.

[2] Sanudo, XXVII, 44.

[3] *Ibid.* II, 442.

[4] Sagredo, p. 556.

[5] Brenzone, p. 38.

[6] Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 6b; *Descr.* f. 16b. On Paphos see also above, Ch. I, p. 18.

[7] Sanudo, III, 1118.

[8] *Ibid.* IV, 752.

[9] *Ibid.* II, 446. Lusignan (*Descr.* f. 211) says that the castle of Paphos was destroyed by the Venetians after peace was made with the Turks (probably 1540).

[10] Sagredo in 1562 (p. 543) has a good word for the Bishop of Paphos (Peter Contarini, Hackett, p. 568); he had found his church greatly ruined and almost deserted, and was spending much on making it into a real church again; he had succeeded in making the priests serve it properly. His successor Francis Contarini, as we shall see, distinguished himself in the struggle against the Turkish invader.

[11] Sanudo himself said, in 1519, that it was of use for *navi* only, not for galleys.

[12] For *sorzador* in this sense, see Luke's note on Savorgnan's *Discrittione*, p. 15.

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be enlarged to hold more than 200. But even then, apparently, it would not be accessible to *navi*, owing to shallows and rocks for about 60 paces to seaward, where there was a depth of only 11 feet, except just at the mouth of the harbour.[1]

Lemesos was also useful for its roadstead, but in 1500 the tower, being worthless as a fortress, was only maintained to guard the shore.[2] The place is described in 1529 as ruined and little inhabited; its small castle is of old-fashioned construction. The town was sacked by the Turks in 1539, only the Latin cathedral being left standing; subsequently the greater part of the castle was destroyed by the Venetians, lest it should be useful to an invader.[3]

Salines in 1529 is also described as a mere village; the casale of Larnaka, on the other hand, about a mile from the shore, was then fairly large and populous, and increasing daily, because of the convenience of the scala; the roadstead was good. It was recommended that a strong tower should be built for the protection of the merchandise in the magazines there, which were liable to attack by corsairs.

The fortress of Sigouri was also dismantled.[4]

The reason for all this cutting down of defences was that, in view of the scantiness of their resources, it was considered by the Venetians necessary, instead of maintaining many small strongholds about the island, to concentrate in a few key points such forces as they could afford. But of these, as we have seen, Kerynia received quite inadequate attention, and was useless when the crisis came; Nicosia was not fortified when it might have been, and when the authorities did face the task, it was too late. Lemesos they had intended to fortify when they had finished Nicosia.[5] A suggestion was at one time made that a fortress (to which almost all the nobles of Nicosia should be removed) should be constructed at Akrotiri, on the lake of Lemesos, making an island of

[1] Pp. 41 f. Reinhard, 25 Luke. A possible roadstead for *navi* was at a place called *li scogli* (the Moulia Rocks) about two miles from Paphos, but too near to land, so that it was commanded by guns.

[2] Sanudo, III, 1118.

[3] Jodocus v. Meggen, *Reisebeschreibung* (1580), p. 64, gives the date 14 May 1539. Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 8b (the Venetians partly destroyed it after peace was made); *Descr.* ff. 20, 20b (burnt by the Turks in 1537, the castle destroyed by the Venetians in 1539); f. 210b (destroyed to the foundations by the Turks in 1538, the castle destroyed by the Venetians after peace was made). But much of the 14th-cent. castle has survived (Jeffery, *Hist. Mon.* pp. 368–9).

[4] Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 18; *Descr.* f. 35b.

[5] Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 8b.

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the spot by connecting the lake with the sea.[1] There was however no water supply, and Savorgnan gives other military objections to the proposal, though he would not disapprove of a fort with a few guns behind the point of C. Gata, to prevent enemy ships from lying off there.

Such was the condition of the defences of the island when they were inspected by Astorre Baglione, who was to play so great a part in the defence of the island, and Laurence Bembo, Proveditor-General in the last months of 1569. These two, starting on 3 October, toured the whole of the coast. They were both seriously ill when they returned on 9 December, and it was suspected that they had been poisoned. On 30 December the Proveditor died; but Baglione, after being at the point of death, recovered and returned to Venice.[2]

NOTE I

ON THE COMMISSIONS TO BALTHASAR TREVISAN (1489) AND JOHN CONTARINI (1538), CAPTAINS OF CYPRUS

Of these two ducal Commissions issued by Augustine Barbarigo and Andrew Gritti respectively to Captains of Cyprus, the only two which seem to have survived, the earlier was printed by Mas Latrie, from the original in the Correr Museum.[3] The second was formerly in the collection of Rawdon Brown at Venice. When Great Britain took over Cyprus in 1878, he extracted it from the volume in which it was bound up with other ducal Commissions,[4] and presented it to the Earl of Beaconsfield, having provided it with a title-page mentioning the auspicious event and the appointment of Sir Garnet Wolseley as Governor of the island. It was lot no. 424 in the sale of the remains of the Hughenden Library at Sotheby's on 23 February 1937,

[1] Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 8 b. This was perhaps the proposal which is mentioned by Foglieta (above, p. 845, n. 3) as having been rejected when it was decided to fortify the capital.

[2] The dates are given by Gatto, p. 27. Baglione sailed again from Venice in April 1570 (Sylv. Brenzone, p. 33).

[3] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 454–72. In what follows, I distinguish the first as T, the second as C.

[4] He had two such volumes which, with his other papers, are now in the Public Record Office (*Appendix to 46th Report of Deputy Keeper of Public Records*, p. 368, nos. 102–4).

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and eventually passed into my hands. It is now in the British Museum, MS. Add. no. 45,539. Mas Latrie implies (*loc. cit.* p. 471, n. 1) that he saw it in Rawdon Brown's possession, and prints inaccurate copies of two paragraphs (here 68, 69), which he rightly says are not in the Commission of 1489; but he adds the astonishing statement that the two Commissions are otherwise entirely alike. The fact is that C follows the lines of T only to a certain degree. It omits paragraphs 4 to 14, 16, 20, 21, 25, 26, 29, 36 to 41, 47, the greater part of 48, 49, 50, 61, 62, 64 to 66. It adds not only 68 and 69, but much more, the total of the additions occupying about twice as much space as that which precedes. It seems clear that Mas Latrie did not check the work of the copyist whom he employed, and who must be responsible for a good many misreadings which can be detected in his text.

At the end of C there follows in a different hand (that of Jerome Giambono, coadjutor of the Proveditors) an order[1] dated 2 August 1538 from the Proveditors 'sopra la Camera degli Imprestiti' (the Office of the Public Debt) 'to the Rector afterwards named', to supply details of certain funds for which he is responsible, failing which he will not be permitted to begin his *contumacia*, and a statement that he is to have a net salary of 6200 *librae parvorum*[2] a year. The 'Rector ultrascripto' is however not named later. He is evidently the governor of Famagusta.[3]

A full text of the two Commissions, with commentary and comparison with other commissions to Venetian colonial officers, would be rewarding, but cannot be undertaken here. The Rawdon Brown Collection contained only one other commission to an officer of an overseas possession, viz. that issued by Augustine Barbarigo to Bartholomew Minio as Captain of Candia. Minio was appointed to that office in 1500 (Sanudo, III, col. 672); the date 1480 assigned to the commission by an earlier owner of the MS. is a mistake. It offers very few contacts with T and C; I have distinguished it as M where I have cited it in what follows. I have attempted to give a précis, which I admit to be inadequate, of the majority of the paragraphs in T and C. They are numbered according to Mas Latrie's publication, as far as that goes; numbers in brackets are of paragraphs that are not repeated in C.

The drafting of the Commissions gives a poor impression of the skill or conscientiousness of the Venetian Chancellery. The inconsistency in the

[1] Similar orders may be found, for instance, in the Commissions to Bartholomew Minio as Podestà of Padua in 1507 (Rawdon Brown MS., P.R.O., no. 102, pp. 207–60) and to Alvise Minio, Captain of Capo d'Istria in 1526 (*ibid.* no. 104 (3)).

[2] The *lira di piccoli* was worth 20 *soldi di piccoli*, the ducat of account was worth 124 *soldi di piccoli*; the salary was therefore 1000 ducats of account.

[3] Above, p. 773.

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matter of *contumacia* is one example (see note on § 1); the entry concerning the payment to the Queen of Cyprus, twenty-eight years after she was dead (see note on § 23) is another. There is no sort of system or order in the arrangement of the paragraphs. Some of them are duplicated: 84 = 100, 48 = 101, 66 = (with modifications) 107. In the later document especially there is much that seems to have little to do with the office of Captain of Cyprus, e.g. the instructions about the inspection of the galleys in § 85. But it would appear that the Commission developed by degrees from special instructions to the Captain into a general manual of law and regulations with which he was expected to be familiar.

Since the law came by reason of offences, the impression given by the severe penalties imposed for infractions of it throughout is that the integrity of the average Venetian colonial official must have been a fragile thing. As we have seen, the records of actual trials bear this out. The mischievous practice of rewarding delation is another unattractive feature of the administration. This practice furnishes an ironical commentary on the praise accorded by Gaspar Contarini[1] to the system by which prosecution was in the hands of the Avogadori, and no private person could assume the role of accuser, without incurring great unpopularity as well as the odium of the accused.

The words *Dominium nostrum*, meaning the Doge with his *consiglieri di sopra* (M.L., *H.* III, p. 828) are generally rendered here by 'Signory'.

1. Appointment for two years, and until his successor arrives. To have a salary, and to be exempt from *contumacia*,[2] and may be elected Procurator of St Mark and Captain-General of the Sea during his office.

3. Salary at the rate of 3500 ducats (reduced in C to 2000 ducats), half to be held back as caution-money. Not to accept any other office, present, honour or benefice from any other source.[3]

(4) To take eight servants at his own expense, and keep eight horses,[4] a secretary and a *comilito* (aide-de-camp).

(5) Passage out and home to be paid once.

(7) The Camera to be administered by Lieutenant and Counsellors; rules for the distribution of the fines received by the Camera.

[1] *Della Republica et Magistrati di Venetia* (Aldus, 1591), p. 65.

[2] In spite of this exemption, we find him elsewhere subject to *contumacia*, as in §§ 66 (for comparison with 106 in C shows that M.L.'s *conscientia* is a misreading), 83 and 96. The Duke and Captain of Candia were similarly exempt from *contumacia*.

[3] Acceptance of presents similarly forbidden in M, § 13.

[4] § (50): a strict account to be kept of these, and refunds to be made at end of term for any of his servants or horses which have been lacking at any time. Similarly in M (§ 7).

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(8) The Viscount John Mistachiel is to continue to hold his jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases, as under the Kings, but sentences involving shedding of blood to require assent of the Rectors. Cases of *lèse-majesté* to be judged by the Rectors, with the Captain as assessor if possible. In urgent cases the Rectors to decide as expedient, consulting the Captain if convenient. Conversely in cases within the Captain's jurisdiction.

(9) Appeal from the Viscount from sentences not involving bloodshed and in civil cases to lie to the Rectors; if all three Rectors agree, their decision to be final; if only two, in cases of over 300 ducats, appeal to lie to Venice.

(12) Every care to be taken to prevent serfs being removed from the island.

(13) No master of a vessel to remove serfs from Cyprus without licence from Rectors (penalty: perpetual loss of mastership, imprisonment for a year, and a fine of 200 ducats for each serf, half the fines to go to informers). No ship to sail until it has been searched by *civitani*. Mutual arrangement with the Grand Master of Rhodes for return of serfs who have escaped to the respective islands.

(14) Farmers of estates not to make serfs work for them privately without wages; offenders to pay the serf three besants for each day he had been thus forced to work.

15. All foreigners wishing to reside at Famagusta to be provided with houses or sites and farms; provisions to be imported into Famagusta without paying duty, with certain exceptions (wine in cask, bread wholesale, and goods to be exported from Famagusta).

(16) Free transport, with provisions, to be offered to Venetian subjects from Corfù, Lepanto, Modon, Coron, etc. who will go to live at Famagusta, with three ducats for each household, and sites for houses and lands, as in § 15.

17. Persons banished from Cyprus for simple homicide may return to Famagusta, provided the crime was not committed there. A man who commits homicide in Famagusta or its territory may go to live at Paphos.

18. Persons banished from Venetian territories, except rebels, may go to live at Famagusta.

(20) The Captain to make every effort to encourage settlers in the island, giving them all possible privileges (tithes due to the Camera being reserved).

(21) The tribute to the Sultan to be paid regularly every year, and to include the largest possible quantity of camlet.

22. Farmers of estates, taxes, etc. not to be granted any grace, gift, remission or suspension of payments.

23. The decision of Francis Priuli, Captain-General of the Sea,[1] that 10 per cent of the revenue should be spent on the fortifications of Famagusta, is to

[1] See Ch. XII, p. 736.

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be maintained, without prejudice to the 3000 ducats due to be remitted to the Council of Ten and the sums due from time to time to the Queen.[1]

24. The troops complain of arrears in their pay and provisions; this is to be corrected and assignments of wheat, etc. to be made in places convenient to their stations.

27. The castellans of Kerynia and Famagusta not to leave their fortresses except by turns and on fixed days, and never to sleep outside them.

30. The Captain and all his staff strictly forbidden to engage in any trade.[2]

31. The Captain and his Counsellors to have jurisdiction in Famagusta[3] and district, except over paid troops, stradiotes and all who at present are under the 'jurisdiction of the Proveditor of the island'.[4] Local castellans and *civitani* to have civil jurisdiction over troops stationed outside the Famagusta district, with appeal to the Captain; criminal cases to be reserved to him, as also civil when he is on the spot. All troops quartered in Nicosia to be under civil and criminal jurisdiction of the Rectors.

32. The Counsellors in Famagusta to try civil cases, with appeal to Nicosia, and keep accounts of expenditure on fortifications, but the Captain to decide its allocation.

33. The districts of Sigouri (under a Captain) and the Karpass (under a Civitain) to be subordinate to Famagusta; those officers to have civil jurisdiction, with appeal to Famagusta. Taxes and dues from these districts to go to the Nicosia Camera, and the Rectors to try any cases in which it is interested.

34. The Captain to ride once during his term of office through the island inspecting fortresses, taking not more than thirty days; ten besants a day allowed for his expenses, and nothing to be exacted from the people.[5]

35. In time of war or menace thereof he may make such a progress as often as seems necessary; otherwise he is never to sleep out of Famagusta.

(41) The census (*pratico*) of the whole island to be taken by the Counsellors of Nicosia every four years.[6]

42. The Captain not to engage in any private agency or business without express mandate from the Signory (penalty 500 ducats).

[1] Though the Queen died in 1510, this provision survives in C.

[2] Similarly in M, § 11, where among the trades forbidden keeping a tavern is specified.

[3] In C this word has been struck through and (wrongly?) altered to Nicosia in another hand.

[4] When there was no Proveditor, the Captain had jurisdiction over all the troops (M.L., *H.* III, p. 849).

[5] Cp. M, § 27 (same allowance for expenses).

[6] See above, p. 769. If this important provision is omitted in C, it is because it concerned the Rectors, not the Captain directly.

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43. He is to have command over all *sopracomiti* (gentlemen-captains) and masters of ships, who are not to remove from the island any person, soldier in the pay of the Republic or any other, without express licence from the Captain or Lieutenant.

44. In view of the importance of the affairs of Cyprus, deliberations and communications thereon are to be made not by the Signory alone, or by the College, but by the Senate.

45. Careful estimate to be made annually of grain available; any surplus, after requirements of fleet and fortresses are met, may be exported, until the end of January to Venetian territory only, after that to foreign lands, provided the island and Venetian possessions are not stinted.

46. The Salines to be exploited to the utmost possible.

48. If the Captain is convicted of embezzling the funds or property of the Signory to the amount of 50 *lire di grossi* or more, or accepting from others above his legal due to the amount of 100 *lire di grossi* or more, he is to be mulcted of that amount and as much again (informers, if any, to have one-third of the fine), deprived of all offices, places in government or councils, and benefices, both in Venice and outside, and to be solemnly proclaimed in the Great Council. If anticipating conviction he makes restitution, the fine is to be reduced to the sum in question, and he is to lose his office. Lesser penalties are laid down for smaller amounts. [In C this paragraph is shortened: embezzlement to be punished by repayment of the sum and a fine of equal amount, perpetual deprivation of honour, rank, office and benefice, and proclamation every year as a thief.][1]

(50) See Note on § 4.

51. Failure to pay his *comilito* and notaries to be punished by deprivation of all office for five years, a fine of 500 *lire*, and payment of arrears.

52, 53. Nothing beyond salary and expenses to be paid to any notary, clerk or other employee.[2]

54. Mourning not to be worn for any relation except father, mother, child or wife, and that only for eight days, and no mantle.[3]

55. In handing over to his successor, he is to say only 'I consign this government to you in the name of the most illustrious Signory of Venice'; penalty for saying more or less, 500 *lire* and loss of office.[4]

56. In delivering judgement, he must say only 'As it has been written and read, so we say in sentence' [5]

[1] In this shorter form in M, § 73.

[2] Similarly in M, § 70.

[3] M, § 45 adds brothers.

[4] M, § 48 adds formula for acceptance.

[5] M, § 48 contains these articles also.

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57. On entering on office, he must make no speech nor allow any to be made to him (penalty as above).[1]

58. He is to have no commercial relations with any contractor or any soldier in the Signory's pay; penalty, deprivation of all offices, etc., for ten years, loss of right to recover from the persons concerned, fine of 200 ducats, and proclamation annually in the Great Council.[2]

59. He is not to place his coat of arms on any building put up or restored by him, only in one place on his palace, and that only in colour; penalty, 100 ducats for each offence, and all other penalties established by the Council of Ten.[3]

(61) On his return he is to present the letter consigning his office to him, and similarly, on leaving Cyprus, he is to give such a letter to his successor, declaring that he has discharged the sums due to the Camera (as caution-money for himself and staff). All the penalties for embezzlement apply to this.

(64) He is to have two Counsellors elected by the Great Council, with salary of 2200 ducats a year, on same conditions as himself, with passage money of 60 ducats each.

(65) The same for the two Counsellors of Nicosia.

(66)[4] Failure to obey any mandate from the Signory is to be punished by a fine of 200 *lire* to be paid within one month; he may excuse himself for not obeying on the ground of some danger or other cause; but unless the mandate be rescinded, he must obey.

67. He has sworn to maintain the honour and interests of the Signory, from his going out to his return.[5]

68. He is forbidden to treat concerning the surrender of himself or the place in his charge, on pain of losing his head; the same applies to the Proveditors and other Venetian nobles and soldiers; they are to beware of receiving letters or envoys from the enemy.

69. Should the city be occupied by the enemy, the Captain is to be brought to trial by the Council of Ten immediately; he is to appear before it within fifteen days, failing which he will be tried in his absence.[6]

[1] M, § 48.

[2] So M, § 84, but the deprivation only for five years.

[3] Cp. M, § 87; the coat must be simple, and not cost more than 2 ducats. This regulation was not observed by John Renier (Captain 1552–4) who placed his arms in stone on his palace at Famagusta.

[4] This is 107 in C, a good deal modified. For Mas Latrie's *conscientia* read *contumacia*.

[5] Cp. M, § 75.

[6] It is doubtful whether the voyage from Cyprus to Venice could, under the most favourable conditions, be made in so short a time.

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70, 71, 72, 75, 76 concern malefactors banished from Venetian territory, with no special reference to Cyprus.

77. A thief caught in the Captain's district is to be sent to the Rector of the place where the theft was committed.

79. By resolution of Great Council of 17 January 1506, any safe-conduct granted by Rectors to offenders banished from their districts, without licence from Great Council, or from other councils competent to grant such licence, is null and void.

80. By resolution of Council of Ten of 31 August 1506, sons of Venetian nobles born outside Venice in the Captain's jurisdiction are to be notified to the Avogadori di Comun.

81. Since, by resolution of Council of Ten of 27 April 1506, nobles who marry outside Venice must notify the Rector of the place within one month, the Captain must report such marriage, with description of rank and family of the bride, to the Avogadori di Comun.

82. Any legitimate children born to the Captain to be reported within eight days of his return to the Avogadori di Comun.

83. At the end of his term he is to put in a certificate from his successor that he has left all his accounts in order; otherwise he cannot hold any office, or vote, or begin his *contumacia*. If he has given such a certificate to his predecessor and it is found to be unwarranted, he must himself pay the whole sum of which the State has been defrauded.

85. Resolution of Senate, 16 May 1523, ordering that every two months the Captain-General of the Sea, or others deputed by him, shall inspect all the galleys of the fleet, examine their books and report on their condition; a register of their reports to be kept by the *Camera dell' armamento*. The *sopracomiti* of all galleys on their return to be strictly examined on their expenditure.

86. The Captain is not to expend, accept or give away any money due to the Arsenal, but remit it immediately to the *Camerlenghi di comun* (the officials responsible for the exaction, custody and just distribution of the revenue from taxation).

87. By decision of Council of Ten, of 17 May 1522, he may not write on affairs committed to him, or concerning the state, to anyone except the Signory (penalty 100 ducats and immediate loss of office).

88. By decision of Council of Ten, 4 August 1506, no guns to be fired on festivals or on arrival of any Rector, without express mandate and save in cases of necessity of state.

89. Decision of Great Council, 20 April 1533: if any noble, citizen or subject of Venice purchase anything which is the subject of litigation, assuming the defence as a speculation, he is to be banished for five years, and if he is a noble, citizen or advocate, shall not hold any benefice, office or

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governorship, and shall be fined 300 ducats (one third to go to the informer, one to the Avogadori di Comun or to the local Rector, and one to the Arsenal); all such purchases to be null and void, and the vendor not to be obliged to recoup the purchaser.

91. By decision of Council of Ten, 30 August 1531, all banished persons to proceed at once to their places of exile; if found in prohibited places, they can be attacked and killed with impunity, the slayer to have the same reward as if he had taken them alive.

92. By decision of Council of Ten, 20 September 1532, anyone harbouring a banished person for more than one day, or accompanying him, armed or unarmed, in prohibited places, even though a close relation, to be banished for five years from his city and territory and fifteen miles beyond, and to be fined 500 *lire di piccoli*, and so also any companion or associate; informers to have 200 *lire di piccoli* from their property, if any (otherwise, from the state). If the aforesaid convicts break their confines and are caught, they are to be imprisoned for one year and returned to banishment; captors to have 200 *lire di piccoli*.

94. Decision of Great Council, 29 March 1535: Persons have been known of late to sell the same estate twice, thrice or four times over, taking it back on lease from the purchasers; when the fraud is discovered the first purchaser alone has a right to the property. Any person found guilty of this to be imprisoned for one year, fined 300 *lire di piccoli*, and banished for seven years; if not caught, to be banished for fifteen years, and his property to be distrained on for the fine. An exact detailed register to be kept of all sales, purchases and leases of houses and estates. Order also to be taken concerning wills and property burdened with conditions, so that alienations cannot be made to the prejudice of the heirs or the purchasers lose their money; all such conditions to be recorded in a register of wills; notaries who fail to register to be banished for ever to fifteen miles beyond the borders, proscribed from their profession in Venetian territory, and fined 50 ducats.

95. Any convict banished from the Captain's district caught returning in the guise of a clerk, ecclesiastic or religious, to be imprisoned for five years and then returned to exile; his captors to have 1000 *lire* from his own property or, if it does not suffice, 500 *lire* from the state. This applies to persons condemned to death or mutilation or perpetual exile; if the sentence was for a term, they are to be imprisoned for that term or a year, and then returned to exile.

96. The bull of Pope Clement VII of 11 February 1529 against criminous clerks of the first tonsure and four orders is, by a decision of Senate of 12 April 1530, to be published every Easter by the ordinary on the requisition of the Captain; if he refuses, his revenues to be sequestrated. A certificate that the requisition has been made must be presented on the Captain's return;

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failing that, he cannot begin his *contumacia* or be passed for anything in the Great Council.

97. The Captain may not quash any condemnations or sentences passed by a predecessor, or make any compensation therefor, except with consent of Doge and Councillors, but rather see that they are carried out.[1]

104. Letters from the Signory ordering payment of a sum of money or giving credit to any person are not to be executed unless written after deliberation by the College, provided that the case is not outside the authority of the College (resolution of the Great Council, 28 June 1521).

105. Letters from the Signory or College ordering expenses to be paid to any envoy or other person not to be obeyed unless written with the approval of the Senate.

106. The Captain, if he refuse to obey a letter from two of the Avogadori, incurs a penalty of 50 ducats; remission can only be granted by five Councillors and three heads of the Quarantia; if he persists in disobedience, the Avogadori di Comun may proceed against him with such greater severity as the Quarantia approves.

108. Any secretary, coadjutor, scribe, notary or other official, who accepts a larger remuneration for his work than is customary or legal, to be perpetually deprived of his office and fined 200 *lire*, which is to go to the informer (if any), who is to be kept secret.

109. The Captain, under penalty of 500 ducats, is not to admit anyone to any ecclesiastical benefice over 200 ducats, without order from the Senate; smaller benefices may be given on letters from the Signory.

110. He is not to confer an ecclesiastical benefice on any but a citizen of Venetian territory or a Venetian, except on express mandate from the Signory; penalty 500 ducats.

111. He is not to send more than four envoys to the Signory, to the heads of the Council of Ten, or any Venetian magistrates, except on election of a Doge; penalty for granting credentials, 200 ducats.

112. By resolution of Senate, 11 June 1521, envoys from the community or from lands or districts in his charge must bring credentials from him (or they will get no hearing) and other letters enumerating the articles of their petitions, to which no article may be added unless it be similarly sent by him under seal with a letter authorizing the addition. He is to examine all such articles and in a third letter to give his opinion thereon. No matter will be dealt with unless these three letters are presented. Except they wish to make complaint against a Rector; in which case the envoys must present credentials from their own community, and their complaints in a second letter or in the same credentials.

[1] Similarly in M, § 15.

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113. By resolution of Senate, 20 July 1528, any case of plague, whether in the Captain's own jurisdiction or in any other place which he understands to be infected, must be reported to the Proveditors of Health; penalty 200 ducats.

114. He is to take up his duties within a month of the end of his predecessor's term; any further delay to be deducted from his own tenure.

115. On leaving for his post he is to present certificates that he is free from all debt[1] and take with him a letter from the Secretary to the Signory authorizing the handing over to him of his office, and his Commission, under penalty of immediate deprivation of his office and all other offices for ten years to come; his predecessor, if he hands over without such letters, in addition to other penalties, must pay to the Signory the amount of his debt, according to resolution of Senate, 15 October 1516.

116. He is to hand in to the Secretary a certificate from the governors of the revenues and three *savi* that the officials he is taking with him are free of debt; if he takes with him anyone who is in debt to the Signory, or while in office takes on such indebted officials, he will be compelled to pay the debt himself.

117. On his return he is to bring letters to the Signory and to the notary charged with the *contumacia*, stating the date of his entering on his duties, and of his handing over to his successors; otherwise he will remain in *contumacia*.

118. He and his officials are not to employ for wages any servant who is in receipt of any wage or provision from the Signory; penalty for each case, 500 *lire*.

120. He is to provide himself and his household with all necessary arms.

123. He may present to the Senate within three months of his return any recommendations he thinks fit to make for the good of the governorship he has held.[2]

124. Note that he has sworn as in § 67.

C is dated 30 July, Ind. XI, MDXXXVIII and subscribed by H[ieronymus] Murianus Secret[arius]. The same subscription is found in the British Museum MSS. Add. 14,093 and Eg. 755.

[1] See Bembo, *Hist. Vinit.* (1552), f. 166b: in 1511 the Senate, finding that, for all the legislation against them, debtors to the Commune did not pay, passed a law, which was approved by the Great Council, that all magistrates should present to the Clerks (*scrivani*) of the Republic a certificate from four government offices that they had paid. An official who signed a false certificate was liable for the whole debt; the clerk who had drawn it lost his place. One of the offices from which a signature was required was that of the three *Signori sopra il Regno di Cipri*.

[2] Similarly M, § 18, but the time limit is 15 days.

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NOTE II. THE POPULATION UNDER VENETIAN RULE (p. 787)

	1490 Cypriotes	1504 Syndic	1504 Lieutenant	1510–1521 Relatione	1523 Census	1529 Minio	1540 Attar‡	1559 Nores	1562 Sagredo	1562 Savorgnan	1570 Graziani	1600 Accidas
Nicosia	—	—	—	16,000	15,000	—	21,000	18,000	—	—	—	—
Famagusta	—	—	—	6,500	7,300	—	8,000	6,000	—	8,000	—	—
Kerynia	—	—	—	950*	800	—	950	600	—	—	—	—
Paphos	—	—	—	—	—	—	2,000		—	—	—	—
Paphos with Salines and Lemesos	—	—	—	—	2,500	—			—	—	—	—
Francomati	—	—	—	77,066	41,579	—	95,000	125,400	47,503	90,000	—	—
Serfs of Real	—	—	—	47,185	20,000	—	70,050		24,553	50,000	—	—
Serfs of Churches, Knights, etc.	—	—	—		34,000	—			59,100		—	—
Total	106,000	90,000	100,000	147,701	121,179	126,179	197,000	150,000	—	180,000	200,000	250,000
Number of Villages of the Real	—	—	—	834	280†	—	839	818	246	—	—	—
Do. of other owners	—	—	—		597	—			567	—	—	—

* Error in MS., 750.

† Error in MS., 2800.

‡ The statistics in the Leimonidas copy of Attar's Report (Κυπρ. Χρον. XIII, pp. 45–55) are as follows: number of villages, 851; total population, 159,723; Nicosia, 16,000; Famagusta, 8000; Salines, 600; Paphos, 1500; Lemesos, 600; Kerynia castle and town, 600; Francomati in villages, 60,000; Parici, 22,423. Another MS. of Attar's Report (*ibid.* p. 26) gives: number of villages and *prastii*, 834; total population, 147,701; Nicosia, 16,000; Famagusta, 6500; Kerynia, 950; Francomati, 77,066; Parici, 47,185.

For purposes of comparison, it may be mentioned that at the time of the census of 1931 the population numbered 347,959 (including the military, 151). Of these 283,721 were Christians, 64,238 Moslems. Since the British occupation in 1878 there had been an increase of 161,844. (C. H. Hart-Davis, *Report...of the Census of* 1931, Nicosia, 1932.)

NOTE III. VENETIAN COINAGE FOR CYPRUS (p. 803)

The smallest coin from Lusignan times was the *denarion*, of which forty-eight went to the besant; this coin was known to the people as *kartzia*.[1] Whatever small change remained in circulation from Lusignan times,[2] a shortage began to be felt. The Rectors reported the scarcity, and in 1515 the Council of Ten ordered the striking at the Venetian mint of 1000 ducats' worth of *denari* or *carzie*, 'similar in type to the old *carzie*', to be sent out to the Rectors, who required them for the use of the poor.[3] In 1518, the demand being unsatisfied, it was decided to strike the coins in the island,[4] and the necessary punches for making the dies were sent out. The silver alloy should be such that, calculating the cost of striking, the Republic would be neither loser nor gainer. For the present only 2000 ducats' worth were to be struck. But next year, the demand continuing unabated, a new issue of 4000 ducats' worth was ordered (12 January 1519). It seemed impossible to satisfy the demand; the Captain of Famagusta, reporting the shortage of small change, asked that 15,000 ducats' worth of these coins, which it had been decided to strike, should be sent out. At present there were only the Turkish gold sequins, which the people could not use.[5] Again, in 1526, the Rectors reported great scarcity of

[1] Or *kartza*, i.e. χαλκία or χαλκᾶ, for they were of very low silver content. See P. Lambros, Ἀνέκδοτα νομίσματα τοῦ μεσαιων. βασιλείου τῆς Κύπρου, in Sathas, Μεσ. Βιβλ. II, pp. 559–60. On the Venetian *carzia* for Cyprus, see N. Papadopoli, *Le monete di Venezia*, II (1907), pp. 99, 234, 246, 258, 482–6.

[2] Of the later Lusignan kings, Janus issued sizins and billon deniers, and James II sizins; but John II, Charlotte and Louis issued nothing smaller than the gros.

[3] 24 Oct. 1515. Papadopoli, p. 99.

[4] 29 July 1518. Letter from the Doge to the Rectors, *ibid.* Sanudo (XXVI, 152) mentions the decision of the Council of Ten on 29 Oct. 1518 to strike in Cyprus 'a certain coin called Garzia'. The plan of striking the coins in Cyprus seems to have been given up; all subsequent records indicate that they were struck in Venice.

[5] Sanudo, XXVII, 152 (11 Feb. 1519). He asks for *carzie* at two to the *tornese*. We know that the *keration* or *carat* was worth two *kartzia*; but it is generally supposed that the carat in Cyprus was not an actual coin but a money of account (Sathas, *loc. cit.*, and Dawkins on Machaeras, 84, n. 1). The use of the word *tornese* here indicates that it was represented by the *denier tournois*.—The Turkish gold coins which the Captain calls *sarafi* were the *sherīfi* or *ashrafi* of about 53 grains, of which great quantities were issued from Bayazid to Suleiman I (see Stanley Lane Poole, *Brit. Mus. Catal. of Oriental Coins*, VIII, p. xvii). It is evident, if these were the only coins available, that the attempt to stop the export of ducats had failed.

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currency; the Venetian coins in circulation had been so clipped that they had fallen to half their nominal value, and it was decided to call them in. It was asked that 1000 ducats' worth of *carzie* should be struck in Venice and sent out.[1] These *carzie* which were struck from time to time seem to have been without the Doge's name; they have been identified with little coins bearing on the obverse the lion of Cyprus, with the legend *S[ignum] de Chypre*, and on the reverse the cross of Jerusalem[2] with the legend *S[ignum] de Ieruzalem*. Not until the time of Mark Antony Trevisan (1553–4) does the issue with the Doge's name begin.[3] The coins bear the names of five Doges from Trevisan to Peter Loredan (1567–70), the last of whom also issued sizins of six *carzie*. The types of both coins are the lion of St Mark and a cross cantonned with olives or besants; on the sizins the lion is nimbed.[4]

[1] Sanudo, XII, 15–16 (2 Jan. 1526). The *mocenigo*, which was originally issued in 1475 at a value of 20 *soldi*, had owing to clipping fallen to 10, and the *marcello*, issued in 1472 at 10 *soldi*, had fallen to 5. In 1553 John Locke (Cobham, *Exc. Cypr.* p. 70) equated the *mocenigo* to one shilling sterling.

[2] The Jerusalem cross, which should strictly be potent, is here (as frequently on Cypriote coins) represented as *pattée*.

[3] 26 June 1553: the Council of Ten orders 2000 ducats' worth of *carzie* 92 carats fine to be struck at 454 to the *marca*. 18 Feb. 1555, similar order. 28 Jan. 1557, order for 5000 ducats' worth of the same quality and weight to be packed in barrels and sent to the Rectors. Further orders followed on 19 Aug. 1558 (4000 ducats) and 4 July 1559 (5000 ducats). Papadopoli, *vol. cit.* pp. 234, 246, 258.

[4] Schlumberger, p. 206. Papadopoli, II, pp. 233, 234, 246, 258, 275, 294.

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CHAPTER XIV

THE WAR OF CYPRUS

I. THE EXPEDITION OF 1570[1]

Probable as it had seemed for years that an invasion of Cyprus would be undertaken by Suleiman, to crown the glories of his reign by the expulsion of the Christians from the 'rock' which they occupied, a perpetual offence to the surrounding Moslem territories, this satisfaction was not to be his. If he listened to the overtures which were made to him by the discontented elements in the island, he took no practical steps to profit by them. Either he was too much occupied with other undertakings, or he was growing old and tired, or he feared to bring down on himself a combination of the Christian Powers. Venetian ducats or fine robes distributed by the Bailies in the proper quarters doubtless also had their effect. It can hardly have been that he was averse to break the oath which he had sworn to keep the peace with Venice 'and so stain with infamy that glory of which he had always shown himself so desirous'.[2] A general belief prevailed in Constantinople that Venice would never fight.[3] Yet for one reason or another the attack on Cyprus was postponed; not but what preparations went on actively. In 1563, M. de Petremol reported[4] that the Sultan, annoyed by the Venetian seizure of Turkish ships and the use of Cyprus harbours by Maltese pirates, had ordered his fleet to be prepared, probably for an invasion of Cyprus, to which Selim and his sons-in-law were inciting him. But Suleiman was getting old, and the prudent policy of the Signory would avert the danger. On 25 November 1564, M. de Petremol again reported[5] the collection of a great fleet, of 150 galleys and 150 great galliasses or *mahones*, not to speak of other vessels. Some thought they were intended to attack Malta, others Apulia, others

[1] For the sources for this and the next chapter, see Note on the Authorities, p. 1149.

[2] Paruta, *Hist. Vinet.*, Pt. II, p. 9.

[3] Daniel Barbarigo, in 1564 (Albèri, ser. III, vol. II, p. 21): it was believed that Venice 'tollerì ogni ingiuria per grave che sia più tosto che romper la guerra un altra volta'.

[4] Charrière, II, p. 743.

[5] Charrière, II, p. 768.

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Cyprus. For two or three years past the Sultan had been sending munitions, artillery, etc. to a certain fortified place (Fineka) which he had built on the coast opposite Cyprus.[1] Petremol felt that an expedition might start at any time, unless, as already suggested, the Sultan was prevented by his increasing years, or the prudent diplomacy of the Venetian Signory succeeded in diverting his attention. The Grand Vezir was alone opposed to such an enterprise; all the others, especially the Admiral Piale, urged it.

Dying in 1566, Suleiman was succeeded by his son, Selim II, who is said, even before he succeeded to the throne, to have openly professed his determination to take Cyprus; as early as 1550 Bernard Navagero, returned from Constantinople, warned the Senate that if Selim came to the throne, there would be war.[2] He wished to leave a name behind him, not less than his predecessors, for some great conquest. He discussed the matter frequently with renegades and exiles from Cyprus, collecting all kinds of military information. No sooner had he mounted the throne, than there was much talk in well-informed circles, such as those which were in touch with the Admiral Piale, to the effect that if a Turkish fleet were to sail next year, it would be to attack Cyprus.[3]

Selim owed his easy accession to the Grand Vezir, Mehmed Sokolli,[4] that remarkable man who retained the favour of two Sultans, Suleiman and Selim, from 1551 to 1579, when he was murdered, and was throughout that time consistently a friend of Venice. But the Sultan's most influential adviser was the Portuguese Jew, Joseph Miquez, whom immediately after his accession he had created Duke of Naxos. It was thought by some that Miquez was originally in favour of an attack on Spain in support of the Moriscos, but that he was converted by bribes

[1] Cp. Foglieta, col. 949; Graziani, p. 23; Morosini, II, p. 259.

[2] For Bernard Navagero's warning, see Manolesso, *Historia nova*, f. 6b. Mark Antony Donini, secretary to the Bailie at Constantinople, reported Selim's designs on Cyprus in 1562 (Albèri, ser. III, vol. III, p. 182). Cp. Paruta, p. 12; Foglieta, col. 947; Morosini, II, p. 230 (letter from James Soranzo, 1567). Selaniki says that Prince Selim was offended because certain goods sent to him from Egypt had been held back in Cyprus, where the ship had to shelter because of bad weather. Cp. Karachelebizade Abd al-Aziz (Κυπρ. Χρον. V, p. 45).

[3] Letter of Barbaro to the Council of Ten, 23 Nov. 1566, quoted from the *Annali* by Molmenti, *Sebastiano Veniero*, pp. 33–4.

[4] On whom see especially M. Brosch, *Geschichten aus dem Leben dreier Grosswesire*, pp. 3 ff.

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to adopt an anti-Venetian policy.[1] Whatever its origin, there is no doubt of his bitterly hostile attitude to Venice. Though the story that he excited a sottish Sultan's cupidity by plying him with Cyprus wine may be a fable,[2] he doubtless used more serious arguments, pointing out that the island was indispensable—as was indeed obvious—for the control of the eastern Mediterranean, and important as a stage for pilgrims to Mecca. Selim is said to have been so much impressed by his reasoning that he cried, in a moment of intoxication, 'if we get that island, you shall be its king'.[3]

Two men of experience in war brought their influence to bear on the side of the Duke. Lala Mustafa Pasha, whom Selim promoted from the office of Beylerbey of Damascus to be general in command of the land army, was a mortal enemy of Mehmed, having indeed narrowly escaped execution by the Sultan at his instigation. Piale Pasha, of Croat origin, had made a great reputation as a sea-captain by his crushing defeat of Medina-Celi and Doria at Los Gelves (Jerba) in 1560. He too had no love for Mehmed, who had succeeded in persuading the Sultan to subordinate him to Ali Muezzinzade.

The peace concluded on 17 February 1568 for eight years with the Emperor Maximilian II ended the Hungarian war, and Selim's hands were free for another and, as it was hoped, less arduous enterprise. Cyprus certainly seemed ready to fall, a ripe fruit, into his mouth. We have described the attempts to betray the island to the Turks which the Venetians had succeeded in crushing. But such repression did not quell the spirit which had inspired them. Reports continued to reach Venice of plots to hand over the island to the Turks (15 February 1568), of an

[1] E.g. Bizari, *Cyprium bellum*, p. 15. Ferrante Caracciolo, *I commentarii delle guerre fatte co' Turchi da D. Giovanni d'Austria* (Florence, 1681), pp. 2–3, says that the Duke's enmity was inspired by the fact that when Venice sent to confirm the peace with the Sultan he was not bribed like all the pashas.

[2] Romanin, VI, p. 272, n. 5 remarks that it is strange that the story is accepted by Hammer (*Gesch.* III, pp. 563–4). It was very generally believed; cp. Foglieta, col. 947. A reasonable discount should be allowed on Christian stories of the vices of the infidel. Another product of Cyprus which was reported to have attracted Selim was its fine falcons (Calepio, f. 93). After the Turkish conquest such as were caught were reserved for the Sultan (*O.C.* p. 368).

[3] Romanin, VI, pp. 273–4. This story was generally current, as we see from the report of the French representative, 16 October 1569 (Charrière, III, pp. 87–8 and note; Iorga, *G.O.R.* III, 141). The Duke put up in his house the arms of Cyprus with the inscription 'Joseph King of Cyprus'. Cp. Foglieta, col. 948; Hammer, *loc. cit.*

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immense mine prepared at Famagusta, to be fired at the appearance of the Turkish fleet, of soundings taken by Turkish ships in the waters of that port and elsewhere, and such suspicious happenings.[1] The Signory ordered the Lieutenant to take all necessary steps to meet the danger; but he could find no evidence of such a plot, and Mehmed Sokolli remonstrated with the Bailie at Constantinople, Mark Antony Barbaro,[2] because of the unreasonable panic which was making the Venetian merchants quit the city.

With Mehmed, perhaps, the wish was father to the thought. A man of reserved and unwarlike nature, he was the mortal enemy of the two pashas, Piale and Lala Mustafa.[3] He had no wish to give these men an opportunity of increasing their reputation and influence by a successful war. This is enough to account for his policy, without accepting the view, which some held, that he was bribed by the Bailie, and changed to the other side when that fountain dried up. He worked on the miserly instinct of the Sultan, pointing out the great expense of such an undertaking. He must also have impressed on him the economic importance of peaceful commercial relations with Venice, which the war would shatter, although it may be true that Venetian trade with Constantinople had greatly fallen off.[4] He might also, though this was perhaps too much to expect, have observed that the inefficiency of Turkish administration would considerably reduce the value of this rich and tempting prize, as indeed came to pass, and as an intelligent observer, the French agent Grantrie de Grandchamp, foresaw, when he wrote to Charles IX of the ruin which would descend on Cyprus if the Turks

[1] Morosini, II, p. 241; Romanin, VI, pp. 266–7. Cp. Calepio, f. 93 b: the year before the war 70 Turkish galleys sounded the waters of Famagusta, Salines and Lemesos. This was Ali Pasha's work.

[2] On this man's career see Ch. Yriarte, *La vie d'un patricien de Venise au* XVIe *siècle*, Paris [1884]; for his Bailieship at Constantinople, 1568–73, pp. 138–86.

[3] For the course of affairs to the final breach with Venice, see especially Mark Antony Barbaro's two reports of 1573 (Albèri, ser. III, vol. I, pp. 324–5, and Appendix, pp. 390–5); Calepio, f. 93 b; Contarini, f. 2 b; Paruta, pp. 17–18; Foglieta, cols. 952–6; Graziani, pp. 18 ff. Some of the historians put into the mouths of Mehmed and Mustafa long speeches which are probably rhetorical exercises; so especially Foglieta. See also Romanin, VI, p. 270; Herre, pp. 11–15.

[4] Manfroni (*Storia della Marina Italiana*, p. 454) cites the report of Cavalli (Albèri, ser. III, vol. I, pp. 274–5, 1560): the trade of Venice had shrunk to small proportions; she sent no more than 280,000 ducats' worth of products a year to Constantinople, where there were only ten or a dozen Venetian mercantile houses; they used Jews as their agents.

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took it; witness Chios, which used to return a revenue of 70,000 to 80,000 crowns to its Seigneurs, but was now so ruined and deserted as to be nothing but an expense.[1] But few Turks of that day, least of all the Sultan, could have had the wit to look so far ahead. Piale, supported by the Duke of Naxos, induced Selim to resolve on the enterprise in 1568, and he was actually appointed to the command of the fleet, and made ready to sail. But Mehmed was able to withhold the necessary supplies,[2] and by other means procured the temporary dismissal of Piale, and only Ali Pasha was allowed to sail. Mehmed thought he was safe with Ali, who owed him his promotion from Agha of Janissaries to the rank of Admiral. But when Ali went to Cyprus and reconnoitred Famagusta and other ports, he was impressed by the apparent ease of invading the island. On his return he deserted Mehmed and got into touch with Piale and Mustafa. Mehmed's enemies now won over other old naval officers, affirming that Venice would never fight for Cyprus. The Grand Vezir was overborne by the war-party. But he still did his best to divert attention in the direction of Spain.

Venice had, as was customary, on Selim's accession concluded a fresh treaty of peace with him.[3] Any scruples which he may have entertained on this account were removed by the Mufti Abu Sa'ud el-Amadi, who persuaded him that the funds required for the mosque with its adjoining accommodation for pilgrims which he was building at Adrianople should be provided by infidels, and not by the faithful; until he had achieved some conquest he was not entitled to erect such a monument. The Mufti's *fetva* declared that, when in a country formerly possessed by Islam the infidels have changed the mosques into churches and oppressed the faithful, the Moslem ruler, if he wishes to recover it, is not bound by any treaty of peace; such a treaty, if it is not in the interests of Islam, is not sanctioned by the law and may be broken when

[1] 3 Oct. 1569. Charrière, III, p. 87.

[2] It is probable that Mehmed deliberately obstructed the preparations, not only now but later. In his despatch of 9 July 1569 Barbaro says that it is incredible how lacking in all necessaries the Turkish arsenal is (Brosch, p. 9).

[3] 24 June 1567. Dumont, *Corps diplomatique*, V, pt. i (1737), p. 140, no. 76. Included in the treaty was an article obliging Venice to deliver up to the Sultan all refugees, rebels or revolutionaries his subjects who sought asylum in Cyprus, and to suppress all piracy on the coasts of Syria and Asia Minor based on Cyprus. The papal nuncio said that the treaty cost Venice some 150,000 ducats and, since it was impossible to hand over all offenders, an unending series of gifts of money was required to meet the Turkish complaints. Serrano, *Liga de Lepanto*, I, p. 40.

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necessary. The Sultan thus claimed Cyprus as having been formerly possessed by the Arabs and by the Sultans of Egypt, who had devoted its revenues to Mecca and Medina, and it was now his duty to recover them for these sacred places.[1]

Barbaro, while these discussions were going on, kept himself well informed of their tenor, and passed this information on to the Signory, as well as all that he discovered of the warlike preparations which, in spite of the precautions which were being taken to keep them secret, he knew well were intended against Cyprus—the building of a large fleet at Lajazzo and elsewhere, the orders to the army to assemble in Karamania, and the like.[2] At the same time he pretended to the Turk that he did not believe that the Sultan would commit the outrage of an unprovoked breach with Venice.[3] Eventually, when the Grand Vezir told him that the decision in favour of war was definite, he protested, with the result that Mehmed agreed to send an envoy to treat. That was the origin of Kubad's mission, which will be described later.

In spite of all the warnings it received, the Senate was divided in mind; it seemed unwise to provoke the Sultan, but to neglect precautions were folly. The perplexity of the government was increased by the famine from which all Italy suffered in 1569, and in particular by the terrifying explosion which occurred in the Arsenal on the night of 13–14 September. But the reports of the damage to the fleet were greatly exaggerated; although four churches and a great area of the neighbourhood were laid in ruins, only four galleys were completely destroyed. That the fire was due to some agent of the Duke of Naxos or other persons in Turkish pay was a natural suspicion.[4] That the Sultan was

[1] The *fetva* is given by Pechevi; Mouradja d'Ohsson, *Tableau général de l'Empire Ottoman*, v (1824), pp. 73–4; Hammer, *Gesch.* III, pp. 566–7. Cp. Paruta, p. 12.

[2] Paruta, pp. 23–4.

[3] We may believe Barbaro on this matter, rather than Calepio (f. 93b), who says that he was really deceived until the Grand Vezir told him that the Sultan expected Venice to hand over 'that rock Cyprus', and that he was to blame for not having given warning earlier to his government. Sereno is also doubtless wrong when he says (p. 32) that although Barbaro could not fail to notice the great preparations for war he was deceived by the coming of the embassy from the Moriscos into supposing Spain to be the objective.

[4] Cp. Graziani, p. 33. Sereno (p. 16) says that the Duke was suspected of having employed Jewish agents; but that was doubtless an inference from his being himself a Jew. For other references see Balan, VII, p. 41, n. 1. I have not been able to consult Tosi, *Dell' incendio dell' arsenale di Venezia* (Florence, 1906).

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encouraged by the difficulties in which, as the Duke impressed on him, the Republic found itself, may be taken as certain.[1]

It was not difficult for the Sultan, in the state of tension which prevailed, to pick a quarrel with Venice. Such offences as the failure of the Venetian navy to deal with the so-called Uskoks,[2] the harbouring in Cyprus of corsairs[3] who infested the Syrian seas and interfered with commerce and the pilgrim-traffic to Mecca, encroachment over the frontier in Dalmatia, the execution of Moslem corsairs captured by Venetian ships (who ought, in accordance with treaty, to have been returned to the Turkish authorities), and the like, absolved him from the oath which he had sworn in 1567, as the Turkish lawyers explained to the Venetian Bailie.[4] On Barbaro's admitting that the distance of Cyprus from Venice was about 2000 miles, 'what', he was asked by the Grand Vezir (who was no enemy to Venice), 'do you want with an island so far off that it is useless to you and is the cause of such disorders? Leave it to us, who have so many provinces neighbouring it. And in any case the Sultan is determined to have it.' The island, it was asserted, had been possessed by the Sultans of Egypt, and Venice had only owned it for about a hundred years, and Barbaro's reply that the Moslems had never owned it, that it had always been a Christian island, and as such had been inherited by the Signory, carried no conviction to minds which were already made up.

On 16 January 1570 the French agent Claude du Bourg de Guérines arrived in Venice from Constantinople, bringing with him one Mahmud, second secretary and interpreter of the Sultan, charged with a mission to the King of France, but also, it would seem, accredited to the Signory.[5] They had left Constantinople on 1 November preceding;

[1] Calepio, f. 93.

[2] From Serbo-Croat *uskok*, 'deserter'. Originally escaped Turkish subjects, carrying on guerrilla warfare on the Austro-Hungarian border, at this time they had been reinforced by banished Venetians and other Italian adventurers, and infested the whole Adriatic, attacking Turks and Christians indifferently. Their base was Segna (Senj) on the Morlacca Channel. See *Encicl. Ital. s.v.* Uscochi, and cp. Rebecca West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*, I, pp. 125–9.

[3] See Petremol's report, above, p. 878. Pechevi also gives the attacks by Cypriote pirates on ships sailing to Egypt as a grievance against Venice.

[4] Letter of 31 Jan. 1570 in Romanin, VI, pp. 275–6.

[5] On Claude du Bourg's mischievous activities, and the whole episode of Mahmud's mission, see the documents and notes in Charrière, III, pp. 63–106. Paruta, pp. 42–3, says that Mahmud's credentials were to the Signory, but his object was to get into

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the Venetian Captain of the Gulf had met them at Ragusa and brought them on. The Sultan hoped to have French assistance in case he sent his fleet to the aid of the Moriscos in Spain, when it would be convenient for his ships to winter at Toulon. In any case, even if the alleged demand for the use of Toulon was only a manœuvre intended to intimidate the other side,[1] Mahmud's mission was without doubt to arrange for some kind of Franco-Turkish offensive. That such a mission should be received by the French King, who was anxious to keep on good terms with Venice, Rome and Spain in his struggle with the Huguenots, at the very moment when Turkey was about to go to war with just those three Powers, would be in the highest degree embarrassing, and Charles IX hastened to disavow Claude du Bourg and to forbid him to bring the unwelcome visitor to the French court.

While, therefore, du Bourg proceeded alone to France, the Turkish envoy remained at Venice. Though he was accredited to the Signory, events had moved quickly since his dispatch, and the relations between Venice and Constantinople had changed radically. Venetians had been arrested by the Sultan's orders; was this Turk, who was probably a spy, to be allowed liberty of movement? He was taken into custody. The French ambassador, Arnold Duferier, mildly protested,[2] but the Senate (4 April 1570) declined to release the prisoner. He was eventually removed to Verona, where he was confined until the end of the war.[3]

The news had reached Venice that Venetian merchants in Constantinople had been arrested, and that on 13 January two Venetian ships, the *Bonalda* and the *Balba*, had been seized, the channels blocked, and all other Venetian ships also detained.[4] In reprisal for the arrest of the Venetians, all the Turks, Jews, Levantines and others, subjects of the Sultan, were thrown into prison in Venice and their property

touch with the French ambassador, who, being uncertain of the French King's intentions, refused to allow him to proceed to France. Romanin (VI, p. 288) wrongly dates Mahmud's mission after that of Kubad. Hammer (*Gesch.* III, p. 567) was not aware of the real nature of Mahmud's mission, and thought he came merely to make a protest to the Doge.

[1] As Herre (p. 25) believes.

[2] 'Ne fece un modesto risentimento.' Paruta, p. 42.

[3] Yriarte, p. 153.

[4] Calepio, f. 94; Contarini, f. 3b. At the same time the Sultan ordered his sanjaks and cavalry commanders in Dalmatia to attack the Venetians; one of them with 3000 men attempted to take Dulcigno, but did not persevere. Sereno, p. 35. Morosini (*Hist. Ven.* II, p. 260) calls the second ship *Barbara*, and says that another of the same name was seized at Alexandria.

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confiscated.[1] The Mufti, who by this time was working with Mehmed Sokolli for a peaceful solution, interfered to prevent the ill-treatment of the arrested Venetian merchants, and eventually the Signory followed this good example, releasing all the Turks except Mahmud.[2]

The Grand Vezir, as we have already said, agreed to send to Venice to treat for terms. At this time he was, it seems, still urging, as he had urged to Barbaro's predecessor Victor Bragadin and to James Soranzo, that Venice might save Cyprus by handing over one or two unimportant places on the Dalmatian border, and agreeing to an increase in the tribute[3] or the payment of a large sum down. There is no reason to assume that he was insincere, and was merely seeking to allay the suspicions of the Republic.[4] But he was not all-powerful.

Meanwhile Pius V, well informed of the dangerous situation, was doing his best, through his nuncio, Antony Facchinetti, the future Innocent IX, to induce the Signory to unite with Spain against the common enemy of Christendom.[5] The deep suspicion with which both parties regarded each other made the nuncio's task difficult. On 22 February he reported that the Signory disliked the idea of a league, which might bind it to protect the possessions of Spain when the Turks were attacking those possessions, and not its own. Three days later he

[1] 6 March 1570. Romanin, VI, p. 279.

[2] Despatch of Barbaro, 16 Dec. 1570, cited by Brosch, p. 12. Cp. Morosini, II, p. 354. Later, of course, the declaration of war altered the situation, and steps had to be taken to frustrate possible action by secret agents of the enemy, as when on 30 June 1570 an emissary carrying letters from the Duke of Naxos was arrested (Romanin, VI, p. 279).

[3] According to Sereno (p. 35) and Foglieta (col. 958) this suggestion came from the Bailie.

[4] Despatch of Barbaro, 31 Jan. 1570, cited by Brosch, p. 8. Iorga (*G.O.R.* III, pp. 142–3), misunderstanding Brosch and weaving a tissue of blunders, says that the proposal was to raise the tribute from 3000 to 4000 ducats (what Brosch says is 'by 3000 or 4000 ducats') and that Cyprus and Zante in 1558 between them paid 8000 ducats. 8000 ducats is, it is true, the figure given by Dominic Trevisan, ex-Bailie of Constantinople, in his report at the end of 1554 (Albèri, ser. III, vol. I, p. 150) for the joint tribute of Cyprus and Zante, but this is evidently a mistake for 8500, for we know that the tribute for Cyprus had long stood at 8000, while that for Zante was 500 (see above, p. 834, n. 1). By the treaty concluded after the war, the Zante tribute was raised from 500 to 1500 ducats (Albèri, *ibid.* p. 388 n.). There was of course no question at that date of any tribute for Cyprus, as Iorga seems to imply.

[5] Facchinetti's reports to the Pope, published by D. M. Valensise, *Il vescovo di Nicastro poi Papa Innocenzio IX e la liga contro il Turco* (Nicastro, 1898), are only accessible to me as cited by Pastor (XVIII, pp. 364 f.).

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says that the Signory wants from the Pope not a league but money, men, munitions and provisions; it cherishes the delusion that when the Turk sees its military preparations he will leave its possessions in the Levant alone. But the Pope declined to assist Venice unless it would join the league; and on 8 March Facchinetti reported that the Venetians, since war seemed inevitable, were now willing to enter the league, and he recommended that the Pope should tie them down to this resolution.

The Venetian Senate, as we have said, was by no means unanimous in the face of the Turkish menace.[1] There was a peace-party which would have ceded Cyprus in consideration of compensation in Albania and Dalmatia and commercial privileges. Or the Sultan and the pashas might be bought off with large sums of money. But the war-party was in the majority.

On 11 February 1570[2] a Turkish *chawush* or envoy called Kubad was despatched to Venice. The Bailie sent with him his young son Louis, to get him out of the way of danger, and also his secretary Louis Buonrizzo, ostensibly for the security of the envoy during the journey, and to lend more importance to the mission, but really, as he afterwards explained in his report of 1573, to convey the latest information to the Signory.[3] It was known, even before the envoy started, that he was being sent not to negotiate but to present an ultimatum. For the French ambassador at Constantinople, writing on 9 February, speaks of the demand which the Grand Turk is sending to the Signory to cede him Cyprus 'ou de gré ou de force'.[4] What is more, the warnings which the Bailie had been sending left the College in no doubt as to what to expect, and the general sense of the reply which was to be given had already been determined before Kubad arrived.[5] There was some

[1] The discussions are well summarized by Serrano, *Liga*, I, pp. 42–5.

[2] Contarini, f. 4; Calepio, f. 94; Manolesso, f. 19b. Graziani (p. 40) wrongly supposes the envoy to have been the interpreter Ibrahim. The envoy is usually called by the western writers *Cubat Chiaus*. Bosio (III, p. 848) who says that he started on 4 Feb., calls him Cubat Paruana. It was not his first visit to Venice (Morosini, II, pp. 233–4).

[3] Cp. Paruta, p. 45. Buonrizzo also carried a despatch of 9 Feb. 1570 from the French ambassador Grantrie de Grandchamp to Paul de Foix, his colleague at Venice. Charrière, III, p. 103.

[4] Charrière, III, p. 102.

[5] Paruta, pp. 47 f.; Longo, p. 14. It was thought undesirable that Kubad should stay long in Venice, to spy out the preparations for war which were being made, and to awake suspicion in the minds of other rulers that negotiations with the Turk were in hand.

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discussion as to how he should be received, whether it should be in secret, or whether he should not be admitted to Venice at all but sent back, or whether he should be formally received, but his ultimatum rejected unconditionally. The last procedure was adopted.[1] The Senate made up its mind not to yield, and its warlike temper was illustrated, even before Kubad was heard, by the fact that, in the procession of the Doge to the Church of St Zacharias, a red banner was carried in front instead of a white one.[2]

The party travelling overland was met at Ragusa (which it reached on 4 March) by Angelo Suriano, who had been despatched with a galley to bring it to Venice. There Kubad was not allowed to land or hold communication with anyone until, with Buonrizzo and two interpreters, he was conducted privately to the College. On 28 March he presented to that body a formal demand for the cession of Cyprus.[3] He set forth the grievances of the Sultan, which have already been mentioned, and alleged that the island was an appanage of Mecca and a former Moslem possession. If his words are correctly reported, and if the Grand Vezir's instructions to try and bring about an agreement were not overridden by orders from a higher authority,[4] he went a strange way about it, for this is the language which he is reported to have used:

> Selim, Ottoman Sultan, Emperor of the Turks, Lord of Lords, King of Kings, Shadow of God, Lord of the Earthly Paradise and of Jerusalem, to the Signory of Venice: We demand of you Cyprus, which you shall give us willingly or perforce; and do you not irritate our horrible sword, for we shall wage most cruel war against you everywhere; nor let you trust in your treasure, for we shall cause it suddenly to run away from you like a torrent; beware to irritate us.[5]

[1] Pastor, XVIII, p. 366.

[2] Sereno, p. 37. Six banners were carried in such processions; in peace, the white went first, in truce the blue, in war the red. Hieron. Giustiniani, *Hist. of Chios*, ed. Argenti, p. 370.

[3] Romanin, VI, pp. 276–7. Contarini is out in his date for the arrival of Kubad in Venice 'nel principio d'Aprile'. So too Bosio, III, p. 848. The latter (p. 849) makes him put the point that, the Sultan being the direct lord of Cyprus, the Venetians had only the *utile dominium*, which they had forfeited by fortifying Nicosia without the Sultan's leave, and by the other offences already mentioned.

[4] Kubad's explanation of the Grand Vezir's personal feeling in the matter (see below) indicates that this was the case.

[5] I have translated from a 16th-cent. copy in the Rawdon Brown MS., P.R.O., G. and D. 25/4. Cp. Gatto, p. 28; Daru, IV, p. 104, n. 2; Zinkeisen, II, pp. 925–6;

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Kubad having been heard, the College now debated on the exact form which the reply should take, and referred its proposal to the *savi grandi* and *savi di terra firma*, who placed it before the Senate. A similar despatch was prepared to be sent to the Grand Vezir. The majorities in the Senate approving the form of the reply were overwhelming.[1]

The Signory could not believe, it said, that the Sultan would have so lightly broken the oath which he had so recently sworn. As Venice was in justice the mistress of Cyprus, so she would, by the grace of Jesus Christ, have courage to defend it. That was the reply which the Signory proposed to send to the letters of the Sultan and the Grand Vezir.

The envoy, asking and receiving permission to speak freely, explained that the Grand Vezir[2] was the friend of the Signory, and, whatever preparations the Sultan might make, would do his best to restore peace. The suggestion was met with silence. To his final statement that the Sanjakbey of Herzegovina had his orders not to make any move until he had returned to Constantinople, it was replied that the Turks on the Dalmatian border did not cease to murder, plunder, and do their worst.[3]

Albèri, ser. III, vol. I, p. 340 n.; Quarti, p. 11, n. 1. Sereno gives the challenge as coming from the Pashas (p. 39). M. Crusius (*Turcograecia*, Basil. 1586, lib. IV, pp. 344–5) prints from a MS. entitled 'Letter which the Sultan Selim the Turk sent to the Venetian Signory', a letter conveying the same challenge and threats at much greater length; one or two of the phrases in the version given above recur in it. From Crusius it has been copied by Miklosich and Mueller, *Acta et Dipl. Graeca*, III, p. 366, and Sathas, Τουρκοκρατουμένη Ἑλλάς, pp. 130–1; from Sathas by Sakellarios and Zannetos. I do not pretend to judge whether it is authentic. Crusius notes that on 15 April 1570 Samuel Budina wrote to him from Laibach: 'The Venetians are preparing a great fleet against the Turk, who has declared war against them by his envoy more or less in these words, that he wishes for Cyprus *per amor ouer per forza*. Let them do what they wish. For he has decided for a surety that he will drain their immense treasure like a torrent.' Evidently the same version as above.

[1] Yriarte, pp. 152–3. In the voting on the first, there were 199 ayes, 5 noes, 16 neutral; on the second, 202 ayes, 4 noes, 10 neutral. An unprecedented majority, according to Morosini, II, pp. 282–3.

[2] Sereno (pp. 39–40) gives the gist of a letter from Mehmed, who writing as a good friend of the Signory regrets that his efforts have not borne the desired fruit, but hopes that Venice will not, for the sake of a mere rock, make an enemy of the Grand Signor. Until the return of the Chiaus no harm shall be done to any Venetians.

[3] According to Paruta (pp. 46, 56) there was an actual armistice until Kubad got as far as Ragusa on his way home. In March, however, Bernard Malipiero, Proveditor of Cavalry in Dalmatia, a brave but imprudent officer, was wounded in a skirmish and brought back to die in Zara (Contarini, f. 5). Fabio Canale was appointed in his place on 14 March.

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Kubad was then dismissed by a back door, to avoid the attentions of an exasperated mob, and conducted to his galley.[1]

The papal nuncio Facchinetti[2] was summoned and informed of the reply which had been given to the Turkish envoy. He encouraged the Signory in its determination, saying that, although he had never exhorted it to break with the Turks, now that they have chosen to violate the peace out of sheer perfidy, since they have no faith or religion and never keep an oath, he urged it to make, with speed and with good courage, all necessary provision for this war. He could promise that it would not fight alone, but would have the aid of God and of all the Christian princes. Should another envoy come with some peace offer, it would be only a device to put the Signory's fears to sleep, slow down its preparations, and sow mistrust of it in the minds of other Powers. Nor let anyone who had stocks of merchandise or capital in Turkish lands be moved thereby, for even if the Sultan promised to restore them he would not do so, since he never keeps a promise or an oath, and never misses an occasion of offence.

Jerome Grimani, following, expressed his confidence that the Republic was ready to sacrifice everything to defend itself under the standard of Christ, even though it were abandoned by all, and that none of those who had capital or sons in the enemy's country would falter. 'I am one', said John Mocenigo, 'of those, since I have a large capital and one of my sons in Turkish lands, and I am of the same steady purpose as these other gentlemen, and will do as they, even though I must lose all the rest of my possessions and all my other sons.'[3]

In spite of these gallant words, it is probable that even at this moment Venetian prudence would have found a way of avoiding war, had it not been for the confidence expressed by the papal nuncio, and indeed generally felt, that the Christian Powers would rally to the side of the

[1] According to Sereno (p. 40) he asked to be let out by a back door but was told he had nothing to fear and was taken back to the galley by the way he had come. Manolesso (f. 21) says that he was sent to Caorle, sixty miles away, to await the Signory's reply.

[2] His speech and those which followed, in Romanin, VI, pp. 277–9. Herre (p. 21, n. 1) thinks they have probably been written up in the Livian manner.

[3] The seizure of Venetian property by the Sultan did as a matter of fact occasion a financial crisis. Thus the bankers Mark Dolfin and Sons failed for 800,000 ducats: Manolesso, f. 21. According to Natale Conti (p. 448) they were harshly punished, being thrown into prison, and the family degraded from its noble rank; if they failed to meet their debts within a certain time, they were to be imprisoned for life.

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Republic and enable it to hold Cyprus. Such a combination, as we know, was only effected after intolerable delays, when it was too late. There was in fact, as we have seen, a section of the Senate which counselled moderation. And when later the Doge Peter Loredan died, it was whispered that he had been poisoned, because he had urged giving up Cyprus to the Turks rather than breaking with them. Men wondered at the harshness of his punishment, but commended the prudence which dictated it, says a contemporary.[1]

The Mufti, as we have seen, had sided with the war-party. But while Kubad was away on his mission, the Bailie, as he himself reports,[2] used his good offices to persuade Abu Sa'ud to hold the door open for further negotiation. Knowing that Mehmed Sokolli was similarly inclined, the Mufti agreed, and approached the Sultan. Without contradicting his previously expressed opinion, he added that the Sultan was in duty bound to go to the assistance of the Moriscos in Spain. They were hard pressed by King Philip and, when they sent a deputation to Constantinople in the spring of 1569, a great wave of sympathy spread through the devout Moslem population, and the opinion that they ought to be succoured was strongly voiced by the ulema. But Selim would not listen. Barbaro, it is true, was assured that when Kubad returned agreement was likely to be reached, for it was hoped that the reply would be such that, when it was reinforced by Mehmed's inclination to peace, the Sultan might be brought round. But the uncompromising reply from the Signory wrecked all those hopes. Barbaro did not disguise his opinion that the College had acted rashly, and ought to have negotiated.

Kubad returned to Constantinople on 5 May 1570.[3] Selim was indignant at the unceremonious reception of his envoy;[4] nor had the Signory thought fit to send a representative of rank to convey its reply to his ultimatum, or to allow Buonrizzo to return, as had been stipulated.

[1] Sereno (pp. 37, 48), saying that this report of poison was universally believed, adds that this deed 'non meno di prudenza fu commendato che per severità ammirato'. Loredan was unpopular, the ignorant populace, after its wont, blaming him for the bad times and the dearth from which Venice was suffering; he was buried with almost no ceremony (Natale Conti, p. 449).

[2] Albèri, ser. III, vol. I, pp. 324–5. Cp. Foglieta, cols. 950–1.

[3] Contarini, f. 5b. Mistranslated by Stupanus, who has 'pridie Idus Maij', which would be 14 May.

[4] But, according to Barbaro (Albèri, Appendix, p. 394) Kubad did not complain of improper treatment; he reported that he had been treated 'moderatamente'.

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Guards were placed at the house of the Bailie,[1] and the consuls at Aleppo and Cairo were similarly confined, though all were afterwards released on parole.[2]

But Selim had not waited for Kubad's return to take military and naval measures. The fifth Vezir, Lala Mustafa Pasha, was to be serdar or commander-in-chief of the land forces, which were to be sent across by land to the south coast of Anatolia. Piale, the third Vezir, was to be Captain-General of the fleet, although under him the Kapudan Pasha Ali was entrusted with the special command of the crews and the direction of the voyage.[3] Already before the end of March, about the time when Kubad was arriving at Venice, Murad Reis had sailed for Rhodes with twenty-five galleys, to bar the way to any Venetian fleet that might be sent to the succour of Cyprus.[4] He did meet the two ships conveying Martinengo's force, but was beaten off with considerable loss.

Selim's enthusiasm for the plan that he should take the field in person, if it was ever more than momentary, faded when the reality had to be faced. Mehmed Sokolli was against his doing so, for it would have meant that, in accordance with Ottoman practice,[5] the whole government and army, including himself, would have to accompany the Sultan, and the defences of Bosnia, Albania and Greece would accordingly be weakened. The Sultan's presence in the field would have been embarrassing to Mustafa Pasha.[6] For once the two Pashas were agreed in being glad that Selim decided to stay at home.

On 17 April Piale sailed from Constantinople with eighty galleys and thirty galliots.[7] A month later, on 16 May, more ships followed

[1] He was not under close arrest, and managed to communicate with his government. In fact, after the fall of Nicosia, it was through him that the Signory negotiated (though fruitlessly) with the Sultan. Yriarte, pp. 157–8; Molmenti, *Sebastiano Veniero*, pp. 35–6. This was evidently due to the good offices of Mehmed and the Mufti; but Barbaro's bribery of some of his jailers contributed.

[2] Contarini, f. 5b; Paruta, p. 57. Vincent Alessandri, who was with the Bailie learning Turkish, managed to escape to Venice with useful information.

[3] Paruta, p. 77; Foglieta, col. 963.

[4] Contarini, f. 4b; Paruta, pp. 57–8.

[5] Cp. A. H. Lybyer, *Gov. of the Ottoman Empire* (1913), p. 90.

[6] Paruta, p. 76.

[7] Contarini, f. 5b; Calepio, f. 97b. He had started before, but had had to return to refit after encountering a little rough weather, for his ships were wretchedly found. Barbaro's despatch of 14/15 April, cited by Brosch, p. 9. Cp. Charrière, III, p. 131: Piale sailed with 80 galleys so badly equipped 'et avec tant d'effroi', that had the Venetian fleet, instead of staying at Zara, proceeded to Negroponte, it would either have defeated Piale or forced him to retire without loss of time.

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under the Kapudan Pasha Ali, laden with artillery, munitions, and other requisites for a land campaign, in the charge of Mustafa Pasha,[1] who seems therefore not to have led the land army across Anatolia.[2] Piale meanwhile had been cruising in the Aegean. He attacked the island fortress of Tenos, which he besieged in vain for ten days;[3] its gallant defence by Jerome Paruta cost him many out of the 8000 men who laid waste the island. Then, after pitching and revictualling his ships at Negroponte, he sailed on 28 May for Rhodes, which was reached by the combined fleets on 1 June.[4] All the best naval experience that the Turks could command was collected here, except that Uluj-Ali (Ochiali), the renegade corsair, was absent, operating in Sicilian waters,[5] and doubtless increasing King Philip's reluctance to spare ships for the expedition to the Levant. At Rhodes it was learned that the Venetian fleet was immobilized at Zara by sickness and other difficulties, and that there was no sign of any of the allies. It was therefore considered safe to proceed to the invasion of Cyprus,[6] and after a delay of only three days at Rhodes the fleet sailed for Fineka on the Anatolian coast, where the cavalry, Janissaries and munitions which were coming overland were

[1] Contarini, *loc. cit.* Mustafa's secretary confirms this date. Selaniki does not mention Piale's false start, but first describes his fleet as numbering 84 katerga and bastardas 'and the sea is full of the ships of the privateers'; then he says that on 26 April the fleet left Beshiktash and paraded before the Serail; twenty days later (i.e. about 15 May) Mustafa Pasha left with the army and fleet of 124 warships etc. Hajji Khalfa gives the second decade of Zu'l-hijja (16–25 May). Pechevi's date for the sailing (3 Aug.) is hopelessly out. In Calepio's dates for his sailing from Constantinople (16 March) and leaving Negroponte (28 March), 'Marzio' must be a mistake for 'Maggio'. Other variants for the numbers of the contingents are given from Turkish sources by Alasya, p. 28.

[2] As, to judge from Selaniki, the Beylerbeys under his command did.

[3] Paruta (pp. 78–80) places the attack on Tenos after the call at Negroponte, which does not fit the dates supplied by other sources (28 May for leaving Negroponte, 1 June for arrival at Rhodes). The amount of space devoted by Paruta to this episode is perhaps due less to its importance than to the fact that the defender belonged to his family. Sereno (p. 42) says that the Turks left Tenos *in extrema miseria.*

[4] Contarini, f. 7b; Manolesso, f. 22; Calepio, f. 97b; Paruta, pp. 77–8 (no date). Mustafa's secretary says that the Kapudan Pasha reached Rhodes on 4 June, and Piale on the 5th. A letter had been received from Piale on 20 May stating that the Christian fleet comprised 120 galleys and 42 other ships.

[5] Foglieta, col. 970. Caracciolo (p. 4) wrongly says that Uluj-Ali joined the others at Rhodes. Diedo has the same mistake.

[6] Paruta, p. 78.

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to be taken on board.[1] The embarkation was considerably delayed, for the forces which it was proposed to pick up were late.[2] While waiting at Fineka, about 20 June, Piale sent out six galliots to get information; they landed a small force at the village of Lara near Alessandretta, but were attacked by a body of twenty-nine stradiotes and driven back to their ships, losing a number of men, while the stradiotes had only one horse killed.[3] But the news given by the prisoners of the immense force which was about to invade the island struck the authorities with panic.[4]

[1] Contarini, f. 7b; Paruta, p. 80; Foglieta, col. 970. Stupanus, in his translation of Contarini, p. 18, wrongly identifies Fineka with 'Aperrae' (the ancient Aperlae).

[2] Charrière, III, pp. 131–2. Joseph Giustinian says that the combined fleet arrived at Adalia on 17 June, where it expected to find 34,000 men (including 12,000 cavalry). The Beylerbey of Karamania, who was responsible for assembling them, was cashiered by the Sulṭan. On 24 June a message reached Piale that the 34,000 men would soon arrive. Giustinian left Constantinople on 12 July, by which date there was no further news of the expedition. Adalia in this account is probably an error for Fineka; it was at the latter place that new fortifications had been constructed (Graziani, p. 23), and that the embarkation actually took place. When Contarini (f. 9; cp. Sereno, p. 53) makes Piale stay 28 days at Fineka, he contradicts himself; for he makes him sail from Rhodes on 4 June (f. 7b) and leave Fineka on 27 June (f. 9).

[3] Calepio, f. 98. Gatto (p. 33) says there were 40 ships. Kyprianos, p. 282. The captain of the stradiotes took his prisoners and the heads of the killed Turks to Lefkosia, but the Lieutenant Dandolo, to his disgust, gave him no reward, and would not even recoup him for the loss of his horse. Sylv. Brenzone (pp. 35–6) says that the Turks landed no less than 300 men. The commander of the stradiotes, Peter Rondacchi, sent out thirty men, who killed forty of the raiders, while the remainder fled back and spread panic in the fleet. Graziani (pp. 70–1) gives the name of the Turkish captain (Scirocco), and the number of his ships as twenty-five, and of the men landed as 500. Most circumstantial is Natale Conti (*Hist.* 1589, II, ff. 77b–78): on 22 June twenty-five Turkish galliots were seen off Paphos, and soon afterwards off Fontana Amorosa. Rondacchi rode after them from Paphos with 35 horse, and found that they had landed 1000 or more men at Lara. Mark Antony Kyrieleïson now joined him with five horse; together the forty attacked, killed some forty-six Turks and captured two; but Kyrieleïson and Rondacchi's standard-bearer were killed. Some of these details may be correct, but in the text I have followed the more modest accounts.—Peter Rondacchi was a veteran stradiote, having held a captain's commission as early as 1541, when he was knighted as a reward for his faithful service. His father Nicolas had also been a captain of stradiotes. Sathas, Μνημ. VIII, pp. 359, 364. Scirocco (elsewhere Sirocco, Siloco) is probably the Bey of Iskenderiye (Scodra?), called Solak Mehmed in a despatch from the Sultan to Mustafa (Refik no. 17).

[4] Graziani, *loc. cit.*

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On 27 June the fleet sailed for Cyprus.[1] It comprised, probably, about 350 sail.[2] By 1 July this formidable armada had reached the southern

[1] The journal of Mustafa's secretary (ed. Safvet) says that the fleet left on 16 Muharrem 978 (= 20 June 1570), but 16 is obviously a mistake for 26, and is tacitly corrected in Philippou's translation, which is accurate. The revised translation given in Κυπρ. Σπ. II, p. 129 appears to be impossible. (Information from Dr Paul Wittek.) Podacataro's date (24 June) for the appearance of the fleet off Cyprus is possibly due to confusion with the raid on Lara.

[2] The estimates are widely divergent. The most modest is that of Selaniki, who says that the fleet contained 124 warships, gun-ships (*top ghemileri*) and *maonas*. Pechevi says the total number was about 400—galleys (*katerga*), *maona*, *parcha* and *kalita*. Hajji Khalfa (Hammer, *Gesch.* III, p. 576): 180 *katerga*, 10 *maona*, 170 *parcha* and *caramussals*, in all 360 sail. Of the Italians, Contarini (f. 9) has 160 galleys, 60 galliots and foists, both of them kinds of fast ships with sails and oars and one or two masts; 8 *maone*; 6 *navi* (including the two which had been seized from the Venetians); 1 galleon (sailing-ship with three or four masts) belonging to the Grand Vezir; 3 *palandarie*; 40 horseboats; 30 *caramussalini* and 40 frigates, making a total of 348 sail. Sereno (p. 53) agrees. So does Calepio (f. 94) although his faulty punctuation seems to make him differ about the first three classes, and in the French version (*Descr.* f. 240) we have 170 galleys and 60 *fustes*, although the total is unaltered. Manolesso (f. 31) agrees with Contarini for the galleys, galliots, *fuste*, *mahone*, *navi* and galleon, but does not specify the number of the other ships. Bizari (p. 51) agrees in the figures for the galleys and galliots, although he puts the total of oared ships at about 200; he mentions also 3 Venetian ships, 6 *mahone* laden with provisions and munitions; 6 *palandrie* (horse-transports), and an unspecified number of *caramussali*, 'Liburnian' vessels and 'biremes'. Foglieta (col. 971) has only 160 large galleys, 60 small, and 80 transports, etc.; but elsewhere (col. 983) in a speech which he puts into the mouth of Doria, his figures are 175 galleys (triremes), 20 smaller oared ships, 100 *caramussali*, 10 *mahone* and 8 transports (*onerariae*). Longo (p. 18) enumerates 155 galleys, 70 *fuste* and frigates, 8 *maone*, 20 *palandarie*, 30 *caramussali*, 5 *navi*. Other reports gave a total of 400 (Sozomeno, *Exc. Cypr.* p. 86; Manolesso, f. 31; Bizari, p. 51; Graziani, p. 73) or 500 (Brenzone, p. 38); but the Grand Vezir himself later raised even this total of 400 by half as much again. Writing to Charles IX on 16 Nov. 1570 (Charrière, III, p. 136) he describes the fleet as comprising 240 armed galleys, 58 other large oared galleys, 17 large ships (*navires*), 18 large galliasses, 5 galleons, 40 galliots, 120 medium ships called *caramussalin*, 20 others a little larger, called *igrib*, and 87 corsair *fustes*, in all more than 500 sail (actually they add up to 605). He may be suspected of exaggerating with the object of impressing his correspondent. Paruta (p. 80) is for the most part vague about his figures, but takes the trouble to explain some terms for the benefit of Venetian readers. *Maone*, he says, were of the same build as heavy galleys, but not quite so large; *palandarie* (of which he says there were some 50) were built like light galleys, but broader at the poop, with higher freeboard, and decked; they took some 100 horses each. *Caramusolini*, he says, were smaller freight-ships. The interpretations given by W. Malim (in notes to his translation of Nestor Martinengo's account of the loss of Famagusta) are as follows: 'Caramusalini be vessels like unto the French

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coast of Cyprus and, after a preliminary descent on Lemesos, Piale on 3 July disembarked his forces, artillery, munitions and baggage at Salines,[1] without opposition.

The invasion had begun; but before telling the story of the loss of Cyprus we must turn westwards and describe the ineffectual efforts of the Christian Powers to avert the disaster. Although the allied fleets failed to reach the Levant until after the fall of Nicosia, and then ignominiously retired from the scene without striking a blow, yet, in order to fill in the background of our history, and define the place that the struggle for Cyprus took in the critical years 1570 and 1571, an account of their organization, of their movements, and of the tedious bickering between their commanders must not be omitted. The historian of the period is apt to ignore the expedition of 1570 as a minor episode; but it should be useful to him, for it gives an accurate reflection, all the sharper for being concentrated in a small space, of the political situation

Gabards, which saile daily upon the river of Bordeaux, which saile with a misen or triangle saile. *Maone* be vessels like unto the great Hulks, which come hither from Denmarke, some of the which carry 7 or 8 hundreth tunnes a peece, flat and broad, which saile some of them with 7 misens a peece. *Palandrie* be great flatte vessels made like Feribotes to transport horse.' Cobham translates *palandarie* as mortarboats, but their use as *navi bombardiere* seems to date from the 17th cent (*Diz. della Marina, sub voc.*). The *caramussalini* were transports of the type built at and named after Karamursal, a small port on the Gulf of Nicomedia (Dr Wittek). For Turkish descriptions of some of these ships, see P. Kahle, *Die Bahriye des Piri Re'is*, pp. XXXIV f. Hajji Khalfa (though it is not always clear to what period he refers) describes the *kalita* [Ital. *galeotta*] as having from 19 to 24 banks of oars; the *katerga*, 55 ells long from stem to sternpost, has 25 banks, with four men to an oar. With 25 to 36 banks, it is a *bastarda*; if it is taller and broader, it is a *maona*, 65 ells long, with seven men to an oar. ['Banks' are obviously counted horizontally, not as vertically superimposed.] The *parcha* (Ital. *barca* or *bargio*) according to Mehmed Shükri, *Esfar-i-bahriye-i-Osmaniye*, was a large flat-bottomed sailing ship, not so large as a carrack; used by the Europeans, for freight, it could also serve as a warship. We deal with the estimates of the fighting strength of the invaders on p. 965. The fleet which sailed from Fineka carried only a portion of the Turkish forces; the rest were fetched from the ports of Asia Minor later.

[1] Contarini, f. 9b; Calepio, f. 98b. Hajji Khalfa's date 20 Safer 978 (24 July 1570) for the fleet's arrival at Tuzla (Salines) is impossible. He may have confused it with the date (probably 22 July) when Piale and Ali returned from Lajazzo and Adalia with reinforcements.

[2] One of the most recent historians of Venice dismisses the dispute between Zane and the others in a footnote of six lines, saying incidentally that Colonna sided with Doria.

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in the West, where the Papacy was striving to effect some unity of purpose between Powers which had good reason to be acutely jealous and suspicious of each other.

The news of the detention of the Venetian ships and residents in Constantinople, and other information sent by the Bailie, had made it clear, even before Kubad arrived with his ultimatum, that the Sultan's project was directed against Venice. The Signory hesitated no longer, even though there was still a party that hoped to avert war. Mark Quirini, called Stenta,[1] Captain of the Gulf, was ordered to Crete, with twenty-five of the older galleys, to hasten the fitting out of twenty others which had been left there without crews or equipment.[2] Letters went to the Pope, to Philip II and to other Christian princes, warning them of the Sultan's intentions and preparations. Quirini, who sailed from Lesina on 16 March, met Kubad next day off Ragusa,[3] whence Angelo Suriano was fetching him to Venice. On the 27th (Easter Monday), Jerome Zane received in St Mark's from the hands of the Doge his bâton and standard as Captain-General of the Fleet (Plate VIII).[4] To him were attached two experienced naval commanders, the Proveditors of the Sea, Antony Canale and James Celsi, with Sforza Pallavicino[5] as general of the land forces. The four had equal votes in war councils, but if

[1] For this name see Sereno, p. 42; cp. Gatto, p. 48 ('l'Ecc.mo stenta') and Graziani, p. 172. Morosini, II, p. 231, describes him as 'vir a prima juventa maritimis studiis innutritus, impiger, neque unquam fatigando lassus, unde *Stentae* cognomen est adeptus'.

[2] Graziani (p. 43) says that the Signory ordered the building of 90 new long ships (galleys) in the Arsenal and 22 in Crete, in addition to the 36 which were already in commission to protect the coasts, 12 galliasses, 20 cargo vessels, etc. Morosini (II, p. 264) estimates the fleet at Venice at 80 'triremes', 11 'quinqueremes' (presumably galliasses), ten cargo ships, and the Fausto galleon; to which should be added the ships in Corfù and Crete, making 140 in all.

[3] Contarini, f. 4.

[4] Stupanus (tr. of Contarini, p. 22) has 'pridie Calend. Martij, postridie Paschatis', where it should be 'a.d. vi Cal. Apr.' The words used by the Doge at this ceremony: Rawdon Brown MS., P.R.O., G. and D. 25/4. Zane was in his eightieth year, according to Natale Conti (p. 449). Of the four chief actors in the tragi-comedy, he was the oldest. Sebastian Venier was seventy-five; the other two were in the prime of life, Colonna having been born in Feb. 1535, and Doria in 1539.

[5] Sforza, son of Manfred Pallavicino, Marquess of Cortemaggiore. Litta, *Fam. Cel., Pallavicino*, tav. XXII. Pallavicino wrote a *Relatione intorno all' impresa dell' armata contro il Turco il primo anno della guerra di Cipro*, 22 (27?) April 1571, Vatican MS. Barberini Lat. no. 5367, from which quotations are given by Serrano, *Liga de Lepanto*.

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they were equally divided, the pair which included the Captain-General decided.[1] It was inevitable that this kind of command by committee should hamper efficiency, just as did the lack of a single commander with definite powers for the allied fleets.

A proposal to despatch sixty of the best galleys to Crete, while the others should await the allies at Zara, was rejected in favour of the more cautious policy of not weakening the Venetian fleet before it was joined by the Spanish and Papal contingents.[2]

On the 31st Zane sailed for Zara, where however he did not arrive until 13 April.[3] By this time, in addition to thirty-one armed galleys which were already in the Gulf and elsewhere, forty-two others had left Venice under Zane's command.[4]

Quirini reached Candia on 3 April, and did his best to get his galleys, which (apart from their crews) he found in good order, to sea before the Turks should reach those waters.[5] But owing to contrary winds, against which his ill-trained rowers could make no way, he never succeeded in doing so, and at last, on 28 June, he sailed for Corfu with twenty-one galleys. On the way, with an enterprise which distinguished him favourably among the Venetian captains, he, on 30 June, attacked and destroyed the Turkish fortress of Brazzo di Maina in the Morea, which, commanding as it did the Port of the Quails, caused much inconvenience to western shipping on the Levant voyage.[6]

Meanwhile at Venice the Arsenal (which, as we have said, was not very seriously damaged by the fire) was working at high pressure; galleys were being built and equipped,[7] artillery and munitions hurried out to Cyprus. Extraordinary measures were adopted to raise money.

[1] Colonna's Report, 27 Sept. 1570, p. 433. Foglieta (col. 963) says that Zane and Pallavicino were to decide, but does not say what happened if they should disagree—as they did (cp. Morosini, II, p. 265). Graziani (p. 56) says that Zane could not take any important step without the support of one of the Proveditors.

[2] Foglieta, col. 964. Longo (p. 18) says that the Venetians had intended to send the whole fleet direct to Crete, to meet the enemy alone, but changed their minds because of the promise of help from the allies.

[3] Contarini, f. 5; Manolesso, f. 25. Guarneri's statement (f. 12b) that Zane sailed from Venice with thirty galleys on the day of his appointment must be incorrect.

[4] Contarini, ff. 3b, 4, 4b.

[5] Contarini, ff. 5, 5b.

[6] Contarini, f. 8b; Manolesso, ff. 37b, 38; Paruta, pp. 72–3. Simon Pinargenti's *Isole che son da Venezia nella Dalmatia*, etc., has a map of Brazzo di Maina with a legend commemorating its capture by Quirini, and signed and dated *Nicolo N*: 1570.

[7] Foglieta, col. 963: 120 galleys, 12 galliasses and a large number of transports.

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State properties were sold, new gabelles imposed; the mint accepted gold and silver on terms advantageous to depositors; the number of Procurators of St Mark was increased by eight, the dignity—the highest after the Dogate—being conferred for a loan to the State of 20,000 ducats; the age limit for admission to the Great Council of young men of noble birth was lowered to eighteen years on deposit of 100 scudi in the treasury, and they were admitted without ballot. In this way some 300,000 scudi were raised.[1] Large contributions in money were made by private citizens and communities. Vicenza gave 12,000 ducats, Bergamo 10,000, Padua 9000, the Archbishop of Cyprus (Philip Mocenigo) 2000.[2] From similar sources came corps of infantry, with all expenses paid up or guaranteed, some for six months, others for the duration of the war.[3] The Duke of Savoy, Emanuel Philibert, showed his goodwill to the Signory, offering his help, allowing Count Vinciguerra da S. Bonifacio, a Veronese in his service, to transfer to that of Venice, and Count Francis Martinengo di Malpaga, a Venetian subject, to recruit 1000 or 2000 foot-soldiers. He urged King Philip to send his whole fleet to join with those of Venice and the Pope.[4] But otherwise Venice had to depend on its own resources. A great number of private citizens undertook to enlist troops, the largest force being offered by Sforza Pallavicino (5000), while others (including the wife of Astorre Baglione,[5] with 2000) brought the total up to 58,000. The most impressive muster seems to have been made by Jerome Martinengo, under whom a body of 2000 men made a brilliant display in the Piazza of St Mark's.[6] Not all his company, however, reached Cyprus, and those who

[1] Manolesso, f. 22 b (gives the names of the Procurators); Paruta, p. 56; Sereno, p. 47.

[2] Contarini (f. 6) has a list of sixteen such gifts and one loan amounting in all to 44,200 ducats, 2000 scudi and 600 talleri. For the contributions from Brescia, Verona, etc. see also Natale Conti, *Hist.* (1589), f. 68 b.

[3] Thus Treviso supplied 400 infantry for six months at a cost of 1200 ducats a month; Verona 500 infantry, under Col. Ugolino da Sesso, for six months of each year for the duration of the war. For details of Verona's contribution, see Avena, *Memorie Veronesi*, pp. 97–105.

[4] A. Segre in *Mem. R. Acc. delle Sc. di Torino*, ser. II, t. 48 (1899), p. 121.

[5] Cp. Brenzone, p. 95. She was Ginevra Salviati, a lady of strong character, of whom we shall hear again.

[6] Contarini, f. 6b (1000 men); Manolesso, f. 23; Paruta, p. 28; Sereno, pp. 32 and 47; Guarneri, f. 13. Calepio (f. 94) and Graziani (p. 41) give the number as 3000. Natale Conti (p. 449) has 1300, but this is the number that reached Cyprus (see below). P. Giustinian (*Rer. Ven. hist.* 1576, p. 434) gives the number as 2500, and adds that

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did so, on 5 May, brought with them only the corpse of their commander, who had fallen ill and died at sea.[1] He was buried at Famagusta. On the way thither the ships conveying the force were unsuccessfully attacked, as already stated, by Murad Reis. Eugene Sinclitico, Count of Roucha, who was at this time Collateral General of the Venetian land army, was more fortunate than Martinengo, although it would perhaps have been better for Nicosia if he also had failed to arrive. Offering his services, he was sent out with 1000 foot, and placed in command of the cavalry.[2] The Marquess Pallavicino Rangoni was appointed in Martinengo's place, raised 3000 men, and went out with Sebastian Venier, but, as will appear, declined to go farther than Crete.[3]

Astorre Baglione of Perugia, appointed commander-in-chief, sailed in April, reaching Cyprus at the end of the month, and entering Nicosia on 1 May.[4]

Martinengo also offered his young and only son Antony. According to Graziani, Julius Savorgnan had demanded 8000 men, but Martinengo, who was jealous of him, said he could defend Famagusta with 3000. Since Martinengo's was not the only contingent, this may be mere gossip. Sereno and Foglieta (col. 956) exaggerate in saying that the whole of Martinengo's force was destroyed by disease. Morosini (II, p. 303) says that 1300 out of the 2000 reached Famagusta. Manfroni (*Storia della Marina Italiana*, p. 459) states that the remnant of Martinengo's force arrived under Astorre Baglione. But if Graziani is right (p. 66) Baglione was already in Famagusta, with orders to defend it until Martinengo should arrive. Among those who did arrive then were Col. Palazzo da Fano and the engineers Jerome Maggi and John Mormori, and the captain of bombardiers Gasparo (Gatto, p. 31).

[1] Off Corfù, not at Candia, as Sylvestrani Brenzone (p. 36) says. The date 5 May is given by Gatto, p. 30.

[2] Paruta, p. 27. When Baglione left for Famagusta, Roucha took over the chief military command. Morosini (II, p. 306) praises him for his energy in organizing the defence, encouraging the Italians by offering them rewards, and raising the hopes of the effeminate and unwarlike Cypriotes. But by others he was severely criticized. E.g. Graziani (p. 64) describes him as completely incompetent in military affairs. He arrived alone (not with 1000 men); though as a Cypriote he must have known the gravity of the situation, he was so much puffed up by the honour of his appointment that he thought of nothing else. Cp. p. 67: Dandolo and Roucha always *fatali pertinacia* took the wrong line. He was certainly incompetent, but died fighting gallantly enough. James de Nores, Count of Tripoli, was one of his severest critics; but of James himself, though Master of the Ordnance, it was said that he had hardly seen a cannon in his life (Rym's report of July 1570, quoted by Hammer, III, p. 784).

[3] He was the son of Louis Rangoni of the Spilamberto branch (Litta, *Rangoni*, tav. VI). Contarini mentions him (f. 6b) in command of 3000 men (misprinted 'Doragne' in the 1645 ed.). See Sereno, p. 32; Foglieta, col. 956, and below, p. 943.

[4] Brenzone, p. 33.

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As to the Venetian fleet, it is interesting to find a Genoese historian[1] volunteering the opinion that, until it was ruined by disease, it was of the very finest quality, in officers, men and equipment of all kinds. In any case, whatever criticism of it may have been justified, the Signory cannot be blamed for apathy or negligence. It is significant of the pressure under which the officials concerned were working that, when the Doge, Peter Loredan, died on 5 May, the Great Council cut down the proceedings in the election of his successor, Alvise Mocenigo, omitting much that would have interfered with their duties.[2]

But the story of the next few months reveals a deplorable picture of apathy, procrastination, jealousy and intrigue among the Powers who ought to have been forward to combine against the common enemy. The last great league against the Turks, between Paul III, Charles V and Venice, in 1538, had broken down through the conflict between the interests of the allies. The prospects of harmony now were not bright. The only disinterested figure on the scene is Pope Pius V;[3] it needed not the eloquence of the Venetian ambassador Michael Suriano to inflame his crusading zeal. On 27 February 1570 (a full month before the Sultan presented his ultimatum to Venice) he summoned the College of Cardinals, who agreed to the levying of a tithe on ecclesiastical property in Venetia up to the amount of 100,000 ducats, on condition that the Turkish expedition took the direction of Cyprus.[4] But at this consistory the hostility of Spain to a Venetian alliance found clear expression. Cardinal Granvelle, while agreeing that everything ought to be done to save Cyprus from the hands of the infidels, said openly that Venice deserved no support; history showed that she would only help

[1] Bizari, p. 86.

[2] Romanin, VI, p. 283. Mocenigo was elected on 9 May. The Doge was of course little more than a figure-head, and the change made no difference to public policy.

[3] Longo (p. 15) unfairly accuses Pius of failing to show the zeal and charity which might reasonably have been expected of him. Pastor's account (XVIII, ch. IX) of the Pope's unflagging efforts, which at last resulted in the conclusion of the League on 25 May 1571, and were crowned by the victory of Lepanto, is entirely convincing.

[4] Herre, p. 48; Pastor, XVIII, p. 368. The levy is variously described as a tithe (e.g. Foglieta, col. 960) or as a total sum of 100,000 ducats (e.g. Paruta, p. 30; Catena, p. 184; Graziani, p. 43). Zuñiga, writing on 28 Feb., says that three days ago the Venetian ambassador had received letters from Venice saying that despatches from Constantinople confirmed the intention of the Turks to attack Cyprus, and asking for the grant of the tithe (Serrano, *España en Lepanto*, p. 19).

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others when it was to her own interest to do so[1]—as if that were not the general rule governing alliances. The affairs of the Holy See were so deeply embarrassed that the Pope could do little in the way of practical assistance. He offered, however, if Venice would supply twenty-four galleys, to equip them and pay the crews and troops; but he found himself obliged to halve his offer, and even so to ask the help of Florence.[2]

There was considerable debate between the Signory and the Pope on the organization of the expedition.[3] The Signory would have no single commander; the commanders of the three fleets were to consult on all plans, and one of them, to be commander-in-chief, was to execute the decision of the majority. This commander-in-chief was to be nominated by the Pope. Pius at first proposed to contribute only funds, perhaps on a suggestion from Philip's agents, who felt that the authority

[1] Longo, p. 16; Foglieta, col. 961; cp. Graziani, pp. 52–3. The accusation was of course justified; cp. Manfroni, *Storia della Marina Italiana*, p. 457.

[2] Herre, p. 79. Cp. Manfroni, 'La marina di Cosimo I' in *Riv. Marittima*, XXVIII, ii (1895), pp. 291–4. Pius V, after long delay, owing to Philip II's unwillingness to release Cosimo from his engagement, at last obtained a promise that twelve ships, fully equipped and manned, should be ready at Civitavecchia by April 1571. Cosimo's exploitation of the Pope's difficulties to his own advantage, and the opposition of various other rulers to his promotion to Grand Duke, are dealt with also by V. Bibl, 'Die Erhebung Herzog Cosimo's von Medici zum Grossherzog von Toskana' in *Arch. f. oesterr. Gesch.* 103 (Vienna, 1913), pp. 69 ff. The various devices to which Pius resorted for raising money are described by Manolesso, f. 29b and Sereno, pp. 51–2. He raised the number of the clerical dignities known as *chiericati della camera apostolica* from six to twelve, and sold them for 30,000 ducats each. He sold the office of *sommista* or Vice-Chancellor of the Roman Church to Ferdinand Cardinal de' Medici for 20,000 ducats. He imposed a tax of 400,000 scudi on the congregations of the monastic Orders. The office of Chamberlain of Holy Church was usually the perquisite of the Pope's nearest relative among the Cardinals; he took it away from his nephew and sold it to Louis, Cardinal Cornaro, for 70,000 ducats. The editors of Sereno (p. 384, n. 9) observe that the Pope was not guilty of simony, because these offices were not ecclesiastical benefices but urban magistracies. Natale Conti (*Hist.* 1589, ff. 105b–106), describing the Pope's methods of raising money, adds that he refused the suggestion that he should raise a large sum by authorizing the practice of the 'regresso', that is, the faculty which holders of benefices claimed of resuming benefices which they had resigned in the hope of acquiring others, when that hope was not realized. This was condemned by the Council of Trent, on the ground that anything in the least resembling succession or hereditary title in the matter of a benefice was contrary to the canons and decrees of the Fathers. Conti describes these measures somewhat out of place early in 1571. Pastor apparently does not mention them at all.

[3] Foglieta, col. 969.

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of the King's admiral would be greater if there were no ships flying the Papal flag. Eventually Pius afforded the equipment of twelve ships with their complements. The Signory complained that he ought to have contributed at least thirty.[1] Then they mistrusted his choice as commander of Mark Antony Colonna, Duke of Tagliacozzo and Paliano, and Grand Constable of the Regno of Naples (Plate IX). He was thought to be too Hispanophil for the Signory's taste, which would have been better suited by a Venetian prelate, such as Louis, Cardinal Cornaro. But the Pope's insistence and Colonna's tactful diplomacy brought them round, and he proved, from the Venetian point of view, an admirable choice.[2]

By the beginning of June it had been agreed that he should be the Papal commander, and leader of the combined fleets. But this was not what Philip II intended, so far as he was concerned. His representatives in Rome, while receiving powers to conclude a league, were instructed to convey to Colonna his wishes in the matter of the command. So Colonna was told that he was not the commander-in-chief, and also that there was as yet no such thing as a military force representing the league. He was also reproved for accepting his command without consulting Philip.[3] But the Pope was not deterred by such representations; on 3 June he published the appointment, and on the 11th, in a solemn ceremony in St Peter's, Colonna was placed in command of the Papal force, as Captain-General of the Church.[4] He appointed Pompeo Colonna, Duke of Gazaruolo, as his lieutenant, and got to work without

[1] See Pastor, XVIII, p. 379, n. 2. But it must be regarded as doubtful whether Venice sent as many as twenty-four empty hulls to Ancona, for, as will appear, Colonna had only eight equipped there and had to go to Venice himself for the other four.

[2] On Colonna see especially A. Guglielmotti, *Marcantonio Colonna alla battaglia di Lepanto* (1862). Colonna kept records of everything that happened from day to day, beginning with his appointment on 11 June as Captain-General of the Church (see Note on the Authorities, p. 1151; they will be referred to by the letters there given as Document A, etc.). Colonna's methodical preservation of these records bears witness to his conscientiousness and also, probably, to his expectation that they would be required in justification of his conduct of the campaign.

[3] Despatches of Zuñiga and Granvelle to Philip, 9 and 12 June 1570. Herre, pp. 81–2.

[4] Herre, p. 83; Pastor, XVIII, pp. 380–1. The Pope's brief, 11 June 1570, in Guglielmotti, pp. 8–11 (Doc. A). Colonna, after his return from the expedition, gave the standard which he had received from Pius to the Cathedral of Gaeta, where it was placed over the High Altar.

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delay. Venice was to supply the hulls of the twelve ships, to be fitted out at the Pope's expense. Colonna had eight equipped at Ancona, but had to go to Venice himself for the other four. He had reason to complain of the quality of what was provided. Venice did not give him of her best.[1] However, by the beginning of August they were all ready, and by the 6th he had brought them to Otranto. Serving under him was a man destined to become more famous than any other who took part in the War of Cyprus, Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra.

At Otranto a letter[2] reached him from the King of Spain, written on 15 July, by which time Philip had come round. It expressed pleasure that the Pope had made him Captain-General of his galleys; Philip is sure that he will have as much care for the King's fleet and service as he has always shown in any task entrusted to him. John Andrew Doria, Prince of Melfi, and grand-nephew of the famous Genoese Admiral Andrew Doria, had been chosen by Philip to command his contingent (Plate X). He was to take his ships to join the galleys of the Pope and Venice, to obey Colonna, and follow the flag of His Holiness.[3] Philip

[1] Writing to the King from Venice on 11 July 1570 (Serrano, *Corr. dipl.* III, p. 447) Colonna describes the Signory's fleet as comprising 145 galleys, 11 large galleys, a galleon and 20 *navi* (22 galleys from Candia which have not yet joined the rest being included); with a fighting force of 12,000 men; but he says nothing of the ships allotted to him. In his own reply to Doria (Doc. E, p. 336) he says that the greater part of the galleys were old and unfit, such as had been left in the Arsenal as inferior, and his own flagship was forty years old. Guglielmotti (p. 105) finds reason to believe that the ship in which Colonna was sailing when at the end of the expedition he parted company with the Venetians, and which was struck by lightning and blew up, was the famous 'quadrireme' built some years before by Victor Fausto, to whom the Venetian authorities granted the use of an enclosed building yard for the purpose in 1529 (Molmenti, *Venice, The Golden Age*, tr. Brown, I, p. 42). It is true that the Tuscan envoy at Venice, in a letter of 10 June 1570, says that 'they are having furbished up for Signor Marcantonio Colonna the quadrireme galley "del Fausto", which has not been at sea for thirty years' (Guglielmotti, p. 25 n.; cp. Paruta, p. 26). There remains, however, some doubt (though the dates tally) whether the galley of which Colonna complained that it was forty years old was actually the Fausto; for Contarini (who is not likely to be wrong on such a point) tells us (f. 19) that on the expedition itself the Fausto galleon, Captain Jerome Contarini, was in the squadron with the heavy galliasses, under Francis Duodo. Cp. Morosini, II, p. 264. Natale Conti, p. 449, describes the Fausto as sailing like a fortress on the sea, and carrying 300 guns of one sort or another.

[2] Doc. B. Guglielmotti, pp. 28–9.

[3] Antonio de Herrera, *Historia general del mundo* (Madrid, 1601), I, p. 412, is certainly wide of the mark when he says that the King's order to Doria was that he should

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ends by asking Colonna to avail himself of the advice of Doria in everything.

There seems, however, to be no doubt that Doria had secret instructions of a different complexion from those of which Colonna was informed. He was to use his own discretion as to obedience to Colonna's orders. And that meant neither more nor less than that Doria was not to fight, but was to bring his ships back safely. For Doria, throughout the expedition, made no attempt to disguise the fact that his chief concern was for the safety of his ships.[1]

The negotiations which had brought King Philip up to the starting-point had been long and difficult. The envoy, Louis de Torres, whom Pius had sent to Spain early in March,[2] and the representatives of the Signory, Sigismund Cavalli and afterwards Leonard Donato,[3] pressed upon him the urgent need for a large number of ships. The Pope had

follow the Venetian general in everything. But it was of course commonly understood by everyone except Doria that he should join the Venetian fleet; as it is put by Guarneri (f. 20): 'ut quae summus Pont. imperasset, faceret; quoque tempore, loco et ratione constituisset, se cum Veneta classe coniungeret'.

[1] The evidence that Doria had secret orders from Philip is collected by Guglielmotti, p. 44, n. 57. Cp. Quarti, p. 18, n. 1: Colonna, writing to Cardinal Rusticucci from Corfù, Nov. 1570, said that Zane had shown him a letter from Ragusa, saying that Pagano Doria, John Andrew's brother, had offered to bet that there would be no fighting with the enemy fleet, because John Andrew had orders from Philip II not to fight this year. Colonna himself afterwards assured Philip that nothing in Doria's conduct hurt him more than the attempt to make him believe that the King had given secret orders which were not to be revealed to him; he protested that he could not believe this of the King (Doc. Gb, p. 438; cp. L, pp. 30–1). Such a protest to a King merely means that the writer is shocked, not that he does not believe. At any rate, the suspicion destroyed any confidence that the Venetians felt, and brought discredit on the fleet. Colonna had as much desire as Doria to preserve the King's fleet, but he was at the same time jealous of its reputation, and anxious that no one should afterwards blame the King's servants for failing to lend aid to such a Christian enterprise as this on which they were engaged. Guglielmotti, p. 102.

[2] The Pope's instructions to Torres in Appendix to Sereno, pp. 427–31, dated 5 and 12 March 1570; also Brit. Mus. MS. Add. 20,052, cited by Pastor, XVIII, p. 370, n. 2; other copies have 15 instead of 5 March. The secret instruction is a masterly and unanswerable exposition of the reasons why the King, even for his own interests, should combine with Venice. For the mission of Torres, see also Paruta, pp. 31–4; Foglieta, cols. 964–9; full treatment in the light of documents, Herre, pp. 84–111; Pastor, *vol. cit.* pp. 369–73.

[3] Donato met Torres at Genoa and they sailed in the same ship to Barcelona. (Morosini, II, p. 270; see also his Life of Donato in his *St. della Rep. Ven.* t. V, pp. 255–7.)

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some hope of as many as a hundred.[1] All that he succeeded in extracting from Philip was a nominal fifty. The King had very good excuses for his niggardly contribution in the difficulties in which he was involved in Flanders and Spain, and in the threat to his maritime possessions from the Barbary corsairs. The last, and perhaps also the fear of an expedition by the Turks in support of the Moriscos, had caused considerable alarm. The King had given orders for the raising of military and naval forces at his ports in Naples, Sardinia, Corsica, La Goletta and elsewhere.[2] But a much more potent cause of the difficulty which he made was his dislike of Venice. He was unwilling to see the power of the Republic enhanced by the formation of a league such as the Pope desired. He suspected also that the Signory harboured the intention of making terms with the Porte. It was this distrust that caused his delay in issuing his commission to Doria.[3] It must be admitted that the Signory was not innocent of the thought of coming to an agreement with the Porte,[4] and

[1] In return for certain concessions, Pius IV had obtained from the King a pledge to maintain 100 galleys to fight the infidel. Pius V now offered to renew these concessions if Philip would provide the same number. Foglieta (col. 959) says that the request was for 50 only; but that was the number actually promised (Longo, p. 18), and it proved to be a nominal figure.

[2] Contarini, f. 6. When Doria was commissioned to join Colonna he was at the same time ordered, while on his way, to see to the security of La Goletta and the coasts in that region. He accordingly sailed towards Bizerta, in the hope of surprising Uluj-Ali, who was reported to be cleaning his ships there. On the way he captured a Turkish galliot and learned that Uluj-Ali had gone to Jerba (Los Gelves) and Tripoli to take in provisions and prepare to go to the Levant to join the Turkish fleet, when he had ascertained the movements of the allies. Doria therefore gave up the attempt to catch him and went to Sardinia to take on board troops under Sigismund Gonzaga. Bosio, III, p. 854. This delayed his arrival at Messina. [3] Rosell, p. 34.

[4] There is no doubt that negotiations with the Porte were carried on through the Bailie throughout the course of the expedition of 1570, as they were redoubled after its failure (cp. Graziani, pp. 116–17). The letter of the King's representatives of 8 Sept. 1570 (Serrano, *Corr. dipl.* IV, p. 9) is confirmed by that of the papal nuncio to Cardinal Rusticucci of 20 Sept. (*ibid.*): it is certain, says the latter, that the Bailie in Constantinople has been and is trying to make terms with the Turk, and the Signory has not been uninterested, however distrustful; it would seize any convenient opportunity to conclude an agreement, for it is feeling the cost of the war and cannot do without its Levant trade. The conclusion of the League must therefore be pressed forward. See Serrano, *Liga*, p. 82. It is relevant to note that this same 8 Sept. 1570 is the date of a letter from the Doge, Louis Mocenigo, urging the necessity of checking the Turks, who were attacking Dalmatia and Cyprus (*Libri Comm.*, under date 25 May 1571; *Reg.* VI, p. 323, no. 141).

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that it was fearful of an increase of Spanish influence in Italy. Both Powers knew that united they would be a match for the Turk, but neither trusted the other.[1] Philip kept the question of taking part in the expedition as such, which he could not decently escape from doing, separate from that of joining in a formal league. The rumours that Venice was playing a double game grew stronger. On 20 June Zuñiga reported to his master that the Signory did not want a league, and was sorry it had proposed such a thing, because it was sure it would be worsted in a conflict with the Turks this summer, and therefore it was inclined to come to terms with them.[2] Surprisingly, it was this information that brought Philip round, at least in appearance. For he feared that if Venice made terms with Constantinople, the Turks would be left free to attack him. Zuñiga's report had been received in Madrid on 7 July; on the 15th, as already stated, Philip wrote to Colonna that he recognized him as Papal commander, and had instructed Doria to join him and take orders from him. The news of Philip's decision reached Rome on the 27th, and the Pope wrote on the same day to Colonna, who received both letters at the same time. The Doge also wrote on 5 August telling Colonna that he had heard with gratification from his ambassadors at the Spanish court that the King had commissioned Doria to take his galleys to join the Venetian fleet 'under Your Excellency's flag and command'.[3] But neither the Doge, nor the Pope, nor Colonna knew that Philip had adopted the ignoble expedient of giving Doria secret instructions which stultified his compliance with the Pope's appeal for support.[4]

[1] Cp. Manfroni, *op. cit.* p. 455. Philip feared that Venice would take her revenge for what had happened at Prévesa by abandoning him at the critical moment.

[2] Herre, pp. 124–7. Longo, it must be noted, is not supported by the evidence when he says (pp. 14–15) that it was the Spaniards who proposed to the Pope that there should be a league, seeing in it a means of binding the Republic to the protection of Spanish possessions; by using the Venetian fleet for this purpose they would spend only about a thirtieth of what the defence of their maritime possessions would otherwise cost them. The fact that, as he says, when the league came into being they disbanded the forces they had raised to defend the Regno of Naples does not prove his assertion.

[3] Doc. C, *Il Saggiatore*, III, pp. 170–1. Romanin (VI, p. 298, n. 2) cites letters of 22 July from the Senate to both Zane and Doria, recommending them to defend Cyprus either by making a diversion or by direct attack.

[4] Rosell (p. 36, n. 24) quotes a statement made by Philip to Santa Cruz: 'I have resolved to order Juan Andrea Doria to join the allied forces and obey the orders of

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Doria's commission instructed him to collect 1500 Italian soldiers from Sardinia and as many Spanish from Naples.[1] The Viceroy of Naples was also ordered to allow the export of grain for the Venetian fleet.[2] Doria arrived at Messina, where the fleet was to assemble, at the end of July, got his galleys into condition, and embarked some infantry under Don Carlos d'Avalos.[3] The contingent under the Marquess of Santa Cruz left Naples on 6 August, and arrived at Messina two days later, all ready for the voyage to the Levant.[4]

The fleet by the contribution of which the King satisfied himself that he was doing his duty as a great Christian prince, and magnanimously forgiving the Venetian Signory its manifold delinquencies,[5] never numbered more than forty-nine galleys. There were three squadrons, under Doria himself, Don Alvaro de Bazan, Marquess of Santa Cruz, and Don John of Cardona.[6]

Although it only indirectly concerns this history, we may pause here to refer to the course of the Pope's efforts to induce the Christian rulers to combine in a formal league. Philip II, after agreeing to furnish a contingent to the expedition, and pleading that the question of joining

Marco Antonio Colonna as General of the Papal galleys and follow his flag as long as the said *junta* lasts.' As General of the Papal contingent and not of the expedition, says Rosell. Such a distinction, if it meant anything, was only meant to cause trouble.

[1] Adriani, p. 858.

[2] Paruta, p. 34.

[3] Costo, f. 19b.

[4] *Informatione* (Doc. M), p. 27.

[5] Cp. Manfroni, p. 458.

[6] According to Paruta the King undertook to assemble in Sicilian ports his own galleys and those of captains in his pay, and of his allies, amounting to some 65, besides those of Spain, which could not leave those waters because of the war with the Moriscos. Bizari (p. 57) gives the number of the ships as 60. It is certain there were never more than forty-nine concerned in the expedition; this is the number given by nearly all sources. But when they give figures for the force which actually sailed from Sitia on 18 Sept., there are only forty-five (Contarini, ff. 16b, 17; Paruta, p. 115; cp. Guarneri, f. 41). Manolesso, indeed, says (f. 39b) that when Doria arrived at Suda on 31 Aug. he had only 45 galleys. Doria's squadron contained 12 galleys of his own, in the King's pay, each galley costing Philip 10,000 scudi a year, together with 4 others belonging to Ambrose di Negron. The Neapolitan squadron under Santa Cruz numbered 19, the Sicilian under Cardona 10. Now Santa Cruz seems to have brought 23 galleys from Naples to Messina (Costo, f. 19). It would seem therefore (unless Manolesso is right) that 4 of his ships were left behind in Crete when the expedition sailed from Sitia. They were probably picked up on Doria's return, so that he sailed home with the King's fleet intact.—Rosell (p. 36, n. 23), without citing his authority, gives Doria 11 ships of his own, 20 of Naples, 10 of Sicily, and 8 of various (apparently all Genoese) owners.

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a league against the enemy could not be decided in a hurry, was eventually persuaded by Torres to instruct his representatives at Rome to discuss it with Pius, and to give them powers to reach a conclusion.[1] Negotiations with other princes, whether for an immediate contribution to the expedition or for adhesion to a league, were much less successful. The Emperor Maximilian had quarrelled with Pius over the concession of the title of Grand Duke to Cosimo de' Medici,[2] and neither he nor King Sigismund Augustus of Poland would do anything to offend the Turk. To the Venetian ambassador, who approached Maximilian on the subject, he replied sympathetically, but pointed out that there were still five years to run of his truce with the Turk, and declined to move until he saw what the other Powers proposed to do. The Regent of France, Catherine de Médicis, was interested at the moment in her plans for expelling the Spanish from Flanders, and replied to the Pope that the French King's position was different from that of other rulers, since he was asked to break with an old friend, whereas they would only be continuing a war with an old enemy. To the Venetians she made the suggestion, which was politely declined, that her son should act as mediator between the parties.[3] The seventeen years old King Sebastian I of Portugal promised thirty galleys or galleons, and well-equipped round ships, which might be reckoned as equivalent to thirty more galleys; but this was for next year.[4] The Knights of Malta, who by their piracies had furnished one of the reasons for Turkish enmity, were hostile to Venice, and it was said that if it rested with them not one but ten Venetian islands might have fallen into the hands of the Turks. Nevertheless they provided five ships which were placed under the command of Francis de San Clement, Grand Conservator and Captain-General of the Galleys, with orders to join Doria. One of the five had not yet joined the others, when they were surprised off the south coast of Sicily by Uluj-Ali. Only one of the four escaped; the commander was guilty of incompetence and cowardice for which he afterwards paid with his life. But the *Santa Anna* made a gallant resistance, and Uluj-Ali is said to have lost so many killed and wounded, and had his ships

[1] Paruta, p. 34. Full powers to Granvelle, Pacheco and Zuñiga, 16 May 1570. Pastor, XVIII, p. 373.

[2] Which also much annoyed a great many other princes, especially Alfonso II d'Este, who claimed seniority. Pastor, XVIII, pp. 268–79.

[3] Herre, p. 161 (12 April 1570).

[4] Negotiations with Portugal, Herre, pp. 129–38.

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so badly knocked about, that he was obliged to retire to Algiers and report to the Sultan that he was unable to pursue his plan of going to the Levant to join the Turkish fleet.[1] The engagement took place on 15 July. The contingent which the Order eventually furnished naturally arrived too late at Messina to sail with Doria and Colonna; we shall see what happened to it afterwards. Other offers or actual contributions to the allied fleet were negligible.

Venetian efforts extended farther afield were equally disappointing. The Patriarch of Constantinople was asked to stir up revolt through his clergy in the Morea, and to support an appeal which was being made to the Tsar of Muscovy, Ivan the Terrible, to attack the Turks from the rear. Nothing happened in the Morea, and the Tsar, if he ever got the letter, was too busy at war with Poland to attend to it.[2] An ambassador was sent to the Sophy of Persia, Shah Tahmasp, but failed to obtain an audience with the Sophy himself, who was disinclined to take any action until he saw what success the league might achieve.[3]

Zane spent two months at Zara, hoping to be joined by the Spanish and Papal squadrons. The enemy made it impossible to collect provisions from the countryside, and his force would have starved but for supplies obtained from Apulia, the March and Venetia. Disease[4] spread alarmingly, carrying off thousands of men; the stores intended for the expedition were consumed; discipline went to pieces, and there were many desertions.[5] What is more, the Turk was given time to mature his plans. Contemporaries remarked that it was fortunate that he did not sail to the Gulf of Venice instead of to Fineka, at a time when there were only seventy galleys in the Gulf, the rest of the fleet being partly at Corfù, partly at Candia.[6]

[1] Bosio, III, pp. 856, 859. For the Turkish version, see Hammer, III, p. 580.

[2] Romanin, VI, p. 287. On the Pope's efforts in Poland and Russia, see Pastor, XVIII, pp. 376–8.

[3] Paruta, pp. 40–1; Romanin, VI, p. 288 (citing a report by the envoy, who was that Vincent Alessandri who had escaped from Constantinople; above, p. 892, n. 2). The Pope's appeals in the same quarter, as also to the Kings of Arabia Felix and Ethiopia, belong to a time when the fate of Cyprus had been decided; they are of 16 and 17 Nov. 1571. Catena, pp. 282–90.

[4] There had been some sort of skin disease (*peteccie*) in the fleet before it started, but Colonna, writing on 11 July, said that it had stopped. Serrano, *Corr. dipl.* III, p. 447.

[5] Romanin, VI, p. 289. Sforza Pallavicino (*Relatione*, Serrano, *Liga*, I, p. 79) was throughout without confidence in his troops, which were untrained and decimated by disease.

[6] Manolesso, f. 28; Sereno, p. 50.

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On 12 June Zane, acting on the orders of the Senate, took his seventy galleys to Corfù, picking up six galliasses and some *navi* at Lesina on the way, and arriving there on the 23rd.[1] His instructions were not to attack any Turkish possessions on the way, as it was not desirable to provoke the enemy; for this reason, and owing to the lack of the necessary munitions, he had passed the Bocche di Cattaro without making any attempt on Castelnuovo.[2] He found at Corfù Sebastian Venier, the Proveditor of the island and Proveditor-General elect of Cyprus, with a useful squadron (Plate XI).[3]

The month of June was a busy one in the Arsenal at Venice, which produced 127 light and eleven heavy galleys and a number of other ships, as well as repairing those which had not been irretrievably damaged by the fire. This speed of construction, which impressed Venetian contemporaries,[4] was however not necessarily accompanied by adequate training of the crews.

A few days before Zane's arrival at Corfù, Venier made a successful attack on the fortress of Sopotò, a nest of Turkish and Albanian brigands on the opposite Albanian coast. Starting on 7 June with twelve galleys commanded by James Celsi, Proveditor of the Sea, he bombarded the place for three days, and then found it had been abandoned by the Turks. The Greek, Manuel Mormori of Nauplia, who had proposed the undertaking, was left in charge. This success induced certain of the population in the neighbourhood of Cheimarra to submit themselves voluntarily to Venice. But Sopotò (like Cheimarra, Dulcigno, Antivari and Budua) was recaptured by the Turks next year, Mormori being taken prisoner.[5]

[1] Contarini, ff. 7b, 8.

[2] See below, p. 913, n. 1.

[3] On his career, see P. Molmenti, *Sebastiano Veniero e la Battaglia di Lepanto* (1899). Born in 1496, he was now seventy-five years old. He was elected on 17 June, in place of Laurence Bembo, who died in Cyprus 30 Dec. 1569 (Gatto, p. 27). His orders were to sail with Pallavicino Rangone; the Senate sent him 20,000 ducats for the pay of the soldiers; his salary was 200 ducats a month, with 300 ducats to buy horses, and 30 ducats for *coperte*. Molmenti, pp. 47–8.

[4] Contarini, f. 9; cp. Longo, p. 14.

[5] Contarini, f. 7b; Manolesso, f. 26b; Paruta, pp. 65–6; Sereno, p. 49; Foglieta, col. 971. Plan of the siege of Sopotò by Venier, in Pinargenti, *Isole che son da Venezia*, etc., and in G. F. Camoccio, *Isole famose, porti...sottoposte alla Ser^ma Sig^ria di Venezia*. Mormori was imprisoned in the Black Sea Tower at Constantinople, where Gatto (p. 121) found him on being taken there himself on 20 Nov. 1571.

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At the same time the Turks in these parts were not idle, and continually harassed the Venetian possessions in Dalmatia. After Zane's departure for Corfù they occupied the fortress of Zamonicó (Zemonica), eight miles from Zara, thanks to the treachery of the Venetian commandant. Novigrad, some twenty miles east of Zara, they failed to take; but two galleys sent out from Cattaro to the relief of the neighbouring Lustica (near the south entrance to the Bocche di Cattaro) were captured, and Cattaro itself threatened, so that three galleys had to be despatched from Venice for its protection.[1]

Another month was spent at Corfù, but the health of the force was not improved by the change of station, and it was becoming demoralized by inaction. At Sebastian Venier's suggestion, therefore, an attempt was made on the Turkish fortress of Margarition, which had been reported to be easily accessible some two miles or more from the coast and ill-fortified, but which actually lay some eight or nine miles inland on the mainland opposite the southern extremity of Corfù and was approached by a difficult road.[2] On 3 or 4 July, accompanied by Venier, Pallavicino took 5000 men and four heavy guns in 48 or 50 galleys under Celsi. But he lacked the sumpters necessary for the transport, and found the place situated on a high hill, with strong walls; he was without sappers and his artillery was inadequate for the situation. He retired (after a difference of opinion with Venier,[3] who was unwilling to give up the enterprise so hastily), reaching Corfù on 7 July. He had done no more than burn the *borgo*, ravage the countryside, and somewhat damage his own reputation.

Zane then sent him, with James Celsi, to reconnoitre Santa Maura and Prévesa, but they reported that these places could not be successfully attacked without a larger force than was available.

[1] Paruta, pp. 66–7. Other fighting in these parts, Morosini, II, pp. 289–90.

[2] Manolesso, ff. 38, 38b; Contarini, ff. 9b, 10; Paruta, pp. 68–71; Sereno, p. 55; Foglieta, col. 971; Graziani, p. 50. That the enterprise was due to Venier's advice is confirmed by a letter of Zane to the Senate, 5 July 1570 (Molmenti, *Sebastiano Veniero*, p. 41, n. 1): the writer reports the increasing mortality in his fleet, which is wrecking his chances of proceeding against the enemy. Pallavicino's defence of his action, 27 April 1571 (*ibid.* p. 42 n.). Next year the Venetians took and razed the fortress (Paruta, p. 265). Pinargenti, *op. cit.*, has a map showing 'Margaritin 8 miglia fra tera & 10(?) miglia da Corfù qual possedeua il turcho presa alli 8 nouembrio 1571 de ordine del Clar° S^or^ Sabastian Venier General dell' armada'. Another in Camoccio, *op. cit.*

[3] Manolesso blames Venier for failing to supply the sumpters and sappers.

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It is difficult to explain why these attacks on Turkish possessions should have been undertaken or contemplated, in view of the instructions which had been issued to Zane not to provoke the enemy. The Signory was well alive to the danger that the Turks might move large forces into Dalmatia and Albania, or send their fleet into the Gulf to attack Venice itself, which was left defenceless, or at least prevent the junction of the Spanish, Papal and Venetian forces.[1]

During this period of enforced inaction, an effort was made to repair the losses which disease was inflicting on the force. The Rectors of Cefalonia and Zante were asked to supply as many rowers as they could raise.[2] But the insanitary conditions of life in warships in those days meant that when contagious disease had got a hold on a fleet, the recruiting of new crews did little more than provide fresh victims.

There was still no sign of the allies, and the Senate, impatient of the delay, ordered Zane to proceed to the relief of Cyprus with what forces he had, engaging the enemy if necessary.[3] Before he moved on, however, he was rejoined by Mark Quirini, who arrived twelve days after his exploit at Brazzo di Maina, and was sent off again almost immediately with twenty galleys to the Archipelago, in search of men to repair the losses among the rowers in the fleet. Antony Canale was sent on a similar errand at the same time. Zane also despatched four galleys, two to convey Sebastian Venier to Cyprus, and two to go as far as Scarpanto for news of the enemy. But Venier was met by bad weather, and got no farther than Naxos; and the other galleys returned without any information.[4] On 23 July the fleet, still ravaged by disease, sailed from Corfù. It was met at Modon by Quirini, who had collected some

[1] Serrano, *Liga*, p. 76 f., quoting the *Relatione* of Pallavicino, who also says that another reason for not attacking Turkish fortresses like Castelnuovo was the lack of the necessary munitions. Manolesso, f. 27b, gives the same reason.

[2] Zane is said to have collected 700 rowers from Corfù, 500 from Zante and 900 from Cefalonia. Morosini, II, p. 298.

[3] Cp. the Doge's letter of 5 Aug. 1570 to Colonna (Doc. C): he has ordered Zane to push on to Crete, recruit troops and rowers there to replace his losses, and get intelligence of the enemy; he presses Colonna to follow him as quickly as possible. From the letters cited by Romanin (above, p. 907, n. 3) it would appear that the Senate did not altogether rule out the plan of making a diversion somewhere else instead of a direct attack.

[4] Manolesso, f. 39; Sereno, p. 66. They wrongly make Zane arrive in Crete on 23 July. Nixia is not one of the Cursolari islands, as Molmenti supposes, but Naxos.

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300 men from the islands. Two days later, on 4 August, Zane reached Suda in Crete.

Quirini had raised expectations which were disappointed; on arriving at Suda, it is said, it was found that no stores had been accumulated, and the fleet was made to feel that it was not welcome.[1]

The recruiting expeditions in the islands returned with some 500 Turkish prisoners, of whom 300 were taken by Quirini and 200 by Canale. But Quirini's activity was stained by a discreditable incident; his men got out of hand at Andros, where the inhabitants were Christians, sacked their houses and churches and violated their women. This treatment of fellow-Christians scandalized the Candiotes, making them unwilling to serve in the Venetian fleet, and alienated the sympathies of all the Greeks of these regions.[2] When Zane returned to Crete on his way home, there was actual fighting between the Greeks and Italians, the Greeks even murdering those who were lying sick in their houses.[3] The outrage at Andros evoked a protest from Pius V.[4]

The Venetian fleet was certainly in a sorry state. It was said that the losses from disease amounted to over 20,000 men—soldiers and rowers —but this estimate probably covers the whole duration of the expedition, not merely the first stage out to Crete.[5] The Captain-General, ably assisted by his son Matthew Zane, did his best to improve conditions, sending another recruiting expedition into the Archipelago, while waiting for the scouts which he had despatched for intelligence of the enemy. Quirini, who had been sent out towards Rhodes, returned on

[1] *Relatione* of Pallavicino (Serrano, *Liga*, p. 77, n. 3).


[2] Paruta, p. 73; Manolesso, ff. 39, 39b; Sereno, pp. 66–7; Costo, f. 19b; Adriani, p. 860.

[3] Adriani, p. 862; A. de Herrera, *Hist. gen. del Mundo*, I, p. 418. Alluded to by Bizari, p. 53.

[4] Which may be read in Guglielmotti, pp. 94 ff., who prints it *à propos* of the assertion that Doria intended to scour the islands for recruits, although there is no evidence that he carried out any such intention. Guglielmotti's bias against Doria is betrayed by his connecting the Pope's protest with him rather than with the Venetians, who were to blame.

[5] Paruta, p. 68; Longo, p. 18; Graziani, pp. 50–1. 3000 men (soldiers, sailors and rowers) were said to have died while the fleet was at Crete (Guglielmotti, p. 26). Natale Conti's figure of 36,000 for the total mortality in the fleet in this expedition (*Hist.* 1589, f. 90) is surely an exaggeration. Manolesso (f. 39), describing the mortality as increased by the fact that most of the men were unused to the sea, speaks of the lack of food and medicaments and the confined space in the ships.

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FROM CRETE TO SYRIA

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24 August to report that the Turks were in Cyprus.[1] But Zane still, in the absence of the allied contingents, did not feel justified in taking action. Thus the best part of the season slipped away, although something was done to fill up the gaps in the crews and troops, not only by the expeditions to the islands, but by the energetic action of Luke Michiel, the Proveditor of Canea, who was locally popular.[2]

We have seen that the Spanish fleet, such as it was, had assembled by 8 August, but Doria did not move from Messina. He maintained, indeed, to the Pope's lively indignation, that he had no orders actually to join forces with the Venetian fleet.[3] At last, on 8 August,[4] the same day on which Santa Cruz arrived, came an order from the King which left Doria no option but to proceed, at any rate to join Colonna at Otranto; yet it was not until the 12th that he weighed anchor.[5] It appears that at the time he did not know that Colonna was waiting for him; but this he learned when a frigate despatched by Colonna met him at Capo delle Colonne. By the 17th he had all but reached Otranto, having had

[1] Contarini, f. 10b.

[2] Manolesso, f. 39b. Zane is said to have demanded 7000 men for the service of the fleet from the Venetian nobles resident in Candia, and an equal number from the local magistrates. (Morosini, lib. IX, p. 48.) Paruta, p. 74, says that the fleet was sufficiently brought up to strength, both in rowers and soldiers. Doria, as we shall see, never admitted this; and even Colonna assumed that it was only so if it was reckoned that the rowers could be armed.

[3] Putting the best construction on the appearances, Foglieta (col. 950) asserts that there was a genuine misunderstanding. The King had promised Torres that Doria should, in deference to the Pope's wishes, proceed to Messina with his ships, 'Pontificis et Venetorum caussa'. Torres took this to mean that Doria was to obey the orders of the Pope in all matters. Doria on the other hand believed that his obedience to the Pope did not extend further than going to Messina. Philip, on the Pope protesting, laid the blame on his secretary, and ordered Doria to do what the Pope wished. This had wasted six weeks or rather two months. Doria's belief, as a matter of fact, was justified by Philip himself; in a letter to his ministers in Rome, 15 July 1570, he wrote: 'la causa porque a Juan Andrea no se ordenó los dias passados mas de que juntasse con todas las galeras en Sicilia, fué porque ni se pidió mas desto de parte de S.S.' The King and his ministers knew perfectly well the real meaning of the request made by Torres, but stuck to the letter of it. Serrano, *Liga*, p. 73.

[4] *Informatione*, Doc. M, p. 28.

[5] Doria's itinerary is fixed by letters from Colonna to the Cardinal Rusticucci and the Spanish ambassador, quoted by Guglielmotti, pp. 48 n., 51 n. Longo also makes him set out on the 12th. Foglieta's date (21 Aug.) is obviously wrong. Colonna's report to the King of Spain (Doc. Gb, p. 431) also fixes his arrival at Otranto on the night of the 20th (not the 19th, as Manfroni has it, p. 461).

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favourable weather; but he turned back to Taranto to pick up some soldiers. 'I see', wrote Colonna, 'that this tardiness is the ruin of this business.'

The distance from Messina to Otranto, in good weather and with the following wind which Doria enjoyed, could have been covered in two days; he took eight. His rate of progress contrasted unfavourably with that of Santa Cruz, who, leaving Naples on 6 August, had brought his twenty-three galleys to Messina by the 8th.[1] When he arrived on the night of the 20th, he did not enter the port. According to Colonna, he behaved with scant courtesy, omitting to report his arrival either on that night or the next day, and Colonna had to take the first step, sending his lieutenant Pompeo and then calling on him in person on the 21st, ignoring his rudeness, and addressing him as General, although he had less right to this title than Zane.[2] Doria told Colonna that although he had the King's orders to sail under the Pope's flag, he was also bound to preserve the King's fleet intact. The season was late, and he could not easily join the Venetian fleet in Crete; his ships were not in a condition to fight;[3] in fact he multiplied difficulties.[4] Cardona agreed, but Santa Cruz expressed no opinion. Colonna explained that the King, in placing Doria under the Pope's flag, was paying a compliment to His Holiness, without derogation to Doria's reputation as a commander of experience. This was no time to talk of difficulties. The King's orders were clear, and the two fleets having now united, and the desire of the Venetian Signory being known, it was their duty to act with the Venetians in the service of God and the King. Doria finally agreed to sail for Crete, but asked that a frigate should be sent to tell Zane to bring

[1] Costo, f. 19; *Informatione*, Doc. M, p. 27. As the crow flies, the distances are roughly the same; but by following the coast, Doria's route would be considerably the longer of the two.

[2] Colonna's complaints of Doria's lack of manners are described by Doria's apologist Rosell (p. 34, n. 17) as instances of his 'puerile vanity'. As will appear from an incident at Suda soon afterwards, Doria, if he reported in person to Colonna, would have admitted that Colonna was his superior.

[3] This statement is on the authority of Colonna (Report to King of Spain, Doc. Gb, p. 432); it is somewhat surprising that Doria, so critical of others, should have made it, unless he was short of good reasons for not going on.

[4] Doria 'makes many difficulties not only about going beyond Candia but about going even so far as that', wrote Colonna on 21 Aug. (Guglielmotti, p. 48 n.). Cp. below, p. 922.

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his fleet to Zante as a protection against the enemy.[1] Santa Cruz observed that, Zane being at Candia and the Turks seven hundred miles away, this was unnecessary; but Doria insisted, and Colonna borrowed a frigate from Santa Cruz for the purpose (thereby offending Doria, because the loan was not asked for through him). Zane however was asked for only a few ships; and in any case, if the message ever reached him, not one was sent. The two fleets sailed on the 22nd. Doria had wasted another two days over business that might have been settled in two hours.

Such is Colonna's story of what happened in Otranto. Doria's version, in his first Manifesto, gives a different view of his attitude.[2] He begins with the admission that it lay with Colonna to decide whether the allies should proceed to look for the enemy. Therefore, although he knew of the defective state of the Venetian fleet, and the season was so late, he felt bound to sail with him to join Zane. To save time he recommended taking the direct route, not through the islands.[3] Nevertheless, they did not make good time. While Doria claimed that he had to take Colonna's galleys in tow,[4] the other side complained that even in fine weather he sailed for a whole day using his foresails only.[5]

Meanwhile the Turkish Admiral, Piale Pasha, had not failed to inform himself of the chances of his being attacked by the allies. He left Salines with a hundred galleys and cruised to Rhodes, whence, about 20 August, he despatched five galliots in the direction of Crete. These, having landed a party in the island, brought back the intelligence that the Venetian fleet was still alone there; deaths from disease had greatly depleted its forces, and it would not move without the Spanish fleet,

[1] Cp. *Informatione*, Doc. M, p. 28. Veroggio (p. 75) maintains that the charge that Doria was afraid of being attacked by the Turks on the way to Crete is not in keeping with his character. But there is no doubt that the desire to keep his ships intact overruled every other consideration in his mind. Doubtless he was afraid not so much of the enemy as of what Philip might say to him if his ships were lost.

[2] Doc. D.

[3] Longo, p. 19, says that Doria's brother Pagano said at Corfù that his commission 'non lo serviva', and they wished to go to Malta. If this is true, Doria must have put in at Corfù on the way south from Otranto. Colonna says that, for fear of being seen, he went so far out to sea that they nearly failed to make Candia; yet one morning they were so near Cape Matapan that they were actually sighted.

[4] Bosio, III (1602), p. 865. Colonna (Doc. Gb, p. 433) admits that some of the Papal galleys, *di fresco armate*, needed to be towed.

[5] *Informatione*, Doc. M, p. 28.

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for which it was waiting. Piale was not the sort of sea-captain to seize such an opportunity of attacking his adversary. He returned to Cyprus about 30 August.[1]

Zane, who had taken forty galleys to Candia in the hope of recruiting rowers there, returned to Suda on the last day of August, on which day also the Spanish and Papal contingents appeared. The new arrivals were greeted with much ceremony and demonstrations of joy, prompted by expectations which were too soon to be disappointed. At every stage of the expedition henceforth there were dissensions between the commanders; first, on the question whether it should proceed at all; and afterwards, when events decided that it must turn homewards, on how the retirement should be conducted.

At Otranto, as we have seen, Colonna had passed over Doria's breach of etiquette. At Suda, a difficulty of the same kind arose. Zane sent the two Proveditors Celsi and Canale to pay a formal visit to Doria on his arrival. He at first declined to go in person, since that would be acknowledging Doria's precedence. Colonna however persuaded him to do so, on the ground that this respect was due to the King's flag rather than to Doria. 'With this act', says Colonna, 'the precedence of Doria was established.'[2] The incident illustrated the complete lack of equilibrium in the organization of the expedition. If it meant that Doria was acknowledged by Zane as a superior officer, it did not thereby imply that Zane was obliged to take orders from him. The Venetian General had instructions from the Senate to show every kind of honour and respect to the other two commanders, and to yield them the first place, in virtue of the greatness of the princes whom they represented, although in the enterprises which they would have to undertake the only charge and authority entrusted to them was that of member of a council.[3] No one's dignity allowed him to take second place; no one was in a position to claim the first.[4]

On 1 September Colonna, preparatory to calling a council of all the commanders, visited Zane, who summoned Sforza Pallavicino and the two Proveditors, whom by the terms of his appointment he was bound to consult. Pallavicino and Celsi were for making a diversion in the Aegean. Canale supported Zane, who produced orders from the Signory

[1] Calepio, f. 103.

[2] App. to Sereno, Doc. Gb, p. 433.

[3] Paruta, p. 75: 'benche nell' imprese, che essi havessero a prendere, non fusse loro altro carico, & autorità riserbata, che di consigliare'.

[4] Rosell, p. 36, n. 24.

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to make for Cyprus and attack the Turkish fleet. Colonna was not prepared to state his opinion; the decision ought to be taken at a council at which Doria and the commanders of the squadrons of Naples and Sicily ought to be present. Such a council Colonna summoned on 3 September, but asked Zane to absent himself from a preliminary discussion with Doria, Santa Cruz, Cardona, and Pallavicino, at which Pompeo Colonna was also present. They were informed of the decision of the Venetian Senate and of Zane's determination to follow its orders. Doria then gave his reasons against proceeding further. The season was too late; when they had once left Crete there would be no harbours in which they could shelter; the Venetian galleys were inadequately manned; those of the enemy, on the other hand, were fully manned with fine soldiers; the numbers of the fleets were about equal. If they joined battle the only naval force which the Christians possessed would either be destroyed or save itself by a disgraceful flight. He drew no positive conclusions however, but said that he must return to the West at the end of the month.[1] He was supported by Don John of Cardona, but the Marquess of Santa Cruz (who generally favoured the bolder policy, and throughout makes a most favourable impression in contrast to his chief) insisted that they must do both the things that the Venetians required, to wit, go forward and prepare to fight when the right time came. Colonna's lieutenant Pompeo spoke in the same sense. Pallavicino,[2] on the other hand, was for a compromise, suggesting a diversion to the Dardanelles, to draw the Turkish fleet away from Cyprus; on the way thither, Negroponte might be occupied. Last of all, Colonna himself dwelt on the disgrace they would incur by a retreat. Although he

[1] According to his own statement, Doria informed Colonna of this awkward fact, not at the first council, but on 4 Sept. For him to stay until the end of the month would still be too late if he wished to escape bad weather; but he was willing to run this risk, since it would give the Venetians twenty-six more days. The voyage between Crete and Cyprus could be made in six to eight days in favourable weather. Doria adds that Colonna admitted that he would be justified in not staying after the end of the month, and that he might turn back from wherever he might be.

[2] Romanin (VI, p. 297) summarizes Pallavicino's arguments from the statements in the *Annali* and reports on the voyage in the *Relazioni della guerra di Cipro*, etc., in the Venetian Archives. He argued that by making for the Dardanelles they could open the way to Constantinople itself, and if the enemy attempted to stop them he could only bring part of his fleet; the rest he must leave to prevent Venetian ships issuing from Cyprus ports and thus placing him between two fires. But, yielding to the arguments of Zane and Canale, Pallavicino said he was ready to obey. (*Annali*, under 16 Sept. 1570.)

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thought well of Pallavicino's suggestion,[1] he felt himself bound to support the Venetians, whose orders were to go to the rescue of Cyprus. Rebutting Doria's arguments, he denied that the season was too far advanced; they could keep the seas even into November. As to harbours, there was Famagusta, still untaken, as well as Paphos, Lemesos, Larnaka, Kerynia.[2] The Venetian numbers had been brought up to their normal strength; their rowers were all Christians, and could be armed.[3] The fleets combined numbered in all 205 sail (12 Papal, 49 Spanish, of the Venetians 126 galleys, one galleon, eleven galliasses, and six *navi*) against 150 of the enemy. Zane now appeared, bearing a written request from himself and his staff that the expedition should proceed and not be deserted by the Spanish and Papal contingents. Doria was obliged to give way. But his attitude had convinced the Venetians that his solicitude was for the twelve galleys which were his own private property, and in which his whole patrimony was sunk. They therefore asked Colonna to inform him that they would go security for them to the amount of 200,000 ducats, and the cost of any repairs that might be necessary. Colonna naturally refused to convey so insulting a proposal. But Doria asked for certain concessions. They were for the most part granted, but the demand did not lessen the prevalent ill-feeling, although Colonna did his best to throw oil on the troubled waters. Doria was to be supplied with biscuit for the whole voyage; he should do no rearguard duty (as normally all were expected to do in turn); his galleys were not to sail in a body with the rest, where they would be compelled to fight if there was a general engagement, but separately;[4] finally, there should be a thorough review of the fleet at Sitia. He also recommended that two galleys should be sent on to Cyprus to obtain intelligence of the enemy. This was done, Quirini sailing from Suda on 6 September, with

[1] This is hardly enough to justify the assertion of Manolesso (f. 40) that Colonna, like Doria and the Generals of Naples and Sicily, agreed with Pallavicino and Celsi, but yielded to the arguments of Zane and Canale.

[2] The printed text of Colonna adds *Leska*, meaning presumably the roadstead of Pendayia near Lefka.

[3] It must be observed that a number of Turkish prisoners, captured in the islands, were among them.

[4] He asked, says Colonna, to take the right wing, but this Zane refused, and placed him on the left, though allowing him to sail at some distance from the rest. As they sailed along the north coast of Crete, he would be on the seaward side. But Longo (p. 19), describing the departure from Sitia, says Doria took the right or seaward wing (which was properly the place of Pallavicino), because it would be easier for him to escape in case of need.

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a second galley; and on the 9th, the combined fleets having moved to Candia, Louis Bembo, Angelo Suriano and Vincent Maria Priuli were despatched on a similar mission.[1]

Zane, writing to the Council of Ten from Suda on 7 September, described Doria's obstructive attitude. Colonna, he says, has told him that it was with great difficulty that Doria was persuaded to come; merely in order to cause delay, he wanted to go to Malta first; then he said it was too late to go on to Cyprus, considering the length of the voyage; and finally, though he pretends to be willing to fight the enemy, he does not wish to do so at all, and never ceases to make difficulties. Zane adds that the Rectors in Crete, in spite of his protests, are very slow in providing men.[2]

Meanwhile in Cyprus Piale had formed the conclusion, which proved to be correct, that it was unlikely that the allies would ever agree with each other on any plan of attack, so that he was able to detach men from his fleet, a hundred from each galley, to reinforce Mustafa Pasha before Nicosia.[3] Thus, as we shall see, Mustafa Pasha carried the place on 9 September. It has been urged that if the allies had been near enough to take advantage of this weakening of the Turkish fleet, they could have wiped it out; the argument ignores the fact that had they been so near, Piale would have known of it and would not have denuded his ships. It is true that this might have given some respite to Nicosia.

On 13 September, a move was made to Sitia. There on the 16th Quirini returned with the certain intelligence that the Turks were in Cyprus; but Nicosia was supposed to be still holding out.[4] The promised review of the whole fleet was now held.[5] Zane's crews were so depleted that five galleys had to be disarmed and their men distributed among the others.[6] The twelve Papal galleys proved to be well found, having

[1] Contarini, f. 12b.

[2] Molmenti, *Seb. Veniero*, pp. 50–1, and in *Riv. Marittima*, XXXI (iii), 1898, p. 255, from the *Annali*. In the former work, p. 47, n. 1, Molmenti also cites a letter of Zane to the Senate dated 8 Sept. in which he says that he is in despair because of the mortality in his fleet.

[3] Contarini, *loc. cit.*

[4] The Lieutenant of Cyprus, Nicolas Dandolo, had written an urgent letter to Zane on 29 Aug. representing the desperate situation (Morosini, II, p. 308; Romanin, VI, pp. 293–4).

[5] Colonna's date (Doc. Gb, App. to Sereno, p. 434), 21 Sept., for the review is an obvious mistake, since they left Sitia on the 17th.

[6] Foglieta (cols. 982, 983) says that Zane's fleet was reduced to 120 galleys, which Contarini's enumeration, to be cited later, shows to be incorrect.

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complements of a hundred or more fighting men each. Those of Doria (his forty-nine galleys had dwindled to forty-five) were also fully furnished. But the Venetians had only some eighty fighting men, in addition to sailors and rowers, in each galley. With the 122 galleys, eleven galliasses, the Fausto galleon, ten armed *navi*, and four *galeoncini* or small galleons, there were 205 sail of the line.[1] As to the number of the troops they carried, the only detailed estimate reckons it as 16,995.[2]

If Colonna was satisfied (and his rejoinder to Doria will show that he considered the fleet fit to meet the enemy), Doria was not, and raised so many objections that Colonna asked him to put them in writing. This he did on 16 September.[3]

[1] These figures are given for the fleets as they sailed from Sitia by Contarini, ff. 16–19. Doria (letter to Zuñiga, Doc. Kb) enumerates 180 galleys, 11 galliasses, 1 galleon and 5 *navi*. Paruta (p. 115) agrees with Contarini except that he gives the Venetians two more light galleys. Sereno (p. 68) also agrees with Contarini, except that he gives Doria 49 galleys, and Canale 20 instead of 19. Earlier (p. 47) he had said that Venice gave Zane 137 galleys, 11 galliasses, 1 galleon, 14 *navi* and 7 *fuste*. Colonna (App. to Sereno, Doc. Gb, p. 435) reckons 180 galleys, 12 galliasses and 6 *grosse navi*. Manolesso (f. 22b) says that Zane was put in command of 158 galleys (but he includes the 12 hulls given to Colonna), 11 galliasses, the Fausto galleon, 14 *navi*, 7 *fuste*. His figures for the whole fleet at the Sitia review, however, are only 149 galleys, 12 large galleys (including the Fausto) and 14 *navi* (f. 40).

[2] Contarini, ff. 14–16. The 12 Papal galleys carried 1100; those of Spain, 3500; the Venetians, 8561. In addition there were 37 gentlemen who had volunteered, 565 soldiers of fortune, 1600 foot-soldiers from Brescia, Verona and Salò, and 1632 collected from various fortresses. Manolesso (f. 40) agrees with Contarini for the Papal and Spanish contingents, but puts the Venetians at 12,500, making 17,100 in all, which is near enough to Contarini's total. Yet, in his account of the review, he puts the total infantry at 16,000, in which Sereno (p. 67) follows him. Guarneri (f. 41) allows 1100 men to Colonna, 3900 to Doria, and 8660 to Venice. Paruta (p. 115) says that the losses by death in the Venetian fleet had been nearly made up to the original number of 10,000 foot by recruiting in the islands. Longo (p. 14), describing the Venetian fleet as it started under Zane, says that the 126 galleys each had a hundred fighting men, and there were some 40,000 'tra l'armata e li presidj'. Of modern writers, Rosell (p. 36) reckons the number of men at 15,000, viz. 8000 under Zane, 5000 under Doria (3000 Spaniards, 2000 Italians), 1000 under Colonna, and some adventurers. Guglielmotti (p. 68), counting 202 sail of the line, gives them 1300 guns, 16,000 soldiers and more than twice that number of sailors and rowers.

[3] His first Manifesto (Doc. D). Cp. Bosio, III, pp. 865–6. The drafting was perhaps due to his adviser Ascanio della Corgna. Besides this, and Colonna's reply, see Paruta, pp. 112–15; Sereno, p. 69; Bizari, pp. 64 ff.; Foglieta, cols. 982–5; Graziani, pp. 56–9. Guglielmotti analyses the discussion, pp. 69–73.

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The two galleys which had been sent out had brought a report from Scarpanto that the enemy's fleet had been reduced to 150 or 160 galleys (which was perhaps founded on the fact that 160 had always been the number of the galleys, apart from other less effective ships). Doria disbelieved the report, and was sure that if the reduction had taken place, the Pasha in command of the land army might be expected to have reinforced the fleet. The Venetians themselves, said Doria, admitted that the Turks had 175 galleys as well as other vessels. He allowed that the Venetian galliasses might be of great assistance; Santa Cruz, who had inspected them, reported that they were in good order. Still, he could find only two reasons in favour of going forward, reasons which he stated at length, only to reject them as bad. To the argument that the allies might retire if they found the enemy too strong, he replied that all retreats were shameful. He bitterly criticized the state of the Venetian ships.[1]

Inspection had shown him that there were as many as sixty of them which lacked a third of their crews, and the number of soldiers and sailors, good and bad, was not more than eighty to a ship. What is more, he accused Zane of trickery at the review. Instead of arranging his ships, as Doria himself did, outside the harbour, and taking the small boats inboard, he drew them up in the harbour, with their sterns on shore and the soldiers forward, not taking in his small boats, so that men could be transferred from one ship to another between the several inspections.[2] If they were to proceed (and he saw no object in doing so), he could only suggest that the Venetians should with all speed find another 3000 soldiers, so that the complements could be made up to a hundred a ship. This ought to be done in two weeks, for he must be gone by the end of the month; his biscuit would be exhausted by 18 October.[3] Colonna should stir up the Venetians so that all might be over by the end of the month. Doria professed himself reluctant to return without the Pope's fleet having won the reputation which was its due. Colonna, he continued, had said that it would be more in keeping with the dignity of the King of Spain to lose his ships than to retire without striking a blow. That accorded with the zeal which he and his

[1] Longo (p. 19) makes him say that in his commission there was a line in King Philip's own hand warning him to keep an eye on the Venetian ships.

[2] The charge was probably unjustified, and Colonna says that Doria failed to prove it.

[3] Longo, p. 19. The Venetians had already undertaken to supply him with biscuit.

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house had always shown in the service of the King. But if they declined to fight, it would be due to the deficiency of the Venetian, not of the Spanish, fleet, so that no blame would attach to Colonna. Finally, he professed that if the Venetian deficiencies were made good, he would be willing to go forward, subject of course to that time-limit, which he could not exceed without risking his ships.

Colonna replied in writing on the same day.[1] He described the difficulties he had experienced in equipping his own ships, and quoted the letter which he had received from the King at Otranto (above, p. 904). When he reached Suda, Zane had requested him to accompany the Venetian fleet to the relief of Cyprus. Those were the orders of the Signory, and Colonna's course was plain, since he had been sent by the Pope with orders to give every possible help to Venice.[2] All the blame for shirking a fight would rest on the King. The Venetians were incurring a much greater risk than the King with his forty-nine ships, for they risked the loss of their islands and all their possessions oversea. The allied fleet was superior in the quality of its officers, in the number of its fighting men and guns, and in 'artificial fire'. It was not so weak that it must fear contact with the enemy, who had not been reinforced by Uluj-Ali and the western corsairs, and never had more than 165 galleys; in any case, it was impossible now to find more men. If the Venetian ships had only eighty fighting men apiece, their rowers were Christians, not captive slaves,[3] and could be armed, like the rowers in the Papal squadron. Their ships had a protective armament which the Turks lacked, and their great galliasses were like fortresses towering over and firing down upon the enemy. To desert the Venetians now would alienate them from the Pope and the King, and drive them into the arms of the Turk. The Pope and the King had sent their fleets to help the Venetians, not to look on idly while Cyprus, to the shame of Christendom, was wrested from them. It was the delay of the Spanish and Papal contingents that had wasted the whole summer and brought the rot on what had been a flourishing fleet.

Colonna's memorandum having been distributed to the captains, a council was held the same evening, and Doria had to give way. But

[1] Doc. E.

[2] He confessed afterwards to the King (App. to Sereno, Doc. Gb, p. 434) that he saw the objections to proceeding with the expedition, and had Zane had another plan he would willingly have agreed to it.

[3] But see above, p. 921, n. 3.

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he lost no opportunity of annoying his colleagues. Although it was the rule that at night only the flagship of the admiral in command should show a light on its poop, he asserted his independence of Colonna by doing the same himself. As he had been given leave to sail separately from the body of the fleet, no protest was made against what was, at the best, a breach of etiquette. He took the right wing, which, once the expedition reached the Anatolian coast, placed him on the seaward side.[1] The Venetians remembered the equivocal part played by his great-uncle Andrew Doria at Prévesa in 1538; the great-nephew seemed to them now to be running true to form.[2] What that form was became still more clear at Lepanto, where he deliberately allowed Uluj-Ali to escape. The immemorial jealousy between Venice and Genoa made a fertile soil for the growth of such suspicion.[3] Philip indeed, if he deliberately aimed at making a fiasco of the expedition, could not have chosen a better instrument than Doria.

Meanwhile Turkish galliots[4] reaching Crete on 15 September captured a barque from which they learned that the allied fleets had united and were about to sail. This information, reaching Cyprus on the 23rd, caused Piale, who was lying off the 'Gardens' of Famagusta, some anxiety. But, encouraged by Ali and Mustafa Pasha, he put ashore all his prisoners and non-combatants, left his heavy ships at Famagusta, sent two galleys to Cape S. Epiphani to scout, and took all his oared galleys to Lemesos, whence he intended to sail in search of the enemy.[5]

The allies weighed anchor from Sitia on 17 September at the fifth hour of the night.[6] On the 18th they were in the channel between

[1] See above, p. 921 and n. 4.

[2] Graziani, p. 60. The nuncio at Naples reported a conversation with Colonna, who gave the reasons for Venetian suspicion of Doria: his refusal to stay beyond a certain date, to take the rearguard, or to sail anywhere but on the seaward wing (Serrano, *Corr. dipl.* IV, p. 64, n. 1).

[3] Cf. Manfroni, p. 464; Herre, p. 127.

[4] The commander's name in the Italian writers appears as *Caiacelebi*, *Caiacelebin*, *Caia Cenlibi*, *Caccialebinus*, or *Caracelebino*. He may have been Kaya, Sanjakbey of Izmid, who is mentioned later (Refik, no. 11, probably in Feb. 1571) as in command of 20 ships. See Addenda, p. 1161.

[5] Contarini, f. 19; Sozomeno (*Exc. Cypr.* p. 86); Calepio, ff. 101, 109; Bizari, pp. 53–4; Foglieta, col. 990; Brenzone, p. 64.

[6] Contarini, f. 16; Sereno, p. 68. Doria's second Manifesto (early at night on the 17th). In his letter to Zuñiga (Doc. Kb) he has, quite wrongly, the 13th. Foglieta, col. 990 (17 Sept.); Paruta, p. 115 (18 Sept.); Colonna, Report to King of Spain,

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Rhodes and Scarpanto; on the next day the *navi* and galliasses which had been sent on some twenty or twenty-five miles ahead with the vanguard were sighted.[1] The fleets made Castellorizo on the evening of 21 September[2] without incident, but between that island and Fineka were caught by bad weather. The Venetian and Papal commanders took their ships into shelter,[3] but Doria kept at sea, on the ground that it was unsafe to go into the confined space at night with so many ships; though it

Doc. Gb, p. 435 (19 Sept.). Colonna's dates for the rest of the voyage are otherwise generally acceptable. All the fleets kept together until St Matthew's Day, 21 Sept., when he and Zane took shelter at Calamata, but Doria kept out at sea. 'Meanwhile' the two galleys came with the news of the fall of Nicosia. On the 22nd the council decided to return. All documents and other sources show that all the fleets were at Porto di Tristamo on the 26th. Alasya (p. 26) makes the fleets reach Meyis (i.e. Megiste, Castellorizo) on the 22nd. Contarini confusedly says that Bembo's returning galleys were sighted by Quirini in the vanguard 'about' the 22nd; that the fleet entered Vathi that evening, that the council met next day; retirement began at the seventh hour of the night of the 22nd; the storm broke at the sixth hour of the day on the 23rd; Tristamo was reached on the 26th, and all three fleets left it 'about 30 September'. Paruta gives no precise dates. Sereno makes Bembo arrive on the 22nd; council on 23rd; gale on the way to Scarpanto on 26th. Foglieta makes the retreat begin on 21 Sept., the storm on 22nd; Doria, separated from the rest, made Tristamo on 23rd (confirmed by Doria himself, Doc. Kb), put to sea on 24th, but was driven back to port; on which day the others arrived. Natale Conti (*Hist.* 1589, f. 89b) has the impossible date 20 Sept.—Sforza Pallavicino, *Relatione* (Serrano, *Liga*, p. 80, n. 2), says that the fleet left Crete in great confusion, nobody paying attention to the sailing orders. Later he says (*ibid.* n. 4, and Rosell, p. 46 n.) that when it was attempted to range the ships in battle order the inexperience, indiscipline and weakness of the force became conspicuous (Serrano says that this test took place 'in Rodas', meaning presumably the channel between Rhodes and Scarpanto). It may be this test which is alluded to by Doria in his letter to Zuñiga (Doc. Kb), when he says that the day after sailing from Sitia, there was a conference on the order of sailing and battle. Manolesso also (f. 40b) says that Pallavicino, noticing the disorder, spoke to Zane, who in consultation with Colonna issued orders for sailing and fighting.

[1] Doria's second Manifesto, Doc. J, p. 359.

[2] Doria (Doc. Kb) blames the Venetians for slow sailing; they took four days to cover half the distance.

[3] At Vathi and Calamiti (Paruta); Vasi (Contarini); Calamata (Colonna); Calamatta (Foglieta); Calamato (Graziani); Acque fredde (Doria and Natale Conti). These places have not been identified. Guglielmotti (p. 76) says that since the fleets were some twelve miles from Castellorizo the place can only be the great roadstead of Cáccamo. If so, Vathi and Calamata may have been the small harbours on the mainland side of the strait. See the *New Mediterranean Pilot* (1802), no. 198, for a plan. The island which shelters the roadstead, and the town on the mainland are both marked as Kekowa in later maps, such as the Austrian survey of Lycia.

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was suspected that the rising force of the scirocco would force him to run westwards, and give him a good excuse for deserting the expedition.[1]

On the evening of the 21st Louis Bembo, who as we know had been sent out from Candia, arrived with the news that Nicosia had fallen on 9 September.[2] He had taken a foist on which were some Christian Turkish subjects, and which was carrying letters from Cyprus to Rhodes. Bembo was met by Quirini, who imparted the news to the other commanders. Zane has been blamed[3] for allowing this information to be spread through the fleet, although in the circumstances it is difficult to see how it could have been suppressed. Even if it could, to proceed with the enterprise on his own responsibility was more than could be expected of him in view of the divided command.

The wind having abated, Colonna at Zane's request summoned a council next day (22 September), sending for Doria who, though he had been warned that he would be wanted, had to be fetched from some twenty miles out at sea. At first Colonna discussed the situation with Doria, Santa Cruz, Cardona and Pompeo Colonna, in the absence of the Venetians.[4] Santa Cruz went over to the side which urged turning back. The enemy, he said, would be encouraged by his success, and plentifully supplied with provisions from Nicosia and all the island; the general of the land army could now reinforce the fleet if the admiral wished to fight; order must by now have been restored after the sack of the city; the weather was unfavourable; the forces of the allies were dispirited, especially as many of them had always been reluctant to come at all.

[1] He did not disguise from Colonna that had the gale increased he would have departed, not caring if he left the others in confusion and within sight of the enemy (App. to Sereno, Doc. Gb, p. 436; cp. Graziani, p. 97). As Graziani says, this not so much offended Colonna as it confirmed the Venetian suspicions. Doria complained that his opinion was never taken into account; whereas, Colonna says, the only point on which he did not conform to it was the question whether the expedition should or should not proceed.

[2] This news reached Rome on 2 Nov. (Pastor, *vol. cit.* p. 394) and Venice about the same time. The 4th of that month is the date of the first letters of the Senate expressing distress at the loss of Nicosia and the failure of the fleet to proceed, and recommending the Captain-General to send help to Famagusta. Romanin, VI, p. 297, n. 1.

[3] Guglielmotti, p. 81.

[4] Doria himself says that he told Pompeo Colonna, who was sent to him for his opinion, that there was nothing more to say than had been said; if the fleet was in good order, then it should go on and fight. The position was no worse than when they sailed from Crete. He then went aboard Colonna's galley. (Second Manifesto, Doc. J, p. 359; cp. Doc. Kb.)

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He was therefore against proceeding. Pompeo Colonna also changed his mind, but suggested that they should wait and see what the Venetians said. Zane and his staff had been discussing the situation for more than three hours. In doubt as to the truth of the report of the fall of Nicosia, they had put the men who brought it to torture, but failed to shake them. Venier, though he recognized that owing to the fall of Nicosia the Turkish fleet might be in a good condition to fight, argued that, if not beaten now, it would be stronger next year, and it would be difficult to find a sufficiently powerful Christian fleet to oppose it; therefore he was in favour of attacking now rather than later. It was impracticable to throw reinforcements into Famagusta.[1] They now came aboard Colonna's flagship and said that for the reasons given it was right to retire, and make no attempt to engage the enemy. Colonna himself, in his report, observes that he had throughout, in this as in other councils, never uttered his own mind on the question at issue, merely stating what difficulties would have to be faced.[2] Although he was leader of the expedition, he did not, in fact, pretend to decide on questions of strategy or tactics.

Zane now suggested that the allies, on their way home, should attempt to do some damage to the enemy. In view of the shortness of the time remaining before winter, they decided that the only possible places to attack must be near Italy and as far as possible from the Turks, such as Durazzo and Valona. Doria himself suggested these places and offered his ships for such an enterprise.[3] Agreement having been reached, the fleets sailed for Scarpanto.

Such is the account given by Colonna himself of the discussion which led to the decision to renounce the attempt to meet the Turkish fleet in battle; and it is confirmed in all essentials by Doria.[4] Although the Genoese admiral's behaviour may have been suspicious and annoying, it is not possible, after reading the documents, to doubt that Zane, however desirous he may have been to carry out his commission from the Signory, was convinced by the turn of events that he could not do so. It is unlikely that, had he insisted, he could have carried Doria with

[1] Molmenti, *Seb. Veniero*, pp. 53–4 (from the *Annali*).

[2] His reply to Doria's first Manifesto (above, p. 925) shows that this statement must be taken with some reserve.

[3] This is confirmed by Doria himself (Second Manifesto, Doc. J, p. 360).

[4] Colonna's Report to the King of Spain; his Letter from Sitia, 28 Sept.; Doria's Second Manifesto (Docs. Gb, I, J).

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him, especially as Santa Cruz, hitherto so staunch a supporter of the forward policy, had deserted his side.

The contemporary historians are, however, not all at one about what happened at the council, and it is not surprising to find a disagreement between the Genoese and Venetian authors. The accounts given by Bizari and, in more detail, by Foglieta, are even more unfavourable to Zane. According to them, at a preliminary discussion among the Venetians, Sebastian Venier and certain of the captains, who had the right to express their opinion but not to vote,[1] were urgent in favour of going on; but Zane himself, the two Proveditors and Pallavicino took the opposite view, on the ground that the enemy, his troops being no longer needed to besiege Nicosia, would be three times as strong as themselves. It would be wiser to make an attempt on Negroponte. Venier and his supporters were unable to move Zane, though they insisted he had no right to disobey the Senate's orders, which were to find out and fight the enemy. Proceeding to consult with Doria and Colonna, Zane was asked his opinion, and repeated that he was in favour of attacking Negroponte or some other Turkish possession. Doria said that the fall of Nicosia had not altered the situation or his opinion, which was, as before, that if they felt themselves sufficiently strong they should proceed, but if (as he held) they were not, they should retire. To attack Negroponte would be futile, for they could not hold it, if they took it. Some place on the Adriatic coast would be a more suitable objective. Colonna held that nothing further should be attempted in that year. So it was unanimously decided, and the combined fleets turned their prows homewards.

Sereno, a comparatively impartial writer, does not mention the names of those who took sides in the discussion, beyond saying that there was a lively altercation between Doria and Colonna. And Graziani agrees with the Genoese version, saying that the votes of Pallavicino, Celsi and Canale were in the sense that Zane himself desired.[2]

Of the Venetian writers, Contarini, as usual, is quite colourless; there being no doubt that Nicosia had fallen, it was felt that the enemy's fleet

[1] Graziani (p. 98) mentions Venier, Quirini, Francis Duodo (who commanded the galliasses) and Santo Tron. For Venier's view, see above (p. 929).

[2] Sereno, p. 69: 'contenzione e rissa di parole altercatorie'. Graziani, p. 98: 'apud idem cupientem magis valuit' (the opinion of Pallavicino and the two Proveditors). But the latter adds that at the council Zane assented *silently* to the opinion of the majority in favour of retirement.

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would be reinforced by the men released from the siege; those with experience of the sea pointed out that the season was far advanced, bad weather was to be expected, and there would be no shelter in the Gulf of Adalia. For these and other reasons it was decided to turn back.

But the semi-official Venetian historian Paruta[1] gives a very different impression of the proceedings. At the council of war, he says, those who, before leaving Crete, had doubted the wisdom of proceeding, expressed themselves still more strongly in the same sense; the others urged that nothing should be done to hinder the execution of the plan which had been jointly undertaken. But Doria clearly stated his wish to return, the object for which they had come, to wit the relief of Nicosia, having disappeared; there was no sense in risking battle with an enemy much stronger in numbers and heartened by his success. The winter was coming on, they were a long way from home, and it was his duty to conserve the fleet which had been committed to his charge. Nothing that Zane or Venier (who was especially keen to go on to Cyprus) could say would shake his determination. He had indeed given reason by his behaviour (his refusal to take shelter is described) for the suspicion that he would desert the others. Doria's attitude encouraged those who were for turning back and were especially alarmed by the stormy nature of the Gulf of Adalia. Zane, seeing the assured resolution of Doria and the doubtful support of the others, was compelled to resign himself to retreating, bitterly disappointed of his hope of executing the commands of the Senate and at leaving the enemy free to return unmolested and triumphant to his base.

Were it not for Colonna's version of the proceedings it might be difficult to decide whether the Genoese or the Venetian story is correct. But Colonna had no reason to favour Doria, and was on very friendly terms with the Venetians. We can therefore have no hesitation in deciding that Zane had made up his mind to give up the enterprise, although it would be unfair to suppose that he did so of his own free

[1] Pp. 116–18. Longo (pp. 19–20) generally confirms him: Zane, supported by Colonna, proposed to go on, arguing that probably the Turkish fleet had been largely denuded of its fighting men, who were plundering Nicosia; Famagusta was holding out and there was a large force in it; many Christians had taken to the hills; by a sudden attack they could wipe out the Turkish fleet. Doria argued that the Turkish fleet might have gone far away from Cyprus, leaving the army in the island, where they had found plenty of provisions; and his orders were to defend Cyprus, not to fight the Turkish fleet.

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will, and not in deference to the opinion of the more experienced members of his staff. Since, on being brought to trial at Venice for his conduct of the expedition, he was acquitted, it must have been proved that he was the victim of circumstances.

The retreat began, and so did the bad weather. From Porto Piga or Pigadia on the east coast of Scarpanto, where he was forced by the scirocco to run for shelter, Zane sent a frigate to Famagusta with a promise of speedy help.[1] A storm had scattered the fleets. Doria, taking a different course from the others, ran up the west coast of Scarpanto and reached the shelter of Porto di Tristamo.[2] On the 25th the weather seemed more favourable. The others had not yet arrived, and Doria, thinking that they had gone on to Crete, stood out to sea, but was driven back by a gale. On returning to port, he found that the others had come in, all but sixteen galleys. One Venetian galley had foundered with all hands. The *navi* and galliasses were at sea two days separated from the others.

A fresh discussion of plans seemed to be called for, and now the division between Doria and the two other commanders reached breaking point.[3] Doria had made up his mind to shake off his allies, and go ahead of them through the Archipelago[4] to Zante and Cefalonia. There, he

[1] Contarini, f. 19b. It does not seem to have reached Famagusta until 3 or 4 Oct., perhaps owing to the bad weather. See below, Ch. XV, p. 1000.

[2] Or Tristomo, on the west coast of the northern extremity of Scarpanto. In the old sources the name is usually Tristamo or Tristano.

[3] Longo's evidently biased account (p. 20) is best confined to a footnote: when Doria and Colonna had reached Tristamo (they arrived before the Venetians, having followed a different route), Doria suddenly sailed at night; Colonna had him fetched back, and the whole question of attacking Negroponte or Prévesa or Modon was discussed. Doria said they had not enough men to hold such places, and if he stayed longer in the Levant he might be caught and defeated by the enemy. Colonna showed letters from the King, proving that he was in command; Doria denied it, and there was a bitter quarrel. Zane did his best to persuade Doria to keep with them as far as Zante, but in vain. Colonna told the Venetians afterwards that Doria would have liked to see them lose a hundred ships. Bizari (pp. 74–5) and Foglieta (col. 994) also mention Doria's determination to part company from the rest, and the former records the appeal to him not to do so before they should reach Zante. Doria felt that he could get home more quickly and safely by himself than if he were tied to the other fleets, whose discipline and organization had gone to pieces; there was also a lack of harbours on the way capable of taking so many vessels.

[4] In order, Colonna suspected, though perhaps without reason, to impress men for his galleys.

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professed, he would await orders, and unless the King required his presence elsewhere would lend his aid to the Republic. His reasons for this decision were the advanced season; the increasing difficulties of the voyage to Sicily; the expiry of the agreed time-limit; the absence of any sign that the Venetians were going to take any action against the enemy (perhaps because they realized their weakness better every day); the state of the Venetian and Papal galleys, almost denuded of rowers and sailors; and the delay and increased risk of sailing in disorderly fashion through seas where there was no harbour which could hold so large a fleet. Marcello Doria was sent to lay this reasoning before Colonna, who at once communicated the disconcerting news to Zane, putting the best colour on it and begging him not to take it in bad part. Zane maintained that since the King had granted him so many favours he was entitled to expect that Doria should continue to accompany him, as a protection against the enemy, as far as Zante; he would have to weaken himself by leaving some ships and a number of troops in Crete; though he undertook to stay there no more than two days. Doria told Colonna that, if a council were called, he could convince Zane that there was no more need of his services. Next day (the 26th) he again approached Colonna personally, pointing out that the fear of being attacked by the Turkish fleet was groundless, since it was so far away that it could not overtake them. He was now invited to discuss the matter directly with Zane. At this meeting[1] Don Carlos d'Avalos was present, and among the reports of it is a letter which he wrote about a month later.[2] Colonna pointed out that if Doria went on alone he would offend the Venetians and alienate them from the King of Spain.[3] Sforza Pallavicino argued that Doria had promised to accompany them to Cyprus until the end of September; there were still four days to run, to which should be added the time required to return from Cyprus; they were asking him for less than this, for they proposed to stay only two days at Candia. Doria replied that he was only pledged if they were intending to meet the enemy. No agreement was in sight, and Colonna found it necessary to assert his authority. 'If', he said, 'I order you to remain with us, will you do so?' Doria replied that his commission did not leave him free to run infinite risk to his ships, if there was no

[1] Which Doria (Letter to Zuñiga, Doc. Kb) seems to date on the 25th.

[2] Doc. L, in Costo, ff. 19b, 20; 23 Oct. 1570.

[3] Graziani, p. 99.

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intention of fighting the enemy, merely in order to bear the Venetians company when there was no danger of their being attacked. Colonna insisted that the Spanish fleet had been sent by the King at the instance of the Pope; therefore he, as General of the Church, claimed to dispose of it. Doria denied that he had such absolute authority as Don John of Austria, or was the General of the King of Spain; he was there merely as the Pope's man.[1] But when Colonna produced letters from the King, and asked him what written authority he could set against them, he could adduce nothing which he dared submit to public inspection. But he insisted that the command of the King's fleet lay in his hands, and referred Colonna to the Marquess of Santa Cruz and Don John of Cardona, who would say whom they were under orders to obey. Colonna countered with the suggestion that they should refer to the Marquess of Torremaggiore, Colonel of the Neapolitan troops,[2] from whom they would learn that he had instructions from the Viceroy of Naples to obey Colonna's orders. Here d'Avalos, encouraged by Doria's arrogant behaviour, broke in with the exclamation that he also was in command of troops, and he had no orders from the Viceroy to obey anyone but Doria. In the altercation which followed Colonna lost his temper, and d'Avalos was so disrespectful that even Doria thought he was going too far, and sent him away to his flagship. Colonna's parting words to him were that he ought to be ashamed of speaking thus disrespectfully to his 'elder brother'.

The Papal commander now washed his hands of the matter, so far as the King's ships were concerned; but he declined to desert the Venetians. Doria did not actually refuse to accompany them as far as Zante, having decided, as he himself asserts, to take orders from Colonna until the end of the month. He took his leave politely, but he was heard to say, on returning to his ship, 'Marcantonio thought he was going to distinguish himself in Cyprus at my expense'.

Nothing had been gained by the meeting, except to clear the situation by removing all hope of agreement. Doria stood out to sea the same day, but not before he had received a letter from Colonna asking him to put d'Avalos under arrest, until the King of Spain should deal with

[1] Doria meant to imply, and Colonna produced evidence to refute the implication, that he was in a purely honorary capacity, as if the Pope had nominated some Prelate or Patriarch to represent the Church, as was customary. Bizari, p. 80.

[2] John Francis di Sangro, Marquess of Torremaggiore, in command of 2000 infantry from the Regno. Costo, *Compendio*, pt. iii, f. 19.

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his case.[1] The letter seems to have had no effect on either Doria or the King.

The weather was still so unfavourable that four of Doria's ships (three of Naples and one of the Negroni) parted company and were not recovered for some days. He again returned to port; but the Venetian and Papal commanders, with less prudence, sailed for Crete (27 September). Doria complained that Colonna left without warning him. Nevertheless, he afterwards claimed, he would have followed Colonna had the weather been good; but, as it was not, he stayed behind to cover his rear against a possible Turkish attack.[2] When he wrote this on 13 October, he had doubtless forgotten that a very little time before, at Scarpanto, he had insisted that the Turks were so far away that there was no danger of any such thing.[3]

Although he started later, Doria made a straight run and arrived at Candia on the 30th, three or four days before the others. Zane and Colonna were at Sitia by the 28th, on which day the latter wrote a report to the King of Spain.[4] But the port was too small to hold all the ships, and it was necessary to proceed westwards to a safer harbour. Zane sent some of his galleys on to Suda, while he himself took the rest to Candia. Between Spinalunga (in the Gulf of Mirabello) and Sitia a northerly gale caught the Papal squadron and two of the galleys were wrecked, though the men and equipment were saved.[5] It was not until 4 October that the voyage could be continued, Quirini being left behind to recover the guns and other armaments from the wrecked galleys. Zane reached Candia on 5 October. On the 6th another northerly gale caught those of his ships which he had not taken into harbour, as well as those which were making for Suda, and eleven were wrecked.[6]

[1] Doc. F. Tristamo, 26 Sept. 1570.
[2] Doc. Kb, p. 483.
[3] Above, p. 933.
[4] Doc. I.
[5] Manolesso, f. 41; Adriani, p. 862. Contarini's account (f. 19b) is obscure. After saying they had left Tristamo 'about the end of September', he says they had not gone 25 miles (so in the 1572 edition, altered to 10 in that of 1645) when between Spinalunga and Sitia they were caught by a northerly gale, etc. This reads as if the 25 (or 10) miles were reckoned from Tristamo; but it must refer to the course taken by the ships after leaving Sitia, from which to Spinalunga is about 25 miles.
[6] According to Adriani, p. 862, four Venetian galleys and another of the Pope's, owing to careless pilotage, were driven ashore and broken up, while later near Retimo seven other Venetian ships were wrecked. Manolesso (f. 41) says that the captains and *sopracomiti* of many galleys disobeyed the order to go into harbour at Suda, and eleven were driven ashore; he gives their names, three being Papal.

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Colonna, according to Doria's account,[1] arrived at Candia with the greater number of his ships so badly knocked about that it was all he could do to get them into port. He contemptuously describes Zane and Colonna as making heavy weather and scattering galleys like seed. He himself actually lost no ships, and it must be admitted that on this expedition he showed himself a better seaman than those responsible for the navigation of the other fleets.[2]

The time-limit (the end of the month) which Doria had set was now past, and four days more (which according to Sforza Pallavicino ought to have been calculated from the date of turning back) brought him to 4 October. After consulting Santa Cruz and Cardona, he informed Colonna that, seeing they were all safe in harbour, he proposed to sail for Sicily. Colonna agreed that it was time for him to do so, and he took his leave and called on Zane, who had just arrived, and who asked whether he had made his arrangements with Colonna. Being assured that he had, says Doria, Zane showed much satisfaction at the readiness with which he had lent his aid to the Republic, and wished him Godspeed. We have, unfortunately, no other first-hand version of the interview by which to test this surprising statement.[3]

Doria sailed from Candia on 5 October.[4] He is said to have spent the

[1] Doc. J, p. 364.

[2] He says in the same Manifesto (*loc. cit.*) that after reaching Crete he recovered three of his ships which had parted company (near Tristamo) and left ten with Santa Cruz to recover the others lacking from his squadron; Santa Cruz brought the 'lost galley' (i.e. probably the fourth which had parted company) to Candia on 7 Oct. (This date is evidently an error for 2 or 3 Oct.) We know from Colonna (App. to Sereno, Doc. Gb, p. 437) that Santa Cruz came to him at Sitia to recover his galleys and that on the same night (1 Oct.) they all sailed for Candia.

[3] It is repeated by Bizari, pp. 84–5; cp. Natale Conti (*Hist.* 1589), f. 89b. In his letter to Zuñiga (Doc. Kb, p. 484) Doria merely says that he took leave of the two commanders, promising to wait for them at Zante. Foglieta (col. 995) says that he obtained leave to go from Colonna and the Venetians. But Natale Conti (*Univ. hist. sui temp.* 1581, p. 458) says that when Doria departed, Colonna embraced him like a friend, and not only approved his reason for going, but wished him all good fortune; that Venier and Zane parted from him in the same kindly fashion; and that he was thanked in the name of the Senate. In fact, the diplomatic proprieties were correctly observed.

[4] That he took advantage of his four days wait at Candia to take in a cargo of wine may be true, and small blame to him; but that was not necessarily his purpose in delaying, as Guglielmotti (p. 93) seems to imply. He may be credited with the desire to wait for the four days beyond the end of the month to which, according to Pallavicino, he was pledged.

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days while he waited for the arrival of the others in taking on supplies of local wines. If he had ever intended, as was alleged, to scour the Archipelago to make slaves of Christians living under Turkish rule, in order to reinforce his crews, there is no evidence that he did so. From Corfù, on 13 October, he addressed letters to the Pope, to Zuñiga, and to the Doge of Venice.[1] To the first he said little more than that he was writing fully to Zuñiga, to whom he justified himself at length on much the same lines as in his Manifestoes; to the Doge he spoke of the King of Spain's devotion to the Republic, asserting that he himself had always been most ready to fulfil all his obligations, but as a good seaman he had been compelled, in view of the approach of the winter season, to bring his ships home in safety. Zuñiga himself wrote to the King on 27 October; his letter shows the effect of the failure of the expedition on Roman feeling, and attempts to defend Doria.[2] After Doria's return the King promoted him General, with seniority over all other generals of his galleys of Naples, Sicily and Spain, and next year proposed him as commander-in-chief of the League. To that position he was not appointed; but he was given command of the right wing at Lepanto and nearly lost the battle for the Christians. There is no doubt that Philip approved of his conduct throughout. His excuse for the way he behaved was certainly the fact that he had secret orders from the King. That placed him in a very difficult position, which his antipathy to Colonna did not tend to ease. Knowing himself to be in the wrong, he assumed an arrogant attitude; while Colonna throughout behaved like the gentleman that he was. But in the whole unhappy business more blame attaches to the sinister figure of Philip in the background, than to his agent. Colonna, it is true, throughout declined openly to blame the King. While he said that Philip's ministers believed that if Venice were worsted, it would be more ready to yield to Spain, and it would be to the advantage of the King if Cyprus fell into the hands of the Turks, he professed that Philip did not share the views of his ministers, and the chief reason for Doria's hanging back was fear of risking his ships.[3] But all the evidence goes to show that his trust in Philip, if he really felt it, was misplaced.

Any hope of a joint enterprise against Durazzo or Valona had of course faded away in the light of this experience of Doria's recalcitrancy

[1] Docs. K a, b, c.

[2] Serrano, *Corr. dipl.* IV, pp. 61–4.

[3] *Riv. Marittima*, XXXI (1898), p. 257 (Molmenti).

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and ill-temper, from which, as Colonna said, nothing but harm could result.[1]

Zane remained at Candia until 16 October, making arrangements with Colonna, Pallavicino, Sebastian Venier, Marino Cavalli, Proveditor-General of Crete, and the Rectors of Crete, for sending relief to Famagusta, and appointing officers to command the force; though, for reasons which will appear, this expedition did not start until next year. On 22 October he was at Suda, whence he despatched Peter Emo with two galleys, and shortly afterwards Vincent Maria Priuli and Angelo Suriano, to obtain information of the movements of the Turkish fleet.[2]

Meanwhile the Turkish admiral, seeing no sign of any action by the enemy, had decided to leave Cyprus and winter in the Archipelago or at Constantinople. On 6 October,[3] the Turkish fleet sailed, leaving only seven galleys on guard at Famagusta.[4] At Castellorizo Piale learned of the retirement of the enemy; at Rhodes, of the desertion of the Spanish contingent. Sending out scouts for further information, and leaving his booty, women and children at Rhodes, he took his galleys to Stampalia, from which he again despatched twelve galliots to Crete. They were reported from Sitia to have reached the island, but not to have put any force ashore; and soon Peter Emo came into Candia with the news that the main fleet was at Stampalia. Fearing an attack, Colonna and Zane concentrated their ships at Suda.[5] There they landed guns on the Islet of the Monks[6] at the mouth of the harbour, where also the eleven galliasses and the Fausto galleon took up stations.[7] Piale, however, fortunately for the Christians, did not follow them to Crete (if he had ever intended to do so); he knew well that the harbours of that island, being all situated on the north coast and exposed to the northerly winds, offered poor shelter in the winter season. The weather

[1] *Informatione*, Doc. M, p. 30. [2] Contarini, f. 20.

[3] We have the date from Calepio (f. 109b), Brenzone (p. 66) and Bizari (p. 54). Gatto's date (after 8 Oct.) and his reason for Piale's going, must be wrong (see below, p. 1000, n. 4). Sereno's date, 26 Oct., is altogether astray.

[4] For the number of galleys, see below, p. 944, n. 8. They were based on the harbour of Constanza, though some describe them as lying off the Gardens.

[5] Not at Canea, as Manolesso says (f. 42).

[6] Suda Island, known as *Fraronisi* to the Italians, had a monastery of St Nicolas and many hermits (Flam. Cornaro, *Creta Sacra*, I, pp. 8, 92; Gerola, *Monumenti Ven. nell' isola di Creta*, I, p. 516).

[7] Bosio (III, pp. 868 E, 869 A) includes the Maltese ships under Br. Peter Giustiniani in this move; if so, it must have been made after 26 Oct. See below, p. 939.

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was so bad that he had difficulty in making the harbour of Stampalia. Eventually he returned to Rhodes, picked up the ships which he had left there, and sailed to Suassara,[1] where he began to block the harbour entrance with rocks with a view to wintering there; but giving up this plan, he went on to Constantinople, which he reached early in December.[2] Though he was received with manifestations of rejoicing, his failure to follow the retreating enemy threw him out of the Sultan's favour.

Although Piale withdrew his main naval force from the Archipelago, he left guardships to patrol it, protect Chios, and intercept any relief which might be sent to Cyprus. Thus the seas were by no means clear of Turkish warships. Br. Peter Giustiniani, commanding five galleys of the Order of St John, who was on his way to join Colonna, arrived at Suda on 26 October with only three, having lost the others in an encounter with eighteen Turkish galleys.[3] Again, on 4 November the galleys of Angelo Suriano and Vincent Maria Priuli were attacked off Paros by five Turkish galliots; Suriano escaped, but Priuli was killed and his galley captured after a long fight.[4]

There was no reason why Zane and Colonna should remain any longer in Crete. Sickness, supposed to be due to stale flour and other bad food, as well as to unhealthy quarters (Suda was especially marshy), was still ravaging the forces.[5] Returning from Suda to Canea, Zane completed his plans for the defence of the island and the succour of Cyprus. Having done this he considered it his duty to relieve Crete of the burden of victualling the large force that he had with him.[6] He left

[1] So Calepio; Contarini and Manolesso have *Soassera*; Sereno, *Soassero*; Paruta, *Calogiero*. I have not identified it. The name Calogiero is attached to more than one rocky islet in the Archipelago, but none of them seems to have anything like a harbour.

[2] Calepio (f. 109b) says he arrived on 14 Dec. Alasya (p. 39) has 12 Dec. But already by 2 Dec. his arrival with 50 galleys was reported, and that of Ali Pasha with 60 on the 15th; the bad condition of the ships of both was noted (Charrière, III, p. 141; letter of M. de la Tricquerie to Charles IX).

[3] Contarini, f. 21; Manolesso, f. 41b; Sereno, p. 71; Paruta, p. 120; Bosio, III, p. 867B.

[4] Contarini, Manolesso and Sereno, *ibid.*; Paruta, p. 119; Morosini, II, pp. 329–30. Natale Conti (*Hist.* 1589, f. 95b) has 'Paxù' in the Archipelago.

[5] Bosio, III, p. 867C.

[6] Another somewhat curious reason given for his departure (Manolesso, f. 42; Paruta, p. 135) was that he would thereby relieve the enemy of the necessity or occasion for wintering in the Archipelago, and thus secure Crete against attack by so powerful an enemy from so near a base.

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behind him Mark Quirini with the Cretan galleys, to which he added some of his own manned by convicts, and three heavy galleys.[1] Colonna, with the three Maltese and ten of the better Venetian galleys, sailed on 10 November; the Maltese were to accompany him as far as Corfu, whence he would go on to Venice.[2] Next day Zane left Canea with the rest of the fleet, reaching Corfù on 17 November.[3] There he disarmed many more of his galleys, which were in bad condition. Colonna, who had arrived just before him, did the same, retaining only three or four armed galleys, and dismissing the Maltese, who left Corfù on 18 November; the prevalent infectious disease had broken out among them on the voyage.[4] Colonna himself, on the 28th, left Zane and sailed north; but he got no farther than Casoppo at the north point of the island, where he was held up by contrary winds for nearly a month. Moving on, off the Bocche di Cattaro his ship[5] was struck by lightning and burnt, although no lives were lost, some escaping to shore, Colonna himself with others transferring to the ship of Francis Tron.[6] This again was itself wrecked. Running considerable risks of capture by Turks, he made his way to Zara, and thence to Ancona, and so to Rome.[7] Pius received him kindly, and expressed himself as completely satisfied with his conduct. Colonna certainly had no reason to reproach himself with the failure of the expedition, which was, however, a bitter disappointment to the Pope and others, such as Cardinal Morone, who said publicly that Doria had hindered far more than he had helped the Venetians, who would have done better if he had never joined them. Pius complained formally to the King.[8]

Sforza Pallavicino, who had left Zane at the same time as Colonna and, like him, been detained at Casoppo by the weather, was also caught

[1] Contarini, f. 21. The squadron of the *condennati* was commanded by Santo Tron (*ibid.* f. 18b). According to Longo (p. 20) Zane disarmed twelve of his galleys at Candia.

[2] Bosio, III, p. 869A.

[3] Contarini (f. 21: *il General Venier* in the 1645 ed. is a mistake for *il General Veneto*). If, as Contarini says, he left Crete on 11 Nov. and reached Corfù on the 17th, it was quick sailing. Graziani (p. 100) remarks that it was very like a flight; and the Venetians, had the Turks caught them on the way, would have been wiped out.

[4] Bosio, III, p. 869D.

[5] See above, p. 904, n. 1.

[6] This was a Venetian ship under a Venetian captain (Contarini, f. 18b); it was doubtless one of the ten which Colonna borrowed on leaving Crete.

[7] Paruta, p. 136. Manolesso (f. 42b) and Sereno (p. 72) say that he sailed from Ragusa, where his ships were repaired.

[8] Pastor, XVIII, p. 392.

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in a severe storm, but refused to abandon his ship. He got as far as Lesina, where he was disabled by an attack of gout. He reached Venice on 13 February 1571, and laid up his galley.[1]

Shortly after Zane had sailed from Crete, Nicolas Donato arrived in his galley from Famagusta, which he left on 5 November,[2] slipping through the guard left by Piale. He brought with him the Bishop Jerome Ragazzoni, who had been commissioned to report to Venice on the fall of Nicosia and on the condition of Famagusta. He was sent on to Zane at Corfù, and thence to Venice.[3]

Zane himself remained at Corfù awaiting orders. But he was a broken man. His health had given way under the hardships of the expedition and the mental strain to which, thanks chiefly to the obstructiveness of Doria, he had been subjected. He asked to be relieved of his post, and the Senate, on 10 December,[4] appointed in his place Sebastian Venier, with Mark Quirini and Peter Tron as Proveditors of the Fleet.[5] Venier, who had remained in Crete, was ordered to Corfù.[6] Early in February, Augustine Barbarigo proceeded to that island, and, on his arrival, despatched Zane to Venice.

[1] Contarini, f. 22b; Paruta, p. 136. Manolesso (f. 42b) and Sereno (p. 74) say that he fell ill at Zara.

[2] Gatto, p. 42. Riccoboni, p. 28.

[3] Contarini, f. 21; Foglieta, col. 996. He afterwards served to negotiate peace at Constantinople.

[4] Romanin, VI, p. 300, n. 1. The appointment was dated 10 Dec., the letter to Venier 13 Dec. Molmenti, *Seb. Veniero*, p. 61.

[5] Tron, however, died in Crete soon after, if not before, his appointment. The dates given by Contarini (ff. 22, 22b) for the appointments are: 20 Dec. for Venier, 16 Dec. for Quirini, 21 Dec. for Tron. Manolesso (f. 47b) puts them all on 20 Dec. Quirini was elected in place of Celsi, and Peter Tron in place of Canale. When Peter Tron's death became known, Canale was continued in his office, and Quirini was succeeded as Captain of the Gulf by Santo Tron. Paruta, p. 167.

[6] In case he should have gone to Cyprus before the order reached Crete, Augustine Barbarigo was appointed Proveditor of the Sea. Venier was instructed to hurry on the relief of Famagusta, and the arming of all the galleys of Crete, and return with two galleys to Corfù as soon as possible. The Senate had prepared two large ships laden with victuals, which were on the point of sailing; with them would be sent money for equipping and paying troops, and providing munitions and a garrison for the defence and preservation of 'tutti quei fidelissimi et a Noi veramente Christiani'. The purchase of Sicilian grain for the island had also been ordered. Molmenti, p. 63, from the *Annali*. Cp. Manolesso, f. 48; Paruta, p. 136. Venier heard of his appointment in Crete, and sailed for Corfù on 17 March 1571 (Contarini, f. 22b), arriving there at the beginning of April (Paruta, p. 167).

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Such was the humiliating end of the career of a very distinguished servant of the Republic. Worse was to follow, for he was prosecuted as responsible for the failure of the expedition, and did not live to see himself cleared from the charge.[1]

It is easy, at the present day, to condemn both Zane and Colonna for their weakness in failing to stand up to Doria; to say that Zane, who must have known that Doria had secret orders, should have reported the fact to Venice; that Colonna ought, if Doria refused to show his orders, to have arrested him and taken general command of the whole

[1] In the Senate's decision to recall him, the reason is given as his desire to return home and his illness. His prosecution was not ordered until 1572 (Romanin, VI, pp. 299–300). The documents partly contradict accounts such as are given by Bizari and Graziani. The former says (pp. 87–8) that as soon as the Senate heard of his arrival at Corfù it gave orders to have him not only deprived of his office, but arrested and brought a prisoner to Venice. Graziani (pp. 104–6) says that, knowing he was to be accused, he asked to be relieved of his command: the Senate agreed, but had him arrested and brought in chains to Venice. He was accused of neglecting the discipline of the fleet; failing to control the arrogance of Venetian citizens in their relations with the soldiers and the allies; abusing his position for the sake of private gain; being unequal in spirit and counsel to his responsible position; and, worst of all, suborning the Proveditors to oppose the Senate's instructions to persevere in the relief of Cyprus, and so making it possible for himself to evade his duty. Nicolas Contarini, John Mocenigo and Frederic Valaresso were appointed syndics to investigate the charges against him and others, but his friends managed to delay the trial until they had gone out of office. When finally the public excitement had died down, and the case was tried by the Quarantia criminal, he was acquitted. But before this happened, he had died of his sufferings in prison in Sept. 1572. The Senate granted him public and honourable burial (Manolesso, f. 48b). Paruta (pp. 167–8) has a just appreciation of Zane as the victim of circumstances which caused the memory of his earlier successes to be wiped out. As Manolesso says, his disgrace was an example of the power of calumny. Apologists on the Spanish side naturally have little good to say of him or any other Venetian; thus a MS. quoted by Rosell (p. 46, n. 41), on the 'Notable mistakes made by the Venetians in the war against the Turks', describes him as inexpert in naval and military matters, and Sebastian Venier and Augustine Barbarigo as the same, although Venier was brave and Barbarigo very prudent. The popular voice accused the Venetian commanders of maladministration, starving their men, etc. (Adriani, p. 864; Natale Conti, *Hist.* 1589, ff. 105–105b). Sforza Pallavicino and James Celsi were both deprived of office and various captains of galleys were discharged on the ground of accepting bribes, malversation of funds, and otherwise neglecting their duty. (Doglioni, *Hist. Venetiana*, 1598, p. 833). Manolesso, *loc. cit.*, mentions Jerome Gritti as having been banished; he had commanded a galley in James Celsi's squadron (Contarini, f. 18).

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expedition;[1] that if Colonna had enjoyed sufficient prestige as a naval commander, and had had the faculty of imposing on his subordinates a plan of operations, and technical knowledge such as would inspire confidence in his leadership, the disadvantages under which the expedition suffered might have been overcome.[2] Such judgements lose much of their force when we remember that the Signory would not have thanked Zane, nor the Pope Colonna, for any action likely to bring about an open breach with the most powerful monarch in Europe, of whom, be it noted, Colonna himself was a vassal.[3]

It remains to describe the last flickers of life shown by this unfortunate expedition. The arrangements for throwing reinforcements into Famagusta which Zane, before he sailed for home, had made with the Rectors of Crete and Mark Quirini, were carried out after much delay.[4] He left behind 2500 foot-soldiers, of whom 1600 or 1700 were to be sent in four[5] armed transports to Cyprus, while the others were to remain to garrison Candia. The Proveditor Venier was urgent that these numbers of both ships and men should be doubled,[6] but was for various reasons unable to carry his point. Peter Giustiniani's offer to help in the escort with his Maltese galleys was not accepted.[7] Zane, finding that the officers whom he proposed to send on this hazardous adventure showed unwillingness, cashiered them and appointed others. The Marquess Pallavicino Rangoni (who had come out with 3000 men to take the place of Jerome Martinengo) should have been in command of the troops but

[1] Quarti, p. 19.

[2] Serrano, *Liga*, I, p. 83. Among the disadvantages this writer omits to mention the most serious of all, the double-dealing of the King of Spain.

[3] See Colonna's own profession of loyalty to the King and the Pope, Serrano, *Corr. dipl.* III, p. 447. Quarti (p. iv), asking why Doria was never made the object of any jest, or satire, or criticism of any sort at Venice, explains that the Senate, realizing that it was Philip II who was really the cause of the rot, suppressed any such criticism, in order not to stir up a hornets' nest.

[4] Contarini, ff. 21b–23b; Podacataro, p. 15; Riccoboni, p. 26; Longo, p. 20; Paruta, pp. 134–5, 168–9; Manolesso, ff. 46–7; Sereno, pp. 71–4; Brenzone, pp. 69–72; Graziani, pp. 171–2; Bizari, pp. 91–2; Foglieta, cols. 995, 997–8. Morosini's statement (II, p. 332) that Zane, before sailing for home from Crete, sent 1000 picked troops under Louis Martinengo, in four ships commanded by Peter Tron, to Famagusta, is to be corrected in the light of his own account of the actual expedition (II, pp. 360–1).

[5] So Contarini and all others except Paruta and Foglieta, who speak of three transports only. The latter has also only 800 men, 2000 being left in Crete for the garrison.

[6] Molmenti, *Seb. Veniero*, p. 54. [7] Bosio, III, p. 868D.

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bluntly refused to go.[1] Louis (Alvise) Martinengo, Governor of Canea, volunteered in his stead. Peter Tron, who was to captain the transports, having died, Mark Antony Quirini was appointed in his place.[2] After considerable delay, the transports sailed on 6 January 1571.[3] Thirteen[4] galleys, under the command of Mark Quirini, escorted them. Sebastian Venier, partly because of his failure to obtain an increase in the strength of the force, but still more because of illness, did not sail with them, and thus missed his last chance of taking up his duties as Proveditor-General of Cyprus. Sickness, indeed, was still causing great difficulties. Peter Tron, as we have seen, had died; two captains were unable to sail with their galleys,[5] and the galley of Francis da Molin was sent back from C. Salamone (the extreme eastern point of Crete) by Quirini, because of sickness on board. On the 25th the four transports and twelve galleys were sighted at Cape S. Andrea;[6] on the 26th, the transports, which had gone a little ahead, were already in the channel leading to the harbour of Famagusta.[7] Quirini kept his galleys out of sight, close inshore, while he sent the transports on to draw out the seven[8] galleys

[1] For this man, see above, p. 900. Paruta (pp. 134–5) records his reasons: he had been commissioned to go to Famagusta, if Baglione was not there; otherwise, to Nicosia. (As Manolesso says, f. 23, Jerome Martinengo had been appointed because Baglione could not defend two fortresses at the same time.) Now that Nicosia was lost, he was discharged of his functions. This excuse the fighting men considered unworthy of a soldier and unfitting the occasion; and the consequent blow to his reputation was thought to have hastened his death, which followed soon afterwards.

[2] Mark Antony Quirini is of course to be distinguished from the better-known Mark Quirini, called Stenta, Captain of the Gulf, and, after the disgrace of Zane, Proveditor of the Fleet. Bizari and Guarneri wrongly call the latter Mark Antony; Gatto once calls him Mark Antony, but gets him right elsewhere; for Riccoboni, there is only one Quirini, whom he calls Mark Antony; while Foglieta (col. 997) calls him *Jerome* Quirini. We know from Paruta that it was Mark Antony who actually sailed in command of the troops. Sereno also (p. 72) has a Proveditor Quirini who sends the ships with an escort under Mark Quirini, Captain of the Gulf.

[3] Due, according to Graziani, to the indolence and cowardice of Mark Antony Quirini. Manolesso has 16 Jan. Sereno's date, 26 Jan., is the date which he himself gives for the arrival at Famagusta.

[4] Sixteen, according to Foglieta.

[5] Alexander Contarini and Jerome Tron. Contarini, f. 22.

[6] Gatto, p. 45. Calepio (f. 113) says the 23rd.

[7] 'In Dromo di Famagusta': Contarini, Manolesso and Sereno.

[8] This is the number given by Contarini (f. 22), Sereno (p. 71) and Paruta (p. 168). Graziani has six, Calepio (f. 109b) and Bizari eight, and Foglieta twelve. Where exactly Quirini lay when he kept his galleys out of sight, it is not easy to say. Brenzone

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which were lying on guard at Constanza. The ruse succeeded, but the Turks, when Quirini's galleys came in sight, turned back to the shore before he could cut them off. There he could not attack them at close quarters, since a large force of the enemy had come to their aid on land; but he destroyed three of them by gunfire.[1] The engagement lasted all day; when night fell, a gale got up, and Quirini towed the transports into the harbour to prevent them being blown out to sea. The reinforcements, which included 1600 or 1700 soldiers and much munitions and provisions, were joyfully received by the besieged.[2] The four *navi* for their part brought in a prize, a small French ship which they had taken off the coast.[3] In the next three days Quirini took a *mahona* carrying 300 men, with munitions and provisions; his galleys were mistaken for Turkish, and little resistance was offered. The Turks burned what was left above water of the three galleys he had driven ashore, and a *caramussalin*, but he captured another transport, also laden with Turkish soldiers of fortune, munitions and provisions.[4] These exploits

says that a Turkish galley sighted the four transports off Cape S. Andrea, making for Salines, and that Quirini reached C. Greco, but that by the morning he was back under the Constanza fort. Morosini (lib. x, p. 360) also says that Quirini lay hid 'citra Pedalium promontorium'. It is difficult to see how from such a distance he could have carried out his plan to intercept the Turkish galleys when they came out of Constanza harbour.

[1] Two, says Graziani. Bizari says that of eight enemy galleys he took one and destroyed three; the Turkish commander escaped on one of the other four. While all the other sources agree more or less about this engagement, Gatto's account of what took place on the 26th is quite different (p. 46). He says Quirini went to the port of Constanza, where Rapamat Pasha had five galleys and two galliots; he sank one galley but came under fire of a fort which the Pasha had built at the mouth of the harbour. He proposed to destroy it by gunfire from his ships, but Bragadin sent a frigate to beg him rather to bring the four transports into safety in Famagusta harbour. This he did, and the troops with their officers (of whom Louis Martinengo is specially mentioned) and the munitions were landed.

[2] Brenzone however (p. 70) says there was much disappointment at the small amount of stores which was brought; it would have been worse had Quirini not taken the French ship which was laden with stores for the Turks.

[3] Gatto, p. 48.

[4] A French ship, commandeered by the Turks, and carrying 200 soldiers, says Graziani (cp. Brenzone, p. 71: Quirini flew the Turkish flag and clad his men in Turkish clothes, and took six important prisoners). The ship was captured off C. Greco (Morosini, II, p. 428). In it was the Pasha of Damascus, who however escaped in a small boat (Sereno). Bizari speaks as if these captures came after he had set sail from Famagusta, and included four galleys and a transport carrying 500 Janissaries, gold

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created a panic among the enemy, and he was able to make landings almost unresisted. Thus he destroyed certain forts erected by the enemy on the Gambella reef near the fortress, and a mole which they had built at Constanza for the protection of their galleys.[1] He then bade farewell to the defenders of Famagusta, promising that they should not lack succour, and sailed on 16 February, taking with him all the valuable merchandise which it was desirable to remove, and the children and other non-combatants. With the four transports, two of the three ships which had been sheltering in the port[2] and his prizes he reached Crete on 21 February. Turkish official documents show what an impression his exploit made on the enemy.[3] He had carried out a brilliant little operation with a success that suggests that, had the other commanders, whose dissensions we have described, been possessed of his dash, or been unhampered by the timid counsels of Doria, Pallavicino and Celsi, the

coins to the number of 60,000, and two barrels of aspers (silver coins reckoned at about 60 to the Turkish *sultanino* or the Venetian ducat). Cp. Natale Conti, *Hist.* (1589), f. 104. P. Giustinian (*Rer. Ven. hist.* 1576, p. 448) says that Quirini captured five galleys and two ships, including one with 300 Janissaries.

[1] Bizari says that a tower at Constanza was taken and destroyed by Astorre Baglione in a sortie from Famagusta, which was timed to coincide with Quirini's attack on the Turkish galleys, and resulted in the slaughter of 400 of the enemy and the capture of two guns, but there is little doubt that Quirini's attack on the galleys took place before he got into Famagusta. From Brenzone (whose account of the naval operations is difficult to follow) it would seem that Baglione did make an attack on the morning of Quirini's arrival, but that it was Louis and Hercules Martinengo who destroyed the fort later.

[2] Gatto, p. 48; Manolesso, f. 47. The three ships were the *Gradaniga*, *Cornara* and *Contarina* (Gibellino's plan of the siege); they had brought Jerome Martinengo's troops. The *Cornara* was unseaworthy from age, and sank in the Gulf of Adalia on the way home (Morosini, II, pp. 361, 429).

[3] Two official documents give the Turkish account of this exploit (Refik, nos. 16, of 16 March, and 17, between 27 March and 26 April; both despatches from the Sultan to Mustafa). Mustafa at first reported that twenty-two galleys and four transports had entered the port; later that twelve galleys and five transports had done so, while twelve others were cruising off the shore. A great quantity of troops, equipment and provisions had been landed, and without reinforcements the exhausted Turkish army would hardly accomplish its task. On 9 Feb. order was sent to attack with all available ships the enemy in Famagusta or wherever he might be. The infidels, after staying twenty-three days, sailed on 18 Feb., evacuating from the fortress treasure, women and children, and were proposing to return with more reinforcements. But for their coming the surrender of the fortress would have been certain. Muzaffer, Beylerbey of Marash and Governor of Nicosia, was sent to prevent the infidels cruising round the island and inciting the inhabitants to revolt. Alasya (p. 39) says that the ship with 300 men was captured on 24 Jan. (= 4 Feb. N.S. ?) See also Addenda, p. 1161.

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history of the expedition of 1570 might have been much more satisfactory for the allies. His exploit so shocked the Sultan, that he beheaded the Bey of Chios, and degraded the Bey of Rhodes from his flag-rank, as responsible for letting the enemy pass. The Bey of Negroponte was ordered to collect all the guardships of the Archipelago and await orders at Chios, while Ali Pasha sailed with forty galleys, to pick up the guardships and take them to Cyprus, which he reached early in April. The re-equipment of other galleys was also hurried on.[1]

Subsequent attempts to send more reinforcements to Famagusta met with no success.[2] Bishop Ragazzoni, who had, as already related, escaped from Famagusta to Venice, brought letters from Bragadin and Baglione, and presented a report on the munitions of which the besieged were specially in need. It would appear that the Venetian authorities were slow to take action, and were only forced to do so by the insistence of Ginevra Salviati, the wife of Baglione.[3] However this

[1] Contarini, f. 23; Sereno, p. 124. From an undated despatch of the Sultan to the Kapudan (Refik, no. 50), we learn that at the time of the return of the Imperial fleet it had been reported that there were no enemy ships in the Archipelago and that those at Crete were out of condition. The Kapudan was then ordered to assign fifty to sixty ships to guard the seas and prevent reinforcements reaching Cyprus. But, when the enemy was reported to be sailing from Crete towards Cyprus, the ships under the Beys of Rhodes and Alexandria were found to have no rowers and to be in a miserable state, and the Bey of Rhodes had to be degraded.

[2] Bizari, when he says (p. 157) that Venetian reinforcements left Crete on 16 Feb. and were successfully landed, seems to have grossly misunderstood his source, Nestor Martinengo.

[3] Paruta (p. 169) says that the Senate was energetic. But Graziani (pp. 183–4) tells us that Ginevra had to exert herself in the matter; that nobody volunteered, and she prepared to go herself, and sent to Perugia (the home of the Baglioni) to recruit men. The Senate was at last moved to order a force of 700 men to sail with Honorius Scotto; two ships were laden, to be captained by Nicolas Donato. His orders were to proceed with caution, and first go to Crete to get intelligence of the enemy. If Ginevra had difficulty in persuading the Senate to give orders for the expedition, she found Donato no less slow in starting, and, when he started, in sailing. She herself was not allowed to accompany him. Had he gone direct, the mere report that he had come with reinforcements might have saved the city; but he went to Candia, where he was delayed for various reasons, the chief being the greed of Marino Cavalli, the Proveditor of Crete (*navium commeatui inhians*), and the obstinacy of Mark Quirini, who was sore because the Senate had not sufficiently recognized his services and, some said, having made money out of the war, was not anxious to exert himself further. All this sounds as if it was based on some not impartial statement by Ginevra herself, and must be considerably discounted.

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may be, an expedition was arranged; Nicolas Donato, who had brought Ragazzoni, volunteered to return and was given two transports, with 800 men commanded by Honorius Scotto.[1] He got as far as Crete, where he put in for intelligence of the enemy before the beginning of April.[2] But no certain information was to be had; on proceeding, his ships were so much damaged by storm that he had to return to Crete. Then came news of Turkish galleys stationed on guard in Cyprus waters,[3] and the Proveditor Cavalli and Mark Quirini, who had been so successful before, now agreed that to take the two transports without an escort would result in certain loss. The enemy were reported to be numerous, and no galleys could be spared from Crete.[4] Donato therefore disembarked his troops, which made a welcome addition to the depleted garrison of the island. They were useful when shortly afterwards the Turks descended on it in great force.[5] Donato may have been wrong in not taking the shortest route to Cyprus,[6] but it is hardly likely that such reinforcements as he carried would in the long run have saved Famagusta, as some maintained they would.

[1] Riccoboni, p. 30. Paruta (pp. 169–70, letters of encouragement addressed to the Famagustans and Baglione). Donato's nomination, 24 Jan. 1571 (Romanin, VI, p. 300, n. 3).

[2] Quirini, arriving from Corfù early in April, found him there. Contarini, f. 23b (6 April); Manolesso, f. 49 (1 April).

[3] Twenty galleys under Kiaia (Kaya) Chelebi sailed from Constantinople and united with the guardships of Chios and Rhodes under Sirocco (Siloco) to check any attempt to relieve Famagusta. Paruta, p. 179. On these commanders, see pp. 926, n. 4; 894, n. 3; 1161.

[4] Paruta, pp. 179–80.

[5] While Mustafa was occupied with the siege of Famagusta, Ali on 5 June sailed with all his fleet to Crete. Using his forecourses only, so as not to be seen by the guards, he entered Suda harbour, landed, burned many villages, taking many prisoners, and sent forty galleys raiding round the island. Manolesso, ff. 59, 59b.

[6] It is not certain that he disobeyed orders in not sailing by the direct route south of Crete; even the hostile account given by Graziani says that he was ordered to put in at Crete, although it goes on to blame him for doing so. Manolesso and Contarini, on the other hand, say that he was ordered to sail direct, and blame him for disobeying his orders. It appears (Riccoboni, p. 30; P. Giustinian, *Rer. Ven. hist.* 1576, p. 450; Foglieta, col. 999) that he was imprisoned and brought to trial, but was acquitted.—The statement of Kyprianos (p. 294) that, after Quirini had returned from Famagusta, Donato arrived (at Famagusta?) with 800 soldiers, has misled later writers. Diedo (lib. VII, p. 256) seems to assume that he reached Cyprus; and Sakellarios (I, p. 550) even makes him land 800 men at Lemesos, which would have been difficult, since that place was in Turkish hands.

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Another abortive attempt to relieve the beleaguered fortress seems to have been made in July 1571.[1] Mark Quirini was urgent that something should be done; on 2 July he sailed to try and obtain intelligence of the movements of the enemy, and returned on the 13th with the news that they had sailed towards the west.[2] Meanwhile the Rectors had arranged to despatch 1000 regulars and 300 volunteers, and Count Honorius Scotto offered to lead them.[3] But the *Barbara*, one of the ships in which they were embarked, was (owing, it was suspected, to sabotage) driven ashore and broken up on the 13th. While men and munitions were being transferred to another ship, Quirini sailed to the Rhodian channel, but could hear no news of the enemy. Returning to Candia he found orders from the Senate recalling him to Messina. He delayed to obey, still persevering in his effort to relieve Famagusta.[4] But on 13 August a new summons came from the Senate and Venier, to return with all speed to Messina, and he was obliged to obey. In any case, Famagusta had already fallen.[5]

[1] In spite of what Brenzone (p. 86) says the decision to despatch an expedition must have been taken *before* the arrival of a frigate sent by Bragadin from Famagusta on 14 July.

[2] Manolesso, f. 56.

[3] Brenzone, p. 86. Cp. Morosini, lib. x, p. 440.

[4] The Senate was still on 30 July recommending the Captain-General to send prompt relief to Famagusta (Romanin, VI, p. 306, n. 1).

[5] Manolesso and Brenzone, *ll. cc.*

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CHAPTER XV

THE WAR OF CYPRUS

II. THE TURKISH CONQUEST

The naval expedition of the Christian allies had been a complete fiasco, thanks chiefly to the obstructive behaviour of the Spanish commander, but also partly to sheer ill-fortune. Similarly, it was owing to a series of mischances that the supreme military direction of the defence of Cyprus was left in incompetent hands. Laurence Bembo, who had been Captain of Cyprus from 1564 to 1566, and was appointed Proveditor-General on 20 August 1568, died on 30 December 1569. Sebastian Venier, who was on 17 June 1570 chosen to succeed him, never, as we have seen, reached the island. Jerome Martinengo, in whom great hopes were placed when he sailed with 2000 men for the defence of Famagusta, died on his way out. Pallavicino Rangoni, his substitute, shirked his duty and went no farther than Crete. The control of the defence of the capital was left in the hands of the Lieutenant Nicolas Dandolo, who assumed the office of Vice-Proveditor,[1] and his mismanagement was generally held to be the chief cause of the fall of the city. The only senior and experienced military officer available for the command of the troops—other than the Captain, Mark Antony Bragadin, who was confined by his office to Famagusta[2]—was Astorre Baglione of Perugia (Plate XII).[3] Had Baglione remained in the capital, its

[1] So he is called by some of the authorities, e.g. Calepio, f. 100. Graziani (p. 63) says that he assumed the office of Proveditor-General without the authorization of the Senate. Morosini (II, p. 307) has a scathing characterization of him, as poor-spirited, stupid and irascible.

[2] With him was Laurence Tiepolo, Captain of Paphos, head of the civil administration and judicature (Paul Tiepolo, *Istoria della guerra di Cipro*, cited by Cigogna, *Inscr. Ven.* VII, p. 636 n.; Graziani, p. 63), and specially concerned with the provision and rationing of food. Bishop Ragazzoni reported favourably to Venice on his activity in this respect (Cigogna, *ibid.*). Tiepolo had been sent out as Captain of Paphos in 1570 (Cigogna, *op. cit.* VI, pp. 635–6).

[3] Portraits of Astorre Baglione (as Captain-General of all the light cavalry of Venice and Governor of Verona, in white armour) and of his wife Ginevra Salviati were painted by Orlando Fiacco (Vasari, ed. Milanesi, V, p. 299; ed. Gottschewski and

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fate might have been different; but, as it was commonly supposed that Famagusta would first be attacked by the enemy, he went thither and, as we shall see, was not allowed to leave it when he was most needed at Nicosia. When he left the capital, Colonel Leonard Roncone remained in charge of the Italian troops. He had been active in completing part of the fortifications, but made no further mark on events, being hardly mentioned again, until he was mortally wounded on the last day of the siege.[1] The chief military command, when Baglione left the capital, was in the hands of Eugene Sinclitico, Count of Roucha, Collateral of the Venetian land army, who had offered his services and had been sent out to take command of the Cypriote cavalry.[2] He showed no military capacity whatever.[3] There were gallant officers of less standing, such as Caesar Piovene of Vicenza, Colonel Francis Palazzo of Fano,[4] the gunner Antony dal Beretino, the captain of stradiotes Andrew Cortese, the commander of the sappers John Sozomeno. Special mention must also be made of the fighting Bishop of Paphos, Francis Contarini, who

Gronau, v, p. 229). The portrait in the Ambras Collection (reproduced by Kenner, *Jahrb. A. H. Kaiserhauses*, XVIII (1897), p. 192, no. 46) may be a copy of it. The full-length engraving in Jac. Schrenck v. Nozing, *Augustiss. Imperatorum...imagines* (1601), p. 119, is generally ascribed to Domenicus Custos after a drawing by G. B. Fontana, or, according to some, after Orlando Fiacco (Plate XII). Biadego in *Arte e Storia*, XXIV (1905), p. 37, announced that Sgulmero had identified the portrait of a man in armour in the Verona Gallery (presumably no. 32 in the Catalogue of 1910) as the Fiacco portrait, but his proof seems not to have been published. A three-quarter length in armour, attributed to Fiacco, in the Verona Gallery (perhaps that referred to by Biadego) is illustrated by O. Gurrieri, *I Baglioni*, Florence, 1938, p. 57; and another portrait by an unknown painter, on p. 55. The portrait in the Ambras Collection and the engraving in Schrenck evidently represent the same man. A relic of Baglione (also in the Ambras Collection) is his white breast-plate (with back-plate): A. Primisser, *Die k.-k. Ambraser-Sammlung*, p. 66, no. 131 (CXXVI).

[1] Above, Ch. XIII, p. 849, n. 1; Calepio, ff. 96, 104.

[2] When Roucha assumed the command as Lieutenant of Baglione, the command of the cavalry was given to John Sinclitico (Morosini, II, p. 303), who seems to have been a brother of Roucha. He did good work against the enemy in the mountains (below, p. 973), but after the fall of Nicosia he came in and surrendered to Mustafa (Calepio, f. 106).

[3] Above, Ch. XIV, p. 900.

[4] Pastor (XVIII, p. 391, n. 2) mentions a letter of Palazzo which may be interesting, but which, being buried in a *nozze* publication by G. Castellani (1916), is unfortunately inaccessible to me. Palazzo sailed with Jerome Martinengo and arrived at Famagusta on 5 May (Gatto, p. 31).

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not only encouraged the defenders by his exhortations and his example,[1] but raised at his own expense and led into battle a company of a hundred men,[2] and met his death at the taking of the city. But such men were powerless in the face of the inertia and timidity of the Lieutenant. As to the rank and file, though not much fault seems to have been found with them at first, the Cypriote militia were of poor quality, and when the final assault came broke and fled.

On the declaration of war, the government of the island was informed both by the Signory and by the Bailie at Constantinople. The letters reached Cyprus shortly before the relics of the force which had started under Jerome Martinengo and arrived on 5 May.[3] They contained little more than exhortations and promises of help, and orders to concentrate in the fortified towns and in the mountains,[4] and fall upon the enemy as soon as he appeared. These letters also announced the appointment of Astorre Baglione as general of the army and of the Count of Roucha as commander of the cavalry.

The forces actually in the island[5] were quite inadequate to the occasion. The ordinary garrison comprised, of foot-soldiers, some 2000 Italians. Some 1000 of the militia of Terra Firma had been sent out, as well as the 2000 who had been recruited by Martinengo, but of whom only about 1300 arrived. The remainder of the large numbers recruited on the outbreak of war was wasted in the abortive expedition described in the preceding Chapter. Of cavalry, the only regular body in the island consisted of 500 stradiotes. There were, it is true, a certain number of feudataries, bound by their tenure to maintain three or four horses for military service; but this body, which under the Kings had amounted to as many as 700, was now much reduced.[6] The breeding of

[1] His sermon, preached early in the siege, or perhaps before it actually began, evidently excited great enthusiasm. Calepio, f. 98; Paruta, pp. 97–8; Foglieta, col. 975.

[2] Calepio (f. 95b) is more likely to be correct than those who give him 300 (e.g. Sylv. Brenzone, p. 39).

[3] Calepio, f. 94. Gatto (p. 30) says the declaration of war was published throughout the island on 4 May.

[4] Peter Paul Sinclitico and Scipio Caraffa were sent to the mountains to collect and organize the fighting men. Calepio, f. 96.

[5] Paruta, pp. 84–5.

[6] Paruta's estimate of little more than a hundred is probably under the mark. Contarini (f. 10b) says the feudataries and *provvisionati* (pensioners) counted as many as 500 horse, and these were in Nicosia; and Calepio gives the same figure. Manolesso (f. 31) reckons 2500 Italian infantry, 500 horse of the feudataries, 500 stradiote horse,

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horses had been neglected, owing to the greater convenience of mules, which the island produced in great numbers and of fine quality, as it does still.

It is difficult to estimate the forces collected in the capital, owing to the discrepancy of our sources.[1] But, although there may have been some 20,000 fighting men of all kinds in the city, it is doubtful whether many more than half of them were effective, owing to lack of training and equipment, to inefficient officers, and to sickness. The engineer

and a large number of infantry of the *cernide* or country militia; these last he describes as cowardly and untrained. Natale Conti (*Hist.* 1589, f. 82): 2500 Italian infantry, 500 mounted nobles, 1000 light horse, 5000 of the peasant *cernide*, unfitted for war and only half-armed; the cavalry garrison of the island was reduced to 830 stradiote light horse, under eighteen captains, with as many mounted Cypriote arquebusiers, totalling little less than 2000 horse.

[1] The most precise figures are those of Calepio (ff. 95b–97, 107), but some of the details are obscure (Cobham's translation contains several errors). The numbers add up to 12,690, but this does not seem to include the stradiotes. He reckons the Italian companies, under seventeen officers, at 1300. (So too others, as Contarini, f. 10b, and Manolesso, f. 32.) When the siege began, the inhabitants were registered and found to number 56,500, of whom few were of use as combatants. Cypriote nobles and burghers with their servants came to 1500 (half of these under the brothers Phoebus and Artius Zappe manned the Podocataro bastion, the others, under Hugh Flatro, the Constanzo). There were 750 villagers, country militia, and 3300 militia from towns such as Kythrea, Lapithos, Salines, Lemesos, Lefka, Paphos. Besides the stradiotes there were 500 other cavalry of the feudataries and pensioners, as well as 300 war-horses which were not used. Paruta (pp. 94–5) reckons some 10,000 infantry, of which 1500 were Italians; all the remainder were from the island, viz. 3000 from the *cernide*, 2500 raised in the city itself, 2000 newly recruited from the villages, and 1000 Nicosiote gentlemen. Foglieta (cols. 974–5) has the following figures: 1500 Italians (of whom many were disabled by sickness); 3000 men from the island levies, 2600 from the city; 2100 men paid partly by the State, partly by private citizens; 500 Epirote horse (stradiotes) and 200 foot; 200 Cypriote and 60 Italian gunners; 1000 gentlemen; in all about 11,000 fighting men, though, as stated, many were sick. Some 8000 peasants had been brought in for service as a labour corps. Women and other non-combatants came to 56,000; making in all some 76,000 mouths. Graziani (p. 77) more or less agrees with Foglieta, including the 500 mounted and 200 unmounted stradiotes; he reckons altogether over 20,000 fighting men—a good number, had they been provided with officers and arms. Another estimate (Sylv. Brenzone, p. 39) of the fighting men in Nicosia is 16,000, of whom only 6500 were trained. Morosini (II, p. 307) agrees mostly with Foglieta (but 1300 Italian infantry, and 4000 sappers). Natale Conti (*Hist.* 1589, f. 82b) reckons 1200 Italian infantry, 500 mounted Cypriote nobles, 500 stradiotes, and many island levies. The figures given by Alasya (p. 27) seem to be an arbitrary selection from some of these sources.

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Sozomeno[1] urged on the Lieutenant a scheme for using the cavalry (the stradiotes, the feudataries making perhaps another 500, as well as musketeers mounted on hacks) in defence of the capital; there was ample space between the walls and the houses for deploying them. The engineer Jerome Maggi of Anghiari supported him, but Colonel Palazzo disagreed, and men who should have been used as cavalry had to fight on foot with weapons to which they were not accustomed.[2]

The city had munitions and provisions sufficient to sustain a siege for two years, but they were badly administered.[3] There were no swords or other weapons, no arquebuses or defensive armour for the 2600 soldiers who were recruited in the city; 900 heavy arquebuses for use in fortified positions[4] were sent to the peasants in the mountains, and the rest, which at the beginning of the siege were placed on the walls, were not used because the soldiers did not know how to fire them. In the magazines there were only 1040 arquebuses, which anybody took who could lay hands on them. Many of these soldiers were brave enough, but knew so little about the arm that they could not discharge it without setting fire to their beards. The greater part of these men from the city were artisans; they were not paid and owing to their military duties could earn nothing by their hands, so they starved (for owing to lack of organization they were miserably fed)[5] and grumbled and cursed.

[1] *Exc. Cypr.* p. 85; cp. Manolesso, f. 34b; Sereno, p. 60.

[2] This proves, by the way, that Maggi was, at any rate for this occasion, in Nicosia, although Gatto (p. 31) says that, arriving on 5 May, he remained in Famagusta, where indeed he went through the siege, was taken a prisoner to Constantinople, caught attempting to escape, and strangled on 27 March 1572 (see the life of Maggi by Promis in *Misc. di Storia Ital.* I (1862), pp. 105 ff. and Catizzani's intr. to Gatto, p. 19). It is to be noted, however, that when Contarini (f. 10b) speaks of 'Cav. Maggi ingegniero' among the headquarters staff at Nicosia, it is probably an error for Magrino, who is one of the Italian officers in Calepio's list of killed (f. 111). I note as a curiosity that according to the *Acta Sanctorum* (18 March, p. 665) Maggi, inflamed by the miracles of the Blessed Bartholomew of Anghiari, deserted his wife and children and went out to the war in Cyprus, where he wrought much slaughter among the Turks at Famagusta, but at last fell into their hands and was flayed alive. Daru (VII, p. 269) mentions an unpublished letter of Maggi to Desiderio Guidoni of Famagusta, 19 Oct. 1570, in the Farsetti Library at Venice.

[3] Calepio in Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 265.

[4] *Archibugieri* (read *archibusi*) *di posta*; Calepio, f. 96. This passage about the lack of equipment is omitted in the *Description*.

[5] Calepio, f. 102b.

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From the first it was supposed that the enemy would attack Famagusta, and Baglione, it was decided, was to defend it until Jerome Martinengo should arrive. He was to be allowed 3000 of the Cypriote *francomate* militia, while the same number were to be brought into Nicosia. After it had been ascertained how many each city would hold, all the rest were to be sent, with their families, to the hills.[1] Kerynia, it was considered, was not strongly enough fortified to resist a siege, and it was even proposed to pull down its walls and take its guns to the capital. But it was decided to await instructions from the Senate; meanwhile Baglione ordered certain improvements in the defences.[2] Eventually, as will appear, it surrendered without a blow.

Astorre Baglione[3] did his best with the very inadequate material at his disposal, and in the face of obstruction by the Lieutenant. On his arrival in the island,[4] he made a tour of inspection of the fortresses, arranging at Kerynia with the commandant for the alterations just mentioned, while at Famagusta he and Bragadin put in hand improvements which have been described elsewhere.[5] Some time in May the latter issued a proclamation inviting all persons under sentence of banishment from the territory of Famagusta to return and serve in the army at the usual rate of pay; some 300 accepted the offer.[6] An increase of the garrison by about the same number was afforded by the company which Alexander Podacataro volunteered to raise from his own estates.[7]

[1] Graziani, p. 66.

[2] See above, Ch. XIII, p. 852.

[3] For his activity at Nicosia, see especially Sylv. Brenzone, pp. 33–9; also Gatto, p. 30.

[4] At the beginning of May, according to Brenzone; but there is reason to suppose that he went out a good deal earlier. See below, p. 958, n. 1.

[5] Ch. XIII, p. 861.

[6] Gatto, p. 31. On such *banditi* see the commissions to the Captains of Famagusta, p. 867, § 17.

[7] Gatto, *ibid.* Podacataro wrote a *Relatione de' successi di Famagosta dell' anno* 1571, which was published by A. Tessier (Nozze Bonomi-Bragadin, Venice, 1876). An anonymous writer quoted by Cigogna (*Inscr. Ven.* VI, p. 905) says that of four reports submitted to him, those of Nestor Martinengo and Alexander Podacataro were good, but omitted many of the deeds of Bragadin. Podacataro himself says that his father Philip and his brother Tuccio came with him to Famagusta, bringing a great quantity of provisions; Philip was entrusted with the task of bringing in as much grain and cattle as possible, and Alexander himself with the raising of a Cypriote company; he raised three hundred and clad most of them at his own expense, and trained them. These three came from Nicosia in response to the Signory's appeal for the defence of Famagusta. Many others at first volunteered, but when it came to the point the Podacatari found themselves alone.

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The problem of the pay of the troops of all kinds, of the workmen in the factories, and other employees of the government, soon became difficult, owing to the exhaustion of the gold and silver coin. Bragadin solved it by establishing a mint for copper 'besants' (which were to be redeemed for silver after the war). They were a forced currency, the penalty for refusing them being the gallows[1] (Fig. 11). Returning to Nicosia, Baglione attended to its fortifications. He could get no help from the indolent Greeks, who refused to believe that the Turks would ever attack the island. At every turn Dandolo put difficulties in his way, refusing to distribute the work of strengthening the defences among the



Fig. 11. Copper siege-money of Famagusta.

persons to whom, according to Savorgnan's scheme, it had been allotted. This Dandolo considered wasteful, and decided to work on his own plan, fortifying one bastion at a time and employing only a few men, although it had been decided that several thousand were necessary. He veered between keenness and slackness with every changing rumour.[2] Baglione and other officers and gentlemen, with the clergy (both Greek and Latin), women and boys, set to work himself, carrying stones with his own hands. All persons able to fight were registered and trained in shooting and using the spear. The commander of the stradiotes, Rondacchi, who had dealt so successfully with the Turkish force landed at Lara, rode round the coast by Paphos and Lemesos rallying the stradiotes. As a matter of course Baglione had sent an urgent demand to Venice for troops, asking for 20,000 foot and 4000 horse. All that he got was his

[1] Gatto, p. 32. Graziani, p. 182. Above, Ch. XIII, p. 803, n. 2.

[2] Graziani, pp. 63–4. We have already noticed how Dandolo obstructed Savorgnan (above, Ch. XIII, p. 846). Natale Conti (*Hist.* 1589, f. 61) seems to be alone in praising Dandolo and the Counsellors, as well as the eighty-years-old Simeon, Bishop of the Greeks in Nicosia, for working as energetically as Baglione at the fortifications. This bishop seems to be otherwise unrecorded.

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own appointment as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. But, as we shall see, even this did not give him power to overrule the Lieutenant when it was a question of opposing the landing of the enemy at Salines. He endeavoured to obtain intelligence of the Turkish fleet, sending Nicolas Donato to Karamania, but without result, except for some damage done to St Theodore, one of the invasion ports.[1] He sent away to St Hilarion and Buffavento as many non-combatants as possible; interned Jews, Copts, Maronites, Armenians, Syrians and 'Indians'; ordered the poisoning of wells,[2] the cutting down or burning of trees and corn; levelled villages too near the capital; dismantled ships in the ports. The Governor of Famagusta[3] had quarrelled with the *sopracomiti* of the galleys; Baglione sent the Bishop of Paphos to make peace. It was he who brought the 3000 men of the militia of the country towns into the capital, and organized them in twelve companies of 250 each under Italian captains.[4]

Then, believing, as we have said, that Famagusta would be the first objective of the invaders, he betook himself thither. There was a certain rivalry between the two cities, natural but in the face of the enemy pernicious. The question, which of the two was to gather in the crops and cattle of the Mesarea, caused difficulty. A conference between the authorities was held at Askia (Asha),[5] and an equal division was agreed

[1] Sylv. Brenzone, p. 37. This is the expedition described by Gatto (p. 32), on which Donato, with Frederick Baglione, starting on 25 May, and returning in seven days, destroyed the enemy's wharfs in a port of Karamania. Earlier (p. 30), Donato and Francis Tron had gone to Tripoli, captured a ship laden with supplies, and done some damage to the port. Cp. Riccoboni, p. 26. From Morosini (II, p. 419) it appears that St Theodore was at Seleucia (Selefke).

[2] This was done by John Muscorno and John Sozomeno, who went out with a force of foot and horse for the purpose; but the Turks were wary, and sank new wells. Natale Conti, *Hist.* 1589, f. 79b. The poison had been brought from Venice by Roucha.

[3] Colonel Scipio Piacenza of Crema was succeeded in this office about the outbreak of the war by Col. Dionisi Naldi. Gatto, p. 29, who mentions a quarrel between him and Captain John Boglione. Other quarrels between officers were dealt with by Baglione by sending one of the parties from Nicosia to Famagusta, or *vice versa*. See below, p. 977.

[4] 'Ordinanze ordinarie de' casali.' Details in Calepio, f. 96b.

[5] According to Morosini (II, p. 302) this conference discussed defence measures in general, and decided that 75,000 of the inhabitants should be taken into Nicosia, and 25,000 into Famagusta; all the rest with their cattle should be sent to the hills. Certainly much fewer than these numbers were taken into the cities.

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upon; but such plans as were adopted were so imperfectly carried out that an immense quantity of grain, and the greater part of the cattle, were left for the enemy to collect, instead of their having to send for supplies from the mainland.[1] It was apparently hoped that the Christian fleet would arrive in time, and even that the Turks would not attempt an invasion this year. The soldiers who had been called up for service were allowed to go home to see their wives, and if they wished to bring them back to the capital. They were still away when the Turks landed at Lara,[2] and though the raid was driven off the authorities in a panic called them back. Yet of 7000 only 2500 obeyed the summons and returned.[3]

The discontented state of the population had of recent years impressed on the home government the danger that the Turkish invader would be welcomed by the victims of oppression. When the invasion was imminent, the government gave its authorization for the liberation of all the *parici* (as the Spartans had once in a similar emergency promised to liberate the Helots). The serfs were full of hope, for all the masters declared publicly that they consented. Whether the Rectors blocked the measure, because they did not wish to lose the serfs of the Real, our authority cannot say; but the only freedom they obtained was that which Mustafa Pasha gave them.[4]

On 1 July 1570 the Turkish fleet was off Paphos.[5] Reaching Lemesos,

[1] Calepio, f. 98; Gatto, p. 27; Graziani, pp. 65–6. Gatto dates this conference on 15 April 1570 and says that Astorre Baglione called it; if he is right, then Sylv. Brenzone is wrong in his date for the arrival of Baglione in Cyprus at the beginning of May. Baglione seems to have carried out his part of the plan, as regards the Mesarea and Karpass, effectively, destroying what could not be brought in (Gatto, p. 33). The credit for this action is given to Bragadin by Riccoboni (p. 16), who says that he took it on 4 June. The Rectors unloaded 10,000 bushels of corn from ships which were about to start for Venice; and the Count of Tripoli brought in all the wheat from his estates and presented it to the Rectors (Natale Conti, *Hist.* 1589, f. 61 b).

[2] Above, Ch. XIV, p. 894. [3] Graziani, pp. 70–2.

[4] Calepio, f. 98. In the *Descr.* (f. 247b) the words 'per conto di Parici del Dominio' (which seem to mean that the Rectors blocked the measure because they did not wish to free the government serfs) do not appear, nor does the sarcasm about Mustafa. Graziani (p. 72) says that only a few of the serfs, who lived near the towns, availed themselves of the offer of freedom; the others thought themselves safer in the hills.

[5] Where Peter Rondacchi had warning of its approach from a sailing vessel which he had waiting there. Θρῆνος, vv. 56 f. The continuation of G. Bustron (Κυπρ. Σπ. II, p. 121) has the 6th hour of Saturday 2 July, but 2 July was a Sunday. The journal of Mustafa's secretary (ed. Safvet) has the right dates, correction being made of the

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it landed a force,[1] which sacked the town and Akrotiri (where it burned the monastery of St Nicolas of the Cats)[2] and various other places between Episkopi and Lemesos, and penetrated as far inland as Polemidia, taking a number of prisoners. The commander of the stradiotes, Peter Rondacchi, and Vincent Malipiero,[3] Vice-Captain of Paphos, attacked them and drove them back to the sea, killing a number and taking two prisoners who, with two loads of heads, were sent to the capital and excited great jubilation.[4] Next day the fleet was at Salines.[5] Here, to their surprise,[6] the Turkish commanders found that there was to be no opposition to their landing, which was carried out unmolested on the 3rd.

If it were possible to accept the account of the failure to prevent the landing which is given by the Lieutenant, in his report of 5 July,[7] the responsibility lay on the shoulders of Astorre Baglione. Dandolo asserts that many days earlier he had sent the Count of Roucha to Salines with 200 stradiotes and 100 foot. A few Turks having landed, Roucha drove them back and, had he obeyed orders, would not have left the place. But Baglione, with the idea of combining all the cavalry at some

misprint 16 for 26 Muharrem for the start from Fineka. In Gatto (p. 34) 21 June is an evident error; so too are Morosini's dates, 24 June (cp. Podacataro, p. 23) for the fleet's being sighted from the western point of the island, and 26 June for its arrival at Salines (II, p. 419). As to Sakellarios, the dates which he gives here and generally throughout the War of Cyprus are wildly inaccurate.

[1] Hammer (III, p. 567) confuses this landing of a detachment at Lemesos with the disembarkation of the main army at Salines. Others have followed him, e.g. Oman, *History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century*, p. 724. Cp. Baker, p. 263. Molmenti's evidence for his statement (*Seb. Veniero*, p. 43) that the Turkish army landed near ancient Paphos (i.e. Kouklia), with 50 falconets and 30 heavy guns, eludes me, unless it is a misunderstanding of Paruta, p. 89. If the fleet anchored for a day off Paphos, as Graziani (p. 72) says it did, no force was landed there. The continuation of Bustron says the Turks did no damage at Lemesos.

[2] Θρῆνος, vv. 65 f. .

[3] Who appears in Kyprianos, and those who follow him, as 'Pallipetros'.

[4] This success is mentioned by Calepio (f. 98b) and Dandolo (Romanin, VI, p. 292). Other authors (Contarini, f. 9b; Manolesso, f. 31b; Sereno, p. 55; Paruta, p. 83) tell only of the raiding and captures by the Turks.

[5] Varying dates for the arrival at Salines are noted from Turkish sources by Alasya, p. 29 n.

[6] They considered that this landing would be the most difficult task they would have to face. The fate of the force which had landed at Chrysochou in June showed what could be done by a spirited defence. Sylv. Brenzone, pp. 35–6.

[7] Romanin (VI, pp. 291–3) accepts his report as explaining better than all the historians how the landing took place. How, perhaps, but hardly why.

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place as near Famagusta as possible, summoned Roucha, who was obliged to go at night, with all his horse and foot, and some fifteen knights and feudataries, to an appointed place, only to find that Baglione had departed to Famagusta.[1] Meanwhile Rondacchi, who had arrived with his stradiotes, was waiting in the neighbourhood for orders from Roucha, which never came. On the next morning the enemy landed his forces, set fire to Larnaka and another place, and advanced as far as four leagues inland without any opposition. When Roucha, who had gone to Famagusta at Baglione's orders, learned this, he obtained leave to return to the capital with all his force.

The affair takes on a different colour in the light of other authorities.[2] From these it appears that Dandolo's report must be regarded as an attempt to shift the responsibility from his own shoulders. All the authorities who give any details, except Dandolo himself, agree that the Lieutenant objected to any serious attempt to oppose the landing, and was supported by Roucha; some, perhaps, seem to regard Roucha as chiefly to blame.[3] Baglione, overruled by the Lieutenant's authority, had pledged himself not to undertake what the Lieutenant might consider rash. The proposal to call upon a large body of francomates had not been accepted, even had there been time to organize it. He therefore had no option but to withdraw, returning himself to Famagusta, and sending Roucha and his force back to the capital. That something went wrong in the communications between the various forces which it was proposed to combine, we may well believe.

Mustafa was thus able, on 3 July, to disembark at his convenience the troops intended for the land campaign, cavalry as well as infantry, with all their munitions and baggage.[4] He made himself master of the countryside, fortified his camp, and sat down to await the arrival of the troops still at his disposal in the invasion ports of Asia Minor, for whom there had not been room in the ships which sailed from Fineka. Piale,

[1] Calepio (f. 98b) confirms this in so far as he says that Roucha went to confer with Baglione at some village between Salines and Famagusta. So too Gatto (p. 34).

[2] They are analysed in the note at the end of this Chapter (pp. 1037 f.).

[3] Cp. Rym's despatch, July 1570, quoted by Hammer, III, p. 784: 'Discordia Hectoris Baleonis et Collateralis Comitis Bocanii [*sic*!], qui nullus [*sic*] alteri cedere volebat, est factum, etc.'

[4] 20,000 foot and 3000 horse, according to Morosini (II, p. 304). He describes the nervousness of the Turks, their suspicion that the beaches had been mined, and other imaginary fears.

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with a hundred galleys, twenty horse-transports and twelve *mahone*, went to the Gulf of Lajazzo to bring over horses, spahis (cavalrymen) and Janissaries, while Ali with the rest of the ships went to the Gulf of Adalia for other troops.[1] They both returned to Salines on 22 July.[2]

While waiting for their reinforcements, the Turks raided the countryside,[3] testing the temper of the population. That it was inclined to welcome the invaders was shown at the large village of Lefkara, although what exactly happened is not very clear. According to one account[4] the place, among other seditious actions of which it was guilty, sent messengers into the hills to persuade those who had retired thither to come down and join the invaders openly. An unfortified village like Lefkara could obviously make no resistance,[5] and it may have been not of their own accord but at the bidding of the Turks[6] that the men of Lefkara went to seduce the people in the hills. It is fair to say[7] that the people submitted partly out of fear of the Turks, partly out of hatred of the Venetians. Finding that many were inclined to follow their example, the Venetians exacted a terrible retribution. A force[8] numbering 100 horse and 600 foot (for whose loyalty their wives and children were held hostages) was sent out with orders to kill all the inhabitants fit to bear arms and destroy the village.[9] Surprising it by night, they put some

[1] According to Paruta (p. 84), 80 galleys and many ships of burden were sent not only to the ports of Karamania, but also to Tripoli.

[2] Contarini (f. 10) gives this date. Foglieta (col. 973) makes them return on the 18th, and adds, it would seem quite incorrectly, that the first thing they did was to expel the Venetian garrison from Kerynia and seize that place. Kerynia did not actually fall until after Nicosia.

[3] On 6 July they burned the monastery of Stavrovouni. Cont. of G. Bustron, Κυπρ. Σπ., II, p. 121. Θρῆνος, vv. 130–1.

[4] Paruta, pp. 84, 90.

[5] Calepio (f. 98 b) says that the Turks were guided to it by a Greek priest. According to the Θρῆνος (vv. 173–202), two women tried to save the famous relic of the Holy Cross which was preserved there. They stumbled and lost it, but the Turks, blinded by Heaven, did not find it, and it was afterwards recovered, together with the silver (by which is perhaps meant the reliquary in which it was encased). On this relic, see Κυπρ. Χρον. XIII (1937), pp. 56 f.

[6] As Sylv. Brenzone (p. 42) says.

[7] With Graziani, pp. 76–7.

[8] According to Calepio (f. 99) a body of light horse under the captain Meaduca Dimitri Lascari (cp. Graziani, p. 77); according to others (Sylv. Brenzone, p. 42; Foglieta, col. 973) Caesar Piovene was in command. Cp. Morosini, II, p. 305.

[9] Calepio says the orders were to kill the whole population, and Graziani agrees that all were massacred.

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400 rebels to the sword, as well as all but two of the Turks who were engaged in looting, and burnt the place to the ground.[1] The example of Lefkara, we are told, was not lost on others who were inclined to join the invaders.[2]

The respite afforded by Mustafa's delay at Salines was occupied by the Famagusta command, while the enemy's first objective was still in doubt, not only in strengthening its defences and replenishing its stores, but in confirming the morale of the population. The oath of fidelity to Christ and the Doge, and to their trust as defenders of the fortress, was taken on 17 July by Bishop Ragazzoni, Bragadin, Laurence Tiepolo and Baglione, all the captains and gentlemen, as well as by the troops and by the whole population, men, women and children, who crowded the piazza, the terraces, loggias and windows, to hear the Bishop say the Mass of the Holy Ghost, and listen to orations from their leaders.[3]

Soon after landing his army, Mustafa tried the effect of persuasion on the Venetian authorities. A blind Greek monk, Nicodemos from Corfù, who had fallen into his hands, was sent to the capital with a letter demanding the surrender of the island, on the familiar grounds. The Pasha, it said, had brought an army of 200,000 men, and the Sultan was prepared to throw the whole of his forces into the struggle, so that all the princes of Christendom leagued together would be no match for him. Venice, one small State out of all Europe, deserted by the rest, should not resist, but amicably cede the island and retain the favour and friendship of the Sultan; otherwise it would suffer all the horrors that a wrathful victor inflicts on the vanquished.[4] This ultimatum was to expire in half a month, by which time Mustafa expected that his reinforcements from the mainland would arrive.[5] The Rectors in Nicosia,

[1] After dealing with Lefkara, Lascari attacked a large detachment of Turks, but had his horse killed under him and returned to Nicosia.

[2] Alasya (pp. 28–9) describes the episode of Lefkara ('the fortress of Leftari in Limasol') as taking place at the time of the descent on Lemesos.

[3] Gatto, pp. 36–7; Riccoboni, p. 18. Cp. Morosini, II, pp. 421–3.

[4] Such is the substance of the letter, as given by Foglieta, an indifferent authority on such matters. Graziani (p. 76) says that the letter promised personal and religious liberty to all the nobles, if they would surrender. As the Venetians took no notice, Mustafa gave orders to lay waste the countryside, and the Lefkara incident followed. Alasya (p. 30) is apparently wrong in dating the mission of Nicodemos after the siege had begun.

[5] On the assumption that his calculation was more or less right, he must have sent the ultimatum about 7 July.

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although some thought that a reply should be returned, decided to take no notice of his threats. Nevertheless they sent an urgent appeal to Famagusta[1] for help, asking that Baglione should come back to the capital with reinforcements. The reply was that it was not certain that Nicosia was to be the first objective of the enemy, whose way it was to spread false reports of his plans and so take his opponent unawares. Baglione himself said that he was under the orders of the Famagusta command.

Meanwhile there was some disagreement at the Turkish headquarters on the question which of the two fortresses should first be attacked.[2] The Italian writers describe what they allege to have been the arguments on either side. It may be assumed that Mustafa's decision was influenced by information, brought by renegades from Nicosia, of the condition of the capital, which has already been sufficiently described; possibly, too, by his knowledge that the two most competent officers on the Christian side were at Famagusta. Piale mistrusted the report of the renegades, and still preferred Famagusta, but Mustafa decided for Nicosia. Either as a feint, or in order to cut the communications between the two cities, or with both objects, he sent a detachment in the direction of Famagusta, with orders not to show themselves too near it, lest they should be attacked by Baglione. That, however, was exactly what happened, for he surprised them on the night of 30 July with considerable success. Taking 600 Italians, as many Greeks, and 200 horse, he went out to a villa near A. Sergios, where the enemy, numbering some 3000, were bivouacking. Owing to one of his vanguard mistaking a donkey in the darkness for a Turk and firing too soon, his attack did not go quite according to plan, but he killed a number of Turks, including two Sanjakbeys, and captured some standards. The Turk in command of the galleys at Constanza,[3] only about a mile away, alarmed by the noise

[1] Brenzone, pp. 44–5; Foglieta, col. 974. Cp. Romanin, VI, 294, n. 2. Paruta (p. 94), by the position which it occupies in his narrative, seems to be referring to this appeal, though the reply, as he gives it, seems to be that which was returned to the third appeal.

[2] Paruta, pp. 88–90; Foglieta, col. 974; Graziani, pp. 74–6. The last says that Mustafa at first favoured Famagusta, but changed his mind because of the information brought by the renegades, who offered to show him the way into the capital. Morosini (II, p. 306) says that Mustafa was also influenced by his knowledge of the unhealthiness of the neighbourhood of Famagusta.

[3] His name appears in the western sources in many forms, most usually 'Rapamat', which represents Arab Ahmad, where the first word merely means that he was a Moor by birth. The identification (which I owe to Dr Wittek) is given by (1) the fact that

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of the conflict, supposed that a relieving force had come to Famagusta, and fired a few shots, but discovered his mistake on reconnoitring the port when day came.[1]

the 'house of Rapamat' was the first residence of the English ambassador in Constantinople (Hareborne in Hakluyt, *Principal Navigations*, II, i, 194) and (2) a Turkish document of 1594 referring to the noisy and immoral behaviour of the English in their embassy, 'the house of Arab Ahmad Pasha'. He was a protégé of Mehmed Sokolli, who promoted him from a low position by degrees to the rank of Beylerbey. At this time he was Bey of Rhodes (Gatto, p. 88). He is frequently mentioned hereafter as Ahmad Pasha, and was eventually murdered by his own troops in 1578. See Hammer, *Gesch.* IV, p. 45. The name recalls the 'Arab Achmet' mosque in Nicosia, which is a 17th-cent. building, probably taking the place of a medieval church. Does it take its name from the Turkish commander, who may have built an earlier mosque, on the site, or converted the medieval church?

[1] The narrative must be constructed from various discrepant sources. Most of them say the detachment consisted of only 500 horse. Graziani, however (p. 76), while saying that it was to keep itself hidden, makes it consist of 3000 foot; he mentions it again (pp. 173–4) saying that it was wiped out almost to a man. Podacataro (pp. 11–12) says that there were 2000 Turkish horse, and that Baglione attacked with 2000 Greek and Italian foot and 250 horse. From Gatto we learn (p. 37) that on 30 July a Greek priest, a spy of Baglione, informed him that at a villa, six miles from Famagusta and one from the port of Constanza, called *Sansferre*, there were some 3000 Turks, mostly cavalry. Baglione attacked the same night, as described above. From Calepio we can identify *Sansferre* as A. Sergios; Brenzone (p. 60) gets nearer with *Sanserio*; he says that more than 2000 Turks, including two Sanjakbeys, were killed. A Greek who hearing the first firing took fright and came back, reporting that all the Christians had been wiped out, was sentenced by Bragadin to have his ears cut off, but at Baglione's intercession lost only his horse and weapons. Foglieta (col. 978) also says that 2000 Turks including two Sanjakbeys were killed, and some standards captured. Morosini (II, p. 420) says that 500 horse were first sent to A. Sergios, and followed afterwards by 3000 foot. He also mentions (p. 419) that stradiote horse, issuing from Famagusta, skirmished with the Turks, bringing back the heads of twenty whom they had killed, though Count Rondacchi died of wounds which he received in the engagement; that a Famagustan citizen (Valmaranus), with a force of Greeks, ambushed and killed many, and captured a galley off A. Napa. This Rondacchi cannot have been the stradiote captain Peter Rondacchi, who went through the siege of Nicosia, and escaped to Famagusta, where he was killed, as we shall see, on 29 July 1571. Perhaps the reference is to Peter's brother Gondo, who was killed at Katapetra in a raid from Famagusta (Brenzone, p. 61). Another exploit by Baglione is mentioned by Morosini (II, p. 420) as taking place on 31 Aug. when in a night attack with 400 Italian foot, 300 picked Greeks and all his cavalry Baglione fell on the Turks 'ad Sancti Georgii pagum', and killed 200, himself losing only eight men.—When Alasya says (p. 29) that Mustafa Pasha, Beylerbey of Sulkadr, was sent to invest Famagusta, the reference is possibly to this detachment; but he also says that 500 horsemen were sent to cut communications between Famagusta and Nicosia.

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On 22 July both Piale and Ali returned to Salines and immediately disembarked the reinforcements they had brought. There is the usual discrepancy between the sources regarding the strength of the Turkish army, but it is generally agreed that the whole force which set out for Nicosia, fighting men and others, numbered something like 100,000. If Mustafa, in his letter demanding surrender, claimed to have twice that number, we may reasonably suppose him to have been purposely exaggerating.[1]

[1] It must be admitted that he was supported by the statement of his lieutenant, after Famagusta had fallen, when there was less reason for exaggeration (Gatto, p. 96). Asked with how large a force Mustafa had come to Cyprus, this man said it numbered 250,000, reckoning in 7000 horse, 40,000 sappers, and camp-followers. The losses in the war were constantly made up by sending for more troops from the mainland. But other estimates are much more moderate. To take first the Turkish writers: Selaniki speaks of 10 Sanjakbeys with their Spahis and Alaybeys, as well as 2000 Janissaries, with the Colonel of the 64th Janissary regiment, as being in the first-mentioned fleet of 84 katerga, etc.; he gives no figures for the complete force. Pechevi says the Agha of the Janissaries had 5000 Janissaries with a sufficient force of gunners with the artillery-train, and the six cavalry regiments attached to the Janissaries. Hajji Khalfa gives the same number of Janissaries with their Ketkhuda (Kiaya, or Lieutenant-General) Yahya. As to the Italian writers: Contarini (f. 10) has: 4000 horse, 6000 Janissaries, 4000 spahis, and an unknown number of irregulars. Calepio (f. 107): a total of 100,000 men, including 10,000 cavalry, but excluding 25,000 who were brought up from the fleet for the last assault; some, he says, reckoned only 4000 horses, with many mares and mules, which were used like horses; 6000 Janissaries and 4000 Spahis. On f. 103b Calepio has the same estimate of 100,000. This agrees with Sozomeno (*Exc. Cypr.* p. 86): the Turks had 4000, report said even 10,000 horses, counting mares and mules; 6000 Janissaries; the whole force made up 100,000 men. Paruta (p. 84) reckons 50,000 foot-soldiers, 3000 sappers, 2500 war-horses and as many more of burden, 30 guns, some firing 50 and some 100-pound shot, and 50 falconets (light field guns). Morosini (II, p. 306) follows Paruta, adding to the artillery two immense mortars. Elsewhere (p. 95) Paruta mentions 6000 Janissaries and 4000 Spahis (cavalry who at need served on foot with the infantry). Foglieta (col. 976) agrees as to 50,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry, with others (various irregulars, sutlers, batmen and other camp-followers) making a total of 100,000. Manolesso (f. 31; cp. Conti, *Hist.* 1589, f. 82) has 6000 Janissaries, 4000 horse and 90,000 foot, who were not brought to the island all at once; many came from various neighbouring lands after the first portion of the host arrived. Conti adds 40,000 pioneers. Sereno, as frequently, follows Manolesso (p. 54); but elsewhere (p. 56) he seems to follow Contarini. Höniger (p. 689), like most of the others, has 6000 Janissaries and 4000 horse; also 4000 infantry 'and others fighting for pay'. Lastly Graziani (p. 75) says the army numbered 70,000, with sutlers and batmen bringing the number up to 100,000, including 9000 Janissaries, 2000 war-horses and as many mules, etc., which were saddled and ridden. Brenzone's figure (p. 38) for the number of soldiers is 60,000. Paruta's figure for the

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Among the senior officers holding command under Mustafa Pasha were the Pashas Iskender, Hasan, Bahram, Mustafa Ibn Ja'fer, and Dervish (Beylerbeys of Anadoli, Karaman, Sivas, Sulkadr and Aleppo respectively), and Muzaffer Pasha, ex-Beylerbey of Shehrizur.[1]

Since there was still a possibility that at any time the Christian fleet might arrive on the spot, Mustafa forbore to withdraw any men from his own ships. Piale, it was arranged, was to remain with 130 galleys, fully prepared to meet the enemy, sending nine to Rhodes to obtain information of his movements.[2]

On 23 or 24 July[3] Mustafa moved from Salines, but cautiously, for it was feared that the apparent absence of resistance was a trap. On the 25th the infantry, with a vanguard of cavalry, appeared before the capital, and were joined next day by the remainder of the host, including the artillery.

The appearance of the first portion of the enemy's forces before the city offered an opportunity for an action which might have thrown the plans of the invaders into confusion.[4] Colonel Palazzo, in command of

number of *guastadori* at the siege of Nicosia seems unduly small, although there may not have been as many as the 40,000 who seem to have been employed at Famagusta, as we shall see. Rosell (p. 25, n. 5) is inclined to accept Paruta's figures, since a larger number seems out of proportion to the ship-space available, even if many made two voyages. But the local sources favour a higher estimate.

[1] Hammer, III, pp. 575, 579. This is Hajji Khalfa's list. Selaniki has 'the Beylerbey of Marash Lala Ja'fer Pasha and his son Mustafa Pasha', and a second Bahram as Beylerbey of Aleppo. Pechevi makes Iskender Pasha and Bahram Pasha change places. Selaniki says there were also 10 Sanjakbeys; Pechevi mentions those of Tirkhala, Yania, More, Elbasan and Prizren of Rumelia (these are also mentioned by Hajji Khalfa). Iskender has been misunderstood by the Italian writers as the Pasha of Alexandria. According to Sozomeno, Hasan commanded 'la gente della Caramanea et una natione detti Remoliti', which Cobham misunderstood to mean that his family name was Remoliti. The nation remains to be identified.

[2] Foglieta, col. 974.

[3] 23 July: Contarini (f. 10). 24 July: Calepio (f. 99). 22 July: Manolesso (f. 32), Paruta (p. 90) and Foglieta (col. 974). 21 July: Sereno (p. 56), on same day as return of Ali and Piale with reinforcements. Bizari (p. 36) gives no precise date; Graziani (p. 77) and Falchetti (*Exc. Cypr.* p. 80) both say that Mustafa took six days (or six marches) to cover the distance; yet the former makes the second portion of the army arrive before Nicosia on 25 July. It is to be assumed that at least a day elapsed between the arrival of the reinforcements at Salines and the starting for Nicosia.

[4] Sozomeno, p. 82; Calepio, f. 99; Manolesso, f. 32b; Sereno, p. 56; Bizari, p. 36; Graziani, p. 77. Cp. Brenzone, p. 45, who says that Baglione had given orders for the Turks to be prevented from encamping without opposition.

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the 1300 Italian infantry, was urgent that he should be allowed to attack with all the stradiotes, the feudatary cavalry, the newly raised infantry and others, while the enemy were still without artillery and full cavalry support, and wearied by their march in the great heat. Palazzo pointed out that he could retire at will if necessary, while the guns of the fortress, playing on open country, would keep the enemy at a distance. The Rectors and the Count of Roucha, true to their determination to take no risks, obstinately rejected his plea, and a great opportunity was again lost.

Mustafa took up his position opposite the southern and south-eastern stretches of the enceinte, facing the Tripoli, Davila, Constanzo and Podocataro bastions, where his artillery could command it from rising ground. He made no attempt at a close investment from the other sides, but by day and night a regular patrol by a hundred horse and as many foot was maintained from St Dominic's Gate to the Trakhona Gate, to deal with any possible sortie. The Turkish camp spread over a wide area. The more forward portion of it was on the Mandia heights to the south-east of the city, behind Santa Marina, where new wells were sunk and, contrary to the expectations of the inhabitants of the region, plenty of water was found.[1] Others, especially the cavalry, encamped near the spring which was the source from which the citadel was supplied.[2]

[1] It will be remembered that Baglione was said to have poisoned the existing wells. Above, p. 957; Graziani, p. 78.

[2] Calepio, *Chor.* f. 99: 'verso Santo Dimitri, oue sta la radice della fontana'; *Descr.* f. 249: 'vers sainct Demetrie, où est la source de la fontaine qui entre en Nicossie'. Sozomeno (*Exc. Cypr.* p. 82): at S. Clemente, where is the spring that supplies the citadel. Manolesso (f. 33), Sereno (p. 57) and Bizari (p. 37) follow Sozomeno. Neither St Demetrios nor St Clement seems to be identified; for A. Dometios, with which Kyprianos would identify the former, seems to be too distant. (It was at St Demetrios that the Mamelukes encamped when they came with James II to Nicosia; above, p. 564.) If the site of the citadel was, as seems probable, somewhere outside and to the south of the present Paphos Gate, the Turkish lines must have extended to this area, as is indeed indicated by the fact that the Tripoli bastion was one of those assaulted. Pechevi says that the forts were erected on seven places. Hammer (III, p. 579) says that Mustafa divided his 50,000 regular troops into seven divisions, each of about 7000 men, which he stationed opposite seven bastions, supplying each with seven cannon, and the siege lasted seven weeks. The figures need not be taken seriously, for his source is playing with the number seven, as he points out (p. 784). In the disposition of the commands before the Constanzo, Podocataro, Davila and Tripoli bastions he agrees with the Italian sources: Mustafa Pasha himself before Constanzo, Iskender Pasha before Podocataro, Muzaffer Pasha before Davila and the Pasha of Aleppo, Dervish,

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Finally the camp extended some five Italian miles south-eastwards, as far as Aglangia (Eylenja) and Athalassa, along the Larnaka road; these positions were also dictated by the water supply.

Mustafa began operations by sending his cavalry round the walls in the hope of enticing the defenders into the open. Officers such as Piovene and Cortese would have liked nothing better than to accept the invitation, but Dandolo and Roucha persisted in their preference for defence over attack, on the ground that, even if a good many of the enemy were killed, they were so numerous that it could have little effect on the result. It was with the greatest difficulty that they were persuaded to permit a few sorties, the outcome of which unfortunately seemed to justify their caution. Piovene was allowed to take a few horsemen and try to draw the enemy within range of the guns, but with little success, although three such attempts were made. On one of these, probably on 29 July,[1] the stradiote captain Andrew Cortese was captured and his head cut off.[2]

On 30 July Mustafa began the construction of earthwork forts from which to bombard the fortifications and the city within them.[3] The first he placed on the hill of St Marina, and completed successfully, working night and day, in spite of the fire of the defenders' eighty-pounders from the Caraffa bastion and the curtain between that and the Podocataro.[4]

before Tripoli. According to Alasya (p. 30) it was Mustafa Pasha, vali of Marash, who was before Davila. Brenzone (p. 45) is wrong in supposing Ali Pasha to have been present in the early days of the siege.

[1] The date may be fixed by the fact that Sereno says that on the night after Cortese's sortie Mustafa Pasha began the construction of his forts, and Calepio dates that on 30 July.

[2] Calepio, f. 99; Contarini, f. 10b; Falchetti, *Exc. Cypr.* p. 80; Sozomeno, *ibid.* p. 82; Manolesso, f. 33; Sereno, p. 57; Bizari, p. 38; Foglieta, col. 975 (Cortese was only captured when he had been severely wounded and his horse had been killed under him). Calepio alone mentions Piovene in this connexion. It is probably this skirmish that the Θρῆνος describes (vv. 249 ff.), though it makes Rondacchi, not Cortese, fall into the hands of the enemy, owing to his bridle breaking. We know however that Rondacchi was not captured, but escaped when the city fell, and was afterwards killed at Famagusta. Since both were captains of stradiotes, the confusion was easy.

[3] Calepio, *Chor.* f. 99b; *Descr.* f. 250; Sozomeno, p. 82; Contarini, ff. 10b, 11; Manolesso, f. 33; Sereno, pp. 57–8; Graziani, p. 78.

[4] The distance of this work from the Podocataro bastion is given by Contarini as 130 paces, by Calepio as 140, by Sozomeno, Manolesso and Sereno as 270, by Graziani as 300 (i.e. 238, 257, 495 and 550 yards respectively). Since Sozomeno was an engineer, his figure is probably right; as also his description of the defenders' guns as firing

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A second fort was constructed on a hill at St George of Mangana; a third on the little hill of Margarita, facing the Constanzo and Podocataro bastions; and a fourth on the slope of Mt Mandia. The fire from these batteries seems to have done comparatively little damage, beyond demolishing some houses. Mustafa therefore advanced a second parallel, driving deep trenches as far as the fosse of the old city, and thence towards the four bastions.[1] Here, on the site of the ruins of the old city, he built four forts at eighty paces (147 yards) from the bastions. From these he kept up a bombardment for four days, from morning until evening, with a pause of four hours at midday on account of the heat.[2] They effected little, for the artillery of the defenders, under the direction of Antony dal Beretino,[3] made a lively reply, knocking out many of their guns, while their own sixty-pound shot buried themselves ineffectively in the earth of the fortifications. Thus, as already observed,[4] Savorgnan's adoption of a turfed slope for the upper part of the walls was so far justified, although, on the other hand, the earth brought down helped to fill the fosse and make the access of storming parties so much the easier.

Bombardment not having the desired effect, Mustafa resorted to sapping. His zigzag saps penetrated as far as the counterscarp and into the fosse, throwing out the earth and making traverses (for stiffening which he used fascines brought by horse from a distance); these protected the attackers from flanking fire. His arquebusiers, installed in a deep trench or counterfosse along the counterscarp, from which the earth was thrown out into the fosse, were constantly relieved, day and

eighty-pound shot (so too Contarini), whereas Calepio has fifty-pounders. A passage in Calepio, which was misunderstood by his French translator, and anyhow remains obscure, may perhaps be an echo of Colonel Piacenza's view that the rising ground on which the Turkish batteries were placed ought to have been taken into the fortifications by the 'founder' of the fortress, that is Julius Savorgnan (above, Ch. XIII, p. 844).

[1] Calepio, *Chor.* f. 99b; *Descr.* f. 250; Sozomeno, p. 83; Contarini, f. 11; Manolesso, f. 33; Sereno, p. 58; Graziani, p. 79; Bizari, p. 39. Falchetti (*Exc. Cypr.* p. 80) speaks of five forts facing five bastions (if so, the fifth must have been Caraffa), and says that the Turks were posted behind a hill called 'Famagosta'.

[2] Cp. Brenzone (pp. 45–6): they fired with 50-pounders and mortars on the houses of the city, and with fire-arrows set light to the cotton of the traverses of the defenders.

[3] Paruta, p. 99. The Count of Tripoli also knocked out two of the enemy's guns; but Antony dal Beretino was later killed by an arquebus shot (Brenzone, p. 46; see below, p. 977, n. 2).

[4] Ch. XIII, p. 849.

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night, and paralysed the defence of the besieged, who were unable to show themselves on the walls.[1] Thus the enemy gradually worked up to the bastions, and began to pull their faces and points to pieces.[2] So much earth was thrown into the fosse that the besiegers were able to ascend with ease to the level of the bastions.

Counter measures by the besieged availed them little.[3] A cavalier constructed by Palazzo to command the enemy's forts was never used, the first person to ascend it being killed by a shot from St Marina; and breastworks on the crest of the parapets intended to protect the arquebusiers were shot away. A mine which was being made at the angle of a bastion failed, falling in because the enemy were working under it. The stock of gunpowder was small; at least there were bitter complaints of the Lieutenant's niggardliness in doling it out; he could not, he said, justify any waste to St Mark, and it was forbidden to fire on any of the enemy who came within range unless there were at least ten of them. Dandolo believed, or affected to believe, that the bastions were invulnerable 'as so many mountains'. It is not surprising that there was talk of his being a traitor.[4]

Sozomeno and other officers continued to urge the adoption of more aggressive measures; the enemy's works should be directly attacked. The Rectors and Roucha were consistently unwilling to permit any such offensive action; the Italian troops were so few, and the soldiers drawn from the countryside and the city of such poor quality, that they

[1] Cp. Brenzone, p. 45 (who says this trench was begun on the night after Magrino's sortie, to be mentioned below).

[2] Calepio, *Chor.* ff. 99b, 100 (the *Descr.*, f. 250b, mistranslates various details); Sozomeno, p. 83; Contarini, f. 11b; Manolesso, f. 33b; Sereno, pp. 58–9; Paruta, p. 100; Bizari, p. 40; Foglieta, col. 976. Bizari, like the *Description*, turns 'guns firing sixty-pound shot' into sixty guns'.

[3] Calepio, f. 100b.

[4] Calepio, f. 100. Cp. the gunner's words on the last day of the siege (below, p. 981, n. 3). On 12 Aug. the gunners scored a direct hit with a hundred-pound shot on one of the enemy's guns, destroying the embrasure and killing many Turks. But Dandolo refused to sanction any further expenditure of powder, and the feat could not be repeated, though the gunners continued to do the best they could (Calepio, f. 101 (mistranslated in Cobham)). The Lieutenant alleged that it was on the advice of Julius Savorgnan that he objected to the use of cannon of large calibre instead of three- or four-pounders. The gunners refused to believe him (Calepio, f. 103b). Dandolo was in the habit of justifying his wrong-headed opinions by reference to absent experts, such as Sforza Pallavicino.

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feared to risk losing more men, especially as sickness was taking its toll of their numbers.[1] Nevertheless a certain number of ineffective attempts to interfere with the besiegers were made.[2] Thus the engineer Cav. Magrino with John Falier took 500 Greeks and Italians towards St George of Mangana; but the promised support by Piovene with 100 horse did not reach them, and they were recalled. Another time two parties of fifty each went out, and Piovene with 100 stradiote horse and Lazarus Coccapani with his company sallied from the Trakhona Gate towards St Marina. The Turks fled, but rallied; after a long skirmish the recall was again sounded by order of Roucha. Thirdly, there was a sortie by John Doglione[3] with 150 men from the Podocataro bastion and Cecco Angelo da San Giusto from the Constanzo.

It was on the day after the second of these sorties that Mustafa, to test the defences, ordered an attack on two of the bastions, those just mentioned.[4] From the Podocataro he was easily repulsed; but the defenders of the Constanzo were taken by surprise. The Turks got over the parapet, and actually planted a standard on the bastion, but were driven back by Paul del Guasto and John Andrew da Spello, though the latter captain was killed. Had Mustafa pressed home his advantage with larger forces, it was believed that the city would have fallen that day.

At the beginning of August another effort was made to persuade Astorre Baglione to come to Nicosia and bring some gunners with him.[5] The first messengers, carrying letters in cypher, were captured by the

[1] Sozomeno, p. 83; Calepio, f. 100. Bizari, p. 41 (*quaedam communis et tabifica lues* attacked the levies from the countryside especially). *Una influentia di malatia* is Manolesso's phrase (f. 35).

[2] Sylv. Brenzone, pp. 45, 46, 48. I find no other mention of these.

[3] Possibly identical with the Captain John Boglione da Civital de Bellona, mentioned by Gatto, pp. 29–30.

[4] This particular affair is mentioned by Paruta, Foglieta and Brenzone, but not by the other sources. It is the last (p. 46) who dates it after the sortie by Piovene and Coccapani. He gives the credit for the repulse to 'John Antony' da Spello and 'Estore' Podocataro. The former and Count Octavius de Nores, brother of the Count of Tripoli, were killed, and Hector and Hercules Podocataro were wounded. Calepio (f. 111) gives 'John Andrew' da Spello in his list of killed, but not Octavius de Nores; the former commanded a company drawn from the village of Nisou, while Paul del Guasto had one of the Italian companies.

[5] The appeals to Famagusta and the forces in the mountains: Calepio, f. 100b; Sozomeno, p. 84; Contarini, f. 12; Manolesso, f. 35; Sereno, p. 61; Paruta, p. 94 (but see above, p. 963, n. 1); Sylv. Brenzone, p. 47; Bizari, p. 45; Foglieta, col. 978; Graziani, p. 86.

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Turks, and paraded and put to death before the eyes of the besieged. The Italian captain of infantry, John Baptist of San Colombano, was then despatched;[1] he got through, with the loss of his hat and dagger, which were exhibited to the besieged. He presented to the Council of Famagusta the request for Astorre Baglione and reinforcements of Italian infantry and gunners. The Famagusta command were exceedingly unwilling to part with Baglione, but on 8 August they gave him permission to leave, though without the force of soldiers, of which they refused to deprive the fortress. Nevertheless he was ready to venture with a small escort; when new objections were raised. Finally, on 11 August he was told that he might do as he pleased, but he decided to fall in with the wishes of the command, lest he should seem to be taking an unreasonable risk, since the enemy, from letters which had been intercepted, were well aware of his intention.[2] San Colombano accordingly returned, accompanied only by one gunner, Leonard Rossetti of Verona. With great difficulty, going without food or drink for some days, they succeeded in reaching Nicosia.[3]

[1] The Bishop of Paphos, says Brenzone, offered to go, but was too useful, by his work among the poor and sick, to be spared.

[2] So he wrote in a letter cited from the *Annali* (p. 116) by Romanin (VI, p. 293), who however, gives as its date 7 Aug., in which case it cannot refer to what happened on the 8th and 11th.

[3] On St Laurence's day, 10 Aug., according to Calepio, which again conflicts with Romanin's date for Baglione's letter. According to Brenzone, Bragadin refused to weaken Famagusta, 'the eye of the Kingdom', by depriving its garrison, which was still intact, of the services of its captain, and sending him, at imminent risk to his life, to command an already broken army, thus ruining a strong city for the sake of one already half-destroyed. If he went, the troops would follow him. Baglione then attempted to escape in disguise, but was discovered. Bragadin allowed him to send his advice in writing by San Colombano. Paruta also says that it was feared that the soldiers would obey no one but Baglione, and if he deserted them there would be a mutiny. Foglieta speaks of three separate appeals to Famagusta. The first (col. 974), made before the enemy started from Salines, has already been mentioned. A second, when the enemy had actually appeared at Nicosia, was equally fruitless (col. 976). On a third appeal, Baglione attempted to escape secretly, but was discovered, and the Famagusta command explained by letter to Nicosia that the troops would follow him, and the people of Famagusta would hand themselves over to the Turks, so that, while he could do little to save Nicosia, Famagusta would be destroyed. Foglieta thus agrees with Brenzone. But the story of Baglione's attempted secret departure must be taken with reserve, in the light of his own letter. That letter was confirmed on 6 Sept. by Bragadin (Romanin, VI, p. 294, n. 2; from the *Annali*), who gave his reasons for refusing the first request of the Rectors; afterwards it was too late, the enemy having

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Disappointed of its hopes of help from Famagusta, Nicosia lifted its eyes to the hills. Letters had been received from officers who said that some 100,000 persons had taken refuge there, of whom 20,000 were fighting men, and were all faithful to the Republic. The Turks, who were overrunning the country, laying it waste with fire and sword, had frequently been attacked, and John Sinclitico had in various engagements killed more than 500 of them. He and Scipio Caraffa were reported to have come down with 4000 peasants to the region of Paphos and done much execution among the enemy.[1] But hopes of reinforcements for the capital from this quarter were also doomed to disappointment. Letters in cypher asking for 10,000 men were intercepted, as had been those sent to Famagusta, and the messengers exhibited to the besieged.[2] And indeed if any appeals got through they met with small response, for reasons which have already been explained.[3] The peasantry were ready to carry on guerrilla warfare on their own account, but to come into the capital to the aid of their oppressors was another matter.

Mustafa, unable, it was said, to decipher the captured missive, returned it to the hands of the senders attached to an arrow, and accompanied by a letter in which he said that he had mercifully refrained from taking the city; but that since the defenders were so obstinate, he would now take it and deliver it up to be sacked. They could hope for no relief, for the Venetian fleet was immobilized in Crete, and King Philip was too busy defending his own possessions to come to their help. Grossly exaggerating the number of his forces, he asserted that the 200,000 men he had originally brought to the siege had now been increased by half as many again.[4] No notice was taken of this threat by the besieged.

The attacks on the bastions, made possible by the inclined plane of earth which the enemy threw up towards them in the fosse, had

blocked communications; also, the garrison of Famagusta consisted largely of troops of poor quality, and many of those who had come from Venice were dying of dysentery, from which Baglione was himself suffering.

[1] Sylv. Brenzone, p. 50; Foglieta, col. 978.

[2] Calepio, f. 101; Sozomeno, p. 84; Contarini, f. 12; Manolesso, f. 35; Sereno, p. 61; Bizari, p. 45; Foglieta, col. 986; Graziani, p. 87. Sylv. Brenzone (p. 52) says that the messenger was escorted by forty horsemen, but nevertheless captured. The appeal to the mountains is mentioned by most of the authorities in connexion with that to Famagusta, but both Brenzone and Foglieta put it later, after the reported arrival of the Christian fleet.

[3] Above, Ch. XIII, p. 808.

[4] Foglieta, col. 986.

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revealed their vulnerability. Retrenchments were made in the four which were chiefly the object of the enemy's attentions. In Podocataro and Constanzo, Colonel Palazzo constructed retrenchments which closed the throat of the bastion; but in Tripoli and Davila the engineer Sozomeno devised another sort, which left no room on the platforms for the enemy if he got over the parapet.[1] Had this latter plan been adopted in the other bastions, the final assault might have been less successful than it was.

The persistence of the Bishop of Paphos and others at last had an effect on the inertia of the Lietuenant, and permission was extorted from him for a sortie in force to be made on the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin, 15 August, to attack the forts and spike the guns.[2] It was led by Caesar Piovene[3] of Vicenza, Lieutenant of the Collateral, who, though a cavalry officer, chose on this occasion to fight on foot. The plan was to make the sortie at the time of the midday siesta of the Turks; Piovene was to issue from the Famagusta Gate, make his way by the fosse towards the river and work round to the gate of the old city, spreading out his force as far as the Davila bastion; he was then to give a signal, at which George Pandeo[4] was to descend from the embrasures of the Constanzo bastion with a mixed force of Greeks and Italians. They were then to rush the forts and kill their defenders, and spike their guns before

[1] Sozomeno, p. 84; Calepio, f. 101; Manolesso, f. 34b; Sereno, p. 60.

[2] Calepio, f. 101b; Falchetti, *Exc. Cypr.* p. 80; Sozomeno, *ibid.* 83–4; Contarini, f. 11b; Manolesso, f. 34 (25 Aug.); Sereno, pp. 59–60 (25 Aug.); Paruta, pp. 101–2; Sylv. Brenzone, p. 49; Bizari, pp. 42–4; Foglieta, col. 979 (col. 985, 16 Aug.); Graziani, pp. 82–5. Guglielmotti (p. 55) takes the wrong date from Manolesso or Sereno. Foglieta has a remarkably circumstantial account of the plan for the operation, but it contains some doubtful details. He says there was to be a force of 2000 foot and 400 stradiotes, but later makes Piovene lead four *signa* of Italians and 13 bands (each of 25 men) of *urbani*, as well as 2000 *ex delectibus*, while Gregory 'Panteus' was to join him with 600 mixed Greeks and Italians. Calepio's figure for the force is only 1000 foot (in which Sozomeno and Bizari agree) and 400 horse, and he says that fewer went out than had been proposed. Sylv. Brenzone and Graziani support Foglieta's figure of 2000.

[3] 'Tiene' in Sereno and Foglieta; 'Caesar of Treviso' in Falchetti.

[4] 'Giorgio Pandeo' in Calepio (who says he actually took part in the sortie). 'Gregorius Panteus' in Foglieta. According to Paruta, 'Gregorio Panteo' was captain of the force which was prevented from going to Piovene's support, because the Count of Tripoli required it for the defence of the Constanzo bastion, which the Turks took advantage of the occasion to assault. But that assault seems to have taken place not on this occasion but later.

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aid could come to them from the camp. At the same time, at a given signal, the stradiote cavalry were to issue[1] and ride for St Marina, to check the Turks who would be making for that point. The Lieutenant, it must be noted, had forbidden the cavalry of the feudataries, much to their indignation, to take part in the sortie, wishing to save them, as his best material, for the defence of the city. Unfortunately the plan was wrecked by the indiscipline of the Greeks, many of whom rashly attacked the works which the Turks had constructed along the counterscarp. Their example was followed by some of the officers of detachments under Piovene, either because their hearts failed them to attack the forts, as was proposed, or because they resented being under Piovene's orders.[2] Piovene himself, meanwhile, deserted by all but two of his officers and their men, having given the agreed signal, penetrated to the fosse of the old city, and reached two of the forts, killing or driving out their defenders and spiking their guns. His men reached the camp, from which the Turks at first fled in panic, and fell to looting. But the enemy soon rallied, when they found that the attacking force was not large. Now had the stradiote cavalry come to Piovene's support at his signal, as arranged, all might have been well. The troopers stood ready at the gate, and the rest of the infantry were eager to join in the fray. But here the fatal Lieutenant interfered. Mingled with the stradiotes were some of the gentlemen, who had lowered their vizors and hoped to escape notice. One of these, John Falier, was recognized by the Lieutenant, who flew into a rage at this disobedience to his orders. He closed the gate, and forbade any attempt at a sortie, even by the stradiotes, on what he professed was a forlorn hope. For, meanwhile, the enemy had returned in great numbers, and surrounded Piovene. He

[1] From the Trakhona Gate on the north, according to Foglieta. It will be remembered that a previous sortie was made from that gate towards St Marina, which was on the opposite side of the town (above, p. 971). The reason was apparently that the northern gate was out of sight of the main Turkish lines, and there was more chance of surprising the enemy.

[2] This explanation of the miscarriage of the plan is given in detail by Foglieta; there are echoes of it in Sylv. Brenzone, Paruta and Graziani. Paruta says that Piovene's men, instead of following up the enemy, fell to looting, and the disorder was aggravated because the Greeks and the Albanian cavalry [but the stradiotes, we know, never issued from the city] attacked the trenches inopportunely, either because they wished to be first in the assault, or because they resented being under Piovene's orders; and it was this inopportune attack that gave warning to the Turkish camp. In the other sources, it is the attack on the forts that gives the alarm.

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held the forts that he had taken, until, worn out and overpowered, he was killed.[1] With him fell the Italian captain, John Baptist Bertocci of Fano, and Count Albert Scotto of Piacenza.[2] Many other Italians and about 100 Greeks were taken prisoners. Estimates of the Christian dead range from 80 to 200; of the Turkish, from 1000 to 1500. In these last figures we may suspect exaggeration. Pursued by the Turkish cavalry, the survivors of the sortie made their way back into the city by the ditch as best they could. The timorous Lieutenant, who had closed the gate to prevent the stradiotes from going to the rescue, kept it closed for fear the enemy should penetrate into the city. It was little consolation for the disaster that those who had looted the trenches or camp brought back a certain number of trophies in the shape of handsome weapons.[3]

Since the officers and men who had been killed or captured in this affair were picked men, the Rectors set their faces against any more sorties, in spite of the protests made by Rondacchi and others who believed in attack as the best method of defence. It is not too much to say that this was the turning-point of the siege, and it was the fault of the Lieutenant that it turned the wrong way. It was generally believed, and the Turks themselves admitted, that had the sortie been supported according to plan, the whole course of events might have been changed in favour of the Christians.

The Turks gradually completed their approaches to the bastions.[4] In their assaults they are said to have carried fairly large bags full of inflammable powder, throwing them upon the defenders, who were badly burned if they tried to handle them; it was possible, however, with the point of a pike, to throw them back on the enemy.[5] 'Artificial fire', shot by arrows, was also used to set light to the defenders' traverses,

[1] Some, says Calepio (f. 101b), laid the blame of the failure on Piovene himself, who wanted all the honour for himself, and, rather than that the commander of the stradiotes should share it, ordered the cavalry to be held back. It sounds like an unconvincing attempt to shift the blame from the Lieutenant's shoulders.

[2] Manolesso and Sereno say, in error, that Scotto was not killed but taken prisoner.

[3] Among those who returned safely was the engineer Cav. Magrino. He is said to have complained that he never went out against the enemy without coming across something like treachery (*tradimento*). The good Calepio thinks that he must have said *impedimento* (obstruction), because the Lieutenant's retort was merely 'you are young yet, and do not understand everything'. But the implication was obvious.

[4] Calepio (f. 103) relates how they drove a donkey up the incline, taunting the besieged: 'Don't hurt the poor ass, he will not hurt you.'

[5] Calepio, f. 102.

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which were built up with bales of cotton, and so destroy their interior defences.[1]

The recurring assaults, bombardment and continual fire from the trenches which, as already remarked, kept the walls clear of the defenders, not only caused much loss of life,[2] but gradually demoralized the garrison, which began to take refuge in houses, churches and even wells and tombs.[3] Some three-quarters of the labour corps ceased to function, and necessary works were carried out but slowly, and the retrenchments planned, where breaches might be made in the defences, were not completed.[4] Discipline and order were at an end.[5] In contrast to what was later seen at Famagusta, there was grievous lack of organization as regards the distribution of food, and the care of the wounded, and Brother Angelo Calepio complains that private charity did not play its part.[6] (We may be less surprised than he that the Greeks did not subscribe to his fund for a votive church of the Latin rite to be dedicated to Our Lady of Victory.) There was much loss of life from disease, which attacked especially the country levies, who would have been unaccustomed to the conditions of town life at the best of times; and of the original force of Italians there were, when the final assault came, only 400 left. The heterogeneous constitution of the garrison encouraged indiscipline; even before the siege began there had been an outbreak between the men under Antony d'Ascoli who were on guard, and some of the country levies who were working at the fortifications; Antony had to be sent away to Famagusta, where he was put in command of the Greek troops.[7] Some of the officers failed to set a good example, going at night to sleep in their own houses, and causing the rank and file to murmur; they had to be compelled to come to their

[1] Paruta, p. 99.

[2] The artillery captain, Antony dal Beretino, fell in one of the assaults, and Captain Phoebus Zappe, who commanded half the nobles, was killed by a cannon-ball on the ramparts (Calepio, f. 103).

[3] Cp. Sylv. Brenzone, p. 48.

[4] Foglieta, col. 977.

[5] Sylv. Brenzone, p. 51.

[6] Calepio, f. 102b.

[7] Sylv. Brenzone, p. 41; Podacataro, p. 18. From Gatto (p. 33) we learn that in May Captain Antony Miliani of Ascoli with his company came from Nicosia to Famagusta; he took the place of Charles Razonasco, Captain of the guard of the Sea Gate, whose men had fought with the rowers of the galley of the *sopracomito* Francis Tron, and who was therefore sent to Nicosia. Cp. Natale Conti, *Hist.* 1589, f. 66b. A letter from Miliani to Desiderio Guidoni of Famagusta (10 Oct. 1570) is mentioned by Daru (VII, p. 269) as in the Farsetti Library at Venice.

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quarters on or near the bastions or in the retrenchments; only the Rectors were allowed to sleep at home.

The month of August wore to an end. Mustafa had good reason to suppose that the defence was exhausted, although arrows shot into the city, carrying letters demanding surrender, with the usual mingled threats and promises, met with no reply.[1] Any likelihood of the Christian fleet coming to the rescue seemed, at least for the time, to be dispelled, Piale having, about 30 August, brought the news that the Venetians in Crete had not yet been joined by their allies.[2] Mustafa now proposed a truce for an hour or two, which was agreed. At the Constanzo bastion he presented a formal demand for a surrender on terms. The Rectors replied that they were determined to resist to the last; and an irresponsible gunner did not wait for orders to resume firing. A number of Turks were killed.[3]

The will of the besieged to hold out was strengthened by the hope, which they were loth to relinquish, that succour was to come from the Christian fleet. It was encouraged by the appearance of a deserter from the Turkish camp, who was rumoured to have brought letters from Famagusta definitely announcing the arrival of the fleet. The Rectors, though they knew the truth, sent orders that the officers commanding the levies in the hills should light the fires which, it had been agreed, should be the signal that the long-desired help was at hand. The sight of the signal-fires caused intense excitement in the city, and sent the soldiers, and even the women and children, flocking to the walls, to jeer at the enemy and remind them of their failure at Malta five years earlier, which was now to be repeated.[4]

This illusion cannot have lasted long. The bombardment and the assaults were continued, and in an attack on the Constanzo bastion, in which the Turks got over the parapet and held it for a time, the Count of Tripoli, who had gone outside the stockade in the middle of the platform, was mortally wounded. The Turks were however thrown out.

[1] Paruta, p. 103; Foglieta, col. 985; Graziani, p. 86.

[2] Calepio, f. 103.

[3] Calepio, *ibid.*; Paruta, pp. 103–4; Sylv. Brenzone, p. 50. The last says that Mustafa Pasha addressed a letter to the Count of Tripoli (James de Nores) personally, offering to reward him if he would persuade the Rectors to surrender. He very properly passed the letter on to them.

[4] Paruta, p. 104; Foglieta, col. 986. It is a little curious that Calepio says nothing of this.

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The Count's brother, Francis Maria de Nores, succeeded him in the command of this post.[1] It is to be noted that, however lacking the Count may have been in the qualifications necessary in a master of the ordnance,[2] all the sources agree in praising him as a gallant soldier.

The stubborn resistance which he encountered gave Mustafa much food for thought. It seems that, whatever fault may have been found with the untrained levies, the professional soldiers and the feudataries were, man for man, more than a match for the Turks. The supposedly redoubtable Janissaries,[3] always difficult troops to control, showed themselves unwilling to lead an assault, for fear of mines, and the Pasha had to be content to let them stay in their trenches and use their arquebuses to keep the defenders off the walls. His only hope lay in overwhelming the defence by sheer weight of numbers. Accordingly he demanded reinforcements from the fleet.[4] Two messengers were despatched with urgent messages to Piale and Ali; there was no immediate danger from the Christian fleet, and all that Mustafa needed now was more men, for the approaches to the walls were so easy, with traverses protecting them from flanking fire, that cavalry could ride up them. Ali, with the required reinforcements, marched to the capital; Piale seems to have stayed with the ships. There are as usual varying estimates of the numbers; they range from 25,000 in all to 100 men from each ship, which would amount to some 16,000.[5]

Although these reinforcements did not reach Nicosia until the evening of 8 September, Mustafa was able to throw them into the struggle at dawn on the 9th, which says much for their quality.[6] To

[1] Calepio, f. 102b (it was suspected that the arrow which wounded the Count was poisoned); Paruta, p. 105; Foglieta, col. 987; Sylv. Brenzone, p. 51 (the Count lingered for two days).

[2] Above, Ch. XIV, p. 900, n. 2. [3] Paruta, p. 105; Sylv. Brenzone, p. 51.

[4] Calepio, f. 103b; Sozomeno, p. 86; Contarini, f. 12b; Manolesso, f. 35; Sereno, p. 62; Paruta, p. 105; Foglieta, cols. 987–8; Sylv. Brenzone, p. 52; Graziani, p. 88.

[5] Although Foglieta makes it 20,000, a total also given by Manolesso and Sereno.

[6] Calepio (f. 103b) says that on 7 or 8 Sept. the Pashas of the Sea despatched their men towards Nicosia. According to Contarini (f. 13) the men were landed from their ships before day on Saturday, 8 Sept. [but the 8th was a Friday] and Ali took them to Nicosia the same day, arriving at 22 hours (misprinted XXXII in the 1645 edition). Manolesso (f. 35) gives the same time for their arrival. From the statement of Calepio (f. 106) that after the capture of Nicosia the men returned to Salines, it follows that the ships were there and not, as might be supposed, at Famagusta. It is to be noted that more than one of our sources say that, after the arrival of his reinforcements and before

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stimulate the ardour of his troops, he offered extravagant rewards for gallantry: the first three over the walls should be made Sanjakbeys; if one of the Pashas should be killed, the first to enter the city should enjoy his dignity.[1]

All the night of 8 September the enemy guns bombarded the fortress.[2] As Saturday 9 September dawned the final assault began, the fifteenth which was delivered during the forty-five days of the siege.[3] It was directed, as usual, against the four bastions Podocataro, Constanzo, Davila and Tripoli. The Pasha of Karaman, Hasan, led the Greek and Karamanian troops against Podocataro; Muzaffer Pasha commanded against Constanzo,[4] Ali Pasha against Davila, and Mustafa himself against Tripoli. All four points were attacked at the same time with immense numbers, but especially the Podocataro, which was in a more ruinous state and more accessible than the others.[5] Here the enemy came on with such fury and shouting that many men of the country levy, who were on the platform in front of the retrenchment, were too terrified to take up their arms, and gave way;[6] others resisted gallantly for a time, but were eventually cut to pieces, and the ditch of the retrench-

the final assault of the 9th, Mustafa Pasha made an attack on the four bastions, which was beaten off with heavy losses (Sylv. Brenzone, p. 53; Paruta, pp. 105–6). There can be little doubt that this attack was one which took place earlier, before the arrival of the men from the fleet.

[1] Foglieta (col. 986) mentions such promises as having been made before the earlier assault, in which the Count of Tripoli was killed. I have followed the other sources, which make them preliminary to the final assault.

[2] Sylv. Brenzone, p. 53.

[3] The storming and sack of the city: Calepio, ff. 103b–107b; Sozomeno, pp. 84–5; Contarini, ff. 13, 13b; Manolesso, ff. 35–7; Sereno, pp. 62–4; Paruta, pp. 107–10; Sylv. Brenzone, pp. 54–6; Bizari, pp. 46–9; Foglieta, cols. 988–9.

[4] If one may credit the tradition (Gunnis, p. 74), the first Turkish standard was planted on the Constanzo bastion by a Turk who was immediately cut down, on the spot now marked by the 'Mosque of the Standard Bearer'. Since, as will appear, it was the Podocataro that was first captured, may the reference be to an earlier assault when a standard was actually planted on Constanzo? (above, p. 971). Jeffery describes the Mosque as 'a curious typical monument which is invariably set up by the Turks on their obtaining possession of a city by assault' (*Hist. Mon.* p. 39 n.). But there may well have been a reason for the choice of the spot on which it was erected.

[5] Paruta, disagreeing with the other sources, makes the Constanzo the scene of this stage of the attack.

[6] According to some they were caught asleep (Sylv. Brenzone, p. 54; Foglieta, col. 988; so too Paruta, but of the Constanzo bastion).

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ment was choked with their corpses. Meanwhile the bell had rung to arms, and Italians, nobles and citizen-soldiers coming up in support, a stiff struggle for the retrenchment ensued, lasting for some two hours. Here fell, among others, the Collateral, Eugene Sinclitico, Count of Roucha, who had been brought to the scene by the noise of the attack;[1] Thomas Sinclitico, Viscount of Nicosia, Artius Zappe, who had succeeded his brother Phoebus in command of half the nobles, and Colonel Palazzo were killed; while the Counsellor Peter Pisani and Colonel Roncone were mortally wounded. But both here and at the other bastions resistance continued, although the Lieutenant, who should have remained to encourage the defence, deserted his usual post at the Famagusta Gate, and retired to his palace.[2] The batteries had, as usual, been kept short of powder; only when the bombardier of the Caraffa bastion came down and made a violent protest,[3] was a message sent to the Master of the Ordnance to let him have a cartload of powder with all speed; but it arrived too late. The messenger, who was Brother Angelo Calepio himself, was also to say that, if it came to the worst, the ammunition store was to be blown up. This order, it would seem, was not obeyed.

Gradually the enemy forced their way in. The stradiote cavalry, had Sozomeno's advice been taken,[4] might have done great execution among them, but had been dismounted and set to guard the bastions. Penetrating in various directions, the Turks attacked the bastions from the inside, and taking the defenders in the rear cut to pieces all but a

[1] Graziani is alone in his statement (p. 91) that Roucha repelled the first attack, and then went back into the city, followed by many others, and that the Turks then attacked successfully. This may be due to confusion with the earlier attack on Constanzo.

[2] It must however be admitted that Foglieta, who has no love for the Lieutenant, says that he and the Bishop of Paphos rode round collecting men from the other bastions and sending them to support the defence of Podocataro; and Sylv. Brenzone also says that Dandolo and the Bishop came to help, but were forced to retire to the palace.

[3] The bombardier's words to the Rectors, as recorded by Calepio, who was present at the Famagusta Gate and heard them, are worth quoting: 'You dogs, enemies of God and yourselves and the Signory, do you not see that the enemy is winning? Why have we no powder to drive them off? While I had powder to flank them, they could not gain ground. What the devil! have we eaten the powder? have we swallowed the balls? your saving it for St Mark, I doubt not, will mean the loss of all.'

[4] Above, p. 954.

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number who fought their way out and carried on the struggle in the streets with the help of those whom they found there. At one of the bastions[1] the Captain in command, Paul del Guasto, turned his guns inward and held it for a time. Many Turks were killed by missiles thrown from roofs and windows. But any sort of organized resistance was no longer possible. Great numbers of the local militia and the peasant soldiery thought only of saving themselves, and tried to escape by slipping down through the embrasures, only to be cut down the sooner outside. Some of them turned their arms against those who tried to rally them. A stand, however, was made in the neighbourhood of the Greek cathedral, where a great many Greek monks and priests, as well as two Greek bishops, were killed. A fairly large body, rallying under Captain Tuccio Constanzo, made for the city square. They were met by a crowd of peasants, both mounted and on foot, who were bent on saving themselves, and refused to be dissuaded, although the Provincial of the Carmelites argued with them for two hours. Foolishly crediting the assurances of the enemy[2] that they could save their lives by surrendering, they threw down their arms. The panic spread to the Italians and Greeks, who broke open a gate, in the hope of escaping to the mountains and Kerynia.[3] They were mostly cut down by Turkish cavalry or taken prisoners.[4] But resistance was by no means altogether quelled; indeed the struggle was not over for some seven or eight hours. Before this, an incident occurred which illustrated the general feeling against the Lieutenant. The Venetian patrician Andrew Pesaro sought him out, abused him roundly as a traitor who had handed over the city to the enemy, and was about to draw his sword on him, when at

[1] Near St Luke's, says Calepio, therefore either Barbaro or Loredano.

[2] Sozomeno, Contarini, Manolesso and Sereno say that Mustafa, entering the city and seeing many prepared to resist in the city square, bade his men cease fighting, and promised the Christians their lives if they would lay down their arms, which many did; some twenty-five or thirty nobles and no great number of citizens thus survived. This may be another version of the final surrender at the Lieutenant's palace.

[3] The gate is called by Calepio the Bemba; this seems from the context to be yet another name for the Kerynia or Trakhona Gate. See above, Ch. XIII, p. 848, n. 1.

[4] Among those who escaped were John Philip de Lusignan (brother of the historian), Flatro Flatri (his cousin), Gianetto de Nores and his son Hector, Alfonso Bragadin, and the stradiote captain Peter Rondacchi, with some hundred men (Sylv. Brenzone, p. 56; Graziani, p. 92). Two stradiotes, escaping, thanks to the swiftness of their mounts, took the news of the fall of the city to Famagusta (Morosini, II, pp. 420–1). Rondacchi and many others gradually found their way thither.

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Dandolo's cry 'Kill him, kill him', the guard of halberdiers cut him down. But Dandolo had not much longer to wait for his reward.

About this time, the Famagusta Gate was opened, the Turkish cavalry rode in, and the victors swarming through the city began the sack. Dervish Pasha, who had entered by the Tripoli bastion, first dispersed those who, under John Falier,[1] were making a stand at the Barbaro bastion; then he made his way to the main square in front of the Lieutenant's palace, where he found a considerable number defending themselves stoutly. Bringing up three[2] guns from the walls, he compelled most of them to retire into the courtyard, where the Lieutenant himself, the Bishop of Paphos and other persons of importance had already gathered. The Pasha now sent in a Cypriote friar, who had just surrendered, with the promise of personal safety to all who would yield themselves. Tuccio Constanzo was sent back with him to accept the terms, and the besieged laid down their arms.[3] But when the doors were opened, the Turks who were thronging round forced their way in, and began indiscriminate slaughter. The palace was overrun, though a few brave men defended themselves on the upper floors, and enjoyed the satisfaction of throwing their assailants out of the windows. But a drunken Greek pulled down the standard of St Mark that flew on the palace, and hoisted the Turkish flag. The Lieutenant (who, hoping to be distinguished from the rest and so be spared, had dressed himself up in

[1] Sylv. Brenzone and Graziani: Falier was resisting with some hundred men, the remainder of his four hundred having deserted him; he was wounded and taken prisoner, and eventually ransomed himself.

[2] Paruta and Sylv. Brenzone; Foglieta says six.

[3] This is Paruta's account of the surrender, with which Foglieta's agrees in essentials. Calepio, on the other hand, says that the Lieutenant sent a formal written proposal to surrender the city if the Turks would stop the slaughter, spare the lives and property of all the Christians, and allow all captives in the Sultan's hands who wished to go to their homes. The Turks did not find this to their taste ('parue alquanto amaro al nimico'), and continued to take prisoners and sack the city, killing everyone whom they found with arms. Kyprianos (p. 290) has misunderstood Calepio, who says that the Lieutenant sent to the lodgings of the Grand Chancellor for his coadjutor to write the letter, not that he was in the Grand Chancellor's house. Zannetos (I, p. 989), out of the Κονσιλιάριος Πισάνη (the Counsellor Peter Pisani), whose title he confuses with Καντζιλίερος, creates a *Consul of Pisa*, to whose house, he says, the Lieutenant went from his own palace. Sylv. Brenzone says that Tuccio Constanzo, after unsuccessfully attacking the Janissaries with several mounted knights, had already surrendered to the Pasha and was sent by him with a Franciscan friar to the Lieutenant.

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his crimson velvet robe[1]) was taken and his head struck off, to be sent to Famagusta. That doughty prelate, the Bishop of Paphos, was also cut down here by a Janissary.[2]

The sound of the guns and arquebuses had now died down, but the massacre and sack went on for three days. The number of the dead on the first day was said to be over 20,000.[3] The reader may be spared description of the horrors, which were such as usually occurred at the capture of any Christian city by the Turks.[4]

The widowed Countess of Tripoli, without leaving her house, notified her surrender to Mustafa; but the promises of safety for her family and property and for the 300 men who, under her brother Hector Podocataro, were protecting the house, promises which she obtained at great cost from the Pasha, were not observed. Hector was beheaded;[5] she and two young sons, and the other prisoners, with her property (said to be worth 100,000 scudi) were placed in a *mahona*, and disappeared, according to some being lost at sea.

An exception to the general savagery with which the conquered were treated seems to have been made in respect of a certain number of those

[1] Natale Conti, *Hist.* 1589, f. 86.

[2] He was killed on the spot, according to most of the sources, having been at first promised his life by a molla to whom he surrendered, but who then went off after plunder, when a Janissary cut him down. But Calepio, who made enquiries about his fate, heard that he died later on the 'islet of Stinco' near Rhodes (which can only mean Cos). Foglieta is certainly wrong in saying that he was killed while defending the Podocataro bastion.

[3] Graziani adds that besides the prisoners taken at Nicosia 20,000 were carried off from other places. Longo, p. 19, gives the number killed as 40,000 in Nicosia and 60,000 in the island, while Piale kept 50,000 as galley-slaves. Natale Conti (*Hist.* 1589, f. 86) says that 30,000, not counting Italians, were killed and 20,000 taken prisoners. The Grand Vezir, writing to Charles IX (Charrière, III, p. 137) says that 60,000 were put to the sword and 50,000 enslaved. All such figures are worth very little.

[4] Calepio dilates on them, and tells how his mother's head was cut off; but what shocked him most, apparently, was that the Turks killed all the swine they found, and their carcasses were mingled with the human corpses.

[5] The story that this was done later, in the Turkish camp at Famagusta, rests on doubtful authority (see below, p. 1004, n. 4). Natale Conti (*Hist.* 1589, f. 86b) relates how Hector, who had been wounded in the head, surrendered to Mustafa, revealing where his treasures were hidden and offering a liberal ransom for the lives and liberty of his sister and her children. Mustafa accepted, but broke his word and would have dragged Hector, wounded as he was, to Famagusta. Hector protested that he would complain to the Sultan, whereupon his head was struck off. The Countess and her sons were drowned at sea.

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who had been sent to organize resistance in the mountains, such as Peter Paul Sinclitico, John Sinclitico, Scipio Caraffa. These came in and made their submission to Mustafa Pasha, who received them with honour, and clad them in robes of brocade.[1] They were, it would seem, afterwards sent into the country, with many Greek priests, to induce the population to submit.[2]

The day after the capture of the city, the prisoners and the plunder were put up for sale. The good-looking young men and maidens[3] fetched good prices; the others, except those suitable for the galleys, went for almost nothing. Thanks to the general ignorance of the victors about objects of real value, such as precious stones, the few who understood such matters made their fortunes. No such riches, it was said, in loot from private houses and churches, had been taken in any city since the capture of Constantinople. It took eight days to empty Nicosia of the plunder.[4]

The Janissaries, who had been by no means foremost in the storming of the city, characteristically claimed the largest share of the booty. The Pasha had some difficulty in settling a dispute which might have developed into a conflict more violent than had been waged for the city itself.[5]

Mustafa reserved, besides ordinary booty, some hundreds of captives, the flower of young men and maidens from Nicosia, as presents for the

[1] Manolesso (f. 37), followed by Sereno, says that Mustafa 'ottenne a patti la montagna', and gave everyone leave to return and cultivate his land; cp. Manoli Blessi, *Presa di Nicosia*, st. 108; Paruta, p. 111; Natale Conti, *Hist.* 1589, f. 95. It is doubtful whether, as Graziani says (p. 96), guerrilla warfare was continued for any time after the fall of the capital.

[2] This seems to be the meaning of the statement by Sylv. Brenzone, p. 58.

[3] One of these was a daughter of John Sozomeno On 29 Nov. a handsome Turkish cavalry captain deserted to Famagusta, bringing her with him, and saying that he had killed a rival for her charms at Nicosia, and wished to become a Christian for her sake, and fight against his fellow-countrymen. He was confined in the Castle, and given an interpreter to instruct him in the Christian faith. On 7 Dec. he was hanged for killing the interpreter, who had refused to take him to the lady. Gatto, p. 43; Riccoboni, pp. 24 f.; cp. Calepio, f. 113 (3 Nov. for 29 Nov.). Sozomeno (*Exc. Cypr.* p. 87) says that he laments the loss of his younger daughter in the hands of the infidels—she must be the one just mentioned—and of an elder one who was burnt—doubtless in the galleon which blew up (cp. Cigogna, *Inscr. Ven.* II, p. 379). Three ladies of the Podocataro family were ransomed during the siege of Famagusta on 1 April 1571 (Gatto, pp. 51–2).

[4] Graziani, p. 95.

[5] Sylv. Brenzone, p. 55.

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Sultan. These he took to Famagusta and loaded on the galleon belonging to Mehmed Sokolli, a galliot and a *caramussalin*. On 3 October, by an accident or, as was generally believed, by the deliberate act of a captive Cypriote lady[1] who preferred death to slavery, an explosion was caused in the magazine of the galleon, which with the two other ships was totally destroyed, only four persons, the master and three rowers of the galliot, escaping with their lives.[2] The explosion shook all Famagusta;

[1] Kyprianos (p. 293) gives Lusignan and Calepio as authorities for the statement that it was Arnalda, daughter of the Count of Roucha, who did this heroic deed. What Calepio says is that it was never discovered who did it, but he had heard that it was a noble Cypriote lady (*Chor.* f. 109). Lusignan (*Chor.* ff. 90, 90b) mentions no name. Jauna (II, p. 1138) calls the lady Renée de Rochas, and dates the occurrence on 9 Oct. Sakellarios (I, p. 549) says the lady was either Maria Sinclitike or the above-mentioned Arnalda; Zannetos (I, p. 992) follows him. Another name is Oronta (A. Loschi, *Compendi historici*, 1652, p. 154). The incident was made the subject of a literary exercise in the three styles of writing (historical, rhetorical, poetical) by Famianus Strada (*Prolusiones Acad.* pp. 274–83; ed. by Cobham under the title *Arnalda sive Captiva Victrix*). Brantôme twice refers to the story, describing the lady as 'une damoiselle cypriotte, nouvellement chrestienne' (*Oeuvres*, ed. Lalanne, IV, p. 152; IX, pp. 138–9). Martin Crusius also briefly alludes to it (*Turcograecia*, 1584, p. 234). This heroine must not be confused with Belisandra Maraveglia, wife of Peter Albino (Gallucci, *Vita di G. Raggazzoni*, cited by Balan, VII, p. 47 n.) who, having been captured, after defending the castle of San Teodoro near Canea, fired the powder magazine in the ship in which she was to be carried into slavery, and destroyed herself, the enemy and above a thousand Christian captives (Molmenti, *Venice in the Golden Age*, tr. Brown, II, p. 171).—Selaniki mentions (but on the way home after the fall of Famagusta) the loss of the galleon of Mehmed Pasha and of a gun-ship by explosion, many soldiers and prisoners being killed. He adds that two other gun-ships foundered.

[2] Gatto, p. 40 (6 Oct.); Lusignan, *Chor.* ff. 90, 90b; Calepio, f. 109 (3 Oct.); Manolesso, f. 36b; Contarini, f. 20b; Paruta, p. 110; Sereno, p. 64; Bizari, pp. 54–5; Foglieta, col. 996; Sylv. Brenzone, pp. 56–7; Graziani, pp. 95–6; Hammer, III, p. 581. Some 800 female captives are said to have perished (Romanin, VI, p. 296). The galleon was lying off the 'Gardens' (Gatto, *loc. cit.*). It is represented blowing up in the contemporary plan of the siege by Cartaro (Plate XIII). The legends accompanying the plans of the siege in Camoccio, *Isole famose*, etc. and Pinargenti, *Isole che son da Venezia*, imply that the explosion took place off the spot called Fontanelle: 'In questo loco e l' armata dj Mustafa general de turchj et qui si sbarcorno lj turchj et si abbruscio la naue uenuta dj Nicossia carica đ prigionj.' Nevertheless the burning galleon is put some distance further north, off the south end of the harbour, perhaps for lack of space elsewhere. Calepio, in a second reference to the destruction of the galleon (f. 113) says that it was burnt three miles off Famagusta, which is the distance given for the Gardens by Contarini (f. 13b).

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as a contemporary rhymester[1] put it:

> Such a shock convulsed the town
> When the ship went up in the air,
> As though the heavens came ruining down;
> Such a roar as well might scare
> The devils in the depths of Hell....

The troops which had been withdrawn from the ships returned immediately to Salines, whence the fleet sailed for Famagusta. The fear of the arrival of the Christian fleet was constantly present in the minds of the commanders; they had information that it was being got into condition in Crete. Mustafa himself expected to have to defend Nicosia, and hastened to repair the ruined fortifications, clearing out the fosse, bringing his guns in, and destroying his forts.[2] The Turkish dead were buried; the corpses of the Christians were left to putrefy where they fell for several days, but were afterwards collected and burned. The condition of the streets in the September sun may be imagined; Calepio, who was allowed to return five days after the capture, has a sickening description of what he saw.

On Friday, 15 September, the Latin cathedral having been stripped of all that was offensive to Islam, the Pasha and his suite went there to offer up thanks to God for their victory.[3]

After the capture of the capital, Mustafa lost no time in summoning the two other fortresses to surrender. To Kerynia he sent the captured Captain Paul del Guasto, riding in chains on a horse, with two heads hanging from his saddle-bow.[4] The commandant, John Maria Mudazzo, and the castellan, Alfonso Palazzo, replied that they wished to consult Famagusta, and were given five days to do so, with a safe-conduct for their messenger. Mustafa's own messenger, a peasant carrying in a basin

[1] 'Fese un spasmo a tutti in terra | quel gran schioppo de la nave, | parse il ciel ruinasse a terra, | tanto fo el rimbombo grave | che spauriti hauria nel cave | de l' inferno i Diavoletti. | O Strathiotti puveretti.' Manoli Blessi, *La presa di Nicosia* (Venice, 1572), stanzas 127–31; also in Sathas, Μνημ. IX, p. 274.

[2] Nicosia after the capture: Calepio, f. 106b (Cobham, by an unfortunate misprint, makes him say that the Turkish dead were *burned*).

[3] Calepio, f. 106b.

[4] Gatto, p. 38; Riccoboni, p. 24; Sylv. Brenzone, p. 58. Calepio (f. 105b) says that the Lieutenant's head was sent to Kerynia, and afterwards to Famagusta; Alasya from a Turkish source (p. 34, n. 2) that it was sent to Kerynia and Paphos. I have followed Gatto's account.

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the head of Dandolo, had already reached Famagusta on the 11th.[1] Next day came the messenger from Kerynia, with a letter expressing the determination of the commandant and castellan to defend the fortress to the last inch, and asking the advice of the Famagusta command. Bragadin and Baglione replied, praising their resolution, and giving the required advice. But they were soon disillusioned; for, on the 14th, before the reply from Famagusta reached Kerynia, and without having seen a single enemy gun, the commandant and castellan gave up the fortress.[2] Paphos, Lemesos and Salines were also taken in charge by officers sent by Mustafa Pasha.[3]

The summons to surrender presented to Famagusta, with the head of Dandolo to enforce it, met with such a reply as was to be expected.[4]

[1] Gatto, p. 38; Riccoboni, p. 20.

[2] Paruta, p. 110; Riccoboni, p. 24. Calepio (cp. Graziani, p. 96) says that the Turks would have had difficulty in taking their artillery over the mountain pass; but such difficulties had been surmounted before, by James II and the Mamelukes. Mudazzo and Palazzo were allowed to go to Crete; thence they were sent to Venice and condemned by the Council of Ten to perpetual imprisonment (Morosini, II, p. 321). The Grand Vezir, writing to Charles IX (Charrière, III, p. 137) says all the defenders of the Castle of Kerynia were allowed to go free. Selaniki and Pechevi both say that Kerynia surrendered immediately after the fall of Nicosia. The Journal of Mustafa's secretary seems to imply that Kerynia surrendered long before Nicosia, and very soon after the arrival of the Turks in Cyprus; for he records that (1) on 9 July the Kapudan Pasha recommended that one Mustafa Kethüda [? Lieutenant] should have his pay raised and be made Beylerbey because he had penetrated into Kerynia and persuaded the infidels to surrender the fortress, and thus removed what was a great embarrassment to the army; (2) a Zaim who landed from a galliot at Kerynia and took thirteen prisoners was degraded from his rank, because the castle had submitted, and an order had been issued that none of the inhabitants of the place should be molested; (3) on 18 Sept. and (4) on 18 Oct. 1570 other persons who had contributed to the surrender were rewarded. Foglieta also records the fall of Kerynia at an early date (above, p. 961, n. 2). The explanation of the discrepancy with the other narratives may be that the garrison or its commander had been corrupted as early as July, but the actual surrender did not take place until after the fall of Nicosia. The Journal also records on 24 Oct. that three persons from Kerynia apostatized, and one of them was given a fief.

[3] Graziani, p. 96. The Governor of Paphos was a Pasha of two tails: Kyprianos, p. 300.

[4] Podacataro (p. 13) says that the summons was brought by a peasant on 12 Sept., but was not shown to Bragadin until four days later, since he, Baglione and Tiepolo were all ill at the time. Bragadin vouchsafed no answer but a smile. The head of Dandolo was sent later. Riccoboni however gives the text of a letter from Mustafa to Bragadin and the latter's reply, but they are probably literary inventions.

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To the Famagustans the death of Dandolo was a minor detail in the general disaster; they buried the head and swore to avenge him.[1]

Meanwhile an advance guard of Turkish cavalry,[2] released from duty at Nicosia, arrived before Famagusta, and offered battle. Baglione met them with all his cavalry and some companies of foot at the Grottoes, and a notable skirmish ensued, in which the Turks suffered heavy losses.[3] On the 16th the main Turkish army began to arrive, bringing with them from Nicosia guns,[4] timber, gabions and other siege-materials that had been employed before the capital. A sortie under Nicolas Donato, with the men from his galley, and other Italians and Greeks, supported by the artillery of the fortress, inflicted much loss on the enemy.[5]

The remainder of the Turks arrived on the 17th.[6] Mustafa left in Nicosia a garrison of 4000 Janissaries and 1000 cavalry under Muzaffer, a Pasha of three tails.[7]

On the same day the Turkish fleet arrived with the spoils of Nicosia and anchored off the Gardens, a league from the fortress.[8] Mustafa established his headquarters at a place called Pomo d'Adamo,[9] also about

[1] Graziani, pp. 96–7. Sereno, p. 123. The head of Dandolo was buried in St Nicolas (Podacataro, p. 14).

[2] These may be the 1000 horse which Brenzone (p. 58) says were sent at the same time as the head of Dandolo; they were, he says (p. 62), attacked and defeated by Baglione.

[3] Gatto, p. 39.

[4] Including 25 which they had found in Nicosia: Foglieta, col. 990.

[5] Foglieta (*loc. cit.*) however speaks of several slight skirmishes.

[6] The 17th is given as the date by Gatto, *loc. cit.*; Calepio (f. 108b); Sozomeno, p. 87; Contarini, f. 13b; Manolesso, f. 37b (Mustafa arrived on the 21st); Riccoboni (27 Sept.); Sylv. Brenzone, pp. 56–7; Foglieta, col. 990 (Mustafa arrived on 22 Sept. after a four days' march); Graziani, p. 96 (Mustafa left Nicosia on 18 Sept.). Sereno, p. 125, if correctly printed, wrongly makes Mustafa take 4000 foot and 1000 horse to Famagusta.

[7] Kyprianos, p. 300.

[8] Gatto, p. 39. Mustafa found the fleet already there when he arrived (Foglieta, col. 990). According to Podacataro (p. 14) the fleet arrived three days after the main Turkish army. Pechevi states that, on the advice of Piale Pasha, one-half of the fleet watched the seas around the island while the other, under the Kapudan Pasha Ali, blockaded the port of Famagusta. But Ali himself went to fight in the trenches, leaving the ships under the command of the Beylerbey of Sivas.

[9] Pomo d'Adamo is marked in Mas Latrie's map much further south, some 8 or 9 miles from Famagusta. But the distance of one league, or 3 miles, is vouched for by Gatto, Calepio and Paruta. It is true that Gatto also says (p. 55) that the enemy's trenches began as far as ten miles distance from the fortress.

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a league from Famagusta; the main camp of the Turks was in the Gardens.[1]

The gradual development of the defences of Famagusta under the hands of Venetian engineers has already been traced.[2] The enceinte at the time of the siege is described[3] as a fairly good wall, made of squared blocks of tufa, especially on the land side, where it was twenty feet thick, with a terreplein of twelve paces, crowned by a high parapet of over four feet. The ditch all round was fifteen, never less than twelve paces wide, excavated for the most part in the tufa, and where that was wanting the counterscarp was built of stone. Round the wall were many towers, but for the most part so small, that for lack of space only small guns could be used in them; some, between the Arsenal and the Lemesos Gate, were larger and were called from their shape *mezzelune*.[4] They also had many defects, but were considered stronger and more convenient, being vaulted and provided with sallyports on either side.

It will be convenient at this point, in order that the progress of the siege may be better understood, to make the circuit of the walls as they existed at the time, noting on the way the topography of the neighbourhood and the dispositions of the enemy therein.[5] Starting on the harbour side,

[1] Calepio's statement (f. 113) that it was only on 3 Oct. that the whole camp retired to Pomo d'Adamo, owing to the harassing tactics of the defenders, is probably a mistake.

[2] Ch. XIII, pp. 853 ff. [3] Paruta, p. 208.

[4] Gatto and Paruta usually call them so; the word must not be taken in the usual sense of an outwork.

[5] See the contemporary plan (by Marius Cartaro) here reproduced from the specimen in the British Museum (Plate XIII); the plan by Stephen Gibellino, 1571, reproduced in Enlart, II, Pl. XXI (the legends transcribed, pp. 716–18); the German plan (which gives little that is not in the preceding two) reproduced in Marengo, *Banco di San Giorgio*, p. 67; that in Cobham, *Exc. Cypr.* at p. 108; and that in Jeffery, *Hist. Mon.* at p. 144. Astorre Baglione wrote on 15 Feb. 1571 to the Priors of Perugia enclosing a plan of Famagusta, from which they could see the inadequacy of the defences, and complaining of the difficulties under which he laboured. MS. copy in the Oliveriana, Pesaro; from which a modern copy in Cobham Collection, R. Empire Society, Cyprus Pamphlets, vol. 31. The letter is printed (with date 21 Feb. 1571) by L. Bonazzi, *Storia di Perugia*, II (1879), p. 236, n. 1; and (25 Feb. 1571) by A. Fabretti, *Biografie dei Capitani Venturieri dell' Umbria*, IV (Montepulciano, 1846), p. 295 n. The plan unfortunately seems not to have survived. I have to thank Mr E. W. O'F. Lynam for information about Marius Cartaro. In the description of the defences we take into account the passage quoted from Nestor Martinengo by Maggiorotti (pp. 434–6) and stated by him to have been written in 1558 (above, p. 858 n.).

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at the Citadel, we note the 'spur' from the end of which the chain[1] closing the mouth of the harbour passed to the Tower of the Chain on the end of the breakwater. On this spur, under the command of the Castellan, Andrew Bragadin, were a number of heavy guns, which enfiladed the whole of the sea wall as far as the Tower of the Arsenal. In this sea wall the only tower was that of the Sea Gate (which still has its portcullis). At its south-eastern end was the sea gateway of the Arsenal. At the south-east angle was the great Tower of the Arsenal, with its Cavalier within. The rock enclosing the harbour at the extreme south-east end was soft, and was excavated by the Turks for a battery which, being fairly elevated, commanded the city within the walls, as well as the port. Further south they placed a battery of four heavy guns with which they bombarded the Cavalier of the Arsenal, though they usually fired over it, damaging the houses and churches, until the guns were knocked out by the artillery of the besieged.[2] The same guns were used against the ships in the harbour. From this point a road was made along the sea-shore for bringing up the artillery from the point where it was landed from the fleet. The whole of the land to the south-east of the fortress was riddled with a labyrinth of saps; the sandy nature of the soil of the gardens and vineyards made sapping difficult, and the Turks stiffened it with timber and branches held in basket-work of palm-leaves, which they imported from Syria.[3] Further south, inland from the Fontanelle, in the Gardens and at Pomo d'Adamo, were, as already stated, the main camp of the Turks and Mustafa's headquarters. To the north of this camp was the hill of Chitri,[4] where the Turks built their first fort, but, finding it out of range, put no guns there.

It had been expected that the enemy would site their main camp to the north of the fortress, because that was its weakest side, and the Grottoes afforded lodgement for large numbers. But, finding the outcrop of rock in this region unsuitable for their siege-works, they preferred the region to the south, which had the advantage of the many wells which had served the gardens.[5]

Returning to the walls we pass along the stretch from the Tower of the Arsenal. The curtain adjoining the Arsenal here is often spoken of as

[1] The harbour chain is still preserved in the Famagusta Museum.

[2] So says the legend (H) of Cartaro's map; but Gibellino attaches a similar statement to the nearer of the forts (his D, our I) under St George.

[3] Cp. Paruta, p. 111.

[4] Mentioned only in Cartaro's map.

[5] Paruta, p. 209. Cp. Morosini, II, p. 418.

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the Curtain without qualification. We come in succession to the Towers of the Campo Santo,[1] of Andruzzi or Landrucci, of Santa Napa (also called the Giudeca). The Campo Santo and Santa Napa were backed by cavaliers, though the latter's was not completed at the time when Cartaro's plan was drawn. The Campo Santo Tower was also known as Santa Barbara.[2] The terreplein backing this stretch of the walls was eight to ten paces wide. Facing this stretch were the Turkish forts under the Fountain of St George; the nearer one was used to bombard the Arsenal, but was destroyed by the defenders' guns. Farther to the west was the Hill of the Jews, where some skirmishing took place. We now come to the south-west angle, with the Land or Lemesos Gate, its Tower over it, the Cavalier behind, and the Ravelin in front.[3] (The present Lemesos Gate is modern.) This gate gave admission to the city from the Ravelin, from the south-east flank of which a bridge crossed the fosse to the counterscarp. On the glacis, outside the counterscarp, and attached to it, where the bridge from the Ravelin abutted, was an outer Ravelin, of which no trace now remains.[4] Thus exit from the city at this point was through the Lemesos Gate and the Ravelin, across a bridge, and through the outer Ravelin. There was a postern admitting to the fosse, just to the east of the Gate.

The Towers on the west were the Diocari, the Moratto[5] (backed by its Cavalier), the Pulacizzari and the St Luke.[6] These towers were so small that it was not possible to use breech-loading guns in them. The wall here had a terreplein of twelve paces.[7] Then, at the north-west angle, came the famous Martinengo bastion, generally called in the

[1] Between this Curtain and the Campo Santo Tower mention is sometimes found of the Cavalier of the Volti (Martinengo, f. 3, copied by Calepio, f. 114b; in the *Descr.* f. 276b the latter has 'le cavalier nommé d'Inuolte'). Possibly the explanation lies in the fact recorded by Nestor Martinengo (in Maggiorotti, p. 436), that in the interior of these *mezzelune* there were two vaulted chambers, armed with twenty small pieces of artillery (above, p. 990).

[2] A church of this name is marked near the wall, between Campo Santo and Andruzzi, in Gibellino's plan (no. 9).

[3] Nestor Martinengo (in Maggiorotti, p. 434) seems to say that this tower, which was hexagonal, was called Diamante, as well as the other bastion so named.

[4] Indicated in Jeffery's plan. I take this to be the 'Castello del Rivellino fuor della fossa' which was attacked by the Turks on 24 May 1571 (Gatto, pp. 59–60) and also the 'Rastello della porta di Limiso' mentioned by Sylv. Brenzone (pp. 67, 77).

[5] Jeffery, p. 109 (plan and elevation).

[6] Jeffery, p. 114.

[7] Nestor Martinengo, *loc. cit.*

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accounts of the siege simply 'il baluardo', with its Cavalier.[1] Its guns commanded, to the south-west, the fort erected by the Turks in front of the village of Precipolla (behind which, and out of range from the fortress, was another large Turkish encampment); to the west the village of St Alexios; and to the north-west the Tower of the Goose and the Grottoes, where the Turks attempted to build a cavalier. The four big Turkish guns at Precipolla were aimed at the right flank of the Lemesos Tower and the stair to the Cavalier and the neighbouring curtain, but mostly fired too high, sometimes hitting the houses, sometimes going over into the sea. Two of them were knocked out by the defenders' guns, and the Pasha's chief engineer, a Spaniard, was killed. In the middle of the northern stretch of the enceinte was the Mozzo bastion (so called from its being unfinished) with its Cavalier, and at the north-east angle the Diamante bastion, also with its Cavalier. Between this and the Citadel was the Madonna or Signoria bastion, on the sea-wall. Finally, it may be mentioned that an inlet of the sea between Famagusta and Constanza, called in the map the *cala* of St Catherine, is described as having afforded a base for the corsair Sirocco', who, working with five galleys and a foist between it and the point on the coast south of the city called the Fontanelle, blockaded the port.

The neighbourhood of Famagusta, especially to the north, was notoriously unhealthy, and both Christians and Turks must have suffered grievously. We have no records of the losses of the latter from this cause; only the guess that a fourth of their losses were due to sickness, exhaustion by labour, and lack of sleep.[2] But the diarist Gatto records the deaths among the besieged from sickness of no less than fourteen important persons, including Colonel Dionisi Naldi, Governor of Famagusta, and Colonel Scipio Piacenza of Crema.[3] These deaths mostly occurred in the early months of the siege, down to May 1571. Of the rank and file of the Italians, disease carried off some 600, and of the Greeks 490.[4]

Something between 200,000 and a quarter of a million of the enemy sat down to invest Famagusta. The host included a very large number (some 60,000) of irregular light cavalry (*Akinji*), attracted by the

[1] This cavalier was also sometimes called the Cavalier of St Luke (Martinengo, *loc. cit.*).

[2] Morosini, II, p. 472.

[3] Gatto, pp. 42, 45, 105, 109, 110.

[4] Gatto, pp. 107, 110.

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report, fostered by Mustafa, that there was richer plunder to be had from Famagusta than Nicosia had yielded.[1] It was the Turkish boast that the Sultan had sent so many men to the siege that if each of them had cast a shoe into the fosse it would have been filled up. But the enterprise was to cost the enemy dear. After all was over, Mustafa's representative admitted[2] that they had lost some 80,000 killed, and on one day the defenders' artillery and arquebuses had accounted for 500 killed and 350 wounded. But Mustafa kept his army up to full strength by

[1] On 30 April 1571 (Refik, no. 20), the Sultan reckoned on 5000 Janissaries only: 'there have to be 5000 Janissaries for the siege of Famagusta'. The figure 14,000, in which all the Italian sources agree, must therefore be a gross exaggeration, unless large reinforcements came later. Their estimates are as follows. In reply to an enquiry put by the defenders after the fortress had fallen (Gatto, p. 96, cp. p. 111; cp. Riccoboni, p. 56), Mustafa's representative said that there were 160,000 fighting men, 7000 horse, and 40,000 sappers. Camp-followers were not included in this number, as they were in the same man's estimate of 250,000 for the total enemy force. Spies reported about 17 April (Gatto, pp. 53–4) that the total number of the enemy, horse and foot, was 240,000, of which 7000 were cavalry, 193,000 infantry, and 40,000 sappers (cp. Riccoboni, p. 34). This number of sappers is confirmed by most other sources (e.g. Martinengo, f. 2 and Sereno, p. 124, who for once does not follow Manolesso). The last (f. 47b), Brenzone (p. 76) and Natale Conti (*Hist.* 1589, f. 111) put them at 60,000. Manolesso's total is 200,000: 70,000 regular infantry, 60,000 volunteers, and 70,000 sappers; the 14,000 Janissaries were drawn from garrisons in Anatolia, Karamania and Syria, also from the Sultan's guard. Brenzone (p. 65) gives the number of cavalry as 6000, the Janissaries as 14,000, with a total of 200,000; whether he includes the sappers is not certain. Elsewhere (p. 90) he puts into Baglione's mouth the statement that there were 14,000 Janissaries, 70,000 regular infantry, and 70,000 volunteers. Martinengo (f. 7) has 60,000 volunteers, the large number being due to the reason given above (cp. Brenzone, p. 76; Paruta, p. 210; Graziani, p. 173). He includes in his total of 200,000 for the host, 80,000 regular infantry as well as 14,000 Janissaries. [According to Romanin, VI, p. 306, n. 3, the MS. of Martinengo reads 50,000 regular infantry.] Gatto's figure (p. 111) of 1000 volunteers must surely be a slip of the pen or a misprint. The Beylerbey of Damascus reported (Refik, no. 18) that the rush of volunteers to Cyprus, attracted by the promise of fiefs, was such that practically all men left, so that, for instance, the district of Baalbek was entirely depleted of defenders; order was given to Mustafa to arrest those who had left without his consent and send them back. Alasya's figure (p. 42) of 80,000 for all the Turks may be due to confusion with the number supposed to have been killed (see next note).

[2] Gatto, p. 97; cp. the words which he puts into Mustafa's own mouth (p. 99); Riccoboni, p. 56; Morosini (II, p. 472) mentions estimates of 60,000 and 80,000. A more moderate reckoning of the Turkish dead was 50,000 (Paruta, p. 230; Graziani, p. 183).

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reinforcing it continually from the mainland.[1] Throughout the course of the siege he maintained a steady traffic with Syria and Karamania, not only to repair his losses in men, but to import siege-materials, such as timber, wool, tools and guns.[2] The Karpass also supplied timber, gabions and the like. The ships left by Ali after his visit in the spring included a large number of transports which were specially employed in this service. This transporting of men and munitions was carried out with all possible speed, for it was feared that the Christian fleet might soon arrive and interfere with it. As many as 50,000 men were reported to have reached the camp in a single month.[3]

As to the Turkish artillery, its normal strength was seventy-four cannon, but on occasion as many as a hundred and forty-five guns joined in the bombardment; this figure probably included the guns of the fleet, forty in number.[4] Seventeen batteries were used, though some of the forts first built were abandoned as the besiegers drew nearer to the fortress. It was stated that in the course of the siege they fired 120,000 iron shot and 43,000 stone shot.[5] Among the artillery were four of the—for those days—huge pieces known to the West as 'basilisks'. The 'fatal balls of murthering basilisks' were sometimes as heavy as 200 lb.[6]

[1] A document published by Refik (*Turkish tribes in Anatolia*, Istanbul, 1930, no. 24) is an order of 15 Feb. 1571 to the officer commanding the yürük (nomads) of Kojajı (probably in Eastern Thrace) to send a second contingent of 135 men to Boghazhisar (Rumelihisar on the Bosporus), under their group-leaders, and provided with all necessaries for six months, for the expedition to Cyprus.

[2] Martinengo, f. 2; Gatto, p. 51. [3] Morosini, II, p. 429.

[4] Below, p. 1017; Gatto, p. 111. The Turkish official view (Refik, no. 11, date probably late in Feb. 1571) was that 60 guns and 40 culverins' were necessary for the siege. Powder was at that time very short and was to be used sparingly. The defterdar of Aleppo on 9 March 1571 (Refik, no. 14) was ordered to send all the powder in the vilayet to Cyprus immediately.

[5] During the 75 days of the siege, says Martinengo (f. 7), 150,000 iron shot were seen and counted (the inferior ed. of Martinengo has 140,000); cp. Manolesso, f. 52b; Foglieta, col. 1030. Calepio, f. 120: 140,000 or 170,000 '25 days' in Romanin's quotation from the MS. of Martinengo (VI, p. 306, n. 1) is doubtless a misprint for 75. Natale Conti's story (*Hist.* 1589, f. 95) that in the course of eight days' bombardment the Turks killed only a pig and a mule is an example of the kind of gibe common in soldiers' talk in all ages; cp. Manoli Blessi, *Presa di Nicosia*, st. 124.

[6] Brenzone, p. 79; Hammer, *Gesch.* III, p. 583. Zannetos (I, p. 1012) understands Hammer to say that four veteran pieces, which had actually been used at the sieges of Constantinople, Scutari, Belgrade and Rhodes, were sent to Famagusta.

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Estimates of the numbers of the defenders of Famagusta[1] show the customary discrepancies, but it seems clear that at the best there were between 3000 and 4000 trained Italian infantry, 200 to 300 stradiote horse, and some 4000 Greeks.[2] There were ninety guns, great and small, which fired 4600 shots.[3] But the stock of gunpowder, though probably more adequate or better dispensed than it was at Nicosia, was still insufficient for a long siege. There was great risk of its being altogether destroyed, and the defence in consequence coming to a speedy end, when on 22 March a cotton-store near the powder-magazine caught fire.[4] The artillery defence of the fortress, however, was as spirited as that made by the infantry and cavalry. The best guns (including newly cast pieces) were all brought to that section of the wall (from Lemesos Gate to Arsenal) to which the enemy seemed to be devoting most attention, and platforms were made for the gunners.[5] Cav. Goito of

[1] Gatto, p. 45; a review on the last day of 1570 showed that the Italians numbered about 2000, while of the Greeks there were about 4000 and 100 horse. These figures do not include the Albanian (stradiote) cavalry. At the end of January Mark Quirini brought a reinforcement of 1600 or 1700 men, probably all infantry. Nestor Martinengo (f. 2) says that when Quirini left on 16 Feb. 1571 there were in Famagusta 4000 foot, 800 of the *cernide* (local levies), 3000 citizens and peasants, and 200 Albanians (stradiotes). This is repeated by Bizari, p. 157. Alasya's figures (p. 42), 4000 foot, 800 horse, 200 Albanians, 3000 villagers and nobles, look like a misinterpretation of Martinengo. Podacataro (p. 15) says that in February there were 4000 Italian foot, 1000 of the old *cernide* and 3000 of Famagustans and new *cernide*, and 200 Albanian horse. Another review on 18 April (Gatto, p. 54) showed 3500 Italians; about 4000 Greeks; and 200 horse. Finally Gatto gives the following statistics (p. 105): Italians, including reinforcements received during the siege, 3700; Greek soldiers, 4000; Albanians, including three companies which arrived after the capture of Nicosia, 300. Of the Italians, he says later (p. 107), with a slight discrepancy, 600 died of disease, 2400 were killed, 900 survived, of whom 200 were wounded. Manolesso (f. 51) reckons only 2000 or more Greeks and 2500 Italians. Morosini (II, pp. 429–30) states that, after the expulsion of the useless mouths, there were of men fit for service 7400, i.e. 3500 Italian infantry, 1000 of the country militia, 2500 from the city, and 550 Albanians; but since many were employed on the fortifications, the actual number of fighting men was reduced to about 5000. Natale Conti's figures (*Hist.* 1589, f. 95): 2000 Italians, 2000 stradiotes and 6000 Greeks, have little probability.

[2] The losses of the defenders, according to Morosini (II, p. 472), were, besides the chief officers, 2800 Italians, 3000 Greeks killed; 700 Italians and 60 stradiotes taken prisoners; 800 Greeks remained in the city.

[3] Martinengo (in Maggiorotti, p. 436) says there were 94 guns of bronze, of various sizes, all very light and liable to burst; three or four more were added later.

[4] Calepio, f. 113.

[5] Martinengo, f. 2b; Paruta, p. 212.

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Mantua, who arrived in Famagusta with Mark Quirini at the end of January,[1] was soon afterwards, at the end of February or early in March, made Captain-General of the Artillery.[2] In April, however, he was killed by a musket-shot, when he went out to inspect his company, which on that day was on duty defending the counterscarp. His company was given to Nestor Martinengo, but the command of the artillery, after being left vacant for a time, went to Louis Martinengo.[3] This officer assigned sections of the wall to six captains, while a company of Greeks was attached to each post for the service of the guns.[4] Captain Francis Bogone had the Tower and Cavalier of the Arsenal; Captain Peter Conte the Curtain of the Arsenal, the Cavalier of the 'Volti' and the Tower of Campo Santo; Nestor Martinengo the Cavaliers of Campo Santo and Andruzzi and the curtain as far as the Tower of Santa Napa; Count Hercules Martinengo the Cavalier of S. Napa and all the curtain as far as the Lemesos Gate; Captain Horace of Velletri the Ravelin and the curtain towards the Martinengo bastion; and Captain Robert Malvezzi the great Lemesos Cavalier, which got the worst battering of all.[5] On this Cavalier were mounted some of the long-range guns, which proved useful on occasion, as when on 17 April Mustafa was holding a general review of his troops at a spot three miles from the fortress. Some culverins on the Cavalier were brought to bear on the enemy and firing sixty-pound shot scattered them in panic.[6] A gunner who especially distinguished himself was that Leonard Rossetti of Verona who had gone from Famagusta with San Colombano to Nicosia, and escaped when the capital fell.[7]

Another means of defence, which began to be employed as the enemy came nearer to the walls and penetrated into the fosse, was 'artificial fire', or, as our writers of the time usually call it, 'wildfire'. In March 1571 the command appointed officers to take charge of this work on

[1] Gatto, p. 47; Martinengo, f. 2b of the Venice (Angelieri) ed. The inferior Venice ed. of the same year misprints the name *Foito*, and this mistake is repeated by Calepio (*Fuoito*), Contarini, Manolesso and Natale Conti. Sylv. Brenzone (p. 77) has the name right.

[2] Gatto, p. 49.

[3] Gatto, pp. 53, 58; Manolesso, f. 52.

[4] *Porta* in Martinengo's account (f. 3) must be an error for *posta* (copied by Contarini, f. 24b).

[5] Cp. Manolesso, f. 51b. Podacataro (pp. 17 f.) differs slightly in these details.

[6] Gatto, p. 54; Calepio, f. 113b (16 April).

[7] Sylv. Brenzone (p. 87) says that his gun alone killed 3000 Turks; obviously a mere guess.

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various sections of the wall from the Lemesos Gate to the Arsenal. There were three captains, each in command of twenty men. No such arrangement was made for the rest of the walls; it was clear that the enemy's efforts were expected to be directed against the southern fortifications, as indeed came to pass.[1]

Both sides used mines, as we shall see, with considerable effect. One of Baglione's contrivances was the exploding of a distant mine. The Turks used a ruined house near the Lemesos Gate as an observation-post. A mine was placed there on the night of 18 April, and touched off next day by the wheel-lock of an arquebus which was pulled from the counterscarp by a buried cord. At the first attempt the cord broke, and the Turks, who did not understand its purpose, jeered; but it was reconnected and did its work.[2]

The story of the siege of Famagusta reveals a much more satisfactory condition of garrison and population in regard to discipline and morale than we have found at Nicosia. The feeding and paying of the troops

[1] Martinengo, f. 2b. Gatto (pp. 50–1) gives the ingredients of the wildfire mixture, which was enclosed in shells of metal and glass and pottery grenades (*pignatte di terra*) and bottles, as follows: Spanish pitch, black pitch, saltpetre, sulphur, camphor, turpentine, rock-oil, ardent spirit (*aqua vitae*), all compounded together with heat. This stuff was mixed with coarse powder, tow and rags, and placed in the pots and bottles, which were bound with hoops of iron; barrels of the size of about three buckets were also filled with powder, this mixture and chips of stone, and hooped with iron. He describes other missiles, such as stone 'mortars', nearly as big as a bushel, which exploded with the noise of a hundred-pounder; and tubes (*trombe*) which scattered balls of tow and rags impregnated with the wildfire mixture, and arquebus-bullets. The whole passage requires further elucidation. The wildfire was more elaborate than that supposed by Hime (*Gunpowder and Ammunition*, p. 51) to have been used by the Venetians against the Turks, viz. a mixture of sulphur, pitch, charcoal, turpentine, bay salt and saltpetre; but a still more complicated mixture is described by G. B. Isacchi, *Invenzioni* (Parma, 1579), p. 69, to which the late Mr F. M. Kelly referred me. The *trombe* mentioned by Gatto were probably similar to those of which the manufacture is explained by V. Biringuccio, *De la Pirotechnia* (Venice, 1540) ff. 159–60; they were carried on points of pikes and discharged explosives (for attacking gates, etc.) or bullets. The same author illustrates the pottery grenades or *pignatelli* (ff. 162b–163). Paruta (p. 215) mentions ordinary shells filled with very fine gunpowder.

[2] Sylv. Brenzone, pp. 74–5. Gatto (p. 54) says that the mine was laid under the Hill of the Jews, a bowshot from the city, where the Turks were entrenched and had a battery which was bombarding the Ravelin and the Lemesos Gate Cavalier. The Hill of the Jews, if the map can be trusted, seems too far from the fortress for the contrivance to have worked; but Gatto speaks of no such contrivance, saying merely that the mine was laid in the night and sprung in the morning.

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were well organized.[1] There seems to have been no difficulty with the Greek soldiers. The people of the town, men, women and priests, laboured with a will at bringing up materials for defensive works. Many of the officers were evidently popular, Baglione in particular being adored by his men. It was remarked that, if at Nicosia there had been officers equally keen in encouraging their men, it would have held out longer and might have been saved.[2] It was not until about March 1571 that Bragadin formed a bodyguard for himself.[3] The only instance of his having trouble with one of his officers seems to have been in April, when he drew his sword and killed Captain Marius Compagnone of Macerata for gross and insolent insubordination.[4] Of course discipline sometimes involved punishment; as Martinengo says, Bragadin, Baglione and Tiepolo were present at all the actions to encourage the fighters and punish those who deserved it.[5]

Such were the conditions during the siege, with the chronicle of which we may now proceed. On 23 September the Turks built a battery on the rock opposite the Tower of the Arsenal.[6] On the 26th or 27th, they began to bombard, with five fifty-pounders, the three *navi* and other ships in the harbour, and also the spur of the Citadel.[7] In the night of the 29th they built batteries at the Fountain of St George and opposite Santa Barbara, and took some guns to Precipolla with

[1] The rationing and distribution of bread for the troops was in the charge of Laurence Tiepolo from April 1571. The bread was all made at one oven at the Arsenal (Martinengo, f. 2b). All barley, spelt and straw having by then been exhausted, the horses of the cavalry lived on bran. Wine was also rationed and, when it was finished, a mixture of vinegar and water took its place. Salted meat and rice were prepared in a great kitchen for all the troops; on meatless days, beans cooked in oil were served. Oil and vinegar were distributed during the day for their refreshment. 'As long as there was a drachm of food, Bragadin distributed it; and when there was none, there still remained his good will' (Gatto, pp. 52–3). When the bombardment began to be severe, on 19 May, Bragadin had wine, soup, cheese and salt meat regularly carried to the defenders, so that the soldiers did not spend more than two soldi a day on bread. The payment of the troops was in the hands of John Antony Quirini (Martinengo, f. 3). A hospital for the sick and wounded was established and well equipped (Morosini, II, p. 432).

[2] Calepio, f. 114b.

[3] Gatto, p. 51.

[4] Gatto, p. 56; Sylv. Brenzone, p. 81.

[5] Martinengo, f. 3.

[6] Gatto, p. 40; Calepio, f. 112b. Since the latter's narrative of the siege is largely taken *verbatim* from Martinengo, I refer to him henceforth only when he differs.

[7] Gatto and Calepio, *ibid.*; Manolesso, f. 37b. For the *navi*, see above, Ch. XIV, p. 946, n. 1.

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which to bombard the Lemesos Gate Cavalier. They opened fire on 1 October, but their guns were speedily knocked out by those of the fortress.[1] At the same time their sappers in great numbers began trenches opposite Santa Barbara and the Arsenal, so deep that neither guns nor arquebuses could touch them.[2]

But suddenly the enemy abandoned their forts and trenches, and withdrew to the camp about three miles distant. On seeing this movement, the Christians issued and destroyed the works, but were attacked on their way back. There was a sharp engagement, lasting some five hours; the enemy were said to have lost over 300 killed and many more wounded, the Christians took twenty prisoners and lost only ten killed.[3] Such estimates, as regards the enemy, are of course guesswork.

Possibly this retirement of the enemy was due to panic. A frigate from the Christian fleet, probably that which was despatched by Zane from Scarpanto (above, Ch. XIV, p. 932), ran into Famagusta harbour at dawn on 5 October.[4] It had been seen the day before by the enemy, who seem to have supposed it to bring news of the imminent arrival of the Christian fleet. But it is equally possible that the Turkish scouts who had been sent out from C. St Epiphani[5] had by this time brought information that the Christians had turned back to Crete, and that Mustafa thought it safe to take his army into winter quarters and send Piale with his ships home. The captain of the frigate[6] greatly raised the spirits of the besieged, telling the people who flocked down to the quay that the Christian fleet was due to arrive very soon. What he told the

[1] Manolesso, f. 37b. Cp. Sereno, p. 123. It is probably to this that Paruta refers (p. 111) when, writing of the early days of the siege, he says that the fortress artillery destroyed three forts which the Turks had hurriedly constructed at St George, Precipolla and the Tower of the Goose; but, in doing so, the besieged spent a great deal more powder than they could spare. [2] Gatto, p. 40.

[3] Manolesso (f. 37b) says that Mustafa returned to Nicosia for the winter. Foglieta (col. 996) is the authority for the engagement; but Graziani (p. 174) may refer to it when he says that Baglione attacked the enemy as they were going into winter quarters and killed over 500.

[4] Riccoboni, p. 24. 4 Oct. according to Morosini (II, pp. 424–5). At the beginning of October, according to Podacataro (p. 14). Brenzone gives no date (p. 63). Gatto (p. 41) says that it arrived on 8 Oct. But if, as he says, Piale's departure was hastened by its arrival, he must be wrong, for there is little doubt that the Turkish Admiral sailed on the 6th.

[5] Above, Ch. XIV, p. 926; Calepio, f. 109.

[6] A Candiote called Fassiodonio (Gatto), Falcidonio (Brenzone), Fassidonius (Riccoboni), Fascidonius (Morosini).

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command secretly was, more accurately, that it had gone back from Castellorizo to Crete, whence it was intended to send relief to Famagusta as soon as possible. Bragadin kept him in his service, and 'made him an admiral'.

Piale sailed on 6 October, leaving behind some seven galleys to maintain what was not a very effective blockade of the port.[1] The galleon and two other ships, with the more valuable part of Mustafa's spoils, had been destroyed by an explosion a few days before (p. 986). Piale's movements in the Aegean on his return to Constantinople have already been described (p. 938). His conduct of the campaign, and especially his failure to pursue the retreating Christians, are enough to account for the fact that he was degraded from the rank of Pasha, to which Pertau was promoted, while for future operations in Cyprus his place was taken by Ali Pasha.[2]

Some of those who had escaped from Nicosia at the time of its capture now began to find their way to Famagusta, the most important among them being Peter Rondacchi, the commander of stradiotes, who came in about 6 October and was at once given the command of the cavalry. Others are mentioned as arriving down to January 1571, one of the last being the gunner Leonard Rossetti of Verona.[3]

Unlike the Rectors of Nicosia, Bragadin and Baglione from the beginning encouraged the practice of making sorties to harass the enemy.[4] It would be tedious to describe them all. Their object was

[1] As to the date of sailing, Pechevi's statement that the fleet came home on 17 Jumada 979 (7 Oct. 1571) is of course impossible; Dr Wittek suggests correcting to 978, which would give 17 Oct. 1570. On the variation in the numbers given by the sources, see Ch. XIV, p. 944, n. 8. I do not understand the statement of Hammer (III, p. 582), on the authority of Hajji Khalfa, that the Bey of Rhodes, Hamzabey, was left behind with forty galleys, and suspect a confusion with the galleys which were brought by Ali next year (see below, p. 1006, n. 3).

[2] Paruta, p. 179; Graziani, p. 100. Contarini (f. 23) gives both the reason in the text and the other report, that Piale's wife, a daughter of the Sultan, had fears for her husband, who was growing old, and persuaded her father to retire him. It was said that but for his daughter's intercession Selim would have put Piale to death (Manolesso, f. 47b; Sereno, p. 126). Cp. Natale Conti (*Hist.* 1589, f. 96), who attributes his disgrace to the intrigues of the Grand Vezir Mehmed.

[3] Gatto, p. 45. Above, p. 972.

[4] Martinengo, it is true, says (f. 2) that only rarely were sorties made, in order to get information of the enemy. But a great many are described by other sources. Some of them went far afield. Thus Baglione on his first one went with 200 horse to Makrasyka, between Akhna and Kouklia, fully ten miles out, and killed sixty Turks, losing only

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sometimes, as on 8 October, to destroy the trenches, and bring in the timber and fascines which were found there; the timber was useful as fuel for the communal oven at the Arsenal.[1] Another cause of clashes was the effort of the enemy to prevent the garrison from bringing into the city a certain 'red earth' which was dug in the region between the walls and St Alexios, and which was used for making mortar for building cavaliers and other works.[2] In the neighbouring Grottoes, near the Tower of the Goose, Baglione more than once laid an ambush for the enemy, who however eventually became suspicious and refused to be drawn into it.[3] On one of these skirmishes at the Grottoes Baglione had a narrow escape of being killed by a cannon-ball fired from St Alexios.[4] The Grottoes themselves frequently changed hands. On 3 December the Turks got into them and by firing on the Martinengo bastion and the curtain made it impossible for the defenders to show themselves there, or for the red earth to be collected. Baglione

one killed and one wounded (Brenzone, p. 59). Still more distant (six leagues) was Katapetra, where three stradiote captains, brothers of Peter Rondacchi, took out seventy troopers one night, killed all the Turks they found, and captured twenty-five horses, though Gondo Rondacchi was killed (*ibid.* pp. 62–3). Podacataro, however, says (p. 11) that Gondo was killed at Makrasyka on a reconnaissance in the early days of the invasion. See also above, p. 964, n. 1.

[1] When fuel began to run short, small and even large boats were broken up, and the wood fetched high prices. A less usual kind of fuel was found in the bones of dead animals, and even in their carcasses from which the flesh had not yet perished; for a great many beasts died from starvation and were thrown into the fosse. (Morosini, II, p. 425.) [Darwin (*Journal of Researches*, ch. IX) notes that the bones of animals from which the flesh had been removed were used as fuel by Gauchos in the Falkland Islands.] On 14 March a heavy gale broke up some of the Turkish galleys in the port of Constanza. Many timbers which were thrown up on the beach were collected by the Christian cavalry, though not without some interference by the enemy. (Gatto, pp. 49–50; Calepio (f. 113) says that five galleys were lost.)

[2] Gatto, p. 40; Podacataro, p. 15; Brenzone, p. 68. Gatto says it 'serviva per calcina per far cavallieri, dente, traverse, et altre fatture'. Mr K. P. Oakley writes that it is the 'reddish-brown loamy material' which gives its name to the 'Red Villages' in areas to the south-west of Famagusta, but it is also found at Famagusta itself. (Bellamy and Jukes-Brown, *Geology of Cyprus*, 1927, p. 44; *Key to Geological Map of Cyprus*, 1905, p. 14.) It is similar to cave-earth, and is the residue formed by the solution (i.e. decalcification) of an impure limestone. For use as mortar (which seems to be meant by *calcina*) it would presumably have to be mixed with lime.

[3] Brenzone, pp. 65, 74.

[4] Brenzone, p. 69. Calepio (f. 113) says that the Turks brought four cannon to St Alexios on 30 Dec.

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made a sortie and, assisted by the fire of the guns on the bastion, drove them out. He had to expel the enemy from the same spot again on the 7th and 13th.[1] It was probably with the object of hindering the enemy activity in this region that he poisoned all the wells between Precipolla and St Alexios.[2] Nevertheless the risks were too great, and the garrison abandoned the practice of going out so far, and fetched earth from diggings just outside the counterscarp.[3]

To prevent the enemy from freely approaching the immediate neighbourhood of the walls, the besieged scattered in the ground to a distance of some three hundred paces caltrops and similar devices; although since the Turkish horses were shod with iron they suffered less than those of the Christians which happened to tread on them.[4]

Baglione's biographer enumerates twenty-six skirmishes in which his hero took part and in which, if not always the victor, he was not the loser.[5] The stradiote cavalry especially distinguished themselves, and he himself did many deeds of great valour. Criticism of his methods was not wanting; it was said that he should command more and fight less. His answer explains why he was so much beloved by his officers and men. A general staying within the walls, and sending out parties to attack the enemy, could not, he said, take immediate decisions in an emergency as could a general in the field; also 'I, who love my soldiers, go with them'.[6]

But these sorties were not always successful, and became rarer as the danger increased.

Personal combats, quite in the Homeric fashion, with crowds of both sexes looking on from the walls and housetops, were also a feature of the siege in which Baglione distinguished himself. It was, however, complained that the Turks failed to observe what the Christians held

[1] Gatto, p. 43.

[2] Brenzone, p. 69. Gatto (p. 54) says that all the water in the neighbourhood of the city was treated with poison specially sent out from Venice—doubtless the same as had been used at Nicosia (p. 957, n. 2).

[3] Brenzone, p. 69. Building materials were also collected from the beach, while armed boats, issuing from the harbour, fired on the enemy who were attempting to prevent the collection, and the galleys from Constanza, which came out to attack the boats, were driven off by the guns of the fortress. Morosini, II, p. 427.

[4] Gatto, p. 54. Brenzone (p. 63) says that the nails which were stuck in planks buried in the sand were poisoned. Morosini, II, p. 426.

[5] Brenzone, p. 59.

[6] Brenzone, p. 72. Cp. p. 77: 'la persona mia è necessaria nelle battaglie'.

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should be the rule in such duels, that the horses should not be wounded, and that the vanquished should yield himself to the victor, and not try to escape.[1] Baglione offered from his private purse a reward of two ducats to anyone who killed a Turk, and five ducats to anyone who unhorsed a Turk in single combat; of such rewards he bestowed many.[2]

With the approach of winter, Mustafa, in the hope of avoiding the prolongation of the siege, endeavoured to induce the fortress to surrender without fighting. He had already, on his arrival before it, endeavoured to frighten the defenders by sending riders round the walls, carrying on spears the heads of various notables killed at Nicosia.[3] This having had no effect, he made use of John Sozomeno, the engineer, who had been taken prisoner at Nicosia, sending him ostensibly to raise money for his ransom. Sozomeno was instructed to say that, if the commanders did not wish to come to a decision themselves, they should write to the Signory. Mustafa also, it is said, prepared forged letters in the name of the Famagusta command, and addressed to the Venetian Bailie at Constantinople, suggesting surrender. Far from taking his advice, Bragadin and Baglione decided that Nicolas Donato, who was in port with two galleys, should take Bishop Ragazzoni to Venice to appeal for succour.[4] Donato and Ragazzoni, as already related, sailed for home

[1] Morosini, II, p. 426. [2] Gatto, p. 45.

[3] Paruta, p. 111. Cp. P. Giustinian, *Rer. Ven. hist.* (1576), p. 445.

[4] Riccoboni, p. 26; Paruta, pp. 111–12. Graziani (pp. 174–5) relates this incident with circumstances which must be taken with the greatest reserve. He says that Hector Podocataro was sent by Mustafa with Sozomeno, and that the besieged retained Sozomeno, because his technical knowledge would be useful to them. But Podocataro (who was in a shocking and almost unrecognizable condition, owing to neglect of the wound he had received at Nicosia) they sent back, lest Mustafa should take revenge on his family. Whereupon Mustafa had him beheaded before the eyes of his wife and children. Now all the other sources give the impression that Podocataro was beheaded at Nicosia, even when they do not definitely say so (above p. 984); and Calepio (f. 110b) includes him in the list of those who were killed there. As to Sozomeno, it is true that he was taken prisoner at Nicosia (Calepio, f. 111). He also succeeded in ransoming himself. He did not stay in Famagusta, for none of the sources mentions him as contributing to the defence. Eventually he got back to Venice, and composed a work describing the siege of Nicosia, and his own experiences, in the course of which he laments the loss of two daughters. This work, or an Italian translation of it, has survived, but has not been accessible to me. The dedication, bearing date 10 Feb. 1571, shows that he reached Venice before that time. Cigogna (II, p. 378a, gives his epitaph, which was formerly in San Lorenzo: 'Ioanni Sozomeno Equiti Feudatario Regni Cypri in expugnatione Nicosiae capto et redempto, etc.' See Note on the Authorities, p. 1153.

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on 5 November (Ch. XIV, p. 941). Donato (who with his men had been exceedingly useful in the defence of the fortress, and was very popular) left behind him a deed presenting to the city everything belonging to him that was to be found there, such as oil, wine, dried meat and other stores to the value of more than 1000 ducats; these were distributed among the officers and Italian soldiers.[1]

During the first few months of the siege, the Turkish bombardment seems not to have been heavy, and the saps had not been driven near to the walls. On 14 December Baglione took all his men, except those assigned to the immediate defence of the walls, outside and set the Greeks to work to make a covered way on the glacis 15 feet beyond the counterscarp, along the whole of the enceinte from the Arsenal to the Diamante. In the course of the operation, Baglione unhorsed a Turk in single combat, and brought him in mortally wounded.[2]

The great event of the end of January 1571 was the arrival of reinforcements under Mark Quirini, who was sighted off Cape S. Andrea on the 25th. His exploits have already been related (Ch. XIV, p. 944). Four captains about this time resigned their commissions in order to return home,[3] and presumably sailed with him when he left on 16 February.[4] Before he went, he made presents to all the officers of wine, cheese and other provisions, and he left behind a *caramussalin* which he had captured off the Gardens; while his namesake Mark Antony Quirini, the commander of the four *navi* sailing under his escort, also left behind a small ship which he had captured with a useful cargo of drugs and other medicaments.

On the night when the Quirini sailed, Bragadin and Baglione arranged a surprise for the enemy. They gave orders that in the morning no one was to appear on the walls, but all were to keep hidden and with their arms ready. On the cavaliers all the guns were to be loaded, with large and small shot, grape and chain-shot. In the city no one, man, woman

[1] Gatto, p. 42; Sylv. Brenzone, p. 67.

[2] Gatto (p. 44) describes the work as 'una banchetta ovvero trincera'. I take it to be the 'strada coperta' marked D in the contemporary map by Cartaro. Brenzone (p. 65) says that Baglione made the captured Turk his friend.

[3] Gatto, p. 47.

[4] Martinengo, f. 2. From this point, Contarini transcribes and Bizari translates Martinengo's account of the siege, and it becomes unnecessary to refer to them. Sereno also admittedly borrows Martinengo's narrative, and most of the other authorities are based on it.

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or child, was to be seen on the roofs or at the windows. Rondacchi, commanding the cavalry, was to stand ready with his troopers at the sallyport of the Diamante bastion. A single shot from the Lemesos Gate Cavalier was to give the signal for a general discharge of cannon and arquebuses and for a sortie by the cavalry. About dawn the Turks began to show themselves, gradually coming up as near as the counterscarp, and, mystified by the deserted appearance of the walls, began to think that Famagusta had been abandoned, and that its defenders had departed with Quirini. This was reported to Mustafa, and immediately the whole Turkish army appeared within range. The signal gun was fired, and broadside after broadside from the cannon and rapid fire from the arquebuses mowed down the enemy ranks, while the cavalry, moving out, rode through them doing great slaughter.[1]

There can be no doubt that about this time the position of the besieging force was very unsatisfactory. It was being reported to the Sultan that unless there should reach Cyprus a fleet equal to that which was sent formerly, not only would the conquest be impossible, but also disorder would break out in the army. Artillery and ammunition were very short.[2] However, as regarded the reinforcement of Cyprus, with the approach of spring, the Turkish fleet again made its appearance. On 30 March some eighty galleys arrived under the command of Ali Pasha.[3] He lay for a time off the Gardens, disembarked some 18,000

[1] Gatto, pp. 48–9. Riccoboni, pp. 30 f.

[2] Refik, nos. 11, 14, 16.

[3] Martinengo, f. 2; Riccoboni, p. 34. According to Gatto (p. 51), a deserter reported that the commander was Piale; but he, as we know, had been superseded by Ali. According to Paruta (pp. 179–80), after 'Cajacelebi' had sailed from Constantinople with twenty galleys and joined the guard-ships of Chios and Rhodes under 'Siloco', Ali followed with thirty galleys, went to Fineka to embark troops, and so to Cyprus. [As to 'Siloco' see above, p. 894, n. 3.] Foglieta (col. 999) says that Ali took forty galleys from Constantinople, and was joined at Chios by Mehmed, Bey of Negroponte, with an equal number drawn from the guardships of the Aegean. Sereno (p. 124) wrongly says that Ali found the Bey of Negroponte at Chios with eighty galleys. All these statements must be checked by the official documents (Refik, nos. 11–13). No 11 (undated), addressed to Mustafa Pasha, says that there have been despatched, besides the ships under the Beys of Iskenderiye (rather Scutari than Alexandria) and Rhodes, 20 ships under Kaya, Sanjakbey of Izmid, and also the fleet under the Kapudan Pasha, Ali, Beylerbey of Algiers, with orders to land the troops for the siege and appoint a commander for the ships which are to blockade the island. No. 13 (undated, to the Kapudan) cites his report that he has reached Chios, where the Bey of Negroponte, Mehmed, has arrived with his bastarda (large galley) only, his other ships being delayed

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troops,[1] and sent to fetch more men and munitions from Tripoli, and then, on 15 May, sailed to join Pertau Pasha and Uluj-Ali; after which the combined Turkish fleet raided Crete. He left a strong detachment of galleys under Arab Ahmad to guard Cyprus, as well as a number of transports which from this time were constantly employed in fetching troops and supplies from the mainland and the Karpass.[2]

at Negroponte by illness among the crews. No. 12 (to the Kapudan Pasha, 28 Feb. 1571) cites reports of an alliance between the Pope, Spain and Portugal to assist Venice, and preparation of a great fleet, to meet which a great Ottoman fleet must be ready; the Kapudan, having delivered in Cyprus the necessary provisions and equipment, is to leave there 15 or more ships for transport purposes, and put the other ships under a suitable commander. This is to be the Sanjakbey of Rhodes, Ahmad (nos. 15, 17). From no. 17 it appears that Kaya (the Cajacelebi of Paruta) had sailed from Constantinople on 17 Feb.—Reference to Refik, no. 20 (to the Kapudan Pasha, dated 5 Zu'l-hijja 978=30 April or 1 May 1571) reveals a very serious difficulty. The Sultan says he is appointing Ali to the command of the fleet now being despatched for the conquest of Famagusta, and orders him to sail soon. This on 30 April, while the Italian sources (and both Martinengo and Gatto were careful about dates, though it must be admitted that in one case the latter may be a good deal out) agree that Ali reached Famagusta on 30 March or the beginning of April. Dr Wittek observes that it is difficult to suppose that the editor has read Zu'l-hijja instead of Zu'l-ka'da; for Refik, no. 17 (dated in Zu'l-ka'da, i.e. 27 March–26 April 1571) speaks of the hope that Ali will soon have ready a fleet; this could hardly be said, even if the letter was written on the first of the month, if only five days later things were so far advanced that the appointment was made and instructions given to Ali. Pechevi (I, p. 495), as Dr Wittek observes, gives an impossible date for the fleet's sailing from Constantinople, viz. Nevruz 1 Safer 979; 1 Safer 979 was Sunday 24 or Monday 25 June 1571, while Nevruz is 21 March! Selaniki, however (p. 104), has Friday, Arife (i.e. Bayram-eve), 9 Zu'l-hijja 978=4 May 1571, which squares better with the official document. Both Pechevi and Selaniki imply that Pertau, having been appointed Serdar of the fleet, was ordered to go to Cyprus with Ali, but it is doubtful whether he did so. Nevertheless, in view of the agreement between Gatto and Martinengo, I have ventured to allow their date to stand, subject to correction if and when the Turkish documents can be verified.

[1] Manolesso (f. 47b), Sereno (p. 124) and Natale Conti (f. 111) say that Ali brought 60,000 (Sereno 40,000) pioneers from Lajazzo; but it is more likely that many of these had been fetched at an earlier stage.

[2] Various figures are given for the ships left by Ali off Famagusta. According to the Turkish documents, his orders were to leave 15 to 20 galleys (Refik, nos. 12, 15), and so he did (*ibid.* no. 38). Paruta (p. 180) says he left 20 galleys, 10 *maone*, 5 *navi* and many other vessels, and sailed himself with 54 galleys. Martinengo (f. 2): he left some 30 galleys and a great number of *caramusalini*, *maone* and *palandarie*. Podacataro (p. 16): 18 galleys. Contarini (f. 23): 22 galleys, 3 *fanò* (flagships) and a number of *caramusalini*, etc. Foglieta (col. 999): 23 galleys and a large number of ships of burden. Graziani (p. 155): 30 triremes (galleys) and many other ships.

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About the middle of the month of April, Mustafa brought fifteen more cannon from Nicosia, and, moving his camp from its original place, established part of it in the Gardens, and part to the west, behind Precipolla.[1] Three thousand horse and two *corps de garde* were lodged behind Precipolla and at St Alexios, being conveniently sheltered from the Venetian artillery by the high ground, and 3000 towards Constanza.[2] But when the enemy waxed too bold, the heavy arquebuses on the walls dealt with them.

The siege was now being pressed with more determination, and Bragadin had to consider carefully how long he could hold out if he were not relieved. On 16 April[3] he appointed a commission of four gentlemen of Famagusta, and four Italian captains, to make an exact census of the city, and search all houses and other places where stores might be hidden, taking note of all the provisions that they found. As a result of this investigation, it was decided that hunger was likely to be more dangerous than the enemy's weapons, and that the useless mouths must be expelled. Notice was given that all who were residents in the city from no wish of their own should report to the Chancellery In a few days no fewer than 5370[4] of all ages and both sexes presented themselves, and were informed that they must go away, taking with them their possessions, but no arms, and corn and flour for one day only. Bragadin himself stood at the sallyport of the Diamante, and saw that they were carefully searched, lest they should carry away more victuals of any kind. When at the siege of Siena, not many years before this, Montluc had found himself driven to expel his *bouches inutiles*, the unfortunate people were driven back to the walls. The same fate had befallen those who were expelled from Corfù when it was besieged by Khair ed-Din Barbarossa in 1537. The Turks at Famagusta, surprisingly, were more merciful or less intelligent than the besiegers of Siena and Corfù, and we are told that the expelled Christians were allowed to dis-

[1] Martinengo, f. 2. [Contarini, f. 23 b, who is copying Martinengo, misreads him here and gives the date as 15 May.] Paruta, p. 210. Foglieta (col. 1022), who says that the camp at Precipolla stretched over a distance of four miles, confuses *east* with *west*.

[2] Brenzone, p. 66.

[3] Gatto, p. 52; Riccoboni, pp. 32 f.

[4] Paruta (p. 212) says that perhaps 8000 were expelled, leaving only 7000 fighting men behind, of whom 3500 were Italian infantry. Cp. Morosini (II, p. 429): 7500 allowed to go away'. Podacataro (p. 15) has only 4000. Gatto's precise figure, with which Riccoboni agrees, must be accepted.

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perse among the villages.[1] Perhaps, like Montluc, Bragadin regretted that he had not taken this measure at an earlier stage, as Baglione had done at Nicosia.[2] It would be interesting to know whether Montluc's precedent was known to Bragadin; he must have known that of Corfù; and there were doubtless others, for, as a contemporary puts it with more point than elegance, it is the custom of besieged cities to expel children, old men and women, as a sick body relieves itself by vomiting.[3]

As the threat to the fosse grew nearer, Cav. Maggi, for its better defence, made two casemates, hewn out of the rock of the inner side of the counterscarp, one opposite the Martinengo bastion, the other opposite the Ravelin, with loopholes from which arquebusiers could direct flanking fire along the fosse. They were approached from the sallyports by passages passing under the cunette or central ditch of the fosse. This ditch was itself provided with a covered way from which arquebusiers could command it. A strong guard was posted in the covered way of the counterscarp, and in the sallyports. To defend the counterscarp a breastwork of beams laid lengthwise, with loopholes two feet apart, was constructed on top of the wall, and the towers and cavaliers and the edge of the counterscarp itself were also provided with similarly loopholed parapets of turves for arquebusiers, who prevented the enemy from showing themselves on the glacis.[4]

On 25 April[5] the enemy began to construct an immense system of trenches, using their 40,000 or more Armenian sappers, as well as all the peasants of the island who could be collected for the purpose.[6] As they worked chiefly at night, it was almost impossible for the besieged to interfere with them. They began, it is said (though it is difficult to believe it),[7] at a distance of ten miles, and certainly reduced the whole

[1] Paruta, p. 212; Morosini, II, p. 429.

[2] Above, p. 955. For Montluc's expulsion of the *bouches inutiles* see his *Commentaires*, ed. A. de Ruble, II (1866), pp. 72–4; and cp. Natale Conti (*Hist. sui temporis pars prima*, Ven. 1572, p. 232). 4400 or more were expelled from Siena; for eight days they were chased back to the walls to find the gates closed, and less than a quarter escaped alive.

[3] Natale Conti, *loc. cit.*

[4] Gatto, p. 55; Martinengo, f. 2; Morosini, II, p. 432.

[5] Gatto, pp. 55–6; Martinengo, f. 2; Riccoboni, p. 34 (13 April). Foglieta, from this point, gives an abbreviated and not always accurate translation of Martinengo.

[6] Cp. Refik no. 11: a large number of peasants and soldiers to carry earth and make a position commanding the fortress.

[7] See above, p. 989, n. 9.

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region for three miles to the south of the fortress to a maze of trenches and covered ways, zigzagging and communicating with each other. The trenches were so deep that mounted men could ride along them and only the tips of their lances be visible. And they were so extensive that the whole army could be accommodated in them; the parapets made of the earth thrown out of them concealed all but the tops of the tents from the eyes of observers on the walls.[1] When the enemy reached a point whence the city was within range of their cannon, they made two immense forts of beams and fascines bound with ships' cables, with concealed embrasures, towering like castles above the city. The first was at Precipolla, and commanded the right flank of the Ravelin; and the line of forts extended to the reef opposite to the Tower of the Arsenal. As the Turks worked nearer and nearer to the counterscarp, which they reached on 1 May,[2] they ceased to make use of the forts farther back. In all they constructed ten forts, with a frontage of some 50 feet, so strongly built with oak beams, the intervals packed with earth, sacks of cotton and other materials, as to be able to resist almost any assault. When the defenders' artillery destroyed them, the unlimited number of sappers instantly rebuilt them.[3] The depth of the trenches and covered ways made it difficult for the besieged to interfere with them except by actual sorties, such as were made with success on 3 May from the Lemesos Gate by the Quartermaster-General Frederick Baglione, and again on 9 May, but with more doubtful issue on the 17th.[4]

According to the Turkish official report, these works of investment had all been completed before the middle of May and the bombardment began on the 12th; Ali (who had prepared to take over a section) had to sail to join Pertau Pasha,[5] probably on the 15th. By 18 May the enemy, who held all the open country, had already captured part of the counterscarp. In their trenches, 12,000 Janissaries kept up a continual fire on the walls every day, from an hour before to two hours after dawn, and again from 21 hours until darkness fell. It became extremely risky to use the walls, or even to walk about the city, owing to the hail of bullets. Sometimes this firing began at midnight, sometimes it lasted all

[1] Paruta, pp. 210–11.
[2] Morosini, II, p. 431.
[3] Paruta, p. 211. Cp. Podacataro, p. 16.
[4] Gatto, pp. 55–6. Cp. Podacataro, *loc. cit.*; Morosini, II, p. 431.
[5] Refik, no. 24.

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night and all day.[1] On 19 May,[2] beginning two hours before dawn with an hour's volley fire from all their arquebuses, followed by a shout from the whole army thrice repeated, the enemy delivered the heaviest bombardment yet experienced by the fortress. From ten forts seventy-four[3] cannon, firing shot of from fifty up to a hundred and twenty pounds, and four basilisks, two of a hundred and forty and two of a hundred and eighty, battered the walls from the Lemesos Gate to the Arsenal as well as the interior of the city, day and night, doing so much damage to the dwelling-houses that the garrison preferred, even when off duty, to remain at its stations on the wall. The officers made their quarters at the foot of the terrepleins, so as always to be on the spot when there was fighting and share the toils and perils of their men.[4] Bragadin had his quarters in the Andruzzi Tower, Baglione in the Santa Napa, Tiepolo in the Campo Santo.[5]

The fortress artillery, under Louis Martinengo, replied effectively, knocking out, it was reported, many of the enemy's best pieces,[6] and ruining their forts, though these were immediately rebuilt as good as new in the course of the night. But when, after ten days, it was found that gunpowder was running short, the counter-battery was ordered to

[1] Gatto, p. 57.

[2] Gatto, pp. 57–8; Riccoboni, pp. 34 f.; Martinengo, f. 2b. This seems to be the bombardment which Morosini (II, pp. 433–4) dates on 16 May, when he says that Francis Francavilla was killed. See below, p. 1012, n. 7.

[3] Not sixty-four (as Foglieta, col. 1023), or sixty-six (as Morosini). But Podacataro (p. 18) has eighty-two.

[4] Paruta, p. 214. It will be remembered that at Nicosia it had been necessary to order the officers to make their night-quarters at the bastions (p. 978). It is true that, as just remarked, at Famagusta the walls were safer than the interior of the city.

[5] Gatto, p. 76. Cp. Manolesso, f. 52b.

[6] Martinengo (f. 3) says that fifteen enemy guns were choked (cp. Brenzone, p. 79) and some 30,000 men killed. Manolesso (f. 52b) seems to follow him and so does Foglieta (col. 1023), though he gives the number of guns choked as eleven. Calepio (f. 114) says that it was reckoned that the enemy fired 2500 times, and that the same evening an Albanian captive came in and said that up to that time some 3000 Turks had been killed. Further bombardments on 20, 21, 22 and 24 May are mentioned by Calepio, and on the 21st he says that the stradiotes made a sortie to the Tower of the Goose and killed 72 Turks. We may suspect that the figure 3000 is nearer to the truth than 30,000. Curiously enough, Gatto (pp. 60–1), apparently referring to the same report brought in from the enemy's camp, says that it was reckoned that some 30,000 had been killed, but this was probably an under-estimate, for it was the Turkish habit to divide the number of their losses by ten, and multiply the casualties of their opponents by the same number. The practice, however, was not confined to the Turks.

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cease, and only thirty guns were allowed to fire, each thirty[1] shots a day, and were given only half their usual supply of shot; seven captains had the duty of seeing that they did not fire without serious occasion.[2] Having battered the interior of the city for some days, the enemy turned their attention rather to the walls.[3] After a general testing bombardment, they directed their efforts towards breaching five points. The Tower of the Arsenal was bombarded by five cannon from the fort on the reef; the Curtain of the Arsenal by two forts with twelve pieces;[4] the Andruzzi Tower by two forts with two basilisks and seven cannon; Santa Napa by two forts with two basilisks and nine cannon;[5] and finally the Ravelin and Lemesos Gate Cavalier together by three forts with thirty-four cannon.[6] The attack on this last point was especially severe, being directed by Mustafa Pasha himself. Going out into the fosse the garrison carried into the city the débris made by the bombardment, for use in repairs, in which dangerous work the clergy, friars, women and girls assisted.

But the enemy gradually pushed their way nearer, and by 24 May had taken the works on the counterscarp close to the outer Ravelin, firing from which the defenders' arquebusiers had prevented them from making use of the fosse. On that day they attacked and attempted to burn the outer Ravelin.[7] The defenders' arquebusiers in the cunette were hampered by heavy rain all day, but eventually, using pikes and levers, destroyed the works which had been seized by the enemy and successfully exploded a mine under the outer Ravelin.

Forts were constructed by the enemy at ever closer range, the more distant ones, as already stated, being abandoned, or used to give shelter to cavalry. The prolonged bombardment destroyed a number of the

[1] Not three, as Foglieta says; nor 300, as Manolesso (f. 52b).

[2] Gatto, p. 58; Martinengo, f. 3; Paruta, p. 215.

[3] Gatto, pp. 58–9; Martinengo, f. 2b; Manolesso, f. 52 (29 May).

[4] So Gatto; Martinengo (followed by Manolesso, f. 52) speaks of eleven guns.

[5] So Gatto; Martinengo (followed by Manolesso) says that the Andruzzi Tower with two Cavaliers above it was bombarded by one fort with eleven guns, and that all four basilisks were directed against Santa Napa (he does not mention the nine cannon).

[6] Thirty-three, according to Martinengo (followed by Manolesso and Brenzone) Even Gatto's figures only add up to seventy-one guns.

[7] Riccoboni, p. 36; Gatto, pp. 59–60. The latter reports the death on this day of Capt. Francis Francavilla, who, according to Morosini (II, p. 434), was killed in an artillery duel which lasted the whole of 17 May, and which seems to be dated by other authorities on 19 May (above, p. 1011, n. 2).

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defenders' best guns and ruined their embrasures. The majority of their most skilled gunners and crews had been killed, and all the parapets of the cavaliers, curtains and towers had been ruined, so that it was no longer possible to fire at the enemy from them.[1]

Nevertheless all was not well in the Turkish camp. A deserter who came into the fortress in May said that a Turkish frigate had arrived reporting that the Christian fleet was on its way.[2] The number of casualties had caused great alarm. There is no doubt that the gallantry of the defence had astonished the enemy, who wrote home that Famagusta was defended not by men but by giants.[3] On the other hand the Turks suffered from no lack of provisions, a number of vessels being regularly employed in bringing supplies.

The difficulty in which the Pasha found himself prompted him on 25 May to send messages by a Janissary addressed to Bragadin and Tiepolo. He was met, however, by Baglione, who sent him back with a defiant reply, while all the troops shouted 'Viva San Marco'.[4]

On 28 May a Venetian frigate once more arrived, bringing a message from Crete, giving hope of speedy succour.[5] It is to be supposed that it was sent while there was still hope that Nicolas Donato's effort to bring relief would succeed (above, p. 948). The master of the frigate was conducted round the city and the walls and to all the sallyports, to see the ruins and the state of the fortress in regard to munitions and provisions, and was sent back with grim souvenirs in the shape of iron shot from Turkish cannon and basilisks.

The aim of the enemy meanwhile was to fill up the fosse opposite the points where the bombardment had breached the walls. But the earth and fascines and timber and sacks of wool and cotton which were poured into it by their army of sappers, assisted by the soldiers and by peasants

[1] Gatto, p. 60.

[2] Gatto, pp. 60–1.

[3] Romanin, VI, p. 306, citing extracts from Constantinople despatches, 21 July 1571.

[4] Calepio, f. 114b. Next day, after a bombardment, an arrow was found in the fosse with a letter attached, calling on the Famagustans to surrender and save their wives and children. Cp. Riccoboni, p. 36. Pechevi says that before Famagusta surrendered Mustafa had twice written to Bragadin bidding him surrender and deliver up the fifty Moslems he held as prisoners, but had received a defiant reply: 'one day our fleet will come and then your army and fleet will be destroyed; then I shall make you walk before my horse and clear away on your back the earth you have filled the ditches with'.

[5] Gatto, p. 61; Riccoboni, p. 36; Martinengo, f. 3 (29 May); Podacataro, p. 19 (3 June).

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from the island, were carried into the fortress by the defenders.[1] To prevent this the Turks excavated the outside of the counterscarp and opened innumerable loopholes in it, 'so that it looked like a dovecot'. The defenders could no longer enter the fosse, and the arquebusiers who had been stationed in the cunette by the Lemesos Gate had to be withdrawn.[2] Attempts to enter the fosse at night and attack the enemy with wildfire were defeated with great loss. An invention of John Mormori, the engineer, by which the men carried on their shoulders a couple of boards, joined over their heads, making a sort of portable covered way from sallyport to counterscarp, was tried on 30 May, and a certain amount of material was brought in, but the contrivance was found ineffective against the enemy's missiles and was withdrawn, Mormori himself being among the many casualties incurred. He was wounded by a bullet in the thigh and died a few days later.[3]

A new fort was set up on 1 June opposite the Ravelin, and four guns placed in it. Frederick Baglione, the Quartermaster-General, was killed in attempting to repair the parapet on the left of the Ravelin which these guns broke down.[4]

On 3 June the besiegers began to deal with the fosse in a new way.[5] They pierced a gate in the counterscarp, giving entrance to the fosse, which they proceeded to fill up with earth. At several points on the stretch from the Lemesos Gate to the Arsenal they built traverses in it, about 40 feet wide, with fascines, timber, wool and cotton, mixed with earth and bound with ships' cables. These they built up to the height of the wall, completely masking the defenders' flanking fire. Nothing could be done to attack them from the walls except by throwing wildfire down on them. The defenders however continued to venture out and fight to prevent the work or capture the materials; and Bragadin offered a reward of two ducats to anyone who brought in wool or cotton. But the enemy were able to establish a number of *corps de garde* actually in the fosse. Crossing it in the shelter of covered ways opposite

[1] Gatto, p. 61; Riccoboni, p. 38; Martinengo, f. 3; Brenzone, p. 79; Manolesso, ff. 52b, 53.

[2] Gatto, pp. 61–2 (29 May and later). Lorini's anonymous Count describes this stage of the siege (p. 63); the counterscarp being made of good walling afforded protection to the besiegers.

[3] Gatto, p. 62; Martinengo, f. 3b; Brenzone, p. 79; Manolesso, f. 53; Lorini, *loc. cit.*

[4] Gatto, p. 63.

[5] Gatto, *ibid.*; Martinengo, f. 3b; Manolesso, f. 53; Paruta, p. 215.

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the breaches in the walls, they proceeded to pull down the rubble and throw it into the covered ways, whence they carried it to fill up other parts of the fosse. Working their way under the platforms of the curtain and the towers, they pulled away the ground from under the retrenchments, so that they fell in. The material of the retrenchments—gabions, boxes, bales of wool and cotton, sacks of earth—was all dragged down with hooks or set alight with fire-arrows. Finally, reaching the interior of the wall, the enemy laid mines. Some but not all of these—those of Santa Napa, Andruzzi and Campo Santo—were located by the defenders, who disarmed them and brought in the charges for their own use, while for their part they laid a mine under the ruins of the Ravelin.[1] The chief efforts of the enemy were directed to this work (by 20 June they had made a breach in the left flank of the retrenchment on it),[2] and to the Tower of the Arsenal, in the face of which on 21 June[3] they sprung a mine which carried away all the face and the parapet of both flanks, and all the platform in front of the retrenchment, as well as eight feet of the flank of the latter.

This breach opened the second phase of the siege, that of the assaults,[4] of which six or seven are reckoned to have been delivered before the fortress capitulated. The Turks, assaulting in force, planted their flags on the ruins caused by the mine, and attacked the much weakened retrenchment. The company under Peter Conte of Montalbotto, which was on duty where the explosion occurred, dazed by its force, offered little resistance, but Nestor Martinengo came to its support. The guns and heavy arquebuses on the Cavalier of the Arsenal did much execution on the attackers and so did guns on the spur of the Citadel, taking them in flank. Since the Turks under the retrenchment were out of reach of guns or arquebuses, wildfire in great quantities was thrown down on them; unfortunately an accidental ignition of the mixture, while it was being carried through the defenders crowded in the retrenchment, caused over a hundred casualties.[5] After five hours of bitter fighting, in

[1] Gatto, pp. 63–4.

[2] Gatto, p. 65.

[3] Gatto, pp. 65–6; Riccoboni, p. 38; Martinengo, f. 3 b; Brenzone, p. 80; Manolesso, f. 53 b; Paruta, pp. 216–17; Podacataro, p. 18 (2 June).

[4] The first assault: Gatto, pp. 66–8; Martinengo, f. 3 b; Manolesso, f. 53 b; Morosini, II, pp. 436–9 (the most detailed account).

[5] According to Brenzone (p. 80) the cases containing the wildfire were left uncovered, and the Turks, learning this, threw 'powder' which ignited it. Peter Conte was among those who were hurt, being burnt from head to foot; nevertheless he

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which Baglione took part, while Bragadin and Quirini stood close behind in reserve, the Turks, who had returned to the attack six times, were finally thrown back. They had lost about 600 killed.[1] The next day the disposition of the defences, from the Ravelin to the Arsenal, was completely reorganized, officers and companies being assigned their posts at the various breaches, with strict orders not to leave them unless summoned by the Sergeant-Major to relieve others.[2]

The breach at the Arsenal was repaired on the night of the 21st. Cav. Maggi, with Captain Mark Crivelatore, constructed retrenchments at all the breaches, and wherever mines were heard being dug, with casks and sacks full of damp earth, mattresses, and all sorts of fabrics, such as curtains, carpets, even sheets, when sacking was exhausted. The materials were brought by the Greeks with great readiness. This work had to be done at night, which meant that the soldiers, being always on duty on the walls, got no sleep. They were constantly visited by their officers, whose only possible time for sleep was the hottest hours of midday.[3]

Once more, on the night of 22 June,[4] a Venetian frigate came to raise the hopes of the besieged; the master swore a great oath that they would see the Christian fleet within eight days, and that he had left it on its way at Castellorizo, whence he had been sent to give warning of its approach. There was still less foundation for his story than for that told by his predecessor on 28 May. What inspired it, it is difficult to say, unless it was the hope that Mark Quirini, who was still in Candia, actively urging the sending of relief, might achieve his purpose.

was appointed next day to a command at the Santa Barbara Tower (Gatto, p. 70), and survived to be taken prisoner at the last. Gatto calls him Pier Conte Gambutio da Montalbotto; Calepio (f. 121), Piero Conte da Mont' Alberto. Conte is his family name, not a title. Peter had come to Famagusta with Mark Quirini, though he had been nearly captured by the Turks when he landed at Fineka with a party to get water. He was put in command of the Curtain of the Arsenal (above, p. 997). The Turks, it is said, were so much impressed with his gallantry in the defence of Famagusta that they tried to persuade him to join them and become a Moslem. Natale Conti, *Hist.* (1589), f. 104.

[1] Calepio, f. 115b. The Turkish commander, Jambulat Bey, distinguished himself in the attacks (Brenzone, p. 80), and the bastion is still known by his name (Gunnis, p. 103).

[2] Full details, with lists of the officers, in Gatto, pp. 69–71.

[3] Martinengo, f. 4; Manolesso, f. 54; Paruta, p. 217.

[4] Gatto, p. 72; Riccoboni, p. 38; Martinengo, f. 4; Manolesso, f. 54. Morosini (II, p. 440) says that the frigate brought the news of the destruction of the *Barbara* and the sailing of the Cretan galleys for Messina. But all that took place much later.

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The second assault,[1] directed in person by Mustafa, was prepared by the firing on 29 June of a Turkish mine which had been made in the rock under the face of the Ravelin. It brought down the whole of the face and both flanks, and blew the platform into the air, filling up the fosse with the ruins so that the enemy could have driven wagons across it. They had made a traverse from the counterscarp to the breach, on the level of the Ravelin, with three covered ways, each giving space for ten horsemen to ride abreast. The explosion was immediately followed by the signal for a general assault, and by artillery discharge from all the forts, directed on the point where the mine had caused most destruction, to prevent the defenders from making repairs. The guns having ceased fire, the Turks made their way on to the Ravelin, and destroyed the retrenchments, but were nevertheless thrown back by the Christians, who however suffered heavy losses.[2] The Bishop of Lemesos, as always when fighting was going on, was present in the front line, carrying his cross and encouraging the troops. Women also aided the soldiers, bringing up arms, stones and water.

At the same time as the Ravelin the enemy attacked the Tower of the Arsenal. Six assaults were made in the course of seven hours, supported by the guns of the Turkish galleys, which were however kept at a distance by the defenders' culverins on the Cavaliers of the Arsenal and of the Diamante and on the Citadel. Towards sunset the Turks retired from the struggle, in which they had been comparatively unsuccessful. We are asked to believe that the defenders lost only five killed.

These assaults and bombardments wrought terrible destruction on the defences.[3] Such repairs to the retrenchments as could be effected in the night were destroyed at the first discharge of the enemy's guns next morning. All day the defenders fought off the enemy, without the protection that they had laboured all night to provide. Every available

[1] Gatto, pp. 72–4; Riccoboni, p. 40; Martinengo, f. 4; Podacataro, p. 20; Manolesso, ff. 54, 54b. Bizari (pp. 169–73), here unfortunately departing from Martinengo, produces a long oration of Mustafa to his army.

[2] Capt. Mignani of Perugia, Sergeant-Major, was mortally wounded; the Captains Erasmus of Fermo and Celio of Padua were killed; among the wounded was the commander of the Greeks, Antony Miliani of Ascoli. Some thirty of the rank and file were killed. A Christian captive who escaped and came in next night said that 2600 Turks, including two senior officers, had fallen (Calepio, f. 116).

[3] Gatto, pp. 74–5; Riccoboni, p. 40; Martinengo, f. 4 (who was wounded); Manolesso, f. 54.

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hand was employed in the thankless task, from the two bishops and their clergy down to the women. Many of the latter with arquebuses and other weapons took part in the actual fighting. But the materials for repairs ran short; not merely timber, barrels, gabions, and cotton, but all kinds of bedding and carpets. The stores of fine textiles were opened, and sacks made of them and filled with earth for the retrenchments. Provisions were also scarce; a small cask of wine was not to be had for fifty ducats, chickens for the sick and wounded cost three or four ducats, horseflesh or donkey's flesh three or four reals[1] a pound.

The Ravelin was now practically lost to the defenders, so little of it being left that there was hardly room left to wield a pike. Two guns on the edge of the fosse opposite battered its remains. Cav. Maggi prepared a mine in one of its flanks against the time when it should be necessary to retire from it altogether.[2]

Towards the end of June, at the extreme seaward end of the fosse, opposite the Tower of the Arsenal, the enemy built an immense fort, so high that it overtopped the wall, making it very dangerous to use the Curtain.[3] More guns were also placed on the edge of the fosse opposite the breaches, and battered the retrenchments behind them.[4]

On 1 July there was a bombardment, heavier than usual, of all the breaches, but especially at the Andruzzi Tower.[5]

On 7 July a Turkish flagship with a number of galleys came to the Gardens and landed forty cannon (fifty-pounders and heavier). Immediately a general bombardment was begun with no less than 145 guns, while at the same time all the sappers, reinforced by the soldiers and by Greeks from the island, carried on their work of enlarging the breaches, filling the fosses, widening the traverses, and so on.[6]

The besiegers had suffered so heavily in the first two assaults that they desisted from such attacks for a time, devoting themselves to artillery bombardment. They constructed seven new forts, nearer to the walls,[7] bringing to them the guns from the more distant batteries, so that they now used eighty pieces. The firing grew more furious;

[1] By the real is probably meant the Spanish silver dollar.

[2] Gatto, p. 75; Martinengo, f. 4b. [3] Cp. Martinengo, f. 5b.

[4] Gatto, pp. 75–6. [5] Gatto, p. 76.

[6] Gatto, p. 79. Rumour, started by the arrival of the ship, said that the Turks had captured John Andrew Doria.

[7] Eighty paces distant, whereas the others had been at least 250 paces away (Lorini, p. 63).

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it was reckoned that on the day and night of 8 July they fired 5000 shots.[1]

On 9 July the third general assault was launched, repeated seven times over seven hours, directed against all the breached points, and seven times repulsed.[2] But the enemy's sappers, during the fighting, got under the retrenchment on the Ravelin. The defenders were deprived of this protection and had no room to wield their weapons. The enemy also used bags of some poisonous compound which did more harm than any other missiles. It was time to withdraw. Unfortunately the bombardier whose business it was to fire the mine, fancying he heard the order to do so, set it off too soon. Both Christians and Turks were blown into the air together: some hundred and fifty of the former and, it was said, ten times as many Turks.[3] Baglione came to the rescue at the flanks of the Ravelin with some Italians, Greeks and stradiotes, and fought for two hours while the Christian dead were recovered. He and a stradiote captain each captured a standard. Heavy fighting also went on at Santa Napa and Andruzzi; at the latter the Quartermaster-General David Noce was killed, as was Captain Francis Bugone at the Cavalier of the Arsenal.[4]

More material from the ruins of the Ravelin was carried into the city, and a mine was laid in its remaining left flank. The opening of the Lemesos Gate was filled up, leaving an entrance tall enough for a man to ride in on horseback, and broad enough for two men with barrows to pass. It was furnished with a portcullis. The enemy with their fire

[1] Martinengo, f. 4b; Manolesso, f. 55. Cp. Graziani, p. 179.

[2] Gatto, pp. 79–80; Riccoboni, p. 44 (13 July); Martinengo, f. 4b; Podacataro, p. 21; Brenzone, p. 82 (wrongly numbered 68); Manolesso, ff. 55, 55b; Paruta, pp. 218–20; Foglieta, col. 1027 (7 July); Graziani, p. 180.

[3] The figures, for the enemy at least, are as usual guesswork; but it is interesting to find that the besieged did not exaggerate; for while Selaniki tells us that there perished many Turks, including the Sanjakbey of Malatia (Ferhad Agha), the Sanjakbey of Aintab, Ayaspashazade Suleiman Bey and another Ayaspashazade Ghazi Mahmud Bey, Pechevi says that 3000–4000 of the attackers were buried under the débris, including Ferhad Agha, who had been the favourite of Selim I, and three other Sanjakbeys as well as numerous zaims and spahis. The Italians give the following figures: Martinengo (cp. Manolesso): 100 Christians, more than 1000 Turks. Foglieta: 100 Christians, 2000 Turks. Graziani: 100 Christians, 3000 Turks. Capt. Robert Malvezzi was among the killed.

[4] Gatto, p. 81. Martinengo, however, says Noce was killed at the Arsenal, where he himself was again wounded. So too Podacataro.

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and sacks of powder did their best to prevent the materials from being carried in, and the defenders had to drop that work and sally forth between the Gate and the Ravelin to kill the Turks, who however continued to place mines at all the breaches. On the 10th they sprung one under the platform of the Ravelin, bringing it all down.[1]

As commonly happens when besieged and besiegers are separated by so narrow a space, talk went on between them. The Turks jeered at the Christians, whose hopes of relief were vain, since their fleet had been scared into flight; the Christians at the Turks, who waged war like peasants, with pick and shovel, not like soldiers with weapons of war. But sometimes the talk was more serious, and the besieged were urged to surrender. Conversation with the enemy had to be forbidden on pain of death. Finding their advances met with silence, the Turks resorted again to letters, addressed to the Generals or to the people, which they shot with arrows into the city. None of these efforts had any success.[2]

The fourth general assault was delivered on 14 July.[3] The enemy had made a huge trench upon the Ravelin, and from thence fired at the Lemesos Gate, in front of which they succeeded in planting their standards. Baglione attacked them there, killing or driving them to leap from the flanks into the fosse. When they returned to the attack, he fired the mine in the left flank, killing some 700.[4] After the explosion the Christians went out over the ruins, finishing all whom the mine had left alive. Thirteen standards were captured, of which one, taken by Baglione, was a Venetian flag which the Turks had captured at Nicosia.[5]

It was about this time, the middle of July, that the resolution of the inhabitants of Famagusta seems to have begun to weaken.[6] The Bishop

[1] Gatto, p. 83.

[2] Paruta, p. 220; Morosini, II, p. 448.

[3] Gatto, pp. 83–4; Riccoboni, p. 46; Martinengo, f. 5; Manolesso, f. 55b (13 July).

[4] Gatto's figure; others say only 400: Martinengo, Brenzone, pp. 82–3 (68–9); Manolesso, f. 55b.

[5] Calepio, f. 117; Paruta, p. 221.

[6] It is with some hesitation that I reject the date 2 July given by the careful Gatto (pp. 76–7) and Riccoboni (p. 40). The other sources, when they give dates, favour 20 July or thereabouts (Martinengo, f. 6, followed by Manolesso, f. 57b; Calepio, f. 117b and Bizari). Brenzone (pp. 84–5) has no date. If Gatto and Riccoboni are right in recording that the Bishop of Lemesos was mortally wounded on the 19th; the deputation must have been not later than that morning. Gatto himself (p. 84) says, under date 14 July, that Bragadin despatched a frigate to Candia; so too Riccoboni; and it is reasonable to suppose that he would not have waited so long after the 2nd to

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of Lemesos came to Bragadin and in the presence of Baglione and many other officers laid before him an appeal in the name of all the people. There was no hope of any relief; their strength was exhausted; death had reduced the garrison to such a degree that, reckoning Italians, Greeks and stradiotes, there were not more than 150 to defend each breach; there were munitions for only ten days;[1] of the walls, half a mile had been broken down so that wagons could easily be driven into the city; in the fosses covered ways opposite each breach and traverses some 40 feet broad had been made so that at need a squadron of cavalry could ride in at the level of the parapets; all the materials for repairing the retrenchments were finished.[2] Fighting all day without protection, since the repairs which had been effected at night were immediately destroyed by the enemy's guns, had exhausted the garrison's powers of resistance. Yet they would hold out if His Excellency was certain that the Christian fleet was coming to their help. But if he was not, they besought him to surrender, lest they should suffer the bitterness of seeing their wives and children put to the sword and lose at once their honour, their lives and all their possessions.

Bragadin asked the Bishop to say mass, himself acting as server. Then, turning to the people, he thanked them for their faithfulness and courage, but assured them that the Signory would not desert them. He would send a frigate to Candia to report the gravity of the situation.[3] He begged them to wait fifteen days, after which they would take counsel on the situation. The people, taking heart from his words, cried that they were content to wait fifteen, nay twenty days, if the city could hold out so long.

fulfil his promise, nor, if he had sent one at once, would he have sent another twelve days later. Romanin (VI, p. 306) dates the deputation to Bragadin on 15 July, without stating his authority. It may be observed that Bragadin asked the people to wait fifteen days; and it was on 31 July that he finally decided to treat for surrender. According to Morosini (II, p. 451) it was Matthew Golfi, not the Bishop of Lemesos, who was the spokesman of the deputation; but he seems to have taken this from Paruta, confusing this deputation with a later one which preceded the decision to surrender.

[1] Brenzone, p. 84.

[2] As we shall see, there was still some cotton left at the time of the capitulation (p. 1028).

[3] This frigate, says Brenzone (p. 86), reached Candia; he associates with this the abortive expedition under Honorius Scotto; but that is not possible for chronological reasons. See Ch. XIV, p. 949, n. 1.

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The frigate was despatched on 14 July. Next day the enemy sprung the mine at the Curtain of the Arsenal, but it had little effect, and no assault followed.[1] The bombardment was continued at close range, as was the work of widening and raising the traverses in the ditch; all the earth near the counterscarp was dug out, and there the besiegers lodged in their tents. Seven guns were placed on the wall of the counterscarp but concealed from the defenders; two fired from the Ravelin, two at Santa Napa, one at Andruzzi, and two at the breach in the Curtain of the Arsenal. The sappers in their work were protected by planks covered with raw hide; the defenders poured wildfire on them, and sallied from the retrenchments to attack them, but suffered heavy losses. The damaged parapets were repaired with earth, rags and cotton in wet buffalo hides. As always the women and clergy (a Greek priest receives special commendation) worked gallantly, carrying stones, and water to quench the fires.[2]

On the same 15th of July the enemy broke in the gate of the sallyport of Santa Napa, but the soldiers on guard killed all the storming party and closed the gate again.[3]

On 17 July the attackers made a fire at the Lemesos Gate with a wood called *teglia*, which burned without flame but with an intolerable stench and smoke.[4] To this they added pine-roots, other wood treated with pitch, turpentine and wildfire, as well as ordinary timber and fascines. For four days and four nights it burned. The Gate was blocked by a thick double wall; but nothing the defenders could do to quench the flames with water, or scatter the burning materials with explosives, availed, and they had to withdraw within and close the Gate, blocking

[1] Martinengo, f. 5; Manolesso, f. 57; Brenzone, p. 83 [69]. This seems to be the same mine which is described by Gatto (p. 83) under date 13 July.

[2] Martinengo, f. 5.

[3] Gatto, p. 84. He mentions here a contrivance of Cav. Maggi, who imbedded in the soil, for some 12 feet on either side of the breaches, boards studded thickly with the points of daggers, standing up a span and a half, to catch the feet of the enemy if they forced the retrenchments to come on to the platform of the bastion. Cp. above, p. 1003, n. 4.

[4] Gatto, pp. 84–5; Riccoboni, p. 46; Martinengo, f. 5; Brenzone, p. 84; Manolesso, f. 57. *Teglia* or *tiglia* suggests the limetree, but that does not make a stench. Paruta (p. 221) calls it *tezza*, which he says was the peasants' name for a local product. *Taeda* used by Stupanus (in his translation of Contarini) should mean a pine-torch. *Feia* in Podacataro (p. 21) is presumably a misprint. Knolles (p. 864) describes it as 'wood much of the nature of the firre or pitch-tree'.

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it up altogether with earth, stones, etc. The Turks went down and dug fresh mines in the flanks, and to the surprise of the defenders remade the platform of the Ravelin and mounted a gun over against the Gate.

On 19 July they broke in the gate of the Andruzzi sallyport, as they had done at Santa Napa four days before, and established themselves under the vault of the Tower; but again they were thrown out after a hand to hand fight, and the gate closed.[1]

At this time a sortie was made from the Arsenal in order to capture some Turks and obtain information of the mines which they were making; it was supported by small boats, but was unsuccessful, and the Christians had to retire by the shore to the Sea Gate.[2]

On the same 19th of July the garrison suffered a considerable loss in the person of the Bishop of Lemesos, who was mortally wounded by an arquebus bullet as he sat at table.[3] This prelate, the Dominican Serafino Fortebraccio of Milan, had been left in charge of the spiritual needs of Famagusta by Bishop Ragazzoni when he sailed for Venice. He was always to be found in the thick of the fighting, taking refreshments to the men or confessing and communicating them; nor did he neglect the civilians of his flock. The Turks considered him of so much importance that when they took the city they made particular search for him, not knowing that he was dead.

On 20 July a Christian captive of the Turks, who was working under the Arsenal breach, came in and reported that the Christian fleet had been sighted off the western point of the island. He gave other information, perhaps more trustworthy, of the mines which the Turks were making in ever increasing numbers.[4]

On 23 July the Turks placed two more guns on the Ravelin and battered the Gate; the defenders could offer no resistance to their fire, and were mowed down by the shot which raked their ranks.[5]

On 28 July the Turks proposed a parley and, the Christians consenting, a letter from Mustafa was brought to Bragadin, demanding surrender on honourable terms. The reply was returned that the fortress would be defended inch by inch, by artillery, if Mustafa

[1] Gatto, p. 85.

[2] Gatto, p. 86.

[3] Gatto, *ibid.*; Riccoboni, p. 46; Calepio, f. 116; Natale Conti, *Hist.* (1589), f. 102b; Hackett, p. 577.

[4] Gatto, p. 86; Riccoboni, *loc. cit.*

[5] Gatto, p. 87.

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used his artillery; but the defenders preferred fighting with pike and sword.[1]

Nevertheless the garrison was almost at the last gasp. As regards provisions, all the wine, fresh and salt meat, and cheese were exhausted, or only to be had at an exorbitant price;[2] all the horses, donkeys and cats had been eaten; nothing was left but bread and beans, with vinegar mixed with water to drink, and that began to fail. Of the Italian troops there were only 500 unwounded, and they were worn out for lack of sleep.[3]

On 29 July a general assault, fiercer than any yet experienced, was delivered at all points from the Lemesos Gate and Cavalier to the Arsenal.[4] It was preceded as usual by the explosion of mines. By this time practically all the defences, including the retrenchments, had been broken down. Deafened by the noise, blinded and choked by the smoke of the guns, the wildfire and the dust from the ruins, the Christians nevertheless held their ground until the enemy retired. But their casualties amounted to two-thirds of their number. Among them was Peter Rondacchi, the commander of the stradiotes, who was killed when three mines were sprung at the Lemesos Gate Cavalier.[5] A mine at the Arsenal brought down all the rest of the Tower, destroying a whole company of soldiers; only the two flanks were left standing. During the night, efforts were made to reconstruct retrenchments, using for lack of sacking even the clothing of the soldiers filled with earth.[6]

[1] Gatto, p. 87; cp. Riccoboni, p. 46. Martinengo says nothing of this. It may be noted that the Turks were averse to using the pike (Oman, *Hist. of the Art of War in the Middle Ages*,[2] II, p. 357). On the other hand, Ricaut (*Ottoman Empire*, 1682, p. 349) says that the spahis 'esteem not much of Fire-Arms, having an opinion, that in the Feild they make more noise then execution'. They used lance, scimitar or sword, and javelin.

[2] As to wine, a good quantity seems to have been hoarded until the end of the siege.

[3] Martinengo, f. 5b. According to him, this was the state of things before Bragadin was approached with a view to surrender. Some 400 Italians were still alive, though wounded, if Gatto is right when he says later (see below) that all but 900 Italians had been killed. Brenzone (p. 84) has 700 as the number surviving at the time of the appeal to Bragadin; Foglieta (col. 1629), 800.

[4] Gatto, pp. 87–91; Riccoboni, pp. 46 f.; Martinengo, ff. 5b, 6; Manolesso, f. 57b. Gatto and Riccoboni date this fifth assault on the 30th, but that, as they themselves say, was the date of the sixth assault. Gatto gives the names of the Turks commanding at the various points; among them are 'Zamberlot Bei' and 'Gianberlabei', either of whom may be the Jambulat Bey whose heroism became a legend (Gunnis, p. 103).

[5] Cp. Brenzone, p. 87.

[6] Gatto, p. 92.

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If this assault had been severe, that which followed on the 30th, the sixth, was even more terrible.[1] It lasted from dawn to sunset, hand to hand fighting all the time. All the Turkish galleys lay off the harbour, contributing to the bombardment. The fortress artillery, for lack of powder, was unable to reply; for the same reason, arquebus fire and wildfire were limited. Nevertheless the Christians threw the enemy back nine times, with heavy losses, which were guessed to amount to 5000. On the defenders' side, of the Italians all but 900 had been killed, and of the survivors, many, perhaps 400, were wounded. The remainder were worn out and weak for lack of food, for the ration was but two small loaves of bread, and water. The general assault was resumed on the 31st.[2] Three attacks were beaten back, and, after six hours' fighting, at midday the enemy retired. They had fought with less than the usual ardour, and had lost some 300 killed, while of the Christians some hundred were killed or wounded.[3] But the generals, inspecting the defences, concluded that they were at the end of their resources. An exhaustive search of all the magazines produced no more than seven barrels of powder, five of coarse powder for the guns, two of fine for the arquebuses. Victuals were finished. They decided to surrender.[4] The white flag was raised on the ramparts on 1 August.

[1] Gatto, pp. 92–3; Riccoboni, p. 48; Martinengo, f. 6; Morosini, II, p. 458.

[2] Gatto, pp. 93–4; Riccoboni, p. 50; Martinengo, f. 6. [3] Calepio, f. 118b.

[4] Baglione protested (Graziani, pp. 186–7) that he was not responsible for the surrender, but considered himself to have been betrayed by the Venetian Senate; and according to Brenzone (p. 90), he and Bragadin were still against surrendering, but yielded to the pressure of the people. Paruta (pp. 221–4), who strangely ignores all fighting after the fourth assault and the fire made with *teglia* at the Lemesos Gate, says that it was an appeal made by the people (whose spokesman was Matthew Golfi) which forced the commanders to consider surrender, and open negotiations on 1 Aug. Morosini (II, pp. 459–64) also describes how, after an appeal by the chief citizens, the commanders debated the question. Bragadin urged that they should hold out to the last; Laurence Tiepolo argued, from his experience as Venetian consul in Egypt, that the Turks were not to be trusted, and a decision should not be taken hastily; Baglione advised surrender, although if it was decided to the contrary he would do his duty; while Louis Martinengo agreed with Baglione, but suggested that if it was decided not to yield they should sally forth against the enemy, attack with all their force, and die fighting. Podacataro (pp. 22–3) describes the appeal of the citizens and Bragadin's consultation with Baglione and the others, after which, on 1 Aug., he hoisted the white flag on the ramparts. Gatto and Riccoboni, on the other hand, say that the Turks on retiring signalled that they wished to parley; but it seems more probable that the besieged took the first step.

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A messenger came from Mustafa saying that he would send one of his staff to one of the breached bastions to discuss a truce.[1] The cease fire was ordered on both sides. Mustafa's lieutenant now came and demanded the surrender of the fortress, and proposed to return next day with a companion to receive the capitulation.

Mustafa's representative[2] and that of the Agha of the Janissaries appeared on 1 August at the Diamante, where Count Hercules Martinengo and Matthew Colti,[3] a gentleman of Famagusta, issued from the sally-port to go as hostages to the enemy's camp. Baglione, with an escort of 100 arquebusiers, received the Turkish officers; Mustafa's son, with a large troop of cavalry, met the Christian hostages at the counterscarp, and conducted them with ceremony to his father, who presented them with magnificent robes. The Turkish representatives, received by Bragadin and Baglione, presented a *carte blanche*, swearing to observe the terms of capitulation.[4] The Christian generals proposed, first, that the Italians (generals, officers and soldiers) should go free, and embark with colours flying, taking all the artillery of the fortress, three horses captured from the enemy, their arms, baggage, wives and children, and be conducted safely to Candia, accommodated with three galleys, a *nave* and seven *caramussali*, and provisions for the voyage. Their sick and wounded should go with them; also any Greeks, Albanians (stradiotes) or Turks who wished to accompany them. Second, that

[1] The surrender: Gatto, pp. 94–6; Riccoboni, p. 52; Martinengo, f. 6; Brenzone, pp. 90 ff.; Manolesso, f. 58; Paruta, pp. 224–7; Graziani, pp. 187–8; Morosini, II, pp. 464–6. Calepio (f. 118b) says that the Turks attacked again on the morning of 1 Aug.; their guns did great damage to the Lemesos Gate, and there was a *gran scaramuccia*, but after midday they retired. This is probably a confusion with the assault on the morning of 31 July. Romanin's date for the sealing of the capitulation, 18 Aug., is plainly wrong.

[2] *Kiaja* is the term used, meaning, as Paruta explains (p. 224), a sort of major-domo, or rather, lieutenant. See Luke, *Cyprus under the Turks*, p. 34, and Lybyer, *Government of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 96, n. 4. Podacataro has *Chiecagia*.

[3] So Gatto, Riccoboni, Podacataro, Paruta and Morosini; Martinengo and Manolesso have *Colfi*, Brenzone *Colfo*. Paruta however has previously mentioned Matthew *Golfi* as spokesman of the people when they appealed to the commanders to surrender (above, p. 1025, n. 4) and probably means the same person. Cp. also Morosini, II, p. 451. According to Gatto (p. 71) Matthew *de'Colti* had been appointed to a command of the Greeks on 22 June; cp. Podacataro, p. 18. Bizari has *Colsius*, Graziani *Colcius*, Natale Conti *Celsi*, and Romanin *Colli*.

[4] The lieutenant of Mustafa 'appresentò carta bianca, promettendo, e giurando... di mantenere quanto in essi capitoli conterrà' (Gatto, p. 95).

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the Greeks who did not wish to go should, with their families, enjoy their personal liberty and property, and have two years in which to decide whether they would remain in the island, and, if they then wished to depart, should be given safe passage to whatever country they chose.[1] These terms were sent to Mustafa to be sealed, but he returned them, refusing to allow more than five guns to be removed. After some dispute, this was agreed, and the capitulation was signed by Mustafa and sealed with the Sultan's seal, and returned, together with the safe-conduct for Candia. This document provided that the commanders and all the garrison should be conducted to that island; if they met the Turkish fleet they were not to be molested; they were to be given water and biscuit, and more ships if required; while corsairs, if met, were to protect them and escort them to their destination. Mustafa also addressed letters to the people of Famagusta, promising to intercede with the Sultan on their behalf, and to Bragadin and Baglione, full of acknowledgements of the gallantry of their defence, and flowery Oriental compliments, the emptiness of which was soon to be revealed.

[1] Brenzone (p. 91) puts the time limit at three years, and adds to the conditions, that no tax of any kind should be imposed on persons or property, that Christians remaining in the island should be allowed the free exercise of their religion, and the churches should not be turned into mosques. Morosini (II, p. 465) says that the Greeks were to be allowed to have two churches, and that all the bronze cannon and church bells might be taken away; any Greeks who did not depart in ten years should be free of taxation. According to Podacataro (p. 23) the inhabitants were to be exempt from any *angaria* for five years.—Pechevi asserts that the Venetians promised to surrender the prisoners they had taken, along with the fortress, as soon as the terms had been agreed and exchanged in writing; when asked about the prisoners, Bragadin said that he would reply himself. It is implied that, the prisoners having been done away with, he declined to commit himself in writing. The terms given by Alasya (p. 45) from Turkish sources are: (1) officers and men, with their arms and possessions, to be sent to Candia; (2) they were to retain 5 cannon and 3 of the finest horses; (3) ships to be provided for their transport; (4) the Famugustans to keep their goods and enjoy religious freedom; (5) the 50 Moslems, who had been taken captive while on pilgrimage before the siege, to be surrendered. Ali says that when Bragadin was asked about the captives, whose surrender was included in these terms, he replied that the surrender was not demanded until after he had given up and left the fortress. It is to be noted that the Italian sources do not include the surrender of prisoners in the terms.—With regard to the bells, it is to be observed that in the Greek churches the use of wooden or metal sounding-planks (σήμαντρα) is common, permission to use bells having long been refused by the Turks.

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On the 2nd he sent food into the city,[1] and ordered eight *caramussali*, three galleys and a *nave* to lie outside the chain of the harbour, and the embarkation of the women, children and property began.[2] Next day the companies began to go on board, their colours flying; the five guns permitted by the capitulation were brought down to the harbour, and the three horses embarked.

At first the Turks associated on friendly terms with the Christians, but trouble occurred when on the night of 3 August some of the Turks advanced farther than had been agreed, and a scuffle arose which, if the Pasha had not intervened, might have had the most fatal results. Some of the men from the galleys also, entering by the Sea Gate, sacked the houses near it.[3] During the embarkation of the troops on the 4th the cotton at the Cavalier of the Lemesos Gate accidentally caught fire, and there was a general alarm, but the embarkation was not interrupted. It was nearly completed on the 5th, the Greeks and Albanians with their families, and some companies of the Italians, having gone on board.

Bragadin now sent Nestor Martinengo to Mustafa[4] to say that he proposed to take him the keys of the city, leaving Laurence Tiepolo in charge; he begged that during his absence the Turks should not further molest any of the Christians, and asked for two more ships for the rest of his soldiers. Mustafa replied, with the usual compliments, that he would be glad to receive Bragadin and the officers who had so bravely defended the fortress. He sent a Janissary to give orders that no Christians should be ill-treated; the offences by the men of his galleys had, he said, been committed without his knowledge or consent.

The same evening, at the twenty-first hour, Bragadin left the fortress on his melancholy mission. He wore his purple robe of office as magistrate, and walked under the red umbrella which denoted a commander's rank. He was escorted by his personal bodyguard, and

[1] Graziani, p. 187.

[2] Gatto, p. 97. Morosini says that he supplied six galleys, four cargo-ships, and some horse transports. Pechevi says that there were twenty ships, under Arab Ahmad Bey, assigned for the transport of the Christian garrison, over 4000 men.

[3] Cp. Paruta, p. 226; Morosini, II, pp. 466–7.

[4] Gatto, p. 97; Riccoboni, p. 58; Manolesso, f. 58b. The text of Martinengo (f. 6) misprints 15 for 5 Aug., and is followed by Calepio; and Brenzone also has Assumption Day. The correct date is in Contarini (f. 30b) and Morosini (II, p. 467). According to Podacataro (p. 24), Bragadin proposed to embark in a ship with all important papers and a detailed report on the siege, but was persuaded by the others to accompany them to the Pasha.

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accompanied by Astorre Baglione, Louis Martinengo, John Antony Quirini, a number of officers, and some fifty soldiers, making in all a company of some 300 Italians, Greeks and Albanians.[1] At a bowshot from the city they were met by some of Mustafa's highest officers, with a troop of cavalry, and conducted with due ceremony to the pavilion of the Pasha, who received them with apparent courtesy.[2]

But the officers were made to give up their arms, and the musketeers to extinguish their matches. On the pretext of doing them honour, Mustafa had placed a large armed guard round his pavilion. After some amicable conversation, the Pasha changed his tone. He began by demanding a hostage as security for the return of the ships which he was lending. Bragadin replied that he was not bound to this by the terms of the capitulation, and that he had no one whom he could leave in that capacity;[3] whereupon the Pasha pointed to Quirini, and said that he must remain. On Bragadin's stoutly refusing his consent, Mustafa flew into a rage, real or simulated. 'What', he cried, 'have you done with the men you captured from me and had in the fortress?' Bragadin replied that he had some of them there, and had sent the rest to Venice. 'Do I not know', was the angry retort, 'that you have murdered them all?' As to that, said Bragadin, he could satisfy himself by making enquiry in the city. To the further demand for the munitions which he should have handed over, Bragadin answered that all provisions had been exhausted, and the seven barrels of powder remaining had actually been given up. The Pasha, in a fury, leapt to his feet and drew a knife, shouting, 'Tell me, you hound, why did you hold the fortress when you had not the wherewithal to do so? Why did you not surrender a month ago, and not make me lose 80,000 of the best men in my army?'

At his command, the defenceless Christians were now seized and bound. Bragadin was made to stretch out his neck three times as though

[1] We may doubt the statement of Pechevi that all the Christian garrison remaining (some 4000 out of the original 10,000) came out of the fortress and encamped in tents.

[2] The massacre at the camp: Gatto, pp. 98–9; Riccoboni, p. 60; Martinengo, f. 6b; Podacataro, pp. 25–6; Manolesso, ff. 58b, 59; Paruta, pp. 227–8; Graziani, p. 188. Tomitano, *Resa di Famagusta*, gives a defiant speech by Astorre Baglione (to whom he attributes the chief part in this scene). It is probably his own invention.

[3] Morosini, however, says that Bragadin offered one or two hostages, and Mustafa accepted them, although the commander of the galleys (Arab Ahmad) rose and protested that he would not trust himself in Crete.

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he were to be beheaded. Then, changing his mind, Mustafa with his own hand cut off the unfortunate man's right ear, and ordered a Turk to cut off the other and his nose, covering him, as he lay helpless on the ground, with insults to his faith, to which his victim vouchsafed no reply. Reserving him for a more terrible fate, the Pasha now ordered all the soldiers and other Christians to be found in the camp to be cut to pieces, an order which was promptly carried out with few exceptions. Count Hercules Martinengo escaped with his life, being hidden by a eunuch of Mustafa's, who took him as his slave;[1] and three Greeks who were in the pavilion were also spared. Astorre Baglione was led to the space in front of the pavilion; as he abused the Pasha for a breaker of faith, his head was struck off. Holding it aloft, Mustafa showed it to the army, crying 'Behold the head of the great champion of Famagusta, of him who has destroyed half my army, and given me so much trouble'. After Baglione, Louis Martinengo was similarly beheaded. Bragadin was removed, dragged along the ground and scourged, while the butcher triumphed over him: 'You hound, where is now your Christ to deliver you out of my hands?'

The Turkish soldiery,[2] having tasted blood, immediately made a move for the city, to glut their appetites. But Mustafa, who had begun to recover his senses, sent a body of Janissaries to his lieutenant, ordering him, on pain of death, not to let them enter Famagusta. Nevertheless a great number forced their way in, and proceeded to rob and kill the Christians, or chase them on to the ships lying in the port, and then to sack the city. Boarding the ships, they beat all whom they found there within an inch of their lives and robbed them of every farthing, tore children from their parents, and satisfied their brutal lusts on girls and boys. The men were chained to the rowing benches of the galleys, and fed on a ration of seven ounces of weevily biscuit and putrid brackish water. Many died under this treatment.[3]

[1] According to Paruta, both hostages, Martinengo and Colti, were released. Podacataro says that the Viscount of Famagusta (whom he does not name), Dardano Squarcialupi, Angelo di Nicolò and Colti were spared as Famagustans; Hercules Martinengo and all those who were found in the ships (including the writer) were enslaved. Squarcialupi had been Viscount of Nicosia in 1563 (above, Ch. XIII, p. 772, n. 2); he was a close friend of Laurence Tiepolo (Cigogna, *Inscr. Ven.* VI, p. 637 n.).

[2] The sack of the city: Gatto, pp. 100–2.

[3] Brenzone says that Mustafa ordered all the soldiers who had been embarked to be chained; all in the city were killed or enslaved. But, he goes on to say, the city 'non fu offesa nella vita nè meno nelle facoltadi'. Presumably this refers to the Famagustan

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The heads of all those who had been murdered in the camp, some 350 in number, were piled in front of the pavilion of Mustafa. Those which were identified as belonging to the Castellan Andrew Bragadin and John Antony Quirini were set aside with the heads of Astorre Baglione and Louis Martinengo.

On the 6th Laurence Tiepolo, who had been confined in the galley of Arab Ahmad, and the stradiote captain Manoli Spiliotti were dragged through the streets, with blows and kicks, cords round their necks and their hands bound behind their backs. Tiepolo was taken to the top of the Lemesos Cavalier, and Spiliotti to the Curtain of the Diamante, and there they were hanged.[1]

Nestor Martinengo fortunately survived to write the history of the siege. After hiding for five days in the houses of Greeks, he gave himself up to the Sanjakbey of Birejik on the Euphrates, offering a ransom of 500 ducats, and finally escaping to Venice.[2]

By degrees, others found their way back to the West. Having lost their all, their condition was pitiable. It was described by Jason de Nores in an oration congratulating Sebastian Venier on his election as Doge in 1576. Speaking in the name of those gentlemen of the Kingdom of Cyprus who were present on that occasion, he reminded the Doge of their fidelity and devotion to the Republic, which they had preserved unspotted and undiminished, enlarged on the misery to which they had consequently been reduced, and begged for some assistance in

citizens. According to Paruta, a number of those who had not actually embarked were made prisoners by individual Turks, who then released them on payment of a ransom. The Pasha forbade the holding of private prisoners, wishing to have the largest possible number to grace his triumph.

[1] On 7 Aug. (Podacataro); but Riccoboni has the 4th. Paruta (who is followed by Kyprianos) is doubtless wrong in saying (p. 228) that Tiepolo was hanged from the yard of a galley. Fed. Sanuto (*Storia della guerra dal* 1570 *al* 1573, quoted by Cigogna, *Inscr. Ven.* VII, p. 636 n.) relates that the Pasha ordered that Tiepolo, being a friend of his (he had known him as Venetian consul at Cairo), should have the distinction of specially lofty gallows—a grim jest in keeping with the nature of the brute; in Sanuto's words, 'chiaro esempio del procieder de questi cani'.

[2] Martinengo, f. 7b; Manolesso, f. 59. After 42 days of captivity, the ransom was paid with the help of the consul of the French merchants, who had come from Tripoli. The Sanjakbey still refused to free him, saying that he would do so after he had taken him to his government on the Euphrates. But Martinengo escaped in a Greek fishing boat to Tripoli, where he hid in a Christian house until on 25 Sept. he escaped in a French vessel. Alex. Podacataro (p. 955) was also ransomed for 375 sequins paid to the Pasha by his friend the French consul.

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relief of their calamitous state.[1] The Venetian government had however already made some attempt to deal with the situation; thus on 5 July 1573 it established a community of Greeks, including a large number of refugees from Cyprus, at Pola. The experiment was not very successful, since the 'fanatical Latins' quarrelled with the 'schismatic Greeks'.[2]

On 8 August, Mustafa made his triumphal entry into the conquered city.[3] Bragadin lingered in uncertainty of his fate until Friday the 17th, the Muhammadan feast-day, which his captor selected for the culmination of his torture.[4] He was by this time seriously ill, the wounds on his head festering. In the presence of Mustafa and his officers he was hustled round the walls, to all the breaches, forced to carry heavy sacks of earth and stones like a common sapper,[5] and to kiss the ground every time he passed the jeering Pasha. More dead than alive he was taken to the galley of Arab Ahmad. There he was tied in a chair and hoisted up to the end of the yard, to be shown to all the people, while Arab Ahmad taunted him, saying 'Look if you can see your fleet; look, great Christian, if you can see succour coming to Famagusta'. After half an hour of this pillory he was taken, with blows and taunts, hardly able to walk for weakness, to the place of public execution in the chief square, stripped naked, tied with his face to the column, and flayed alive,[6] while Mustafa looked on from the *loggia* of the palace, jeering at him and saying: 'Become a Moslem, and I will save your life, and you shall be high in the favour of my Lord the Great Emperor.' But Bragadin bore his tortures with unfailing fortitude for half an hour, until, as the knife of the executioner reached his waist, he expired with a prayer on his

[1] Printed at Padua, 1578. Legrand, *Bibl. Hellénique, xve–xvie siècles*, IV, p. 215. Jason de Nores died at Padua in 1590.

[2] On the history of the Pola community, see Chr. Papadopoulos, Ἡ Ἐκκλησία Κύπρου ἐπὶ Τουρκοκρατίας (Athens, 1929), pp. 19–22.

[3] Gatto, p. 112. Martinengo (f. 6b) says he entered on the 7th, and hanged Tiepolo on that day.

[4] Gatto, pp. 102–4. Riccoboni (pp. 52 f.) has the wrong date, 7 Aug., having made the Pasha first enter the city on the 4th. Martinengo, f. 7; Brenzone, pp. 93–4, wrongly dates the hanging of Tiepolo after the execution of Bragadin; Paruta, p. 229; Graziani, pp. 188–9. Podacataro, who was a prisoner, obtained his account of the martyrdom of Bragadin from a Genoese renegade (pp. 27–8).

[5] Cp. the threat which Bragadin, according to Pechevi, uttered to Mustafa when first asked to surrender (above, p. 1013, n. 4).

[6] According to Cotovicus (*Itin.* p. 105; *Exc. Cypr.* p. 196), the executioner was a Jew.

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lips.[1] His head was cut off and placed above the gallows.[2] The body was quartered, and the quarters and the heart and entrails placed at the five breaches. The skin was cured and stuffed with straw and cotton, and clad in his own garments, with a cap of sarsenet, and the red umbrella over his head, mounted on a cow, and led round to all the breaches and through the streets of the city, with a Turk on either side crying to the people: 'Behold your Lord, come, see, salute and honour him, and obtain from him the reward of your fidelity and toil which you have scattered to the winds.' It was afterwards transferred to a galliot with the heads of Astorre Baglione, Louis Martinengo and Andrew Bragadin, and, slung from the yard, taken to the Syrian coast, thence to Lajazzo and Karamania, and triumphantly exhibited at every stopping place. The show returned to Famagusta on 21 September.[3]

The history of Cyprus is rich in episodes of horror, and this was an age inferior to no other in barbarity; but as an example of cold-blooded ferocity, in which the childishness of the savage combines with the refinements of the sadist, the martyrdom of the hero of Famagusta by Mustafa Pasha yields the palm to none. It was inspired not by momentary fury, but by deliberate bloodlust.[4] Some of the details of the story

[1] Gatto says that he made no reply to Mustafa's taunts; others, as Martinengo and Graziani, that he upbraided him for his breach of faith.

[2] There was a legend that the head, which was stuck on a pike, shed forth rays like the sun, and emitted a marvellous fragrance, for three nights. P. Giustinian, *Rer. Ven. hist.* (1576), p. 451, from whom it is repeated by Riccoboni (p. 66).

[3] Gatto, p. 114; Riccoboni, p. 68.

[4] Paruta, p. 229; Hammer, *Gesch.* III, p. 587. The narrative given above follows the Christian authors. But Mustafa's own version was given to Ali Efendi (who was present at the conquest) and is preserved in abstract by Pechevi. There were eleven Christians of the rank of 'bey'. The Serdar demanded that as he was sending Arab Ahmad Bey with 20 galleys to evacuate the Christians, one of their beys should remain as hostage. Bragadin scornfully replied that he should have no bey, not even a dog. Losing his temper, the Serdar asked where the Moslem prisoners were. The reply was that they did not belong to the commander but to individual beys or soldiers, who had killed them on the night of the surrender. 'And those who belonged to yourself?' 'I did the same.' 'Then', said the Serdar, 'you have broken the treaty.' He ordered them to be put in chains, and ten to be beheaded on the spot; those Christians already in the ships were disembarked, chained and distributed among the fleet. Bragadin's ears were cut off, and he was ducked several times in the sea, since he was alleged to have so tortured his prisoners. He was made to walk before the Serdar when he entered the fortress, and while the Moslems were at their Friday prayers to carry earth from the fosse. Then they took him and chained him to the pillory; there he confessed to having tortured the prisoners. He was flayed, and his skin, stuffed with straw, hung on the

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may have been exaggerated by anti-Moslem sentiment, but the main facts are not open to doubt.

Against this background, the memory of the victim shines all the more splendid, and his monument is not in the Venetian church where that poor relic is preserved, but in the walls which he so gallantly defended, and which, as the poet dreamed, his ghost still seems to haunt:

> Ici, dans son vieux port que son haut mur défend,
> À la place où les Turcs t'ont écorché vivant,
> Écarlate et debout en ta chair torturée,
> J'ai cru voir, Bragadin, rôder sur le rempart
> Ton fantôme sans peau tendant sa main pourprée
> Que léchait en pleurant le Lion de Saint-Marc.[1]

Mustafa had, as already stated, made his triumphal entry into Famagusta on 8 August. On the 9th[2] the whole army, the Greeks of the island and the people of Famagusta were set to work to clear out the fosse and the cunette, and remove from the surrounding land all traces of the siege-works. All persons expert in the working of lime and in

pillory; his body was quartered and distributed to the gates. The brief account given by Karachelebizade Abd al-Aziz (Κυπρ. Χρον. v, p. 47) seems to be based on Pechevi. Alasya (p. 49) contests the assertion that Mustafa broke his word, and maintains that he was taking reprisal for the killing of the Moslem captives after the armistice—a charge which is not admitted by the western writers. According to the Venetian sources, Bragadin's behaviour was correct, if firm. The phrase 'concitato maggiormente dalle parole' in Paruta, which Hammer takes as an admission that Bragadin's language was rash, means, I think, that Mustafa worked himself up into a greater fury by his own words. Morosini (II, p. 471) discusses the alleged reasons for Mustafa's ferocity; he might have been infuriated by his losses; he might have thought to satisfy, by this detestable crime, the soldiers who were disappointed of the loot which he had promised them; or he might have been annoyed by the state in which Bragadin had appeared before him, clad like a victor rather than a vanquished foe, and by the lack of humility in his language; but he concludes that Mustafa had made up his mind to treachery even before the surrender of the city (as was afterwards reported) and did not act from momentary impulse. Even the Turks condemned his cruelty. But the flaying alive of a captured enemy, and hanging of his skin on the rigging of a ship or sending it as a trophy to Constantinople, was a Turkish practice. Instances are mentioned by Miller, *Essays*, pp. 221 (a Corfiote captain captured during the battle of Lepanto) and 379 (Dionysius, Archbishop of Trikkala, who made an attempt on Joannina in 1611).

[1] Henri de Regnier, 'Le Spectre Rouge', in *Le Miroir des Heures*, 7e éd.

[2] Gatto, pp. 112–13; Riccoboni, p. 66. A poll-tax of four sequins was imposed on the Famagustans (Podacataro, p. 29).

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building were called in to repair the ruined walls. Mustafa picked out from his army 12,000 foot-soldiers for the garrisons of Famagusta, Nicosia and Kerynia, and 4000 cavalry which were distributed to Salines, Lemesos, Paphos, Kerynia and elsewhere.[1] All the remainder of his force was demobilized; the ships available in the island were ordered to convey them to their homes, and to return with munitions and victuals. All the guns which had been brought to the siege of Famagusta, and some which had been captured there, were embarked.

The appropriation of the Christian churches to the service of Islam was very thoroughly carried out. Not content with destroying the altars and the images of saints and breaking up the church plate, Mustafa is said to have had all the graves opened and the bones of the dead scattered.[2]

On 22 September[3] he sailed for Constantinople, leaving only four galleys to guard the island, and taking with him his trophies (the skin of Bragadin and the heads of his other chief victims) and all his prisoners from Famagusta. They were treated with the utmost brutality on the voyage, which was made in very bad weather. On the night of 30 September two *mahone* and some other vessels foundered; one of the *mahone* contained the greater part of the Italian women.[4] At Constantinople, which was reached on 2 November, a number of the prisoners, officers and other ranks were sent to the Black Sea Tower, to join others previously captured by the Turks. The miseries suffered by those who were confined in this dungeon are fully and feelingly described by Angelo Gatto from his own experiences.[5]

[1] So Gatto, p. 113. On the other hand, according to Martinengo (f. 7b) and Calepio (f. 120), Mustafa left behind him in Cyprus, not only as a garrison, but also, since the island was all but deserted, as colonists, 20,000 foot and 2000 horse. The latter had but wretched beasts, in poor condition. Podacataro (p. 28) says that when he left the island on 17 Sept. 1571, there were garrisons in Famagusta of 800 Janissaries, in Nicosia 500, in Kerynia 200, and 3000 horse were distributed throughout the island. But the consideration of the military arrangements made by the Turks for their new possession must be postponed to the following volume.

[2] Paruta, p. 230; Morosini, II, p. 470. This presumably refers to tombs within the churches.

[3] Gatto, p. 114; Riccoboni, p. 68. Paruta and Morosini (as above) date his departure 24 Sept.

[4] Including, probably, the Countess of Tripoli. See above, p. 984.

[5] Gatto, pp. 114–25. Brantôme tells how the Bishop of Dax, Francis de Noailles, bought at Constantinople a Cypriote girl who was sold as a slave (*Oeuvres*, ed. Lalanne, V, p. 67).

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Mustafa, arriving at Constantinople with twenty-one galleys and all his prisoners and booty that had not been sunk on the way, found the Turkish capital under a depression, caused by the news recently received of the Christian victory at Lepanto on 7 October. If there were celebrations of his success in Cyprus, the heart of the people was not in them.[1] Nevertheless, thanks to the dissensions among the victors of Lepanto, that spectacular success was to bear no fruit, and the Grand Vezir was justified in his boast that, if the Republic had shorn his beard, he had cut off one of her arms.

Bragadin's skin and the heads of the other victims were presented to the Sultan, who placed them in the Bagno. Calepio, who was confined in that prison on the charge of being a Papal spy, tried, when he regained his freedom, to steal the skin, but was unsuccessful.[2] In 1580, however, a certain Jerome Polidoro, of Verona, at the instance of the Bragadin family, abstracted it from the Arsenal and conveyed it to the Venetian Bailie, and it was brought to Venice by James Soranzo, ambassador to the Porte, in 1581. At first placed in a pilaster of the church of San Gregorio, where the Bragadin family were buried, it was on 3 May 1596 deposited in an urn in the church of SS. Giovanni e Paolo.[3]

[1] As to this, we may believe Calepio (f. 122), who was present in Constantinople, though a prisoner, and says that the people did not as usual go out to greet the conqueror, or fire salutes, rather than Paruta (p. 230), according to whom Mustafa was received with much honour and the greatest signs of joy. The criticism which Sinan Pasha is said to have made of his conduct of the war (Brantôme, *Oeuvres*, II, p. 65) may have been inspired by jealousy.

[2] Calepio, f. 120.

[3] Cigogna, *Inscr. Ven.* I, pp. 262–3, and in his note on Riccoboni, pp. 70–2. Cp. Reinhard, II, p. 170, who gives the inscription from SS. Giovanni e Paolo from Cotovicus (*Itin.* p. 106). Hammer, III, p. 587; Romanin, VI, p. 308, n. 1. Graziani, however (p. 189), says that Bragadin's sons bought it from the Keeper of the Arsenal, and kept it in their house *pro insigni familiae decore*. Possibly this was only until it was placed in San Gregorio. Judging from the inscription quoted by Cigogna (p. 262) the 'reliquiae' of Bragadin and the 'ossa' of the brothers John Louis and Andrew were all placed in the family tomb which, as the inscription says, Antony Bragadin erected, in 1576 (1596 in Mariti, I, p. 148, is a misprint). The other, shorter inscription in Cigogna (p. 264), also from San Gregorio, mentions only the *reliquiae* of Mark Antony Bragadin. Since the body of Bragadin was drawn and quartered and distributed in various places, his bones would not have found their way to Venice, unless pious hands collected them and smuggled them out. What then were the 'reliquiae'? If they were the stuffed skin, then (since that was not brought to Venice until 1580) the first inscription cannot be contemporary with the date 1576 which

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The news of the fall of Famagusta was long in reaching Venice. On 15 September the Senate was still occupied with the question of despatching provisions for a year to the beleaguered city. On 17 October it wrote to the Proveditor-General Barbarigo asking why, after the enemy fleet had left Crete for the West, the relief which had been destined for Famagusta had not been sent, and instructing him to enquire particularly into the matter.[1] But this was no longer of any practical significance; and in the treaty of peace, which was concluded with the Porte on 7 March 1573, Venice paid a heavy war-indemnity and renounced all claim to Cyprus.[2]

NOTE

ON THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE UNOPPOSED LANDING OF THE TURKS

The substance of the report by the Lieutenant, Nicolas Dandolo, on this episode has already been given (p. 959). The other evidence on the subject may be analysed as follows.

Contarini[3] tells us that the decision not to oppose the landing was taken because there were so few cavalry available to cover the seven hundred miles of coast-line, and because of the distance of Salines from Nicosia, which was

it mentions. Polidoro, who was frightfully tortured when his theft was discovered and brought home to him, was after some years ransomed by the martyr's brother, Antony, and on 18 Feb. 1588 was granted by the Senate a pension of five ducats a month.

[1] Romanin, VI, p. 309.

[2] Romanin, VI, p. 339; Hammer, *Gesch.* III, p. 601. The capitulations with Venice were renewed by the ambassador, James Soranzo, on 10 Aug. 1575 (Dumont, V, i, pp. 244–7; Hertslet, pp. 713 f.). The progress of the negotiations is described by L. von Ranke, *Zur Venezianischen Geschichte*, pp. 55–6. In March 1572 the Council of Ten were still bellicose; in June they began to think of peace. A French ambassador was beginning to negotiate; the Venetian Bailie was told to leave it to him, and confine himself to generalities. 19 Sept.: the Bailie is ordered to take it in hand himself, give the Pasha up to 50,000 sequins and offer a larger tribute for Cyprus. 19 Nov.: the Ten press for peace ever more urgently; they think no more of recovering lost territories; Cyprus is forgotten; yet all the time they try to make the world believe that they wish to go on fighting. This is all done by the Ten without the knowledge of the Senate.

[3] Contarini, f. 9b.

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thirty miles; had it been a matter of four or six only, the attempt might have been made. But we have to ask who was responsible for the decision, and the reports of the debates on the question show that it was taken against the advice of Baglione and others. The engineer Sozomeno [1] tells us that Baglione wished to show himself with his cavalry and mounted musketeers, to obstruct the landing and learn the enemy's strength, but neither the Lieutenant nor the Collateral (Roucha) would allow this, for the same reasons which we have already cited from Contarini. They quoted in their support an opinion which had been given some time earlier by Sforza Pallavicino to the Senate, and had received its approval. He held that only the fortified cities should be defended; the Turks would be unable to bear the heat of the season and would raise the siege.[2] All the nobles, except Roucha and his brother, put it in writing that they wished to go with Baglione to Salines and do what they could to hinder the landing.[3]

But the will of the Lieutenant, swayed or supported by the Collateral, prevailed, and therefore Roucha and his stradiotes, who were at Salines, retired to Nicosia as soon as the fleet showed itself. Sozomeno himself had submitted a statement to the Lieutenant, advocating a scheme which would have inflicted damage on the enemy if he landed, and forced him to change his plans. Some six to seven thousand mounted lancers and musketeers, and some 25,000 francomates, should have been stationed on the hills near Salines, in full sight of the enemy, making at least a show of resistance.[4]

Some kind of compromise was reached.[5] The Lieutenant said that Baglione might do as he pleased, and take such cavalry as were willing to go to oppose the landing; but if anything went wrong a full report would be sent to the Senate (and that, as we have seen, was done without delay). Baglione, convinced that the Senate placed more trust in its Lieutenants than in its Captains, undertook to do nothing rashly against the wishes of Dandolo. But he gave orders[6] to Roucha, with the captains Antony dal Beretino and Lazarus

[1] In Cobham, *Exc. Cypr.* pp. 81–2, 85.

[2] Cp. Graziani, p. 68; Natale Conti, *Hist.* (1589), f. 78; Bizari, p. 35. Pallavicino generally distinguished himself by lack of confidence, as when he retired from Margarition, and in his steady opposition to the forward policy in the naval expedition.

[3] Sozomeno adds that Baglione himself bore witness to this letter having been written, in a statement which he made at Famagusta to Nicolas Donato. Cp. Bizari, pp. 35–6.

[4] Cp. Bizari, pp. 49–50. Graziani (p. 67) attributes this scheme to Baglione.

[5] Graziani, p. 69.

[6] Brenzone, p. 37; on p. 40 he gives the force as 400 horse and 100 Italian arquebusiers.

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Coccapani,[1] to take 300 horse to Salines; he himself would follow next night with 500 mounted arquebusiers, while Rondacchi (who as we know was following from the shore the progress of the enemy fleet) would arrive at the same time with 150 stradiotes. Roucha, says Baglione's biographer, left Nicosia with 400 horse and 100 arquebusiers, but from fear, or jealousy of Baglione, or prudence, did not attack the enemy. Rondacchi on arriving found him gone. He had sent his force back to Nicosia, and himself gone to Famagusta, being met by Baglione on the way.

From Angelo Gatto[2] we learn that the Lieutenant had promised Baglione 300 mounted arquebusiers. On 13 June, Baglione sent two gentlemen to Nicosia to ask for them, but they could not even get an audience with Dandolo. They reported this, and were sent back again, and this time got a promise that the arquebusiers should be sent under Roucha. When the news of the arrival of the Turks off Paphos reached Famagusta, Baglione rode out in the direction of Salines with all his stradiote cavalry. Meeting Roucha at a village on the way, he asked for the mounted arquebusiers, only to be told that the Lieutenant had declined to send them. Roucha reported further that he had been unable to do anything at Salines, because the Turks had landed in great numbers; he had skirmished a little but had been forced to retire. Cavalry were sent out to reconnoitre, and reported that the Turks were in great force and had passed Larnaka. Baglione and Roucha now retired to Famagusta; the latter's stradiotes returned to Nicosia, whither he himself followed; but Bragadin, in the name of the Signory, retained Baglione in Famagusta.

The account just quoted, though written by a great admirer of Baglione, is comparatively dispassionate. But others used language less restrained. Perhaps the most violent denunciation of the Lieutenant is to be found in Foglieta,[3] who quotes an opinion he had frequently heard expressed by important persons, that Dandolo showed as much cowardice in the conduct of the war as negligence and indolence in making military preparations and provisioning the fortresses. No prayers or protests by Baglione could persuade him to send cavalry (of which he had as many as 1200 at his disposal) to the coast, and seize the opportunity of preventing the disembarkation of the enemy or at any rate inflicting serious losses on him. His mean and timid spirit was quite unequal to rising to the splendid resolution which offered the only chance of salvation. Roucha falls equally under the writer's lash, as

[1] Called Lazaro Cocuban by Calepio (f. 111); Lazaro Caccopani by Brenzone (p. 46); apparently identical with the Pocopani or Pochipani of Contarini (f. 11b) and Sozomeno (p. 84).

[2] Gatto, pp. 34–5.

[3] Foglieta, cols. 971–2.

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having caused Dandolo to reject Baglione's plan and himself refused to go to meet the enemy. That he went, however, though unwillingly, we know.

Finally, of the more or less contemporary authors, Morosini (who was writing his official history of the war from 1598 to 1618), in his account of the episode,[1] has no word of any dispute between Dandolo and Baglione. He says that the latter ordered Roucha to take about 400 cavalry and 100 Italian *sclopettarii* under Antony Berettino and Lazarus Cocapane; 300 *fistulatores* mounted on ponies were to be sent out (these seem to be the arquebusiers whom Gatto says the Lieutenant had promised), and he himself would soon follow from Famagusta with as many infantry and 150 Epirote horse. Roucha, for some uncertain reason, failed to accomplish his task, sent his Italians back to Nicosia, and returning to Famagusta with the others found Baglione about to start out. Baglione intended to ride by night and surprise the enemy at dawn; but, either because he saw that his plans had gone wrong, or because his horses were tired, or because Roucha was unwilling, he gave up his intention. Roucha returned to the capital on the morning of 4 July. Rondacchi, supposing that Baglione's orders had been carried out, and that the enemy were being engaged, pressed on, though his horses were worn out, and reached Salines soon after Roucha had gone; but, seeing himself disappointed in his expectations, also returned to Nicosia.

The eighteenth-century historian Diedo[2] says that Roucha left Nicosia with 300 horse, collected with great difficulty, and 100 Italian arquebusiers on hacks, under Berettino and Coccapani; Baglione came from Famagusta with 300 mounted arquebusiers and 150 stradiotes; and Rondacchi (Roncadi) with the few remaining horse; they met, and considering the risk to which they were exposing the few troops, on whom the defence of the Kingdom depended, decided to return to defend the fortresses, and left the enemy to advance unresisted. Diedo too says nothing of any dispute with Dandolo, and his account of what happened is at variance with all the other evidence.

[1] II, p. 304.

[2] II, p. 230.

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CHAPTER XVI

THE TWO CHURCHES (1220–1571)

Easily subdued and exploited as they were in other respects, the Cypriotes, when it came to an attack on their religious institutions, showed once more the same obstinacy which had defended the autocephaly of their Church from the assaults of Antioch.[1] The differences between the Greek and the Latin Churches may have been irreconcilable; but had there been any chance of union, the agents of the Roman See were too often tactless though sincere bigots, the last persons likely to find a bridge for the gap, especially when they had to deal with opponents of very similar character. The power of passive resistance of the Greeks, the common sense occasionally shown by the Popes who tried to restrain the extravagances of their representatives, the equally sensible tendency of the kings and regents to hinder the complete destruction of the Church of their Greek subjects, the revival of Cypriote nationalism[2] from the time of Helena Palaeologa—these factors would suffice to account for the eventual disappearance of Roman Catholicism from the island, even had Turkish policy not dictated its expulsion. We have already followed the vicissitudes of the two Churches in the course of the history of the earlier Lusignan rulers; we shall now deal specially with the struggle between them from the convention of Lemesos in 1220 to the Turkish conquest.[3]

[1] It is difficult, in the light of the history of the struggle, to understand how Stubbs (*Seventeen Lectures*, p. 187) can say that 'the peculiar privileges of the Cypriot church, which was autocephalous, made it easy for the remaining prelates and people to accept the Western obedience'.

[2] On the character of this 'nationalism', see above, p. 754.

[3] The best modern authority, though somewhat prejudiced against Rome, is always Hackett, *Hist. of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus*. The first two volumes of Greek translation, by Papaïoannou (1923–32), have extensive revision and corrections by the author and translator. I regret that I was unable to consult this work when writing Vol. I, and that it only came into my hands, thanks to the Archbishop of Thyateira and Mr Hormousios, when the relevant chapters in Vols. II and III had already been written. Mas Latrie, in his *Histoire* and in his *Hist. des archévêques latins*, shows an evident endeavour to be fair, but is apt to pass over lightly or in silence incidents that the other side would emphasize. The sketch by Philippos Georgiou in his Εἰδήσεις ἱστορικαί,

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The Lusignan rulers of Cyprus were faced with a conflict between their devotion to the Church of their religion and their sense of a wise policy in regard to their Greek subjects; they realized better than anyone in Rome could understand the necessity of not driving the Orthodox Church to desperation. Their liberality to the Latin churches and religious Orders is illustrated by numerous grants of property and privileges. Some of these have already been mentioned incidentally, such as the extensive grants to the Hospital by Hugh I in 1210. In 1195 Aimery granted land to the Temple in Nicosia (but was paid handsomely for it with a valuable ruby).[1] The bull of Celestine III of 13 December 1196 confirms the grant of two casali to the church of Nicosia which had been made by Aimery;[2] and a letter of Innocent III of 8 January 1206 also mentions a grant to the church by Aimery of a garden in Nicosia. Coming down to the reign with which we are now first concerned, we note the grant in 1220 by Queen Alice to Archbishop Eustorge and his church of the use of the royal mills at Kythrea, free of all charges; this was for the redemption of the souls of her husband Hugh and her ancestors.[3] It is unnecessary to enumerate later grants[4] of the same kind; they are in accordance with the usual practice of rulers in relation to their established churches. But there were two problems which from the beginning gave trouble; first, it was easy to say that the Crown granted to the Latin Church the tithes on domain and baronial lands, but it was not easy to enforce their collection; and secondly, there were the claims of the Greek Church.

1875, is full of matter not to be found elsewhere, and there is an excellent sketch of the whole subject by H. T. F. Duckworth, *The Church of Cyprus*, 1900. See also the article by A. Palmieri in Vacant-Mangenot, *Dict. de Théologie catholique*, vol. II (1905). The dissertation by Ph. I. Kourites, Ἡ ὀρθόδοξος ἐκκλησία ἐν Κύπρῳ ἐπὶ Φραγκοκρατίας (1907) is useful. The Greek point of view is put throughout by Zannetos in his History (1910–11). La Monte has published (*Byzantion*, t. v, fasc. II, 1929–30) an invaluable Register of the *Cartulary of the Cathedral of Nicosia*, of most of the documents in which Mas Latrie had already made use; this is referred to as *Reg. C.N.*

[1] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 598–9; Röhricht, *Reg.* 723. *Reg. C.N.* no. 1; cp. no. 37 with La Monte's note.

[2] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 601–5; Hackett, pp. 479–80, n. 2; Papaïoannou, III, p. 16, n. 2; *Reg. C.N.* no. 3.

[3] M.L. *H.* III, p. 611; Röhricht, *Reg.* 929; Hackett, p. 496; Papaïoannou, III, p. 37; *Reg. C.N.* no. 12. Mas Latrie, *Arch.* pp. 218 ff., notes a number of other donations made in the time of Eustorge.

[4] See Hackett, pp. 497–500; Papaïoannou, III, pp. 37–41; also *Reg. C.N. passim.*

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In October 1220 an attempt was made to deal with these questions, at a convention at Lemesos.[1] Upon the request and frequent admonition of the Cardinal Legate Pelagius, the Queen, the Constable Walter of Caesarea and the barons of Cyprus on the one part, and on the other Eustorge the Archbishop, his three suffragans, Martin of Paphos, R. of Lemesos and Caesareus of Famagusta, came to an agreement. The essence of this was that the tithes on land belonging to the Crown and barons, and the dues and service owed to the Crown by villeins on the estates of the Latin Church, were all confirmed to that Church; as to the Greek Church, its clergy was to be free of poll-tax or corvée, but its obedience to the Latin Church was more strictly enjoined, and the ordination of Greeks and movement from one estate to another were very severely controlled. Measures were to be taken to curb the excessive growth in numbers of the Greek clerks (due to the ease with which taxation and service could be avoided by taking minor orders).[2]

[1] M.L. *H.* III, pp. 612–14; Röhricht, *Reg.* 938; Hackett, pp. 82–3, 481–2; Papaïoannou, I, pp. 113–15; III, p. 20. *Reg. C.N.* no. 13 (the last is inaccurate in supposing the Legate to have been present).

[2] In more detail: Tithes on all land belonging to crown or barons to be paid to Latin Church in accordance with the usage and customs of the Kingdom of Jerusalem (Art. 1). Poll-tax (*chevagium*) and dues (*dimi*) owed to Crown by villeins on estates of Latin Church to go to that Church (2). The Latin Church not to question the rights of Crown and its lieges to properties which they hold, but which had belonged before the occupation to Greek churches and monasteries (10). Priests and deacons of Greek Church to be free of poll-tax or *angaria*, i.e. corvée (2). The Greek clergy to pay canonical obedience to their Latin ordinary (2). Greek priests and deacons, as long as the present excess of Greek clergy prevails, not to move from one casale to another (3). No Greek to receive ordination without his lord's consent; if this should happen, another good villein to be provided in his place by the archbishop or bishop (4). A Greek who gets himself ordained outside the island, without his lord's knowledge, and returns, to be suspended, and can be taken back into servitude (5). No Greek to become a monk or lay-brother without his lord's consent (9). Greek priests or deacons hereafter to be ordained may move from one casale to another, without their children, without prejudice to the lord's rights, and with licence of the Latin ordinary, who should appoint other Greeks in their stead (6). Election of Greek abbots to be canonically conducted, with assent of the lord of the place, and confirmed by the Latin ordinary; an abbot so elected not to be removed from his abbey except for some offence to be judged by due form and process of law; abbots and monks to be obedient in all things spiritual to the Latin ordinary (7). Greek churches and monasteries remain in undisturbed possession of any benefactions or properties granted to them by Latin lords, without prejudice to the juridical rights and customs of such lords in matters temporal (8).

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The agreement was communicated to the Pope, and had his entire approval.[1] He insisted on the supremacy of the Latin Church; the Greek bishops were not to rank as *presules* in the four Latin dioceses. The property formerly belonging to the Greek clergy was to be possessed by the Latin clergy and the nobles were to respect the rights of the latter in these possessions. Pelagius also gave his confirmation from Damietta.[2]

The scheme, however much it may have been confirmed,[3] was unworkable. There was, to begin with, the recalcitrancy of the Greeks, who of course had not been consulted as to the disposal of their rights. The Orthodox Archbishop Esaias[4] at first complied, but then, repenting, went to Nicaea and obtained pardon for his apostasy from the Patriarch Manuel;[5] but he was not allowed to return to Cyprus. His successor Neophytus refused submission, and was banished and went wandering about the East.[6]

The civil power in Cyprus saw the difficulty of the situation, and appealed to the Pope to allow the Greek bishops to have authority over the Greeks. To which Honorius replied[7] that some of the Greeks had actually invaded Latin churches; he would like to favour such Greeks

[1] Letters of 17 Dec. 1221 (*Reg. C.N.* no. 17); 30 Dec. 1221 (M.L., *H.* II, p. 44; Potthast, no. 6748); 5 Jan. 1222 (M.L., *Arch.* p. 217, n. 36, wrongly dated 1221; *Reg. C.N.* no. 18); 8 March 1222 (*Reg. C.N.* no. 20). For later confirmations and recommendations for the enforcement of the agreement, see below, n. 3.

[2] 16 May 1221. *Reg. C.N.* no. 15.

[3] Mas Latrie (*Arch.* p. 218) enumerates the constantly recurring orders by Pope or Legate to the barons to keep to the agreement: in 1224, 1225, 1228, 1231, 1232, 1237. Cp. *Reg. C.N.* nos. 53 (1243), 84 (1255), 87 (1255), 89 (1255), 100 (1267), 117 (1345=M.L., *H.* III, p. 738), 133 (1496=M.L., *H.* III, p. 492). For the important arbitration of 4 Oct. 1232 (M.L., *H.* III, pp. 633–6), see D.L.R., *Cart.* II, no. 2034; Hackett, p. 483; Papaïoannou, III, p. 483; and below, p. 1052. In 1255 Alexander IV reminded Queen Plaisance that she had sworn to defend the Church and respect the agreement and told the Archbishop of Nicosia that he could excommunicate those who refused to pay tithes. In 1345 Clement VI demanded that King Hugh should force the nobles to pay. In 1496 the Venetian authorities enforced the payment.

[4] Dositheos, Ἱστορία περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἱεροσ. πατριαρχευσάντων (ed. of 1715), lib. VIII, c. 18, para. 5, p. 826; Hackett, p. 309; Papaïoannou, II, p. 74.

[5] Manuel died at the end of Aug. or beginning of Sept. 1221 (Lequien, *Or. Chr.* I, col. 278).

[6] First letter of Germanos, in Reinhard, I, Beyl. 17 (from Cotelerius); Sathas, Μεσ. Βιβλ. II, pp. 7 f.

[7] Letter of 30 Dec. 1221 in Raynaldus, 1222, pp. 500–1, §§ 8, 9; Potthast, no. 6747.

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as had returned to the Roman obedience, but it was intolerable that there should be two heads to one body. Therefore he was writing[1] to the Patriarch of Jerusalem and the Archbishops of Tyre and Caesarea to see to it that the offending Greek bishops should be put down and should pay obedience to the Roman Church in accordance with the agreement between the Queen of Cyprus and the prelates of her Kingdom.[2]

Nor did the Crown and the barons like the arrangement; it was much too favourable to the Latin clergy, whose appetite grew with eating. Later, as we have seen (p. 88), this led to an open breach between the Queen and her co-regent Philip d'Ibelin.

The actual grievances of the Greeks do not appear clearly from the agreement, to which they were not parties. But we learn, from the letter written later by the Patriarch Germanos in reply to the request for guidance which the Cypriotes addressed to him, that the heads of their complaints were four.[3] First came the provision that there should be but one archbishop (and that the Latin one), who with his three suffragans should exercise jurisdiction over the whole island, the Greek bishops being made completely subordinate to the Latin ordinaries of the districts in which they resided. Second, appeal should be allowed by the Greeks, whether clerks or laymen, from the decisions of the Greek bishops to the courts of the Latin ordinaries. Third, no Greek elected to any position in his Church should be allowed to take office without the permission of the Latin ordinary. Finally, on election, every Greek bishop should kneel before his Latin ordinary and do homage and swear fealty as vassal to lord.

It was not only the Orthodox Greeks who resisted the encroachments of the Latins. The Archbishop complained to the Pope that obedience was refused to him by the Syrians, Jacobites and Nestorians and certain others who would take orders from no one but the Pope himself and the civil government. Honorius wrote accordingly[4] to the Archbishop

[1] Letter of 3 Jan. 1222. Potthast, no. 6755; M.L., *H.* II, p. 45 (date incorrectly given as 23 Jan.).

[2] Cp. M.L., *H.* I, p. 211 where, in n. 1, the letter is dated 21 Dec. 1221, which appears to be a slip for 30 Dec. 1221.

[3] First letter of Germanos, as above. Hackett, pp. 83, 89 f.; Papaïoannou, I, pp. 115, 123 f.

[4] 22 Jan. 1222. M.L., *H.* III, pp. 618–19; Potthast, no. 6773; *Reg. C.N.* no. 19. Mas Latrie notes that the Maronites gave no trouble to the Latin Church. They had abjured their monothelite heresy in 1182 (Will. of Tyre, XXII, c. 8). Other sects did not adhere to the Roman Church until later; the Nestorians in 1288. See Grousset,

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of Caesarea, the Bishop of Acre, and P. Treasurer of Caesarea, ordering them to bring the rebels to obedience to the Archbishop of Cyprus under pain of the censure of the Church. Nothing more is heard of this complaint; but that the Syrians continued to be recalcitrant is shown by the fact that the second letter of Germanos, written in 1229 and recommending resistance, was addressed to them as well as to the Greeks.

The Latins took advantage of the presence of the Legate Pelagius at Famagusta on his way home to Italy, and he summoned, with the consent of the Queen, a conference of the high Latin clergy and the barons. The Legate, with the Grand Masters of the Temple and Hospital, formed a committee of arbitration. On 14 September 1222 the agreement of Lemesos was reviewed, and the stranglehold on the Greeks was tightened.[1] With regard to the canonical obedience which is to be paid by the Greek clergy to the Latin ordinary, it is noted that this is in accordance with the obedience paid to the Latin bishops in the Kingdom of Jerusalem by the Greek priests and deacons. To the restrictions on ordination is added that a Greek bishop, who ordains anyone in the island without licence from the Latin bishop and the temporal lord, is to be suspended by the Latin bishop from the office of conferring orders, and the person so ordained is to be returned to servitude. The number of monks to be allowed in each of the Greek monasteries is to be fixed by the Archbishop of Nicosia or a bishop representing him, and by a representative of the Crown; when the existing number has been reduced to the statutory limit by death or removal, it is not to be exceeded. While the provision that the Crown and its lieges should not be disturbed in the possession of property formerly belonging to Greek churches and monasteries is confirmed, a clause is added excluding from the field of dispute cathedrals and other churches, estates, and all other property which the Latins now hold or shall in future acquire by donation, with the tithes and other revenue of which the churches are to be content.[2] Finally, the four Greek bishops, who by the consent of the arbitrators and the wish of both parties[3] are all that shall remain in Cyprus, are to

III, p. 360. The supposition that the Jacobites adhered in 1237 is incorrect; see Chabot in *C.R. Acad. des Inscr.* (1938), pp. 448 ff.

[1] *Reg. C.N.* no. 23, and the confirmation, no. 24; M.L., *H.* III, pp. 619–22.

[2] The text is ungrammatical, the subject of the verb changing in the middle of the sentence from the Crown and its lieges to the Latin churches.

[3] It must be remembered that the parties are the Crown and barons on the one hand, and the Latin Church on the other. The Greeks are not represented.

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be obedient to the Latin ordinaries, in accordance with the custom of the Kingdom of Jerusalem; and they are to reside in the places assigned to them, i.e. in the Nicosia diocese, at Solia; in the Paphos diocese, at Arsinoe; in the Lemesos diocese, at Lefkara; in the Famagusta diocese, at Carpasia.[1]

This last provision shows that the reduction of the number of Greek bishops to four was definitely decided. When it actually became effective, we do not know. The probability is that the reduction was a modification by the arbitrators of Famagusta of the order, which the Pope had issued as early as the end of 1221 or beginning of 1222,[2] for the expulsion of all the Greek bishops. To anyone on the spot with a sense of responsibility, like the civil authorities, it was evident that the Greeks could not be converted wholesale, and could not be left without pastors. But these pastors were to be deprived of nearly all authority, and could only exercise their offices, for instance ordination, under the supervision of their Latin ordinaries.

The estates and tithes belonging to the four sees were eventually to be handed over to the Latin Church, although the existing Greek bishops were to enjoy their revenues as long as they lived, after which the Greeks were to receive from their priests and deacons such payments as were customary for the Greeks in other places.[3]

The Cypriote deputation to the Patriarch Germanos at Nicaea has already been mentioned. The deputies Leontios, Bishop of Solia[4] and his namesake the Abbot of Apsinthi speak generally of the despoiling of the Greek Church, and tell of the expulsion of Neophytus and the refusal of the Latins to allow any archbishop but their own;[5] the Latin Archbishop

[1] As late as 1472 this exile was confirmed by Sixtus IV; see below, p. 1094.

[2] Above, p. 1045.

[3] Fl. Bustron, p. 53; Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 31. Cp. Giblet (Loredano), I, p. 36. In the 15th cent. the Greek bishops got one besant a year from each priest and minor cleric of the *parici*, and two besants from the priests and clerics of the *francomati*, and from each marriage a besant and two fowls. Amadi, p. 86; Fl. Bustron, p. 53; Hackett, p. 480, n. 1; Papaïoannou, III, p. 16, n. 33.

[4] That is bishop of the old Orthodox see of Solia (which had not yet been abolished); not, in accordance with the Famagusta scheme, 'bishop of Solia of the Greeks of Lefkosia'. The deputation was sent by the Cypriote archbishop and the other bishops and all the clergy and lay folk.

[5] Mansi on Raynaldus, 1222, p. 501, thinks that in spite of the decision of Famagusta only the Archbishop had been expelled; all the others had been allowed to remain, though they were threatened with the prospect of expulsion if they were disobedient.

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is forcing the Greek bishops and the remaining clergy to submit, promising if they will do so that they may keep their own bishoprics and exercise their priestly office.[1] When asked to be more precise, they describe the grievances already mentioned (p. 1045), but they say nothing about the reduction of the sees to four. That cannot therefore, at the time when this letter was written, in 1222–3, have been actually put into force.

The letter of Germanos and the Synod describes in somewhat artless fashion how the Patriarch and his advisers were at first inclined to recommend formal submission, considering it justifiable to conform if by so doing the Cypriote bishops could escape the necessity of deserting their people, and continue to minister to them in all matters essential to their faith, while yielding outwardly to the demands of the Latin prelates, which they regarded as inspired by material motives. But when this decision was announced, the Synod was invaded by a crowd of Greeks who had suffered at the hands of the Latins since the conquest of Constantinople. They made a scene, and insisted that the act of homage was not a mere form, but an admission of complete surrender, as of prisoners of war (and the Latins, clerks or laymen, knew what it meant, for they were all warriors). The Synod gave way, and ordered that the Cypriote bishops should refuse to do homage. But it directed that on the points of obtaining the leave of the ordinary to take possession of office, and of admitting appeal to the ordinary from the decisions of their own bishops, they should yield.

The messengers must have returned with these instructions, but from what happened six or seven years later it is clear that the Cypriote clergy did not hold together in their resistance to the Latins. For in July 1229 the Patriarch Germanos wrote a second letter,[2] addressed this time to the Syrians as well as the Greeks. After a spirited denunciation of the unbridled ambition of the Roman Church, which had broken away from the decisions of the general Councils, and invented new dogmas, setting up the Pope in the place of Christ, he forbade the Cypriote clergy to have anything to do with those of their ecclesiastics

[1] So the anonymous writer quoted by Leo Allatius on the martyrs of 1231 (*de eccl. occ. et or. perp. cons.* 1648, lib. ii, col. 694; Sathas, Μεσ. Βιβλ. ii, p. πγ′; Hackett, p. 96; Papaïoannou, I, p. 132) says that to Greeks who conformed the Latins φιλονείκως διετίθεντο, which seems to mean treated them as friendly rivals.

[2] Reinhard, I, Beyl. pp. 29–37, no. 18 (from Cotelerius); Sathas, Μεσ. Βιβλ. II, pp. 14–19; Hackett, pp. 91 f.; Papaïoannou, I, pp. 126 f.

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who had yielded to the demands of the Latins, and ordered them to ignore any sentence of excommunication uttered by such seceders, since it would be without validity. All laymen, who are genuine children of the Catholic Church, should avoid contact with the priests who have yielded obedience to the Latins, nor enter their Churches, but rather worship in their own homes.

A few years later the judicial martyrdom of thirteen Greeks showed the stuff of which some of the Cypriotes were made. A long narrative of their sufferings has come down to us.[1] Two monks from Athos, John and Conon, who had come to Cyprus to share the sufferings of their fellow-believers, collected a small body of disciples, and finally settled at the monastery of Kantara. A Dominican friar, named Andrew, determined to root them out, went with a companion to the monastery and questioned them on the great point at issue between the two Churches, the use of leavened or unleavened bread in the Eucharist.[2] The Greeks maintained firmly that the use of unleavened bread had no scriptural authority, and that the Roman Church, which followed that practice, was heretical. They proposed that one of themselves and one of the Latins should go through the fire carrying the respective kinds; but Andrew declined the ordeal. Summoned before the Archbishop Eustorge, and maintaining their opinion, they were thrown into prison, where they languished for three, perhaps four, years, and suffered untold

[1] 'Narrative of the thirteen holy fathers burnt by the Latins in the island of Cyprus in the year 6739' (1231). Sathas, Μεσ. Βιβλ. II, pp. 20–39. The 13th-century Vatican MS (H. Stevenson, *Cod. MSS. gr. Palat. Bibl. Vat.* no. 367) contains a commemoration and a chronological note of the martyrdom. Sathas (*op. cit.* p. πγ'), miscalculating the date, puts this in 1221, and makes the Legate Pelagius responsible (in this error he is followed by Duckworth); that prelate has sins enough to his charge without this. The victims were kept in prison for one year after the first hearing, and then again after the second for three years (unless the writer's 'three years' include the first, as the account given by another writer seems to suggest). The persecution therefore cannot have begun later than 1229, since the martyrdom was in 1231. Hackett (pp. 93–5; Papaïoannou, I, pp. 128–31) gives the full story, many details of which I have omitted above. He points out that the narrative is not a contemporary record. On the proposed identification of one of the martyrs with Makarios Kalorites see *Rev. de l'Or. chrét.* XXII (1920/1), pp. 162 ff., (1922/3) pp. 144 ff. Duckworth (p. 23) notes that the name of the village just outside Nicosia, Ἅγιοι Ὁμολογητάδες, may commemorate the martyrdom.

[2] In a letter of 5 March 1231, Gregory IX enjoins on the Archbishop of Nicosia that he should excommunicate the Greek monks who persist in attacking the practice of the Latin Church in this matter. M.L., *H.* III, p. 630; *Reg. C.N.* no. 28.

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hardships, from which one of them, Theodoret, also from Athos, died. His body was dragged through the market-place and burnt. Eustorge referred the matter to Pope Gregory IX, who ordered him, if they persisted, to treat them as heretics. As Eustorge had to leave the island for a time,[1] he deputed Andrew to deal with them. They were brought before the Haute Cour, and the King authorized Andrew to do his pleasure with them. Professing that it was not in his power to inflict death himself, he handed them over to the civil authorities to execute the sentence, which he pronounced to be that they should be dragged at the tails of horses and mules through the market-place or the river, and then burnt. Another writer[2] gives further details of the last scene, and says that one of the Latin knights, seeing John standing in the flames, threw a log at him and knocked him down; also that only some were dragged through rough places, burning being reserved for the select few; and finally that when the fire died down, the bones, being found to be unconsumed, were mixed with the bones of unclean animals, so that they might not be preserved as relics, and were then consumed in a second fire.[3]

Although the *Narrative*, as it has come down to us, has evidently been written up for purposes of edification, there is no doubt that the martyrdom took place, and was not inferior in the refinements of its cruelty to many that have been recorded. The Chiote Greek, Leo Allatius, who lived in Rome from an early age and became Librarian of the Vatican in 1661, deals at length with the whole affair in a book published in 1648. A convert to the Roman Church, moving in papal circles, we need not be surprised that he is concerned to justify the punishment of the heretics; but it is to his credit as a scholar that he preserves the text of another account, which we have quoted above, giving details of the actual martyrdom. This independent account has not been written up like the long *Narrative*, and bears the stamp of

[1] He retired to Acre owing to the quarrel with Balian d'Ibelin, who was excommunicated for having married Échive de Montbéliard within the prohibited degrees, and who threatened to kill him. Mas Latrie, *Arch.* p. 221. Above, Ch. II, p. 104, n. 3.

[2] Quoted by Leo Allatius, *de eccl. occ. et or. perp. cons.* 1648, col. 694.

[3] So the bones of Eusebius, Nestabus and Zeno, martyrs of Gaza, were said to have been mixed with the bones of camels and asses; but, less careful than the Latins of Nicosia, the executioners did not burn them again, and the distinction between the bones was divinely revealed to a Christian woman. *AA.SS.*, 8 Sept. III, p. 257. There may be other cases in hagiographical literature.

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truth. Further, if any more confirmation were needed, the Patriarch Germanos, in his letter to Pope Gregory IX[1] in 1232, says that Cyprus has lately supplied, in its martyrs who have gone to their death through fire and water, the last thing that was required to fulfil the curse of the war between the two Churches.

From this statement, as well as from the anonymous writer previously cited (who gives the story of the Cyprus martyrs as something exceptional), it is evident that the persecution of the Greeks in Constantinople, Antioch, and elsewhere had never reached the same degree of ferocity. Robbery and insult—the long beards of the Greek clergy must have been an irresistible temptation to the Latins[2]—there had been, but bloodshed and burning at the stake had been reserved for the unfortunate island.

While utterly refusing to accept the point of view of Germanos, the Pope went so far as to appoint a commission of two Dominicans and two Franciscans to discuss the possibility of an agreement.[3] It is not known whether they considered the special case of Cyprus; but the commission, as was to be expected, effected nothing.

Among the numerous documents illustrating the difficulty of collecting the tithes from the barons, three more may be mentioned, from 1231 and 1237. The first is a letter from Gerold, Patriarch of Jerusalem and Legate of the Holy See,[4] quoting a previous letter of the Pope of 4 August 1228,[5] which insisted on the carrying out of the agreement. It shows that the Crown and barons had appealed once more to Rome against its provisions; but the Legate rejected the arguments of the

[1] Raynaldus, 1232, p. 71, § 48; Mansi, *Conc.* XXIII, col. 53; Sathas, ii, p. 44; Hackett, pp. 98 f.; Papaïoannou, I, pp. 134–5.

[2] Ἐξυβρισθέντες εἰς τὸ τοῦ πώγωνος σέμνωμα. *Letter of Germanos*, Sathas, p. 10. On the differences between the clean-shaven West and the bearded East, see, besides the article on Beards in *Cath. Encycl.* (Thurston), a useful note in T. A. Archer, *Crusade of Richard I*, pp. 383–5. Also Vol. I, p. 320, n. 3, and Hubert and La Monte, *The Crusade of Richard Lion-Heart by Ambroise*, p. 102, n. 47.

[3] Letter of 18 May 1233. Raynaldus, 1233, p. 75, §§ 1–3; Wadding, *Ann. Min.* II, pp. 320–3; vol. II, pp. 362–7 of the Quaracchi ed.; Potthast, no. 9198; Sathas, II, p. 47; Hackett, p. 99; Papaïoannou, I, p. 137. The commission went in 1234. Mansi on Raynaldus, *loc. cit.*

[4] 19 July 1231. M.L., *H.* III, p. 631; Röhricht, *Reg.* 1024; *Reg. C.N.* no. 29, cp. no. 30 (27 July). Similar letters to the King, Queen and barons, and to the Archbishop of Tyre. *Reg. C.N.* nos. 31–4.

[5] M.L., *H.* III, p. 625.

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barons, without waiting for the reply to the appeal to come from Rome, and declared that the agreement must be fulfilled. The second (of 1232)[1] records an arbitration (by Peter, Archbishop of Caesarea, and others) in the case between Archbishop Eustorge and his suffragans on the one side, and the King and barons on the other, regarding tithes which the barons refused to pay to the Church. The arbitrators decided against the King and barons who had defaulted, and charged them with a debt of 2000 marks, to be paid in five years; the King was further to pay at once 1000 white besants to be divided between the four sees; further sums were estimated on property he had recently acquired, and he was to give the estate of Mandia to the Archbishop and his see. To prevent evasion of the terms, copies of the arbitration, bearing the royal and episcopal seals, were to be exchanged between the parties. It is to be noted that all the arbitrators were heads of religious Orders or prelates of the Church. The third is a letter from Gregory IX to the King and Queen of Cyprus.[2] In addition to renewing the old complaint about the non-payment of tithes, it says that no notice is taken by the offenders, in this and other matters (such as marrying within the prohibited degrees),[3] of the excommunication by

[1] See above, p. 1044, n. 3.

[2] M.L., *H.* III, p. 641; Potthast, no. 10482; Auvray, *Reg. de Grég.* IX, 3950. 17 Nov. 1237.

[3] Balian d'Ibelin's marriage to Échive de Montbéliard in 1230 was the memorable example at the time, though he had probably been reconciled to Eustorge by 1236 or earlier. (See p. 104, n. 3.) In the narrow society of the Latins it was difficult to find a wife or husband outside the prohibited degrees. Significant are the words of the dispensation granted to Henry de Novaria and Mary Dagulier of Nicosia, 'pro eo quod arta et ab inimicis fidei orthodoxe circumvallata existit' and the people of the island are Greeks, they themselves are Catholics, and cannot easily find their equals outside the prohibited degrees (*Reg. Clem. V*, no. 7770, 26 April 1312). The same reason is given over and over again, as when dispensations were granted to Elixia, daughter of John Letor, lord of Pera (23 July 1295, *Reg. de Boniface*, VIII, no. 307), to Guy d'Ibelin and Isabel, daughter of Baldwin d'Ibelin (31 Dec. 1303, Benedict XI, *Registre*, ed. Grandjean no. 161), to Baldwin, son of Aygue de Bessan, and Mary, daughter of the late Hugh d'Ibelin (19 Sept. 1325, Mollat, *Jean XXII, Lettres comm.* no. 23432) and to Thomas de Montolif and Alice de S. Bertino (21 April 1327, *ibid.* no. 28468). So too Pope Clement VI was told in 1348 by Philip, Archbishop of Nicosia; and owing to the remoteness of Cyprus it was not easy to obtain dispensation from the Pope. Accordingly Clement granted Philip power to give the dispensation to six couples who applied for it (M.L., *H.* III, p. 740; *Reg. C.N.* no. 121). Another reason occasionally given is that the marriage would heal a family feud, such as was common in such re-

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which it is sought to punish them. Particularly it blames them for substituting for Latin bailies in their estates Greeks or Syrians hostile to the interests of the Latin Church. It is probable that there was a dearth of Latins competent for such posts.

It was not only the barons from whom the Latin Church required the payment of tithes. Thus, in 1230, the Patriarch Gerold was called upon and arbitrated between Bertrand de Thessy, Grand Master of the Hospitallers, and the Bishop and Chapter of Lemesos, and decided that the Order should pay annually 120 besants saracen to the Church of Lemesos in lieu of tithes on all lands held by the Order in that diocese.[1]

The quarrel with the Greek clergy continued.[2] By the Pope's instructions Eustorge issued orders to his suffragans that no recusant Greek ecclesiastic should be allowed to say mass, and summoned the Greek Archbishop and Bishops to hear these orders. They asked to be allowed to deliberate on the matter. But, when the day on which they were to give their answer arrived, it was found that they, accompanied by the other leading priests and monks, had left the island and fled to Armenia, taking with them all the treasures of their churches and monasteries. The Greek Archbishop threatened any of those who, remaining behind, should yield obedience. Gregory, on hearing this, directed Eustorge to fill the posts left vacant with Latins, and ordered the civil powers to lend him their support if necessary.[3]

The accession of Innocent IV in June 1243 fortunately brought about a change in the policy of the Holy See. In his first year, he wrote to the Patriarchs of Antioch and Jerusalem instructing them to see that the

stricted circles (so in the case of Baldwin and Mary just mentioned and in that of Peter de Mimars and Gille Chappe, widow of Raymond de Mimars, 4 March 1327, Mollat, *op. cit.* no. 28071). Such quarrels were apt to cause great disturbance in the Kingdom and even to lead to murders (Benedict XII, *Lettres comm.* ed. Vidal, nos. 3619, 3628, 8059). Cp. Mollat, *op. cit.* no. 10662, 13 Nov. 1319: matrimonio pro tranquillitate regni Cypri contrahendo. Anyone, it must be remembered, who happened to fall out with pope or prelate was liable to have the charge of incest raked up against him, unless he had taken the precaution to obtain dispensation.

[1] Delaville le Roulx, *Cartulaire*, II, p. 405, no. 1959, 13 May 1230.

[2] Hackett, p. 100; Papaïoannou, I, p. 137; Raynaldus, 1240, §§ 44–5 (p. 248). *Reg. C.N.* nos. 48–51 (letters of 9 April to the King, the Archbishop, and the Preceptor and Brethren of the Hospital in Cyprus, and of 13 April to the barons). The letter which Mas Latrie (*Arch.* p. 224, n. 93) attributes to Gregory IX and dates 25 March 1240 is that which he rightly prints (M.L., *H.* III, p. 618) as from Honorius III, 20 Jan. 1222 (*Reg. C.N.* no. 19; Potthast, no. 6773).

[3] Raynaldus, 1240, § 45; Potthast, no. 10868.

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Archbishop of Nicosia and his suffragans did not annoy the King.[1] In relations with the Greek Church, also, it would seem that conciliation was now to be tried instead of persecution. An early sign of this change may possibly be seen in the exemption granted in July 1243 to the Greek Basilian monastery of St Margaret de Agro, although from the wording it may seem that this house had yielded obedience to the Latin Archbishop,[2] so that no change of policy was involved. In 1247, however, Innocent in appointing the Franciscan Brother Laurence, his penitentiary, as his Legate for the East,[3] including Cyprus, enjoined him to protect the Greeks, of whatever denomination, from any molestation by the Latins. As regards Greek prelates who wish to return to the Roman obedience, those who have hitherto been subject to the Latin Patriarchs of Antioch or Jerusalem or other Latin bishops are to remain in the same position; but those who have not been so subject, are to be dependent directly on the Pope, and this category includes the Orthodox Patriarchs of Antioch and Jerusalem and their suffragans. They should go in person, or send representatives, to Rome, the papal chest, if necessary, paying their expenses.

The result was that a number of those who in 1240 had fled the island returned. A new Legate, Eudes de Châteauroux, Cardinal Bishop of Tusculum, arrived in Cyprus with Saint Louis in September 1248. His conciliatory behaviour—possibly he was encouraged therein by Saint Louis—seemed for a moment to heal the wounds that had been festering for half a century. The Greek Archbishop even, of his own accord, came and promised obedience and did homage to the Legate.

There seemed to be a prospect of a permanent settlement, but the differences between the two Churches were too wide. Encouraged by the friendly approach from the Roman side, the Greeks now formulated a series of demands, the granting of which would have meant the

[1] Berger, *Reg. d'Inn. IV*, no. 304.

[2] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 643 f.; Potthast, no. 11087; *Reg. C.N.* no. 52. The monastery is taken under Apostolic protection, and exempted from tithes on lands which it had possessed before the Lateran Council of 1215, and which it worked with its own hands, but not lands acquired since the Council. On 25 Jan. 1245 the Patriarch of Jerusalem was instructed to protect the monks from molestation (*Reg. C.N.* no. 55). On the other hand, on 23 July 1246, the Archbishop of Nicosia was instructed to reform certain Greek monasteries (Berger, *Reg. d'Inn. IV*, no. 2058).

[3] 5 June 1247. Hackett, p. 101; Papaïoannou, I, p. 138; Raynaldus, 1247, p. 378, §§ 30, 31; Berger, *Reg. d'Inn. IV*, no. 3047. Cp. *AA.SS.*, 19 March, III, p. 60. On Laurence da Orte see Golubovich, II, pp. 350–5.

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abrogation of the Famagusta decision, and the renunciation by the Latin Church in Cyprus of its claim to supremacy.[1] The fourteen original sees were to be re-established, the Greek clergy were to be dependent not on the Latins in Cyprus but directly on Rome, the Greek bishops were to recover their old jurisdiction, no restriction was to be placed on the taking of orders or becoming monks, the tithes now paid to the Latin bishops were to go back to the Greek, appeals from the decisions of Greek bishops were to go not to the Latins but to the Pope or his legate; these and other demands were set forth, including an amnesty for those who had been punished for disobedience.

The Pope instructed Eudes de Châteauroux to settle the question, in consultation with those on the spot, having regard to the saving of souls, healing the feud of the Church, and securing obedience to its head. The Cardinal's task, difficult enough, was not made easier by the new Latin Archbishop, Hugh of Fagiano (Eustorge had died on 28 April 1250).[2] Ignoring the injunction of Innocent IV to leave the Greeks in peace, Hugh commanded,[3] under pain of excommunication, all Greeks who had been confirmed and married according to the rites of the Churches of Rome and Nicosia to attend with their children in the Latin cathedral every Sunday, to confess there once a year to a Latin priest and take the sacrament according to the Latin rite, unless prevented by necessity. The same ban fell upon all Greek priests and deacons who refused obedience to the Churches of Rome and Nicosia.

How far this order was obeyed is doubtful. The Legate was certainly unwilling to support it.[4] There was a vacancy in the Greek archbishopric,

[1] Raynaldus, 1250, §§ 41–2 (p. 432); Hackett, pp. 102 f.; Papaïoannou, I, pp. 140 f. These details appear from the Pope's reply to Cardinal Eudes, dated 21 July 1250. Potthast, no. 14018; Berger, *Reg. d'Inn. IV*, t. II, no. 4769.

[2] Amadi, p. 200. He had gone to Damietta with St Louis. Hugh was elected and consecrated in his place, but not yet enthroned on 9 April 1251. The pallium was sent to him on 20 Dec. 1251. M.L., *Arch.* p. 232. On Hugh's episcopate see also M.L., *H.* I, pp. 355–8, 364, 369–71, 379–84.

[3] Mansi, *Conc.* XXVI, col. 336; Hackett, p. 104; Papaïoannou, I, p. 142. This was on Palm Sunday, 9 April 1251. Hugh's order was read again next year. All sorts of other offenders were excommunicated at the same time, from those who denied that the Roman Church was the head of all Churches, and those who deserted the religious habit for the world, to pirates and gamblers.

[4] He had again received orders on the disagreement between the two Churches in a letter from the Pope dated 17 Feb. 1254 (Potthast, no. 15241; Berger, *Reg. d'Inn. IV*, no. 7331).

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and the Greek suffragans were allowed to elect Germanos Pesimandros,[1] the choice being confirmed by Legate and Pope. Hugh being absent from the island, and his representatives protesting in vain, the Legate allowed Germanos to be consecrated by his suffragans, and accepted from him and from his suffragans, in the name of the Roman Church, a promise of obedience directly to the Roman Church, and further from the suffragans directly to Germanos as their metropolitan, the Church of Nicosia being ignored.[2] Hugh was baffled, and withdrew in disgust

[1] Permission to the Greek bishops to elect a successor to the metropolitan see, which had been empty for some time, was given as early as 20 Dec. 1251: M.L., *H.* II, p. 65; Potthast, no. 14445; Berger, *Reg. d'Inn. IV*, no. 5523; if there was any opposition the Legate was authorized by the Pope to decide without appeal, Berger, no. 5524. From a letter of Innocent IV, of 25 Feb. 1254 (Berger, no. 7332), it would appear that, the archbishopric being vacant, the Greek bishops *Ecclesiae Romanae devoti* had elected one George, a Greek clerk in minor orders. The Pope had refused to confirm the election as not being in canonical form; the Greeks had petitioned that either it might be confirmed when the candidate had been promoted to full orders, or they might be allowed to put up another fitting person. The Legate was instructed to confirm the election if canonical. Unless 'George' is identical with Germanos, which is unlikely, it would seem that he was not confirmed, and Germanos was chosen in his place. It is necessary to enquire which see was occupied by Germanos as Archbishop. In the *Constitutio Cypria* of 1260 he is at first described as 'Archbishop of Cyprus', and as being accompanied by three suffragans, Nibon of Solia, Joachim of Carpasia and Mathias of Lefkara. Now these three places, as we know, were the seats of the three Greek bishops in the dioceses of Nicosia, Famagusta and Lemesos. Since Joachim at Carpasia was over the Famagusta diocese, Germanos cannot have had that see. Paphos (with its Greek bishop's seat at Arsinoe) was vacant. By the same *Constitutio*, Nibon was transferred from Solia to that vacancy, and Germanos was given the see of Solia, and made free to reside there or in Nicosia at the Church of St Barnabas, which was attached to the see of Solia. Since Solia was quite a small and decaying place, it is probable that he preferred to live in Nicosia. But he could not properly be called 'Archbishop of Nicosia', and the mention of an *Archiepiscopus Nicosiensis* of the Greeks at the Council of Lyons in 1274 may be due to a mistake. Hackett suggests, indeed, that that archbishop was of Nicosia in Sicily (p. 310, n. 1; Papaïoannou, II, p. 75 n.). The report of the Council reads (Mansi, *Conc.* XXIV, col. 66): 'per eum [scil. patriarcham Graecorum] et Archiepiscopum Nicosiensem, et alios Graecos qui secum [i.e. with the Patriarch] venerant, et alios archiepiscopos, et abbates Graecos de regno Siciliae...'. This is far from proving that an archbishop of the Sicilian Nicosia is meant, even if there were evidence that that place ever was an archiepiscopal see. The R. archbishop of Nicosia who was authorized by Charles of Anjou on 14 Aug. 1278 to leave the port of Naples with his suite (*Arch. Stor. Ital.* ser. 4, vol. I, 1878, p. 429) was doubtless the Latin prelate, Ranulph, who had just been appointed to the see, 20 July 1278 (Nicolas III, *Registres*, no. 102).

[2] Raynaldus, 1260, p. 65, § 37; Mansi, *Conc.* XXIII, col. 1038.

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to his native Tuscany, not to return until after the death of King Henry. All he could do was to place the Kingdom under an interdict.[1]

Cardinal Eudes remained for some time in Cyprus. Numerous disputes between the two Churches on questions concerning sacraments, rites and ceremonies, were referred to the Pope, and his decisions were communicated by the Cardinal to the Greek bishops.[2] Innocent took the opportunity to reiterate his desire to tolerate the rites and usages of the Greeks who had returned to the Roman obedience, and renewed his injunctions that the Latin archbishop and bishops should not molest them.

Unfortunately, the Cardinal did not remain much longer in the island. Meanwhile, King Henry having died on 18 January 1253, Archbishop Hugh returned.[3] One of his earliest acts was to issue on 18 June 1253 two decrees, of which the first insisted on decent behaviour by lay-folk in church, while the second enjoined on the regular clergy not to seduce the people from attendance at the churches of the secular clergy, and

[1] Amadi, p. 202.

[2] Cherubinus, *Bull. Magn.* I, pp. 100 f.; Raynaldus, 1254, §§ 7–11; Reinhard, I, Beyl. pp. 49–53, no. 24; Mansi, *Conc.* XXIII, cols. 578–82; Potthast, no. 15265; Berger, *Reg. d'Inn. IV*, t. III, no. 7338 (6 March 1254). Hackett, pp. 105–12, expounds the decisions in detail (Papaïoannou, I, pp. 144–52). Here it is only necessary to mention that one of them (xxiii) insists on the Roman doctrine of Purgatory, which has never been admitted by the Eastern Church. Innocent's letter to the Cardinal insists that while the Legate is to expound the customs and rites to the Greek bishops, and cause them to be observed, the Greeks are not to be molested by the Latins. Cp. an earlier letter to the same effect, 17 Feb. 1254, M.L., *H.* II, p. 68; Potthast, no. 15241; Berger, no. 7331.

[3] And, says Amadi (1253, p. 202), 'reconciliò la terra', by raising the interdict.—Mas Latrie, *Arch.* p. 234, calls attention to a curious problem, raised by a letter of Innocent IV dated 30 March 1254 (Potthast, no. 15307; Berger, t. III, nos. 7393–6). It commits to the Patriarch of Antioch, in order to help him to repair the damage done by the Turcoman raiders, the Church of Nicosia and its revenues. But the Pope must have known that Archbishop Hugh had gone back to Cyprus long before. The letter, which was addressed in identical form to four different persons, might none the less have been misdated. But it may have been written under a misconception; for four months later (25 July 1254, Berger, no. 7873) the Pope orders merely that, since the Patriarch cannot live peaceably in his own place, he is to be provided with some other see in his patriarchate or in Cyprus, which he may hold together with his patriarchate. Later, Alexander IV (*Reg.* nos. 1175, 1176, 21 Feb. 1256) granted the Patriarch the revenues of Nimocium (Lemesos), which was vacant. On 9 Feb. (no. 1087) a tithe of all the Church revenues in Cyprus and the province of Antioch for three years was appropriated in aid of the fortification of Kossaïr.

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especially, on holy days, at the cathedral of Nicosia, the only parish church of the Latins in the capital.[1] But the Legate left Cyprus, and the death of Innocent IV also, on 7 December 1254, removed the last check on the Archbishop's zeal. It is not easy at this time to hold the balance between the two parties. To the Greeks, Hugh must have seemed a bigoted persecutor, whose little finger was thicker than the loins of his predecessor. To the Latins, he was a man of ardent piety and great simplicity of manners,[2] with a yearning for the monastic life, filled with a burning zeal to establish the true Catholic doctrine, to whom the existence of a rival archbishop of equal rank but heretical views, and what he must have regarded as a rabble of recusant clergy, was naturally intolerable. The impartial student must sympathise with the efforts of the civil authorities to keep the peace in what must have seemed to them a cat and dog fight, in which the two Archbishops bandied excommunications with each other. Their action shows that they thought Hugh's methods extreme to the point of danger. Finally, defeated by their moderation, he retired once more, probably not long after the publication of the bull of Anagni of 3 July 1260, and the decision to allow Germanos to retain his dignity and function until his death.

The immediate cause of his retirement from Cyprus was this decision in favour of Germanos, and that had resulted from an appeal by Germanos in person to Rome.[3] Hugh had summoned Germanos to answer certain charges against his administration of his diocese. Germanos declined to appear at the summons of one whom he regarded as not superior to himself in rank, and went with his three suffragans[4] to Rome to put the whole case before the Pope (Alexander IV, who had succeeded Innocent IV on 12 December 1254). Before leaving Cyprus, Germanos formally put himself and his Church under the protection of the Holy See; but this did not prevent Hugh from attacking his

[1] Mansi, *Conc.* XXVI, cols. 318–19; M.L. *Arch.* p. 234, n. 138. Vidimus by Matthew, Archbishop of Caesarea, 26 Oct. 1280: M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 348–9; Röhricht, *Reg.* 1437; *Reg. C.N.* no. 102.

[2] Mas Latrie, *Arch.* p. 237. For the other point of view, read Hackett.

[3] Raynaldus, 1260, pp. 65–6, §§ 36–9; Hackett, p. 113; Papaïoannou, I, p. 153. Taken from the *Constitutio Cypria* of 1260. (Mansi, *Conc.* XXIII, cols. 1037–1046; Potthast, no. 17910. In Mansi, col. 1038, for *Petri* read *Pelagii*.)

[4] These were 'Nibon de Solia, Joachim de Carpasio, Mathias de Lefchara, Graecarum sedium Cypri episcopi'. The name of the Bishop of Solia in the Greek versions of the *Constitutio* also appears as Nilon and Nikolaos.

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representatives in his absence, ejecting them with violence and endeavouring to seduce his flock from their obedience to him. Germanos had excommunicated various Latins; Hugh now tried to force the Greeks to annul these sentences, and himself excommunicated Germanos. The respect in which this ban was held and, at the same time, its futility have never been better illustrated.

Cardinal Eudes was back in Rome when Germanos arrived, and Alexander referred the dispute to him. Some proctors of Hugh, who were at Rome on other business, were summoned by the Pope to appear for their master. They attacked the validity of the election of Germanos (the electors having no right to elect him, and being themselves under excommunication at the time, as also were the persons who obtained from Rome permission to make the election), and they argued, from previous decisions ranging back to Celestine III, that there could not be more than one archbishop in the province.

The *Constitutio Cypria* or *Bulla Cypria* of Alexander IV, 3 July 1260,[1] laid the basis for the future of the constitution of the Greek Church in Cyprus, although it did not by any means put an end to the troubles. Its main provisions were as follows. It confirmed the limitation of the Greek sees to four, not more than the Latin sees, and covering the same areas; the Latin archbishop was to be the sole metropolitan (a temporary exception being made in favour of Germanos); and the Greek bishops were to be under his supervision, and to reside in the places previously assigned to them. New elections were to be made from among the ecclesiastics of the diocese in which the vacancy occurred, and confirmed by the Latin bishop of the diocese, who was to exact from the elected person an oath of obedience to the Roman Church and to the Latin archbishop in a prescribed form.[2] The Latin bishops were not to appoint

[1] Mansi, *Conc.* XXIII, cols. 1037–46; Reinhard, I, Beyl. pp. 53–60, no. 25; Hackett, pp. 114–23; Papaïoannou, I, pp. 154–64. On the various Greek versions see A. Palmieri in *Bessarione*, ser. II, vol. IX (1905), fasc. 82, pp. 141–9.

[2] The form for the Bishop of Solia runs thus (more or less as translated by Hackett, p. 115; Papaïoannou, I, p. 156): 'I ..., Bishop of Solia in the diocese of Nicosia, from this time forward will be faithful and obedient to Blessed Peter and the Holy Roman Church, and to my Lord N., Archbishop of Nicosia, and to his successors canonically appointed. I will not be privy to any plot or act, whereby they may lose life or limb, or suffer any loss. Any purpose, which they shall reveal to me, either personally, or by messenger or letter, I will not make known to anyone to their disadvantage. I will assist in defending and maintaining the supremacy (*papatum*) of the Roman

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to vacancies, unless the competent Greeks failed to do so; and only Greeks could be so appointed. In litigation between Greeks in the ecclesiastical courts, the Greek bishop was to decide, but reference might be made from him to the Latin bishop of the diocese, and from that bishop to the Latin archbishop. Mixed cases were to go before the Latin bishop. Both nationalities could appeal to Rome. The Greek bishops were allowed to have only one ecclesiastical court within the dioceses of their Latin ordinaries; but certain long-established courts administered by archdeacons and other dignitaries were excepted from this restriction.[1] Latin ordinaries were not to interfere with Greek bishops in the exercise of their recognized rights in regard to their co-religionists. But the Latin archbishop and bishops were to have the right of ecclesiastical censure of Greeks (as of Latins) for offences against the rights of themselves and their churches. The Greek bishops, abbots and priests were to attend the annual diocesan synods and accept their constitutions so far as compatible with their own Orthodox rites (provided that the latter were permitted by the Roman Church). They need not attend the Latin archbishop's provincial synod. The Latin bishops were to have the same privileges of visitation among the Greeks of their dioceses as all metropolitans had when visiting the dioceses of their suffragans. But the contributions to be exacted from the Greeks towards the costs of these visitations were carefully and specifically limited.[2] The right of the Latin clergy to tithes was confirmed, and no one was to be exempt from their payment.

Church and the primacy (*pontificatum*) of the Church of Nicosia and the ordinances of the Holy Fathers, against all men, without prejudice to my privileges. When summoned to the Synod I will attend, unless there be any canonical obstacle. The Legate of the Apostolic See, who has been certified to me, I will treat with honour both in his coming and in his going, and will aid him in all his requirements. So help me God and these God's Holy Gospels.'

[1] A codex of the marriage laws and procedure in the Greek episcopal court of Paphos-Arsinoe, is published by Sathas, Μεσ. Βιβλ. VI, pp. 515–85. Analysis of the first section (breach of contract of betrothal) in Zannetos, I, pp. 714–17. Probably each of the three other courts had a similar codex.—On the bearing of the *Constitutio Cypria* on mixed marriages, see Aimilianides in Κυπρ. Σπ. II, pp. 200 f. I have not had access to his τὸ οἰκογενειακὸν Δίκαιον ἐν Κύπρῳ ἐπὶ Φραγκοκρατίας (Leukosia, 1939).

[2] Details of the dues payable by the Greek Bishop of Solia on his consecration, and of his annual contributions in kind, to the Latin archbishop, vicar and canons of Nicosia, are preserved for the year 1547. M.L., *H.* III, pp. 538–9; Hackett, pp. 120–1; Papaïoannou, I, p. 162; *Reg. C.N.* no. 139.

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Special provisions were made in favour of Germanos,[1] who was evidently regarded with great consideration by the papal authorities. He was to retain his rank and title of archbishop for his lifetime, and to be completely independent of the Latin archbishop. After his death or resignation, no Greek archbishop was to be elected; the office was to be abolished. He was appointed, as we have seen (p. 1056, n. 1), to Solia, the bishop of which see normally, according to the organization of 1222, was also bishop of all the Greeks in the diocese of Nicosia. When in Nicosia he was allowed to reside in the church of St Barnabas, which was by the bull attached to the see of Solia. Later, Solia having fallen into ruin, the Greek archbishop probably came to reside permanently in the capital.[2]

Without prejudice to any rights over Greeks enjoyed, in virtue of this constitution, by the Latin archbishop as metropolitan, or by the Latin bishops as diocesans, Germanos was made completely independent of the Latin archbishop and bishops, who were robbed of all other authority over the Greeks. Germanos was to appoint to vacant Greek sees (subject to approval of the candidates by the Latin ordinaries); to conduct visitations of the Greeks, with the powers given by the canons to metropolitans; and he was not to suffer interference in such matters from the Latin prelates. Yet Germanos, although personally exempt from the jurisdiction of the Latin metropolitan, had to take the oath of obedience to him on being made Bishop of Solia; but this was an empty form, since the Latin metropolitan was not allowed to censure him or give him orders! On the other hand, the right of appeal by Greeks to the Latin prelates in the several dioceses remained (Germanos personally being again excepted, unless he himself desired to appeal to the metropolitan).

This curious compromise, with its various and confusing concessions to Germanos, was intolerable to Hugh of Fagiano; who once more, and for the last time, retired from Cyprus, going to put his case in person before the Pope.[3] But he kept his title of Archbishop of Nicosia, and continued to exercise his archiepiscopal powers even in

[1] He had been treated with some harshness by the Latin Archbishop; one of the Greek versions says the latter πολλὰς ἐπέφερε τὰς βαρύτητας, the Latin one softens to *nonnullis*. Palmieri, *loc. cit.*

[2] Cp. Kirmitses, Κυπρ. Σπ. IV, pp. 99–100, who thinks this may have been due to the influence of Helena Palaeologa.

[3] He was in Italy by 13 April 1264: M.L., *H.* III, p. 657, n. 1. See p. 1062, n. 3

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his retirement to the house of Augustinian Regular Canons which he founded at Rezzano in a Tuscan valley.[1] He died probably on 27 August 1267.[2]

The personal privileges granted to Germanos by the new Constitution are an indication of his importance in the eyes of the Holy See, whether because he was personally respected, or because it was considered desirable to disarm him. The main provisions of the Constitution left the Church of Cyprus very much where it had been before. Heresy, in the eyes of the Pope, was as rife as ever.[3] The Greek clergy who had conformed had been excommunicated by the recusants, their supplies cut off, their property destroyed, so that they even had to depend for their sustenance on the Archbishop. The civil power refused to help in the punishment of the Greeks and Syrians, the Bailie alleging that he could not touch the vassals of the crown without the consent of the Haute Cour. There was great danger, since the fall of the Latin Empire of Constantinople, lest the new Greek Emperor should profit by the discontent in Cyprus to make a descent on the island.

[1] See M.L., *Arch.* pp. 231, 237 f. He called it at first Episcopia, after the monastery (better known now as Bellapaïs) with which he had been closely connected from the time before his elevation to the archbishopric. This name was afterwards displaced by Nicosia.

[2] For the day of the month, see M.L., *Arch.* p. 242; the year is indicated by the date of the appointment of his successor (below, p. 1063, n. 1).

[3] Hackett, pp. 124–5. Papaïoannou, I, pp. 166–7. Jan. 3, 1263: Urban IV to the Archbishop, to extirpate heresy among the Greeks (*Reg. C.N.* no. 93). Same date, to Bailie, barons and nobles, to assist the Archbishop in suppression of heretic Greeks and Syrians (*ibid.* no. 94). 12 Jan. 1263, to the Bailie and barons: fear of a surprise attack by the new Greek Emperor on Cyprus, which he considers to belong to his Empire (M.L., *H.* III, pp. 653–5; Potthast, no. 18465; Guiraud, *Reg. d'Urbain IV*, t. II, no. 188). 23 Jan. to the Bailie: the conforming Greek clergy are being attacked by their own people; he should help the Archbishop to punish offending Greeks and Syrians (M.L., *H.* III, pp. 655–7; Potthast, no. 18476; *Reg. C.N.* no. 95). 13 April 1264: to the Bailie complaining that (as the Pope learns from the Archbishop, who has come in person to Italy) he has refused to help the Archbishop to enforce orthodoxy (alleging that he cannot act against his vassals without the consent of the Haute Cour), so that the Archbishop's excommunications are ineffective; if the Bailie does assist, he will receive the temporalities forfeited by excommunicates (Raynaldus, 1264, p. 153, § 66; Guiraud, *op. cit.* t. III, p. 250, no. 1656; *Reg. C.N.* no. 96). The Pope accuses certain of the clergy and laity of Nicosia of all sorts of crimes, open adultery, blasphemy, magical practices, games of chance, and even unnatural vice. Same date, to the Archbishop, on same subject (*Reg. C.N.* no. 97).

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Little is known of Hugh of Fagiano's immediate successor, who seems to have been one Giles, appointed in 1267,[1] or of his successor. After the death of Giles, the see remained vacant for a long time, until 1278. The Chapter quarrelled bitterly about the succession;[2] John of Angoulême, on whom a majority at last agreed, died before he could be confirmed; so did Bertrand, Dean of Nicosia, who was chosen in his place.[3] Finally Ranulph the Archdeacon was elected and confirmed by Nicolas III on 20 July 1278. The next Archbishop was probably Raphael,[4] who issued a Constitution, of which the date is not known, laying down instructions for the Greek clergy, their discipline, ritual and administration.[5] By his account, the Greek clergy were ignorant and slack: ignorant as to the canonical hours and masses; careless about confession and penance. Many Greeks and Syrians, if they confessed at all, did so to other than their own priests, or to recusants and heretics, and priests administered the sacrament to those who had not properly confessed. Monks were prone to wander from their monasteries, or to follow the ways of the laity, engaging in the chase or harbouring women.

In issuing this Constitution, which was to be read four times a year by the Greek bishops to clergy and laity, Raphael speaks of the Greek prelates as merely 'tolerated', whereas the Latin are *ordinati*.[6] Obviously

[1] Clement IV appointed Egidius, *sedis apost. capellanus*, to be Archbishop of Nicosia on 20 Sept. 1267 (*Reg. Clém. IV*, no. 528).

[2] The history of the dispute is given by Nicolas III, *Registres*, no. 102.

[3] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 660–2; *Arch.* p. 244; Röhricht, *Reg.* 1375; Hackett, p 542; Papaïoannou, III, p. 87; *Reg. C.N.* no. 101. Bertrand, Canon of Nicosia, was appointed Bishop of Famagusta by Clement IV on 1 Sept. 1268. The Pope then (*Reg. Clém. IV*, ed. Jordan, no. 715) instructs the Archbishop of Nicosia, if Bertrand declines, to find another fit person in consultation with the Chapter; if they cannot agree, he is to appoint an administrator of the temporalities, reserving the provision of the church to the Apostolic See. Bertrand seems to have refused, for when Archbishop elect in 1270 he is described as Dean of Nicosia, having been previously canon and vicar.

[4] M.L., *Arch.* pp. 244 f. Since his Constitution mentions no Greek archbishop, Germanos must have been out of the way, which dates it after the Council of Lyons in 1274, if the identification of the Archbishop of Nicosia present there is correct (above, p. 1056, n. 1). Ranulph, as we have seen (*ibid.*), was appointed in 1278, and was still in possession of the see on 26 Oct. 1280. By 1286 the see was vacant again. M.L., *ibid.* p. 245.

[5] Mansi, *Conc.* XXVI, cols. 322–35. Hackett, pp. 106–12 (Papaïoannou, I, pp. 145–52) gives various provisions of the Constitution in elucidation of the previous decisions of Innocent IV in 1254.

[6] Mansi, as above, col. 324.

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such a tone was not calculated to heal the chronic soreness; but there seems to have been no acute outbreak until 1313. We may therefore turn for a moment to the other side of the question, the condition of the Roman Church, which has been incidentally illuminated in the course of the preceding sketch. That Church, apart from the hostility of the Greeks, had to contend, externally, with the restraining influence of the Crown and barons, who, as already indicated, saw the unwisdom of alienating the subject people, even if it were possible, which it was not, to crush them altogether; and who were also affected in their pockets by the claims of the Church for tithes. The various attempts to settle the latter question, from the agreement of Lemesos in 1220 onwards, have already been mentioned. It was continually necessary to remind the Crown and barons of their duty to adhere to the agreement.[1] The Church had its internal difficulties, although details of the disputes are scarce. We have to wait until the next century for an open quarrel between Pope and Archbishop; but the Pope had occasionally to interfere on the side of those who had a grievance against the latter. One such intervention, which took place in 1252, arose out of the question of the prebends attached to the cathedral of Nicosia. In 1240 Gregory IX had confirmed the appointment of ten priests, five deacons, five subdeacons and ten acolytes, with revenues drawn from the property of the Church.[2] In 1249, however, the Legate Eudes de Châteauroux, in recommending various reforms (those concerning education will be mentioned later), criticized the establishment of the cathedral as too meagre for the amount of its revenues, and decided[3] that it should have at least twelve resident canons, seeing that in the old days, with smaller revenues, there had been as many as sixteen.[4] There was also to be a resident dean,[5] with the revenue of two canons, to rank next to the archbishop;

[1] Above, p. 1044, n. 3.

[2] 25 March 1240. M.L. *Doc. Nouv.* p. 345; *Reg. C.N.* no. 47.

[3] Labbé, *Conc.* XI, ii (1671), col. 2403, art. 10; M.L., *Arch.* p. 227.

[4] The number had gradually decreased, he says, owing to neglect. (This is not easily to be reconciled with the supposition that Eustorge, in 1240, was improving the position when he established ten canonries.) Canons who did not reside should not be paid, unless (in accordance with a decree of 10 March 1223, M.L., *H.* III, p. 622) they had licence from the archbishop, and the consent of the Chapter, to be absent for study, or were captives of some enemy, or were on business of the church or Chapter; if it was on a case against the archbishop, only the consent of the Chapter should be necessary.

[5] Labbé, *loc. cit.* col. 2402, art. 9.

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and the number of parishes should be increased in all the dioceses. It seems that these proposals, or the reflexions which they cast on Eustorge's administration, caused him great offence; for it is probable that the renewal of the general immunity from interference with the archbishop by excommunication, interdict or suspension, which Innocent IV granted to him in 1249,[1] must have been occasioned by an appeal by Eustorge against the strictures of the Legate. There was more trouble in 1252, when that masterful prelate, Hugh of Fagiano, seems to have quarrelled with the Chapter of Nicosia over the continuance of the benefices which his predecessor Eustorge had established, and Innocent IV ordered the Bishops of Paphos and Lemesos to enquire into the matter, giving them power to coerce the Archbishop, overriding any immunities which he might enjoy.[2] The legate Eudes de Châteauroux was also authorized to intervene. The Chapter had given their oath to Eustorge that they would never accept any archbishop who would not continue these benefices; if Hugh could not be forced to continue them, the Chapter was to be released from its oath. The result of the intervention is not known.

Eustorge himself in 1218 had had trouble with one of his suffragans, the Bishop of Famagusta, whom he had evidently treated with some harshness, for Honorius III had to write to the Legate Pelagius against the Archbishop, who was seriously molesting the Bishop.[3] It would seem also that the great abbey of Bellapaïs was apt to behave with less than due deference to the Primate. In 1232 Gregory IX had to point out to the Abbot and Chapter that they owed obedience to the Archbishop.[4] The Apostolic Legate, the Patriarch of Antioch, with the Archbishop of Apamea and a canon of Antioch, was appointed judge in the case. Nearly three hundred years later, in 1510, the same question came up, and the civil authorities (the Venetian lieutenant and counsellors) tried it and decided in favour of the Church. But in 1547, again sitting on the case, the Lieutenant decided, as one would suppose correctly, that he was not competent, and referred it to the apostolic judge, the Bishop of Famagusta.[5]

[1] 26 Feb. 1249. M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 345–6; *Arch.* p. 228; *Reg. C.N.* no. 64.

[2] *Reg. C.N.* nos. 74, 75, 76, 77; M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 347–8.

[3] 13 July 1218. M.L., *H.* II, p. 38. The subject of the dispute is not known.

[4] 9 April 1232. M.L., *H.* III, pp. 632–3; Potthast, no. 8917; Röhricht, *Reg.* 1035; *Reg. C.N.* no. 35.

[5] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 513, 537; *Reg. C.N.* nos. 137, 138.

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The Archbishop was liable to frequent interference from other ecclesiastics of high rank. So much so, that he had to seek immunity from the Pope. In 1233, Gregory IX (in forbidding the Patriarchs of Antioch and Jerusalem to poach on each other's legatine preserves to the scandal of the Church) exempted Cyprus from both, so far as legatine powers were concerned.[1] In 1245, Innocent IV granted Eustorge immunity for five years (renewed in 1249) from suspension, excommunication or interdict by any legate or sublegate or other papal official without special order from the Pope.[2] The high status of the abbey of Bellapaïs is indicated by the fact that letters announcing this immunity were sent to the Abbot,[3] who was warned not to allow anyone to molest the Archbishop contrary to this grant of immunity.[4]

Other immunities granted to Eustorge show that legates or other authorities might try to force him to appoint to benefices persons of whom he did not approve, or summon him out of the island at an awkward time.[5]

The Latin patriarchs were indeed only too ready to interfere in the affairs of the island Church. The Latin Church in the island, of course, had no right to the autocephaly which was the boast of the Greeks,[6] as frequent reference of disputes to ecclesiastical judges from Syria and Palestine shows. But the degree to which poaching went on is illustrated in 1291, when it appears, from a complaint of Archbishop John of Ancona,[7] that the vicar of the Patriarch of Jerusalem had been trying cases which belonged to the competence of the Archbishop, and had been making visitations[8] in the diocese of Nicosia, with the result that

[1] *Reg. Grég. IX*, no. 1379 (10 June 1233).

[2] M.L., *H.* III, p. 645; Potthast, no. 11761; *Reg. C.N.* nos, 56, 57 (July, 1245); M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 345; *Reg. C.N.* no. 64 (26 Feb. 1249); *Reg. C.N.* no. 65 (23 Dec. 1250).

[3] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 346; *Reg. C.N.* nos. 67–9.

[4] As we have seen in the case of Hugh of Fagiano, it was easy for the Pope, when an archbishop was troublesome, to decide that his immunities were not to stand in the way of investigation.

[5] *Reg. C.N.* nos. 60, 61.

[6] It is amusing to find that the Latin Archbishop, Victor Marcello, in 1481, in denying the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Jerusalem, 'coolly transfers to his own communion privileges conferred upon the Orthodox rival, which it had dispossessed' (Hackett, p. 477, n. 1; Papaïoannou, III, p. 13, n. 28).

[7] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 349; *Reg. C.N.* no. 104; Hackett, p. 477; Papaïoannou, III, pp. 13–14.

[8] So too in 1267 the Patriarch of Jerusalem made a visitation of the churches in Cyprus. Above, Ch. III, p. 159.

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the Archbishop's people had acquired the habit of frivolously appealing to the vicar or the Patriarch, in scorn of the Archbishop, who was in consequence considerably impoverished.[1] The Patriarch had refused to interfere; further he had extorted the repayment of a loan which had been made, it was alleged, to the Archbishop's predecessor Ranulph, but had been embezzled by the Archdeacon of Nicosia. Other grievances are detailed, and the Patriarch is ordered to see that they are remedied.

Archbishop John of Ancona seems to have been the first to call himself, in 1292, 'Archbishop by the grace of God and of the Apostolic See'. The last years of the thirteenth century saw the innovation by which the Holy See reserved to itself the right of nomination of a certain number of bishops. The new formula is the recognition of this right. John of Ancona was the first of the archbishops of Nicosia to be nominated directly by the Pope, though with the assent of the Chapter.[2] As a matter of fact, the Chapter had not been able to agree between two candidates. One of these declined the see; the other, Henry de Giblet, Archdeacon of Nicosia and Chancellor of Cyprus, accepted it, but could not obtain ratification and retired. Nicolas IV thereupon nominated the Franciscan, John Turco, in 1288.

The Church and the monasteries in the thirteenth century were the only institutions in Cyprus which provided for the education of the people. The Oecumenical Council of 1215 prescribed the establishment of free schools in connexion with cathedral churches. It appears, however, that nothing was done in Cyprus at the time to carry out this order.[3] For in 1248 the Legate, Eudes de Châteauroux, after a visitation of the churches of Cyprus, severely criticized the neglect of the decisions of the Council on the instruction of the faithful and the elimination of ignorance.[4] The Archbishop of Nicosia was ordered to open two free schools in his cathedral, one elementary, for the faculty of grammar, the other for the teaching of theology. Grammar schools were also to be established in the suffragan churches at Paphos, Lemesos and Famagusta.

[1] We may infer from this that a great part of the revenue of the see must have come from court fees.

[2] M.L., *Arch.* p. 223, n. 83; Hackett, p. 543; Papaïoannou, III, p. 88. On the significance of the innovation, as marking the increasing dependence of the bishops on the Holy See, cp. F. Rocquain, *La Papauté au Moyen Âge* (Paris, 1881), p. 216.

[3] M.L., *Arch.* p. 227.

[4] Labbé, *Conc.* XI (ii), col. 2401, art. 2.

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It is hardly a mere coincidence that about this time George (afterwards called Gregory) of Cyprus, the future Patriarch of Constantinople, was sent to school at Nicosia, which was supposed to offer better opportunities for education than he could obtain elsewhere.[1] But he was sadly disappointed, for even here, among the Greeks, there were no teachers of anything more than the rudiments.[2] He therefore went to a 'Roman'[3] (i.e. Roman Catholic) school, where the instruction was in the original Latin language, 'a strange and bastard tongue'. Among the subjects taught was the logic of Aristotle, of which, owing to the language difficulty, he could learn but the merest elements. He went home again disgusted with his lack of progress, when he was fifteen years old.

The moral standard of the Latin clergy and religious Orders in Cyprus was probably about the same as elsewhere, although degeneration similar to that which the records attribute in Syria to the effect of residence in that pleasant climate may have extended to Cyprus. The historian of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus has collected with some zest the evidence from official and unofficial sources for the open licentiousness of the representatives of the Catholic religion.[4] There can

[1] Migne, *P.G.* 142, col. 21; W. La Meere, *La tradition manuscrite de la correspondance de Grégoire de Chypre* (Inst. Belge de Rome), 1937, pp. 176–9. He was at first educated at home by his parents until it was necessary for him to go to a grammar school (ἕως αὐτὸν ἔδει φοιτᾶν ἐς γραμματιστῶν). When he had passed this elementary stage, which was at a quite early age (ἐν πάνυ νέᾳ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ), since he showed a natural capacity for learning, εἰς τὴν Καλλινικησέων πλείονος παιδεύσεως ἕνεκεν πέμπεται. (For Kallinikesis, see Vol. I, p. 264.) Gregory was born about 1240, see notes in *P.G. ad loc.* and B. A. Müller in Pauly-Wissowa, *R.E.* VII, 1852.

[2] This was doubtless due to the reduction of the resources and activities of the Orthodox Church; but for the assertion (Kl. Karnapas, Ἀνέκδοτα Κυπριακὰ Ἔγγραφα, Famagusta, 1904, p. 19) that the Franks suppressed such schools there seems to be no foundation.

[3] παιδευτήρια Ῥωμαίων, where the latter word evidently does not mean Greek, like Ῥωμαϊκός. Gregory by ἡ πάτριος Λατίνων φωνή means the original Latin language. Without the adjective, ἡ Λατίνων φωνή would mean a Western vernacular. This interpretation is due to Dr Wittek.

[4] Hackett, pp. 510–21; Papaïoannou, III, 51–62. Attempts (such as that made in 1223) to suppress concubinage were ineffective, as is clear from Sagredo's report in 1562 (M.L., *H.* III, p. 544). Mas Latrie nevertheless insists on the 'purity of morals and edifying conduct of the Franco-Cypriote clergy during the four hundred years of the Lusignan and Venetian domination'. With this we may contrast the view of Zannetos (I, p. 709), who has no doubt that the corruption was introduced by the Latin clergy, who communicated it to the Cypriotes.

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be no doubt that, even from the beginning, there was much need for reform. And it cannot be denied that the Greek clergy and monks, quite apart from their generally admitted faults of bigotry and violence, were also subject to the reproach of immorality. There is evidence to this effect in occasional accusations brought against them in the course of the innumerable charges which were levelled against their heretical beliefs and the violence with which it was sometimes attempted to enforce them. Archbishop Raphael, as we have seen (p. 1063), accuses them of ignorance and slackness, and the monks of something like immorality, and the charges made by Urban IV in 1264 (above, p. 1062, n. 3) are much more serious. Nevertheless on the whole, the Greek Church comes slightly the better out of the comparison; although, if we are to give even partial credit to the sweeping denunciation of the morals of the clergy uttered by Bryennios in 1412, they degenerated to such a degree that there was nothing to choose between them and the Latins.

Returning, with the last years of the thirteenth century, to the history of the two Churches, from the regular chronicle of which we have digressed, we find the uneasy relations described in the preceding pages persisting. But many years of Latin domination had reduced the Greeks to an attitude of sullen compliance. Only occasionally did their hatred express itself in an open riot. But all attempts to bring about agreement in creed and ritual were no more than superficially successful.

The later years of John Turco of Ancona's tenure of the see of Nicosia had been disturbed, from 1291 to 1295, by a quarrel with his Archdeacon, Henry de Giblet. Henry had been disappointed in his expectation of the see, and had since been on bad terms with the successful candidate. It may have been this quarrel which led to the translation of John to Torre in Sardinia in 1295. In 1296 the Pope restored Henry to his archidiaconate and other benefices of which John had deprived him.[1]

Boniface VIII made an unfortunate choice when he promoted Gerard, Dean of Langres, to the archbishopric in 1295.[2] In the first

[1] *Reg. de Boniface VIII*, no. 1317, 1 Sept.

[2] 24 April 1295. Digard, etc., *Reg. de Boniface VIII*, no. 99. Golubovich, II, p. 448. [1296, 4 March, in this work, as the date of the translation of John to Torre in Sardinia, seems to be a misprint for 1295.] Amadi (p. 233) has 1294. M.L., *Arch.* p. 250, shows conclusively that it could not have been before 1295. (Amadi usually begins the year

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place, Gerard did not go out to Cyprus until 1297, and then stayed there but two years.[1] Returning to the West, he openly took the side of Philip the Fair against the Pope, and contemptuously ignored Boniface's order that he should return to his see.[2] It is curious, in view of the violent temper of this Pope, that Gerard was only suspended (on 15 August 1303) from the administration of his see, but not deprived of his title.[3] He never returned to Cyprus; functions which should have been performed by the Archbishop, such as presiding at the examination of the Templars, were, as we have seen, entrusted to others—the Bishop of Lemesos, or the vicar, the archdeacon or the cantor of Nicosia. Nevertheless, bulls relating to the Council of Vienne, at which decisions were taken against the Templars, were addressed to him and his suffragans of Paphos and Lemesos. It has been thought possible that, like them, he attended the Council at which, on 3 April 1312, the suppression of the Order was announced. But he must have been dead before that date.[4]

on 1 March.) In the *Gestes des Chiprois* (549–50) the promotion is also mentioned, along with the translation of John Turco, under 1294. Expecting Gerard to proceed to his see, the Pope on 27 Oct. 1295 ordered him to proceed against the canons and priests of the Cathedral Church of Lefkara and others in Cyprus who were heretics or suspected of heresy, and imprison them. *Reg. de Bon. VIII*, no. 613.

[1] Amadi and the *Gestes* both say that Gerard spent only two years in Cyprus, and then went overseas. That he was in Cyprus on 1 May 1297 is shown by the agreement (wrongly dated 1287 in the Cartulary of St Sophia, see M.L., *Arch.* p. 250 and *Reg. C.N.* no. 107) between him and John de Verny, about land situated between Agridi and Ornithi. A bull of 10 June 1299 shows that he was then still there (Digard, etc., *Reg. de Bon. VIII*, nos. 3060–2).

[2] *Reg. de Bon. VIII*, no. 5385 (15 Aug. 1303): Gerard suspended from the administration of the see.

[3] As Boase observes (*Boniface VIII*, p. 336), the Pope at this time was acting with considerable restraint.

[4] For on 10 May 1312 Clement V (*Reg. Clem. V*, An. 7, no. 8013) states that Gerard, Archbishop of Nicosia, being dead, some of the Chapter chose Henry, Archdeacon of Nicosia, others Guy, Bishop of Famagusta. Henry (who is presumably Henry de Giblet, who had already once been disappointed in his ambition, twenty years before) went to Rome in person, Guy did nothing. The Pope, not on personal grounds, but for other reasons, rejected both candidates and, taking the provision into his own hands, appointed John, formerly Archbishop of Pisa. Thus, by 10 May 1312, there had been time for the news of Gerard's death to reach Cyprus, for the Chapter to vote on his successor, and for one of the candidates to reach the West. It is evident that the date 26 Feb. 1315, which M.L., *Arch.* p. 254, gives as the date of Gerard's *obit* on the authority of the Martyrology of St Lazare, is three years too late.

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An episode in the history of the see of Famagusta, falling during this period, may be mentioned here. The Bishop Guy d'Ibelin, on his death in 1308, left in trust with his bankers the sum of 70,000 besants, to be spent on the building of the cathedral of St Nicolas as his successor and the Chapter should decide. At the instance of the Regent, the Chapter elected in his place Antony Saurano, the treasurer. This person, though he survived his election but a year, extracted from his predecessor's trustees 20,000 besants, and sold the greater part of the church plate, doing what he would with the proceeds. It was said that had he lived longer the bishopric would have been bankrupt, and the building of the church would have come to a stop.[1]

If Gerard was little concerned with the history of Cyprus, neither was his successor, the Dominican, John del Conte, a noble Roman of the family of Polo, in any hurry to repair to his post. Appointed on or before 10 May 1312, and ordered by John XXII at some date in his second year (therefore 1317–18)[2] to betake himself within one month to his church 'on the confines of the Hagarene nation', he did not arrive at Famagusta until 31 August 1319.[3] He entered Nicosia on 6 September. During his absence the see was administered first by Peter d'Erlant, Bishop of Lemesos, who had been appointed to this office in 1308, and later by the Legate, Peter de Plaine-Cassagne.[4]

The Legate found plenty of matters calling for reform in the Catholic Church. At a synod held at Nicosia on 15 June 1313,[5] he condemned the laziness of the clergy, ordered them always to wear the clerical habit, to engage in no occupations improper to their status, to show devoutness in church, and generally to behave themselves decently. He made fresh regulations regarding confession and the celebration of

[1] Amadi, p. 291; Fl. Bustron, p. 172; Hackett, pp. 579 f.; Papaïoannou, III, p. 126. Amadi says that work was begun in April. But the building was actually being constructed as early as 1300. Enlart, I, pp. 268 f.; Jeffery, *Hist. Mon.* p. 117.

[2] Mollat, *Jean XXII, Lettres Comm.* no. 8356.

[3] Amadi, p. 400.

[4] The Legate (on whose career see especially Golubovich, III, pp. 125–53) died on 6 Feb. 1318. But he had long since ceased to administer Nicosia, and is not heard of in Cyprus after 15 June 1315. On 25 June 1317 John XXII directed that the agreement for three years between Cardinal James Colonna, to whom Clement V (sometime between 1312 and 1316) had assigned half of all the revenues of the see of Nicosia (5000 gold florins), and John, Archbishop of Nicosia, should be observed. Mollat, nos. 4174–5.

[5] Mansi, *Conc.* XXVI, cols. 356–62; Labbé, *Conc.* (1671), XI, ii, cols. 2418 f.

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mass. It should be the duty of the clergy to maintain the faith and moral standard of the Catholics. They were to take proper care of church books and furniture, and build fine churches. His orders on the education of the clergy are revealing. He says all clerks are to learn to read currently, if they do not already know how to do so, and to sing, and grammar; that they may at any rate know and understand literally the general sense of what they say and hear in church, to differentiate them from laymen, so that the priest may not become like the people, a mere senseless image (*sculptae imaginis idiota*).

One of the outbreaks of the Greeks was directed against this Legate.[1] Nothing is known of its real cause, except that the Greek bishops had had some difference with him. They came to Nicosia and went to the Archbishop's palace to speak with him. Seeing that they were being followed by a mob of Greeks, who had got the idea that the Legate intended to insult them, they turned back, presumably to avoid a disturbance. The mob, however, went on, forced their way into the palace and, unable to find the Legate, tried to burn it down. They were dispersed by the Viscount, and it was forbidden to enter the courtyard on pain of losing a hand and a foot. The ringleaders were put in prison, but released on the ground that they had acted in ignorance. The Greek bishops were also confined for a time. Without speculating on the actual reason for the excitement of the mob,[2] we may agree that the incident shows how easily the latent hostility of the Greeks could burst into flame.

The Archbishop John del Conte has left a favourable memory by his benefactions to the Church and by his charities. But that he was not exempt from the Latin tendency to harsh treatment of the Orthodox Greeks is shown by the affair of Germanos, Abbot of St George of Mangana.[3] It appears that the Archbishop had ejected Germanos from

[1] On 1 May 1314, Amadi, pp. 395 f. (1 May 1313 according to Fl. Bustron, p. 247); Hackett, p. 126; Papaïoannou, I, pp. 168–9; Zannetos, I, pp. 755 f.

[2] Zannetos is puzzled to know why the bishops turned back; what is suggested in the text is a sufficient reason. The release of the prisoners, in the opinion of Golubovich (III, p. 145), is a testimony to the mildness and prudence of the Legate.

[3] The letters of John XXII relating to this affair, of which nothing is otherwise known, are in Mollat, nos. 15785 (8 July 1322); 15991–3 (21 Aug.); 25114–15 (27 April 1326); 25120 (28 April); 25309 (15 May); 40736 (21 March 1328); and E. Rey, *Recherches géog. et hist. sur la domination des Latins en Orient* (1877), p. 62 (29 April 1326). This episode shows that the monastery was important long before the time of Helena Palaeologa, who is supposed to have founded it about 1453 (Hackett, p. 361).

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the abbey, and with his servants had seized all the Abbot's goods, utensils and furniture (valued at 46 gold florins), as well as a sum in money of 222 gold florins. He had also caused Leo V of Armenia to admit the monk Macharios of Mangana, an adversary of Germanos, as administrator to the monastery of St George near Lambron,[1] which belonged to the abbey of Mangana. John XXII in 1322 ordered that Germanos should be restored, and that the Legate, Peter de Plaine-Cassagne, should enquire into the whole affair; and he also wrote to King Henry II enjoining him to protect Germanos and his monastery. In this connexion there is an indication that Leo, Bishop of Solia,[2] had been involved in a piece of sharp practice in favour of a nephew. Four years later (1326) we find that little or nothing had been done, for the Pope ordered the Bishop of Famagusta and the Abbot of Holy Cross (Stavrovouni) to restore the seized property and money, since Germanos had appealed to Rome. By the sentence of Peter, Bishop of Palestrina, given on this appeal in the Roman curia, he was to be reinstated, and the Bishop and Abbot above-named were instructed to render to him an account of the administration of the property of his abbey, which had been committed by the Archbishop to two monks (Dionysios and Païsios) of another house, and to compensate him for the damage which he had suffered. The Bishops of Paphos, Lemesos, and Famagusta were appointed judges conservators for him and his abbey for five years. King Hugh was also informed that Germanos, having been reinstated by a definitive judgement of the curia, should be maintained and protected in his rights. As to the monastery of St George near Lambron, when the Tatars invaded Armenia, Macharios had taken away all the treasures, and Leo had conferred the monastery on some outsiders. The Pope now desired the King to restore it to Mangana. Two years later, in March 1328, the affair had advanced another stage. The Bishops of Paphos and Famagusta had expelled Païsios from the room which he used to occupy at the abbey, taken away his account books and kept them, and declined to allow his expenses to the time of rendering his account. The Dean and Cantor of Nicosia were ordered to do him justice.

[1] Ad portum de Lambro prope civitatem Tarcen. See Alishan, *Sissouan*, p. 116.

[2] He is to be added to Hackett's list of the Orthodox bishops, p. 324 (Papaïoannou, II, p. 97). In 1318 he and another Greek bishop, Lemanos de Lostara (Lefkara ?), were imprisoned by the Patriarch of Jerusalem (Mollat, *Jean XXII, Lettres comm.* 8679, 28 Nov. 1318). In 1321 the Pope ordered that he should have a pension from the funds of the abbey of Mangana (*ibid.* 13737).

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Here the records of this affair come to an end. It is clear that the interference of the Archbishop was occasioned by intestinal quarrels in the monastery; but it is equally clear that he and his agents, in the Pope's opinion, had acted with a very high hand. Nor did the bishops who were called in to remedy the trouble behave as they should have behaved to Païsios.

Although John XXII was eager to see justice done in a scandalous case such as this, he was none the less determined to suppress heresy. Writing in 1326[1] to Raymond, Patriarch of Jerusalem, he enjoins him to extirpate heresy among the Jacobites and Nestorians and the Orthodox Greeks. Some he accuses of the Monophysite heresy, others of denying the existence of Purgatory and Hell (although maintaining that the souls of both sinners and saints do not go to their allotted places until the Day of Judgement), of refusing to partake of the consecrated element unless brought from Constantinople, and even of giving it as medicine to their beasts. The Patriarch is given full powers against these heretics, and the King is asked to support him.

Archbishop John concerned himself actively with the discipline of the Church, in Constitutions issued almost annually from 1320 to 1325.[2] His benefactions to his cathedral were extensive.[3] The church was so far advanced that he consecrated it on 4 November 1326. A few of his gifts may be mentioned. He built a chapel dedicated to St Thomas Aquinas, and also the Galilee or entrance porch, as far as the vaulting; that is, the whole of the porch as it exists, for it never had an upper story. He decorated with paintings three bays of the nave and the chapel of St Thomas, as also the six columns round the high altar. Among the ornaments which he gave to the church special mention is made of the great silk tapestry with the scene of the Transfiguration,[4] which was hung in the middle of the church on feast-days. He founded three benefices, for a priest, a deacon and a sub-deacon. His charities were numerous. We have seen how he succoured those who suffered in the inundation of 1330 (p. 306); many and large were his gifts to young women as marriage-portions, and to poor widows and orphans.

[1] 1 Oct. 1326. Raynaldus, 1326, p. 330, § 28; Hackett, p. 127; Papaïoannou, 1, p. 169.

[2] M.L., *Arch.* pp. 259 f.

[3] Amadi, pp. 405 f.; Fl. Bustron, p. 255; Enlart, 1, p. 85.

[4] Which seems to have had some special interest for him, since, as Mas Latrie observes, he used it also on his seal.

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Among all these pious works, it is not to be omitted that he made the Jews and Jewesses wear a yellow sign on their heads.[1]

The many charities for which he made himself responsible left him a poor man. Indeed the entry in the Dominican register of S. Maria Novella in Florence, recording his death on 1 August 1332, says that of the 25,000 gold florins which he had from the revenues of his see he kept nothing for himself, but gave all to the poor and to the mendicant friars, taking no thought for the morrow.[2]

But the work for which the historian of Cyprus owes him a special debt is the drawing up of the Cartulary of St Sophia. It was completed in 1322, and then contained 105 documents, to which additions came to be made from time to time.[3] The Cartulary is of essential importance for the history of the Church of Cyprus.

Archbishop John was much in the counsels of Kings Henry II and Hugh IV. He was with the former at the time of his death at Strovilos. His importance in the diplomatic field is shown by the fact that he drafted the treaty with Genoa in 1328, which is actually described as

[1] The imposition of a distinguishing mark on the Jews was decreed by the Lateran Council, 30 Nov. 1215, the idea being probably borrowed from the Moslems (H. Graetz, *Hist. des Juifs*, tr. M. Bloch, IV, pp. 167–8). It was widely adopted; among later measures may be mentioned the yellow circle which the Jews in Venice were ordered in 1395 to wear on their breasts (Molmenti, *Venice: Middle Ages*, tr. H. F. Brown, I, p. 194), and those of Florence to wear in their caps in 1567 (Lapini, *Diario*, ed. Corazzini, p. 157); or, to come down to the present time, the yellow six-pointed 'star of David' enforced on Jews by their modern persecutors. Elias of Pesaro in 1563 (Cobham, *Exc. Cypr.* p. 76) says that two Jewish doctors in Famagusta wore a black hat with a small yellow badge, a privilege allowed to no other Jews, who were all obliged to wear, as at Venice, a head-covering entirely of yellow. For similar distinction at Corfù and Chios, see Miller (*Essays*, pp. 211, 313), who quotes an ordinance of 1532 as saying that it was a substitute for the expensive custom of stoning them, which did so much damage to houses. The distinction at Chios was a yellow cap (Hieron. Giustiniani, *Hist. of Chios*, ed. Argenti, p. 65, quoting Martin Crusius). For the distinguishing badge and garb of Jews from 1600 to 1840, see A. Cohen, *An Anglo-Jewish Scrapbook* (1943), pp. 249–59. To his references add Peter Teixeira, *Travels* (Hakluyt Soc., p. 135) who describes the garb in Cyprus in 1605.

[2] M.L., *Arch.* p. 261, from Mattei, *Hist. eccl. Pis.* II, p. 53 n. As to his wealth, it is to be noted that at the beginning of his tenure of the see the total revenue was only 10,000 florins (above, p. 1071, n. 4). In the middle of the 15th cent. it was 12,000 fl. (M.L., *Arch.* p. 289; George Bustron, p. 450); in the middle of the 16th, it was 13,000 fl. (below, p. 1099). Either then 25,000 fl. (if it means annual revenue) is a wild exaggeration, or more than half of it was his personal wealth.

[3] See Note on Authorities, p. 1145.

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'the treaty of the Reverend Father in Christ, Lord John, Archbishop of Nicosia'.

John was succeeded by the Franciscan, Elias de Nabinaux,[1] who was nominated by John XXII on 16 November 1332.[2] When on 12 July 1342 he was created Patriarch of Jerusalem in succession to Peter de la Palu, he ceased to hold the title of Archbishop, but was given the spiritual and temporal administration of the see *in commendam*, since it was not possible to draw any revenues from Jerusalem. On 22 September of the same year he was promoted Cardinal of S. Vitale, and ceased to draw the revenues of Nicosia either then or, soon afterwards, when (before 30 August 1344) Philip de Chambarlhac was translated to that see from Nice.

The Constitutions of this Archbishop stress the necessity of the reform of discipline. As he himself says, on the visitation of his province which he made soon after coming out, he found that earlier Constitutions were a dead letter. With one abuse he dealt specially, when he forbade holders of supernumerary canonries or 'expectatives' to sit in canons' stalls, wear their vestments, vote or fulfil any of the functions of canons until they were actually provided with a prebend. It is interesting to note, as showing the independence of the suffragan bishops, that Odo of Paphos declined outright to accept this Constitution.[3]

One of the reforms ordered by Elias provoked something like a mutiny at Bellapaïs. What the reform was, we do not know; but George, prior and canon of S.M. de Episcopia, and the other canons appealed to the Pope against certain ordinances made by the Archbishop and the Abbot Gerald. George was clapped into prison, fettered hand and foot, for four months, and for forty days given only bread and water. On 22 November 1337 Benedict XII ordered the Bishop of Paphos to investigate the matter and see that justice was done to George against the Archbishop and Abbot.[4]

[1] M.L., *Arch.* pp. 261–7; Hackett, pp. 545–6; Papaïoannou, III, p. 91; Golubovich, III, pp. 394–404.

[2] Mollat, no. 58872. The Abbots of Episcopia and Holy Cross were appointed *judices conservatores* for him (*ibid.* no. 60953, 9 Aug. 1333). He was allowed to raise a loan up to 3000 gold fl. (*ibid.* no. 61108, 28 Aug. 1333). Various other faculties and indults, *ibid.* nos. 61388–94, 61396.

[3] Labbé, *Conc.* (1671), XI, ii, col. 2438, art. VI; M.L., *Arch.* pp. 263, 265 (cui constitutioni non consensit; immo totaliter contradicit, nec vult ipsam locum habere in sua Paphensi ecclesia).

[4] Benedict XII, *Lettres comm.* ed. Vidal, no. 5120. S.M. de Episcopia is, of course, Bellapaïs, not, as Vidal thinks, a house at Episkopi.

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Apart from the reforms in the discipline of his own Church, Elias addressed himself to the difficult task of persuading the other sects (Greeks, Syrians, Maronites, Chaldaeans, Armenians) to conform to Latin faith and ritual. He seems to have enjoyed a certain measure of success, for at a provincial council in January 1340, at which besides his own suffragans there were present the Greek, Maronite and Armenian bishops, the heads of the Nestorian and Jacobite communities, and other Latin and Greek clerics, a creed of the Catholic faith was adopted, as well as statutes, of which the eight articles confirmed the Constitutions issued at previous Councils.[1] Whoever, it is decided, would be regarded as a Catholic, must hold and publicly confess that the Holy Roman Church is the mother and mistress of all the faithful, and has full principality and primacy over the universal Catholic Church. All of the Kingdom of Cyprus, of whatever race, must accept this creed, if they would escape the vengeance of the Pope Benedict XII. But this does not prohibit the Greek bishops and their subjects from following their rites, provided they are not adverse to the Catholic faith, in accordance with the composition between Greeks and Latins made by Pope Alexander and long observed.

All this was accepted by the representatives of the Greeks, Maronites, Armenians and others, voluntarily and without any intimidation.

The Archbishop as early as 1338, had received the enthusiastic thanks of the Pope, who sent him magnificent presents.[2] But whether this seeming agreement had much practical effect is doubtful.

An event which caused great excitement among the devout of all Churches fell within the time of Elias.[3] The Cross of Tokhni, reputed to have been brought thither by St Helena,[4] worked so many miracles that it excited the jealousy of the Latins. In 1318 a Latin priest[5] stole it and attempted to carry it oversea. Acting in the traditional manner, the relic raised a tempest. The sailors, to whom the priest seems to have confessed his theft, put him ashore; but having picked out the jewels

[1] Labbé, *Conc. vol. cit.* cols. 2432–9.

[2] *Lettres closes*, ed. Vidal, no. 1834 (30 May 1338); Raynaldus, 1338, p. 148, § 72.

[3] Machaeras, 67–77; Strambaldi, pp. 27–32; Amadi, pp. 406–7; Fl. Bustron, pp. 256–7; Hackett, pp. 435–9; Papaïoannou, II, pp. 294–9.

[4] Vol. I, p. 246.

[5] Σαρθαμαρήν, Machaeras; *Sardamari*, Strambaldi and Bustron; *Sardamaria*, Amadi. Taken as *Santamarin* by Mas Latrie and Dawkins.

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from the mount, and hidden the cross itself in a hollow carob-tree, he was taken on board again, and was able to proceed on his voyage. No more is heard of him. But twenty-two years afterwards, in 1340, the cross was revealed to a slave-boy called George. He had visions, and was led by a series of apparent accidents to discover a fire burning in the hollow of the very tree. When the villagers whom he called to put out the fire cut into the tree, there came forth a sweet odour as of musk. The boy, espying the cross, put his hand into the fire unhurt, and drew it out. It immediately began to work miraculous cures. The Orthodox Bishop of Lefkara[1] pronounced it to be the veritable Cross of Tokhni. It was taken by George to King Hugh IV, who would have liked to keep it, but he was forced by terrifying visions to return it to George, who took it with him to Kerynia. There he became a monk, taking the name of Gabriel. The authenticity of the relic was now challenged by Mark, Latin Bishop of Famagusta, but it successfully passed the test of being burned in a stove for an hour, and emerging undamaged. At the sight of this miracle, Queen Alice recovered the faculty of speech which she had lost for three years when she attempted to enter the monastery of Machaera, which was forbidden to women. In thanksgiving for her cure, the Queen's aunt, Mary d'Ibelin, now proposed to build a church for the housing of the relic.[2] The site for the building, between A. Dometios and Nicosia, was divinely revealed to Gabriel, and the church received the name of 'the Revealed' (*Phaneromenos*). The relic was enclosed, with others, in a larger wooden cross, by the Patriarch of Antioch, Ignatius II, to be carried in procession when it was needed to avert calamity. It has unfortunately disappeared;[3] but the legend seems sufficiently characteristic of the time to be worth recording at some length.

[1] This would be Clement, Bishop of Lemesos, who attended the Nicosia Synod of 1340 (Hackett, p. 316; Papaïoannou, II, p. 85).

[2] The motive for the offering was also to secure that her husband, Rupin de Montfort, who had been sent on a mission to the Pope, might have a safe journey (Machaeras and Strambaldi, *loc. cit.*). There had been a quarrel between Genoese and Cypriotes, and Rupin's mission was to induce the Pope to intervene. If this was in 1340, or thereabouts, it is difficult to fit it into the known chronology.

[3] Kyprianos (p. 358) says that it was up to his time preserved in the church of Lefkara. Lusignan (*Descr.* f. 22) says that there was doubt as to whether the relic of Lefkara was part of the True Cross or of the suppedaneum thereof. See the adventures of the relic of Lefkara in the Turkish invasion of 1570, above, p. 961, n. 5.

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Elias de Nabinaux did not return to Cyprus after he was called to the West in 1342 to receive the cardinal's hat. He died in 1348.[1]

Philip de Chambarlhac,[2] although he was nominated as early as 1343, did not go out until 1350.[3] In 1357 he was back in Avignon as envoy of Hugh IV, and does not seem to have returned to his see. In 1360 he was nominated to the archbishopric of Bordeaux, but died in June 1361 before he could take possession.

The absenteeism of the Archbishops of Nicosia during the period which we have so far covered cannot have failed to impress the reader. In the sixty-nine years from 1291 to 1360, the Archbishops were absent for something like thirty-six. In the cases of Gerard of Langres and, in the first instance, of John del Conte, this was no fault of the Pope; but the others were kept in the West because they were found useful there. That the Church in Cyprus suffered from such a policy it is hardly necessary to say;[4] and King Hugh IV was fully justified in his complaint to the Pope.[5]

At the same time, the bulls issued by Clement VI to Philip[6] suggest that this Pope recognized the desirability of giving more power of

[1] Golubovich, III, *loc. cit.* Baluze, who dates his death in 1350, and Ciaconius, who puts it as late as 1367 (M.L., *Arch.* p. 267) must both be corrected.

[2] M.L., *Arch.* pp. 267–72. An indult to 'Philip, Archbishop of Nicosia', to contract a loan up to 6000 florins shows that he was already promoted by 26 July 1343 (Clement VI, *Lettres closes*, etc., ed. Déprez, no. 303).

[3] On 16 Sept. 1350 Clement VI sent him 6000 gold florins to be transmitted to the King of Armenia. The Armenians were involved in heresy, but Clement hoped that they would see the error of their ways. Raynaldus, 1350, p. 519, § 37; Reinhard, I, Beyl. 45, p. 76. The Pope took the opportunity offered by King Constantine's request for help against the Turks to order William, Patriarch of Jerusalem, Archbishop Philip, Odo Bishop of Paphos and Leodegar Bishop of Lemesos, to send to Armenia a wise man inflamed with zeal for the Catholic faith, to obtain from the Catholicos a clear answer which would show his attitude to the true doctrine (Raynaldus, 1351, pp. 535 f., § 19; 22 Sept. 1351). Cp. J. Gay, *Clément VI & les affaires d'Orient*, pp. 130, 149.

[4] M.L., *Arch.* p. 263.

[5] In 1347 the Bishop of Famagusta and the Archbishop of Nicosia were both at Avignon. Clement was willing to let the latter go, but excused the former, on the ground that his brother, a cardinal, was seriously ill. Gay, *loc. cit.* It is partly owing to this absenteeism of the archbishops that we find the Bishop of Paphos employed by the Pope in so many important capacities; he communicates directly with Avignon; he collects the crusading-tithes (Clement VI, *Lettres closes*, ed. Déprez, nos. 213, 401–2, 904); he sequestrates the property of the dead Patriarch of Jerusalem; he transmits funds to the Armenians, etc. (Gay, p. 130).

[6] See especially *Reg. C.N.* nos. 110–23; M.L., *Arch.* p. 269.

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independent action to the man on the spot, in view of the difficulty of communication with the West. Some of the powers which these bulls confer do not refer so much as in earlier times to particular cases. To be noted are the power to absolve from excommunication various classes of persons, such as any who have made the pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulchre without licence; those who have done violence to the clergy (the number is limited in one bull to two hundred, in another to fifty); any who have been guilty of minor sins and irregularities; priests or laity (limited to fifty) who have kept concubines. At the same time the Archbishop is permitted to create notaries apostolic any clerks who are not married or in holy orders; to promote members of his own household to higher offices in the Church without licence; to license a hundred persons to go on pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulchre; to go there himself with two hundred persons; to leave and return to Cyprus at his own discretion; to grant dispensation to six couples in Cyprus for marriage within the prohibited degrees.[1] In the direction of reform is the order to suppress all chapels or oratories which are insufficiently endowed.

These and other bulls (among which we may mention the *Ecclesiarum fabricis* of 19 September 1347, granting an indulgence of a hundred days to those who contribute to the construction or repair of the cathedral of Nicosia) were issued before Philip went out to his see. They show that unusual care was taken to prepare the way for his administration, although there is little evidence that the results were any more satisfactory than in the past. In regard to relations with the Greeks, no tendency to enlightenment is to be seen. In spite of racial antipathy, a certain degree of fusion between Greeks and Franks had begun to appear. The modern historian may realise how enormously such fusion between the conquerors and the conquered, as is illustrated by the history of Norman England and Sicily, would have benefited the island. But in the fourteenth century the Greeks would not actively promote it, if they could, while the Latins definitely discouraged such misalliances. One of the first acts of Philip on his arrival was to insert in his Constitution of 1350[2] two clauses on mixed marriages. They were prohibited until

[1] This fitted in with Hugh IV's policy of dissuading the nobles from going back to France, which they were liable to do because of the difficulty of finding wives in Cyprus. Gay (*op. cit.* pp. 128–9) cites letters from the Pope to Hugh and the bishops from 1347 to 1352 on the matter of such dispensations. See also above, p. 1052, n. 1.

[2] Labbé, *Conc.* (1671), XI, ii, cols. 2439–40; Mansi, *Conc.* XXVI, col. 380; Hackett, p. 137; Papaïoannou, I, p. 181.

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the banns should have been read three times in the customary manner in Latin churches. The Greek party must first have been confirmed according to the Latin rite. The children of such marriages were to be brought up in the Latin Church. No Greek priest was to administer the sacraments to a Latin, or *vice versa*, save in urgent necessity. Clergy who violated these provisions were to be liable to the same penalty as those who celebrated clandestine marriages; lay persons who assisted were excommunicated.

In the interval between Philip de Chambarlhac and Raymond de la Pradèle, the next Archbishop of whom there is any record, the stage is filled by the remarkable figure of the Legate, Peter Thomas. His arrival in the island on 8 December 1358 was soon followed by a serious riot, provoked by an attempt to convert the Greek clergy.[1] Having called them before him to the cathedral, and closed the doors, he lectured them on their errors. The Greek chronicle says that the Latins attempted to confirm the Greeks by force. If the Legate convinced any, he provoked the majority to violent opposition. The uproar was heard by the mob which had gathered outside, and which now either was admitted by some of the Greek priests, or battered its way in. An attempt seems to have been made to set fire to the church. The disturbance was finally quelled by the arrival of the Prince of Antioch with some soldiers. Peter's biographer says that he bore himself with great courage, facing the furious mob without flinching. From what we know of his personal bravery we may well believe this to be true. It is clear from all accounts that his methods were not approved by the civil authorities, and were completely unsuccessful.[2] We know that, as a result of this

[1] *AA.SS.*, 29 Jan. pp. 611–38 (Life by Mézières); Raynaldus, 1360, pp. 46–7, § 16; Machaeras, 101; Strambaldi, p. 39; Amadi, p. 409; Fl. Bustron, p. 258; Sathas, Μεσ. Βιβλ. II, pp. ϙγ′ f.; Hackett, pp. 130–1; Papaïoannou, I, pp. 174–5. From the fact that Kyprianos (p. 158) relates this episode immediately after mentioning the coronation of Peter as King of Jerusalem at Famagusta, Ph. Georgiou (p. 61 n.) infers, I think wrongly, that it took place at Famagusta in 1360 on the occasion of the coronation.

[2] Those who had been forcibly confirmed, says Machaeras, spat upon the swabs of cotton with which the chrism was wiped off. Of the later accounts we mention, for what they are worth, those of Loredano (Giblet, I, pp. 385 f.) and Kyprianos (pp. 158–9), which are in substance the same. They say that the Legate's intention was to hand over the Greek sees to the Latins; that the Greeks attacked the palace of the Legate, who took refuge in the cathedral, where he fortified himself. The church would have been burned had not the Prince of Antioch intervened. The Legate, protesting that he had done nothing out of the ordinary, demanded the punishment of the guilty. The

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affair, King Peter asked the Pope not to send out such troublesome Legates. But it is improbable that, as the Greek chronicle states, the Legate was actually asked to leave the island, for he was present next year to crown Peter in Famagusta.

The records of the remaining Archbishops of Cyprus to the end of the reign of James I are very scanty.[1] It was perhaps to the first of them, Raymond de la Pradèle, that Urban V, on 29 May 1368,[2] addressed an injunction to stop the practice among the nobles and rich bourgeois of Nicosia of celebrating marriages, baptisms and divine offices generally in private chapels, and to prevent Latin women from frequenting Greek churches. Peter I had called the Pope's attention to the damage done to the interests of the Latin Church by these practices. As we have seen, the suppression of inadequately endowed private chapels had already been ordered. One may see in these injunctions, in the first place a reflexion of the decay in the dignity and influence of the metropolitan church—not unconnected, it may be, with the absenteeism of the Archbishops—and in the second, perhaps, a symptom of that fusion of the races which the Latins exerted themselves to check. In fact, it has been observed that the first signs of reconciliation between the two elements are seen after the failure of Peter Thomas to crush the Greeks.[3] Members of the race which had hitherto been treated as helots began to

King declined, so early in his reign, to bring on himself the hatred of the Greeks, who were more numerous than the Latins, and refused to appear to be siding with the Legate and attacking the religion of his subjects rather than punishing their misdeeds. In a disturbance of this sort it was impossible to pick out the ringleaders. The only important part of this account is the view which it gives of the King's policy.

[1] M.L., *Arch.* pp. 272–7. They were Raymond de la Pradèle, 1366–; Bérenger, son of Gregory, 1376; Micheli; Andrew (?); Conrad, 1396. Bérenger (called Παλουγκέρ by Machaeras, 596) has been identified by Dawkins with the *Belengerius Gregorii* who was vicar and dean of Nicosia in 1374. If the date 1376 given by Machaeras for the blessing by this Archbishop of the foundations of the Castle (above, p. 429) is correct, there is some difficulty in explaining the document of 11 Jan. 1376 (M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 587), from which it appears that the Patriarch of Jerusalem, Philip of Alençon, farmed out to Antony Micheli, priest of the church of Nicosia, all the Patriarch's revenues from Cyprus for four years for 800 gold fl. a year. Possibly, however, the date of the document is 1377 N.S.; or the Patriarch's revenues from the island were not from Nicosia but from other sources. Incidentally, we may ask whether this Antony was the Micheli who became Archbishop.

[2] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 757–8; *Reg. C.N.* no. 127; Hackett, p. 138; Papaïoannou, I, pp. 182–3.

[3] Sathas, Μεσ. Βιβλ. II, p. ϙέ.

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acquire offices of State;[1] Greek priests and bishops began to work for the common interests with the Latins; Latins began to frequent Greek churches.

St Bridget of Sweden[2] passed through Cyprus on her way to Jerusalem just after the murder of Peter I. She is said to have exhorted Queen Eleanor and Peter II to forgive the murderers. In Jerusalem she had a revelation of the impending ruin of Cyprus, which was recorded and sent to the King and Regent. As it was not taken seriously, she afterwards came in person to Famagusta to repeat it before the royal family. The greater part of Christ's admonition, as revealed to her, is addressed to the Latin Cypriotes. They are told that if the people of Cyprus will not amend its ways, He will wipe out its generation and race, and will pardon neither poor nor rich, so that in a little time the memory of it will have vanished from the hearts of men, as though it had never been. But afterwards He will plant there new plants, which will accomplish His commandments and love Him with all their hearts. Those who repent will be received into the fold. As for those Greeks who know that all Christians should be of one faith and submit to one Church, which is that of Rome, and to one Vicar-General of Christ, the Pope, and yet will not acknowledge it, they are, by their 'obstinacy, avarice, carnality and lascivious petulance', unworthy to receive pardon and mercy after their death. Those who know no better but, if they knew, would conform, and who live according to their lights, and abstain from sin, will have a claim to forgiveness. Let all Greeks know that their Empire, Kingdoms and Lordships will never be in safety and free from suffering until they submit to the Church of Rome.

It is generally agreed that this version of the Revelation was written up after the death of the saint in 1373. One may doubt whether it was much edited. The reference to the destruction of Cyprus is so vague and generalized, that it would be unreasonable to see in it any prophecy, after the event, of the occupation of Famagusta by the Genoese, which at its worst was far from involving the complete destruction of the island. If the Revelation had been edited as supposed, one would have found the reference more precise. The Turkish conquest would seem

[1] Noble Greeks from Byzantium do military service under Peter I (Sir John Lascaris) and Peter II (George Monomachos). Sathas, *loc. cit.*

[2] *AA.SS.*, 8 Oct. pp. 449–58, 520–1; Lusignan, *Descr.* ff. 231b–234b; Reinhard, I, pp. 265 f., Beyl. 60, p. 92; Hackett, pp. 135–6; Papaïoannou, I, pp. 179–80; Dawkins on Machaeras, II, pp. 176–7.

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to have fulfilled the prophecy more adequately. But what of the 'new plants' which were to restore the kingdom of the righteous? The latter portion of the Revelation certainly reads like a piece of Roman Catholic propaganda, but there is no reason to suppose that St Bridget would have disapproved of it. On the whole, it may be that the text of the Revelation, as we have it, fairly represents the original utterance of the woman whom the Greek apologist describes as a schismatical ventriloquist and instrument of papistical humbug.[1]

In the schism which rent the Roman Church in 1378,[2] obedience to Clement [VII], as the representative of French interests, was yielded by the Kingdom of Cyprus, i.e. by the civil authorities and the secular clergy. But the religious Orders were not bound thereby. The Hospitallers of Rhodes were for Clement; but the Dominicans in Cyprus acknowledged Urban VI, and the Franciscans in the East were divided. It appears, from the fact that Franciscans were nominated to sees in Cyprus by Clement, that he had the obedience of the friars of that Order in the Kingdom; but those in Jerusalem obeyed Urban VI.

The Latin archbishops recorded for the first decade of the fifteenth century left no mark on history.[3] During this period, however, the

[1] Dositheos, Ἱστορία περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις πατριαρχευσάντων (Bucharest, 1715), p. 1150: ὅτι Βριγίτῃ τινὶ γυναικὶ σχισματικῇ καὶ ἐγγαστριμύθῳ ἀπεκαλύφθη ὁ ἀφανισμὸς τῆς βασιλείας τῶν Ῥωμαίων... ὅτι ἡ ἀποκάλυψις αὕτη τῆς Βριγίτης ψευδής ἐστι καὶ πλάσμα παπιστῶν.

[2] Golubovich, v (1927), p. 235, n. 1; H. Finke et al., *Acta Conc. Const.* II, p. 13. According to Reinhard (I, p. 282) the King of Cyprus and the Latin Church at first observed strict neutrality, but finally came to acknowledge Urban VI, partly because he stood well with the Genoese. This seems to be an inversion of the facts.

[3] Hackett, pp. 549–51; Papaïoannou, III, pp. 95–6. The first was John III, previously Archbishop of Tarsus. In May 1399 Lesgare speaks of the Archbishop (whose name he does not give) as having attached to him a friar minor. From a document of 3 June 1399 it is known that he was then Brother John, Archbishop of Tarsus, postulate of Nicosia. The chroniclers say that Janus was crowned on 11 Nov. 1399 by Matthew, Archbishop of Tarsus (called a Dominican by Machaeras, a Franciscan by Amadi). If this is the Archbishop mentioned by Lesgare, Amadi is probably right, for a Dominican prelate would hardly have a Franciscan attached to him. And unless 'Matthew' is a mere mistake of the two chroniclers for 'John', then the latter was probably not yet confirmed at the time of the coronation; had he been, it is unlikely (*pace* M.L., *Arch.* p. 278) that he would have handed over the coronation to the Archbishop of Tarsus. But on this whole question, see above, p. 447, n. 1. The next Archbishop was Conrad (II) Caraccioli (1402), who was followed by Stephen of Carrara (1406); probably they neither of them saw Cyprus, but held the see *in commendam*.

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unfortunate Cypriote Church made an attempt to recover the position within the Orthodox Greek communion which it had forfeited by yielding to the pressure of the Latins, which had culminated in the *Bulla Cypria* of 1260. By accepting this Constitution, the Cypriotes had fallen between two stools. They had yielded up their independence to the Latins, and they had earned the execration of the Orthodox Greeks without gaining the esteem of the Latins. The agreement of 1340 had made their situation if possible worse. When Cyprus fell to the Turks, the Dominican Angelo Calepio was able, in a somewhat muddle-headed way, to attribute the plight of the Cypriote Greeks to their preference for the Orthodox communion.[1] Referring to the profanation of the churches of Famagusta and the conversion of the Latin cathedral into a mosque, he continues:

> This was indeed a punishment and act of justice on those Greeks of all this Kingdom, many of whom, while they were subject to the Latin Christians, rejected with horror the most limpid water of the holy Roman obedience, and despised the life-giving liquid of its head; behold these Greeks preferred to be the subjects of that rotten limb, the Patriarch of Constantinople, because that Patriarch and the other Greek Patriarchs, especially those of Jerusalem, when the poor Cypriote merchants and pilgrims went into their churches, abhorred them, holding them for excommunicate, because in Cyprus they yielded obedience to the Latins; and said the same even more strongly to the Greek Bishops of Cyprus, because they were elected by the Royal Latin Council, and confirmed by the Latin Bishops; for which reason the ignorant people came to conceive in their minds a secret hatred of the Latins, as being excommunicate and damned.

In this unhappy situation, an approach was made in 1405 by the Cypriote Greek clergy (the Bishop of Lemesos, however, standing out) to Constantinople for union with that see. It is to be presumed, although it is not so stated, that this would involve the sacrifice of that autocephaly which had been so stoutly defended since the fifth century. In reply to their request, the monk Joseph Bryennios was sent from Constantinople to study the question on the spot. Arriving on 27 June, he assembled on 28 July 1406 a local Synod.[2] He had instructions, if he found that the

[1] Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 122 (omitted in the *Description*). Tr. in Cobham, *Exc. Cypr.* pp. 160–1. Cp. Hackett, p. 141; Papaïoannou, I, p. 187.

[2] Philaretos Kourites, Ὀρθόδοξος ἐκκλησία ἐν Κύπρῳ, p. 79. The Acts of the Synod are preserved in MS. no. 247 of the monastery of Kosinitza in Macedonia; a portion of them has been published by A. Papadopoulos Kerameus in the Supplement to

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Cypriotes confessed the Pope of Rome to be holy, and regarded the bishops under him as their own, and associated[1] with the Latin bishops, he was to refuse their request for union. At the enquiry the Bishop of Paphos was represented by the Bishop of Nicosia; the Bishop of Famagusta was also present; but the Bishop of Lemesos was absent, since he agreed with the others neither in this nor in any other matter, being presumably wholly subject to the Latins. Bryennios asked who first brought about the separation from the Orthodox Church, and was told that it was Germanos, 'nearly two hundred years before'.[2] He pointed out to them the obstacles to union; first, that they, on appointment to their sees, acknowledged the Pope of Rome to be holy and the true successor to the blessed Peter. On the Bishop of Famagusta protesting that they gave this acknowledgement 'without prejudice to their faith', Bryennios replied that such a reservation was of no avail.[3] It was useless to plead that while, in order not to oppose Rome openly, they were obliged to attend the synods of the Westerners and act with them as far as possible, confessing fidelity to the Pope, yet this was all an outward show, since in their hearts and in their churches they believed and behaved as they would. Bryennios pointed out the enormity of such pretence; 'he who merely by a nod denies God is subject to destruction'. Here, unfortunately, the publication of the Acts breaks off; but it appears from the words of Bryennios six years later that the bishops promised in writing to obey the commands of the Church of Constantinople, but failed to keep their promise. Apparently, therefore, they were, as a result of this Synod of 1406, put to the test.

When the question came up again, Bryennios, on 17 March 1412, declared his opinion, in the Synod at Constantinople, in a wordy and rhetorical but nevertheless convincing speech.[4] The case of the Cypriotes was indeed hopelessly weak. They proposed a secret compact with the Orthodox Church, conforming outwardly with the Roman. Accept-

t. 17 of the *Hellen. Philolog. Syllogos* (Constantinople, 1886), pp. 48–51; the promised complete publication does not seem to have appeared. The portion published is reproduced by Kourites, pp. 80–4, and Zannetos, I, pp. 839–43.

[1] ἐὰν συμφοραίνωσι τοῖς τῶν Λατίνων ἐπισκόποις.

[2] Which would take us back to about 1206, a date irreconcilable with the date of Germanos.

[3] One bishop pleaded that he paid 700 ὁλοκότινα ξένια (ducats?) to be excused from making the acknowledgement.

[4] Printed in his works, Ἰωσὴφ Μοναχοῦ τοῦ Βρυεννίου τὰ εὑρεθέντα (Leipsig, 1768). Abstracts in Hackett, pp. 142–9; Papaïoannou, I, pp. 188–96; Zannetos, I, pp. 844–54.

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ance of the Cypriote proposal would drag the Orthodox Church into subjection to the Roman. How could they, who had thrown away their own independence, guarantee it to the Orthodox Church? There was among the Greeks in Cyprus no one autonomous ecclesiastical authority; the four bishoprics were independent of each other, though dependent on their Latin superiors. The fact that they had submitted to this state of things by compulsion proved them unfit for communion with the Orthodox Church. Bryennios went on to give chapter and verse from the oath taken by the Greek bishops (above, p. 1059, n. 2) and the ceremony of consecration, to show their complete subservience to Rome; he stressed also the compulsory attendance of the clergy at the great Latin festivals and at funerals of deceased Latins. They actually not merely attended but took part in these services. He used strong language about the morals of the clergy; they ordained candidates who had contracted second marriages; others, after ordination, had married again; others had children openly from prostitutes and concubines; and acceptance of such priests and association with them in service was not done under pressure from someone else, but of their own volition. 'So that there is not one among the clergy who does not openly keep concubines, either while his lawful wife is living, or, much worse, if she is dead, and also before marriage. One solution there is which we can offer them, but that is death to us, and of no advantage to them; and that would be for us miserably to yield to the Cypriotes, and not the Cypriotes to us, by such compliance with them unreasonably subordinating ourselves to the Pope of Rome. Their promises to obey the orders of the Church of Constantinople, made both verbally and in writing, are worthless, for they cannot keep them; they could not attend a Synod if summoned, for they may not leave the island. The Latins and the Cypriotes are one body, of which the Pope, and no other, is head.' The argument that the Orthodox Church ought to make the best of the circumstances and agree to the union, in order that the Cypriotes may not be driven into complete Latinization, Bryennios finds very dangerous, since it would furnish a precedent for many other Orthodox Churches.

These are but a few of the points made by Bryennios, with crushing effect on anyone who took seriously the differences between the Greek and Roman Churches. A historian,[1] whose sympathies are with the

[1] Zannetos, I, p. 855.

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Cypriotes, is forced to admit that Bryennios had much ground for his strictures, though he might have been less harsh, and it would have been more statesmanlike to point out gently how impossible it was to grant the desires of the Cypriotes, praising their zeal and suggesting that they persevere in that spirit but await a more suitable opportunity. It is difficult to see in what such advice would have profited either side, since its hollowness would have been apparent. What actually happened was that, left to themselves, the general antipathy between Latins and Cypriotes gradually became less sharp, although there remained to the end many whose bigotry refused to yield a single point.[1]

Not that the Latin Church, in its representative head at the time with which we are concerned, Pope John XXIII, afforded an edifying spectacle, likely to attract schismatics to its arms. As one of the witnesses against the Pope at the Council of Constance, in the matter of the scandalous bargain with King Janus over the Grand Commandery, remarked:[2] 'it is publicly said and reported, that he has ruined the church of Bologna and the churches of the Kingdom of Cyprus, causing such a scandal that the Catholic faith was and is in great peril, because there are Greeks there, and but few Latins to uphold the faith, and they are obliged to retire because of the alienation of the property of their churches, since the tithes on the royal domain have been alienated by the Pope in favour of the King and his next successor'.

The next Archbishop of Cyprus, Cardinal Hugh de Lusignan,[3] lived through stirring times. We know from an allusion by Bryennios that he had been elected to the see before 17 March 1412.[4] But for some

[1] Ph. Georgiou (p. 63, n. α) quotes Ephraim, Περιγραφὴ τῆς Ἱ. Μονῆς τοῦ Κύκκου (pp. 31–2 of the 1819 edition), who says that the Orthodox patriarchs and the other bishops then by synodical decision cut off the Cypriotes from the Church; although later, when the Cypriotes, repenting with tears, came and excused themselves, saying that they had acted unwillingly οἰκονομίας χάριν, they were received again. Georgiou observes: 'when and where the patriarchs met in Synod and cut off the Cypriotes, and likewise when they received them again, we at least do not know'. It may be replied that the Synod doubtless acted on the opinion of Bryennios; and from a later source we learn that the Cypriotes were reconciled with the Great-Church at a Synod held by the Oecumenical Patriarch Jerēmias, which was attended by Silvester of Alexandria and Germanos of Jerusalem (Letter of Archimandrite Arsenios, 24 Oct. 1633, in Legrand, *Bibl. Hellen.*, XVIIe *siècle*, III, p. 274). The date of this Synod was 1572.

[2] *Acta Conc. Const.*, ed. H. Finke et al. IV, pp. 762–3.

[3] M.L., *Arch.* pp. 279–86.

[4] Hackett, p. 148; Papaïoannou, I, p. 195.

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reason he was not actually appointed until fourteen years later, although he had had the administration and drawn the revenues for all that time. The appointment was brought to him with the cardinal's hat on 23 November 1426. He was then governing the Kingdom for his unfortunate brother Janus, who was a prisoner at Cairo. The Cardinal of Cyprus, as he came to be called, after the return of his brother from captivity, spent most of the remainder of his days in the West, occupied, when necessary, with Cyprus affairs. He died in August 1442.

The upheaval caused by the Mameluke invasion in 1426 left its mark on the Church, apart from material destruction. Many of the religious Orders either left the island altogether or were greatly reduced in their possessions and numbers. After mentioning Augustinians, Benedictines, Carmelites, Carthusians, Cistercians, Cruciferi, Dominicans, Franciscans, Observants and Premonstratensians, Lusignan[1] goes on to say that all these above-named religious left the island in the time of King Janus because of the wars of the Mamelukes, who ruined all the churches and violated all the monasteries, and the monks of St Bernard left in the reign of James the Bastard. The Mendicant Orders remained only in Nicosia and Famagusta, impoverished, especially at Famagusta, and no wonder, because the Saracens in those days burned books and privileges; but in Nicosia, all the nobility being there, they recovered somewhat.

The well-meant attempt to bring about union between the Greek and Latin Churches was, as is well known, a fiasco. The Council of Basle, in 1437, gave to the bishops, who were to go out as its envoys, instructions on their procedure to bring the Greeks to the Council of Union.[2] They were to write to the King of Cyprus, urging that, if union could be attained, his own power and that of the Emperors of Constantinople would be better able to resist the enemies of the Catholic faith and of their realms. When it came to the point, the agreement, as we know, was violently repudiated by the Greeks on the return of their representatives. Nor was the adhesion of the Syrians (Jacobites), Nestorians (Chaldaeans) and Maronites, which was given to the Council when it was transferred from Florence to Rome, destined to endure.[3] Doubt has been thrown on the statement that in 1441 Eugenius IV received,

[1] *Chor.* f. 33.

[2] Haller, *Conc. Basil.* v, pp. 197, 199.

[3] Raynaldus, 1445, p. 465, § 20. On 2 Aug. 1445 (Raynaldus, 1445, p. 466, § 21) Timotheos, Archbishop of Tarsus, Metropolitan of the Chaldaeans of Cyprus, and Elias, Bishop of the Cypriote Maronites, were confirmed by Eugenius in the same privileges as other Christian bishops, and given the right to bless marriages between their people

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from some Cypriote Greeks, a complaint that the decisions of the Council were ignored by the Latin clergy, who refused to admit them to marriages, funerals and other public occasions. Eugenius referred the complaint to the Archbishop of Rhodes, who was to compel the Latins to admit the Greeks to such communion with them.[1] By those who doubt the truth of this record, it is argued that the Orthodox had never shown any desire for such communion, and only wanted to be left alone. But we know that Bryennios brought against them, not long before, the very charge that, willingly or unwillingly, they were in the habit of attending such functions in Latin churches. Compelled or choosing to do so, in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution of 1260, some at least of the Cypriote clergy—like the Bishop of Lemesos who was Latinizing in 1406—might well have appealed to the Pope in the manner that is reported. At the same time, it is possible that western opinion may have felt that the Latin clergy in Cyprus were somewhat lax in upholding the supremacy of the Roman Church. That would explain the remark of Aeneas Sylvius when, enumerating the various Churches represented at the Council of Basle, he wrote: 'I say nothing of the Cypriotes, who are more Greek-minded than Roman.'[2]

Attempts were made by the Popes from time to time to enforce the decrees of the Council of Florence, as by Leo X in 1521, in a bull which was renewed and confirmed by Clement VII in 1526. But they were quite ineffective.[3]

When the see of Nicosia again fell vacant by the death of the Cardinal of Cyprus in 1442, Queen Helena seized the opportunity of pushing the claims, which cannot have been strong, of a nephew of her Greek nurse.[4] As he was presumably an Orthodox Greek, his election

and Catholics, provided they were celebrated according to the Roman rite. But that the Maronites were actually converted, is denied by Dib in Vacant-Mangenot, *Dict. de Théol. Cath.* x, cols. 48–9. At the same time the heretical designation of 'Nestorians' for the Chaldaeans was forbidden.

[1] Raynaldus, 1441, p. 370, §6; Th. Ripoll, *Bullar. Ord. FF. Praedic.*, ed. A. Brémond, III, p. 143. Hackett, pp. 151–2 (Papaïoannou, I, p. 199), quite unjustifiably, as it seems to me, doubts this record.

[2] Letter from Basle, 1438, in Haller, *Conc. Basil., Studien u. Dokumente*, VIII, p. 193.

[3] *Bulla Beatissimi Papae Leonis X de privilegiis Graecorum et ejusdem confirmatio per SS. Clementem VII...*, 1776; Hackett, pp. 173–4; Papaïoannou, I, pp. 287–9.

[4] Herquet's statement (*Charlotta*, pp. 92–3) that it was the King's bastard son James on whom Helena caused her husband to confer the archbishopric at this time seems to be wide of the mark.

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would have been unprecedented, and a triumph for her Hellenizing policy. But it is probable that Eugenius IV had foreseen some move of this kind on her part, and she found herself forestalled; the Pope had already nominated Galesius de Montolif.[1] Helena however succeeded in making things so unpleasant for the Pope's nominee that he left the island for Rhodes, whence he resorted to Rome. Helena for her part also sent an envoy to the Pope, who referred the question to two cardinals. A compromise was reached; Galesius was removed, being made titular Archbishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia; but no one was appointed in his place, though James Benedetto, Bishop of Orvieto, was entrusted with the administration of the see, and Galesius himself retained the administration of the dioceses of Paphos and Lemesos.[2] Eventually the Grand Master of Rhodes, John de Lastic, and the Bishop of Famagusta, John of Monteleone, Apostolic Legate in the East, were commissioned by the Pope to mediate in the quarrel, and were successful. Galesius was reinstated, apparently in 1446. But he died[3] early in 1447, being succeeded on 19 April by the Dominican Andrew of Constantinople, Archbishop of Rhodes.[4] To him, on 3 August, as *legatus a latere* in the East, Pope Nicolas V gave instructions to prevent the Greek bishops, especially those of Rhodes and of Cyprus, from asserting that their representatives at the Council of Florence had refused to accept the Catholic doctrine, but that on the contrary the

[1] On this episode, see Raynaldus, 1445, p. 465, § 20; M.L., *Arch.* pp. 286–7. Apart from the romancing Loredano (Giblet, II, pp. 177–80) the only authorities are western. Eubel (*Hierarchia Catholica*) dates the nomination about 18 March 1443; but Iorga (*N.E.* II, p. 397) cites the letter of nomination by Eugenius, 23 May 1443. Galesius was previously Bishop of Lemesos (*ibid.* p. 413).

[2] On 16 Aug. 1445 the Pope, having learned that the King was disposed to support Galesius, ordered him, if he recovered the see of Nicosia, to give up the *commenda* of Lemesos to James de Nores, and that of Paphos to Andrew, Archbishop of Rhodes (Iorga, *N.E.* II, p. 413).

[3] Loredano, *loc. cit.*, characteristically observes that the premature deaths of the Archbishop and his butler, following so soon on the restoration of the former, show that the hatred of powerful women is always dangerous.

[4] Eubel, under Nicosia and Rhodes (*Colocen.*) states that Galesius was translated to Tarsus, and John Moreli, Prior of the Hospital of Rhodes, elected, 10 Feb. 1447; John was then translated to the archbishopric of Rhodes, and Andrew on 19 April 1447 appointed to Nicosia. The King, however, withheld from him the revenues of the see, and the Hospital had to make serious representations on his behalf in 1448 and 1449 (Herquet, *Charlotta*, pp. 93, 102).

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Latins had been forced to accept the Greek creed. He was, if necessary, to call on the secular arm to assist him.[1] It is well known that the representatives had actually given their acceptance, but that their action was repudiated by those whom they had been sent to represent. But not by all, if it is true that in 1441 certain Cypriotes complained that the Latins were not carrying out their part of the bargain.[2]

The adhesion of the Chaldaeans to the Catholic faith was, as already remarked, of brief duration. They had relapsed by 1450, when Nicolas V instructed the Archbishop of Nicosia to reprove and if necessary excommunicate them.[3]

The strange episode of the archiepiscopate of James the natural son of John II[4] belongs to political rather than ecclesiastical annals, and has already been sufficiently narrated. It need only be observed here that James seems, thanks doubtless to his Greek parentage, to have been able to gain the support of the Greek clergy as well as the Latin.[5] Rome, however, as we have seen, refused to ratify his election as archbishop. On the death of Andrew, the see was, on 10 May 1456, given by the Pope *in commendam* to Cardinal Isidore of Kiev.[6] James, when he assumed the crown of Cyprus, placed in effective occupation his trusted friend and adviser William Goneme.[7] This election, of course, the Holy See declined to confirm, and Cardinal Isidore of Kiev remained in titular possession until his death on 27 April 1462. Isidore was followed in this empty honour in quick succession by Antony Tuneto and John Francis Brusato, in 1464. William Goneme, however, was at last accepted by Rome in 1467, and Brusato ceased to hold the title.[8] But the see was again vacant in 1469, Goneme having resigned and resumed his life as an Augustinian friar.[9] His successor was, in spite of the efforts

[1] Raynaldus, 1447, p. 514, § 27.

[2] Similarly in 1447 the clergy and others of the faithful among the Greeks demanded that their Latin colleagues should allow them a share in the profits from marriages, burials, processions, etc., in order to remove any doubt as to the solidity of the union, and Eugenius ordered an enquiry into the question (5 Nov. 1447, Iorga, *N.E.* II, p. 424).

[3] Raynaldus, 1450, p. 554, § 14; Reinhard, I, Beyl. p. 102, no. 68.

[4] M.L., *Arch.* pp. 288–93. Above, Ch. X.

[5] Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 64b; *Descr.* f. 164b.

[6] Eubel, *Hier. Cath.*

[7] M.L., *Arch.* pp. 293–7. See above, p. 560.

[8] He survived until 1477. His monument by Luigi Capponi in San Clemente, Rome, was commissioned in 1485. *Arch. Stor. dell' Arte*, VI (1893), p. 86.

[9] He died on 14 Sept. 1473. G. Bustron, p. 485.

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of the Venetian Senate to prevent the appointment of a Catalan,[1] that Louis Perez Fabregues who was to do so much mischief after the death of James II.[2] After his flight from Cyprus he continued to draw the revenues of the see by the agency of the Bishop of Lemesos, Antony di Zucco, who, as Queen Catherine had reason to complain in 1475, was abetted by the Venetian Counsellor Peter Diedo and the Proveditor Francis Giustinian.[3] But the next year put an end to this unsatisfactory situation; in March 1476 the see was vacant again, and in May the Venetian Senate was supporting the claims of its candidate, Victor Marcello (above, p. 726).

In the course of two centuries and a half the restrictions which had been placed in 1222 on the Greek bishops had gradually broken down, and they had been tending to stretch their jurisdiction beyond the towns assigned to them. Since Solia was in a state of decay, it is not surprising that in 1458 we find the Greek Bishop Nicolas in Nicosia, especially as some latitude in this respect had been allowed to Germanos by the *Bulla Cypria*; and in 1464 the capitulation of Famagusta speaks of liberty being guaranteed to the Greek as well as the Latin bishop. The Hellenizing policy of Helena Palaeologa, although it did not in the end succeed, must have done something to weaken the hold of the Latin Church over the Greeks. A side-light is thrown on the situation by what happened at Lemesos. In 1459 the Latin Bishop, Peter de Manatiis, in offering his resignation on account of the ruinous condition of the city and his church, said that the Latin bishop had no cure of souls, which belonged to a Greek bishop (appointed by the Latin bishop); therefore it was the Greek rite that was in use there.[4] The Latin services had been transferred from Lemesos to a chapel at Kolossi, five miles away, where the archives and ornaments of the church were kept. The revenue of the church was 800 ducats a year in cash, wine, wheat and barley (before the destruction of the city it had been 3000 ducats). There

[1] Above, p. 637. Letter of the College to the Ambassador at Rome, 4 June 1469.

[2] M.L., *Arch.* pp. 297–300.

[3] Above, Ch. XII, p. 724.

[4] Cp. above, Ch. I, p. 16, n. 2. It would seem that the Greek rite was still in use in 1494, for Casola remarks that the priest from Mantua who served the Cathedral had learned to speak Greek. Lusignan (*Chor.* f. 31b) says that when the other Greek bishops returned to their old residences, he of Lemesos remained at Lefkara (for the same reason as the Latin bishop preferred to live in Nicosia, i.e.) because the place was so ruined. This statement of Peter de Manatiis proves that sometimes the Greek bishop of Lefkara was to be found at Lemesos.

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were six canons, a treasurer, an archdeacon and a cantor; but the bishop's residence was in Nicosia, since it was unsafe for him to live in Lemesos exposed to pirates and other invaders.[1]

A bull of Sixtus IV, issued in 1472, indicates the extent of the irregularities which prevailed.[2] Thus in the city and diocese of Nicosia there was and is a Greek bishop of Solia, who presumes to exercise all the powers of episcopal jurisdiction and office in that city and diocese, outside the place of Solia from which he takes his title, and in which he is entitled to have a court. There, and in other cities and dioceses of Cyprus which are subject to Latin diocesans, this Greek bishop and other bishops of Armenians or Jacobites or other heretics and schismatics are acting contrary to the sacred canons and ordinances of the Apostolic See and the customs of the holy Fathers, admitting to holy orders by simony, ordaining persons who have been twice married or are bastards or are entirely unlettered, giving dispensations for marriage within the fourth and third degrees, allowing divorces and re-marriages, hearing and deciding as they please matrimonial and other spiritual cases, allowing twice-married persons to be promoted to celebrate mass and other divine offices, and confessions to be heard and absolution given, even for sins reserved to the Apostolic See, by themselves and other priests, sometimes even by those who are not priests. Thus instead of obeying the Constitutions of the Council of Florence, and extirpating crime, schism and heresy, they sow error and scorn and neglect religion and the ordinances and decrees of the Apostolic See, to the extreme prejudice of the church of Nicosia and its bishop who is the Metropolitan of Cyprus. The Pope therefore, not at the instance of Archbishop Louis or anyone else, but of his own motion, forbids (under pain of excommunication) any bishop of the Greeks or Armenians or Jacobites or Nestorians[3] or any other sect to exercise any jurisdiction in Nicosia or its diocese or in any city or diocese of Cyprus which is under the care of other suffragans of the Metropolitan, except only in Solia, where the Greek bishop is entitled, as suffragan and vicar of the Latin archbishop, to have jurisdiction over his own Greeks. Similar restrictions are made for the other three dioceses, of Arsinoe, Lefkara and Carpasia.

[1] So too, in 1562, the Bishop of Lemesos was an absentee, and the see was administered by a vicar (below, p. 1103).

[2] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 325–30; *Reg. C.N.* no. 131.

[3] Since the relapse of the Chaldaeans from the Catholic faith (above, p. 1092) the Pope naturally resumed the use of the heretical designation.

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Candidates for priesthood or other holy orders must be examined by the Latin diocesan or his vicar, and the same approval is essential for licence to read or preach or hear confessions and give absolution.

Venetian control, as established after the death of James II, produced little external change in the ecclesiastical situation. True to its principle of not altering more than was necessary in the customs of the Kingdom, the Senate laid it down[1] that the old custom of obtaining the consent of the Crown to the appointment of Greek bishops and abbots should be respected. When Venice acquired the Kingdom, it was to the Doge that reference was made for the confirming of elections.[2] It was a natural result that, except in so far as a Pope might interfere, all the Archbishops of Nicosia who followed Louis Perez Fabregues were Venetians, with one exception, and he (Aldobrandino Orsini) was a protégé of the Senate. From the first days of the Venetian domination, the Senate aimed at control over the appointments. But when, after the death of the first Venetian Archbishop, Victor Marcello (1477–84),[3] it attempted to secure the election of its candidate Nicolas Donato, Sixtus IV appointed Benedict Soranzo,[4] a member of the famous Venetian family, and a protonotary at the Roman curia. Venice, at the time on very bad terms with Sixtus, found the fact that the Pope had chosen him sufficient to warrant the worst suspicions,[5] and promptly arrested him and his people, and threw them into prison; but he was released when, after a close examination, nothing was found against him. He was accepted as Archbishop of Nicosia and put in possession of the temporalities. He was still only archbishop elect; the definite appointment was not made until the end of 1484 or beginning of 1485. Nevertheless, although this was the very time when, faced with the depopulation of Cyprus, the Republic was insisting[6] that holders of offices of all kinds, especially ecclesiastical, should live in the island,

[1] 28 Aug. 1477. M.L., *H.* III, p. 414. It is doubtful whether, as Ph. Georgiou states (p. 66), Venice caused all the Greek schools in the island to be closed.

[2] Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 87, describes the procedure. Cp. *Chor.* f. 31b. Pending confirmation by the home government, the bishop was given possession, but was not actually consecrated.

[3] M.L., *Arch.* pp. 301–4.

[4] *Ibid.* pp. 304–13.

[5] As Mas Latrie suggests, he may have been suspected of being an agent for the liberation of Cyprus from the Venetian yoke, though there is no evidence for such a thing.

[6] Navagero col. 1193B (7 April 1486).

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Soranzo was not allowed to go out to his see. Mortified by this treatment, when the Senate came round and decided that he should do so, he refused, although he was threatened with the loss of a large part of his revenues. Returning to Rome, he resumed his office of protonotary. He died on 6 July 1495.[1]

The absence of the archbishops from their see accentuated the decay of the Latin Church in the island. Felix Fabri, in 1483, complained that the bishops did not reside and that sees were bought and sold, and has a scathing characterization of a certain bishop, as a beardless young man, with a woman's face and manners.[2] Soon afterwards, the deplorable condition of the Church is described in an appeal which was made to the Pope at the instance of Queen Catherine in 1488.[3] Innocent VIII was asked to send out a provincial and some men fit to fill the vacant benefices, so that the schismatic Greeks might be enlightened in the true doctrine. A provincial of great learning, says the Queen, is necessary; there are no men left in the Kingdom who have any learning or professional knowledge of the Holy Scriptures.

Rome, however, turned a deaf ear to such appeals. In 1521 we find that a deputation to Venice from Cyprus[4] urged that the archbishops and bishops should reside there, because in their absence their churches and palaces were going to ruin. The Signory's representative in Rome was instructed to put this plea before the Pope. But Livio Podocataro, who was nominated Archbishop in 1524, never took personal possession of his see. In 1557 Bernard Navagero reported that when he informed Paul IV of the death of the Archbishop of Nicosia, the Pope expressed his surprise that his predecessors had left Cyprus so long without archbishops.[5] Meanwhile the churches continued to be shockingly neglected. Even the cathedral of Nicosia was so badly served that when the Rectors desired to go to mass they had to hunt round for some priest to

[1] His monument in the Minerva is by Andrea Bregno or a follower. *Bollettino d'Arte*, VI (1912), p. 243; Venturi, *Storia*, VI, p. 956.

[2] *Evagatorium*, III, pp. 242 f. It was no better under the Venetian regime. In Sept. 1500 (Sanudo, *Diarii*, III, 819) the Syndic reported that the bishops did not reside in Cyprus; it was three years since a confirmation had taken place; there were only the Greek bishops and vicars of bishops (not suffragans).

[3] Decision of the Senate, 17 March 1488. Colbertaldi, cited by M.L., *H.* III, p. 824; B.M. Add. MS. 8631, ff. 112–13.

[4] Sanudo, *Diarii*, XXIX, 629.

[5] *Cal. of State Papers, Venetian*, VI, p. 1374, no. 1088 (26 Nov. 1557).

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say it. The last Archbishop, Philip Mocenigo, however, put an end to this disgraceful state of things.[1]

The decadence of the Latin clergy inevitably encouraged any tendency for Catholics to desert to the Greek rite.[2] The decision of the Council of Florence in favour of union between the two Churches favoured it, although it was more than Rome had bargained for. The fusion—or confusion—proceeded so far that it was possible for the same priest to serve both a Latin and a Greek church, as Felix Fabri was shocked to find when he visited Stavrovouni in 1483.[3] 'This clerk was a monk, which I could not have known from his dress, for he wore a habit of camlet, and was curate of both churches, the Greek and the Latin, and performed indifferently the offices of either rite. On Sundays he first said Mass in the Latin church, and consecrated the Host, as do the Westerns, in unleavened bread. This done, he went over to the Greek church and consecrated as do the Easterns, in leavened bread. This displeased us mightily, and I set down that priest as a heretic of the worst kind, deceiving the people of both rites.'

One of the most remarkable churches in Cyprus, St John Lampadistes at Kalopanayiotis,[4] exemplifies the contact between the two communions. A Latin chapel on the north adjoins the Orthodox church on the south; they are under one roof, with nothing to separate them from each other. The wall-paintings in the Latin portion of the building are strongly under Italian influence, if not partly painted by an Italian hand.

If the substitution of Venetian for autonomous rule produced no definite change in the affairs of the two Churches and their relations with each other, there was an alteration in the atmosphere. The attitude of the Kings and their officers towards them may not have been inspired by spiritual motives, and the revenues of Latin and Greek churches may have been alike considered legitimate objects for plunder.[5] But the grievance was felt more acutely when it was suffered at the

[1] Sagredo's Report, 1562. M.L., *H.* III, pp. 542–3.

[2] Hackett, pp. 152 f.; Papaïoannou, I, pp. 200 f.

[3] Fabri, tr. Stewart, I, pp. 199–200; Hackett, *loc. cit.*; Cobham, *Exc. Cypr.* pp. 40–1.

[4] Jeffery, *Hist. Mon.* p. 287; Gunnis, p. 245. See also p. 1139. For a similar practice of building chapels with two naves, one for the Orthodox, the other for the Latin rite, in Chios, see Argenti's ed. of Hieron. Giustiniani, *Hist. of Chios*, Intr., p. xxviii.

[5] The Latin Bishop of Lemesos complained in 1475 that he had been robbed of a quarter of his revenues by royal officers (*Nuovo Arch. Ven.* XVI, p. 170).

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hands of a government sitting fifteen hundred miles away. The Signory, it is true, took care to continue ecclesiastical administration on the old lines, as is exemplified by its response to an appeal made by the Cypriotes in 1490.[1] It was pointed out that many monasteries had become abandoned, because the provisions to which they were entitled by their endowments were charged at more than their value, or were consigned to distant places; for instance, a monastery might have its provisions assigned at Paphos, from which it was distant ninety miles, so that in the end it received only some tenth of its due. The Signory ordered that the Rectors should maintain in full the endowments which had been made by the Kings, and the provisions should be consigned to places as near as possible to the houses concerned.

In respect of tithes, again, we find orders by the Rectors that they must be regularly paid to the Archbishop and his three suffragans, and that accounts must be rendered by the local officials,[2] or that the farmer of the royal dye-works must also pay tithes to the Archbishop.[3] The tithes, however, which the government exacted from the Commandery of Phinika, went not to the Church, but to the maintenance of the stradiotes.[4]

We have some evidence, from various sources, of the relative wealth of the religious foundations during the Venetian regime. In the early years of the sixteenth century[5] the revenues of the Archbishop of Nicosia and his suffragans of Paphos, Lemesos and Famagusta were 6000, 2000, 1500 and 1000 ducats respectively; while the Greek bishops of the same sees had only 600, 400, 200 and 200 each. The revenues of all the clergy and Orders (including the Hospital's three Commanderies, with 9800 ducats) amounted to 26,400 ducats. The richest of the monasteries was the abbey of Mangana, with 600 ducats. In 1529[6] the revenues were for the most part less: of the Latins, the archbishopric had 5500 ducats; Paphos stood at 2000, Lemesos was down to 1000 and Famagusta to 800 ducats. The Greek bishops between them were up to 1600 ducats; the three Commanderies down to 7200 ducats. In 1559[7]

[1] M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* pp. 543–4.
[2] 1496. M.L., *H.* III, p. 492; *Reg. C.N.* no. 133.
[3] 1497. M.L., *H.* III, p. 537; *Reg. C.N.* no. 136.
[4] 1500. M.L., *Doc. Nouv.* p. 563.
[5] In the document which we date between 1510 and 1521: M.L., *H.* III, pp. 502 f.
[6] Report of Silvester Minio, Sanudo, *Diarii*, LI, 442–9.
[7] M.L., *H.* III, p. 542, n. 4.

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the revenues of the Latin sees (we have no information about the others) were curiously different: Nicosia, with 13,000 ducats (more than it had enjoyed under the later Kings) was the richest of all sees under Venice; Famagusta had risen to 2000; Paphos to 3000; while Lemesos had fallen to 800—the same revenue as it had drawn in the depressed days of 1459.[1]

It was doubtless as a matter of prestige that the Venetian government most valued its control over the appointments to the Latin sees in Cyprus, a control which, in spite of occasional papal opposition, was tighter than the Kings had exercised. Politically—as was clear in the case of Louis Perez Fabregues—an archbishop out of sympathy with Venice was a danger. Its attitude towards the Greek sees was different; the best candidate for an appointment was the one who brought the largest contribution, by gift or loan, to the exchequer. Sufficient examples of the way in which competitions for such sees were handled have already been given.[2]

Although Venice had so powerful a voice in the choice of the Archbishop of Cyprus, it was not until 1560 that Pius IV definitely placed the patronage of the see of Nicosia in the hands of the Signory, in acknowledgement of the services rendered by it in the defence of Cyprus. It was to have the right to present a Venetian patrician to the Holy See at every vacancy, just as if it had founded and endowed the Church.[3] It was in accordance with this privilege that the last Latin Archbishop of Nicosia, Philip Mocenigo, was elected.

The interpenetration of the two faiths, to the growth of which we have already called attention, excited more notice as time went on, and the influence of the Latin Church diminished. Archbishop Philip Mocenigo, for instance, found that in the same house a man, his wife, and children and others might be found professing different creeds; that

[1] *Nuovo Arch. Ven.* XVI (1898), p. 151.

[2] Ch. XIII, p. 778. In 1533 (Sanudo, *Diarii*, LVIII, 598) the Rectors reported that the Greek Bishops of Paphos and Lefkara being dead, the *università*, to whom the power of election belonged, elected Nicolas Mortato of Paphos Bishop of that see, and the Protopapas Peter Generin di Santa Odigitria Bishop of Lefkara. The second see, in the text as printed, appears as 'Bericaria' or 'Bericaja', but Lefkara must be meant.

[3] *Libri Comm., Reg.* VI, p. 298, no. 72 (19 Dec. 1560); Lusignan, *Descr.* ff. 88b, 211; Raynaldus, 1560, p. 107, § 91.—It is to be noted that Paul IV commended the Signory for not nominating one person rather than another for the see. *Cal. of State Papers, Venetian*, VI, p. 1374, no. 1088 (26 Nov. 1557).

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a man who on other days professed to be an Orthodox Greek, on Greek fast-days claimed to live as a Latin, and conversely; and also that some of the Latin clergy followed the Greek custom of marrying a wife.[1] The Dominican, Stephen de Lusignan, had a brother who became a Basilian monk, and a sister who entered the same Order, while two of his cousins were Latin canons of Paphos and archdeacons of Lemesos.[2] The relaxation of the obstacles placed by the Roman Church in the way of mixed marriages must have contributed largely to such a state of affairs.[3]

Devout Roman Catholic as he was, Stephen could not help admiring the scene when members of the heretic churches, in company with the Latins, joined in certain religious celebrations. It is a fine thing, he says,[4] to see so many nations go in procession in festival attire, on Corpus Domini or St Mark's Day. You see going first a Greek cross, and under it the crowd of the populace, in no order; they are followed by their priests,[5] carrying the image of the Holy Virgin, and after that a crowd of women, and this is the way the Greeks always make their processions. Then follow the Greek monks, each monastery with its cross, although they are all of the Basilian Order. The Greek nuns, however, walk with the other women, without any distinction. After the Greek monks come the Latin Mendicant Orders, then the Latin monasteries, accompanied by the various other nations (Armenians, Maronites, Copts, Jacobites, Ethiopians or Indians, Nestorians, Iberians, Georgians), with their priests in copes, and with their bishops, some of whom wear

[1] Raynaldus, 1560, p. 108, § 91. Felix Fabri had noticed long before (tr. Stewart, I, p. 200) that 'many Latin priests transfer themselves to the Greek rite that they may venture on marriage, yet at the same time they wish to enjoy the liberty of priests of the Latin rite, which is not theirs'. That the marriage of members of the Latin religious Orders was tolerated in Cyprus is clear from cases recorded at Lemesos and Bellapais (below, p. 1103). But the toleration of such breaches of the law of celibacy by priests of the Roman Church was by no means confined to regions exposed to Greek influence (Marc Bloch, *La société féodale; les classes et le gouvernement des hommes*, p. 100, of England).

[2] *Chor.* f. 79.

[3] As long as both parties had been baptized, even by a heretic or schismatic, there was no longer any objection to such marriages. Aimilianides in Κυπρ. Σπ. II, p. 206.

[4] *Chor.* f. 35; *Descr.* f. 75b. In the latter book, however, he is careful to begin by saying that a difference in ceremonies corresponded to a difference in the opinions and natures of the various sects.

[5] In the *Description*, the style of the Greek copes, different from the Latin, is described.

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turbans Oriental fashion; each nation chanting in its own language. The Latin secular priests and canons follow, with their archbishop; then the King (wearing his crown and regalia) with all his court; or, since the end of the Kingdom, the Regimento with the nobles.[1]

Nevertheless, it must not be supposed that all was harmony between the rival Churches. Indifference doubtless largely prevailed; but there were many who, like the Dominicans Stephen himself and his friend Angelo Calepio, felt strongly; and the latter expressed his feeling without reserve. He was scandalized when, during the siege of Nicosia, he having been authorized to collect alms for the building of a church to be dedicated to Our Lady of Victory, certain Greeks ('to crown all their iniquities and invite Heaven the sooner to visit them with the just punishment of their schism') refused to contribute to a church of the Latin rite.[2] Lusignan, again, says that he passes over in silence the insults and indignities which the Greeks inflicted on the Archbishop and similar matters, which for the moment he does not wish to mention.[3] He is probably referring to Archbishop Mocenigo's attempt to induce the Greeks to accept the decrees of the Council of Trent. For Calepio tells us[4] that

> when the Most Reverend Archbishop Philip Mocenigo, having returned from the Council of Trent, did like a most vigilant shepherd, using all tact and moderation, exhort them to accept the sacred and holy Oecumenical Council of Trent, they would never do so, but with no little fury gave vent to the noxious poison of disobedience which was buried in their hearts. It was clear to all how they hated the faith of the Latin Church, holding it to be heretical; they allowed no Latin to celebrate upon their altars, regarding them as profane persons; and when the Rectors wished to hear Mass in their churches, they had to have portable altars. And all the time, up to the war, what did not the poor Archbishop suffer, how many exhortations did he not address to Greeks, Armenians, Copts and Maronites, Jacobites and Nestorians! And yet many times these Greeks plotted against him (witness the fact that they carried arms under their cloaks to make an end of the Latins). They would never accept the Council or its decrees, or the Eighth Council of Florence. Indeed the Greek Bishop Loarà said openly to me, when I was sent by the above-named most illustrious Archbishop to enlighten him and

[1] The *Chorograffia* has this alternative, while the *Description* speaks only of the King and his court, whom Lusignan himself can never have seen.

[2] Lusignan, *Chor.* f. 103.

[3] Lusignan, *Descr.* f. 211.

[4] *Chor.* f. 108. Omitted in the *Description*.

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exhort him to obey the Holy Church and fulfil the oath that he had sworn: 'My son', he said, 'the bounds are set between us and you, between Latins and Greeks, and the cures and the flocks are divided between us, so that I have the cure of my Greek people and the Archbishop only that of the Latins. The Eighth and Ninth Councils were held about matters in question between you Latins, they have nothing to do with us.'

Calepio continues in this strain, ending by recording with satisfaction the Divine Judgement which visited this wicked bishop, who died suddenly.

There were indeed those who would have liked to see the Greek bishoprics altogether suppressed, and among them no less intelligent a person than Bernard Sagredo.[1] He writes very much in the tone of Calepio. The Greek bishops, he says, are ignorant, and malignant against those who observe the Latin rite, considering them excommunicate. There is no crime that they will not commit for money, so that they make a good deal, especially by giving the tonsure to those who have committed some offence, and it is made to seem as though they had been tonsured many years before. In this way the criminals escape punishment, because the bishops inflict none on them. Finally, he thinks, nay he is certain, that it would be well discreetly to remove the bishops, especially him of Nicosia, from their rule over the island. But for them, all the people would obey the Italian Archbishop and bishops, and there would never be any controversy such as there was when the Archbishop wished to publish the decrees of the Council (of Trent); the said Greek bishops not only declined to publish them, but tried to raise the people against our Archbishop and bishops. The removal of these bishops would put an end to all dissension and scandal, and intending criminals would abstain, because, not being claimed by the bishop as under his jurisdiction, they would certainly be punished. It would also obviate certain scandals which arise when those who have had a relative or a friend wounded or killed take vengeance on the criminal when they see him walking about with impunity.

Sagredo, however, is far from being blind to the failings of the Latin clergy. He has praise for Archbishop Philip Mocenigo,[2] and for the

[1] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 542–3; Hackett, p. 175, n. 1; Papaïoannou, I, p. 231 n.

[2] Palmieri (in Vacant-Mangenot, col. 2454) is wrong in supposing that this Archbishop took part in the War of Cyprus. He was in Venice when it broke out, and did not return to the island (Kyprianos, p. 306). He died at Rome in 1586.

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Bishops of Famagusta and Paphos, who do their duty by their churches. But he has a hit at the Bishop of Lemesos, of whom he says he can say nothing, because he does not reside in his see; and little good is to be expected from that Dominican friar who has left his monastery to live there for a small remuneration, and acts as the Bishop's vicar.[1] And this is what he says of the great Abbey of Bellapaïs:[2]

> It is all in ruins, and the services are not maintained; but all the brethren have wives, and the revenues are assigned to their children so that the brethren live in great penury. If the Signory (which has the patronage of the Abbey) will not take steps to put an end to this misappropriation, which has not its authority nor that of the Pope, everything will go to perdition. It is a great sin to see so great an Abbey, such a miracle of architecture, falling into ruin. It will be a pious and godly work to cause it to be served by religious of pure life, and not leave it, a shocking example and a scandal, in the hands of persons who serve it according to neither Greek nor Latin rite, but, one may say, according to the Arian, or Turkish; for one of them has affirmed that some of them have as many as three wives.[3]

That Sagredo's strictures were not without foundation is shown by the fact that at a chapter general of the Premonstratensian Order in 1570 it was decreed that a letter should be written to the Venetian Senate, recommending the reform of the Abbey. 'But Selim II', says the historian of the Order, 'rendered this wise provision of the Fathers of none effect'.[4]

The Turkish conquest, indeed, simplified the situation, so far as rivalry between the two Churches was concerned, by removing one of the two parties. The Turks had no love for the Latins, and had already expelled them from Rhodes when they took it from the Knights of St John.[5] It can hardly be said that the record of the Roman Church in Cyprus, apart from its contribution to the ecclesiastical architecture,

[1] There is no doubt that Sagredo refers to Stephen de Lusignan (cp. M.L., note *ad loc.*). The absentee Bishop was Andrew Mocenigo (Hackett, p. 576). It was not he, but his successor Serafino Fortebraccio, who behaved so gallantly in the siege of Famagusta.

[2] M.L., *H.* III, pp. 543–4; Hackett, p. 614; Papaïoannou, III, p. 164.

[3] The Franciscan who served the cathedral at Lemesos in 1482 was also married. Casola, himself a Franciscan, records this without comment though he says that the friar and his colleagues lived under horrible conditions.

[4] Hugo, *Sacri Ord. Praem. Annales*, I, cols. 653–4, quoted by M.L., *H.* III, p. 545 n.

[5] Vertot, III, p. 323.

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was such as to excite any great regret for its disappearance from the scene.

Long before the Turkish conquest of Cyprus the elder Sanudo had observed that, though the Western Powers might destroy the Byzantine Empire, they could not hold their conquests, for the examples of Cyprus, Crete, the principality of Achaia and the Duchy of Athens showed that only the foreign conquerors and not the natives belonged to the Roman faith.[1] The tendency to fusion which we have noticed in Cyprus was due to the weakening of Latins who wandered into the Greek fold, rather than to any approach from the Greek side. It is possible that Sanudo was right, and that the whole history of the Levant might have been different, and the conquests of the crusaders might have been held, but for religious bigotry on both sides which was a fatal obstacle to any union of the Churches.[2]

[1] W. Miller, *Essays*, p. 78. For Crete in the 16th cent. see *ibid.* p. 190.

[2] 'The Greek resents being governed by those of another race and creed, especially if that creed be Roman Catholicism.' *Ibid.* p. 198.

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CHAPTER XVII

LITERATURE AND THE FINE ARTS

From the backward condition of the Greek-speaking population of medieval Cyprus it resulted that Cypriotes of unusual intellectual ability were attracted to centres, such as Byzantium, where they found scope for their talents. Writers on the literary history of the island in the Middle Ages usually begin with George (afterwards called Gregory) of Cyprus. But beyond the fact that he was of Cypriote origin, and endeavoured, in vain, to get himself educated in Lefkosia,[1] he has no connexion with the land of his birth; his sphere as theologian and churchman was Byzantium, where he actually filled the patriarchal throne for six years from 1283. He belongs to Byzantine not to Cypriote literary history.[2]

More definitely associated with Cyprus is a lesser George, called Lapethes or Lapithios, who lived in the first half of the fourteenth century, and is known to history as a friend of King Hugh IV, who enjoyed his philosophical and literary conversation.[3] His works include a tedious poem of some fifteen hundred lines on the duties of a citizen, which belies his reputation. But he seems to have been a Latin as well as Greek scholar of some distinction, and from his retreat on St Hilarion corresponded with such men as Nikephoros Gregoras, George Akindynos and the monk Barlaam.

But the outstanding monuments of Greek writing in Cyprus,[4] besides

[1] Above, p. 1068.

[2] See Sakellarios, I, p. 790; Krumbacher, *Gesch. Byz. Lit.*[2] pp. 98f., 476f.

[3] Above, Ch. V, p. 305, n. 2. See Boissonade in *Notices et Extraits*, XII (1831), pt ii, pp. 3–74; Sakellarios, I, p. 791; Sathas, Μνημ. IV (1883), p. vi; Krumbacher, *op. cit.* pp. 781f.; A. Pernaris in Διαλέξεις περὶ τῆς Κυπρ. ποιήσεως, pp. 61–2.

[4] In connexion with Greek writing in medieval Cyprus it may be of interest to mention that Hugh I corresponded in that language with the Sultan of Konia, Kai-Kaus 'Izz ed-Din (1211–19), on matters of trade, and that the Thessalonican monk, Matthew Blastares, dedicated a work in the early fourteenth century to συργῆ ντε Λεξινιάνῳ, Sir Guy de Lusignan, uncle of the king, probably Guy Prince of Galilee, uncle of Peter II. See Lambros in Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων, V, pp. 40f.; B. E. C. Miller, in *Not. et Extr.* XXXI, ii (1886), pp. 100–1; Iorga, *Hist. de la vie Byzantine*, III (1934), p. 196. The scenario of a Passion play, found in a 13th-cent. MS (H. Stevenson,

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the translation of the *Assises de la Cour des Bourgeois*, which is of no literary interest, are the two Chronicles of Leontios Machaeras and George Bustron, of which so much use has been made in the preceding pages. Yet even of these it must be said that they bear the marks of being the work of men who, of Cypriote origin though they might be, were so closely associated with the Frankish ruling classes and so much assimilated to them in sentiment that, had the matter of the books come down to us in French or Italian, we should hardly have suspected the authors of being Cypriotes. Of Machaeras it has been said[1] that 'politically, although in § 27 we see his feeling for the Greeks against the intruding Franks, he was much in sympathy with the feudal government and had all the aristocrat's contempt for the peasants, though they were of his own religion and blood.... With all this liking for the Frankish kings, he was at the same time instinctively a Greek: nothing can be more characteristic than the very apparent pride which he shows in § 158 for "good Greek", and his scarcely veiled contempt for the mixed and barbarous dialect which the Cypriotes of his own day were using.' The first of the two passages to which reference is here made describes how the Syrians and Latins who settled in the island obtained from the king the privilege that they should not be judged like the men of the land, whose evidence should not be believed against their own; and if one of the poor folk of the country should raise his hand against one of the king's vassals, that hand should be cut off. This was done to bring down the pride of the Greeks that they might not rebel as they had done against the Templars. The second passage is that to be quoted below (p. 1107) about the barbarous language of his compatriots. In spite, nevertheless, of occasional glimpses such as these passages afford, it remains true that the general tone of his Chronicle hardly betrays its Cypriote origin. His editor goes on to point out that he is free of the learned tradition of Byzantium, and that, if his fresh and individual style has debts, they are to contemporary French models rather than

Cod. MSS. graeci Palat. Bibl. Vat. no. 367), written by one Constantine, a tutor, and head of the record office in Cyprus, is hardly to be reckoned as literature; but it is interesting as the only surviving attempt to introduce into Greek-speaking lands a mystery play on Western lines. See S. Baud-Bovy, *Byzantion*, xiii (1938) pp. 332–3; text and translation by A. Vogt, *ibid.* vi (1931), pp. 37–74.

[1] Dawkins, II, pp. 3 f. For Machaeras and other historical sources mentioned in these pages, see also the Note on Authorities. The delightful Taylorian Lecture on Machaeras by Dawkins appeared when this Chapter was already in type.

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to the learned Byzantine writers. That is a fortunate circumstance, for to this escape from the steam-roller of Byzantine sophistication we owe one of the most lively of chronicles, not unworthy in many passages to rank beside the narrative of Philip de Novare, and equally inspired by hatred of the foreign bully—the Genoese in this case, as Frederick II in Philip's. It has been somewhat naively complained of him[1] that he is too ready to retail scandals, especially about women: but in this respect there is not much to choose between him and his fellow-chroniclers or any other writer of court-history.

George Bustron is a less striking personality than Machaeras. He writes without any pretence to style and, as was said of him by Florio Bustron, quite dispassionately. Rarely does he give a hint of his opinion on a moral question, as when he remarks that God did not allow one of James the Bastard's designs to take effect. One feels that, if it had succeeded, he would have related the episode without comment. He is, if possible, even more impartial than Machaeras; and his descriptions are almost as lively. The relations between King John, Queen Helena and the Bastard could not be more naturally and effectively touched off than in George's words:

> The Apostoles took horse and went to his father's court; and when he entered the courtyard, he found the men armed, and seeing them he began to laugh; and the King secretly told those who were friendly to the Apostoles to be careful not to do him displeasure. And they took him up into the chamber where the Queen lay sick. And when the King saw him, he began to scold him, and showed him an ill countenance in appearance, but secretly much affection, and that which he did he did because of the Queen, because she hated the Apostoles.

So much for the matter of the two chronicles; but the language, corrupt though it may be, has an extremely interesting character of its own. Machaeras confesses to its uncouthness when he says, in a well-known passage,[2] that 'when the Latin period began, men began to learn French, and their Greek became barbarous, just as it is to-day, when we write both French and Greek in such a way that no one in the world can say what our language is'. Those who read it now would perhaps rather say that no one would take it for anything but Cypriote. We are

[1] Mas Latrie in *Arch. de l'Orient lat.* II, pp. 170f.
[2] Dawkins, § 158.

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reminded of the fact that though the products of Cypriote art throughout the ages may seem to be compounded of heterogeneous elements, Greek and Oriental and Western inextricably mixed, their Cypriote origin leaps to the eye.

The current of popular poetry, concerning the most important elements of which, the 'akritic' ballads, a word has been said in the preceding volume, continued to flow with considerable force throughout the period with which we are concerned, and still trickles on at the present day.[1] In matter, as in form, it reveals itself as a branch of the general Greek tradition. The culture of the Franks influenced it not at all, except in its late stages;[2] it seems hardly to reflect at any point the presence in the island of a foreign ruling class. In this sphere the people were more successful in standing aloof from the intruder than they were in the fine arts, in which even the village churches show a gradual penetration by Western influences. That is only to be expected where technical skill is more necessary than it is in the construction of 'tribal lays', the technique of which in Cyprus was of the most elementary kind. (The great majority of the poems, whether blank or rhyming, are in monotonous fifteen syllable verse.) As to matter, it was but rarely that a local happening seized the imagination of the Cypriote versifier.[3] The tragedy of Joanna l'Aleman and her persecution by Queen Eleanor, which is the subject of the ballads of the Queen and Arodaphnousa, has already been mentioned in these pages.[4] This story in the ballads differs considerably from the historical narrative. Naturally it is framed in the usual ballad furniture. The heroine is the fairest of three sisters—the others are Krystallo and Little Helen, or Rose and

[1] A collection of specimens is in Sakellarios, Τὰ Κυπριακά, II (1891). The Κύπρια Επη of X. P. Pharmakides, is more critical; he gives explanatory notes, and records the dates and places at which he took down the ballads, and the names and ages of the persons who recited them, and whether they were literate or not. The most recent studies of the subject are by L. Philippou, Τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ Γράμματα ἐν Κύπρῳ (1930), I, pp. 25–6; II, pp. 1–21, and by K. Chatzeioannou in Διαλέξεις περὶ τῆς Κυπριακῆς ποιήσεως (1938), pp. 25–43. For the various types of poietarides in the present day, see the article in *Laographia*, VII, pp. 115–20.

[2] For instance, the translations from Petrarch in the book of erotic poems which once belonged to the humanist Natale Conti, and is now in the Marciana (Legrand, *Bibl. grecque vulgaire*, II, 1881, pp. lxiv–lxvi, 58–93).

[3] The historical τραγούδια of Cyprus have recently been specially studied by Kostas Prousis in Κυπρ. Σπ. VII (1943), Lefkosia 1945.

[4] Above, Ch. VI, p. 361, n. 3.

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Anthousa. The King, who is far away when the Queen is at her fell work, hears and recognizes the cries of the heroine, rises from the table calling for his horse, and in less time than it takes to say good-day or good-bye, rides a thousand, two thousand miles, arrives and forces the Queen's door ('open to me, Queen, the Turks pursue me'),[1] and finds that she has cut off her rival's head or thrown her into the fire. There are pleasing touches, evidently drawn from the contemporary fashionable lady,[2] in the picture of Arodaphnousa going to the palace, bathed and perfumed, clad in her finest attire, carrying a branch of rosemary to shade her from the sun, and a golden apple to play with in her hand; or mounting the palace stairs, with swaying figure and coquettish gesture.

But most of these narrative poems refer to imaginary episodes and popular traditions, drawn from the common stock of Greek folk-poetry. The most famous example is the story of the Foundation Sacrifice,[3] the Cypriote version of which belongs to the 'Bridge of Arta' group, as distinguished from the 'Building of Scutari' group. There is a single master-craftsman who is warned by the voice of an Archangel that his blood must be sacrificed if the bridge (in the Cypriote version it is the Bridge of the Trikha) is to be successfully built. On the old but fallacious argument that wives can be replaced, but a mother or grandfather or sister not, he decides to make his wife the victim. She is lured down on the pretext of searching for her husband's lost ring, and is immured in the foundations. Her name Rodaphnousa, it may be noted, recalls that of the woman in the ballad mentioned above.

Another widely distributed poem, of which two versions, if not more, survive in the Cypriote dialect, is the *Song of the Hundred Words* (Τὰ Ἑκατόλογα).[4] A young man is in love with a beautiful maiden.

[1] In one of Pharmakides' versions 'Janissaries are running after me, Janissaries with their swords, Franks with their knives'; in the other the pursuers are Saracens. By such variations the ballads are brought up to date.

[2] But the description of the perfect type of the lady, which Mrs Talbot Rice (p. 175) supposes to come from this ballad, is from a very different source, La Tour-Landry.

[3] See W. R. Halliday in *Journal of the Gypsy Lore Society*, 3rd ser. vol. 4. I have to thank Principal Halliday for this and other references to this subject. See also the Albanian version from Berat published by Mrs Hasluck in *Man*, Mar.–Apr. 1946. For the Cypriote versions see Philippou, *op. cit.* II, pp. 9, 10, and Κυπρ. Χρον. XI (1935), pp. 97–100; also Kythreotes in Κυπρ. Γράμμ. X (1945), pp. 79–82.

[4] D. C. Hesseling et H. Pernot, Ἐρωτοπαίγνια (*Chansons d'Amour*), Ἑκατόλογα (*Chanson des cent mots*), Paris-Athènes, 1913. One of the Cypriote versions is in Sakellarios, II, pp. 38–45.

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She says that he is very young, but promises that she will satisfy his desires if he can solve a hundred allusions which she will set him. Then follow verses, beginning with one, two, three, etc. After he has successfully explained the first ten, she allows him to proceed by tens. Having solved all the numbers, he is given his reward; but no sooner has he enjoyed it than he turns upon her and cruelly insults her. The popularity of such a song is an instance of the attraction which all kinds of counting games have for childish and unsophisticated minds.

For the historian of Cyprus the most important example of the rhyming poems belongs to the very end of the period with which this volume is concerned, for the *Threnos* of Cyprus[1] describes the Turkish invasion and the capture of Nicosia. Written by one who went through the siege, and had to lament the loss of a son and daughter, taken prisoners by the Turks, it is, from the technical point of view, a deplorable performance; it has been remarked that the humble versifier is intolerably redundant in his rhyming, making the same poverty-stricken rhyme cover as many as fifty verses; but genuine feeling penetrates through the jog-trot rhythm of his recital. Lusignan tells us that he had listened with much emotion to a lament on the ruin of Nicosia, which may have been one of the two dirges on that subject which have survived, and also to a ballad describing the Turkish attack on Malta.[2]

The dating of popular poetry is always a matter of great difficulty. The majority of the narrative poems probably originated before the Turkish period, but the form in which they are preserved may be considerably modified by foreign influences, just as the akritic ballads suffered the intrusion of French and Turkish words. The *Threnos* which has been mentioned was evidently written about 1570. One of the most pathetic of the rhyming tales, that of the Pasha and the daughter of the Papas,[3] is obviously later still. Much older than either of these

[1] Ed. S. Menardos, Δελτίον τῆς Ἱστορ. καὶ Ἐθνολ. Ἑταιρείας τῆς Ἑλλάδος, VI (1906); more complete in Κυπρ. Χρον. III (1925), pp. 56–82. See most recently the discussion of its authorship by Prousis in Κυπρ. Σπ. VII, pp. 26–9.

[2] On this also there is a poem in Sakellarios, II, pp. 181–3.

[3] Philippou, II, p. 12 (cp. Κυπρ. Χρον. VIII, pp. 157–9). The Pasha, landing at Scala, hears that the Papas has a beautiful daughter and immediately demands her for his harem. The Papas denies that he has a daughter, and is put to the torture. The girl, hearing of this, and unable to bear that her father should suffer, goes to the window of her house, is seen and taken to the Pasha, who coaxes her and has her instructed

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is the already mentioned *Song of the Hundred Words*. It has been thought that it belongs to the same period as the Akritika;[1] but all that is certain is that, since the text was already corrupt in the fifteenth century, the original was older. Rhyme only appeared, under Italian influence, in Greek verse-writing, in the fifteenth century; the original of this song was not rhymed, but rhyme was later intruded into one part of it, that which enumerates the hundred words.

Among the numerous narratives of the siege of Nicosia was one written by John Sozomeno, who played a conspicuous part in the siege, was taken prisoner by Mustafa, ransomed himself and returned to Venice. It has been asserted that his narrative took the form of a poem in Greek, and that the work which has come down to us in Italian, under his name, and was published at Bologna in 1571, was a translation of this poem. But the truth seems to be that he wrote in prose in Italian, a tongue in which he was unpractised, and had to enlist the services of a friend to make his work presentable.[2] In any case, the original draft is lost, as is also the Chronicle of Cyprus by Solomon Rodinos of Potamia, which began with the appearance of the Turkish fleet off Cyprus, and fully described the conquest of the island, dealing at the same time with earthquakes and droughts.[3]

The so-called Stradiote verse, although written in Italian and not in Greek, falls properly into place beside the popular Greek poetry in virtue of its authorship and its manner. The chief representative of the style is the stradiote Manoli Blessi, whose lively doggerel songs on military themes such as the capture of Margarition and the fall of Nicosia are written in the Venetian dialect interlarded with phonetic renderings of Greek words. A stanza describing the explosion at Famagusta of the galleon laden with spoils has already been cited (p. 987).[4]

in the faith of Islam. But before she becomes a Moslem, she goes to say farewell to her home. Her mother is in terrible distress, and prays that she may see her girl dead rather than a Moslem; they embrace each other and expire.

[1] Sakellarios, II, p. ιδ'.

[2] See above, Ch. XV, p. 1004, n. 4. Sathas, Νεοελληνικὴ Φιλολογία, p. 191, is responsible for including him among Greek writers.

[3] Sakellarios, I, p. 793. The information comes from Solomon's son Neophytos Rodinos.

[4] Sathas (Μνημ. IV, pp. lviif.; VII, pp. 236–61; VIII, pp. 466–511; IX, pp. 262–80) reprints his poems on the capture of Margarition (Venice, 1571) and on that of Nicosia (Venice, 1572), as well as the poem entitled *I fatti e le prodezze di Manoli Blessi Strathioto* (Venice, 1561) which was written by the comic poet M. Antonio Molino

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If the popular literature of Cyprus seems almost entirely to ignore the existence of the intrusive Franks, it is equally true of the Frankish authors that they do not concern themselves with the subject people except when they are compelled to do so by the exigencies of historical writing. For the most brilliant among them, Philip de Novare, the Greek-Cypriote populace seems not to exist. The war between Frederick II and the Ibelins which he describes so vividly might just as well, for all he tells us, have been fought out in any other land where German Emperor and French barons might come into conflict with each other. Nor, it must be confessed, is Philip acutely conscious of the cause which professedly drew to the East the Franks and the other nations which took part in the Crusades. It is true that the war against the infidel does not fall within the scope of his narrative, which could be completed without even mentioning Jerusalem. But, although he might sympathize with his hero, the Old Lord of Beirut, when he refused to do anything which might, to the shame of Christendom, hamper the

detto Burchiella, a parody of the *Orlando Furioso* in Stradiote verse. See also Legrand, *Bibl. Hellén.*, XV^e^ et XVI^e^ siècles, II, pp. 191–8. From the *Presa di Nicosia* we may quote stanzas 92–4, describing the fate of Cypriote women at the sack of Nicosia:

92 Ma un *morfitera* (bella) Cipriota,
d'ogni honor degna signora,
visto c'have la so rota,
pensò'l modo de inscir fuora
de sto mondo; et fece al hora
un gran fuogo del fassetti;
O Strathiotti puveretti.

93 Et con essa el so *pedia* (fioli)
tolti in brazzo, e puo sul fogo
se la buta, al morte ria.
O méschina, fè mal zuogo,
parecchiarsi un simel rogo
a ti soi viril concetti!
O Strathiotti puveretti.

94 L'altre nobile in cisterne
col fioletti se butavan,
per veder chel zente esterne,
como draghi in caxe andavan
depredando, e ognun cazzavan,
come fusseno cavretti.
O Strathiotti puveretti.

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Emperor's expedition, there is little doubt that the defence of the feudal rights of the French ruling class and, within that society, of the Ibelins even more than the Lusignans, had a larger place in his heart than the recovery of the Holy City. As it is, he gives us an extremely lively and no doubt accurate picture of the feudal society of his age, and his outlines would have been less clear, his narrative less picturesque and certainly less cheerful, had he taken the broader and less biased view which might have won the approval of the professional historian. He is throughout bitterly hostile to Frederick II and the five knights who supported him against the Ibelins.

One of the most distinguished of French scholars[1] appreciates Novare's work as a little masterpiece, worthy to rank with the best pieces of this genre in any literature. The poems included in the story do not, he says, deserve the adverse verdict which has been passed upon them. They are the work, it is true, of an amateur, not of a professional 'trouveur', but of a knight and a man of the world, yet a member of an educated society, familiar with the best French poetry of the time.

The portions of the *Gestes des Chiprois*, other than the work of Philip de Novare which is imbedded in that compilation, are of small literary interest. The same is true of other thirteenth-century French sources for the history of Cyprus (Ernoul and the continuators of William of Tyre). Nor, for the purposes of the present sketch, need we do more than mention the law-books which compose the *Assises de Jérusalem*, to which sections were contributed by Philip de Novare himself in his *Livre de forme de plait*, and by his pupil John d'Ibelin, Count of Jaffa and Ascalon, in the important *Livre de Jean d'Ibelin*, which took place as the officially recognized authority for the law of Cyprus.

Literature as an art pursued for its own sake produced in Cyprus at all times but a scanty harvest. In the thirteenth century we have a long allegorical poem by one Jean, Sire de Journy, entitled *La Dîme de Pénitance*.[2] Preserved in a single manuscript in the British Museum, it is dated 1288. Nothing is known of the author, except what he tells us

[1] Gaston Paris, 'Les mémoires de Philippe de Novare', in *Revue de l'Orient latin*, IX (1902), pp. 164–205. In this article the writer disposes (pp. 173–87) of the attack by Paul Richter on Philip's integrity as a writer and originality as a historian.

[2] Br. Mus .Add. MS. 10015. First noticed by P. Meyer; see his *Documents manuscrits de l'anc. lit. de la France*, I (1881), pp. 13–15, 50–61. The full text with commentary by H. Breymann, *La Dîme de Pénitance... von Jehan von Journi* (Bibl. d. Litt. Ver. in Stuttgart), Tübingen, 1874.

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himself.[1] He had been in the habit of writing light verse, *faux fabliaux*. The gloomy prospect which was opening before the Franks in Syria, where

ches cités que j'ai nommées
Si sont si griefment apressées
Qu'eles n'ont tere pour semer
Ne dont vivre fors que de mer,

had turned his mind to more serious things. He was now atoning for past frivolities with something more profitable. He concludes his poem, which he wrote, a sick man, at Nicosia in 1288 and which runs to 3295 lines, with a long prayer for various contemporary princes, including first of all

mon seigneur le roi Henri
Que Sarasin ont amenri
De toute la gregnour partie
Qui affiert à sa seigneurie.

The only writers of the fourteenth century concerned with Cyprus who need detain us are both associated with the most remarkable personality in the history of the island in the Middle Ages, Peter I. Philip de Mézières (1327–1405), it is true, was no Cypriote, but he was for a time so closely connected with Peter, as his faithful adherent, and Chancellor of Cyprus from 1363, that he calls for at least a passing mention here. Like Peter, he attempted to found a new Order of Chivalry, the Order of the Passion, with much the same object as Peter's Order of the Sword; the first redaction of his *Nova Religio Passionis* dates from 1367–8. But, though he found much support, the project came to nothing. Like St Peter Thomas, whose life he wrote in 1366, he shared King Peter's humiliation at the failure of the Crusade which opened so promisingly with the capture of Alexandria. His connexion with Cyprus practically ceased with the murder of the King, although he continued to call himself Chancellor to the end of his days. Cultivating the vein of allegory popular in his time, he composed, long after his retirement from Cyprus, the *Songe du vieil pelerin* (1389), in which he denounces the wickedness of his contemporaries, especially in

[1] Breymann's researches have discovered various other members of the family de Journy (Journy is in the Pas de Calais); see his pp. 105–6. We may add Guy de Journy who was returning to Cyprus from France in 1343, and carried a letter of commendation from the Pope to Hugh IV (Clement VI, *Lettres closes*, ed. Déprez, no. 177).

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France. It was only by accident, his biographer has said, that he became a writer; his books, like his travels, were undertaken as works of propaganda; but they are none the less interesting for that reason, and the breadth of his ideas and the artless sweetness of his style give this great and noble mind a place among the first writers of his time.[1]

The other writer who calls for notice in virtue of his connexion with Peter I is Guillaume de Machaut.[2] He also was a Frenchman and not a Cypriote, but his long poem, entitled *La prise d'Alexandrie*, is one of the major sources for the life of Peter, although the author seems never to have visited Cyprus. It was written soon after 1369, when Machaut (who was born between 1284 and 1295) was nearing the end of a long life (he died in 1377) in which as poet, musician, chronicler, courtier and official he had won a considerable reputation not confined to his own country. He has been well described as one of those poets who are found in the suite of the houses of good and great families, like a painting or a fine piece of furniture. Famous in the second half of the fourteenth century, he was forgotten a century later. Chaucer owed something to him. His *Prise d'Alexandrie* is the last epic inspired by historical events; its prosaic style marks the transition towards prose historical writing.[3] This somewhat ill-proportioned chronicle—he has nothing to say about the attempted betrayal of Adalia to the Turks, and perhaps too much about the fighting for Gorhigos—apart from the mythological prologue on the birth of the King, is a fairly trustworthy source until he reaches the final tragedy, as to which he was seriously misled by the impostor Walter of Conflans from whom he obtained his information. For his hero he has an enthusiastic admiration, but his Pegasus, overburdened by the weight of nine thousand verses, never soars.

The fifteenth century, so far as literature other than the Greek chronicles of Machaeras and George Bustron is concerned, was a blank in Cyprus. In the last quarter of the century, Venetian influence becomes paramount. For the benefit of Venetian readers, the sixteenth century saw the appearance of Italian chronicles. That which goes under the name of Francis Amadi (who died in 1566), and may have been written by him, brought the history down to 1441. The Cypriote Diomede Strambaldi (whose date is not known, but who was evidently also of

[1] N. Iorga, *Philippe de Mézières* 1327–1405 *et la croisade au XIVe siècle*, p. 513.
[2] Guillaume de Machaut, *La prise d'Alexandrie*, ed. L. de Mas Latrie, Geneva, 1877.
[3] L. Claretie, *Hist. de la litt. franç.* I², pp. 123–4.

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the sixteenth century) produced a version of the Greek chronicle going down to 1458. Rather more lively and intelligent than these two works is the Chronicle of another Cypriote, Florio Bustron, who besides using written sources such as Amadi and George Bustrón, obtained information for the latter part of his work from his own father. He stops at 1489, with the deposition of Catherine Cornaro, after which the history of his native land hardly seemed worth writing. But as an official of the Venetian government, and acquainted with both French and Italian, it was he who was entrusted with the official translation into the Venetian dialect of the *Assises* which was ordered in 1531. The expression of an independent opinion occasionally pierces the reserve of the chronicler, as when he remarks on the lack of moderation shown by Pius II (p. 558) or praises the impartiality of George Bustron. Yet it is to be suspected that he himself would hardly have praised the Venetian regime so unreservedly as he does (p. 807) had he not been an official in the pay of the government.

The Dominican Father Stephen de Lusignan, to whom we owe three books on the history of Cyprus, is a personality of whom some idea may be gathered from occasional remarks in his writings. His attitude towards the Greeks is what one might expect from a scion of the royal house of Lusignan-Cyprus and a member of a Latin religious Order. But it is tempered by a genuine if somewhat sentimental affection for the island, of the character of whose inhabitants he gives an engaging though not quite convincing picture. He is a most valuable authority for the historical events of which he was an eyewitness, for his evident sincerity makes it easy to see how far he is biased by religious or political feeling and to make the necessary discount. It must be admitted that the only surviving reference to him by a contemporary is unfavourable. He was acting, in 1562, at Lemesos as vicar of the bishop of that see. Bernard Sagredo, in his report on the conditions of the island, says that little good can be hoped for from him, since he is willing, for the sake of a small remuneration, to live outside his monastery. It has been rightly suggested that Lusignan's French origin and sympathies may not have endeared him to a Venetian official.[1]

If the preceding sketch of literature in Frankish Cyprus seems patchy and disconnected, it is partly due to the fact of the lack of harmony between the two races concerned; the native strain, seen in the Greek

[1] M.L., *H.* III, p. 543.

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chroniclers, was not strong enough to attain a lasting growth, while the French or Italian writers, with the one exception of Stephen de Lusignan, never descend from their French or Italian view-point, whence they look out over a native population whom they are content to despise when they do not ignore it. A similar lack of harmony becomes evident when we examine the relation between Cypriotes and Franks as reflected in the two major arts of architecture and painting;[1] it is an uncomfortable partnership. The most important examples of the former are the churches or monastic buildings erected by the French ruling class, or other equally foreign constructions such as the Rhodian castle of Kolossi or the Venetian fortifications of Famagusta. These are monuments of an exotic art, with which the native character was quite out of sympathy. That character found its expression in architecture in the Byzantine style and in the paintings which, continuing the Byzantine tradition and yielding slightly and as it were grudgingly to western influences, decorate with such astonishing richness the small churches of the mountain districts—churches which architecturally are of minor interest and which owe little to the West, probably not even the pointed arch. The architects whom the Lusignans brought in were faced by an existing Byzantine architecture from which they took nothing. In their native France, after the twelfth century, wall-painting did not play an outstanding part in the decoration of churches, the need for colour being met by stained glass in the windows. It is a true saying of Emile Mâle, that 'l'architecture gothique n'était nullement favorable à la peinture murale'.[2] In Cyprus the more brilliant sunlight, as in

[1] The works of Enlart, Jeffery, Sotiriou and Talbot Rice, to which reference has been made in Vol. I, form the basis of any study of the arts in medieval and later Cyprus. The brief sketch of architectural development in Melchior de Vogüé's *Les Églises de la Terre Sainte* (1860), pp. 377–9, and Enlart's contributions to Michel's *Histoire de l'Art*, II, pp. 118–25, 557–64; III, pp. 94–5, may also be consulted. The recent war has unfortunately delayed, if it has not altogether destroyed all chance of the completion of Sotiriou's great work by the interpretative volume promised in the introduction to his album. As to wall-painting, up to the present the important articles on Asinou and Galata and on the dated examples listed under the names of Buckler and the Bishop of Gibraltar, and the careful study of the wall-paintings at St Neophytus Monastery by Indianos and Thompson are the only examples of systematic treatment of the subject; I may also refer to Steel's article on the Painted Churches in the *Illustrated London News*. Sir Charles Peers has kindly given me the benefit of his criticisms on what I have ventured to say about the architecture.

[2] In Michel, *Hist. de l'art*, II, p. 401.

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Italy, made large windows unnecessary, and thus left room for more liberal employment of wall-painting as decoration. How far the French-trained architects adopted the suggestion in their greater churches it is not possible to say, since nearly everything of the kind was obliterated when those churches were turned into mosques by the Turks. But we know, for instance, that in the cathedral of Nicosia paintings decorating three bays of the nave, six columns of the choir, and all the chapel of St Thomas Aquinas, were executed to the order of Bishop John del Conte (1319–30). Many of the smaller Latin churches were extensively painted. Nevertheless it remains generally true that in the Frankish churches (which, with few exceptions, such as the royal chapel at Pyrga, are confined to the cities) it is the architecture and not the wall-decoration that is the dominant feature, whereas the converse is true of the churches of the Greek rite, especially in the mountain districts. The result of this uneasy relation between the artistic trends of the two races was that neither was reinforced by the other, and the current of art in the island ran into a backwater from which it never escaped, and which no artists of another country ever explored; in other words, it had probably no influence on any development outside Cyprus[1] (although a Roumanian queen may have copied the little church of St James at Trikomo for her private chapel), and its interest for the historian lies in the way it illustrates the life of the island and, for the student of art, in its use of the Byzantine or East Christian repertoire and in what it is hardly unfair to call its pathology. It is customary to speak of the Franco-Byzantine style of architecture, and the term may be retained for convenience sake; but it is not so much a harmony as a wavering mixture of tendencies. Small wonder that when the Frankish intruders vanished from the island the monuments of the art which they had brought in remained only as lifeless objects, in which the natives took no more interest than if they were specimens in a museum with closed doors and no curator. We owe it to the Turkish conqueror's need for places of worship that at least the skeletons of some of these monuments have not been allowed to fall utterly to pieces.

[1] See below, p. 1123, n. 2. As Bertaux points out (*L'art dans l'Italie méridionale*, I (1904), p. 387), the Cypriote churches lack the most typical characteristics of the Apulian stone-built churches with three cupolas; but, since at the end of the twelfth century there was close contact between Bari and the Levant, and Cyprus possesses little Byzantine churches with two, three or even five cupolas, the idea that such a church as St Francis at Trani may have been suggested by a visit to Cyprus can possibly be entertained.

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The characteristic type of the mountain church, represented by such examples as those at Moutoullas (dated by the inscription on its wall-paintings to 1280) or, of later dates, at Stavros above Platanistasa (1436) or the Theotokos at Podithou near Galata (1511),[1] is covered with a steeply pitched wooden roof, the eaves sometimes descending actually to the ground, as a protection against the weather, which in the mountains could be severe. Occasionally Byzantine cruciform domed churches of an earlier date were completely covered, as a second protection, with such wooden roofs. A good example is the church at Asinou, where, to the original single-naved naos with triapsidal east end, was added in the thirteenth century a narthex with pointed arches and dome, and the whole afterwards provided with a wooden roof, the eaves of which formerly covered a portico about six feet wide round three sides of the building.[2] The outside walls thus protected from the weather were often painted like those inside.[3] Painting usually covers every available foot of wall-space, however dark it may be; in fact the scarcity of windows, some of the churches receiving light only from the doors, is one of their most curious features.

The pointed arch, not necessarily, as is often assumed, borrowed from the Frankish architecture in the thirteenth century, gradually ousted the round arch not only from churches, but from buildings of all kinds; but the Byzantine tradition of the domed church, cruciform or consisting of a single nave, with apse, was not affected.[4] There are a number of very attractive examples, mostly on a small scale, of this so-called Franco-Byzantine style, such as St Evlalios at Lambousa (Pl. XV *b*).[5] One of the most pleasing of all is the elegant little chapel of St James at Trikomo (Pl. XV *a*).[6]

In fourteenth-century Famagusta, the Latin Cathedral of St Nicolas (Pl. II) and other gothic churches threw down a challenge to the Greeks which they could not fail to take up. Thus it comes about that in St George of the Greeks, which is said to have been built by a rich citizen of

[1] See below, p. 1140.

[2] Seymer in *Archaeologia*, 83, p. 329. The arcade was removed not so long ago. Lagoudera has a similar verandah round three sides.

[3] E.g. St Sozomenos at Galata.

[4] See, however, Vol. I, p. 322, n. 1.

[5] *R.D.A.C.* 1935, Pl. II, fig. 4, Pl. VI, fig. 2; Sotiriou, Pl. 47. It can hardly be as late as the sixteenth century, to which Jeffery dates it (*Hist. Mon.* p. 320).

[6] Sotiriou, Pl. 46β.

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the town,[1] we have an Orthodox church in which gothic principles of construction are dominant to a degree not found elsewhere. This impressive building, 'neighbour and rival of the great Latin Cathedral, is one of the most interesting of the several examples in the island of the inter-penetration of gothic and Byzantine forms. The semicircular apses crowned with pointed semi-domes, the quadripartite vaulting interrupted by a dome (no longer standing) over the central bay of the nave; the frescoes in an Italo-Byzantine manner that covered all the walls; the plain exterior walls surmounted by the flying buttresses of the clerestory; these are some of the elements of the successful blend.'[2] This mixture of eastern and western ideas in plan and detail is not found elsewhere in the island on so large a scale.

St George of the Greeks, then, is exceptional. Conformable to the traditional type is the katholikon of the monastery of St Neophytus near Paphos, one of the most frequented pilgrimage shrines in the island.[3] It is a fine basilica consisting of a nave (with apse) and two aisles, covered by barrel vaults; the nave arcades are of round-headed arches supported by round columns with Byzantine capitals of thin acanthus leaves (at the western end is a later narthex, now open to the church). A dome on a high drum is over the nave.

The church of St Mamas at Morphou,[4] another great pilgrimage shrine, is generally constructed like that of St Neophytus, and commonly ascribed to the end of the fourteenth or the fifteenth century. 'It is a relatively good example of a mixed style which is rare and above

[1] Jodocus v. Meggen, *Peregrinatio*, p. 71; Enlart, I, pp. 311–21; Jeffery, pp. 147–51; Cyprus Committee Appeal, at p. 3; Sotiriou in *Prakt. Akad. Ath.* 6 (1931), p. 12 and *Byz. Mn.* I, fig. 44 and Pls. 48, 49α, 50α, 60β, 98, 139. The last illustrates a roof-boss, found in the ruins, which shows a shield charged with two Bs addorsed, surmounted by a cross, regarding it as characteristic evidence of the date of the erection of the church; for it is the arms of the Palaeologi (cp. Kirmitses, Κυπρ. Σπ. IV, p. 99). The coat, in this abbreviated form, instead of the cross between four Bs, is not known to me. The general opinion dates the church some seventy years earlier than the time of Helena Palaeologa (1442–58) and the later series of wall-paintings is actually dated 1431, ten years before her arrival (Mogabgab, *Supp. Exc.* III, p. 140, who has also found two fallen bosses with the Lusignan badge). So important a church would hardly, in spite of her influence, have been built during the Genoese occupation.

[2] J. R. Hilton in *R.D.A.C.* 1935, p. 1.

[3] Jeffery, p. 408. Sotiriou, fig. 41 (plan and section), Pl. 56 (general view of the monastery), Pls. 104–6 (wall-paintings), Pl. 134 (capital).

[4] Enlart, I, pp. 188–94; Jeffery, pp. 221–2; Sotiriou, fig. 40 (plan and section), Pl. 44 (interior looking east).

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all rarely felicitous; it may be regarded as a curious attempt by Cypriote architects, who must have lived towards the end of the fourteenth century, perhaps at the beginning of the fifteenth, to revive the old Byzantine architecture by infusing into it the principles of fine construction and sculpture of the Franks. The attempt only half succeeded for lack of a good sculptor.'[1]

It would be impertinent for a mere amateur to attempt here even to summarize the exhaustive treatment which the gothic architecture of Cyprus has received from a master historian of the subject; nor is this the place to follow him in distinguishing the influence of the various schools of the north of France, Champagne and the Midi on the architecture of the island. We shall content ourselves with brief accounts of a few of the more important monuments which he has described, and occasional indication of details which betray foreign influences.

The earliest portions of the Cathedral of Nicosia (Pl. I),[2] that is the choir, the ambulatory and the two transeptal chapels, may be regarded as the most important example in the island of the gothic architecture of the thirteenth century. It was begun about 1209, and planned in the style prevailing at the time in the Île de France,[3] with a nave and two aisles, transept and choir with ambulatory. No other church in Cyprus possesses this last feature. No chevet of chapels was ever added to the ambulatory, as was done, for instance, at Notre-Dame de Paris. It seems that the only portions of the church which were completed at this stage were the east end and transepts. These transepts have certain archaistic features, for they are little more than chapels, no higher than the aisles, and they have small eastern apses covered by semi-domes. In the angle between the north transept and the choir is the treasury, a building in two stories, with eastern apse, as at the Sainte Chapelle in Paris. The aisles, later than the choir and transepts, probably belong to

[1] Enlart, *loc. cit.* It is perhaps necessary to observe that Jeffery maintains that the present church is not older than about 1725, though it has an appearance of greater antiquity owing to the survival of gothic forms in its construction and various carved details adapted from some much older building. Jeffery's date is based on the fact that 'Drummond gives a lengthy description... of it as it appeared in 1754 when it was quite new'. But one can never rely on a visitor's impression that a building (especially on an old site) is quite new, any more than one can believe chroniclers when they say that a building or a city had been utterly destroyed.

[2] For the church as a whole, see Enlart, I, pp. 78–141; Jeffery, pp. 64–86. For the evidence of the counterseal of Archbishop Eustorge, above, Ch. I, p. 13.

[3] Archbishop Thierry was a Parisian.

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the middle of the thirteenth century. From the south aisle formerly opened a great doorway in white marble, which the Turks, probably less than a century ago, tore out and transferred to the east end; this too is of the middle of the thirteenth century. It is customary to associate these works with the visit of St Louis, in whose train artists and craftsmen went out to Cyprus and Palestine. In any case they belong to the time of the energetic Archbishop Eustorge de Montaigu. One could willingly have spared many other remains of the period for the sculpture which doubtless once adorned the tympanum of the doorway. The upper part of the nave is attributed to the end of the thirteenth or beginning of the fourteenth century.[1] The completion of the church, so far as it was ever carried, was the work of Archbishop John del Conte, who came out in 1319 and consecrated the building in 1326. The west end, with its three doors, its towers (of which only the northern was carried up, and that no higher than the nave) and its great west window occupying all the space between the vault, the walls and the flat roof of the porch, are attributed to him; and it is definitely recorded that he built the beautiful porch or galilee, although he was not able to carry it up, as intended, to a second story, which would probably have had an open gallery between the towers. It has been suggested that this galilee reflects the Italian origin of the Archbishop, for it is a feature more common in Italy than in France. Of the sculptures which decorated the doorways there remain only the small figures (unfortunately headless) in the mouldings of the jambs of the northern doorway, and (unmutilated) two censing angels in panels of the tympanum of the central doorway. Shallow panels on the splays of all three doorways were once decorated with painted figures, over which crowns held by pairs of hands were carved in bas-relief.

In addition to completing the west end, John del Conte built and decorated with painting the chapel of St Thomas Aquinas, which opens on the south side out of the second bay from the west. It follows the design of the transeptal chapels, with apse covered by semi-dome.

Generally the interior of the church is imposing, thanks to the great span of the nave,[2] although the absence of a triforium detracts from its

[1] It is slightly misleading to speak (Enlart, I, pp. 116f.) of these works as having been executed under Gerard de Langres (1295–1312), for this notorious absentee spent only two years (1297–9) in the island.

[2] Approximate measurements: width of the nave, 10 m.; of the nave and aisles together, 22 m.; length, including apse, 67 m.

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height; the austerity of the effect is heightened by the stripping of its enrichments and furniture which it has suffered at Turkish hands, but somewhat relieved by the arcaded gallery under the west window. A feature of the exterior is the flat roof. There are indeed signs that it was intended to cover the aisles, at least of the eastern portion of the church, with sloping roofs.[1] But these were never built, and flat terrace-roofs cover the whole building. This peculiarity, which has been thought to indicate the influence of Spanish churches, such as the Cathedral of Barcelona, although it was more probably due to scarcity of timber and the need for economy, is repeated in all the more important churches of the island. It is not surprising in a land subject to Oriental influence; but it strikes the western eye as detracting from the soaring effect which is one of the most impressive characteristics of gothic church architecture in France.[2]

The Cathedral suffered grievously in the earthquake of 1491 (above, p. 819), though Mésenge probably exaggerated when, writing in 1507, he described it as all new built after being completely destroyed.[3]

The Latin Cathedral of Famagusta (Pl. II), dedicated to St Nicolas, and converted by the Turks into a mosque (after which it became known

[1] Moreover, half a bay of a triforium which still remains shows that the church was intended to have such a feature.

[2] Gothic architecture in Cyprus, it has been suggested, may have had some influence on that of Frederick II's work in Southern Italy, though he can have seen only the few buildings which had been erected by 1229 (C. Shearer, *Renaissance of Architecture in Southern Italy*, Heffer, Cambridge, 1935, p. 154). On the other hand, Bertaux, whom Shearer cites in favour of this view, actually says himself (*L'art dans l'Italie méridionale*, I, 1904, p. 743): 'in the French buildings in Cyprus and Syria, the characteristic details, that is to say the Oriental details which modify French forms, are exceptional. One should be noted; the cathedral of Nicosia is not covered by a steep pitched roof, but by a terrace over the pointed vaulting of nave and choir. Castel del Monte is similarly covered. This resemblance would be of capital importance, were it not clear that the Apulian architect contrived his terraces expressly to collect the rain water and distribute it to his cisterns. He could have thought of this expedient without knowing the churches of Cyprus. In truth, the Latin East has no building which can be presented as a prototype of Castel del Monte.' This seems to me to be nearer the truth than the suggestion that the unknown architect of Castel del Monte may have been one of the band of Imperialists, like Philip Chinard, who took refuge in Apulia and Sicily after the Ibelin victory. As to other comparisons, Shearer's claim that the windows of Castel del Monte and Saint Hilarion bear a singular resemblance to each other seems to me an exaggeration; the division by a heavy transom, so characteristic of the latter, is lacking in the former.

[3] Quoted by Enlart, II, p. 714. Cp. above, p. 1121, n. 1.

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as Ayia Sophia) was begun about a hundred years later than the Cathedral of Nicosia.[1] The earliest document concerning it, recording a bequest of five besants towards the construction, dates from 1300. In 1308 Bishop Guy d'Ibelin bequeathed 70,000 besants for the same object. Some 20,000 besants were converted to his own use by Guy's successor Anthony Saurano, who was fortunately prevented by death from misappropriating the whole. By August 1311 the next Bishop, Baldwin Lambert, as an inscription on the south wall tells us, had built six 'vaults' of the two aisles, that is, the two eastern bays and the apses of each aisle with their vaults. Ten more 'vaults', that is, five more bays of each aisle, also the seven bays of the nave and the central apse, remained to be constructed. What Saurano had left of Guy's bequest was now exhausted; but Baldwin lost no time in beginning work again at his own expense on 1 September. Whether it was he or a successor who completed the church, we have no record; but the design was evidently carried out according to plan, without much subsequent modification. It consists of nave and aisles, with corresponding apses, but without an ambulatory; and there is a sacristy opening out of the eastern bay of the north aisle. Additions were made in the fifteenth century in the shape of two chapels with apses, opening out of the fifth bays of the aisles (the northern one has been removed to the foundations; in the much ruined southern one are traces of wall-paintings), and a third of similar plan opening out of the seventh bay of the south aisle and containing a tomb-niche. The interior, which was from the first almost wholly dependent for its effect on its architectural features and proportions, and possibly on wall-paintings, but not on any sculptural enrichment, is now, stripped as it has been of painting and furniture and monuments, even starker than the Cathedral of Nicosia. The architect has reserved his efforts at decoration for the exterior, especially the west front. This has three magnificent doorways, their gables filled with blind tracery, and the main one surmounted by a fine window of six lights in three pairs. In the heads of these pairs is tracery, a quatrefoil between two large trefoils, and these support a great rose of nine

[1] Enlart, I, pp. 268–300; Jeffery, pp. 116–27. The building suffered greatly from the Turkish bombardment, and also in the terrible earthquake of 1735, when it is said that two-thirds of it were destroyed and two hundred Turks killed (Pococke and Drummond, in *Exc. Cypr.* pp. 255, 274). The latter, most peevish of travellers, takes occasion to remark: 'from what remains of this church, St George and some others, I can perceive that they were built in the worst Gothic taste'.

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(not, as commonly stated, eight) divisions. A superficial resemblance to Lichfield west front inevitably strikes an English eye; to the French, it is a modest imitation of Reims. The effect of the east end, which presents many analogies with Saint-Urbain at Troyes, must also have been very rich, with its two stages of unusually tall two-light windows, the upper ones surmounted, as were also the windows of the clerestory, by rather heavy gables. The lowest part of the west front projected sufficiently to support a gallery connecting the two stair-turrets at the level of the aisle roofs; similarly a gallery was corbelled out at the east end, so that it was possible to walk round the whole church at this level. The northern stair-turret was carried up by the Turks for a minaret, which having fallen was reconstructed by George Jeffery.[1]

When the loss of the Holy Land made it no longer possible for the King of Jerusalem to be crowned at the Holy City, or even at Tyre,[2] this ceremony was performed at Famagusta, until the Genoese occupation in 1373 made a second transference to Nicosia necessary. St Nicolas was probably available by the time of Hugh IV's coronation in 1324. It is suggested that the fact that St Nicolas was to be used for this ceremony may have given the founder the idea of producing an imitation of the Cathedral at Reims, the church of the *sacre* of the Kings of France.[3]

The Abbey of Bellapaïs or S. M. di Episcopia (Plates IV, V) is the most beautiful of the medieval remains in Cyprus.[4] St Dominic's in Nicosia may have had even finer and more extensive buildings, but can never have enjoyed the advantage which its romantic situation overlooking

[1] It is a great disfigurement and unnecessary, since the muezzin can give his call to prayer from the gallery, if, as he assured me himself (in 1934), he is unfitted by his figure to climb the stairs.

[2] Henry II was the last to be crowned at Tyre; Hugh IV was crowned at Famagusta in 1324.

[3] Enlart, I, p. 271.

[4] See above, p. 26, n. 3, for its origin. Enlart, I, pp. 202–36; Jeffery, pp. 323–34. The latter, as usual, differs widely from the former about the date of the buildings, attributing the church to the time of Hugh IV (1324–39 *sic*), the monastic buildings to the fifteenth century. Florio Bustron (p. 258) says that Hugh 'edificò l' abbatia bianca con quella stantia maravigliosa dove per suo diporto andava spesso.' If he built the abbey (not the church only) it is not likely that it should have been rebuilt in the fifteenth century, and that all the fourteenth century work should have disappeared. One is prepared to admit that all the construction may not have been completed by the time of Hugh's death in 1359, and that building went on late into the century.

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the Karamanian Sea gives to the Premonstratensian house. The church, which is earlier than the monastic buildings, belongs to the thirteenth century, having doubtless been begun by the Augustinian Canons who are mentioned as being allowed in 1206 to adopt the Premonstratensian rule. But it is the monastic buildings, constructed, according to the most probable interpretation of the chronicler's words, in the time of Hugh IV (1324–59), which call for our attention here. About half of them, on the west, have been destroyed to the foundations; there remain the cloisters (from the eighteen arches of which the tracery has almost all been lost); on the north the great refectory with its undercroft; on the east the ruins of a very fine common-room and chapter house with dorter over. The doorway[1] opening into the refectory from the north cloister is particularly interesting, illustrating the survival of motives which had long disappeared from gothic architecture in the West; for the two chief elements in the decoration of the arch are a heavy zigzag moulding,[2] a relic of the Romanesque, and the dog-tooth ornament. The latter, which in England was a feature of 'Early English', and in the North of France dated from the twelfth century, surviving into the thirteenth in Normandy and Flanders and, in the Midi, even into the fourteenth, had its chief vogue in Cyprus, as in Sicily and Italy, in the fourteenth and fifteenth.[3] But the grand feature of the abbey is the magnificent refectory (Pl. V), one of the finest in existence and fortunately the best preserved part of the buildings. It measures 30·40 by 10·04 m. and is 11·50 m. high.[4] The vaulting is supported by clusters of slender colonnettes similar to those which we shall find in the beautiful little

[1] Enlart, Pl. XVII.

[2] Other examples of the survival of this moulding may be seen, for instance, in the Bedestan (Nicosia) on the arches beneath the dome; in the unidentified church no. 11 in Famagusta (Enlart, I, p. 390, fifteenth century); on a doorway in Nicosia which may even be as late as 1738 (*op. cit.* II, p. 555), but which Jeffery (*Archit. Rev.* VIII, 1900, p. 133) calls 'early Turkish'. This survival is of course not confined to Cyprus; a good example in Sicily is the fourteenth-century door of St George, Girgenti.

[3] Fifteenth-century examples are on another doorway in Nicosia (Enlart, II, p. 551) and on the mouldings of the machicolation of the Castle of Kolossi (*ibid.* p. 688). The occurrence of this and the zigzag on the doorway of the refectory does not therefore militate against Jeffery's late dating.

[4] The largest known example, covered by a single vault, was that at Poissy (47 by 12 m., and nearly 20 m. high). The equally vast hall at St Martin des Champs at Métiers had to be constructed in two aisles with seven piers down the middle supporting the vaulting. Jeffery, p. 330.

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church of St Catherine in Nicosia; they impart an effect of lightness which is missing in other great vaulted constructions such as the naves of the Cathedrals of Nicosia and Famagusta, with their massive round pillars. The reader's pulpit, perfectly preserved, is corbelled out high up on the north wall over a window; it is lit by a small window with trefoil head, and has a pierced parapet with tracery of trefoils and quatrefoils. The details of the carving of capitals and of the mouldings of the corbel on which the pulpit rests are, however, lacking in distinction; it is to be suspected that the architectural design was the work of a French-trained master, while the details were left to local craftsmen. The massive outer walls of the abbey buildings, fortified with mighty buttresses, towering above the trees, form one of the most impressive sights in the island.

The third in respect of size of the churches of Famagusta is that which was dedicated to SS. Peter and Paul.[1] It was, as is recorded, erected at

[1] Enlart, I, pp. 301–11; Jeffery, pp. 151–4 and *Annual Rep. of Curator of Ancient Monuments*, 1929, pp. 11–14; above, p. 369. Jeffery's doubts about the identification are unnecessary. The church is named and placed more or less in its right position south-east of the Palace in Cartaro's map (Pl. XIII, no. 24). There is no reason to doubt the story of the origin of the church, as Jeffery does on the ground that its appearance 'is much more suggestive of the XVth or early XVIth century'. The building in question was turned by the Turks into a mosque, and we know that that happened to SS. Peter and Paul, which Jean Palerne (*Pérégrinations*, p. 334) saw used as such in 1582, like St Nicolas. It is probably the church which Louis de Barrie, in 1670, says had been made into a magazine for naval stores; it was one of the two largest churches in Famagusta, the other one having been turned into a mosque (M.L., *H.* III, p. 583).— The dedication to St Nicolas has been at one time or another attached to no less than three churches in Famagusta: (1) The Latin Cathedral, renamed by the Turks A. Sophia. (2) A small double-aisled church 'in XVth century Byzantine style' (Jeffery, p. 155; Enlart, I, p. 257, no. 21 of his plan). (3) According to Jeffery (p. 151), the church which we believe to be SS. Peter and Paul. He thinks the designation must be purely Turkish, on the very doubtful ground that an Orthodox church of St Nicolas would hardly be built within a few hundred yards of the great Latin cathedral, creating an inconvenient confusion of names. The church is still known as the Sinan Pasha Mosque. I have not found the name of St Nicolas attached to it by any other writer. Sinan Pasha is mentioned as Beylerbey of Cyprus immediately after the conquest, and occupied himself with the restoration of the fortress of Famagusta (Refik, nos. 28, 49). Mariti (I, pp. 152–3) seems to me to be in confusion here. He says: (1) S. Croce, Greek cathedral, as one of the best buildings in the city, was chosen as a mosque by the Turks, and therefore preserved; (2) St Paul's, built by the Famagustan merchant under Peter I, was not so chosen, and fell into ruin; (3) in his time the Greeks had a church dedicated to St George. What he says of (1) would apply to Sinan Pasha Mosque, while his description of the fate of (2)

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the expense of a Famagustan merchant during the reign of Peter I (1359–69), but certain details are in the style of the thirteenth century, and may derive from an older building. The plan is simple: nave and aisles of five bays, with apses; the latter enclosed in a rectangular construction containing treasury or sacristy; a stair-turret at the south-west corner, where the Turks built their minaret. Including the central apse, it measures 28 by 17 m. The architect has attempted, by the great height of the interior, to atone for these somewhat inelegant proportions. There is, in the interior, complete absence of carving, except in the vault-bosses; the windows are plain lancets, except the circular one at the east end and the two-light west window with its geometrical tracery of quatrefoils and trefoils. The general effect of the exterior is squat and ungainly; lack of science in the construction was ill compensated by piling on weight, as in the unusually thick side walls of the aisles. It seems clear that this church is an example of what the local architect could achieve when unsupported by the technique of French-trained craftsmen. Possibly he had to keep within a certain sum put down by the merchant-founder. But it has, nevertheless, held out against 'the wrackful siege of battering days' better than most of its fellows in Famagusta. In 1937 it ceased to be used as an orange-packing store, was carefully put into good condition, and will serve as a medieval museum, but in 1941 was again requisitioned for storage.

A complete contrast to SS. Peter and Paul is presented by the little church of St Catherine (Haidar Pasha Mosque) in Nicosia,[1] which shows Cypriote gothic architecture at its best, in the last quarter of the fourteenth century, when the 'flamboyant' style makes its appearance. It consists of a nave of two bays and a choir with three-sided apse. Attached to the north-east side is a rectangular construction of two vaulted stories, the lower of which was a sacristy, while the upper, rising to the height of the church, had a window opening into the choir. The corbels carrying the vaulting of the sacristy have finely carved human heads. The stair-turret at the south-west angle of the building has been heightened into a minaret. The buttresses of the nave take the

would fit St George of the Greeks. The church now dedicated to Holy Cross, according to Gunnis (p. 97), is the Mustafa Pasha Mosque (Jeffery, p. 155; Enlart, I, pp. 257, 392–4); it is well preserved.

[1] Enlart, I, pp. 171–6; Jeffery, pp. 90–3. Although the latter describes it as 'a complete example of the XVth century "Flamboyant" style of Cyprus', he states later that the date 1373 on a tombstone corresponds exactly with the style of the building.

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unusual form of three-sided engaged piers, terminating in flat platforms where, in other countries, one would have looked for pinnacles. But they are in harmony with the flat roof which, in accordance with Cypriote practice, covers the building. The interior is very elegant, with its unusually tall and narrow windows, its vaulting supported on clusters of three slender colonnettes, the middle one of which has a vertical fillet. Slender colonnettes in clusters of three also support the voussures of the doorways. In the west doorway (Pl. XVI) the middle colonnette is of marble, and detached, while the other two have vertical fillets. The tympanum, as commonly, is filled with blind arcading; on the lintel is carved a rose between two dragons, thrice repeated; rather heavy foliage carving fills the arch-mould and adorns the capitals.

The curious church to the south of the parvis of the Cathedral in Nicosia, known as the Bedestan ('Market'), and also as St Nicolas,[1]

[1] Enlart, I, pp. 150–62, 715; Jeffery, pp. 84–9; Kirmitses in Κυπρ. Σπ. IV, pp. 100–4. The identification of this building with 'St Nicolas of the English', the church of the priory of the Order of St Thomas of Acre (see p. 54, n. 5), is probable, and no such mare's nest as Jeffery would have it. It is based on Mariti, who says that the church was dedicated to St Nicolas, 'as one sees from the figure of the said saint in bas relief still remaining over the door'. But by the sixteenth century it was an Orthodox church dedicated to the Virgin Mary. In 1507 Pierre Mésenge describes it as a Greek collegial church; he goes on to say, somewhat loosely, that in St Sophia and in this church there are two suffragan bishops, one Latin and the other Greek. In 1518 Le Saige calls it a small Greek church in honour of Our Lady. The passages are quoted by Enlart, II, p. 715; Jeffery has confused them when he says that Mésenge 'describes it as the Greek cathedral "dedicated to Our Lady" (metropolis)'. Jeffery proceeds to urge that the Order of Saint Thomas had vanished from Cyprus long before the church (in its present form) was built, and that the figure of a saint to which Mariti refers has no distinguishing emblem. But this latter argument cuts both ways; if the saint had no distinguishing emblem, why did Mariti call him St Nicolas, unless he knew that the church was dedicated to him? And the original dedication to St Nicolas may have persisted after the Order of St Thomas had disappeared, which was not until after 1350, when Ludolf of Sudheim mentions its house at Lemesos. That the church passed into the hands of the Orthodox Greeks can hardly be doubted. Enlart thinks that it may have been dedicated to Our Lady from the beginning, as well as to St Nicolas, though neither the relief of the Dormition of the Virgin (over the outside iconostasis) nor the figure of the saint dates from the time of the original building. Kirmitses has recently put forward the ingenious conjecture that the building was the church of St Barnabas which by the *Bulla Cypria* of 1260 was attached to the see of Solia; the Orthodox Archbishop was allowed to reside there, and thus it became the Greek cathedral. If he is right, why is it that the later writers, at a time when it was the Greek cathedral, never mention the dedication to St Barnabas?—Lusignan's name for the

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presents the most remarkable medley of styles to be seen in any building in Cyprus. The plan shows a central nave of five bays; over the fourth from the west is a hemispherical dome, lit by eight windows, on a drum carried on pendentives, octagonal externally and cylindrical inside. A five-sided apse, of which the construction may have been suggested by the apse of the treasury at St Sophia, terminates the nave. On the north is an aisle of four bays, at the east end of which a short bay, with cradle vault, leads to the apse with semi-dome. On the south, on the other hand, are twin aisles of six bays (the three western ruined), having no relation to the rest of the plan; thus the three existing divisions fit irregularly into the space corresponding to the third and fourth bays of the nave. This part of the church, seen from outside, has a square east end with a thick wall enclosing the apses of the twin aisles. The porch which served the west end of the church had three doorways. Of these the southernmost survives, having been removed in 1906 to the gardens of Government House. The capitals of the porch recall the Doge's Palace at Venice; but the framing of the doorways in a square dripstone, as at Ayia Napa, has been recognized as due to Catalan influence. The whole church, except the portion covered by the dome, and the short easternmost bay of the north aisle, had ribbed vaulting; a modern cradle-vault which disfigured the two western bays of the central nave has been removed, revealing the springings of the original vaulting ribs.[1] The twin southern aisles probably represent the plan of the original church; one of the capitals of the columns dividing them seems to date from about 1270. Alongside this earliest portion there were built, not earlier than the fifteenth century,[2] the central nave (with its 'Byzantine' dome) and the north aisle. It may be suggested that the inclusion of this Greek element was prompted by the conversion of the church to the Orthodox rite. To that rite is also suited the arrangement of a nave having one aisle on the north, with apse for the altar of prothesis. The most remarkable feature of this puzzling building is the exterior of the north wall. The great doorway here is an imitation of

Greek Cathedral is 'Crussotheistrie', the meaning of which, as far as he can render it, is 'all golden or precious advocate' (*Descr.* f. 31; not in the *Chorograffia*). For this word, Minns suggests χρυσοδεήστρια = golden pleader.

[1] *R.D.A.C.* 1936, Pt. II, p. 96, Pl. XXX, 1, 2.

[2] According to Jeffery all this later portion of the church is of the sixteenth century. The fact that Le Saige in 1518 speaks of the church as small does not show that the nave and north aisle had not then been built; for he uses the same epithet for St Sophia!

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the central doorway of the neighbouring Latin Cathedral. Some of the carving of the enrichments is good, but in other details (as in the panels for painted figures on the splays) the inferiority of the workmanship is apparent. The proportions are more squat than in the model. On the marble lintel is a mutilated figure of a saint holding a book (whom Mariti understood to be St Nicolas)[1] between six shields of a baroque shape (scroll tops and twisted points) with armorial bearings which are probably Venetian. If this carving belongs to the time of the erection of this wall (which is improbable), that time cannot be earlier than the sixteenth century. In the gable of this doorway is a circular opening filled with flamboyant tracery. A second entrance is inspired by the west doorway of St Catherine's; the builder of 'St Nicolas', whatever his powers, knew what models to choose. Finally, between these two doorways is a third, which, it has been suggested, was brought from some other position, walled up and used, not as a doorway (three doorways side by side in one wall would surely have been unnecessary), but as an external iconostasis or picture-stand for special occasions.[2] This, at any rate, is no sixteenth-century imitation of an earlier doorway. Inserted in the lintel—and certainly not contemporary—is a small relief of the Dormition of the Virgin, which, in spite of its poor, clumsy execution, excites attention because it has escaped mutilation. The headless figure, less fortunate, of Christ or an Apostle holding a book, which is carved on the keystone, is of good workmanship and contemporary with the arch. The Bedestan contains many other details which make it a veritable museum of the history of Cypriote gothic architecture.[3]

With a few insignificant exceptions, the possession of castles during the Lusignan period was reserved for the king and the military Orders. For our present purpose it is not necessary to do more than mention the three mountain strongholds of St Hilarion, Buffavento and Kantara, which were abandoned by the Venetians and allowed to fall into ruin (above, p. 862). Of these the former alone retains much thirteenth-

[1] In Cypriote art St Nicolas does not usually hold any distinguishing emblem; when his name is not inscribed, identification depends on accompanying scenes from his life. Talbot Rice, *Icons of Cyprus*, pp. 82–3.

[2] Jeffery, p. 87 (cp. p. 12).

[3] As details illustrating the use of the church for the Greek rite, Kirmitses (*op. cit.* p. 104) notes a capital decorated with two hands blessing in the Greek manner, and a wall-painting of St Andrew in the Byzantine style of the twelfth–thirteenth century.

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century work of importance, as in the great two-storied hall with its finely designed windows overlooking the precipice which was occasionally found useful for disposing of undesirable persons (p. 418), and commanding a magnificent view along the coastal region to the west. Nor need the citadels of Kerynia and Famagusta detain us, for the chief interest of these fortresses now lies in the works within which the Venetians included the earlier structures; and of the early fortifications of Nicosia nothing remains, the existing enceinte being all of Venetian origin, completed by the Turks. The Castle at Kolossi (Pl. III) however still stands as a striking monument of the power of the Knights Hospitallers in Cyprus. The present building,[1] dating from the middle of the fifteenth century, took the place of an earlier fortified manor, probably of the fourteenth. It is an isolated square donjon, practically intact, although the original drawbridge which gave access to the second story, and of which the pulleys for the chains still survive, disappeared long ago, together with the platform on which it rested when down. Access was then given by a ramp leading over a rough archway to the door. This in its turn was superseded in 1933 by stone steps and a new drawbridge. The building is 21 m. square by 29 m. high,[2] and has walls nearly 3 m. thick. There are three stories. The basement (which had an arched doorway immediately under the entrance to the second story) is divided from north to south into three narrow chambers; while the second and third stories are each divided into two chambers, running from north to south in the second, from east to west in the third, the partition walls being at right angles to each other. This arrangement distributes the strain of the pointed cradle vaults which cover the chambers. A circular staircase buried in the south-east angle leads from the second to the third story and thence to the roof-platform. One of the rooms on the second story, which has a large fire-place, may have been the kitchen; the other, into which one comes through the main entrance, and from which one descends by steps to the basement, has on the wall beside the entrance a large painting of the Crucifixion between SS. Mary and John. Under the steps to the basement is the well. In the third story were the living quarters of the Grand-Commander—or, more usually, his lieutenant. The chambers, each of which

[1] See Rey, *Étude*, pp. 233–7; Enlart, II, pp. 683–95; Jeffery, *Hist. Mon.* pp. 373–6 and *Hist. and Arch. Buildings*, New Ill. Series, no. 5. On the date, above, p. 22, n. 3.

[2] So Enlart. Jeffery makes it about 75 ft. high.

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measures about 13·5 by 6 m., were warmed from two fine fireplaces (marked with the fleur-de-lys badge of the founder), back to back on the dividing wall. The more elaborate of the two fireplaces, in the inner chamber which was the living-room, is decorated with a rope pattern of two interlacing strands, which is found in Rhodes, in the enceinte and the palaces of the town and in the castle of Lindos. The same decoration is seen in the frame of a window of a semicircular machicolated bastion, the smaller of two towers still surviving from the town wall of Kerynia.[1] The cradle vaults covering the chambers are about 7·5 m. high; but wooden floors seem to have been inserted about half way up, dividing them into upper garret or store-room and lower living-room, much detracting from the dignity of the latter, for the hoods of the fireplaces must have been cut off by the floors. The windows (two on each face on each story) are almost square; they have depressed arches, and seats in the embrasures. A latrine projects between the windows in the north wall; there was a similar arrangement almost above it on the roof. The roof-platform is protected by a crenelated parapet, of which three sides have been restored in conformity with the fourth which was preserved. At the top of the tower, a machicolated projection with five arched openings, surmounted by a moulding with dog-tooth ornament, protected the entrance. On the east wall is an armorial slab with the coats of arms of Lusignan-Cyprus, of the Grand Masters John de Lastic and James de Milly, and (as is conjectured) of the Grand Commander Louis de Magnac (Fig. 2, p. 70).

Donjons of a similar type, but on a much more modest scale, were built in Cyprus in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries at Pyla, Kiti and Alaminos; but the nearest parallel to Kolossi is that at Brugnac near Castillon (Gironde), which has two doors in exactly the same position.[2] Since the demolition of the Tour Bichat in Paris by Haussmann, Kolossi Castle is the most important surviving material relic, outside Rhodes and Malta, of the Knights of the Hospital of St John.

The close relations which the Lusignan kings entertained with Spain help to account for the penetration of Spanish influences, Aragonese or perhaps rather Catalan, recognizable in certain details of domestic as well as church architecture.[3] For instance, there are the slender marble colonnettes of the present tribune of the mosque of Ayia Sophia in

[1] Enlart, II, pp. 571–2.

[2] Enlart, II, p. 692.

[3] Enlart, I, pp. 62, 299 and in Michel, III, p. 95.

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Famagusta which, with other fragments, capitals, etc., in the Lapidary Museum, appear to come from a neighbouring fifteenth-century building. They are exactly similar to colonnettes and capitals in Saint Anne's in Barcelona. The doorways of some houses in Nicosia betray the same influence, notably one[1] in which the heavy, perfectly plain round arch is framed by a square dripstone crowned by a moulded cornice; a similar type of doorway gives entrance to the monastery of Ayia Napa.[2] Among the ruins of the Government Palace in Nicosia is the old entrance to the court, above the archway of which is a window which shows the survival of this Catalan style into the days of the Venetian regime. The window consisted of four rectangular lights, once separated by slender colonnettes; above was a tympanum with blind flamboyant tracery.[3]

Finally, it was likely that Venice, especially from the time of James II, should make its influence felt; nevertheless it was not until the second half of the sixteenth century, and then only in military engineering and in civic buildings, that Cyprus saw Venetian builders working on a scale corresponding to the degree of control which the Republic exercised over the island. But Cyprus was regarded by Venice merely as a commercial possession requiring military protection; it was unhealthy and unpopular as a place of residence; civil and military officers who went out were apt to take the earliest opportunity to get home again. The statement made in 1520 by a Cypriote orator[4] that under the beneficent rule of the Signory many palaces and other buildings had risen from their ruins or had been and were being newly erected, appears to be an exaggeration. If anything of importance was put up in Famagusta during the Genoese occupation of some ninety years, we cannot say; the lodges of the various nations were famous, but hardly any trace of them remains. Cyprus thus never really enjoyed a Renaissance period, although there are plenty of stray indications of the influence of the Italian style of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and would have been many more if so much of the domestic architecture of Nicosia and Famagusta had not perished.[5] Capitals from the

[1] Enlart, II, p. 547, fig. 341.

[2] Enlart, II, p. 662, fig. 391.

[3] Enlart, II, p. 535 and Pl. XXXII; Jeffery, p. 26 ('latest "Neapolitan Gothic" style').

[4] Above, Ch. XIII, p. 808.

[5] Jeffery observes (*Architectural Review*, 1900, p. 134) that only the façades of houses in Nicosia are preserved, the rest having been built of crude brick plastered with gypsum. Cp. Ali Bey (1806, *Exc. Cypr.* p. 394): 'the floors of all the rooms are

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western porch of St Nicolas in Nicosia, recalling the style of the Doge's Palace in Venice, and the lintel of one of the doors of the same church with Venetian coats of arms, have already been mentioned. A striking but not very happy example is found in the elaborate windows, in a by no means pure Renaissance style, at the monastery of Ayia Napa, which was reconstructed in the sixteenth century and incorporated a number of features from other, earlier buildings.[1] In Famagusta we may note the doorway of one of the mercantile *loggie* mentioned above; the door, opening in a rusticated façade, was flanked by two detached columns supporting the remains of lions which would have held armorial shields.[2]

The front of the Captain's *loggia*, on the piazza facing the Cathedral at Famagusta, constructed, perhaps by John Jerome Sanmicheli,[3] about the middle of the sixteenth century, is the only surviving civic building of any significance which exhibits the Venetian style. It took the place formerly occupied by the Royal Palace. Four grey granite columns, probably from ancient Salamis, flanking three arches, supported the cornice; above the central arch is the shield of the Captain, John Renier (1552–4).[4] The entablature, all but a triglyph surmounting the outer column on the right, has perished; so has the whole of the upper story which, as Gibellino's plan of Famagusta in 1571 shows, had a flat battlemented roof, extending over the whole building. But the outstanding monument of Venetian domination in Cyprus is preserved in the towers and the ramparts and moat, which have made Famagusta the most complete example of a fortified enceinte of the sixteenth century that has survived to modern times (Pl. III*b*). Its development has been traced in detail in a previous chapter.[5] We are not here concerned with

of marble, also the jambs of the windows and doors, and the first few courses of the building: the rest of the walls is constructed of rough stone, badly baked bricks and lime. The houses are not covered with tiles; the roofs are flat and extremely weighty. This pernicious practice certainly accounts for the disappearance of all the ancient buildings, of which the palace only is left.'

[1] Enlart, II, p. 663, fig. 392.

[2] Enlart, II, pp. 625–7 and fig. 377.

[3] See above, Ch. XIII, p. 859, n. 1; Enlart, II, pp. 646–7; Jeffery, *Ann. Report*, 1929, frontispiece and pp. 5–8; Langenskiöld, pp. 169–70.

[4] In the Commissions to Balthasar Trevisan (1489) and John Contarini (1538) it is laid down that the Captain is not to place his coat of arms on any building put up or restored by him, only in one place on his palace, and that only in colour. (Above, Ch. XIII, p. 870, § 59). This rule must have been abrogated or become a dead letter by Renier's time. Renier bore: per pale, arg. and sa., a chevron counterchanged.

[5] Ch. XIII, pp. 853 ff.

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its military value, which was the object of a certain amount of criticism by experts who inspected it at intervals, although, as often as not, their ground for complaint, on the sound principle that men not walls make a city, was not so much the weakness of the fortifications themselves as the inadequacy of the garrison. The ordinary traveller was always impressed by its strength, and one of the last to visit it before the Turkish siege to which it offered so stout a resistance called it the strongest of all cities. The visitor of to-day, discounting developments in fortification from Vauban onwards, cannot fail to admire the imposing stretch of the curtain walls, and the massive towers (Pl. III), especially the great Land Gate with its Ravelin, and the Martinengo bastion. But while any great fortification may give this kind of impression of power, the Venetian work here also has a special quality of style, which reveals the artist in the engineer. That quality is inherent even in the underground galleries of the Martinengo bastion, which were built not long before the siege, and have not suffered from either weather or bombardment or alteration by Turkish engineers (Pl. XVII). Even the somewhat captious critic Ascanio Savorgnan, if a phrase of his has been rightly interpreted,[1] was obliged to say a word in praise of the mason-craft displayed in the Martinengo bastion. Of writers pretending to an appreciation of the monuments of Cyprus, Hamilton Lang must be alone in his opinion that the fortifications of Famagusta, being only of the sixteenth century, are not worth preserving.[2]

Apart from details of architectural enrichments, the remains of sculpture in Cyprus that have survived the hand of time and the Turk are exceedingly scanty;[3] indeed the only piece of any importance is

[1] *Ricco d' attilatura di muraglia.* Above, p. 860, n. 6.

[2] In *Blackwood's Mag.* 172 (1902), p. 182.

[3] The censing angels of the tympanum of the main door of St Sophia at Nicosia (Enlart, I, p. 130, fig. 56), the headless figure of Christ or an Apostle at St Nicolas and the Dormition of the Virgin at the same church (Enlart, I, p. 160, fig. 74) have already been mentioned (pp. 1122, 1131). The Dampierre sarcophagus, an antique of which one side has been reworked in the fourteenth century with the arms of that family in an arcading, is described by Jeffery (p. 89) as one of the most important works of art remaining in Cyprus (cp. Gunnis, p. 59). How poor the sculpture of the Venetian period can have been may be judged by the two reliefs from the old Franciscan monastery: Saint Mamas on his lion, with a donor presented by an angel, in a hilly landscape with trees, dated 18 March 1524; and a Virgin and Child, dated 1555. Both are in the present Franciscan monastery; the latter, poor enough to begin with, has been made still worse by an attempt to repair damage. Enlart in *Flor. M. de Vogüé*, pp. 227–8.

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the marble relief illustrated in Plate XVIII*a*.[1] The main subject is the Ascension, according to a Byzantine scheme (as on the Monza ampullae and at San Clemente in Rome): above, Christ seated, with cruciform nimbus, blessing with his right hand and holding a scroll in his left, in a mandorla supported by four angels (instead of the more usual symbols of the Evangelists); below the Virgin *orans*, approached by the Archangels Michael and Gabriel, carrying lily-topped wands; on either side of her, six Apostles. The subsidiary scenes are: on the left the Crucifixion, with the Virgin and the Baptist, and an angel flying down and apparently removing the crown of thorns from Christ's head; on the right, above, the Baptism in the Jordan, and below, the Annunciation. In small panels, on the extreme left, two soldiers, clad in mail, conducting Christ carrying the Cross; on the extreme right, the Angel seated on the tomb, with the three Maries and two soldiers (clad in mail and holding heater-shaped shields) asleep. There can be no doubt that we have here a work of the Frankish period combining, in true Cypriote fashion, Byzantine schemes with late details. The fifteenth century seems the most probable date.[2]

[1] Now in the museum of Capt. Pitt-Rivers at Farnham, Dorset. It was dug up at Larnaka and exported by Cesnola. It was illustrated in a line-drawing by Sydney Vacher (I'Anson and Vacher, fig. 48), and described by Enlart from that illustration (II, pp. 418–19, cp. p. 15). Vacher says that he was able to give his drawing 'by the courtesy of Mr Lawrence'; that does not mean that he did not see the original, as Enlart assumes; see p. 1162. Enlart's description is inaccurate; he describes the Annunciation scene as the Visitation, and has not recognized the scene of the three Maries and the soldiers at the Tomb. Taking the Virgin *orans* with two angels as an Annunciation (with Gabriel duplicated for symmetry!) he fails to recognize the main subject as the Ascension, and thus misses the whole point of the design. It had already been published from a photograph by L. De Feis, in *Bessarione*, VI (1899), pp. 442–4, and rightly recognized as representing the Ascension. The marble measures (according to Vacher's scale) about 2 ft. 9 in. wide by 2 ft. high. It may have been a tympanum or a retable.

[2] Vacher supposed it to be of the eleventh or twelfth; De Feis thought it must be either pre-iconoclastic or of the time of the Crusades, and was supported by De Rossi. For Enlart it shows that mixture of gothic and Byzantine which began to prevail in the fourteenth and was at its height in the fifteenth. Such a detail as the shields of the soldiers indicates a late origin; they are not visible in our photograph, but are shown, like the mail-armour, in Vacher's drawing. The fact that soldiers, and not servants, lead Christ, is also an indication of late date, hardly earlier than the fourteenth century (G. Millet, *Iconographie de l'Évangile*, p. 378). I have not seen the original, and owe the photograph to Mr T. D. Kendrick; for useful suggestions I have to thank Mr F. Wormald.

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The art of woodcarving, which is plentifully illustrated in a later period in the furniture of the churches of Cyprus, has left few examples of any importance earlier than the Turkish conquest. The most interesting, indeed, dates from only four years before that disaster. It is the well-known cross of Stavrovouni, carved by George Lascaris in 1566 with scenes from the Old and New Testament.[1]

As with the architecture, so with the wall-paintings of Cyprus, we must be content with indicating a few examples, leaving to experts the disentangling of the various strains which they are able to detect in the development of the art. The church at Asinou, already mentioned in the previous volume, may provide us with a starting point in the noble Virgin between the Archangels Michael and Gabriel, on the conch of the eastern apse (Plate XIX).[2] From the style of the lettering of the inscriptions, it is attributable to about 1250; it represents the highwater mark of Cypriote wall-painting. In the thirteenth century there is no trace of western influence; indeed, it has been observed that at this time the West was working in the bonds of eastern technique, and Byzantine art had nothing to draw from western. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries there grew up what may be called a monkish school (since inscriptions in the churches preserve the names of a number of painters who were monks or priests) which adhered steadily to eastern Byzantine tradition, and which survived into the fifteenth, as is shown for instance in the paintings at Pedoulas dated 1474–5.[3] The Christ Pantokrator in the dome of the narthex at Asinou (Plate XVIII*b*), and the half-figure of the Virgin *orans* (the Blachernitissa type) over the doorway from the narthex into the nave in the same church, belong to about 1332–3 and are typical of the time.[4] In the latter half of the fourteenth century, however, western influences begin to make themselves

[1] Illustrated by Sotiriou, Pl. 150γ. An inscription on the silver-gilt base says that it was dedicated by Meletios, Bishop of Kition, in the year 1792, 226 years before which it had been carved by George Lascaris. Indianos in Κυπρ. Σπ. II, p. 157 n., shows that the date of the dedication is 1792 (not 1752 as Sotiriou has it, still less 1702, as Gunnis, p. 432), and the date of the carving therefore 1566, not 1526 or 1476. Other woodcarvings of Byzantine and Post-Byzantine times are illustrated by Sotiriou, Pls. 142–50.

[2] *Archaeologia*, 83, Pl. CII, 2; Sotiriou, Pl. 81β.

[3] Sotiriou, in *Prakt. Akad. Ath.* 6 (1931), p. 14 of extract, and *Byz. Mn.* Pls. 100–2 and 161γ; Buckler (W. H. and G. G.), *Dated Wall-Paintings*, p. 70.

[4] *Archaeologia*, 83, Pls. XCIII, 2, XCV, 2; Sotiriou, Pls. 81α, 82β.

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felt.[1] St George of the Greeks at Famagusta is an outstanding example. 'The very slight vestiges of fourteenth century painting visible in the Cathedral of Nicosia, in the church of the monastery of Vavla, in that of Melandryna in the Karpass, are Italian in style; the choir and porch of Bellapaïs have mural paintings of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, some identical with those which are to be seen in the churches of Siena and its neighbourhood, others quite analogous to those in the Palace of the Popes at Avignon. Even paintings accompanied by inscriptions in French (Pyrga), Greek, Syriac and Armenian (Famagusta) are often of clearly Italian style.... There is no spot in Cyprus so wild and so remote that Giottesque art has not penetrated to it, and it is found even in places which French gothic never reached.'[2]

The paintings in the church of the Panayia at Lagoudera which illustrate this development[3] are apparently fairly early in the fifteenth century. Towards the end of it the foreign strain has become stronger. Perhaps the most striking example of the mixture is afforded by the monastery of St John Lampadistes at Kalopanayiotis, with 'its double church, part Orthodox and part Latin. Both parts are fully painted, and the contrast of styles is most instructive, for much of the work in the Latin church would in western surroundings pass for Byzantine, though in strong contrast with the fully Byzantine manner of the Orthodox church. There are, however, passages of purely western drawing, such as a picture of the three kings riding, where the perspective is quite Italian, such as should date from the end of the fifteenth century.'[4]

[1] It is possible that works which seem to recall the works of Giotto may owe this character not to direct influence from Italy, but to the fact that certain strains, of Byzantine or East Christian origin, appear in both schools. Enlart (I, p. 63) speaks of Giottesque influence in Cyprus; Sotiriou (in *Praktika*, as above), who is not likely to be misled by western prejudice, specifically mentions the paintings in St George of the Greeks at Famagusta in this connexion. Talbot Rice (p. 49, note) disputes this: 'we would be more exact, and distinguish the *Italo-Oriental* influence and also a Constantinopolitan one which was also exercised on Giotto. An actual Giottesque influence in Cyprus is not to be admitted except in the case of a few immigrant Latins.' This may be true about the earlier stages; but later there is more evidence of Italianism than could have been due to merely a few immigrant Latins.

[2] Enlart, *loc. cit.*

[3] See Steel's article in *Illustrated London News* already referred to. He notices an interesting resemblance, in the treatment of the angels' wings in the Nativity, to the Wilton diptych.

[4] Sir Charles Peers, *A Report on the present position of the Ancient Monuments of Cyprus*, p. 10. Cp. what has been said above, Ch. XVI, p. 1097. The only reproductions of the

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The church of the Theotokos near Galata, previously mentioned (p. 1119), contains an important series of paintings of the early days of the Venetian regime, of which we know not only the date (1511) but the painter.[1] An inscription tells us that the church was erected at the cost of Messer Stefano Zacharia and his wife Luisa, and was painted at the cost of Messer Polo Zacharia and of his wife Maddelena and of their children; their portrait was completed on 17 December 1511. The painter was Symeon son of Auxentios. The painting on which the inscription occurs shows Christ seated, his right hand raised in blessing, his left holding an open book with the text 'Come unto me all ye that labour', etc.;[2] on his right and left stand the Virgin and the Baptist. Below kneel Paul Zacharia and four children, accompanied by the family shield of arms.[3]

We need not follow the development of wall-painting later. As to the paintings on panel, especially the portable icons, in which the island is so rich, a mass of material is now available for study, thanks to the labours of Talbot Rice; but for our present purpose it will suffice to say that they exhibit the same variety and mixture of tendencies, and the same late survivals, as we have found in architecture, sculpture and wall-paintings. In view of the hieratic traditions which would be likely to influence the painters of icons, crucifixes and the like, it is not surprising that many dated pieces recall models, not only Byzantine but western, of a much earlier age. Such is the icon of St Maura at Kythrea, dated 1561, of which it is remarked that 'at first sight it calls to mind certain Lombardic paintings of the end of the fourteenth century, but it also falls into place much later in the Cypriot world',[4] such, again,

paintings known to me are in Sotiriou, Pls. 108, 109β; the Journey of the Magi and the Flight into Egypt are included among these. Accounts of the monastery and church in addition to those in Jeffery and Gunnis, will be found in Κυπρ. Χρον. I (1923), pp. 7–10 (E. Vogel), and XII (1936), pp. 241–89 (Kyriazes).

[1] Buckler in *J.H.S.* LIII, pp. 105ff.; Sotiriou, Pls. 111β, 114β. The painting with the donors, Buckler, p. 107, and also in Talbot Rice, fig. 12, at p. 114. An account of the church by Kyriazes is in Κυπρ. Χρον. XII (1936), pp. 60–2. The dedication to the Theotokos was changed to the Archangel Michael some time before 1763.

[2] See Talbot Rice, p. 72.

[3] Per pale, dexter, gules, a palm-tree (?) argent; sinister, argent three bends sinister azure, a lion rampant gules. From the description by Kyriazes it would appear that he sees the dexter half of the shield as a silver lotus on a sable field; a similar coat, he says, is in the church at Moutoullas.

[4] Talbot Rice, no. 138, Pl. XLVII.

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the crucifix at Kokkinotrimithia, of which the analogy is with Italian examples of the thirteenth or fourteenth century, whereas it is dated 1562.[1]

The information which we possess concerning the minor arts as practised in Cyprus is too slight and scattered to justify consideration here.[2] Textiles had probably a higher reputation than any other Cypriote manufacture. We have already had many occasions to mention camlèt;

[1] *Ibid.* no. 117, Pl. XLI.

[2] The information on textiles will, for the most part, be found in Heyd's work (II, pp. 677, 696 ff., 703 ff.). Enlart devotes five pages (700–4) of his book to the minor arts, and illustrates on p. 298 the fine pair of candelabra in forged iron of the fourteenth century from the Latin Cathedral of Famagusta (in 1934 they were in the offices of the Evkaf). Lately Mrs Talbot Rice has made some study of the textiles in connexion with the representation of costumes on icons (*Illustrated London News*, 7 August 1937, pp. 246–7) and Talbot Rice discusses textiles, embroidery and jewellery in his sixth chapter. A few examples of wood-carving, metal-work, jewellery, pottery, etc., for the most part of late date, are illustrated by Sotiriou, Pls. 142–60. The model ship in fine gold of which James I made a present to Bayazid in 1397 (above, Ch. VII, p. 143) was the work of Nicosia goldsmiths. But the wonderful clock which was made for Hugh IV in 1334 was due to Mondino of Cremona (above, Ch. V, p. 305, n. 2). We have had occasion to mention certain manuscripts connected with Cyprus, but there is no evidence of the existence of any sort of school of illumination in the island. C. Gaspar and F. Lyna, *Les principaux manuscrits à peintures de la Bibl. Royale de Belgique*, I (1937), pp. 247–51, describe a MS. of the first half of the fourteenth century (no. 10175) which was in the possession of a member of the Lusignan royal family in 1432. The older miniatures have a pronouncedly Byzantine character, but there is nothing to prove that they were painted in Cyprus. The traveller Peter della Valle has an interesting account of two MSS which were shown him in 1625 by the Jacobite Patriarch Hedà at Aleppo (*Viaggi*, Pt. III, Rome 1662, pp. 427–8). One was a folio of the Gospels in Syriac, on parchment all in gold or silver. It had been bought from Constantinople from the Turks, who were said to have found it in Cyprus when they took the island. It was supposed to be about 400 years old. There were many fine miniatures, but the original binding had been kept by the Turks for the sake of the valuable jewels which adorned it. It was now bound in velvet with silver gilt ornament. The other Gospel Book, older by about fifty years, written in ordinary ink and with few miniatures, had been recently bought from Cyprus for 200 piastres. Nothing is said as to where it was supposed the books had been written Cyprus is ruled out, if the former was identical with the Gospel Book written by the Patriarch Michael, which was originally deposited in the monastery of Bar Sauma in Melitene; the descriptions of the two books tally closely except as regards the bindings; nor is it known how Michael's MS. found its way to Cyprus, though that would not have been difficult. See Chabot's Introduction to the Chronicle of Michael (information from Dr Cyril Moss).

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even more famous was the embroidery with gold thread, *or filé*, for the fabrication of which Cyprus was in the Middle Ages the chief centre, so that it was actually called *or de Chypre*. This thread was of linen, within an extremely fine skin of pig's or sheep's gut covered with gold.[1] In 1338 one finds Pope Benedict XII thanking the Archbishop of Nicosia, Elias de Nabinaux, for sending him cloths of various colours and orfreys;[2] the latter may well have been embroidered in *or de Chypre*.

[1] Heyd, II, p. 677. Cp. J. Ebersolt, *Orient et Occident*, 1929, pp. 40, 46.
[2] *Lettres closes*, ed. Vidal, no. 1834 (30 May 1338).

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Abbreviations frequently used: Abp, Archbishop of Cyprus; Bp, Bishop; C., Cyprus; Cpl., Constantinople; Ct, Count; d., daughter; Emp., Emperor; G.M., Grand Master; Jer., Jerusalem; K., King; m., married; Orth., Orthodox; Q., Queen; s., son; w., wife.

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ADDENDA

Ferdinand of Naples and his designs on Cyprus

The important articles by F. Forcellini on the *Strane peripezie d'un bastardo di Casa Aragona*, which appeared in the *Archivio Storico per le Provincie Napoletane*, XXXVII–XXXIX (1912–14), regrettably escaped my notice until this volume was already in page, and the reprint of them in book form (Naples, 1915) is still inaccessible to me. I note a few details from the *Archivio*.

P. 603. Yolande, Duchess of Savoy, pressed by Sforza to join the new League, refused to be allied with the Venetians so long as they held Cyprus, which belonged to Savoy, and to recover which for Louis she was preparing to make every effort. (23 December 1474; E. Colombo, *Iolanda Duch. di Savoia*, 1894, p. 107.) *Arch. St. Pr. Nap.* XXXVIII, p. 453.

P. 604. Charlotte, at the end of 1473, sent Bernard de Rivesaltes to Naples to negotiate about the adoption of Don Alonzo. *Ibid.* p. 443.

P. 609. The Milanese ambassador at Rome reported as early as 13 November 1476 that Venice had offered actually to restore Charlotte, provided that after her death it should succeed her in Cyprus. The Pope dissuaded her from accepting the offer; perhaps her life would not be safe. (Ghinzoni in *Arch. Stor. Lomb.* II, 1875, p. 176.) *Ibid.* p. 463.

P. 609, n. 2. Don Alonzo was forcibly detained in Egypt; probably relations with the Sultan were strained owing to Ferdinand's having for the time renounced the idea of the marriage to Catherine. He escaped in disguise. The project was revived next year (1488). Don Alonzo was never consecrated to Chieti (probably owing to his deplorable reputation), though he enjoyed its revenues until he resigned in 1497. He died 1 August 1514. *Ibid.* XXXIX, pp. 289–91, 472–3, 492, 773.

P. 631. Ferdinand supported James's appeal to the Pope in 1466, with the result that it was successful (F. Trinchera, *Codice aragonese*, I, Naples, 1866, docs. 30, 271, 272). *Ibid.* XXXVIII, p. 90, n. 3.

P. 664. Louis Perez de Fabregues appears in Italian documents as 'Luys de Fenollet' and 'apostoler de Xipre'. *Ibid.* XXXVIII, pp. 96, 104, etc. Probably 'apostoler' merely means 'envoy'.

P. 669, n. 2. The negotiations for the marriage between the two children had advanced so far by 7 May 1473 that Peter Scales was ordered to Cyprus to take possession of certain casali and the annual income of 12,000 ducats, the dowry assigned to Charla. *Ibid.* p. 97.

P. 670, n. 4. With Belprato were sent Gomes Davila and Hercules de Flori to report on the situation and beg for Ferdinand's assistance. *Ibid.* p. 107.

P. 726. The wife of Rizzo di Marino escaped from custody and was at Naples in August 1478. *Ibid.* p. 464.

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Taxation under Venice

P. 805. A firman of Sultan Selim II of 18 October 1572 (published by Barkan in the *Review of the Faculties of Economic Sciences in the University of Istanbul*, II, 1941), for the communication of which I am indebted to Dr Wittek, enumerates the dues imposed on the rayahs under the 'unbelievers'. From the produce of the crops they had to pay, some a sixth, some a fifth or a fourth or a third. The *parici* had to work two days a week for their masters. The rayahs and their sons and daughters, in addition to a produce tax of 60 or 80 or 90 *akche* (aspers) payable for themselves and their grown-up children, had also to pay 5 *akche* salt-dues, and deliver one-third of the total crop of their fields. For every mule dropped by a mare they paid 60 *akche*, for a foal 20 *akche*, for a calf dropped by a cow 5 *akche*. The sheep-tax was 1 *akche* for every sheep and 1 *akche* for every lamb. In thirty-six of the villages in the districts of Limosa and Avdim (Lemesos and Avdimou) a due of 1½ *akche* for every yoke (*dönüm*) was payable in addition to a third of the crop of the gardens.

This firman was republished by Barkan in his *Legal and financial foundations of agricultural economy in the Ottoman Empire of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries*. I. *Laws* (Istanbul, 1945, p. 348), and with it (pp. 349f.) another firman of the same date, also communicated by Dr Wittek. In this the Sultan states that together with the register of the *kazas* (districts administered by *kadis*) there has been sent him a report of the laws which were valid in Cyprus in the time of the 'dustlike infidels'. According to these there was imposed on all goods, excluding cloth and (finer) materials, a customs duty of 9 per cent on import and 5 per cent on export. The dues for cloth and other woollen fabrics were (on import and export) 2 per cent and for (finer) materials 5 per cent. Nothing was paid on stocks of provisions and wine in the houses of the inhabitants, so far as they did not exceed their own requirements. For meal, wheat and barley, nothing was paid in either money or kind on export or import. Wine brought for sale into the fortresses from the open country was subject to a market-duty of 16 *akche* a load. Further dues levied were: on fish caught off the coast, 3 *akche* per boat; on cattle killed in the slaughterhouse, 5 *akche* a head; in addition, the market-inspector (*muḥtasīb*) took 1 *akche* for every two beasts; on fish, 16 *akche* a load. Under the heading of 'Kile-dues' (bushel-dues) there were levied: for 3 bushels wheat, 1 *akche*; for 6 bushels barley, 1 *akche*; for 3 bushels of other grains, 1 *akche*. Further, there were levied: for 1 load fruit, 1 *akche*; for 3 loads wood, 1 *akche* plus 1 *akche* for the cart (on which the wood was carried); for 6 loads of oil, 1 *akche*; for seed-cotton, 5 *akche* a quintal; for ginned cotton, 15 *akche*. On goods sold at the weigh-house, 2 *akche* a quintal was charged as steelyard-due.

It is further reported that at the time of the conquest the following average prices, regard being had to the different qualities, prevailed:

1 Istanbul bushel: wheat, 12 *akche*; barley, 16; lentils, 13; vetch, 16; beans, 10; sesame, 30; chick-peas, 14; oats, 3 *akche*.

1 load must, 40 *akche*; 1 quintal cotton, 300; 1 quintal hemp, 250; 1 quintal carobs, 35 *akche*.

The Sultan orders the lifting of certain of these dues, and the maintenance of the rest, of which details will be given in Vol. III.

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The Cyprus Tribute

P. 833. L. Bonelli, in *Centenario della Nascita di Michele Amari*, II, Palermo, 1910, pp. 360–1, publishes a receipt from the Kadi of Damascus, dated 5 rebi'I 929 = 22 January 1523, for the payment by Francesco di Marco Zaccaria of 9522 *dirhems* of pure gold (9300 in bars, and 225 [? 222] for minting expenses, equivalent to 8000 *zecchini*, being the Cyprus tribute for the year beginning 9 February 1521.

The Peace of 1540

P. 836. See L. Bonelli, as above, pp. 362–3. The terms proposed by the Sultan, dated 23 rebi'I 947 = 28 July 1940, are contained in a MS. at Venice. Hammer, *Gesch.* 1827, I, p. xxvi, supposed the text to be that of the actual treaty, which, however, was concluded on 2 October 1540; the text has been discovered by Bonelli, who has published the preliminary proposals in full, with additions and variations from the actual treaty.

The War of Cyprus

A number of documents of 1571 relating to this war have been published by Isma'il Hakki Uzuncharshlı in his article 'Some documents concerning the activities of the Allies and Venice with the Turkish State between the battle of Lepanto and the Conquest of Cyprus', in *Türkiyat Mejmuası*, III (1926–33), pp. 257–92. Dr Wittek called my attention to them after this volume was in page. Such as refer to operations in Cyprus are noted here from translations by Miss Henrey.

No. 24. 18 Ramadan 978 (13 February 1571). The Sultan has heard from Mustafa Pasha that the unbelievers with 22 galleys and 4 transports have reached Famagusta. (This was the force taken there by Mark Quirini on 26 January, see p. 946, n. 3.) The Beys of Rhodes and Scutari are ordered to take 40 galleys to Cyprus; the Bey of Midilli (Mytilene) to go to Rhodes with what ships he has. Similar orders were sent to the Beys of Sakız (Chios) and Sighla (the sanjak of which Izmir was the chef-lieu).

No. 25. Same date. The Bey of Rhodes is severely reprimanded for allowing the reinforcements to reach Famagusta. He replied that he had no rowers and was short of bread.

No. 27 (no date). To the Bey of Iskenderiye (Scutari?). The Bey of Kojaeli (Izmid), Kaya Bey, is to join him with 20 galleys; he is to supersede the Bey of Rhodes as serdar of the beys and officers appointed to work with him and the galleys sent from the arsenal; he is to transport to Cyprus troops from Tripoli in Syria, and join up with the ships which are with Mustafa Pasha off Cyprus.

No. 28. 29 Ramadan 978 (24 February 1571). The Bey of Iskenderiye, having reported deficiency of rowers, is reprimanded. He is to join Kaya Bey (who has been sent with 12 galleys) as soon as possible.

No. 30 (no date). To Ali Pasha, who is ordered to sail to join Pertau Pasha, leaving sufficient ships to guard the island; if his presence is necessary there, to select and send a suitable commander-in-chief with the ships to join those at sea.

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
No. 31. Muharrem 979 (June 1571). To Pertau Pasha. Mustafa Pasha's report (received 2 June 1571) was that 20 ships had been left at Cyprus, and Ali had sailed on 15 Zu'l-hijja [978 = 10 May 1571].

Marble Relief from Larnaka

P. 1137, n. 1. Mr J. Joyce, Curator of the Pitt-Rivers Museum, informs me that the relief was purchased at the E. H. Lawrence Sale of Cypriote Antiquities (Sotheby's, 27 April 1892, lot 625). It had been found in excavating a house at Larnaka. Vacher's measurements are correct. There is no reason to doubt that he saw and drew the relief in Lawrence's collection.

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
THE LUSIGNANS OF CYPRUS—TABLE I



This and the two following Tables are based on Mas Latrie, *Généalogie*, and Dawkins, *Machaeras*. The numbers in brackets refer to the former. Abbreviations: A.=Armenia Abp=Archbishop C.=Cyprus c.=*circa* Const.=Constable Ct=Count d.=daughter J.=Jerusalem K.=King Ld=Lord m.=married O.s.p.=*obiit sine prole* Pr.=Prince s.=son ↑=born †=died


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THE LUSIGNANS OF CYPRUS—TABLE II




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THE LUSIGNANS OF CYPRUS—TABLE III



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NOTE ON SOME AUTHORITIES

For full titles of the works mentioned in this Note,
see the List of Books referred to

A. ASSISES DE JÉRUSALEM

The *Assises de Jérusalem* in which the law of the Kingdoms of Jerusalem and of Cyprus is preserved are a composite work, of which the various parts are of different dates. The oldest is the *Livre au Roi*, compiled between 1197 and 1205. Another section, the *Livre de forme de plait*, is the work of Philip de Novare, compiled between 1252 and 1257, and is specially concerned with procedure. The most famous name connected with the *Assises* is, however, John d'Ibelin, Count of Jaffa and Ascalon, a pupil of Philip de Novare; the *Livre de Jean d'Ibelin*, a great work of jurisprudence, dating from 1265–6, was in 1369 formally adopted as the official authority for the law of Cyprus. All these are concerned only with the Haute Cour. The *Assises de la Cour des Bourgeois* seem to have been compiled in Jerusalem between 1229 and 1244; of these, a Greek version was prepared especially for Cyprus; it cannot be proved that it is as early as the time of Hugh I (1205–18), and the texts are not earlier than the fourteenth century. See *Assises de Jérusalem*, ed. Beugnot, in *Rec. Cr. Lois*, tt. I, II, 1841–3; K. N. Sathas, Μεσ. Βιβλ. VI (1877), πρόλογος, pp. ν′–ρβ′; M. Grandclaude, *Étude critique sur les Livres des Assises de Jérusalem*, 1923; J. L. La Monte, *Feudal Monarchy in Jerusalem*, 1932, p. 281. For the Cypriote Greek version, Sathas, *op. cit.* VI, pp. 1–497; Krumbacher, *Gesch. d. Byz. Litt.*[2] 1897, pp. 898 ff. An Italian translation, ordered in 1531 and published at Venice in 1535, is reprinted in Canciani, *Barbarorum Leges Ant.* vol. V. It contains the *Assises* of the Haute Cour, but only a part of those of the Basse Cour. See Ch. XIII, p. 770, n. 4.

B. CONTINUATIONS OF WILLIAM OF TYRE

The thirteenth-century French translation of the twenty-two books of William of Tyre's *Historia Hierosolymitana*, which ends with 1184 (*Rec. Cr. Occ.* I; Migne, *P.L.* 201; and P. Paris, 1879–80, 2 v.) is continued in various MSS to 1228 or 1231. This continuation was formerly attributed to Bernard, Treasurer of the Abbey of Corbie. He, however, only abbreviated or edited an earlier work by one Ernoul, who was probably a valet of Balian d'Ibelin. Ernoul gives a valuable independent account of the Third and Fourth Crusades (ed. Mas Latrie, 1871). Further continuations were added; one, in the MS. de Rothelin, goes to 1261; another, the MS. de Noailles, goes to 1275. (*Rec. Cr. Occ.* II.)

The title *Eracles*, by which the Continuation is usually cited, really belongs to the French translation of William's work as well as the Continuation. It is derived from the allusion to Heraclius in the initial words of the translator: 'Les anciennes estoires dient que Eracles, qui fu mout bons crestiens, gouverna l'empire de Rome....'

For the most recent attempt to disentangle the exceedingly complicated relations between the various continuations, see C. Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord* (1940), pp. 20–5.

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C. LES GESTES DES CHIPROIS

Published by G. Raynaud, Société de l'Orient latin, Genève, 1887; also by Louis de Mas Latrie and others in *Rec. Cr. Arm.*, 1906. Raynaud's edition was made from a modern copy (1883) of the unique MS., itself a copy made at Kerynia in 1343 by one John le Miège. The edition in the *Recueil* is based on the copy of 1883 and on Raynaud. The *Gestes* is a collection of chronicles of the history of Cyprus from the earliest times to 1309, compiled about 1325, probably by Gérard de Monréal. It contained a Chronicle of the Holy Land from Adam to 1218 (only the part from 1131 has survived); the History by Philip de Novare of the war between Frederick II and John d'Ibelin (with interpolations from other sources); and the Chronicle of the so-called Templar of Tyre, continuing the history of Cyprus and Syria from 1243 to 1309 (the following pages of the MS. are lost).

A fully annotated translation of Philip de Novare's History, based on the text of Ch. Kohler, *Les Mémoires de Philippe de Novare*, Paris, 1913, has appeared as *The Wars of Frederick II against the Ibelins in Syria and Cyprus*, by Philip de Novare, transl. by J. L. La Monte and M. J. Hubert, New York, 1936. Kohler's text was established on the basis of the copy of 1883 and the editions by Raynaud and in the *Recueil* mentioned above, with restitutions drawn from Amadi; see below (G).[1]

The Chronicle of the Holy Land which forms the preface to the *Gestes* is close to the *Annales de Terre Sainte* of which two versions are extant (ed. Röhricht in *Arch. de l'Or. lat.* II, pp. 429–61).

D. MARINO SANUDO THE ELDER

The *Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis*, begun about 1306 and finished by 1321, when it was submitted to the Pope, was an elaborate memorandum on the plan which should be adopted for a Crusade. It falls into three books, containing a mass of careful observation from the writer's own experience, and is invaluable for the history of trade, 'of medieval economics as well as navigation, geography and cartography' (Atiya). Book III is a history of the world down to 1313, of which parts IV to XIII give the history of the Crusades. Here the author depends chiefly on William of Tyre and his continuators and on the *Gestes des Chiprois*. The only edition of the text is in Bongars, *Gesta Dei per Francos*, II, Hanover, 1611, and a new text would be very welcome. Part XIV of Book III (chiefly description of the Holy Land) has been translated by A. Stewart, Palestine Pilgrims' Text Soc. 1896. Part XV deals with military tactics and the duties of the model ruler. Sanudo was born in 1270 and died after 1343. See Delaville le Roulx, *F.O.* pp. 32f.; A. S. Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages* (1938), pp. 114–27.

[1] References to Novare are given in arabic numerals to the paragraphs in Raynaud's edition of the *Gestes*, in roman to those in Kohler's book.

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E. CARTULARY OF SANTA SOPHIA, NICOSIA

This Cartulary, in its original form, contained 105 documents, and was compiled for Archbishop John del Conte, in whose time two more were added. The MS. at Venice (San Marco, Suppl. to Latin MSS, Class IV, no. LVI) is a copy of the lost original, made for Archbishop Aldobrandino Orsini about 1524. It has had added to it various other documents down to 1564. Many extracts were printed from it by its discoverer, L. de Mas Latrie, in Vol. III of his *Histoire* (1854) and in his *Documents Nouveaux* (1882). At Paris (B.N., lat. 10189) is a copy made for Mas Latrie. A most useful critical *Register* (cited in this volume as *Reg. C.N.*) with an introduction giving the history of the Cartulary, has been printed by J. L. La Monte in *Byzantion*, t. V (1929–30), pp. 439–522.

F. MACHAERAS

Leontios Machaeras, *Recital concerning the Sweet Land of Cyprus entitled Kronaka which is to say Chronicle.* First printed by Sathas (Μεσ. Βιβλ. II, 1873) and now available in a masterly edition and translation with notes by R. M. Dawkins (2 vols., Oxford, 1932). Dawkins conjectures that Machaeras was born about 1380, since in 1401 he was a secretary to Sir John de Nores, a post he can hardly have held before he was twenty; in 1426 he was in charge of the wine at the battle of Khirokitia, and in 1432 went on an embassy to Asia Minor, both offices which show that he must have been in the full vigour of his age. Loïzos Philippou, on the other hand (in Διαλέξεις περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων Κυπρίων φιλοσόφων καὶ πεζογράφων, 1937, p. 76) holds that he could have filled these offices when he was sixty or seventy years old; and his elder brothers Nicolas and Paul fought at the siege of Kerynia in 1374, while Paul was in the service as squire of Galio de Dampierre and Bertolacci Trari of Florence in 1360. Nicolas and Paul must therefore have both been born before 1350; and it is hardly likely that there was an interval of as much as thirty years between their birth and that of Leontios. Philippou therefore puts the date of the birth of the latter about 1350–60.

His Chronicle goes down to 1432. Of the written sources used by him, only one has been identified, the book of the Invention of the Holy Cross, attributed to a mythical St Cyriac, of which a fragment is preserved in a British Museum sixteenth-century MS. Add. 34554 (Dawkins, *Mach.* II, pp. 12 ff. and more fully in Κυπρ. Χρονικά, XI, 1935, pp. 10–23). Another source, of which nothing seems to have survived, was a book written by Sir John de Mimars (§ 548). Dawkins further conjectures, from the full and intimate elements in the references to Dimitrios Daniel, that Machaeras may have had as a source a book by this man, who was secretary to Queen Eleanor.

Two recensions of the Chronicle exist, represented by MSS at Venice and Oxford respectively, both of the sixteenth century; the former is generally the better text, and both are copies of earlier, lost MSS. Personal references in the Venetian MS. prove that it derives from one written by Machaeras himself; the Oxford MS. can make no such claim, nor is it a mere abbreviation of the Venetian. See also p. 1106.

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G. AMADI

Francis Amadi (who died at Venice in 1566) owned and probably wrote the Chronicle that goes under his name. Published by René de Mas Latrie in *Coll. de doc. inéd. sur l'hist. de France*, Sér. I, Hist. polit.: *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi*, Paris, 1891–3. The book covers the period from the Caliph Omar down to 1441. For 1218–43 it translates the History of Philip de Novare. It is rich in detail from the beginning of the fourteenth century to 1426. The writer did not use Machaeras directly, but must have gone to the same sources.

H. FLORIO BUSTRON

Florio Bustron, *Historia overo Commentarii de Cipro*. Published by René de Mas Latrie in *Coll. de documents inédits*, Paris, 1886. Florio Bustron (second half of the sixteenth century) used and abridged the work of Amadi, and continued to 1489, getting for the latter part information from his father and from the writings of George Bustron (see K). He mentions a number of other sources, such as Philip de Novare, Gérard de Monréal, probably the *Lignages d'Outre-Mer*, the *Remembranze della Secreta*, and the *Assises*. He was employed at the Secrète as notary, and it was he who was entrusted with the official translation into the Venetian dialect of the *Assises*, which was ordered in 1531.[1] See Ch. XIII, p. 770, n. 4 and p. 1116.

J. STRAMBALDI

Diomede Strambaldi, *Cronicha del Regno di Cypro*. Published by René de Mas Latrie in *Coll. de doc. inéd. sur l'hist. de France*, Sér. I, Hist. polit.: *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi*, 2me partie, Paris, 1893. This is an Italian translation by a Cypriote from a version of the Greek Chronicle, similar to but rather better than the Oxford MS. It goes down to 1458.

K. GEORGE BUSTRON

Georgios Bustron, Χρονικὸν Κύπρου. Printed by Sathas, *op. cit.*, following on his text of Machaeras, from two MSS at Venice with two final paragraphs from the British Museum MS. Arundel 518. Bustron continued the Greek *Chronicle*, from the point where Machaeras stopped, down to the year 1501. He is described by Stephen de Lusignan (see L) as a good authority, having been the companion of James II both before and after he became king. He is an honest and artless writer; as Florio Bustron

[1] To the references to him given by his editor, add *Libri Comm. Reg.* VI, p. 286, no. 44 (15 Dec. 1556): Florio Bustron, formerly notary of the Secreta, employed to make a copy of a diploma of the Haute Cour of 1455, in the original French, and provide a translation. Sakellarios (I, p. 793) says that he fell fighting at the siege of Nicosia, and that he is mentioned by Sozomeno in his account of that siege.

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says, he writes *senza alchuna passione*. He records much just as he learned it from sources to which he had access without any idea of its proportionate importance or its bearing on the general course of events; where they cover the same ground, Florio Bustron is often the more intelligible. See Sathas, *op. cit.* pp. ρμα′ ff. Two pages continuing the chronicle of Bustron to 1589 (?) are printed by Indianos in Κυπρ. Σπουδαί, II, pp. 121ff. See also p. 1107.

L. STEPHEN DE LUSIGNAN

Stephen was christened Jacques, but in religion took the name of Stephen, by which he is generally known. Of the royal house of Cyprus, he was born 1526/7, son of Jason, son of Philip, who married Isabel, daughter of John Perez Fabregues, Count of Jaffa and Karpass. Philip was the son of Clarion or Charles, Lord of Lapithos, who was deprived of his possessions by James II. Stephen became a Dominican friar, and eventually Reader in Theology in the College of the Dominicans in Paris.

(*a*) *Chorograffia et breve historia universale dell' isola de Cipro principiando al tempo di Noè per in sino al* 1572. *per il R. P. Lettore Fr. Steffano Lusignano di Cipro dell' Ordine de' Predicatori*. Bologna, 1573.

This work is often valuable because of the author's local knowledge. His history is often quaintly garbled. It is dated (f. 91) as being completed at Naples in Nov. 1570. But it contains (ff. 91–123 *b*) a remarkably badly printed account of the Turkish conquest, written by another Dominican, Fr. Angelo Calepio, in 1572. In some copies the 7 in the date has been surcharged 8, which Legrand (*Bibl. Hellénique, XVe et XVIe s.*) describes as a *supercherie commerciale*, intended to give the book a new lease of life. A translation into Cypriote-Greek, made about 1600, exists in MS. (Pandelidis in Ἀθηνᾶ 34, 1922, pp. 130–65.)

(*b*) *Description de toute l'isle de Cypre*. Paris, 1580.

Though published later than the preceding book, this was composed earlier, having been begun in the convent of the Jacobins at Paris on 9 May and finished on 22 Nov. 1568, in the forty-first year of the author's age. It is not therefore a revision of the *Chorograffia* though something may have been added in the interval between first composition and publication. A French translation of Calepio's account of the Turkish conquest is also included.

(*c*) *Histoire contenant une sommaire description des Généalogies...de tous les Princes... qui ont iadis comma(n)dé és Royaumes de Hierusalem, Cypre*, etc. Paris, 1579.

(*d*) *Raccolta di cinque discorsi, intitolati Corone...nella terza* (*si tratta*) *della nobiltà di Hierusalem*. Padua, 1577.

So far as concerns the later history, both (*a*) and (*b*) are based on George Bustron from the reign of John II, and go down to the retirement of Catherine Cornaro. Of the *Chorograffia* the author admits that it was very imperfect, because he was unable to afford to make it better, having spent all his money in ransoming his relations from the Turks; he had to leave it to someone else to see through the press, and in his absence it appeared full of errors and defects. See also p. 1116.

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M. LOREDANO

John Francis Loredano, a Venetian nobleman and Councillor, was born in 1606. His history of the Lusignans down to the death of James III appeared as the *Historie de' re' Lusignani, pubblicate da Henrico Giblet Cavalier.* Libri Undeci. In Bologna, Per Giacomo Monti, 1647. The name of the author is, as the preface says, deliberately omitted. It appeared again as the fourth volume of Loredano's collected works in six volumes, published at Venice in 1653 and 1660. An edition in French was published in two volumes at Paris in 1732, under the title *Histoire des Rois de Chypre de la Maison de Lusignan...traduit* [sic] *de l'Italien du Cavalier Henri Giblet Cypriot*, which excuses the common error that makes Giblet the actual author. It is this French edition to which references are given here. The preface to this translation praises the author for his *grand fonds de probité, de religion et d'impartialité*, for placing the virtues in the best light, and exposing vices only so much as is necessary to make them odious, for the chastity of his expression, and for never digressing from his subject, his occasional moralisations being made so quickly that the reader hardly notices them. It would be difficult to give a falser idea of the real character of the book, which has been more justly described by Reinhard (in the Preface to his *Geschichte*, pp. iv–vii). It is a tissue of conjectures and political considerations, with little sermons on every possible occasion, scandalous anecdotes, and invented speeches placed in the mouth of his characters; it swarms with genealogical, chronological and other errors. It is, to say the least, surprising that a modern Italian historian like Balan, dealing with the subject of Famagusta and the Genoese occupation, is content to cite this work only, and expressly ignore the Venetian and Genoese writers 'who contradict each other and are without authority, being openly apologists and not historians' (*Storia d' Italia*[2], IV (1895), p. 539).

N. JAUNA

Chevalier Dominique Jauna, formerly Imperial and Royal Councillor, was in his seventy-ninth year when his *Histoire générale des Roïaumes de Chypre, de Jérusalem, d'Arménie et d'Égypte* appeared in two volumes at Leiden in 1747, though the work was practically completed twelve years earlier. Jauna had lived long in Cyprus, being interested especially in silk cultivation. But he was badly equipped for the writing of history, and his treatment of authorities is uncritical. Mas Latrie (*H.*, II, p. ii) is not too severe when he speaks of the work as 'superficiel et faux' and adds that it really contains nothing that can be utilized except a map reproduced from Coronelli.

O. REINHARD

The *Vollständige Geschichte des Königreichs Cypern* of Johann Paul Reinhard, Ordentlicher Lehrer of Antiquities, Rhetoric and Poetry at Erlangen, was published in two volumes at Erlangen and Leipzig in 1766–8. It professes to bring the history of the island down to his time, but fifteen pages suffice to cover the period from 1573 to 1767. It is unnecessary to say more of it here than that it is the first attempt at a critical history, conscientious, thoroughly documented, and quite admirable for its time.

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P. KYPRIANOS

Kyprianos (Archimandrite): Ἱστορία χρονολογικὴ τῆς νήσου Κύπρου, Venice, 1788. Inaccurate and worthless modern editions exist, but that issued at Leukosia in 1933 can safely be used. On the author see Sathas, Μεσ. Βιβλ, II, p. ρνε'; I. K. Peristianes, Ἱστορία τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν Γραμμάτων (Leukosia, 1930), p. 422. He translates extensively from Stephen de Lusignan, using the *Chorograffia*, not the *Description*, and Loredano (the latter being his authority for the Lusignan period). His contribution to the history from the Turkish conquest down to 1788 fills only thirty-three pages. The remainder of the book is a disorderly compilation including the tractate of Archbishop Philotheos (1734–59) on the Church of Cyprus, and some useful information on the bishoprics and monasteries of his time. It ends with cures for the bite of the Cyprus viper.

Q. AENEAS SYLVIUS
(Pius II)

The *Commentaries* (*Pii Secundi...Commentarii...a R.D. Ioanne Gobellino vicario Bonnen...compositi*, Rome, 1584). Book VII contains a sketch of the history of Cyprus, which only pretends to detail after the death of Peter I. Except for the episodes in which Pius was personally concerned (the visit of Charlotte to Italy) this is perhaps the most inaccurate account of the history of the island in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that has ever been written. It is sufficient here to observe that the Pope ignores Peter II altogether, supposes James I, having killed his brother Peter I, to have immediately succeeded him and to have been carried off prisoner to Genoa as King; or, again, that he believes Charlotte's marriage to Louis of Savoy to have been arranged at the persuasion of her mother. Other inaccuracies and distortions are noted in the course of this history, where they seem likely to mislead. The text of that portion of the *Commentaries* with which we are concerned is reproduced in Monod's *Trattato del titolo Regio* of 1633, and from that in Reinhard, II, Beyl. pp. 145–53. A translation by Gragg with notes by Gabel is in course of publication.

Aeneas Sylvius also deals with Cyprus, but no more satisfactorily, in a section of his *Cosmographia* or *Historia rerum ubique gestarum* (*Opera*, Basle, 1551, pp. 376–81: *de Cypro insula*, or *de bello Cyprio*). Mogabgab (*Supp. Exc.* II, pp. 76–86) translates cc. 95–7.

R. SOURCES FOR THE WAR OF CYPRUS

The sources for the history of the War of Cyprus are embarrassingly rich, and by no means confined to the thirty-two titles enumerated by Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. des Osman. Reiches*, III (1828), p. 785. The few works by Turkish writers on the subject have not been translated, but I owe full analyses of those which are available in print in this country to the kindness of Dr Paul Wittek. First must be mentioned the documents concerning the Cyprus campaign published by Ahmed Refik in the Review of the Philological Faculty of the University of Istanbul. These are printed mostly from the Register at Istanbul, not from the original documents; consequently one must reckon with the possiblity of errors in transcription by the compiler of the

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Register as well as by the editor. These documents do not throw light on events earlier than the fall of Nicosia. A Greek translation of some (or all?) of them appeared in the Larnaka journal *Isotes* (1928; not accessible to me), from which nos. 47 and 51 are reprinted by Myrianthopoulos, Χατζηγεωργάκις Κορνέσιος, pp. 17–19. There is further the journal of the secretary of Mustafa Pasha, published in *Tarikhi Osmanlı Enjümeni Mejmuası*, Istanbul, A.H. 1329 (A.D. 1911), of which there is a Greek translation by L. Philippou in Κυπρ. Χρον. x (1934), pp. 161–5. It gives the stages of the voyage from Istanbul to Salines, but is otherwise disappointing, recording little but rewards to Turks for deeds of bravery and doubtful statements about the surrender of Kerynia. Of Turkish historians, the most important is Ali Efendi (Mustafa b. Ahmed), who was present in the Cyprus campaign; his *Künh ül-ahbâr*, composed at the end of the sixteenth century (he died in 1599), has been printed only as far as the fall of Constantinople. He recorded the events at the siege of Famagusta as narrated to him by Mustafa Pasha, and an abstract of this narrative is given by Ibrahim Pechevi (1574 to *c.* 1650). Pechevi's History, covering the years 1520 to 1639, was written towards the end of his life; an unsatisfactory text was published in two volumes at Istanbul in 1866–7; the conquest of Cyprus occupies pp. 486–91 of the first volume. The dates given in the printed text are frequently wrong. Selaniki (Mustafa, born at Salonika) has left a History (*Tarikh*) covering the years 1563–99; he was a contemporary high official of the Ottoman Chancery, and well informed. The unsatisfactory printed text (Istanbul, 1864–5) stops at the year 1592. The conquest of Cyprus occupies pp. 100–4. Hajji Khalfa (as to whom see *O.C.*, pp. 72–9) in his *History of the Naval Wars*, composed in 1656 (two years before his death) gives some useful information about the composition of the invading force. Zirek's *Tarikhi Fethi Kıbrıs* (History of the Conquest of Cyprus), written in 1574, is, according to Hammer, perhaps a chief source of Hajji Khalfa's and other Turkish reports (cp. Babinger, *Die Geschichtschreiber der Osmanen*, pp. 113–14); so also is the *Tarikh-i Al-i Osman* of Ahmed Hasan Beyzade.

The conquest of Cyprus is dealt with summarily in histories of the Turks: Hammer-Purgstall, vol. III, 1928 (2nd ed. vol. II, 1834); Zinkeisen, vol. II (1854); and Iorga, vol. III (1910). References to Hammer-Purgstall are to the first edition, which contains the *Erläuterungen* omitted in the crabbedly printed second.

From a modern work by Karachelebizade Abd al-Aziz, 'Garden of the Great', published at Cairo in 1831, Philippou (in Κυπρ. Χρον. v, pp. 44–7) has translated into Greek the passage on the conquest of Cyprus, which is more curious than accurate.[1]

Cobham, to his translation of Mariti (2nd ed. 1909, pp. 194–6), has added a modern Turkish account from *Kıbrıs Tarikhi* (Nicosia, 1895), adapted for Turkish readers.

The *Kıbrıs Tarihi* of H. Fikret Alasya (Lefkosha, 1939) is chiefly concerned with Cyprus as a Turkish province, but contains in its first fifty-four pages an account of the conquest, which adds little to our other sources.

A study of the Western sources has been made by Camillo Manfroni (*Storia della Marina Italiana dalla caduta di Constantinopoli alla battaglia di Lepanto*, Rome, 1897, pp. 437–51). The expeditions of the Allies and of the Turks in 1570, and the conquest of Cyprus, are only the first phase of the war which ended in the battle of Lepanto,

[1] The statement that the Nile is a river of Cyprus may be derived from the fact that the Pedias, from its habit of depositing silt after a spate, was sometimes called the Cypriote Nile (Ross, p. 37, tr. Cobham; Löher-Joyner, *Cyprus*, p. 13).

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and with the latter this history is not concerned; we therefore here consider the authorities only in so far as they deal with the first phase.

Of prime importance for the history of the dissensions which resulted in the fiasco of the expedition of 1570 are the memoranda and letters in the Colonna archives, and other documents, of which the following are the chief. These, and others not in print, have been fully used by Guglielmotti, in his *Marcantonio Colonna alla battaglia di Lepanto* (1862).

A. The Pope's brief to Colonna, 11 June 1570. Guglielmotti, pp. 8–11.

B. Letter from Philip II to Colonna, 15 July 1570. Guglielmotti, pp. 28–9.

C. Letter from the Doge Alvise Mocenigo to Colonna on his authority over the combined fleets, 5 Aug. 1570. *Il Saggiatore*, Rome, III (1845), pp. 170–1.

D. Doria's first Manifesto, Sitia, 16 Sept. In C. Campana, *Historie del Mondo* (1599), I, pp. 45–8; Bosio, III (1602), p. 865; *Il Saggiatore*, II (1844), pp. 289–94.

E. Reply by Colonna, same date. *Il Saggiatore*, II, pp. 336–8.

F. Letter from Colonna to Doria demanding the arrest of Don Carlos d'Avalos. Porto di Tristamo, 26 Sept. *Il Saggiatore*, III, p. 170.

G. Reports (the same?) by Colonna to the King of Spain (*a*) in the Colonna Archives (cited by Guglielmotti, p. 66, but not printed in full), and (*b*) at Monte Cassino (Appendix to Sereno, pp. 431–8, relating events down to 27 Sept.).

H. Fede di Sforza Pallavicino e di Giacomo Celsi di quel che avvenne tra Marco Antonio Colonna e Giannandrea Doria il dì 26 Sett. 1570 all' Isola di Tristamo. 27 Sept. 1570. Guglielmotti, pp. 88–91.

I. Letter from Colonna to the King of Spain, Sitia, 28 Sept. 1570. *Il Saggiatore*, III, pp. 172–4.

J. Doria's second Manifesto, giving his version of events down to his departure from Crete, 5 Oct. 1570. *Il Saggiatore*, II, pp. 358–65.

K (*a*), (*b*), (*c*). Letters from Doria, Corfù, 13 Oct. 1570: (*a*) to the Pope, Serrano, *Corr. Dipl.* IV, p. 63, n. 1; (*b*) to Zuñiga, Molini, *Documenti di Storia Italiana*, II, 1837, pp. 481–4; (*c*) to the Doge of Venice, *Rivista Marittima* XXXI, pt. 3 (1898), p. 257.

L. Letter from Don Carlos d'Avalos, 23 Oct. 1570, in T. Costo, *Compendio dell' Istoria del Regno di Napoli*, pt. III (Venice, 1591), ff. 19–20.

M. Informatione di quanto è successo nell' infrascritta armata doppo che s' intese esser mente di S. Maestà Cattolica che le sue galere si unissero con quelle di S. Santità. Undated. *Il Saggiatore*, III, pp. 27–31. A copy of this is appended to the *Relazione* of Sozomeno in the Florence MS. Magliabecchi, ch. xxx, no. 160.[1]

A few other documents, not in print, are referred to by modern writers such as Daru, Romanin, Guglielmotti, Rosell, Serrano and Pastor, and will be mentioned as occasion arises. The above-mentioned pieces are, of course, mostly *ex parte* statements; but such evidence, when critically weighed, usually offers better material for a verdict than much professedly historical writing.

As a purely objective account of the events as they occurred, given in chronological order, with invaluable details of the forces engaged, the work of John Peter Contarini

[1] This MS. also contains, according to its table of contents, on ff. 293 sq., following the *Informatione*, the *prima* and *seconda giustificatione del sig^n^ Andrea Doria*, which are, I conjecture, the first and second Manifestos, D and J.

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must take first place.[1] It makes no such pretension to style as detracts from the evidential value of the literary historians, and is perfectly straightforward. But it throws no light on the problem which confronts the modern writer who has to decide whether Doria, Colonna or Zane was responsible for the fiasco already mentioned, or who is to be blamed for the failure to resist the Turkish landing in Cyprus.

E. M. Manolesso's *Historia nova* (Padua, 1572), though not exceptionally accurate, has much valuable detail.

Paruta is generally given pride of place among the professional historians of the War, and he is certainly extremely well informed and not too strongly biased on the Venetian side.[2]

Andrew Morosini (1558–1618), who followed Paruta as official historian, did not begin where Paruta had left off, but went back to 1521, and took the history down to 1615. He began his work in 1598, and having had full access to official documents must be regarded as an all but primary authority. His account of the siege of Famagusta is exceedingly detailed.

Longo, on the other hand, is a mere pamphleteer, frankly apologizing for the Venetians. If, as Manfroni observes, he is partly supported by documentary evidence, our references to him in footnotes show that he cannot be regarded as impartial.[3]

Other Venetian histories of the War of Cyprus, existing in MS. at Venice and Paris, are listed by Daru (VII, pp. 267–8), of which that by Fidele Fideli would seem to be the most important, judging by the number of copies.

The numerous special accounts of the sieges of Nicosia and Famagusta are not all at first hand; to decide the filiation between them all would entail more labour than the result would justify. Most of them are listed by Cobham on pp. 484–5 of his *Exc. Cypr.*; cp. his transl. of Mariti, Cambridge, 1909, pp. 163–8. Pastor (XVIII, p. 391, n. 2) adds a few from MS. sources, including a *Relazione della perdita di Nicosia* by Nestor Martinengo, who however was not through that siege. The *Relatione de' successi di Famagosta* of Alexander Podacataro (so, rather than *Podocataro*, his name seems to be written), Ant. Riccoboni's *Historia de Salamina capta* and B. Tomitano's *Resa di Famagosta* are among the Cobham Pamphlets in the library of the R. Empire Society. Riccoboni is lavish with the text of letters and speeches, but it is to be suspected that they are literary embellishments, and not documentary; the use of the Latin language renders writers liable to such lapses from integrity. He corresponds very closely with Gatto (see below) in his dates, and it seems possible that he had access to Gatto's

[1] Manfroni's statement that the second edition of Contarini (1645) is an improvement on the first is not borne out by a comparison of the two in regard to the expedition of 1570. The later edition contains a surprising number of misprints. The Latin translation by Stupanus (1573) is not to be trusted in the matter of dates. The portion describing the siege of Nicosia is translated in Cobham's *Mariti's Travels* (Cambridge, 1909), pp. 169–75).

[2] Paruta's *Historia Vinetiana* proper stops at 1552; but a second part contained the three books on the War of the League of the Christian Princes against Selim the Ottoman.

[3] Manfroni rightly admits: 'his work reflects faithfully the mind and sentiments of the Venetian patriciate; it is an echo of their politics, justly suspicious, after so many disillusionments, but only too systematically suspicious; therefore his pleading must be accepted with some reserve, and weighed with caution'

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record. It must be remarked that in the Italian translation the dates are almost without exception miscalculated from the Roman calendar of the original. To my regret I have been unable to find in this country, in the present circumstances, any copy of John Sozomeno, *Narratione della Guerra di Nicosia* (Bologna, 1571) except in the translation by Cobham (p. 81) from a MS. at Pesaro which he assumes to correspond to that work.[1] Rocco Benedetti's *Narratio de capta Famagusta*, etc. (Leipzig, 1571) and the *Relatione del R^do Padre Fra Augustin della perdita di Famagosta*, etc. (printed in a Nozze publication by Ct. Niccolò Morosini) have also eluded me. But the *Vera et fidelissima Narratione del successo dell' espugnatione, & defensione del Regno di Cipro*, by Father Angelo Calepio, in Lusignan's *Chorograffia* (also in French in his *Description* and in English, not too accurately rendered, in Cobham) is especially valuable for Nicosia, at the siege of which he was present; less so, perhaps, for Famagusta, since for that he depended on the statements of various officers whom he met when he was a prisoner in Constantinople; indeed, as Cobham says, he has borrowed almost in its entirety the *Relatione* of Nestor Martinengo. Falchetti's brief and very inaccurate account of the siege of Nicosia is translated in Cobham, pp. 80–1, from an early copy in the Pesaro library. I have also used the *Relatione di tutto il successo di Famagosta* of Count Nestor Martinengo; he was through the siege, having arrived with the survivors of Jerome Martinengo's force, was taken prisoner at the end, and escaped. His brief report to the Doge (which is cited by Romanin, VI, p. 306, n. 2, from the *Esposizioni principi* under date 7 Dec. 1571) was published in a number of editions and translations. It was regarded as the most authoritative account of the siege, and was followed almost *verbatim* by other writers, such as Calepio, Contarini, Sereno and Bizari. A MS. of this in the Oliveriana at Pesaro was certified by the librarian in 1899 as 'to all appearances autograph' (Cobham Collection, as above). My references are to the edition printed by Giorgio Angelieri at Venice in 1572. Cobham has translated from this edition in

[1] The Pesaro MS. is said to be not an original but an early copy. In the National Library at Florence there is a MS. of this report by Sozomeno, differing in details only from that translated by Cobham (Magliabecchi, cl. XXX, no. 160; modern copy in the Cobham Collection, Cyprus Pamphlets, vol 31). Either the Florence MS. itself or this modern copy is full of errors. The original was addressed to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, presumably Cosimo I, who died in 1574. There is another MS. at Siena (Daru, VII, p. 270). Sathas (Νεοελληνικὴ Φιλολογία, p. 191) includes John Sozomenos among his Greek writers, and says that he wrote a ποίημα, which being lacking in literary finish was given better form by Francis Altamiro and printed at Bologna in 1576, under the title 'Narratione della guerra di Nicosia fatta nel regno di Cipro da' Turchi l' anno 1570'. If Sathas's date is correct, this must be a second edition; for Cigogna (*Inscr. Venez.* II, p. 379) describes a work under the same title, written by the same man, dedicated on 10 Feb. 1571 to Pompeo Trissino, and published by Biagio Bignami at Bologna in that year. So too E. Legrand, *Bibliographie hellénique...XVe et XVIe siècles*, vol. IV (1906), p. 172, no. 682. Like Cobham, I have been unable to see a copy of this work; but I hazard the suggestion that Sozomeno did not write in Greek verse but in Italian prose, and lacking skill in that language had to have his work revised. Some details not included in the translation by Cobham will be found in Cigogna, *loc. cit.*, and Sakellarios, I, p. 793. Bizari's account of the invasion and the siege of Nicosia is little more than a translation of this Narration of Sozomeno; as his account of Famagusta is of the Narration of Martinengo.

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his translation of Mariti's Travels, Cambridge, 1909, pp. 176–94. An inferior reprint, also of Venice and the same year, but without publisher's name, must have had a fairly large circulation, since at least one of its mistakes appears in the writers who copied it. One of the translations, by William Malim, which was printed by John Daye in London in 1572, was afterwards included by Hakluyt in his *Principall Navigations* (1589, vol. II, pt. I, pp. 117–31).

But by far the most detailed account of the siege of Famagusta known to me is the *Narrazione* of Angelo Gatto of Orvieto. This man was given a company of grenadiers after the death of Captain Francis Foresti of Venice on 5 July 1571. He was wounded on 29 July. His work—which shows enthusiastic admiration of Baglione—is a sort of diary, which he finished writing as a prisoner in the Black Sea Tower at Constantinople on 19 Nov. 1573. In his dedication to Adrian Baglione he apologizes for his inexperience as a writer, and admits that his dates may occasionally be a day or two out; only once have I found reason to think he is less accurate than that. The British Museum MS. Sloane 2256 (of the eighteenth century) represents another, slighter version of the same work. For the two sieges, but especially for that of Famagusta, the *Vita e fatti del... Cap. Astorre Baglione* (Verona, 1591) by Cr. Sylvestrani Brenzone must also be consulted; it is to be supposed that the author had information from his hero's family. Ciatti's *Vita d' Astorre Baglioni*, Perugia, 1851, I have not seen.

The Θρῆνος τῆς Κύπρου, in rhyming verse by a contemporary *poietaris*, gives a few details of interest, and a shorter poem on the same subject is printed by Sakellarios (II, pp. 55–7) and analysed by Zannetos (I, pp. 1018–20). The theory that the Θρῆνος is the work of Solomon Rodinos cannot be sustained: see K. Prousis in Κυπρ. Σπ. VII, p. 27, n. 18.

The note on the Turkish conquest, copied by Archbishop Païsios from an old source, and published in Κυπρ. Χρον. II, pp. 218–19, and, more correctly, in Κυπρ. Σπ. II, pp. 18–19, is of no independent value.

Manfroni gives the first place among the writers of Central Italy to the Roman, Bartholomew Sereno, whose *Commentarii della Guerra di Cipro* was published by the monks of Monte Cassino in 1845. He was present at Lepanto, and wrote an impartial narrative after retiring to the cloister in 1574. He is severe on the Spaniards, and not uncritical of the Venetians. But, though he may be a good witness for the campaign of Lepanto, his account of the expedition with which we are concerned is frequently inaccurate, and shows little trace of first-hand information, except in relation to Rome. He seems, indeed, to depend largely on Manolesso's *Historia nova* (1572), many of the errors in which he reproduces. The Bishop of Amelia, Antonmaria Graziani, compiled his *De Bello Cyprio* from other sources, but is often useful. The *De Bello Cyprio* (1602) of John Antony Guarneri, Canon of Bergamo, is also derivative and of much less importance. Jerome Catena wrote an apologetic *Vita del gloriosissimo Papa Pio Quinto* (Rome, 1587), which is useful as giving the first publication of some documents.

Of the Genoese authorities, Mark Antony Montefiore, Bishop of Nebbio, wrote *De pugna navali Cursularia* (Genoa, 1572), which is very rare and which I have been unable to consult. Manfroni describes it as an apology for Doria, and as the chief source of Foglieta. His quotations show it to be violent in its partisanship; whether it deals with the expedition of 1570, I do not know. The *Cyprium Bellum* of Peter

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Bizari (the preface is dated 1 Jan. 1573) is another work of Genoese origin and tendency, but not violently biased. Of Hubert Foglieta's *De Sacro Foedere in Selimum* (Genoa, 1587) I have used and referred to the text in Graevius's *Thesaurus*. These three authors are all in sympathy with Doria; the last is excessively literary. His narratives of the sieges of Nicosia and Famagusta have been translated by C. D. Cobham (1903). The account of the battle of Lepanto supposed to have been written by a Genoese merchant (*Rivista Marittima*, XXXI, 1898, pp. 253–72) is also an apology for Doria. The *Relacion* of Ferdinand de Herrera (1572), which might have been interesting as giving the Spanish point of view, is disappointingly sketchy.

The humanist Natale Conti (Comes), who was born at Milan in 1520 and died in 1582, wrote in Latin a history of his times, beginning in 1546. The first part, in ten books, coming down to 1557, appeared in 1572; they were increased to thirty in the edition of 1581, which deals at length with the War of Cyprus. His copy, with his corrections and three additional books bringing the history down to 1582, came into the hands of John Charles Saraceni, who published an Italian translation in 1589. Tiraboschi (*Storia della letteratura Ital.* VII, 1824, pp. 1239–42) condemns the work for faulty style and inaccuracy; nevertheless it (especially the Italian version) furnishes some useful details—such as the poisoning of the wells round Nicosia—which have to be noted.

The earliest English writer to deal with the War of Cyprus as a whole was Richard Knolles, in his *Generall Historie of the Turkes* (1603), which includes a sketch of the island's history to 1571.

Of modern writers, the first to be mentioned is Cayetano Rosell, *Historia del Combate Naval de Lepanto* (Madrid, Real Acad. de Historia, 1853)—an apology for Doria. Most important is Albert Guglielmotti's *Marcantonio Colonna alla Battaglia di Lepanto* (1862), notable for the use of documentary material, but somewhat strongly biased for Colonna and against the Spaniards. Sir W. Stirling-Maxwell deals with our subject in his *Don John of Austria* (1883; vol. I, ch. XIII, pp. 246–93), but without adding much to previous writers. Benedict Veroggio's *Giannandrea Doria alla battaglia di Lepanto* (1886) is an uncritical apology for Doria, the historical defects of which have been exposed by Manfroni. It is characteristic of the writer that he supposes the Venetian Captain-General's name to have been Zeno. Vice-Admiral Jurien de la Gravière's *La Guerre de Chypre et la Bataille de Lépante* (1888) is a breezy and extremely readable narrative, illuminated by the author's naval experience, but weak on the historical side. The most critical discussion of our subject is by Manfroni himself. Herre's *Europäische Politik im Cyprischen Kriege*, I, 1902 (no second volume has appeared) is invaluable from its point of view for its critical use of the sources. L. Serrano's *Liga de Lepanto* (I, 1918) is important for the use he has made of the letters of the nuncios in Spain and Venice, and other documents collected in his *Correspondencia diplomatica*.

G. A. Quarti's *La Guerra contro i Turchi in Cipro e a Lepanto* (Venice, 1935) I have not been able to see, but have made some use of the historical introduction to his *La Battaglia di Lepanto nei Canti Popolari dell' Epoca* (1930).

In estimating the value of these documents and of the Venetian and Genoese historians, we do well to remember the words of the Spanish historian Antony de Herrera (*Historia general del Mundo*, I, p. 420); speaking of the Venetian complaints against Doria, he adds: 'pero es cosa ordinaria de los que pierden, quexarse de todos'.

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CATHERINE CORNARO, QUEEN OF CYPRUS

by GENTILE BELLINI

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Ashmolean Museum

JOHN ANDREW DORIA
by DOMENICUS CUSTOS

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SEBASTIAN VENIER

School of Tintoretto


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JEROME ZANE
attributed to PARRASIO MICHELI

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Colonna Gallery *Phot. Anderson*

MARK ANTONY COLONNA

by SCIPIONE PULZONE

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PLATE XII




From Schrenck von Nozing, 'Augustissimorum Imperatorum Imagines', 1601

ASTORRE BAGLIONE

attributed to DOMENICUS CUSTOS

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British Museum

PLAN OF THE SIEGE OF FAMAGUSTA

by MARIUS CARTARO


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Venice, Palazzo Ducale *From Venturi, 'Storia dell' Arte Italiana'*

MARK ANTONY BRAGADIN
by TIZIANO ASPETTI

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
(*a*) ST JAMES, TRIKOMO



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(*b*) ST EVLALIOS, LAMBOUSA


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From Enlart, op. cit.

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
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
FAMAGUSTA, MARTINENGO BASTION

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Pitt-Rivers Museum *Phot. Mr T. D. Kendrick*

(*a*) THE ASCENSION



Asinou *Phot. Lt.-Col. Vivian Seymer*

(*b*) THE PANTOKRATOR


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Asinou *Phot. Mangoian*

THE VIRGIN BETWEEN SS. MICHAEL AND GABRIEL

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